Commentary

Human Development 1998;41:166–171

Cultural Practices, Oppression, and Morality

Elliot Turiel
University of California, Berkeley, Calif., USA

Key Words
Contested meanings W Cultural practices W Heterogeneity W Moral judgments W
Oppression

We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it
must be demanded by the oppressed.
Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The urge for freedom will eventually come.
This is what happened to the American Negro.
Martin Luther King, Jr., 1963, Letter from Birmingham, Alabama, City Jail

On the occasion that the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was in jail for
leading nonviolent demonstrations against racial discrimination he responded to a pub-
lic statement directed at him from 8 clergymen from the state of Alabama. The clergy-
men had referred to the demonstrations as ‘unwise and untimely’, urged that they be
stopped, and criticized outsiders (King was from the state of Georgia) for coming to
Birmingham to participate. In his well-known letter, King [1963] countered that, among
other reasons, he was in Birmingham ‘because injustice is here’. Moreover, he severely
criticized the ‘white church’ and its leadership, from his own perspective as a represen-
tative of the church, for ignoring ‘blatant injustices inflicted upon the Negro’ and ‘long
years of oppression’. He justified the demonstrations, which involved nonviolent activi-
ties pressing for change, on the grounds that ‘History is the long and tragic story of the
fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily’ [p. 6]. Hence he
linked privileges to groups of oppressors and the need to demand freedoms, rights, and
justice to groups of oppressed.
Even though King was often branded a communist, most virulently by the then
Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, it does not appear that he saw himself a Marxist or
neo-Marxist. For one thing, he was a highly religious person who made close connec-
tions between morality and religion. Yet, he was often critical from a moral standpoint
of religious authorities and practices, just as he was often critical of societal or cultural

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practices. Although King may not have been a Marxist, he took viewpoints on religious
and cultural practices that have affinities with the viewpoints articulated by Diana
Baumrind from her neo-Marxist perspective. Some key aspects of Baumrind’s perspec-
tive on cultural practices are, in my view, quite compatible with approaches to morality
different from her own – including those she criticizes (i.e., deontological perspectives
like those of Rawls, Kohlberg, and Habermas). I briefly consider this issue at the conclu-
sion of my commentary. I focus, however, mainly on issues of oppression and critical
perspectives on cultural arrangements and cultural practices.
Martin Luther King’s views on oppression raise questions as to what constitutes
being an oppressor or an oppressed. Questions arise especially with regard to social
arrangements whereby there are differences between groups of people in status, power,
and influence. Social arrangements manifested in cultural practices often entail rela-
tionships of dominance and subordination between males and females, between differ-
ent racial or ethnic groups, and between groupings based on social class or caste. Often-
times, relationships of dominance and subordination entail privileges and freedoms of
choice in a variety of activities accorded to one group but not to another. Implied in
King’s statement quoted at the start is the idea that oppression is ‘felt’ by both oppressor
and oppressed. It is necessary, however, to consider whether social arrangements of
dominance and subordination entail oppression if they are not experienced as such by
those being oppressed. In turn, we can ask, if one does not experience it as oppression,
but others see it as oppression, then is it oppression? If we are inclined to say it is not
oppression if it is not experienced as oppression, we can also inquire as to whether it is
oppression if it is to the detriment of the well-being of the oppressed. And what if while
it is to the detriment of the oppressed it is to the great benefit of the oppressor? What if
practices detrimental to oppressors are in contradiction of some valued moral precepts
of the culture? Moreover, is there a difference if others evaluating practices as oppres-
sive are from the same culture or a different culture?
These are questions that raise difficult and complex conceptual issues that are at
least implicit in Baumrind’s essay – especially in her discussions of false consciousness
and of practices like female circumcision. These questions are also related to the very
useful definition Baumrind provides of oppression. Baumrind thereby raises issues that
I believe would be extremely beneficial to address in theoretical formulations and
research on development, culture, and morality. For the most part, these types of ques-
tions have not been used to inform social scientific analyses. Considering these types of
issues, however, would bring to the fore a fundamental question amenable to empirical
analysis that is all too often left unaddressed. The question is a simple one: Do groups of
people in subordinate positions or positions of inequality in the social hierarchy (those
potentially oppressed or subject to oppressive cultural practices) actually experience
their situations as entailing oppression – or at least as involving injustice, unfairness,
denied rights, or undue suppression in legitimate arenas of personal choice?
In the context of Baumrind’s rich conceptual treatment of moral theories, cultural
constructs, and relations of oppressor and oppressed, I thus raise a ‘mundane’ method-
ological issue: that in much of the research on culture and social development, little is
done in the way of actually examining the perspectives of those in subordinate positions
with regard to their place vis-à-vis cultural practices, political ideologies, and in close
(e.g., with people in the family) and more distant (e.g., with people of higher social
classes or castes) relationships. My mundance issue, however, does have a bearing on
the ways culture, morality, and individual thought have been conceptualized. It is also

