Division Operations, Fmi 3-91 Draft - Feb 06

*FMI 3-91
Field ManualInterim No. 3-91 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, (DraftFebruary 2006)
Division Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE ............................................................ iError! Bookmark not defined. INTRODUCTION ................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Chapter 1 DIVISION FUNDAMENTALS................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Fundamental Design Changes........................................................................ 1-1 Enabling concepts............................................................................................ 1-3 Role of the Division .......................................................................................... 1-6 Organization of the Division............................................................................ 1-7 Operational Framework ................................................................................. 1-18 Command and support Relationships ......................................................... 1-21 Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL AT DIVISION...................................................... 2-1 The Commander ............................................................................................... 2-1 Command Posts ............................................................................................... 2-1 Special Troops Battalion ............................................................................... 2-28 Staff Responsibilities ..................................................................................... 2-29 PART TWO HOW THE DIVISION FIGHTS Chapter 3 SCENARIO AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS .............................................. 3-1 Section IScenario .......................................................................................... 3-1 Road to War ................................................................................................ 3-1 Enemy Situation ......................................................................................... 3-2 Friendly Situation....................................................................................... 3-4 JTF Task Organization, Mission, Commander's Intent, Concept of the Operation.............................................................................................. 3-4 C/JFLC Task Organization, Mission, Commander's Intent.................... 3-5 Environmental Considerations................................................................. 3-6 Section IDivision Concept of Operations .................................................... 3-9
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DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release as a draft document; distribution unlimited. *This publication, when approved, will supersede FM 71-100.
FMI 3-91
Mission.......................................................................................................3-9 Commander's Intent .................................................................................3-9 Concept of Operations .............................................................................3-9 Chapter 4 DEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS....................................................................4-1 Mission ........................................................................................................4-3 Commander's Intent...................................................................................4-3 Commander's Planning Guidance ............................................................4-3 1st Division Concept of Operations for Deployment..............................4-4 Division Command and Control................................................................4-6 Special Troops Battalion .........................................................................4-11 2nd HBCT, 5th HBCT, 10th HBCT and 87th IBCT..................................4-11 11th Combat Aviation Brigade ................................................................4-11 27th Sustainment and 44th Medical Brigades.......................................4-11 34th Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) ...................4-11 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade .....................................................4-12 75th Fires Brigade ....................................................................................4-13 418th Civil Affairs Battalion.....................................................................4-14 Chapter 5 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ........................................................................5-1 Mission ........................................................................................................5-3 Commander's Intent...................................................................................5-4 Concept of Operations...............................................................................5-4 Command and Control...............................................................................5-5 Special Troops Battalion ...........................................................................5-6 Chapter 6 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ........................................................................6-1 Scenario Continued....................................................................................6-1 Mission ........................................................................................................6-4 Commander's Intent...................................................................................6-4 Concept of Operations...............................................................................6-4 Command and Control of Offense............................................................6-8 Special Troops Battalion .........................................................................6-10 BCTs in the Offense .................................................................................6-10 Supporting Brigades in the Offense.......................................................6-11 Chapter 7 STABILITY OPERATIONS ..........................................................................7-1 Mission ........................................................................................................7-1 Commander's Intent...................................................................................7-3 Commander's Planning Guidance ............................................................7-3 1st Division Concept for Stability Operations .........................................7-5 Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C AIRBORNE OPERATIONS ...................................Error! Bookmark not defined. AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS .......................................................................... B-1 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN THE DIVISION .......................................... C-1
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Contents
Appendix D
USAF PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO DIVISION OPERATIONS ...................................................................................D-1
Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H Appendix I
NETWORK OPERATIONS ................................................................................ E-1 ARMY AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL AT DIVISION ...................... F-1 INTEGRATION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES INTO THE DIVISION ...........G-1 BRIGADE TASK ORGANIZATION ...................................................................H-1 DIVISION STAFF TRAINING PLANS ................................................................ I-1 GLOSSARY ..........................................Glossary-Error! Bookmark not defined.
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(BLANK PAGE)
PREFACE Doctrine provides a military organization with unit of effort and a common philosophy, language, and purpose. Therefore, this manual discusses division operations, which is designed to exercise command and control of up to six maneuver brigades and supporting brigades and battalions. Division units will be rapidly deployable, responsive, agile, and tailored for land force combat power. PURPOSE
FMI 3-91 is intended to facilitate the operations and training requirements of Army divisions as they complete the reorganization process, prepare for operational deployment, and conduct combat operations. Its interim format will evolve into an official field manual for division operations after lessons learned from reorganization, training, and operational experiences are incorporated into future Army doctrine.
SCOPE
FMI 3-91 has seven chapters and nine appendices organized in two parts. Part I contains chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 1 discusses division fundamentals and what has changed from the previous division design. Chapter 2 explains the command and control system that the division relies on to synchronize the warfighting functions, which replaced the battlefield operating systems, and details the organization and functions of the staff elements and cells in the newly designed division command posts. Part II of this FMI consists of five chapters which discuss how the division will deploy and conduct full spectrum operations during a major combat operation using a hypothetical vignette to explain. Chapter 3 sets the scenario background for the examples and discussion in part II and explains the division concept of operations. Chapter 4 walks the reader through an example division deployment scenario. Chapter 5 describes how the division may conduct defensive operations within the scenario described in chapter 3. Chapter 6 walks the reader through division offensive operations and chapter 7 describes the division conducting stability operations.
APPLICABILITY
This publication applies to Army forces from Army Service Component Commands to BCTs. It is most applicable to division commanders and their staff officers.
DESCRIPTION OF FIELD MANUALS-INTERIM

An FMI is a Department of the Army publication that provides expedited delivery of urgently needed doctrine the proponent has approved for use without placing it through the standard development process. Unless an FMI is rescinded,
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information it disseminates is incorporated into a new or revised FM. FMIs expire after two years, unless superseded or rescinded.
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and the text. The glossary lists most terms used in FMI 3-91 that have joint or Army definitions. Terms for which FMI 3-91 is the proponent manual (the authority) are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary and printed in boldface in the text. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent manual follows the definition. The glossary contains referents of acronyms and definitions of terms not defined in JP 1-02 and FM 1-02. It does not list acronyms and abbreviations that are included for clarity only and appear one time, nor those that appear only in a figure and are listed in the legend for that figure. Some common abbreviations and acronymsfor example, DOD and abbreviations for military publications are not spelled out (refer to the glossary). Since ARFOR is a defined term as well as an acronym, it is not spelled out. Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Army Doctrine Proponency Division, US Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FMI 3-91), 201 Reynolds Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to web-cadd@leavenworth.army.mil; or submitted on an electronic DA Form 2028.
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Introduction
PURPOSE
This FMI is being published to meet the doctrinal requirements of the division previously called the two-star UEx. This FMI applies to the transformational force across the range of military operations: peacetime military engagement (PME), small-scale contingencies (SSC), and major combat operations (MCO). The doctrine contained in this FMI is approved for immediate use in training and operations. Operational concepts described in this manual are based on decisions by the Army Chief of Staff to reorganize the Army to a brigade-based force, and to quickly implement good enough designs that will be refined over time. The material provided in this FMI is considered good enough to satisfy the requirements of the Armys transforming organizations. The intended audience for this publication is leaders and staff sections at the division headquarters level within transforming units. This manual provides guidance for division leaders and staffs for training and employment of the BCTs and brigades to conduct full spectrum operations. This publication may also be used by other Army organizations to assist in their planning for support to divisions. This FMI applies to the active component (AC), reserve component (RC), and Army civilians. It builds on the collective knowledge and experience gained through recent operations, numerous exercises, and the deliberate process of informed reasoning. It is rooted in time-tested principles and fundamentals, while accommodating new technologies and diverse threats to national security. This FMI describes how the division, formerly known as the two-star UEx, commands and controls the employment of up to six brigade combat teams and five supporting brigades conducting full spectrum operations. The organization and capabilities of the division headquarters and subordinate organizations will be provided in the ensuing chapters. FMI 3-92 will be published in mid-year 2006 and will address the Corps, formally known as the three-star UEx. FMI 3-92 will contain many of the same concepts discussed in FMI 3-91 but will focus on Corps level operations controlling one or more divisions. This FMI is published in conjunction with FMI 5-0.1 which establishes and modifies many doctrinal terms. FMI 5-0.1 modifies Army doctrine for conducting operations. The concepts in FMI 5-0.1 should be understood and applied by readers of this FMI. The reader should understand concepts detailed in FM 3-0, Operations, FM 3-90, Tactics and FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces and FMI 5-0.1, The Operations Process. Where applicable, the reader is referred to those manuals.
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This FMI does not address the emerging concept of Homeland Security or Civil Support Operations. This FMI does introduce the G-5 as the primary staff officer responsible for plans. This is a change from the previous use of the G-5 as the Civil Military Operations officer. This manual also introduces two new special purpose attacks; Strike and Mobile Strike. These will primarily be conducted by the fires brigade and the combat aviation brigade and are explained in detail in the chapters.
FM 7-15 BOS
ART 1.0-Intelligence BOS
CJCSM 3500.04B UJTL TACTICAL TASK AREA

Deploy/Conduct Maneuver
ART 2.0-Maneuver ART 5.1-Mobility ART 5.2-Countermobility
ART 2.0-Maneuver BOS ART 3.0-Fire Support BOS ART 4.0-Air Defense BOS ART 5.0-M/CM/S BOS ART 6.0-CSS BOS
Develop Intelligence
ART 1.0-Intelligence
Employ Firepower
ART 3.0-Fire Support
PerformCSS & Sustainment

ART 6.0-Cbt Service Support
Exercise C2
ART 7.0-Command and Control
Protect the Force

ART 4.0-Air Defense
This FMI does not ART 5.3-Survivability address tasks in terms of ART 7.0-C2 BOS the seven battlefield operation systems (BOS) systems. Because the Figure I-1. BOS UJTL Functional Area Comparison division staff is now organized by functions, this manual discusses staff operations by warfighting functions. The warfighting functions are derived from the UJTL tactical task areas. Figure I-1 provides a comparison of the BOS to the tactical task areas used to organize the staff by function. The seven BOS were replaced by the warfighting functions in FMI 50.1. FM 7-15, the Army Universal Task List, will continue to provide commanders at all levels structured methods of considering tasks that their unit might perform in any action. However, the new division staff is now organized by function, consequently this FMI discusses staff operations by functions. Figure I1 illustrates the link between the old FM 7-15 (BOS) and the tactical task areas from the UJTL used to organize the staff by warfighting function. This FMI will expire after 2 years from its approved publication date. Throughout its life, proponents should collect feedback to refine the emerging doctrine that will be incorporated into new or revised field manuals.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
Current published doctrine remains in effect, unless stated in this FMI that it has changed. The overarching concepts in FM 3-0, FM 5-0, and FM 6-0 remain valid, for the most part. What has changed as a result of modular transformation is explained in this FMI and FMI 5-0.1.
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Introduction
NEW OR MODIFIED TERMS

This FMI, in conjunction with FMI 5-0.1, adds the following terms to Army doctrine: Changes the G-5/S-5 to Plans from Civil-Military Officer (CMO). Establishes the G-9/S-9 as the CMO. Establishes the G-8 as the Financial Management Officer. Establishes the term Unassigned Area (UA) that portion of the area of operations not assigned to subordinate units. Explains the phases of the operational ready cycle as part of Army Force Generation as they pertain to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT).
ORGANIZATION CHANGES
This FMI Eliminates Division rear CP and creates a second tactical CP. Assistant division commanders and replaces them with deputy commanding generals whose duties and responsibilities are set by the commander. Deep Operations Cell at the main CP. Division artillery and division support command. Establishes two identical tactical CPs and a mobile command group. Addresses Changes to the organization of division command posts and staff sections. Changes to division staff as a result of the elimination of division troops (such as changes to military intelligence, signal, and air defense battalion staffs). Elimination of division headquarters company and establishment of division special troops battalion (STB).
REASONS FOR CHANGE

Given that the Army is retaining the capability to generate three echelons of command above brigade, one might ask why the Army is revising its existing division and brigade structure so radically. There are five major reasons. Firstsince 1999, the US military has undergone a sweeping evolution driven by operational experience and new capabilities. In the past, the conduct of operations was divided into loosely linked major land, sea, and air operations; often conducted with different objectives. Today, joint operations form a coherent joint fabric and are increasingly integrated at the tactical level. While this concept addresses the conduct of major land operations, the reader must be cognizant of the degree of interdependence that has emerged among the joint partners. Secondthe operational environment requires Army forces that are much more responsive and tailorable to the needs of the combatant commanders. No single large formation is able to meet the requirements of full spectrum operations. To meet the needs of the Regional Combatant Commander (RCC) for land forces, the Army is constantly rearranging its current force divisions and task organizing them into independent task forces, something for which they werent designed. This is coupled with the need to employ land forces at the outset of the campaign, in completely complementary fashion with other joint capabilities, translated into the requirement for much more deployable Army forces.
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Thirdthe nature of modern land operations has changed in terms of geography and time. In general, operations have become more distributed in space and more simultaneous in time. At tactical and operational levels, subordinate units will operate in noncontiguous areas of operations and conduct nonlinear operations as a matter of routine. This contrasts sharply with the interlocked and hierarchical arrangement of land areas of operations prevalent in the past. This change is the result of smaller and more agile forces, quantum improvements in command and control capabilities, and joint integration. FourthArmy forces continue to increase their lethality, meaning that greater effects can be generated with much smaller forces. This continues the historical impetus of the last 100 years. However, the integration of advanced information technologies multiplies the effectiveness of the individual weapons systems by many times. The antithesis of this development is the increasing dependence on unconventional means by our enemies. They are simply unable to match the conventional military capabilities of the United States, and the disparity is growing at an increasing rate. Thus, the likelihood of facing large, conventional land forces decreases while the need for Army forces for full-spectrum operations increases (when examined as a percentage of the total force engaged in campaigns). Fifththe newly designed brigade combat team incorporates the previous factors. It is a combined arms formation capable of conducting independent full-spectrum operations. The future force is designed around the maneuver brigade. The tactical maxims of the brigade are to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. As these advanced units reach operational status, the Army shifts from a division-based stance to a brigade-based posture. The principal purpose of the Army shifts from generating and employing divisions in decisive land operations to providing the joint commander the right mix of different brigades and C2 as part of a coherent joint operation. The shift makes it easier for the Army to tailor forces to the combatant commanders requirements at the strategic level, and employ flexible, smaller formations distributed across an expanded area of operations.
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Chapter 1
Division Fundamentals
This chapter discusses the division design, enabling concepts, role and organization of the division, and division operational framework. Together, these topics will show how the division is structured to employ assigned forces that establish specific military conditions within a specified area of operations (AO). The division conducts full-spectrum tactical and operational-level operations and may serve as a Joint Task Force (JTF) or Joint Force Land Component (JFLC) in a smaller-scale contingency. When the division serves as a JTF or JFLC, it requires staff augmentation.
FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN CHANGES

1-1. The Army is transforming from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force with brigades organized by function. The brigade building blocks of the division will make it a modular force that is more easily tailorable to the needs of the assigned mission. While this new organization is designed to be more flexible and deployable it is also more reliant on joint interdependence. Reductions in the number of artillery units mean the division will increasingly rely on joint fires. The new design calls for increased joint logistics support especially for intertheater and intratheater movements. Additionally the division will rely on joint assets for protection, such as air and missile defense.
DIVISION REDESIGN
1-2. The division commander shapes the operation for subordinate brigades, resources them for their assigned missions, coordinates, synchronizes and sequences their operations. The division focuses on the conduct of major operations and leaves the details of executing battles and engagements to its assigned brigade combat teams (BCTs) and supporting brigades. The division uses mission command and mission orders (see FM 6-0 and FMI 5-0.1) as the preferred method of command and control (C2). In the previous division design, the division commander sometimes fought battalions such as the attack helicopter battalion. In this new design, the brigades are the primary headquarters responsible for fighting the engagements and the best example of this is the combat aviation brigade is responsible for planning, preparing, executing and assessing attack helicopter operations. During the Cold War, division commanders visualized operations in terms of battalions and issued orders to brigades that were assigned to command those battalions. This was often referred to as thinking two levels down. The new perspective of division operations is different, requiring the commander to envision what were formerly corps-scale operations in terms of their scope. The commander now visualizes operations in terms of brigades. This works well only if the division commander maintains perspective on the overall division situation, and avoids being drawn into the conduct of subordinate unit engagements. It also requires a greater degree of collaboration and initiative among the divisions BCTs and supporting brigades. In a division with a mission command climate, BCT and supporting brigade commanders anticipate each others support without constant reference to the division commander. BCTs and supporting brigades accomplish missions based on the division commanders intent.
KEY DIFFERENCES
1-3. A key design change for the division staff is elimination of the divisions reliance on major staff augmentation from subordinate units. For example, previously under the Reorganized Objective Army
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Division (ROAD) and Army of Excellence (AOE) designs, when the division conducted training or deployed, the division artillery (DIVARTY) would send officers to the division headquarters to create the fire support element. Other subordinate units would also send augmentees to fill or form division staff sections. The current modular division staff no longer requires augmentees from subordinate units to be able to conduct operations. (There are a few exceptions to this statement, for example when the division has OPCON a Civil Affairs battalion that battalion will send staff augmentation to the division headquarters and the G-4 movement control element will often be augmented by a movement control team.) The division headquarters is now a much more self-sufficient organization capable of conducting operations and controlling up to six BCTs and a mix of supporting brigades. 1-4. The signal network supporting division operations is expanding as the size of the signal unit supporting the division headquarters is reduced from a battalion to a company. The signal network expansion has an eventual goal of being free of line of sight restrictions. However, over the life of this FMI, divisions will be dependant on a mix of line of sight and non-line of sight systems to operate the network. But in general terms, the network provides a high fidelity common operational picture (COP) today. (See FM 1-02 for definition of COP) The latency of information contained in the COP will continue to improve over time as more non-line of sight communications equipment is fielded. 1-5. The number and role of the command posts available to control operations is different. The new division has a main CP, two tactical CPs and a mobile command group. These command and control nodes are discussed in detail in Chapter Two but suffice it to say the commander has greater flexibility to control operations and be on the battlefield where he thinks he needs to be. 1-6. The division now has two deputy commanding generals (DCG) instead of two assistant division commanders (ADC). Previously, the ADCs had relatively set functional areas of concentration. One concentrated on maneuver issues and the other on support. The modular division commander may designate DCGs responsible for specific functions. The senior officer normally present at the TAC CPs is one of the DCGs. 1-7. Collection management is also different in this new design. The division does not directly control reconnaissance and surveillance assets. All assets are assigned to the brigades and the division determines the information to be collected and sets priorities for the brigades to execute. The intelligence synchronization plan is developed by the staff led by the G-2. The ISR plan is developed by the staff led by the G-3 utilizing the intelligence synchronization plan, taskings from higher headquarters, requests for information from subordinates and the commanders guidance to answer the division commanders CCIR and information requirements. The G-3 provides the BCTs and other brigades with mission type orders to fulfill information requirements associated with the ISR plan. 1-8. Another key difference is the divisions perspective of the deep fight in terms of time, space and troops available. This division operates more like the traditional corps, taking a longer-term view of operations in an expanded AO. The division concentrates on arranging and orchestrating major operations and allows the BCTs to execute battles and engagements. The division also plans for and employs more joint assets such as joint fires, ISR and logistics than before. 1-9. Finally, the commanders role is different in this division. The commanders intent, communication of his vision of the end state and guidance are more important when using mission command type orders. The division commanders relationship to his subordinates can be compared with that of a JTF commander and how he issues guidance to his component commanders. The division commander should maintain a perspective of the overall division situation, assess how the current situation relates to future division operations and avoid being drawn into the conduct of brigade current engagements. These differences are discussed in greater detail through out this FMI. 1-10. The divisions BCTs and supporting brigades are different and have an expanded capability to execute different operations simultaneously with organic troops. These brigades conduct full spectrum operationsconsisting of a mixture of offensive, defensive, stability operations or civil support. Their fullspectrum operations may be nonlinear in nature and take place in non-contiguous AOs when required by the situation. This next section discusses how these brigades have been changed.
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BRIGADE REORGANIZATION
1-11. One of the greatest differences between the current division and the redesigned division is in the organization of the maneuver brigades into BCTs. These BCTs are comprised of battalion-sized and company-sized subunits. The BCTs are combined arms formations that include maneuver and sustainment units and various arms of service. They resemble the former ad-hoc maneuver brigade formations, however, each BCT has organic supporting arms and branches. BCTs are designed to be fully selfcontained so that they can easily integrate into any division or other C2 headquarters. (Paragraphs 1-41 through 1-43 discuss the role and organizational structure of BCTs.) 1-12. The divisions supporting brigades are organized as multifunctional units intended to support the BCTs and carry out specific tasks in support of the division. Supporting brigades are organized as fires brigades, combat aviation brigades (CAB), combat support brigades (maneuver enhancement) CSB(ME), sustainment brigades, and battlefield surveillance brigades (BFSBs). Single branch brigades available from the Army force pool include engineer, civil affairs, intelligence, air defense, and military police (MP). FORSCOM or the divisions higher headquarterscorps or ASCCtailor the division with combinations of BCTs and supporting brigades based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). These supporting brigades are key to division operations because any brigade can be tasked with the decisive operation, depending on the mission. These other supporting brigades add attack aviation and fires capabilities which complement the BCTs in a combined arms way and make the division a more effective tactical fighting unit. (Paragraphs 144 through 1-83 discuss the roles and organizational structure of the supporting brigades.)
ENABLING CONCEPTS
1-13. The enabling concepts for division operations are responsiveness via the modular force and force tailoring, execution-focused operations, distributed operations, and operational readiness cycle. Most of these concepts are not new ideas. What is new, however, is the way in which the modular division is designed to capitalize on them.
RESPONSIVENESS
1-14. Responsiveness is achieved by meeting the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) requirement for the right mix of forces at the right time. The division achieves responsiveness through the modular force, force tailoring, and deployability.
The Modular Force