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1998;41:166–171
an issue that some anthropologists have begun to address [Abu-Lughod, 1993; Appadu-
rai, 1988; Spiro, 1993; Wikan, 1991]. Wikan [1991, p. 290], for instance, has posed it as
a challenge: ‘Acting on this suggestion might prove more painful to us anthropologists
than we are ready to acknowledge, for it entails modifying die-hard habits of work and
moving down the social ladder away from association with ‘‘culture’s’’ spokesmen and
evocateurs to more ordinary people of humdrum, inostensible concerns.’ The culture’s
spokesmen, the people ‘in power’ were ‘the vocal ones, the eloquent, the experts we
sought out while the poor, the infirm, women and youths were disregarded as unin-
formed about truth’. Wikan [1991] recognizes, further, that these methodological con-
siderations have theoretical ramifications: ‘And so it is that the concept of culture as a
seamless whole and of society as a bounded group manifesting inherently valued order
and normatively regulated response, effectively masked human misery and quenched
dissenting voices’ [p. 290].
And so it is, I believe, that psychologists have promulgated concepts of individuals
whose thoughts, values, motives, and actions reflect a coherent and consistent cultural
orientation such as that toward either individualism or collectivism; as put by Baum-
rind, a holistic dichotomization. This holistic dichotomization rests on the presumption
of ‘sharedness’ among members of a culture, a presumption that according to Triandis
[1996, p. 408], is itself shared by students of culture: ‘There is wide agreement that
culture consists of shared elements that provide the standards for perceiving, behaving,
evaluating, communicating, and acting among those who share a language, historic peri-
od, and a geographic location.’ This presumption, however, fails to account for con-
tested meanings and social conflicts, especially between people in dominant and subor-
dinate positions. The holistic dichotomization, I further believe, fails to detect (a) the
multiple judgments about personal autonomy and collectivistic obligations, (b) the ways
personal entitlements granted to those higher on the social ladder may be masked by the
imposition of collective obligations on those lower on the social ladder, (c) the ambiva-
lences, discontents, and efforts at ‘getting around’ or subverting cultural practices on the
part of those lower on the ladder, and (d) potential sources of change from within stem-
ming from the conflicts embedded in many cultural practices [Turiel, 1994, 1998, in
press].
That contested meanings, multiple judgments, and conflicts (along with shared
meanings and harmony) are part of cultures and of the thoughts and actions of individu-
als is not solely in the realm of speculation. In fact, it may well be granted by most with
regard to Western cultures. Indeed, Martin Luther King’s letter from the jail in Bir-
mingham attests to the conflicts and struggles over issues of justice, rights, and freedoms
around race and ethnicity in one nation. Feminist movements in Western cultures con-
stitute additional examples of conflicts, contested views, and lack of shared understand-
ings regarding independence and role obligations [see Okin, 1989 for further discus-
sion]. Many other social issues are controversial and vigorously debated; these include
abortion, homosexuality, divorce, euthanasia, and even freedom of speech in realms
such as pornography [MacKinnon, 1993]. There are also sufficient indications that in
non-Western traditional cultures there are conflicts and contested meanings. These
come from journalistic accounts provided by those who have carefully examined the
perspectives and judgments of those in subordinate positions (the oppressed), as well as
from recent anthropological and psychological research.
Two examples of journalistic accounts of women’s conflicts with their culture’s
practices were noted by Baumrind: Bumiller’s [1990] in India and Goodwin’s [1994] in

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1998;41:166–171
several Islamic nations. These accounts make clear that, as put by Baumrind, ‘members
of oppressed groups are strongly aware of their own suffering’. I would add that they are
aware of the injustice of suffering that is due to the privileges and control accorded to
others in cultural practices. In particular, Goodwin’s interviews with many women in
Islamic countries reveals that they are aware that many social practices (like the wearing
of the veil, arranged marriages, polygamy, and methods of divorce) serve to suppress
women and favor men. As also noted by Baumrind, there are indigenous movements
aimed at changing cultural practices.
Another revealing account can be found in the sociologist Fatima Mernissi’s recol-
lections of her life as a young girl in a harem in Fez, Morocco in the 1940s. In Dreams of
Trespass, Mernissi relates, in ways that evoke an image not unlike Martin Luther King’s
idea that ‘the urge for freedom will eventually come’, the women’s continual desire to
figuratively and literally go beyond the restrictions of the harem: ‘The women dreamed
of trespassing all the time. The world beyong the gate was their obsession’ [Mernissi,
1994, pp. 1–2]. The women’s complaints and efforts at change were with regard to many
of their rules and traditions (e.g., wearing of the veil, polygamy, restrictions on educa-
tion). The women also engaged in hidden activities to subvert rules imposed on them by
men and to engage in desired everyday pleasures (Mernissi recounts how women con-
spired to engage in activities like listening to a radio kept by the men under lock and key,
refusing to admit to the transgression when caught, and attempting to involve children
in their conspiracies).
Research findings are consistent with the picture emerging from the journalistic
accounts and Mernissi’s childhood recollections [Abu-Lughod, 1993; Turiel and Wain-
ryb, in press; Wainryb and Turiel, 1994; Wikan, 1991]. Abu-Lughod’s ethnographic
studies of Bedouin women in Egypt revealed that their social relationships often involve
disagreements and conflicts, and efforts to alter existing practices. Abu-Lughod has doc-
umented that struggles occur between wives and husbands, as well as daughters and
parents over issues like arranged marriages and polygamy. The women voiced com-
plaints about restrictions on their opportunities for education, constraints on leisure
activities, and household work (as put by a young woman, ‘Even if the woman is old, the
man won’t lift a finger to help, not even to pick up a crying baby’ [Abu-Lughod, 1993,
p. 239]). More generally, women thought that they were treated unfairly by men, who
are mainly interested in their own needs (a theme common to research findings and
journalistic accounts).
A significant feature of the oppositions, conflicts, and subversive activities evident
in the research and in the other accounts is that they come from people who are partici-
pants in the culture and, most likely, highly identified with it. The types of cultural
schisms that might have characterized the perspective of Black people in Martin Luther
King’s time, and in other political movements of rebellion or revolution, do not neces-
sarily characterize the position of people who nevertheless are in conflict with those in
positions of dominance or in opposition to certain practices of the culture. Rather, there
is a combination of acceptance and cultural critique which entails moral judgments and
understandings of personal entitlements and individual autonomy. For these reasons,
the holistic dichotomization of individualism and collectivism fails to capture multiple
judgments and concerns, and especially multiple sides of social hierarchies.
Findings from research on decision making in traditional, patriarchal cultures
illustrate ways social hierarchy has both an individualistic and collectivistic side [Neff,
1997; Wainryb and Turiel, 1994]. It has been found, in keeping with features attributed