1-15. The modular force consists of units packaged into flexible configurations. Modular units are rapidly deployable, responsive, agile, and can be tailored into discrete packages of land force combat power. In marked contrast to the ROAD and AOE division, the modular division is not a fixed formation. A modular division has no organic units assigned to it. It is a headquarters designed to exercise C2 for up to six BCTs and any necessary number of supporting brigades. 1-16. The Army may assign training and readiness oversight of several BCTs and a CAB to each active division. These units will most likely be stationed at the same installation as the division headquarters or a nearby installation. This training and readiness oversight responsibility does not dictate the wartime or deployed configuration of the modular division. The modular division may receive attached or operational control (OPCON) of its BCTs and supporting brigades before, during, or after deployment. The deployment timeline will typically dictate the integration and train-up requirements for the modular division. The modular division is designed to rapidly attach and detach brigades throughout its conduct of full-spectrum operations.
Force Tailoring
1-17. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix and sequence of units for a mission (FM 3-0). FORSCOM and the employing ASCC tailor the modular division with the right mix of brigades or
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battalions necessary to accomplish its assigned missions. This tailoring process results in a division team consisting of units that may not be located on the same installations. This places a premium on the use of doctrine, Army standardized standing operating procedures (SOPs) and early and continuous teamwork once the Army staff determines the deployment or alert cycle for the force. (See FM 3-90.100-SOP for the standardized SOP.) Such teamwork, emphasized by training (live, virtual, and constructive), builds the cohesion in the new team that is essential for mission success. 1-18. Tailoring is a process that continues throughout all phases of the operation. Before deployment, FORSCOM and the employing ASCC tailor the division and recommend a deployment sequence to accomplish the joint force commanders mission. After deployment, the division may continue to be tailored by the ASCC based on changing missions. For example, if the mission changes from primarily offense to primarily stability operations, the division may be tailored with additional civil affairs, engineer, and MP units. One key component of force tailoring is force refinement (see Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-1. Force Tailoring and Refinement
Force Refinement
1-19. The division and its tailored forces are refined to account for the multiple constraints of the projected operation. This refinement is a repetitive process. Force refinement involves METT-TC adjustments, force sequencing, staff tailoring, and task organizing. Commanders analyze the deploying force using the factors of METT-TC to identify any changes necessary for the planned operation. Commanders also refine the force based on other factors, such as those in Figure 1-1. Force Sequencing. The ASCC next compares the situation in the JOA to the available lift, determining the appropriate deployment sequence. The ASCC seeks a balance that provides
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protection, efficient deployment, and a range of options for responding to possible conditions. Lift availability is always constrained, so difficult trade-off decisions are routine. Staff Tailoring. The modular division staff is capable of accepting staff augmentees to provide an expanded capability. If the division is expected to serve as a JFLC or JTF in a smaller-scale contingency, then it must be augmented with other service military officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Task Organizing. Force tailoring is not synonymous with task organizing. While tailoring matches force capabilities needed to accomplish a mission, task organizing temporarily creates an organization from assigned, attached, or OPCON assets with specific command relationships to accomplish the task at hand. The division continuously task organizes brigades throughout the phases of an operation. Task organization is done to accomplish a specific tactical mission. When task organizing, the division uses standard Army command and support relationships (see paragraphs 1-107 through 1-128 and Figure 1-10).
Deployability
1-20. Deployability is directly related to the modular force and force tailoring. The division achieves increased deployability and therefore strategic responsiveness, because it is composed of only those essential C2 headquarters and subordinate elements that are needed by the GCC. The flow of forces into the JOA will typically be determined by the time-phased forces deployment data requirements specified by the GCC and the scheduling of available strategic lift assets.
EXECUTION-FOCUSED OPERATIONS
1-21. Execution-focused operations stress the role of the commander and the staff in decision making after the order has been issued and the operation has begun. The conduct of execution-focused operations balances the often competing demands of maintaining tempo and synchronizing combat power. 1-22. The Armys operational concept requires the division to maintain a tempo that the enemy cannot match by acting or reacting faster than the enemy can adapt, or adapting to a changing situation before the situation deteriorates further. To accomplish this type of agility, the commander uses mission command (see FM 6-0 and FMI 5-0.1) to focus his subordinate commanders initiative and staff supervision to maintain synchronization. While the effect of subordinate commanders exercising initiative within the commanders intent has a significant impact on maintaining the units tempo, division C2 nodes must stay abreast of the current situation and ensure minimum synchronization of actions across the division. Movement and Maneuver Intelligence Fire Support Sustainment Command and Control Protection Figure 1-2. The Warfighting Functions
1-23. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organization, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (see figure 1-2) The warfighting functions, tied together by leadership, replace the battlefield operating systems and elements of combat power. (See appendix A, FMI 5-0.1 for a detailed explanation of the warfighting functions). The division command posts (CP) continuously strive to synchronize the warfighting functions to achieve combat power integration in response to the changing situation on the battlefield. See chapter 4, FMI 5-0.1 for an explanation of how units execute operations using the warfighting functions as an organizational guide.
DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS
1-24. Distributed operations refer to how subordinate brigade elements typically conduct operations in noncontiguous AOs (see FM 3-0). Distributed operations also refer to how the division CPs, their subordinate cells, the BCTs, and other brigades interact with one another from dispersed locations. The
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range of line-of-sight communications systems will not limit locations for CPs and subordinate commands. Distributed operations are enhanced by dedicated access to the global information grid through satellite communication systems.
OPERATIONAL READINESS CYCLE

1-25. All BCTs will have an operational readiness cycle as part of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. The operational readiness cycle has three phases that indicate the units availability to deploy. These phases will vary in length of time based on the number of personnel changes and amount of equipment upgrades. BCTs will have an operational readiness cycle of 36 months. The three phases are: Reset/Train. Ready. Available. 1-26. Reset/Train Phase. Units redeploy from operations, recover, receive, and stabilize personnel, receive new equipment, and conduct individual and collective training. This phase lasts approximately six to nine months. The unit moves into the ready phase when the appropriate commander assesses the unit as trained, equipped, and manned to meet force-level capabilities (as designated by the respective major command (MACOM) commander). 1-27. Ready Phase. Units can conduct mission preparation and collective training with operational headquarters, are eligible for sourcing, may be mobilized, and can be trained, equipped, resourced, and committed to meet operational requirements. This phase last approximately 15 to 18 months. After the unit is trained, equipped, and manned to execute mission-operational requirements (as designated by the respective MACOM commander), the unit may move into the available phase. 1-28. Available Phase. Units are in their planned mission-time windows and are trained, equipped, and resourced to meet operational requirements. This phase is 12 months long. Units may be scheduled to deploy to a contingency and replace a unit already deployed or they may remain in an available status without deploying until the end of the operational-readiness cycle. If a unit remains until the end of the cycle, personnel depart, new personnel and equipment are assigned, and the operational-readiness cycle begins again in the reset phase. 1-29. Division headquarters will not have a set operational readiness cycle but will move through reset/train as soon as possible and train to staff proficiency at their authorized manning level as quickly as possible. The goal is for division headquarters to be in the available phase as much of the time as possible.
ROLE OF THE DIVISION

1-30. The role of the division is to employ land forces as part of a joint, interagency, and multinational force during full-spectrum operations. The division executes offensive, defensive, and either stability or civil support operations (depending on whether or not it is operating in the United States or in a foreign country) in an assigned AO to establish specific conditions. It combines tactical tasks and missions through its battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to accomplish its assigned mission. The division is the primary tactical warfighting headquarters for C2 of land force BCTs. The division design is intended to further enhance the capabilities of the GCC by providing a strategically relevant land force headquarters capable of conducting full-spectrum operations. 1-31. A JTF, JFLC, or intermediate tactical headquarters controls divisions. The division may serve as a JTF or JFLC, with staff augmentation, in a smaller-scale contingency or as an ARFOR headquarters (primarily for operational tasks) in smaller-scale contingencies without additional Army augmentation. When serving as the ARFOR, JFLC, or JTF, the division is primarily concerned with operational tasks and relies on the ASCC to provide most of the administrative control (ADCON) and Army support to forces deployed in the joint operations area (JOA). Joint manning documents are being developed to determine other Service officer and NCO augmentation the division staff requires to perform duties as a JTF or JFLC
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headquarters. When serving as a JTF, the division will organize and operate in accordance with joint doctrine.
ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION

1-32. The division headquarters is organized with a special troops battalion (STB), three CPs, and a mobile command group (MCG). The division will be assigned a mix of BCTs and supporting brigades, to conduct operations, as needed. To conduct full-spectrum operations in a major combat operation, the division was designed to have the appropriate mixture of the three types of BCTs and one of each of the five types of supporting brigades.
SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION

1-33. The STB is organized into three companies with distinct missions. They are a headquarters company, a network support company, and a security company. If the division is assigned a band, it will fall under the control of the STB (see Figure 1-3). 1-34. The division STB is not currently resourced with the security company. The security company is required for the STB to conduct its assigned mission of providing CP security and must be resourced either by task organizing a company from a BCT or by the preferred method of resourcing it from a nondeploying BCT. 1-35. The STB task organizes its organic security, communications, life support, and transportation assets
S p e cia l T ro o p s B attal io n
He ad q u ar ters C om p an y
N ET W O R K SPT C om p an y HQ & N ET De t C P Sp t De t
S EC U RIT Y C om p an y
BA N D
IN F Plt
IN F Plt
N ET EXT De t
IN F Plt
to meet the requirements of the divisions deployed CPs. The MCG, less aviation assets, is assigned to the STB and task organized with required security and communications assets when operating separate from another CP. Figure 1-3. Special Troops Battalion Organization
COMMAND POSTS
1-36. The modular division is organized with three distinct CPs and an MCG (see Figure 1-4). The division organizes and distributes C2 assets according to the situation. For example, the commander may Alternate the two tactical (TAC) CPs between planning and execution. Assign the TAC CPs to Geographically dispersed operations. Different types of operations that are occurring simultaneously (for example, offensive and stability operations).
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Alternate the TAC CPs between phases within a major operation. Combine a TAC CP and the main CP or all the division headquarters CPs to increase the divisions ability to C2 complex operations.
Figure 1-4. Modular Division CP Structure
Mobile Command Group

1-37. The MCG has organic ground C2 vehicles, communications (from the STB network support company), and a small security force (from the STB security company). The size of the MCG security force is determined by the overall size of the MCG and the enemy threat. It may be a squad-sized security force in some instances or a platoon in others. The MCG does not have a staff. The commander selects members of the staff to fill the required MCG positions based on the situation. The number of seats available for staff members is limited by the physical number of seats in the organic ground and air systems. If more staff members are required than seats available, then additional transportation assets must be task organized to the MCG. When the commander requires more rapid movement through the air, the aviation brigade provides dedicated UH-60 Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S) aircraft to move the commander and MCG staff. An A2C2S aircraft has five seats, each with a computer workstation, one of which is manned by the system operator from the aviation unit. The other four workstations are for the commander and the staff officers he chooses to accompany him. All workstations are capable of accessing any of the battlefield functional area applications hosted on the aircraft. The aviation brigade provides additional aircraft to move the security element on a mission basis. The communications in both the ground and aerial platforms allow the commander to exercise battle command on the move, remaining in contact with the TACs, the main CP, higher headquarters, and subordinate brigades. In some instances, the commander will co-locate with a subordinate brigade CP, tying into the network through that units C2 systems and disguising the signature of the MCG. In other cases, the commander will use the full capability of the MCG and move between positions and units continuously in
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order to sense the battle and exert personal influence with subordinates. The commander may also position the MCG with TAC 1, TAC 2, or the main CP.
Figure 1-5. Main CP Organization
Main CP
1-38. The main CP includes the G-5 plans cell, the G-2 intelligence cell, and other selected division staff sections and elements. Unless tactical conditions dictate otherwise, the main CP serves as the location for special staff support to the division, including legal support, interagency coordination, and virtual links to knowledge centers in the United States and overseas. The division chief of staff is normally the senior officer in the main CP. The main CP has some organic transportation and signal support, but requires a much longer setting-up and tearing-down time than the other CPs. The main CP is deployable but only 50percent mobile with organic transportation. Because of the longer time it requires for setup and its connectivity, the main CP normally deploys to and sets up in a pre-established hard-wired site or secure location in the division rear area. The main CP can operate from home station, an intermediate staging area or from within the joint operational area (JOA), depending on METT-TC. The main CP may operate from home station while the TACs or early entry command post are deploying or may move to an intermediate staging area during deployment, as the division stages into the JOA. As communications capabilities increase, the need to deploy the main CP into the JOA is reduced. This will reduce the size of the division footprint and the logistical and security requirements within the JOA.
Figure 1-6. TAC CPs Organization
Tactical CP
1-39. The TAC CPs are designed to conduct C2 of all units assigned, attached, OPCON or TACON to the division. The equipment in either TAC CP is almost identical. The TAC CPs are task-organized with signal
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support, security, and life support organic to the division headquarters STB. All equipment assigned to the TAC CPs may be transported by C-130 or sling-loaded by CH-47 or UH-60.
Early Entry Command Post

1-40. During contingency operations the early entry command post (EECP) normally provides temporary C2 until a fully functional TAC CP and or the main CP deploys into the AO. Normally austere, its specific design is driven by METT-TC and may vary from deployment to deployment. The EECP controls all units committed to the current operation, and conducts those critical C2 functions required to support the division in tactical operations as it initially deploys into an unsecured area. 1-41. To be effective, the EECP is normally sequenced in the deployment to arrive as soon as possible after the initial BCT or the airhead or beachhead is secure. It fights the current fight with division forces on the ground, synchronizing the flow of follow-on units into the AO and phasing them into the fight. It also begins initial planning for the conduct of future operations (branches and sequels). It serves as the division C2 link early in the deployment between division forces on the ground, in the air, and at home station and the higher headquarters. It continues this function until the remainder of the division C2 systems arrive. Normal doctrinal functions will be transferred to a TAC or the main CP as they arrive and are prepared to assume those functions. 1-42. The EECP is not a permanent or a fixed organization. Each situation or contingency mission may demand different requirements, depending on the specific mission. However, each EECP is designed around a basic functional structure of elements representing each of the warfighting functional cells as well as elements capable of performing the integrating cell functions for plans, future operations and current operations. It also contains a task organized package from the STB consisting of signal, security and life support. One of the TAC CPs is often used as the base from which to build the EECP, with augmentees from the rest of the division staff chosen to accomplish the specific short-duration mission. The EECP may be larger or smaller than a normal TAC CP depending on the mission. The EECP is usually the first division CP to deploy to a JOA and should contain a tailored staff focused on deployment into and employment of forces in the JOA, to include reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I). The staff should be capable of performing the initial intelligence analysis, execution and adjustment decision-making, and problem solving associated with deployment into the operational area and RSO&I.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

1-43. In major combat operations, BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy the enemy. BCTs make permanent the otherwise temporary effects of other joint capabilities by seizing and occupying decisive terrain, exerting constant pressure, and breaking the enemys will to fight. They will be the principal ground-maneuver unit of the division. Three standard BCT designs make up the ground maneuver power of the division: heavy, infantry, and Stryker. These BCTs have improved C2 capabilities and organic combined arms capabilities, including battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistic subunits. Medical units and elements are also organic to each of these units. Maneuver within the division capitalizes on integrated joint capabilities to expand mutual support across expanded AOs, and enables BCTs to conduct operations within contiguous or noncontiguous AOs. The division will generate tactical and operational effects through controlling the operations of the BCTs, supporting brigades and joint assets under its control. Figure 1-7 shows an organizational overview of the three types of BCTs.
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Figure 1-7. Brigade Combat Teams 1-44. The division assigns a task organization, an AO, and missions to BCTs. The intent and concept of operations allow the BCT to accomplish assigned tasks with minimum control from the division by use of mission orders. The BCT has a staff that is designed to conduct full spectrum operations. That does not mean that the BCT is ideally structured for full spectrum operations. It will normally be task organized as required to include moving organic units to create task organized units for specific missions. The BCT may require task organization changes, even for combat operations, because it does not have all the combat multipliers that are often required. For example it does not have organic air and missile defense or bridging assets. 1-45. In order to maintain continuous pressure on enemy forces, the division may design operations to cycle the BCTs in and out of the fight to temporary bases where the BCT rests, refits, and receives large quantities of supplies. This type of a sustaining operation is known as a mission staging operation (MSO). The BCT moves to an area designated by the division where a sustainment brigade can conduct the resupply portion of mission staging operations. While in mission staging, the BCT is not available for other tactical tasks other than local security missions. Normally mission staging involves the sustainment brigade, portions of the CSB(ME), and the BCT. In offensive operations, one BCT may replace another in the attack, typically when one BCT has a follow-and-assume mission. The division commander can then order a MSO for the relieved BCT. After mission staging, that BCT may resume the attack while the second BCT refits, thus continuing a tactical cycle of mission staging without relinquishing the initiative.
SUPPORTING BRIGADES
1-46. The modular force features five types of supporting brigades that complement and reinforce the BCTs. These supporting brigades arecombat aviation, battlefield surveillance, combat support
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(maneuver enhancement), fires, and sustainment. These supporting brigades are organized as combined arms units that accomplish a broad function such as protection, in the case of the CSB(ME). Each modularsupporting brigade includes a headquarters, brigade troops, and specialized battalions. A mix of other specialized battalions is assigned, attached or OPCON to the brigade to match capabilities to requirements. During operations, the division commander task organizes between the supporting brigades and BCTs. Unlike the BCT, tailoring and task organization leads to considerable variation between modularsupporting brigades of the same type. Figure 1-8 shows the various types of supporting brigades.
Figure 1-8. Types of Supporting Brigades 1-47. Normally these supporting brigades are assigned or attached to a division headquarters. However, any of these brigades may be attached to a corps, an ASCC or theater-level command instead of the division. These brigades also provide Army support to other services (ASOS) and may be OPCON to a joint functional component commander (for example, the joint force air component commander) or to another Service headquarters (for example, a Marine Expeditionary Force). When operating under the control of the joint force commander (JFC) or another service, the ASCC commander exercises ADCON over that supporting brigade. 1-48. The supporting brigades will conduct operations in the divisions unassigned area (that portion of the area of operations not assigned to subordinate units). The BFSB will collect information, the fires brigade will conduct strike missions and the aviation brigade will conduct mobile strikes in the unassigned area.
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Fires Brigade
1-49. The fires brigade is a newly designed organization very different from the previous DIVARTY design. The fires brigades primary task is to plan, prepare, execute, and assess strike operations within the division AO, based on mission orders from the division. A second task is to provide support to the BCTs and other supporting brigades in the division AO. A third task is to plan for and execute joint missions separate from the division. The fires brigade conducts missions for the division in the unassigned areas to include counterfire, attacks on specific targets, and other typical fire support missions. 1-50. Fires brigades are organized with organic assets that include an MLRS battalion and may be task organized with additional MLRS and cannon battalions and counter fire or weapons locating radars. The fires brigade may receive electronic warfare assets and offensive information operations assets. 1-51. The C2 capabilities of the fires brigade allow it to plan, prepare, execute, and assess strike operations with OPCON of additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and offensive information operations (IO) capabilities, or with the BFSB retaining control of ISR assets and providing the information and desired effects to the fires brigade. The division will assign missions, usually in the form of targets sets to be engaged, target priorities, and/or effects to be achieved. It will task organize the fires brigade to accomplish assigned tasks. It may also allocate joint fires assets to be controlled by the fires brigade. 1-52. The fires brigade may be OPCON to and conduct its full range of missions for the JFLC, JTF, or other service or functional component commander. 1-53. Typical mission sets for the fires brigade assigned to a division are listed below: Conduct Army indirect fires, joint fires, and offensive IO in support of the division. Counter battery fire missions. Provide army indirect fires, joint fires, and offensive IO in support of Suppression of enemy air defense fires to mobile strike operations. BCTs in the close fight. Other brigades in the division AO.
Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

1-54. The primary purpose of the BFSB is to collect information that answers the Division Commanders critical information requirements, specifically his priority information requirements, and other information based on the priorities established by the division. The information it collects focuses on the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil consideration aspects of METT-TC which feed the development and update of the COP. The focus of the BFSB collection efforts is the divisions unassigned area. It receives its taskings through mission orders from the division. The division commander describes the operation, identifies his CCIR, and prioritizes other information requirements. The BFSB commander, not the division staff, controls all assets whose primary role is collecting information on enemy, terrain and civil considerations within the divisions unassigned areas. The BCTs retain control of their collection assets and collect information inside their assigned AO. 1-55. The BFSB is normally assigned, attached or OPCON to a division. It is organized with a Military Intelligence Battalion, a Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Battalion, and a Brigade Troops Battalion. The MI Battalion provides a base of military intelligence collection capability that includes unmanned aerial systems, signal intelligence, human intelligence, and counter-intelligence. The R&S battalion provides manned reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities including mounted scout platoons and mobile long range surveillance teams. The BTB provides the communications backbone for the BFSB that allows it to communicate throughout the division AO and sustainment for the entire brigade. Based on the factors of METT-TC the BFSB can be tailored for the mission and the AO. This may be in the form of additional elements assigned to the BFSB from the division, or provided from ASCC and national-level assets to reinforce the collection capabilities of the brigade. In stability operations, for instance, the BFSB may be organized with additional human intelligence units. Aviation reconnaissance units and potentially
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additional ground reconnaissance units will be OPCON to the BFSB based on the situation. This includes aviation reconnaissance assets and extended range unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) from the combat aviation brigade on a mission basis. 1-56. The BFSB may control significant ground and air reconnaissance capability, however, the BFSB does not conduct security operations for the division. When the division requires security operations screen, guard, cover, area security, and route securityit will assign the missions to BCTs, or in the case of the latter two operations, it may assign them to a CSB(ME). In some operations, the threat will compel the division to maneuver combat units to fight through for information and develop the situation. If so, the division will assign the mission to a BCT or the aviation brigade. 1-57. The division focuses the BFSB collection efforts through two means: the assignment of brigade AOs and the division ISR plan. The BCTs and the CSB(ME) are normally assigned an AO within the division AO. The brigades are responsible for conducting reconnaissance and surveillance within their AOs. This allows the BFSB to focus its resources in the division unassigned areas. The division ISR plan is a collaborative effort within the division staff with the G-3 and G-2 as the leads. The ISR plan focuses the BFSB by clearly defining CCIR and prioritizing other information requirements for collection. This provides the BFSB commander greater flexibility to allocate, and when necessary reallocate, resources within the division unassigned areas to answer the division information requirements. In some cases the size of the unassigned areas will exceed the collection capability of the BFSB. In such cases the division can either augment the BFSB capability or accept risk given the focus and priorities established by the division. 1-58. The BFSB has the capability to augment the other brigades collection capability. The common means of augmenting the other brigades is with CI/HUMINT teams from the MI battalion. The teams will be attached or OPCON to individual brigades depending on the situation and the priorities established by the division. The BFSB can also augment brigades with UASs, signal intelligence, mounted ground reconnaissance, or mobile surveillance teams. For instance, the CSB(ME) has a large AO with several lines of communication that must be monitored. The unassigned areas are well within the capability of the BFSB to collect information so the division directs the BFSB to attach a mounted troop and several long range surveillance teams to the CSB(ME) to assist in covering the lines of communication. 1-59. Information collected and developed by the BFSB will be assessed by the BFSB staff to ensure tasked information requirements have been satisfied. All the information is passed to the division for full assessment, fusion, and dissemination. The information is also posted to a distributed database that allows access to commanders, shooters, and analysts. If the information is critical to a specific brigade it is also reported directly to the brigade. An example is a brigades PIR that is sent to the division as an RFI. The division adds the brigades PIR to its priority list for collection by the BFSB. Once the BFSB collects the necessary information it reports it directly to the requesting brigade for action. The result of BFSB collection activities will often cue other actions. As the BFSB collection effort identifies potential targets, the brigade makes this information available to the division, fires brigade, aviation brigade and the BCTs. Since the bulk of the intelligence analysis capability resides with the G-2 staff, the division develops target handoff criteria in coordination with the other brigades in the division. For instance, the BFSB may locate a high value target in the unassigned areas and pass the target off to the fires brigade or the CAB for the execution of a strike operation. Alternatively, the BFSB may pass off an enemy unit to a BCT as it moves into the BCT AO.
Combat Aviation Brigade

1-60. A combat aviation brigade supports the operations of the entire division with task organized aviation capabilities. The bulk of the Army aviations combat power resides in the multi-functional aviation brigade organized to support the division, the BCTs and other brigades. Based on priorities and missions, the aviation brigade collaborates directly with supported brigades for operational details of the support required. 1-61. The combat aviation brigade is expansible and tailorable to the mission, with various types of organizations, containing both manned and unmanned systems, and can support multiple BCTs. The aviation brigade is tailored to execute assigned tasks for the BCTs, division, ASCC, JFLC or JTF.
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However, it specializes in providing combat capabilities for decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations within engagements and battles. 1-62. A combat aviation brigade assigned to a division typically conducts the following missions: Support BCTs by conducting close combat attack to close with and destroy the enemy in close proximity to friendly forces. Mobile strike operations. Vertical maneuver for dismounted forces to a position of advantage. Screening operations. Aerial sustainment and critical resupply of maneuver forces to maintain operational momentum. MSR overflight to provide security for high value assets traveling the MSR. VIP transport and escort. Aerial medical evacuation. 1-63. The combat aviation brigade receives mission orders from the division, to conduct and support reconnaissance, security, mobile strike, vertical maneuver, close combat attack in support of ground forces, aerial sustainment, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and C2 operations. Based on METT-TC, the aviation brigade commander task organizes available aviation resources into mission packages that are either controlled by a supported brigade or the aviation brigade. 1-64. The combat aviation brigade has organic aerial medical evacuation assets. The air ambulance company is assigned to the general support aviation battalion. Normally when the requirement for MEDEVAC is anticipated, at least three MEDEVAC aircraft are assigned direct support to the BCTs while the remaining aircraft provide general support to the division and receive their evacuation missions through medical operations channels emanating from the medical brigade. 1-65. The aviation brigade can conduct mobile strike operations in support of the division scheme of maneuver. Mobile strike operations may involve rapid task organization of assets across the division. For conduct of mobile strike the aviation brigade will normally have OPCON or direct support (DS) of longrange fires assets from the fires brigade and BFSB reconnaissance assets for planning and execution. The aviation brigade will retain the DS relationship of the fires assets for the duration of the operation, but will release control of the BFSB assets once its own reconnaissance capabilities are on station. 1-66. The aviation brigade executes close combat attack missions for the BCTs. These missions involve conducting integrated air-ground operations to close with and destroy the enemy. These missions require a high level of air to ground coordination and the CAB should attempt to develop a habitual relationship with the supported BCT. Aviation support via this mission allows the ground commander to extend the tactical reach of maneuver forces particularly in urban and other complex terrain. The aviation assets help control the tempo of the fight by provided a force capable of rapid reaction to sudden changes. The attack helicopters provide the BCT extended acquisition range and lethality. 1-67. The aviation brigade may also execute screening missions for the division. The aviation brigade may receive ground maneuver and joint assets and capabilities to carry out these missions. It supports other security operations with aviation forces; including BCTs assigned a screen, guard, or cover mission. For screen, guard and cover missions, the aviation brigade may provide reconnaissance, attack, and lift assets under the OPCON of maneuver BCTs. The aviation brigade can also support area security operations including route and convoy security operationsconducted by the CSB(ME) or BCTs.
Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement)

1-68. The CSB(ME) is designed to receive and control forces to provide protection and mobility to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile action against divisional forces. The CSB(ME) is responsible for security within its assigned AO, which typically encompasses the division rear area and main supply routes. The CSB(ME) is tailored with additional capabilities based on the factors of METT-TC for each operation. A typical force mix will include engineers; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; civil affairs; MP; AMD and EOD assets. The brigade is also task organized with a tactical combat force (TCF) when given an area security mission. The CSB(ME) does not supplant unit self-defense
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responsibilities. Units remain responsible for self-protection against Level I threats. The CSB(ME) provides forces to respond to Level II threats and when task organized with the TCF can respond to Level III threats. The CSB(ME) has some AO-wide protection responsibilities specifically in the areas of CBRN response and AMD when given AMD assets for the division. When given AMD assets they will be attached or OPCON. 1-69. Based on the scope of the operation, more than one CSB(ME) may be assigned to the division. These CSBs(ME), in turn, may be made available to one of the components of the joint force. 1-70. The CSB(ME) is organized and trained to execute selected area security missions including route and convoy security. It is not designed to do screen, guard, and cover operations at the division level. The division assigns screen, guard, and cover missions to a BCT, or in the case of screening operations, to the aviation brigade. The CSB(ME) employs (when assigned) a maneuver battalion as a TCF to conduct combat operations in its assigned AO. When the situation requires, the CSB(ME) executes limited offensive and defensive operations, employing response forces and the TCF against Level II or III threats respectively. The TCF may include not only ground maneuver, but also aviation and fires assets. (A BCT headquarters with a supporting slice should be employed when the situation requires a TCF of two or more ground maneuver battalions.) 1-71. Typical missions sets for a CSB(ME) assigned to a division are listed below. Conduct CBRN Defense. Provide EOD support. Provide AO wide air and missile defense. Conduct area security, local security and LOC security operations. Construct, maintain and sustain lines of communications. Coordinate direct and indirect fires in support of CSB(ME) operations. Provide mobility to division assets while denying the enemy freedom of action. Conduct internment and resettlement operations. Conduct vertical, runway and road construction. Conduct limited offense and defense operations. Conduct some stability operations. 1-72. The CSB(ME) may be assigned an AO according to the situation. When assigned an AO, the CSB(ME) controls and manages terrain and movement within the AO. However, the movement control of sustainment operations within the division as a whole is the function of the division transportation officer. The CSB(ME) provides security in areas designated by the division. Normally, the division will designate a division rear area and assign this AO to the CSB(ME). The sustainment brigade positions many of its assets within the CSB(ME) AO. The CSB(ME) is responsible for the area security operations within its assigned AO, while elements of the sustainment brigade remain responsible for unit security and base cluster defense. 1-73. The CSB(ME) secures, protects, and maintains ground LOC. When the division operates in noncontiguous AOs, the division commander has two options. If the CSB(ME) can counter threats to friendly forces using assigned, attached or OPCON troops, then the CSB(ME) controls the LOC and the terrain surrounding it. The CSB(ME) coordinates convoy security along the LOC and secures the route with static and mobile forces. When the threat to the LOC is persistent, and sustaining operations require combined arms maneuver beyond the capabilities of the CSB(ME), the division will task organize and assign a BCT to conduct LOC security. 1-74. The division provides the CSB(ME) with protection priorities and continuously updates estimates of the threat. The CSB(ME) commander allocates assets to meet the division priorities, based on a careful assessment of the self-protection capabilities of the units in the division. There will never be enough capability to make the division invulnerable to conventional, unconventional, and environmental threats. Therefore the commander tries to balance the needs of acceptable risk, self-defense, passive protection measures, and proactive elimination of threats.
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1-75. In addition to the CSB(ME)s, the divisions higher HQ may allocate functional brigades to the division to support the force as a whole or to carry out a particular task. The CSB(ME) may be required to provide support to these additional functional brigades. For example, in addition to a CSB(ME), a division might receive an MP brigade to control displaced civilians and handle detainees. In this case, the CSB(ME) may provide support, such as general engineering, to the MP brigade. 1-76. The CSB(ME) has a combined arms staff and C2 capabilities that suit it for a variety of missions in addition to protection. An additional capability is execution of some stability operations tasks within an assigned AO. Many stability tasks have direct carryover to tasks normally assigned to the CSB(ME). As long as the threat remains within the capabilities of the CSB(ME) to control the assigned AO, the CSB(ME) may be assigned an AO as part of a stability operation. Another role for which the CSB(ME) is suited is the provision of additional C2 for complex operations. For example, the division commander may use the CSB(ME) as the crossing area headquarters for a major river crossing. This enables the BCTs to focus on maneuver and close combat beyond the river crossing and allows the division TAC 1 and TAC 2 to concentrate on broader missions.
Sustainment Brigades
1-77. The sustainment brigades are assigned multifunctional combat sustainment support battalions (CSSBs) and functional battalions tailored and task organized according to the factors of METT-TC. Sustainment brigades provide distribution-based logistics to the BCTs and supporting brigades of the modular division. This support includes, but is not limited to, the provision of supplies, field services, as well as field and sustainment level maintenance. 1-78. One or more sustainment brigades provide support to the entire division and sustainment replenishment operations and mission staging support to BCTs. The sustainment brigade must coordinate the movement of sustainment convoys with the brigades owning the AOs through which the sustainment convoys move. The sustainment brigade should be assigned a movement control battalion. The movement control battalion coordinates with the G-4 division transportation officer element to plan and control convoy movement division AO wide. 1-79. Normally the division will assign an AO to a CSB(ME) within which the sustainment brigade will conduct sustaining operations. In the case of severe, prolonged threat to sustaining operations or when the division does not have a CSB(ME), the division commander will assign an AO to a BCT for the protection of sustaining operations. The division should plan for ground and aerial LOCs to link the sustainment brigade area with the theater base.
OTHER SUPPORTING UNITS

USAF Air Support Operations Squadron
1-80. An Air Support Operations Squadron is normally aligned to provide support to a division. The Air Support Operations Squadron is a variable sized organization of approximately 70 90 personnel that provide air support planning and execution capabilities. The Air Support Operations Squadron provides Air Liaison Officers (ALO) to the division headquarters and the BCTs. It also provides Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) to the division headquarters and the BCTs. The Air Support Operations Squadron personnel are direct support to the division but remain under USAF command channels. Appendix D expands the explanation of USAF planning considerations and support provided to the division.
Civil Affairs Battalion/Civil-Military Operations Center

1-81. A civil affairs battalion is normally attached to a division. The CA battalion is under division control and typically assigns CA companies to a BCT or supporting brigade. This battalion establishes the division's civil-military operations center (CMOC). The location for establishment of the CMOC is METT-TC dependent with the goal being to establish it at the focus of civil activity within the division AO. This could be at or near a civil governmental function, or population base that is considered, by the division commander, to be the most significant location to positively influence the civil component of his
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AO and facilitate coordination of CMO. The battalion provides a CA planning team to the division G-9 to assist in planning CMO. The division's CMOC plans, prepares, executes and assesses, with continuous coordination with the G-9, all CMO within the division. The CA companies, attached to BCT or other brigades, establish CMOCs for their supported brigade as determined by the brigade commander and with the advice and recommendations of the G-9/S-9 and the CA company commander. The division's CMOC and the CMOCs supporting individual brigades serve as the primary coordination interface for the U.S. armed forces and indigenous populations and institutions, humanitarian organizations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other governmental agencies. 1-82. The CMOC, in conjunction with the G-9, facilitates continuous coordination for CMO among the key participants from local to international levels within a given AO. The CMOC and the G-9 also develop, manage and analyze the civil inputs to the maneuver commanders COP to facilitate situational understanding of the civil component of METT-TC within the maneuver commanders AO. The CMOC is the operations and support element of the CA unit and a mechanism for the coordination of CMO. CA elements at all levels recommend CMO priorities to the supported division and brigade commanders based upon their analysis of the civil component of the AO using METT-TC. The civil considerations analysis (the C in METT-TC) is expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE. See appendix C of FMI 5-0.1
Tactical PSYOP Company