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1998;41:166–171
to collectivism, that males and females in Arab Druze communities (in villages in Israel)
judge that certain decisions within families should be determined by role obligations
and duties of the social group, rather than the preferences of individuals. This type of
reasoning was applied mainly to situations in which females desired to act in ways unde-
sired by males (i.e., their husbands or fathers). By contrast, the same people readily
judged that other decisions should be determined by personal entitlements, self-deter-
mination, and individual preferences of choice. This type of reasoning was applied
mainly to males for situations in which they desired to act in ways undesired by females
[similar results were obtained in India by Neff, 1997].
The judgments of people in these cultures, therefore, are not adequately character-
ized as representing one or the other side of the dichotomy. Whatever heuristic value
there may be in the holistic dichotomization of cultures is offset considerably because it
can mask multiple orientations. In the studies among the Druze [Wainryb and Turiel,
1994], it was found that females, as well as males, accorded personal entitlements and
autonomy to males (sometimes judging that males needed to be self-reliant and granted
freedoms). Yet, the combination of judgments about independence (for those in domi-
nant positions) and interdependence does not entirely portray the multiple judgments
of people in that culture. When posed with the question of fairness, most females evalu-
ated those cultural practices as unfair. Moreover, they expressed pragmatic concerns
through a recognition that women would risk a great deal to their well being if they did
not acquiesce to the desires of their husbands.
As I read the evidence, people in most cultures make moral judgments that some-
times affirm cultural norms and practices and sometimes are in contradiction with and
opposition to cultural norms and practices. Moral judgments, therefore, can be distin-
guished from what exists in particular social arrangements. When people are in opposi-
tion to cultural norms, they sometimes invoke concepts of welfare, justice, and rights.
People also make judgments about areas of personal jurisdiction, which when they are
unfairly or inequitably suppressed or oppressed can become matters of moral rights.
This characterization, I believe, is not inconsistent with Baumrind’s analyses. Baum-
rind brings to the fore moral issues bearing on domination, respect and rights for mar-
ginalized groups in society, oppressive and authoritarian power relationships, exploita-
tion, the interests of the oppressed, their suffering, and much more. That she brings
these issues to our attention in the context of analyses of culture, development, and
morality is itself a very important contribution. It is also of much importance that she
frames these issues in ways that bring to light that which can be obscured by a reliance
on existing cultural practices, without awareness of different standpoints.
Baumrind made it a point to stress that her essay is a work in progress, to be revised
in response to criticism and self-criticism. The writings of those taking ‘deontological’
approaches to morality should also be seen as works in progress. I, along with Susan
Okin [1989], find the deontological approaches more useful than does Baumrind for
addressing the issues raised by Baumrind. I do not interpret those approaches (such as
those of Rawls, Habermas, or Kohlberg) as giving primacy to personal autonomy or civil
rights at the expense of social responsibility and community welfare. As theories of
morality, their concerns are with individuals, communities of persons, different groups
of persons in communities, and a balance of autonomy and interdependence. As in
Baumrind’s approach (and Martin Luther King’s), these approaches leave room for
examination of cultural arrangements that may serve to exploit or oppress groups within
a society. For these reasons, Okin [1989], in her volume on Justice, Gender, and the

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1998;41:166–171
Family, finds Rawls’ theory particularly useful in her political and philosophical analy-
ses of inequalities and oppression in gender relations. Treating it as a work in progress,
Okin extends Rawls’ ideas into realms he did not take them. The idea of the original
position – in conjunction with Rawls’ principles of justice – provides a basis for ques-
tioning traditions, customs, and institutions. For Okin, this is valuable for analyses of
gender relationships of inequality, exploitation, or oppression that are anchored in cul-
tural practices. In turn, Baumrind’s analyses are also valuable for those concerned with
inequality, exploitation, and oppression.

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