1-83. The division will normally receive a tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) company to execute offensive information operations. The PSYOP company coordinates its missions with the information operations elements at the main CP and TAC CPs. The PSYOP company will normally locate at a TAC CP and send tactical PSYOP detachments to the BCTs.
Other Special Operations Forces

1-84. The division may have special operations forces (SOF) under its control or operating in its AO. When this is the case, the division may receive a special operations command and control element (SOCCE) or a special forces liaison element (SFLE) to synchronize SOF activities with division operations. This element should locate at the appropriate TAC CP. Refer to Initial Draft FM 3-05 for more information.
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
1-85. The division operates within a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. It integrates all available forces to synchronize their effects. The division commander arranges forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situation. The commander designs the operational framework (AO, battlespace, and battlefield organization) to accomplish the mission. This framework helps the commander visualize the use of forces to accomplish a missions and how to control the tempo of an operation. 1-86. The division commanders operational framework uses the purpose-based battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to unify elements of the organization and provide common focus for their actions. The division commander organizes the division staff by function to integrate and synchronize their results. 1-87. The division commanders framework describes the context in which the division fights and aids in the development of his intent. The division commander modifies his framework as needed, based on the factors of METT-TC.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
1-88. The higher commander defines the divisions AO. The division AO should be large enough for the commander to accomplish his mission and protect his forces. The division commander employs assigned, attached, OPCON, and TACON units and supporting systems within his assigned AO. Within the division AO, subordinate commanders synchronize their operations with the divisions plan.
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1-89. The division assigns AOs to brigades so they can accomplish their assigned tasks. Normally all BCTs and a select few supporting brigades are assigned AOs. Any brigade may be assigned an AO however, the owning brigade is responsible for terrain management, security, clearance of fires, civilmilitary operations, movement control, Army airspace command and control and development and maintenance of the common operational picture within their AO. Any brigade that is not staffed to accomplish each of these functions should either be augmented or not be assigned an AO. 1-90. The CSB(ME) may be assigned an AO that includes the division rear area and other brigades such as the sustainment brigade, BFSB, fires brigade and the combat aviation brigade may occupy terrain in the CSB(ME)s AO. The division may also position the main CP or a TAC CP in the CSB(ME)s AO. 1-91. The combat aviation brigade and the fires brigade may be assigned an AO, instead of an engagement area or kill box, to facilitate conducting a strike operation. This might be done to ensure unity of command and facilitate control when the strike operation will occur over an extended period of time and several units will participate. 1-92. Boundaries are used to describe the AO, assist in the synchronization of the operation and take full advantage of the divisions capabilities. Commanders specify the necessary control measures to focus combat power, delineate responsibilities, assign geographic responsibility, and support the operations. (Basic graphic control measures are explained in FM 3-90 and FMI 5-0.1.) Generally, division commanders use a mix of per-missive and restrictive control measures to ensure subordinate commanders have the maximum flexibility to accomplish the mission. The concepts of battlespace, area of interest, and area of influence are applicable when assigning AOs to brigades. (See FM 3-0 for details of the above mentioned concepts.) The division will either assign contiguous or non-contiguous AOs (see Figure 1-10). When assigning non-contiguous AOs, the division retains control of the unassigned area in the division AO.
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Figure 1-9. Contiguous and Noncontiguous AOs
Contiguous AO
1-93. Contiguous AOs afford the division commander a better methodology for massing effects and providing mutual support at critical times and places. Contiguous AOs also provide additional security for maneuver units as well as C2 nodes, and the division rear area. Elements that might favor using contiguous AOs include Limited size of the AO in relation to number of friendly forces. Enemy forces concentrated. Reducing risk associated with being defeated in detail because of an incomplete operational picture or because the division is significantly outnumbered. Decisive points in close proximity of each other. Limited availability of joint fires.
Noncontiguous AO
1-94. Assigning noncontiguous AOs to subordinate units allows the division to achieve effects in widely separated areas and increase the effects of its combat power on a dispersed enemy. A commanders decision to use noncontiguous AOs, regardless of command echelon, is derived from a careful analysis of the factors of METT-TCparticularly the enemy, and his ability to mass, and terrain. Overcoming this risk places a premium on the division commanders situational understanding (SU) and on the tactical mobility of his forces. In order to reduce the risk, the division commander typically does not assign non-contiguous
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AOs to subordinate units unless they are within supporting distance of one another and the division is able to rally sufficient combat power to prevent a threat from defeating a friendly unit in detail. 1-95. During combat operations, the division does not assign subordinate units AOs in areas were the enemy does not pose a threat to the accomplishment of the division mission. The division retains these unassigned areas as a division responsibility. It is the division commanders responsibility to ensure enemy forces do not operate in these unassigned areas in such a way as to become a threat in subsequent operations or threaten to defeat in detail any friendly unit. If the enemy activity increases in the unassigned areas, the division may chose to assign the area to a subordinate unit. Each noncontiguous AO must either provide for its self-defense against any enemy capability or be in supporting distance of another divisional unit or otherwise be able to mass fires (both Army and joint) to prevent defeat in detail. The commander will typically establish noncontiguous AOs when Comparative weakness of the enemy is known. Enemy forces are dispersed. Joint fires are available. The division has the ability to influence the division unassigned areas. NOTE: FM 3-90, Chapter 2, and FM 3-0, Chapter 4, provides further details on establishing contiguous and noncontiguous AOs.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
1-96. Division commanders designate decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations and may designate a spatial relationship of deep, close, and rear areas if necessary. Designating these areas provides a tool for analyzing spatial relationships between enemy and friendly combat forces. This technique is particularly useful in contiguous offense and defense operations against an enemy force of similar capabilities. During operations there will be a mix of offense, defense and stability operations that occur simetaneously throughout the division AO. 1-97. The commander may designate simultaneous or sequential operations. In either case, the division will always conduct a mix of offense, defense and stability simultaneously. In situations that dictate sequential rather than simultaneous engagements, the decisive operation is often one of the subsequent engagements. Initial shaping operations create conditions required for the commitment of the decisive operation. Later shaping operations fix the defending enemy in position, block possible counterattacks aimed at the decisive operation, or clear the enemy in the divisions AO as it moves forward. When the division executes sequential operations, key initial shaping operations may be designated as the initial main effort since their success directly affects the decisive operation. When the division executes simultaneous operations, shaping operations prevent an enemy response by overwhelming his ability to identify the decisive operation and concentrate his forces and effects. 1-98. When conducting sequential operations, the area where initial operations are conducted may quickly transition from offense or defense into a stability operation. During the stability operation there may be instances where units must quickly transition back to offense or defense. 1-99. The division must plan for transitioning from one type of operation, offense, defense or stability, to the other. What starts out as predominately one type of operation will naturally transition into the others. These transitions may occur rather quickly for subordinate units of the division and must be considered when conducting the initial planning for an operation.
FACTORS OF METT-TC
1-100. The six factors of METT-TC are the situational information factors used by the division commander and staff to conduct analysis throughout the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of operations. The commander considers these six factors for every type of operation. He uses this information to adjust the resources, concept, or objectives of the plan, analyze risk, or acquire success in
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operations. Appendix B of FM 6-0 provides additional details on the components of the factors of METTTC and Appendix C of FMI 5-0.1 modifies the discussion of terrain and components of civil considerations of METT-TC.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

1-101. The modular division uses Army command and support relationships to task organize for missions. Command relationships are used by the division commander to subordinate one unit to another. This changes the chain of command from the parent (losing) command to the gaining command. Support relationships are used when subordination of one unit is not appropriate, for any of several reasons. When the division places a unit in support of another element, it does not change the command relationship, but it does allow the supported unit to task the supporting unit without referring to the division. Brigades and battalions of the division use the same procedures to task organize within their organizations. Figure 1-10 shows the command and relationships and their inherent responsibilities.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
1-102. Army command relationships are organic, assigned, attached, operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and administrative control (ADCON). Organic and assigned are used for strategic organization of forces only, and not by the division. Administrative control is inherent in attachment, subject to modification by the higher headquarters. Command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between units and their commanders. Through the use of a command relationship, the division commander subordinates one unit to another. For operational matters, the chain of command runs from the division through the gaining headquarters to the subordinate unit. Command relationships unify a chain of command and in so doing, ensure unity of effort. Through a command relationship, the higher (gaining) commander has both the authority and the flexibility to use subordinate forces as circumstances dictate, without reference or dependence on the direction of a commander outside the organization, other than the higher headquarters for an operation. This unifies the chain of command and extends initiative on the part of the gaining commander. 1-103. Command relationships are used to subordinate a lower echelon unit such as a battalion, to a different headquarters, normally a brigade, but occasionally directly to the division. In extraordinary circumstances, the division commander may subordinate one brigade to another, but normally two brigades will work through one of the tactical command posts. Typically, the division uses command relationships to move battalions and companies between brigades. 1-104. The division attaches one unit to another headquarters when the duration of the mission and its complexity requires the gaining commander to have complete flexibility over the attached unit. When the duration of the operation extends beyond four days, and the division expects that the gaining commander will frequently task organize the attached unit with other forces, attachment is the preferred command relationship. Administrative control, including sustainment, transfers to the gaining headquarters, unless modified by the division commander. Attachment works best when the duration of the subordination is for a major operation or a phase of the campaign, 1-105. In contrast, OPCON units normally operate under their higher headquarters for a specific mission, normally four days or less. Change of OPCON does not convey a change of administrative responsibilities, therefore sustainment and other support remains with the parent brigade. Operational control allows the division to subordinate the unit without imposing an undue logistical burden on the gaining command. It works very well if the OPCON unit remains within supporting distance of the parent headquarters. Aviation units subordinated to a brigade are normally OPCON, since their sustainment is intense and specialized. 1-106. The division does not use TACON, unless subordinating a multinational or joint force for a very short period to an Army brigade. Tactical control limits the gaining commander to operational direction only, and prevents the gaining command from modifying the task organization using subordinate formations of the TACON unit. However, when working with multinational formations TACON works well, particularly if sustainment for the TACON force is provided from outside the division.
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Figure 1-10. Command and Support Relationships
SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
1-107. Support relationships are established when subordination of one unit to another would be inappropriate. Reasons include tactical and technical ability to control different types of formations, the echelon of the supporting unit, and the requirement for the supporting unit to answer many requests for support from a variety of other units also needing additional capabilities (manage scarcity). A support relationship depends upon mission command, allowing the supporting commander to function as the expert manager of capabilities within the supporting unit and employing those capabilities to achieve results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and supporting relationship between two units, as in direct support, to a broad level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters general support. Support relationships do not alter ADCON. Support relationships are used when task organizing the force. Army support relationships include direct support (DS), reinforcing (R), general support reinforcing (GSR), and general support (GS). Like the command relationships, support relationships are graduated from exclusive support (DS) to inclusive support to the entire force (GS). Unless modified by task organization or tasks to subordinate units, supporting brigades (fires, combat aviation, battlefield surveillance, sustainment, and combat support) are in general support to the division. 1-108. Support relationships are rarely used between brigades. When one brigade requires the full support of another brigade, the division order normally specifies support required within the concept of the operation or tasks to subordinate units. The most common example is for one BCT to follow and support another BCT. In unusual circumstances, the aviation and fires brigade may be in direct support of a BCT or, in the case of strike operations, of the other. 1-109. If tactical circumstances dictate, the division commander may place one brigade in GSR to another. This is a change for the modular division. The use of GSR as a support relationship between nonartillery forces is new, but it provides the division commander the flexibility to assign supporting
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functions, tasks, or missions to one brigade in support of another and retain the remainder of the supporting brigades capability to support the division. GSR supports the force as a whole and another subordinate organization with specific forces, capabilities, tasks, and missions as limited by the common superior of both forces. Used in the modular division, it focuses the supporting brigade commander on the needs and requirements of the supported brigade without tying its resources completely to the supported brigade. 1-110. Because of the nature of the GSR relationship as compared to other support relationships, the division commander normally specifies the purpose of the GSR relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. The order also may address Limitations on forces and resources allocated to shaping operations The time, place, level, and duration of the support provided to the supported unit. The degree of authority over the support granted to the supported commander. The relative priority of the support provided in the division commanders priorities. The authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort provided in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency. 1-111. Unless limited by the division commander when establishing GSR, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting unit. In general, the commander of the supported force issues tasks, functions, or missions to the supporting commander and allows the supporting commander to determine the details of accomplishment, including the resources to devote to the effort. The supported commander may also designate priority of targets and objectives, timing and duration of supporting actions, and other instructions necessary for coordination. All tasks, functions, and missions given to the supporting force must contribute to the overall objective of the supported force and the common higher headquarters. Within GSR, the supporting force may also be responsible to the parent unit for accomplishing other tasks, missions, or responsibilities, and continues to conduct these while providing required support to the supported force. 1-112. Battalions of one brigade are frequently placed in support of another brigade. Or example, the cannon artillery battalion of the fires brigade reinforces the artillery of the BCT as the mission requires. The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (for example, logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander's effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated within the supporting commander's organization. 1-113. Subordinate units of the brigades may be assigned the full range of the support relationships when placed in direct support of another brigade. Depending on the authority to further assign support relationships, the supported brigade may further assign these supporting forces a supporting relationship to specific brigade units..
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE DIVISION

1-114. All BCTs and supporting brigades are assigned, attached, or placed OPCON to a division. The BCTs may receive attachment or OPCON, of supporting battalions and companies from the other brigades under the control of the division. 1-115. The division commander normally allocates the cannon battalions to reinforce BCTs, while retaining the fires brigade in general support. For a particular mission, such as a mobile strike, the division commander may place the fires brigade GSR to the combat aviation brigade. Fires battalions of the brigade may also be attached, OPCON, or in DS to another brigade. Note, however, that since the BCT has organic artillery, the fires battalion from the fires brigade is normally reinforcing. In some cases, the entire fires brigade may support one BCT for a portion of the operation; the division will normally specify a priority of support to that BCT, rather than using a support relationship. 1-116. Subordinate units of the BFSB may be attached or OPCON to a BCT; attached, OPCON, or GSR to support fires brigade for detection of targets; and attached or OPCON to the CSB (ME) or sustainment
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brigade. During strike operations, the division may specify that the BFSB is GSR to either the combat aviation or the fires brigade. 1-117. Typically, some battalions of the CSB (ME) are attached or OPCON to the BCTs. This may include engineers, MPs, CBRN defense, or other units. The CSB(ME) battalions and companies also may be attached or OPCON for area protection and CBRN support to the BFSB, fires, combat aviation, and sustainment brigades. 1-118. The combat aviation brigades attack, reconnaissance, or lift assets may be OPCON or DS to a BCT or CSB(ME). The aviation brigade may also have attack, reconnaissance, or lift assets OPCON, DS, or GSR to the BFSB, fires, or sustainment brigade. The combat aviation brigade may be GSR to the fires brigade for strike operations. 1-119. The sustainment brigade normally remains in general support to the division, with priority of support specified in the division order. Based on the mission, the division may change the command or support relationship of CSSB units to the BCTs or supporting brigades as these brigades are task organized with additional battalions or companies. This is normally through assignment of a direct support relationship, but may be through attachment or OPCON if the association is prolonged.
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Chapter 2
Command and Control at Division

The command and control (C2) system is the arrangement of personnel, information management (IM), procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations (FM 6-0). There are two parts of the C2 system, the commander and the control system. This chapter briefly discusses the role of the commander in the division and then details the purpose, organization, and characteristics of each of the command posts (CPs) that form the divisions control system. The responsibilities and duties of staff officers are also explained in FM 6-0, Appendix D. Unless specifically stated in the section on staff responsibilities at the end of this chapter, these roles and responsibilities do not change in the modular division.
THE COMMANDER
2-1. The commander combines the art of command and the science of control to exercise C2. Commanders focus the science of control through applying the art of command decision making and leading to support them and regulate forces. They create a positive climate that allows them to exercise C2 through mission command. They accept legitimate risks and errors, foster trust and mutual understanding, inculcate positive communications, build teamwork and establish and use values and examples. 2-2. The commander can not exercise C2 alone. The modular design of the division gives the commander the flexible CP structure to tailor control to meet the commanders requirements. Through use of the main CP, the two nearly identical tactical (TAC) CPs and the mobile command group (MCG), the commander has the flexibility to command from anywhere he desires. CP staffs support the commander by maintaining the common operational picture (COP), providing better information to increase the speed and accuracy of the commanders decision making, and supporting preparation and communication of execution information. 2-3. The role, duties and responsibilities of the commander are detailed in FM 6-0. However, the role of the commander is slightly different in the modular division. The commander is more involved in describing to the brigades their relationships and tasks and purpose to each other in terms of who supports who. The commander weights each phases main effort and the decisive operation by establishing priorities and support relationships and changing task organization. The commander thinks in terms of controlling BCTs and brigades through the use of mission orders and graphic control measures. He normally no longer directly controls battalions. The commander also must ensure the division staff supports the staff of the BCT or brigade executing the division decisive operation.
COMMAND POSTS
2-4. A CP is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). A CP is the basic organization designed to assist the commander in controlling an operation. The staff is functionally organized into G-staff sections, which are organized into functional and integrating cells and their subordinate elements within CPs to facilitate coordination and promote efficiency. The CPs for the division were designed to accomplish specific functions and organized by warfighting function. (See FMI 5-0.1 for detailed description of functional and integrating cells and the warfighting functions.) This organizational design is meant to increase efficiency and ensure every division has the same capabilities for C2.
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2-5. The commander determines the sequence of deployment, timing of moves, initial locations and task organization for all CPs based on METT-TC and the commanders visualization. The commander task organizes functional capabilities and personnel across the CPs to fit his concept for C2 of the operation. He may deploy CPs to separate locations or to a consolidated location based on METT-TC. The division is resourced to field a MCG, two TAC CPs, and a main CP. METT-TC may dictate the co-location of two or more CPs or the creation of a CP tailored from these assets, such as an early entry command post (EECP). Each CP performs specific functions by design as well as additional tasks assigned by the commander. In the division operations order C2 paragraph (paragraph 5), the commander details changes to the authority; responsibilities; and task organization of the division CPs, from doctrinal responsibilities and designed functions as well as any special instructions. 2-6. The fielding of an MCG and three fully functional CPs provides the division commander flexibility in arranging CPs on the battlefield. This flexible CP structure allows the division commander to exert his command presence on the battlefield where he desires.
MOBILE COMMAND GROUP

Purpose
2-7. The purpose of the MCG is to allow the commander to exercise personal leadership at a critical time and place during the conduct of the operation. It allows the commander to decouple from the TAC CPs and maintain continuous access to information. The MCG allows the commander to Provide personal leadership, intent, and guidance at the critical place. Make a personal assessment of the situation. Maintain situational understanding (SU) while moving around the AO by allowing him to have continuous access to updated information. Travel with key staff officers necessary to provide information relevant to the current operation.
Characteristics
2-8. The MCG serves at the commanding generals personal CP. The MCGs mobility allows the division commander to move to the point of decision. He can position himself where he can assess the risks and make adjustment decisions by seeing, hearing, and understanding what is occurring. What he learns and sees helps him mentally visualize adjustments needed in current and future operations as he moves about the AO and interacts with his subordinate commanders and different staffs. Thus the MCG allows him to command from anywhere in the AO and not become tied to a TAC or the main CP. The MCG has both a ground and an aerial component. 2-9. The MCG ground component consists of four armored HMMWVs, each with multifunctional display unitsArmy Battle Command Systems (ABCS)providing battle command on the move. The only personnel permanently assigned to the MCG on the TOE are the four drivers of these vehicles. Two drivers have a military occupational specialty (MOS) of 13F10, one is a signal support staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) (MOS 25U40), and the other is a fire support NCO (MOS 13F40). 2-10. The air component of the MCG consists of Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S) equipped UH-60A/L helicopters assigned to an aviation brigade and are provided when required. The A2C2S is a console capable of simultaneously receiving, processing and displaying tactical, JOA and global broadcasts for use by the commander and his staff. Data links for connectivity to many ground and airborne platforms provide the commander with the flexibility to operate in all tactical environments without additional equipment. 2-11. Ground and air components each have the communications capability to monitor the command, higher command, and the operations and intelligence nets. This communications capability is provided by the signal company within the division special troops battalion (STB). Additionally, while the MCG takes advantage of its small signature, speed, and mobility for securityand usually co-locates with subordinate units headquarters, the MCG requires the presence of a tailored security force when its is moving and
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stationary. While the TOE of the division STB contains a security company, that company has not been resourced and the division commander must task another subordinate unit to provide a local security forces for the MCG. 2-12. The staff officers in the MCG are normally subordinate staff officers capable of operating the ABCS multifunctional display units and they are not primary staff officers. The division commander chooses the individual staff officers that staff the MCG. The personnel in the MCG are normally functional representatives of those staff sections that can immediately effect current operations, such as maneuver, fires, and intelligence in addition to his senior air liaison officer (ALO), and when needed, a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC). The mission and staff available, however, dictate its makeup. For example, during a deliberate breach, the division commander may choose to include an engineer staff officer. When visiting a displaced civilian collection point, he may choose to replace the fires element staff officer and ALO with a G-9/civil-military operations (CMO) translator, or medical officer.
TACTICAL CP
2-13. The division employs one or two TAC CPs to control the execution of operations. The TAC CPs maintain continuous communication with subordinates, higher headquarters, the other CPs, and supporting joint assets. When both TACs are set and controlling operations, they each have specific responsibilities as designated in paragraph five of the operations order. When only one TAC CP is controlling operations, the TAC CP not active in controlling operations may co-locate with the main CP and perform other functions designated by the commander, such as planning and preparation for future operations. When both TAC CPs are employed simultaneously, the commander must ensure unity of command by clearly identifying, in paragraph five of the operations order, the roles and responsibilities assigned to each TAC, and the reporting procedures for subordinate units. 2-14. One of the- two deputy commanding generals (DCG) controls operations from a TAC CP. The G-3 section is responsible for the operation of the TAC CPs. The division commander may command the division from his deployed MCG, either TAC CP or the main CP, as dictated by METT-TC.
Purpose
2-15. The primary reason the division has two TACs is to cycle BCTs into the fight while maintaining constant pressure on the enemy. One TAC controls a set of BCTs currently in the fight until it becomes necessary to replace that set of BCTs with a set of fresh BCTs, which will be controlled by the second TAC. This process may result in selected staff officers who are rotating from the TAC to give up control of the operation to the TAC that is assuming control of the operation. 2-16. The TAC CPs normally control forces committed to the decisive operation and shaping operations, however, they could also control particularly complex sustaining operations such as reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) involving multiple subordinate brigades. The division commander may also use a TAC CP to control specific complex operations, such as air assaults, river crossings, in-stride breaching operations, or passage of lines involving multiple subordinate units, or provide a CP to form a special-purpose task force with subordinate units task organized under its control. 2-17. Maintaining unity of command requires that one TAC CP be in charge of synchronizing the divisions overall operation. The TAC in charge maintains the COP for the division according to the Command Information Management Plan (CIMP). The respective TAC CPs perform duties assigned in paragraph five of the operations order that may include the following: Control units and activities conducting or supporting The decisive operation or shaping operations. Strike and deception operations. Maintain the current operations estimate. Maintain and disseminate the COP throughout the division. Tailor the COP to meet the commanders requirements.
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Monitor sustaining operations. Provide A forward location for issuing orders and conducting rehearsals. A forward short-term planning facility when the main CP must displace. The majority of the personnel and equipment to form an EECP. Personnel for the MCG.
Characteristics
2-18. Each TAC CP is designed to provide C2 for full-spectrum operations. One TAC CP is normally designated to control current operations, which may include both the decisive operation and shaping operations which are setting conditions. The TACs are designed and equipped to perform functions essential to the control of current operations and immediate execution decision making. The main CP is primarily designed and equipped to perform long-range planning, analysis, sustainment coordination, and other supporting functions not directly essential to the immediate control of current operations. 2-19. The TAC CPs are organized as one multifunctional, integrating cell (see Figure 2-1). All warfighting functions are represented in each of the TACs by staff elements capable of conducting 24-hour operations.
Figure 2-1. Organization of TAC CPs 2-20. The TAC CPs are 100-percent mobile, which means they are capable of displacing with organic transportation assets in one lift. Although the two TAC CPs allow the division to plan the displacement of these C2 nodes so that one is always set and controlling operations while the other is moving, this is not the principal reason for providing the division with two, functionally redundant TAC CPs. Factors that influence the movement of the TAC CPs include the flow of operations, the threat of enemy action, and the desires of the commander. Elimination of the dependency on line of sight communications systems, with their inherent range limitations, allows the TAC CPs to remain stationary longer and maintain C2 over
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units conducting operations over extended distances. However, the TAC CPs should remain close enough to subordinate brigades for the staff to be cognizant of the operational environment in which the brigades are operating. 2-21. Both TAC CPs may be employed simultaneously. When not actively employed for the C2 of operations, the TAC CPs monitor all networked communications systems and the COP, prepared to displace or assume control of operations, as required. 2-22. When notified to prepare for deployment, one of the two TAC CPs (the ready TAC) will maintain a higher-readiness posture, configuring equipment and personnel into an EECP package to fit constrained lift, with the other equipment and personnel prepared to follow. The other TAC CP supports joint and Army training. A typical deployment sequence for a division might be as follows: Initially, a consolidated CP (main and one or both TACs) provides C2 of pre-deployment preparation, mission rehearsals, collaborative planning and virtual teaming with higher headquarters, and initial phases of unit deployment. During the initial phases of deployment, the division may form an ad hoc EECP from the ready TAC with additional staff augmentation and deploy the EECP early in the deployment sequence; the remainder of the first TAC CP follows, linking up with the EECP in the division area of operation (AO) to form a fully functional TAC CP. While the EECP and the remainder of the first TAC CP is deploying, the consolidated division CP monitors deployment of subordinate units, controls the deployment of the remainder of the division headquarters, and coordinates with the gaining ASCC, corps, or controlling joint headquarters. The commander determines the initial locations and the sequence and timing of deployment and displacement for all CPs. The commander deploys himself and elements of the command group forward once a fully functional CP is established in the division AO. 2-23. There are a variety of TAC CP employment options, to include the following: The two TAC CPs may alternate between phases within a major operation. One TAC CP controls current operations, while the other rehearses the upcoming operation. As the next phase of the operation commences, one TAC CP replaces the other and the cycle repeats. The commander may distribute the two TAC CPs into separate areas (for example, on different islands in an island group or into noncontiguous AOs during a stability operation). In a widespread offensive operation, the commander may designate one TAC CP to control the operations of forces eliminating bypassed enemy forces within small cities along the line of operations while the other TAC CP controls the decisive operation. In this example, one TAC is acting as a subordinate task force of the division and would be subordinate to the controlling TAC. The division commander may designate one TAC CP to control air assault operations conducted by some elements of the division, while the other controls the continuing operations of the rest of the division. The division commander may distribute control of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations between CPs in complex operations. For example, the commander may designate TAC 2 to control sustaining operations while TAC 1 controls the decisive and shaping operations. Whichever CP is controlling the decisive operation should also control the shaping operations that are setting the conditions. This ensures the controlling headquarters has visibility over both and can effectively synchronize the entire operation. In protracted operations, the commander may combine the TAC CPs and the main CP into a single consolidated CP in order to increase the capability to control particularly complex tasks that may be performed in the AO. When one of the TACs is not employed, it could be used as a G-3 staff component to plan future operations occurring in the next 24-96 hours, allowing current operations to focus on the next 24 hours and G-5 plans to focus beyond 96 hours, or use a similar time horizon determined by the commander. The two TAC CPs can employ forces and deploy forces simultaneously. One TAC CP can be dedicated to controlling the deployment of forces into the AO while the other TAC CP is in the AO controlling initial operations.
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2-24. The TAC CPs receive a task-organized support element consisting of security (not resourced by DAshould come from a non-deploying BCT), communications, and life support provided by the STB. When the TAC CP and main CP are geographically dispersed, the STB commander, the security company commander (if resourced), and the headquarters company commander from the STB each go to a different CP and are responsible for supervising the STB slice providing life support, security, communications, vehicle maintenance, field feeding, transportation, supply and medical support activities for the respective CPs.
Functional and Integrating Cells

2-25. The staff at each TAC CP is organized into cells by warfighting function. The cell structure of the two TAC CPs is almost identical in both function and personnel assigned. Each TAC CP is organized into the following functional cells: Movement and maneuver. Fires Support. Intelligence. Protection. Sustainment. Command, control, communications, and computers (C4). 2-26. The TAC CP elements merge to form integrating cells as required. Essentially the TAC CP functions as one large current operations integrating cell. TAC CP elements may be task organized by the G-3 to form working groups or other temporary matrix organizations to resolve specific problems. For example, when unanticipated opportunities or threats arise, the G-3 may form a future operations (FUOPS) working group from the various functional elements in the TAC to develop branch plans and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to address them. This FUOPS function is a natural extension of the current operations function to an undetermined time in the near to mid-term planning/execution horizon, but within the scope of the current division mission and OPORD. The G-3 may assign branch planning functions to ad hoc FUOPS working groups in either of the TACs or in the current operations element at the main CP or, if sufficient time is available, the G-3 may request that a given branch plan be assigned to G-5 plans in the main CP for development and production of appropriate FRAGOs. If the situation requires a full MDMP analysis and the issuance of a new OPORD, the planning task is ordinarily done by G-5 plans at the main CP. See FMI 5-0.1 for more information on FUOPS, integrating cells and working groups.
Movement and Maneuver Cell

2-27. The movement and maneuver cell is led by the G-3 current operations element and consists of the following elements; G-2 operations, aviation, staff judge advocate (SJA), and when assigned, a United States Marine Corps (USMC) operations element. Each of these elements are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. 2-28. G-3 Current Operations Element. This element coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes efforts of all organic and supporting Army and joint assets conducting and supporting the current division operation. The Current Operations Element Serves as the staff coordinator for the maneuver. Synchronizes the actions of the staff for all other task areas within the TAC CPs. Allocates resources and establishes priorities in support of division operations. Synchronizes the current fight and recommends adjustments including commitment of the reserve. Makes adjustment and execution decisions during the conduct of operations, when delegated these decisions by the commander. Prepares and issues warning orders (WARNOs) and FRAGOs to support the current operation. Performs limited branch planning for short suspense branches off the current operation.
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Passes the requirement to conduct branch planning to the other TAC or to G-5 (Plans) for branches that are not short suspense or are sufficiently complex to require a full MDMP. Coordinates operations with higher headquarters and adjacent units. Coordinates with the G-5 (Plans) element in the main CP to synchronize future operations and the transition from the current operation to a future operation without loss of momentum and unit integrity. Manages the division's terrain. Maintains and displays the COP. Coordinates joint, interagency, and multinational efforts that support the divisions current operations. 2-29. The division G-3 is normally the officer-in-charge (OIC) of one TAC and the deputy G-3 is normally the OIC of the other TAC. A DCG is the senior officer at each TAC. The current operations cell performs as the basis of the joint operations center when the division is designated as a JTF. 2-30. G-2 Operations Element. This element serves as the 24-hour intelligence element in current operations. They integrate intelligence products and collection management into current operations. 2-31. Aviation Element. The aviation elements at the TACs coordinate all issues involving Army aviation and the current operation. The aviation element Coordinates and synchronizes the execution of operational and tactical aviation maneuver and support for maneuver and sustainment operations. Coordinates and synchronizes close combat attack, mobile strike, vertical envelopment, air assault, battle command on the move using aerial platforms, aerial MEDEVAC and key personnel aerial transportation. Coordinates and synchronizes air movements and countermobility operations using Army aviation assets. Provides Army aviation input and receives and distributes information from the joint air tasking order (ATO). Provides aviation expertise to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); protection; sustainment; and C4 meetings and working groups. 2-32. Army Airspace Command and Control Element. The A2C2 elements at the TACs are the division headquarters only airspace control planning and synchronization elements. The main CP does not have an A2C2 element. A2C2 planning support to the Main is provided by the TAC 1 A2C2 element. The TAC A2C2 element Plans and requests immediate airspace control measures (ACMs). Deconflicts airspace through the appropriate control authority. Controls airspace use in the division AO. Writes the A2C2 annex and maintains the A2C2 estimate. Supports the fire support element A2C2 requirements. Provides A2C2 staff support. Serves as A2C2 point-of-contact for subordinate units. Inputs future airspace control order (ACO)/ATO requirements. Coordinates sensor and tactical digital information link coverage with the Air and Missile Defense (AMD) element. 2-33. Each TAC A2C2 element is the primary A2C2 POC for the subordinate BCTs and brigades under their control. The controlling TAC A2C2 element oversees the subordinate TACs A2C2 element and is responsible for managing the coordination, integration, and regulation of division airspace. When the division is under the control of an ASCC, the controlling TACs A2C2 element will coordinate all planned airspace requirements with the ASCC A2C2 element while keeping the subordinate TAC A2C2 element
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informed. The controlling TAC A2C2 element is responsible for accumulating and submitting the division input to the joint ACO. 2-34. SJA Element. This element provides 24-hour legal support and advice to the staff at the TAC CPs. The SJA element provides legal advice in the following areas: Rules of engagement (ROE). Law of war. Lawfulness of targets and weapons. Reports of alleged violations of the law of war (war crimes). Treatment of detainees, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), noncombatants, and refugees. Relationships with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 2-35. CMO Element. The CMO element at the TAC is very lean with only one NCO assigned. It may be augmented with CA personnel from the supporting CA battalion or with a civil affairs planning team (CAPT) that normally would support a brigade. It coordinates CMO affecting division current operations with the CAPTs supporting the BCTs and other brigades.
Fire Support Cell

2-36. The fire support cell is led by the personnel in the fires element and consists of the fires, information operations (IO), Army airspace command and control (A2C2), and the ALO elements. The fire support cell synchronizes the execution and makes adjustments to the divisions fire support plan for Army indirect fires, offensive IO, close air support (CAS) and other joint fires. During planning with the main CP fires element, it establishes target priorities, apportions available joint and multinational operational firepower resources, develops high-payoff targets (HPTs), produces targeting decisions into a collection plan, and when operating as a JTF establishes Joint Force Targeting Guidance. The fire support cell and other members of the targeting team identify when major changes in the tactical situation warrant reevaluation of the high-payoff target list (HPTL). The targeting team continually assesses the current situation with the current operations cell. In coordination with the plans cell, it validates and refines the future fires needs of the division. At the same time, the team reevaluates and updates the HPTL, battle damage assessment (BDA) requirements, and target selection standards (TSSs) as needed. The TAC fire support cells Participate in the division targeting process. Coordinate operational and tactical targeting. Request and coordinate CAS and air interdiction (AI). Synchronize Army indirect fires, offensive IO, and joint fires. Conduct fire support and assessment, and recommend reattack. Coordinate fire support operations with maneuver and A2C2 elements. Update the fire support estimate and annex. Provide input to FRAGOs. Nominates targets to be collected against to the G-2 for inclusion in the collection plan.
NOTE: Nonlethal fires are any fires that do not directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target and are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, function, and facilities. Psychological operation, electronic warfare (jamming), and other C2 countermeasures are all nonlethal fire options. Nonlethal weapons are weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. (See FM 1-02.) 2-37. The fire support cell, in coordination with the tactical air control party (TACP) and other members of the TAC, manages fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs). With the current operations cell, the fires
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element and TACP continuously evaluate current FSCMs and recommend the movement or cancellation of measures. They will also recommend the immediate establishment of any new FSCMs. The current operations cell, fire support cell and TACP review planned FSCMs, evaluate their validity, and recommend changes as necessary. 2-38. The fire support cell contains two field artillery intelligence officers (FAIOs) who coordinate closely with the G-2 target development element. These two warrant officers provide the fires expertise necessary for the intelligence element to conduct quality targeting. 2-39. IO Element. The division G-7 leads the IO element at TAC 1 and an IO operations officer leads the element at TAC 2. The IO element Advises the commander and staff on operational and tactical IO. Integrates IO planning, operation, and targeting to achieve the commanders intent. Synchronizes JFLC and ARFOR IO when required. Writes IO input to FRAGOs. Coordinates military deception operations. Coordinates operations security, computer network operations (NETOPS), and psychological operations. If the division is serving as an ARFOR, JFLC or JTF, participates in joint IO planning and coordination. 2-40. ALO Element. The ALO element is formed around a division TACP. USAF personnel at division function primarily in a planning and execution role, providing USAF operational expertise for planning and execution of Army operations. A seven member TACP will normally be located at each TAC CP to assist in airpower planning and execution. Manning will include two ALOs, two intelligence personnel, two JTACs, and one terminal air control coordination specialist. The air component planning and execution element will normally be located in or adjacent to the fires element and will maintain close communications with G-3 current operations, A2C2, and the analysis and control element (ACE). Specific air component planning and execution roles include the following: Execute air and space power in accordance with C/JFACC guidance and division commanders priority, timing and desired effects within the Division AO. Provide expert liaison function to inform the commander and staff on the capabilities and limitations of air and space power. Accomplish training and mission rehearsal under anticipated operational conditions with USAF and other Service counterparts. Plan, prepare for, execute, and assess airpower (for example, CAS, air intelligence, and suppression of enemy air defenses) operating within its the division AO out to the fire support coordination line (FSCL). Prioritizes, coordinates and deconflicts air and space power executing missions in the division AO, in accordance with the division commanders priorities . Prevent fratricide through constant situational understanding of a multitude of friendly locations, enemy positions, and FSCMs. Provide applicable updates to the COP for air assets tasked to support ground operations. Ensure all subordinate TACPs and JTACs know and understand JOA ROE. Deconflict both air and ground assets by monitoring the COP of both friendly and enemy forces reported by intelligence and collaborative tools linked to other C2 units. Through the use of collaborative tools and secure communications, provide timely and efficient processing of air support requests. Provide fast reaction to immediate air support requests, control kill box operations, and integrate and coordinate air support missions (for example, ISR, EW, airlift) within the division commanders AO. Exercise OPCON or TACON of all JTACs operating in the division AO.
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Exercise OPCON of USAF TACPs operating in the division AO. Collect and report BDA and weapons effects in division AO.
Intelligence Cell
2-41. The deputy G-2 or an assistant G-2 leads the intelligence cell of the TAC CPs. This cell is subdivided into several elements with specific ISR related functions. 2-42. G-2 Headquarters Element. This headquarters element serves as the requirements manager for division organic and attached collection assets. Their primary function is to provide the commander and staff with actionable intelligence. 2-43. Target Development Element. This element develops and nominates priority target sets. They coordinate with the fire support cell and participate in the targeting meeting. They ensure targets are prioritized and sequenced in current operations and future plans. 2-44. Fusion Element. This element provides commanders and staff with the COP and actionable intelligence by performing the following functions: Conduct situation development. Prepare combat assessments. Develop and update the threat portion of the COP and the intelligence running estimate. Integrate and synchronize assets to optimize collection. 2-45. Communications Integration and Administration Element. This element establishes and maintains internal and external communications and ensures communications security (COMSEC) compliance. 2-46. Distributed Tactical Exploitation stores, displays and disseminates signal measurement and signatures intelligence analysis and products. These multi-source requirements (CCIR). System (DTES) Element. This section receives, processes, intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and (MASINT). They provide advanced geospatial intelligence products are used to answer commander's critical information
2-47. Battlefield Weather Element. USAF battlefield weather personnel provide required weather support to each division headquarters, normally through a force tailored combination of overwatch and inplace liaisons. An element is located at each TAC CP and provides weather observation, forecast support, and analysis of weather impact on the current operation.
Protection Cell
2-48. The protection cell consists of elements from the division provost marshal (PM); chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); AMD; and engineer staff sections. The commander designates the senior officer from the subordinate elements as the chief of protection Warfighting function. These staff elements coordinate closely with the CSB(ME) and other protection related supporting units, as well as the other functional cells throughout the division CPs. The protection cell develops and maintains the commanders critical defended asset list. The protection cell also coordinates explosive ordinance disposal issues. 2-49. AMD Elements. The chief of AMD operations leads the TAC 1 AMD element and the deputy chief of AMD operations leads the TAC 2 AMD element. The AMD element Advises the commander and staff on all AMD-related issues. Monitors current enemy air and missile activities. Provides threat early warning. Battle-tracks friendly AMD operations including unit positioning, status, coverage fans, sensor plans, changes in the ATO, priority target lists, ACMs, ROE, and number and type of missiles available.
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Coordinates current operations of subordinate AMD forces and passes critical AMD information. Ensures the direction of beyond-line-of-sight/non-line-of-sight AMD fires complies with the Joint Integrated Air Defense System. Assists with airspace coordination and execution, focusing on defense readiness conditions, air defense warning and weapon control status. Provides and manages linkage to the joint Surveillance Integration Automation Project, managing and developing the COP into SU. Synchronizes current operational protection of the third dimension. Coordinates division current operations with the Deputy Area Air Defense Commander (DAADC). Supports C2 system integration of AMD functions with A2C2 and the fire support cell. 2-50. CBRN Operations Element. A single CBRN operations officer with a staff of NCOs leads this element, which conducts the following actions: Advises the commander and staff on all CBRN issues. Coordinates immediate CBRN logistics functions. Provides CBRN response analysis. Writes immediate CBRN defense FRAGOS. Produces obscuration and flame estimates. Coordinates CBRN defense. Coordinates obscuration and flame operations. Recommends employment of chemical defense assets. Supports the CBRN warning and reporting system. Provides CBRN defense life support to the TAC CP. 2-51. PM Elements. The TACs PM elements are each led by a deputy PM. The PM elements Advise the commander and staff on military police (MP) issues. Coordinate MP support for current operations. Tactical MP requirements. MP support to area security and protection operations. Maneuver and mobility support operations. Internment and resettlement operations. Dislocated civilian resettlement. Law and order operations. Police intelligence operations. Synchronize MP operations between CPs. Write the MP annex to branches. Manage the DOD EPW and detainee program. Establish high-risk detainee operations. Provide populace and resource control. Assign protective services for high risk personnel. 2-52. Engineer Operations Element. Engineer operations officers lead this element at both TACs and are supported by a staff of NCOs. This element Advises the commander and staff on all assured mobility and sustainment engineer operations. When required, coordinates and synchronizes JFLCC and ARFOR engineer operations. Synchronizes engineer operations between CPs.
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Coordinates tactical engineer support for battles and engagements. Assists in the intelligence collection and effect targeting process. Participates in reconnaissance and surveillance and targeting meetings. Writes engineer portion of FRAGOs. Synchronizes and coordinates mobility, countermobility, survivability and general engineering operations. Provides reach back to the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) knowledge centers. Maintains the engineer portion of the running estimate based on current operations. Coordinates explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) support.
Sustainment Cell
2-53. The sustainment cells at the TACs are lean organizations that rely on the main CP to conduct the majority of sustainment functions. The cell consists of two G-4 logistics operations officers capable of monitoring the current situation and coordinating issues with the robust staff at the main for planning, preparation, and execution. 2-54. The surgeon element at the main CP is capable of sending a four person medical team to each TAC CP for the purpose of planning and preparing the execution of all force health protection functions. The commander decides whether to move this team forward to the TACs or to retain the team at the main CP.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Cell

2-55. The division G-6 leads the C4 NETOPS cell at TAC 1 and the deputy G-6 leads the cell at TAC 2. This cell Advises the commander and staff on all matters concerning C4 operations. Conducts IM- and manages NETOPS. Coordinates with the G-3 to establish procedures for collecting, processing, storing, displaying and disseminating relevant information (RI) and using information systems (INFOSYS) to display the COP. Plans, prepares, executes and assesses the development of the COP within CPs. Coordinates with staff sections to ensure information quality criteria are maintained. Controls organic communications systems that interface with the global information grid. Incorporates and integrates network management, information dissemination management, and information assurance (IA) functions. Coordinates with task organized section of the STB NETOPS company to ensure connectivity is maintained between the TAC and all other CPs, joint supporting assets, and higher headquarters.
USAF Air Support Operations Center

2-56. The USAF Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) is the air component commanders center to effectively control CAS. An ASOC will normally be located at the division when the division is operating on a separate line of operations and geographically separated from its higher headquarters or when the division is the JFLC or JTF. Doctrinally, the ASOC is co-located with the senior Army echelons FSE (JP 3-09.3). Actual placement is guided by three principles: The ASOC is a C2 center and derives synergy and efficiency by the fact that a group of highly trained airmen are working together, in concert. The ASOC will not be split up in order to colocate with multiple CPs, other than when it is displacing. While displacing there will be some degradation in capability. The ASOC needs to be located in a relatively secure location. Due to the firepower the ASOC can potentially bring to bear, its loss due to enemy action could have serious consequences for the ground forces.
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The need for a relatively secure location has to be balanced by the ASOC's primary limitation. In order to control airpower, it needs to be able to communicate with the aircraft, which in most cases remains restricted by UHF/VHF LOS. Optimistically, in a billiard-ball world, this could be as much as 100nm with an aircraft at 10,000-feet or higher. However, factors such as radio power, antenna size, and others have to be considered. Also, the distance is described as an arc from the transmitter. In short, the furthest corner of the airspace the ASOC can control should not be short of the FSCL or there is likelihood of creating a sanctuary from air attack for enemy forces. In mountainous terrain, these distances may be considerably less, depending on the elevation of the radio antennas in relation to the surrounding terrain. Radio relays, Joint STARS, and airborne FACs are all means by which the ASOC may extend these distances on a limited basis. In addition, future technologies may overcome this physical limitation. 2-57. If located at the division, normally, the ASOC will co-locate with the TAC CP that is controlling operations; however the ASOC may locate at the main CP. The ASOC commander should recommend the best location for positioning the ASOC to the division commander based on the factors of METT-TC. The ASOC is normally a 54-person center that provides the following functions: Controls CAS assets within the division AO. Manages Air Interdiction assets within the division AO. Processes immediate and preplanned CAS requests. Deconflicts ACMs and aircraft. Allocates attack aircraft to TACP terminal attack controllers in accordance with the division commanders priorities. Manages the Joint Air Request Net and the Tactical Air Direction Net.
EARLY ENTRY COMMAND POST

2-58. The EECP is an ad hoc organization comprised of equipment and personnel from the staff of the TAC CPs and the main CP. One of the TAC CPs provides the base from which staff officers are added or subtracted based on mission requirements to form the EECP. The EECP should be staffed with a mix of current operations personnel, planners, and logisticians to be able to coordinate the reception of the division and plan its initial operations.
MAIN CP
2-59. The main CP primarily conducts future planning, analysis for current and future operations, sustainment coordination and other staff functions. It is capable of controlling operations for a limited time when a TAC CP is not available, however, the main CP requires augmentation from a TAC CP to C2 operations for a sustained time period. The division staff at the main CP, operate under the general supervision of the division chief of staff (COS). The main CP serves as the primary planning CP and coordination CP for logistics and sustainment to include human resources, legal, resource management, PM operations, CMO, public affairs (PA), and inspector general (IG) support.
Purpose
2-60. The main CP performs the following functions: Serves as the primary plans, analysis and sustainment coordination CP. Monitors and assesses operations for impact on future operations. Conducts planning for major operations and battles. Writes OPLANs. Writes branch plans as requested by the G-3 at the TAC CP. Integrates intelligence activities into both current and future operations. Produces multi-source intelligence products. Produces terrain products.
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Conducts IM. Coordinates and manages force structure to include request for forces and equipment. Participates in the targeting process. Coordinates CMO activities in the AO. Prepares and maintains division staff estimates, plans, and orders to support future operations. Plans and synchronizes all sustainment operations. Controls operations when a TAC CP is not available. Prepares all reports required by higher headquarters. Controls units and performs other C2 functions as designated in paragraph five (C2) of the division operations order. 2-61. The main CP is much larger than either TAC CP and is functionally organized into a mix of warfighting function and integrating cells to facilitate staff communications and interaction (see Figure 22). Not all warfighting functions are organized into a pure warfighting function cell such as is the case in the TAC CPs but all Warfighting functions are represented or available to serve temporarily in the current operations and plans integrating cells. The arrangement of the main CP facilitates work and security, smoothes traffic flow, and takes advantage of cover and concealment. The main CP does not have the organic equipment to conduct C2 on the move so it must operate in a stationary mode. The main CP, as currently resourced, is 50-percent mobile and requires two lifts to displace with organic transportation assets. Detailed internal staff SOPs outline CP configurations and functions of individuals assigned. Flexible configurations accommodate the use of different types of existing buildings found in the AO and losses of equipment. Both temporary and long-term configurations should be planned. 2-62. The primary considerations in positioning the main CP are communications, survivability, and accessibility. The commander determines the best location for the main CP based on the above considerations and the C2 plan for use of the TAC CPs. When deployed to an AO, the main CP is normally located in areas that reduce exposure to enemy surveillance and long-range indirect fires. The main CP does not have CP platforms for work areas so the main CP could be established in built-up areas, using maintenance facilities, warehouses, or other buildings large enough to accommodate all personnel and equipment. Support assets task organized from the STB co-locate at the main CP. The organic tactical vehicles and communications equipment are dispersed and camouflaged to reduce their electronic and visual signature. When selecting a location for the main CP, considerations must be made for proximity to a helicopter landing zone. See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of considerations for locating CPs.
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Figure 2-2. Organization of Main CP 2-63. The commander determines where to locate the main CP. A few options for locating the main CP include: With either TAC CP. This is the preferred option when a fixed facility is available and the situation does not require rapid displacement of both TAC CPs. With one of the brigades of the division. This usually is a CSB(ME) or a sustainment brigade with its headquarters located in the division rear area. With the aviation brigade. This allows for dispersed division staff and commanders to reach the main CP quicker. Within the ASCC or corps rear area, in close proximity to a fixed-wing air base. This facilitates coordination and meetings between the main CP and other elements of the joint force, including the ASCC or corps.
Main CP Cells and Elements

2-64. The main CP is organized by function into the following cells and elements: Headquarters element. Plans cell. Intelligence cell. Current operations cell. Coordinating and special staff cell.
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2-65. The main CPs functional elements are organized into cells. The cells are scalable to accommodate staff augmentation when required, such as when the division is assigned the mission to perform the duties of an operational headquarters (JFLC or JTF) in a smaller scale contingency. The arrangement of functional cells within the main CP supports the temporary movement of staff within the main CP. Headquarters Element 2-66. The headquarters element provides administrative support for the division commander, serves as the focal point for liaisons, and orchestrates a synchronized staff effort. The headquarters element consists of the COS, the secretary of the general staff (SGS), organic liaison officers (LNOs), and supporting personnel. The COS is the commanders principal assistant for supervising, and training the staff except in areas the commander reserves. The commander normally delegates authority to the COS to manage the staff. The COS frees the commander from routine details and passes pertinent information and insight from the staff to the commander and from the commander to the staff. (FM 6-0, Appendix D, details staff duties and responsibilities of the COS, and Appendix E details LNO duties.) 2-67. The SGS assists the COS by planning and supervising special conferences and meetings, directing preparation for, and monitoring execution of itineraries for distinguished visitors to the headquarters, and acting as the informal point of contact for LNOs. 2-68. Receiving and dispatching liaison teams are critical functions of the headquarters element. LNOs provide and disseminate RI and represent adjacent, attached, OPCON, supporting, and in some cases supported units, at the main CP. (FM 6-0 discusses the duties and functions of LNOs.) 2-69. The division may also be augmented with LNOs from other governmental agencies (OGAs), NGOs, international organizations, and joint or multinational headquarters. (JP 3-16, JP 3-8 and FM 41-10, Appendix A, provide listings of prominent NGOs and international organizations.) These LNOs will be located within CPs and cells, as necessary, to best facilitate operations. Plans Cell 2-70. The plans cell is the heart of the main CP and is led by the G-5 (Plans and Policy), and is responsible for planning all future operations (see Figure 2-3). The plans cell consists of a plans element and a functional plans element. The plans element is led by the G-5 and contains several specialists including a School of Advanced Military Studies qualified planner, an Operations Research & System Analysis officer, a strategic plans officer, a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System officer, and two NCOs. The functional plans element contains the functional area planners from the following specialties: Aviation. Fires. IO. Deception. Engineers. Military intelligence. Logistics. 2-71. The plans cell is responsible for planning operations for the mid- to long-range planning horizons. It develops plans, orders, branches and sequels. They monitor the COP and stay abreast of the current operation by coordinating with the current operations cell and plan for sequels accordingly. When sufficient time is available before execution and at the request of a TAC CP, the plans cell may write branches for the current operation. Plans cell members use the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) for developing OPLANs and OPORDs. Each staff officer represents his functional area during the MDMP from receipt of the mission to orders production. (FM 5-0 discusses the MDMP in detail.) The plans cell Produces OPLANs, OPORDs, and WARNOs to transition to future operations. Closely coordinates with the current operations cell to transition from current to future operations.
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When requested, writes branch plans of the current operation for the G-3 at the TAC CP. Participates in the targeting process. Performs long-range assessment of an operations progress.
Figure 2-3. Plans Cell at Main CP 2-72. The plans cell normally plans operations to be conducted in the next phase of the operation which normally occurs in the units contingency or orientation planning horizon. (See FM 5-0 for planning horizons.) However, they may be tasked by the commander to plan operations in the current phase or nearterm planning horizon. When this occurs, the division staff may be tailored and additional officers temporarily assigned to the plans cell to conduct short-range commitment planning. These officers may come for a TAC CP or the other staff elements at the main CP. 2-73. When planning requires functional area expertise that is not resident full time in the plans division, an plans working group is convened and outside expertise resident at the main CP is temporarily called in to support the planning effort. The other coordinating, special, and personal staff sections within the main CP support the plans cell, as required, to include G-1, G-4, G-6, CMO, Provost Marshal Office, AMD, space, surgeon, PA, CBRN, SJA, chaplain, and USAF planners. When the division is serving in a joint environment and conducting operations with other services, the plans cell may be augmented with United States Navy and USMC planners. Intelligence Cell 2-74. The intelligence cell requests, receives, and analyzes information from all sources to produce and distribute combat intelligence. The intelligence cell is built around what was previously the MI battalion ACE and includes the USAF battlefield weather input (see Figure 2-4). It conducts continuous IPB to support future operations planning and target development. The intelligence cell develops and tracks critical targets, performs all-source analysis, manages collection, and produces and maintains IPB products. The following paragraphs detail the elements that form the cell and provide a brief description of their functions.
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2-75. Headquarters Element. This element contains the division G-2 and deputy G-2. They provide intelligence for the current operation and future plans. They also manage requirements for organic and attached collection assets. Their main purpose is to provide actionable intelligence to the command.
Figure 2-4. Intelligence Cell at the Main CP 2-76. Special Security Office Element. The Special Security Office Element exercises oversight of sensitive compartmented information reception, transmission, and storage. 2-77. Target Development Element. This element develops and nominates priority targets for engagement with nonlethal systems and lethal indirect fires. They participate in the targeting process with the fire support cell to ensure targets are prioritized and sequenced into current operations and future plans. This element receives two FAIO from the fire support cell to provide expertise in lethal-indirect fire operations. 2-78. Collection Management Element. This element monitors collection assets and develops the collection plan. They also integrate and synchronize assets to optimize collection. 2-79. Division Tactical Exploitation System (DTES) Element. This element receives, processes, exploits, and disseminates SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT information and products. They provide advanced geospatial intelligence analysis and products. These multi-source products are used to answer the commanders critical information requirements. 2-80. Distributed Common Ground Station-Army (CGS) Element. This element receives IMINT and SIGINT from overhead collection platforms. They serve as the downlink from UASs, GUARDRAIL, and JSTARS.
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2-81. Fusion Element. This element conducts situation development, prepares combat assessments, develops, and updates the threat portion of the COP and maintains the intelligence running estimate. They provide the commander and staff with actionable intelligence. 2-82. Communications Integration Element. This element establishes communications with outside elements and maintains internal and external digital communications functions. They also exercise COMSEC oversight. 2-83. SIGINT Element. This element conducts SIGINT analysis, electronic preparation of the battlefield , and tasking of division SIGINT systems. Their overall purpose is to provide single-source intelligence to the G-2 Fusion element as part of the multi-disciplined intelligence picture. 2-84. G-2X Element. This element advises the senior intelligence officer and commander on employment of counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) assets and interfaces with OGA to synchronize CI and HUMINT operations. Their main purpose is to synchronize all tactical and national CI and HUMINT assets in the divisions AO. 2-85. Counter Intelligence Coordination Authority Element. This element provides technical control and oversight for CI assets in the AO. They deconflict CI activities between other services and OGA. 2-86. Human Intelligence Operations Element. This element provides technical control for all HUMINT assets in the AO. They deconflict HUMINT collection between military and OGA. 2-87. Language Coordination Element. The Language Coordination element is the focal point to obtain and orchestrate employment of contract linguists within the division AOs. The division language coordination element directs the integration of contract linguists into subordinate units. This element conducts initial training on Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the United States Army and operational security for all incoming linguists, and fulfills the following tasks: Determines all foreign languages (spoken and written) and dialects in which proficiency is needed across the division to support mission accomplishment. Identifies linguist requirements to support intelligence operations and collections. Consolidates linguist requirements to eliminate redundancy. Recommends linguistic priorities of effort and support to maximize a limited resource. Contracts local-hire linguists with English-language abilities to facilitate operations within the AO and enhance cultural awareness and SU to meet division language requirements. Coordinates security investigations of local-hire linguists to support operations security and force protection. 2-88. Battlefield Weather Element. USAF BW personnel provide required weather support to the main CP, normally through a force tailored combination of overwatch and in-place liaisons. In conjunction with the ACE and geospatial information and services (GI&S) team, BW forces integrate weather information into the IPB. 2-89. Geospatial Information and Services Element. The GI&S element, located in or near the main CP, supports IPB by producing the combined obstacle and related terrain analysis overlays. It supports the planning cell with analysis of traffic possibilities, routes, choke points, avenues of approach and obstacles. The element supports the G-2 collection manager with visible area infiltration routes, landing zones and drop zones, cover and concealment analysis for positioning intelligence collectors, and developing longrange surveillance unit target folders. It supports targeting with line-of-sight, mobility, and cover and concealment studies, and structural information on man-made targets. The element also provides terrain products to subordinate units on request and is capable of sending a two person terrain visualization support team to a TAC CP when required. 2-90. ISR Operations Element. This element serves as the intelligence element of the current operations cell. They conduct interface between the G-2 and G-3 providing intelligence to the operations battle captain and division COS for use in decision making.
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Current Operations Cell 2-91. The current operations cell provides information on the current status of the division to all staff members at the main CP. Within the current operations cell, information is exchanged and the activities of the entire staff are coordinated. From here, the COS provides guidance to the staff and supervises the activities of all cells in the main CP. The current operations cell displays the COP and conducts shift change and battle update briefings. 2-92. The current operations cell is multifunctional, composed of representation from maneuver, fires and effects, the PM, engineers, AMD, aviation and space (see Figure 2-5). The current operations cell of the main CP normally only monitors the current operation and updates the staff at the main. However, with augmentation from a TAC it controls operations when a TAC CP is not available.
Figure 2-5. Current Operations Cell at Main CP 2-93. G-3, Operations Element. The G-3 operations element forms the nucleus of the current operations cell. When required, all staff sections present at the main CP provide representatives to the current operations cell. The G-3 operations officer has responsibility for the overall function of the current operations element. The COS assigns tasks to other main CP cells and elements concerning requirements for their inputs and contributions necessary for the current operations cell to accomplish its functions. The G-3 operations element Monitors the tactical situation to include the status of friendly forces. Maintains information about the current status of the division. Receives and assesses information about the tactical situation from the TAC CPs. Maintains communication with the TAC CPs, MCG, and subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters. Provides current situation information to other CP cells, and to higher, lower, supporting, supported, and adjacent units. Controls tactical operations when a TAC is not available. Receives and actions all incoming messages, orders, requests for information, and taskings from higher headquarters, the TACs, adjacent and subordinate units. Provides updates to the Main CP staff reference the current situation during MDMP. 2-94. Fires Element. The fires element is located in the division main, plans the production of effects resulting from the application of indirect lethal fires and offensive IO. This element synchronizes the planning of fires and effects, Army indirect fires, joint fires and offensive IO to support the commanders intent through physical destruction, information and denial, enemy system collapse, and erosion of enemy
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will. The fires element translates the commanders intent into tasks to subordinate units and parameters for automated systems in support of division operations. The fires element conducts mission planning analysis, COA development, coordinates production of staff estimates, produces the fire support plan, and produces the fire and effects estimate and annex. The fires element and other members of the targeting team analyzes enemy COAs and identifies basic high-value targets at the same time. As the staff wargames friendly COAs, the targeting team develops initial proposals on HPTs and attack guidance. After the commander selects the final COA and issues further guidance, the targeting team Refines and prioritizes the HPTL. Develops the AGM. Submits these products to the commander for approval. 2-95. In coordination with the TAC 1 and TAC 2 FE fires elements, it establishes target priorities, apportions joint and multinational fires, develops HPTs, and when acting as a JTF provides joint force targeting guidance. In concert with the TAC 1 and TAC 2 fires elements and the ISR Target Development Element, it produces a targeting collection plan. The fires element does not produce division OPLANs or OPORDs. Rather, it provides input to the G-5 and its products are incorporated into the fully coordinated OPLANs and OPORDs produced by G-5. Within the plans section, fires element representatives, and TACP personnel develop and recommend FSCMs for the commanders approval as part of the OPLAN/OPORD development process. The recommendation includes the measures location, establishment duration, movement, and cancellation. These FSCMs may include: The divisions recommendation for the FSCL, if used. Free fire areas. Kill boxes. Airspace coordination areas. No fire areas. Restrictive fire areas. Restrictive fire lines. 2-96. Air and Missile Defense Operations Element. Synchronizes and monitors theater and joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) AMD elements. This element is the principal AMD member for all targeting boards and the principal liaison to JIM airspace control authority nodes through virtual networks. It monitors the Single Integrated Air Picture and AMD defense design based on recommended AMD priorities. It updates aerial IPB and recommends targets. It battle tracks AMD forces and recommends changes of mission or support. When a TAC is not available, this element is responsible for current AMD operations to support the division commanders concept of the operation. The AMD element provides a representative to plans, IO, and targeting meetings. 2-97. Engineer Element. This element monitors all mobility and sustainment engineer operations. It participates in planning meetings and boards and provides reach back to USACE knowledge centers. It maintains the engineer portion of the running estimate based on current operations. This engineer element locates in the current operations cell and provides representatives to the other cells as required. The engineer element provides a representative to plans, IO, and targeting meetings. When division is operating as a JTF or ARFOR, it coordinates and synchronizes joint and ARFOR engineer operations and coordinates administrative control and Army support to theater forces, as required. 2-98. Aviation Element. The aviation element monitors all aspects of current operations as pertaining to the divisions aviation assets. This element maintains the aviation portion of the running estimate containing the status of all aviation forces assigned to the division. It also provides aviation personnel to temporary boards or working groups held at the main CP. 2-99. Provost Marshall Element. This element monitors all aspects of MP operations ongoing in the division AO. It maintains the PM-portion of the running estimate and tracks status of all assigned MP assets and other force protection assets. It provides personnel to temporary boards or working groups held at the main CP.
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2-100. Space Support Element. The Space Support Element (SSE) plans and prepares all aspects of space operations affecting the division, its AOs, and ensures the division an enhanced ability to access and exploit all available space capabilities. The SSE provides space expertise and situational awareness to the commander, staff, and subordinate BCTs. This includes the capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities of military, civil, commercial, threat and non-aligned space-based assets. The SSE provides a representative to the plans element to conduct tactical and operational space planning, and in conjunction with the G-2 maintains the space portion of the IPB and order of battle. It prepares the space annex, maintains the space portion of the running estimate, and provides space force enhancement products and support to the staffs of the main and TAC CPs, and BCTs. The SSE provides personnel to the IO, targeting and temporary boards or working groups held in the main CP. The SSE coordinates with SMDC/ARSTRAT for Army space forces and monitors the status of and global missile warning systems. The SSE is also responsible for synchronizing space operations and effects with the TACs and establishing a communication link with the ASCC SSE. When the division operates as a JTF or ARFOR, the SSE establishes direct communication with USSTRATCOM JFCC Space and Global Strike, the JFACC, NGA and other space related agencies. Coordinating and Special Staff Cell 2-101. The Coordinating and Special Staff Cell is located in the main CP under the control of the COS (see Figure 2-6). The staff provides the following functions: Advises the commander and other staff elements on all matters pertaining to their areas of expertise. Assists the G-5 Plans in the preparation of plans and orders, and by preparing estimates in their areas of expertise. Makes recommendations to assist in reaching decisions and establishing policies. Manages information within their area of expertise. 2-102. G-1, Human Resources Element. This element conducts the majority of human resources staff planning and coordination actions. The division G-1 and deputy G-1 manage all personnel actions and functions from this element at the main CP. The G-1 element Integrates personnel service support within the division. Directs the military and civilian personnel systems. Prepares the personnel estimate. Tracks personnel combat power. Manages Soldier readiness programs. Directs other command programs to include Army substance abuse, equal opportunity, safety, and morale, welfare, and recreation. Manages replacement, casualty, and postal operations. Coordinates band activities. 2-103. G-4, Logistics Element. This element conducts the majority of logistical staff planning and coordination actions. The element is organized into several subsections consisting of a headquarters, a CSS effects, maintenance, supply, services, and transportation. This element is the primary link between the division staff and the sustainment brigade supporting the division. The G-4 logistics element Develops the logistic estimate, in support of G-5 (Plans). Develops the movement annex and provides input to the service support annex, in support of G5 (Plans). Develops plans for casualty care, evacuation, medical logistics, and casualty prevention. Tracks critical Class VIII items and coordinate deliveries, as required. Oversees division tactical SOPs, plans, policies, and procedures for all CSS functions. When the division is serving as a JTF, JFLC or ARFOR develops concept of support plans and policy covering all aspects of joint logistics. Accommodates the requirement for TAC 1 and TAC 2 reach back.
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In coordination with the Army Field Support Brigade, oversees contracting management for the division. Serves as the BCT contracting officers link to the Principal Assistant Responsible for
Contracting. Maintains asset and in-transit visibility. Figure 2-6. Coordinating and Special Staff Cells at the Main CP 2-104. G-6, Net Plans Element. The G-6 element is responsible for all matters concerning Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Management (C4IM) operations. C4IM operations include NETOPS and IM. NETOPS include network management, information dissemination management, and IA. The G-6 may be assisted by a NETOPs officer, IA staff manager, IM coordinator, and INFOSYS officer to assist in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing C4IM operations. The C4IM operations element in the main CP Prepares, maintains, and updates the C4IM operations estimates and the C4IM operation portion of plans and orders in support of the G-5 (Plans). Recommends network priorities and locations for division CPs. Ensures that redundant communications means are planned and available to pass time-sensitive critical information. Establishes automation systems administration procedures for all automation software and hardware employed by the division. Plans, prepares, and executes all IA activities within the command. Plans, prepares, and executes the establishment of information network capabilities and services. Coordinates the availability of commercial INFOSYS and services for military use. Manages bandwidth, radio frequency allocations and assignments, and provides spectrum management. Provides IA by Planning and executing information and system security functions.
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Ensuring the appointment of an IA security officer in all elements of the force. Planning, and executing COMSEC measures. Providing IA direction and guidance to IA security coordinators. Develops the CIMP. Establishes procedures for collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and disseminating data and information within the command. Facilitates the staff presentation of RI according to quality criteria of accuracy, timeliness, usability, completeness, precision, and reliability to develop the COP. 2-105. Engineer Element. The engineer element in the main CP plans and coordinates all engineer support within the units AO, including mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations. The engineer element locates in or adjacent to the current operations cell and supports the other cells as required. This element monitors and makes recommendations on all engineering activities to include engineering priorities, efforts, and support for current and future operations. Included are the following functions: Integrates assured mobility. Integrates environmental considerations. 2-106. PM Element. This element consists of three personnel providing the following functions: Advises the division commander and CofS on all matters relating to MP operations. Coordinates MP operations with other division staff elements. Provides planning and coordination for MP functions and missions. Plans tactical and operational MP support for battles and campaigns. Plans long term confinement of US prisoners. Synchronizes MP operations between CPs. Provides guidance and plans for and prepares and executes internment and resettlement operations. Plans detainee operations at the detainee holding area. Coordinates forensic lab support. Provides law enforcement and criminal investigation data management beyond the database within the JOA. Provides links to joint/interagency/multinational organizations, knowledge centers, industry, academia and centers of excellence. Coordinates transportation for detainees from the BCT initial detainee collection point to the division detainee holding area to the higher echelon theater interment facility. Writes detailed MP annexes, plans, estimates and orders in support of the G-5. Provides guidance on nonlethal tactics, weapons, munitions, effects and systems. Coordinates MP specific training and material enhancements. Provides police intelligence and criminal intelligence analysis and coordination (when augmented with Code 50 CID CW2). 2-107. G-8 Financial Management Element. This element consists of four personnel led by the division G-8 and provides the following functions: Develops resource requirements. Prepares, justifies, reconciles, and manages budgets. Identifies, acquires, distributes, and controls funding. Tracks, analyzes, and reports budget execution. Maintains accounting records and capture costs. Establishes a management control process. Establishes and manages financial and resource management programs. Provides stewardship of resources.
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2-108. G-9/CMO Element. This element consists of personnel from the G-9 CA/CMO staff section providing the following functions: Writes CMO annexes for plans and orders in support of the G-5. Reviews OPLANs and concept plans from higher headquarters. Directs and supervises the operations of the CA staff section assigned to the division headquarters. Advises the commander and staff on the allocation and employment of CA units assigned or supporting the division. Conducts detailed analysis of civil considerations in close coordination with other key staff officers. Leads the staff in developing and recommending priority civil information requirements (PCIR). Synchronizes CMO activities with higher headquarters CMO efforts. Requests CA functional specialist augmentation, as required, to plan CMO in support of division full spectrum operations. Establishes a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to conduct interagency collaborative planning and coordination accessible to both US Government and non-US Government agencies. Advises the commander and staff on legal and moral obligations to the local population. Analyzes civilian impact on military operations and the impact of military operations on civilians in the AO. 2-109. CBRN Element. The division chemical officer oversees the CBRN element within the main CP. As the hub of CBRN operations for the division, this element prepares CBRN estimates that address CBRN attacks as well as local toxic industrial material (TIM) facilities and their unique tactical impacts. The CBRN element monitors CBRN equipment status and CBRN support to theater forces. The CBRN element also disseminates contamination overlays and CBRN reports to all units and recommends how to allocate resources and priorities for CBRN support. This element operates the units CBRN warning and reporting system and works closely with the fire support cell. The CBRN element locates in or adjacent to the current operations cell and provides representatives to the plans, targeting, and IO meetings. The CBRN element Prepares and maintains CBRN estimates and the CBRN-portion of plans and orders. Monitors and makes recommendations on all CBRN activities, as well as smoke and flame operations. Receives and issues CBRN warnings and reports. Monitors the location and status of chemical units and assets within the AO. Conducts vulnerability assessments of friendly forces. Assists the G-2 in identifying CBRN intelligence requirements. Evaluates significant TIM facilities in the AO and estimates the effects of accidental or purposeful TIM releases. In conjunction with the fire support cell, advises on employing nuclear weapons maintained by the other services and the effects from employing those weapons. Coordinates and disseminates strike warnings with the fire support cell. Creates, if necessary, NBC-3 reports on friendly strikes against WMD facilities and on strikes due to releases-other-than-attack. Supports planning for sensitive site exploitations. 2-110. Surgeon Element. The division surgeon plan, prepares, and oversees the execution of all medical related activities from the main CP. This elements functions include the following: Advises the commander on health status of the division. Provides the FHP estimate, patient estimates, and medical threat input for the commanders estimate. Prepares the FHP annex for all division plans. (For FHP planning factors, see FM 8-55.)
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Provides reach back capability for the forward deployed surgeons in the TAC CPs. Reviews all OPLANS to identify potential medical hazards associated with geographical locations and climatic conditions. Monitors and coordinates all FHP operations. Manages the division medical troop basis in conjunction with the G-1. Oversees all medical logistics operations for the division. Provides the G-4 (logistics element) a list of medical items that should be a part of the Battle Command Sustainment and Support System commanders tracked items list. Supervises the technical training of medical personnel and combat lifesavers in the division, as required. Monitors and coordinates preventive medicine operations to identify potential medical threats. Monitors the health of the command and advises the commander of preventive medicine measures to counter disease, nonbattle injuries, and other medical threats. Provides technical advice of occupational, environmental health, and medical surveillances, sanitary inspection, and potential CBRN contamination. Ensures that clear and accurate patient records are maintained of all clinical encounters for supported deployed personnel through the use of a DA Form 8007R or through the use of electronic patient records. Determines procedures, techniques, and limitation in the conduct of routine medical care, emergency medical treatment and advanced trauma management. Advises on the health effects of CBRN devices/weapons to include operational exposure guidance. 2-111. PA Element. The PA element is normally located in the headquarters element of the main CP in order to facilitate direct access to the commander. The PA element conducts and executes all PA core processesadvising the commander/staff, and executing PA planning, information strategies, media facilitation, PA training, and community relations. The PA element is augmented by a Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) to establish and operate media operations centers (MOCs), to include ad hoc MOCs. The PA element is also augmented with a Public Affairs Detachment that allows the PAO to establish PAO sections in TACs 1 and 2. The PA element requires the organic capability to communicate within the division and with higher headquarters and subordinate units via secure and non-secure tactical voice and data. The PAO also requires a 24/7 news feed, video conferencing, international commercial voice and real-time COP organic capabilities. The PA element Conducts future and current PA planning and analysis for the commander and staff. Monitors the Global Information Environment/Military Information Environment for pass-back to higher headquarters and impact on division and subordinate units. Monitors/coordinates DOD media, media embeds, and national, international, and local unilateral media requirements. Provides PA support to the division G-9 CMO, for the development and implementation of CA programs. Provides PA coordination and support to the IO element. When augmented by a MPAD, establishes a MOC and controls MPAD operations. When augmented by a MPAD, establishes a PA element in TAC 1 and TAC 2; provides C2 of MPAD. Coordinates and executes media, community relations, and command information requirements and requests within division. Monitors TAC 1 and TAC 2 support of DOD, DA, higher headquarters PA guidance and polices. Conducts press briefings and SME media training. Monitors and coordinates PA operations of attached and subordinate units.
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Conducts security review of PA products. Plans and executes command information radio and TV requirements; provides limited print/radio/TV production ability. 2-112. Division operations are subject to instant coverage by the media and close observation by the American public and international audiences. External and internal PA strategies determine policy decisions that profoundly influence external public support and impact the behavior of Soldiers and other audiences within the divisions AO. 2-113. IG Element. The division IG operates from the main CP. This element conducts inspections, provides assistance, and conducts investigations. 2-114. SJA Element. The division SJA and deputy SJA operate from the main CP. This element provides the majority of SJA functions for the division to include the following: Legal advice to the command and staff on all aspects of operational law. Advise on all administrative actions and investigations. Advise on fiscal law, seizure, requisition, confiscation, purchase and lease of property. Support commanders exercise of General Court-Martial Convening Authority by conducting courts-martial and advising the commander on the disposition of criminal misconduct. Advise on the treatment of detainees, EPWs, noncombatants and refugees. Liaison with the International Red Cross. Conduct Article V tribunals as required by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Provide advice on ROE, law of war, lawfulness of targets, and investigation and disposition of alleged violations of the law of war. Execute foreign claims program for the command. Provide emergency legal assistance to deployed personnel. Advise on legal aspects of civil affairs (CA), CMO, interagency and multinational support, and assists in liaison with NGOs, private voluntary organizations, and international organizations. Provide technical supervision of the brigades operational law teams. 2-115. Chaplain Element. The division chaplain and deputy chaplain operate from the main CP. The chaplain element provides the following functions: Advice on all matters affected by religion and the impact on military operations. Advice to the commander, staff, fire support cell and plans team on impact of indigenous religions on operations. Advice on ethics, moral, and morale as affected by religion. Plan, prepare, and oversee execution of religious support in the AO. Develop and maintain the religious support staff estimate. Write religious support annexes for plans and orders in support of the G-5. Synchronize religious support plans between CPs and with higher and subordinate religious support teams. Provide liaison with indigenous religious leaders and religious affiliated NGOs and international organizations. Provide personal delivery of religious support services, pastoral care, and counseling to the headquarters and STB. 2-116. United States Air Force Elements. USAF TACPs are provided to Army maneuver unit headquarters from battalion through Corps. TACPs advise the command and staff on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of air power. The division ALO commands all USAF personnel within the division and is the air component commander's direct liaison to the division commander. The TACPs are a point-of-contact to coordinate preplanned and immediate air requests and to assist in coordinating air support missions. The division main CP ALO and TACP are located in or adjacent to the fires element. USAF personnel at the division main CP may include, four Master Attack Air Planners, an AI coordinator
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(co-located with the ASOC), an ISR officer, an IO officer, and two Air Mobility Liaison Officers (AMLO). The AMLO is the primary advisor on using airlift resources and is specifically designed and trained to control airlift assets in support of ground troops and operate the airlift advance notification and coordination net. All USAF personnel supporting the division have a direct support relationship to the division and remain under USAF command. Many of these personnel will come from the Air Support Operations Squadron aligned to support the division however; some of these personnel may come for other USAF organizations and may not have previously conducted training with the division.

2-117. The STB task organizes support elements to each CP. The STB provides all administrative support, life support, communications, transportation, and security for the division CPs and MCG. The STB is commanded by a lieutenant colonel with a complete battalion staff. The STB is organized into three companies with distinct missions: a headquarters company, a network support company and a security company. When the division is assigned a band, it is assigned to the STB. (See Figure 2-7.) 2-118. The STB headquarters company contains the STB staff with an S-2/S-3 section, an S-1/S-4 section, a battalion maintenance section, and a chaplain. The headquarters company has a support platoon with a field feeding section, a transportation section, a medical section, and a maintenance section. These sections are subdivided to support the divisions main CP, TAC 1, and TAC 2 (see Figure 2-8).
Figure 2-7 Special Troops Battalion organization 2-119. The STB commander or his designated representative assists the COS with the daily functions of the main CP. The STB commander will ensure the following functions are performed: Provide life support, security, vehicle maintenance, field feeding, transportation, supply, and medical support. General maintenance and upkeep of facilities. C2 of the band. Special duties as assigned by the COS.
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Figure 2-8. Division STB Headquarters Company organization
STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES
2-120. FM 6-0, Appendix D, details staff responsibilities and remains valid with a few changes. The G-5 has changed from the CMO officer to the plans officer. The CMO officer is now the G-9. The G-8 is the staff officer responsible for financial management. He replaces the finance staff officer position in the previous division structure. 2-121. The coordinating staff officers G-1 (Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Operations), G-4 (Logistics), G-6 (C4 Operations), and G-7 (IO) have not changed. Their responsibilities and duties remain generally the same. What has changed is the focus of the division staff. The primary staff officers have the responsibility to manage the manning, training, equipping and professional development of the Soldiers and officers in their fields of expertise. With the removal of the military intelligence, signal, and air defense battalions the G-2, G-6 and air defense officer are now the senior branch representatives. Their role as the senior officer is greatly expanded in terms of their overall supervision, professional development plan, slating and guidance for all Soldiers in their particular field of expertise. All staff officers have the responsibility for knowledge management. The advanced digital C2 systems in use today can increase staff proficiency but only if information is disseminated to those who need to know. Part of the solution is following the CIMP which the G-6 has responsibility for technical execution but the plan itself is the responsibility of the G-3 and COS. 2-122. Previously the division staff synchronized brigade operations for the purpose of fighting engagements. The modular division design calls for the BCTs to fight the engagements and battles and for the division staff to focus on synchronizing major operations at the operational and higher tactical levels.
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2-123. The major change for the G-2 is that the division does not have a military intelligence battalion organic as division troops. The G-2 relies on higher resources and the divisions brigades to collect information. The G-2 sets priorities for collection and tells the brigades what information to collect inside their AOs. He does not manage the brigades collection assets. The G-2 has a special relationship with the BFSB commander who is responsible for collecting information in the divisions area unassigned. The BFSB is the G-2s principle resource for information in the divisions deep area. Another change is that the G-2 now owns the analysis and control element to process all information into usable intelligence. 2-124. The division G-3 remains the principle staff officer for all matters concerning operations, training, force development and modernization. The G-3 is no longer responsible for planning which has been transferred to the G-5. The G-3 synchronizes the operations of the entire division. He coordinates closely with the G-2, G-5, G-7 and G-9 to ensure synchronization. The G-3 also maintains coordinating staff responsibility for several special staff officers listed below: AMD coordinator. Aviation officer. CBRN officer. Engineer coordinator. EOD officer. Fire support coordinator. LNOs. USMC liaison team commander. PM. Safety officer. Special operations coordinator. Space operations officer. AMLO. A2C2 officer. ALO. 2-125. The division G-3 normally operates at the TAC CP that is responsible for controlling current operations and the deputy G-3 operates from the other TAC. If both TACs are employed and controlling forces, one TAC CP is always in charge of synchronizing division wide operations and that is where the G3 operates. All staff officers must ensure their functional area specific operations are coordinated through the G-3 to ensure synchronization with the divisions operations. 2-126. The division staff supports the division commander and supports the brigade commanders and their staffs. When a brigade sends a request for information to the division and that request is a brigade commanders CCIR, then the division staff treats the request just like a division CCIR unless instructed differently by the division commander.
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PART TWO
How the Division Fights

This part of the manual uses a fictional scenario as a discussion vehicle for illustrating one of many ways that a division might conduct decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations as part of its full-spectrum operations within a unified action scenario. It is not intended to be prescriptive of how the division should conduct any particular operation. The scenario focuses on potential challenges confronting the division commander in accomplishing his mission using modular forces.
Chapter 3
Scenario and Concept of Operations

SECTION I SCENARIO
3-1. The region used in this scenario has significant international importance in the year 2008. Its emergence from its former status as an international backwater is primarily due to the discovery of significant petroleum reserves in the BLUE Sea and the countries surrounding that body of water. The newfound energy reserves have attracted extensive investment, primarily European, bringing with it the trappings of western culture. With this influx of international investments, the ports and resources of the region have extensively expanded to become major commercial centers for oil and other products moving from Asia to Europe and vice versa.
ROAD TO WAR
3-2. GREENLAND is a multicultural federal republic recently formed from three largely ethnically based states between the BLUE and WHITE seas. See Figure 3-1. The GREENLAND government, since its founding, has sought foreign investments to develop its economic infrastructure and exploit the natural resources of the area for the benefit of the GREENLAND people. The political leadership of GREENLAND has largely accepted the western social mores and practices that accompany major western financial investments. 3-3. REDLAND is a xenophobic theocracy bordering GREENLAND on the southeast. REDLAND shares an ethnic minority, the Atropians, with GREENLAND and historically dominated that portion of GREENLAND containing the majority of GREENLANDs Atropians, until the entire regions forcible annexation into the then expansionist BROWNLAND in the late 1800s. (See the cross-hatched area of GREENLAND on Figure 3-1.) After the breakup of BROWNLAND in the late 1900s, the Atropians had their own country until the recent regional plebiscite authorized the founding of GREENLAND. REDLANDs senior religious leadership has redemptionists goals to incorporate all historical Atropian lands into a greater REDLAND. The religious leaderships analysis is that the economic benefits of incorporating the Atropian region of GREENLAND will serve to jump start their economy currently suffering from a large and growing underemployed class and economic isolation resulting from their refusal to follow international trading norms. This will ensure that they are able to retain their hold on power.
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BROWNLAND BLUE SEA WHITE SEA
GREENLAND
YELLOWLAND
REDLAND
Figure 3-1. General situation
ENEMY SITUATION
3-4. The REDLAND armed forces consist of five services: Army, Air Force (including national-level Air Defense Forces), Navy, Strategic Forces, and Internal Security Forces. The Army totals two tank, one mechanized infantry, six motorized infantry, and one infantry divisions. Prior to combat, these divisions would normally be task organized into division tactical groups (DTGs) tailored for specific missions. In this process, the original division headquarters may receive additional units allocated from echelons above division or reallocated from other divisions. A similar process occurs in the task organization of some brigades into brigade tactical groups (BTGs), although some brigades could fight in their original structure. These divisions are supported by one separate mechanized infantry brigade, one separate motorized infantry brigade, two combat helicopter brigades, five surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigades, one coastal defense, and two engineer brigades. The REDLAND Army also contains a special-purpose brigade well suited for working with affiliated insurgents and terrorists. This brigade can also conduct reconnaissance, sabotage, or other direct action missions. The infantry division and coastal defense brigade at a minimum constitute REDLANDs strategic reserve. 3-5. The REDLAND Air Force contains a mix of obsolete BROWNLAND- and Western-developed fighter, bomber, transport, and command and control aircraft. The Air Force also includes national-level Air Defense Forces, which supports a national strategic air defense system around population centers. The Air Defense Forces consist of regional air defense centers, radars, and firing batteries with a mixes of BROWNLAND and western systems. 3-6. The Navy has four corvettes, twenty-one missile craft, a hundred plus remote-controlled fast attack craft. The Navy also has several hundred contact- and magnetically-fused moored and floating mines available to defend REDLAND territory along the BLUE Sea.
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3-7. REDLANDs Strategic Forces have 20 to 30 theater ballistic missiles organized into a strategic-level SSM brigade. These are in addition to shorter-range SSMs that belong to the Army. 3-8. The REDLAND Internal Security Forces comprise a variety of police and paramilitary organizations located throughout the country. They have the mission of backing up local police, providing emergency services, border control, and riot control. Elite elements of the Internal Security Forces are responsible for regime security and counterintelligence operations within the country. Units of the Internal Security Forces can be allocated to a DTG or BTG to assist in controlling occupied territory. Alternatively they can operate separately from military commands within REDLAND or on its land and sea borders. REDLAND also has a militia consisting of platoon- and company-size forces in rural population areas backed up by battalion and brigade size forces based in mid- and large-size cities. The level of training and equipment of these forces vary widely from place to place. The militia can conduct internal security missions if Internal Security Forces are not available but do not have the organic sustainment capability to operate far from their garrison locations. 3-9. REDLAND is suspected of constituting a WMD capability as a wedge against U.S. action. REDLAND leadership converted existing dual use facilities to permit the manufacture of fertilizers and genetically enhanced agricultural products as well as chemical and biological agents. Its most dangerous threat is a suspected stockpile of low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons derived from former BROWNLAND stocks that they were able to acquire through criminal connections and the reprocessing of nuclear power plant fuel. While these weapons have limited utility and reliability, they pose a significant threat against population centers within or external to the region. They can be delivered by a variety of conventional air and missile platforms or in an unconventional manner, such as being smuggled into a country within an ISO container. 3-10. REDLAND is actively sponsoring an internal insurgency within GREENLAND. That insurgency feeds off the concerns of a certain segment of the population concerned with GREENLANDs current social, religious, political, and economic direction. The insurgency has political and military wings, with the military wing containing both local and main force elements. This insurgency is largely based in the rural areas of GREENLAND. 3-11. Terrorist training camps are an additional factor in this region. International terrorist organizations, driven from other portions of the globe, gravitated toward the GREENLAND-REDLAND border area where they can establish training and operating bases under the covert sponsorship of REDLAND theologians. These expanded training camps have become the number one area for groups preparing and executing strikes against the U.S and Europe. Local tribal elders are willing to tolerate the presence of terrorist groups who cultivate their relationships with those local leaders through intermarriage and financial incentives. 3-12. REDLAND is currently actively threatening to use force to unite all ethnically Atropian territory into a greater REDLAND. In the last month it has greatly increased the amount of support being provided to both the GREENLAND insurgent movement and terrorist organizations operating along the border region, and taken steps to increase the readiness of its armed forces to include the call-up of reservists, conduct of large and small scale training exercises, and moving supplies to locations that could support offensive action into GREENLAND. 3-13. During the above mentioned training exercises and preparations for operations in GREENLAND, REDLAND appears to have task organized its armed forces into three operational-strategic commands (OSCs) and a strategic reserve. The overall goal of REDLANDs strategic campaign seems to be to occupy the ethnic-Atropian part of GREENLAND and to secure the mountain passes near the GREENLAND capital city THEBSOL in order to prevent GREENLAND and/or coalition forces from maneuvering into the occupied territory. OSC North (consisting of the 20th and 52nd Division Tactical Groups [DTGs], two SSM brigades, one combat helicopter brigade, and one engineer brigade) has the mission to seize and then defend the major mountain pass northeast of THEBSOL. OSC South (consisting of the 10th, 26th, 51st, and 53rd DTGs, three SSM brigades, one combat helicopter brigade, and one engineer brigade) has the mission to seize and then defend the major mountain pass southwest of THEBSOL and controlling Highway 1 (including key road junctions and bridges near KILLEAN) and the mountainous area south of that highway (including the LUSK RESERVOIR). OSC Souths mission also includes securing the key road junction
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near THEBSOL. OSC East (consisting of the 73rd and 77th DTGs, and the 98th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group, plus naval forces in the BLUE SEA) has the mission of controlling occupied territory farther to the eat (including the cities of DIVKOVIC and KORNATI and the coastline). Two other DTGs (90th and 54th) located within REDLAND may be REDLANDs strategic reserve, possibly with a mission of homeland defense.
FRIENDLY SITUATION
3-14. The United States has long had friendly relationships with the three countries that federated to form GREENLAND and that relationship continues. The United States has an advisory group co-located with the GREENLAND Ministry of Defense and a mix of uniformed military, DOD civilian, and contractor personnel providing training and logistical support to the GREENLAND armed forces. Additionally, US SOF regularly conduct training exercises with GREENLAND forces. US SOF on occasion, with the permission of the GREENLAND political leadership, also conduct counterterrorism operations against selected targets in GREENLAND as part of the Global War on Terrorism. 3-15. As part of flexible deterrent operations designed to deter REDLAND aggression against GREENLAND, the secretary of defense authorized the EUCOM commander to deploy theater opening, communications, and protection assets into GREENLAND. The Department of State participates in unified action by assisting the EUCOM staff in obtaining necessary transit, overflight, and landing rights for US forces to include the movement of maritime assets into the WHITE Sea. 3-16. Lastly, the situation in GREENLAND is not the only crisis situation facing the United States. The Pacific region is also experiencing significant tensions that preclude the United States from strictly focusing its military forces on GREENLAND. Much air and maritime combat power is being held in reserve to respond to political and military developments in the Pacific.
JTF TASK ORGANIZATION, MISSION, COMMANDERS INTENT, AND CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION
3-17. This is a major operation so the EUCOM regional combatant commander (RCC) will be the joint force commander. The RCC designates three of his service component commands, USAREUR, USAFE, and USNAVEUR to act as functional commands (JFLC, JFAC, and JFMC respectively). MARFOREUR continues to provide ADCON to Marine forces employed during this operation, but OPCON of those forces belongs to the functional commands. SOCEUR has OPCON of the commands special operations forces.
EUCOM MISSION
3-18. The EUCOM mission is to deploy forces to the GREENLAND Theater of Operations and take actions to deter and, on order, defend GREENLAND territory against a REDLAND attack; and, as required, conduct offensive operations to restore the pre-conflict international borders.
EUCOM COMMANDERS INTENT

3-19. We will deploy forces to support GREENLAND in the defense of their territory. As soon as possible, our initial deployment will be followed by the positioning of United States ground combat forces forward into GREENLAND with the capability to directly confront hostile actions by REDLAND to send a clear signal of US resolve. End state has the REDLAND forces within GREENLAND destroyed, captured or expelled, the international border restored, and EUCOM forces conducting post-conflict stability operations within the JOA.
EUCOM CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3-20. Priority for deployment is command and control, intelligence, counter-air, maritime forces to secure sea lines of communication, and JRSOI capabilities that will facilitate a rapid build-up of forces in the
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JOA. SOF forces will deploy to perform counterinsurgency training to GREENLAND armed forces. They will also perform strategic reconnaissance in support of future EUCOM operations. Ground combat forces will combine with friendly nation military forces to create a force with the capability to defeat any REDLAND invasion. They will attack to drive the enemy from GREENLAND territory while simultaneously rendering them incapable of continued offensive hostile action. 3-21. EUCOM and multinational forces will conduct operations in four phases: (1) deter REDLAND aggression into GREENLAND, (2) deploy forces, (3) conduct decisive operations to defeat REDLAND forces and restore the international border, and (4) conduct post-hostility and redeployment operations.
XXXX C/JFLC XX XX XX 38 62 X X X X
87 173 11 10
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Figure 3-2. C/JFLC initial task organization
C/JFLC TASK ORGANIZATION, MISSION, COMMANDER'S INTENT

3-22. The C/JFLC is organized around the 7th Army headquarters. The ground forces envisioned for employment, once deployment is complete, include GREENLANDs field forcesthree traditional divisions with support slice; a MEB; and seven US Army BCTs under the control of two US Army division headquarters with appropriate slice elements. Figure 3-2 depicts the brigade and larger sized organizations assigned or OPCON to the C/JFLC.
C/JFLC MISSION
3-23. When directed, the C/JFLC deploys forces into GREENLAND as part of flexible deterrent operations. On order it defends GREENLAND territory to defeat any REDLAND attack. On order, it conducts offensive operations to restore the pre-conflict international borders of GREENLAND and
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REDLAND and assists GREENLAND civil authorities in the alleviation of the conditions threatening the continuance of a democratic and free GREENLAND federation.
C/JFLC COMMANDERS INTENT

3-24. The purpose of the operation is to preserve or restore the territorial and political integrity of GREENLAND. If REDLAND attacks, we will defend to retain as much territory as possible without risking the destruction of defending land forces while retaining the use of available S/APODs. As soon as possible, we will attack to restore GREENLANDs control of its territory.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-25. A proper understanding of the operational environment in any region requires far more information than is provided in this chapter. The only information contained in this section applies directly to the conduct of the manuals vignettes.
TERRAIN
3-26. The vast majority of the terrain within GREENLAND consists of two roughly parallel mountain ridges. (Figure 3-3 depicts the major movement corridors from REDLAND and from friendly A/SPODs.) These two parallel mountain ranges are split by the ALBA RIVER. The ALBA is a major river with few fording sites except on its upper reaches near the GREENLAND capital city of THEBSOL.
KRIZANIC
What does it mean? - Terrain supports the defense - Surprise will be difficult to achieve - Movement is easy to detect - Short rapid movements - Long halts
GREENLAND
KACZMARCZYK THEBSOL
GAZI CRITES
Hig
hw
DIVKOVIC
ay
KILLEAN
Alba
Rive
r
KORNATI
Terrain Effects:
Restrictive Terrain Few Lines of Communication Natural Obstacles - Rivers Excellent Observation Limited Cover/Concealment Excellent Fields of Fire
Lusk Reservoir ANHIER
BIRYAN
REDLAND
Figure 3-3. Major movement corridors
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3-27. The vegetation across the GREENLANDs northern and southern valley slopes differ considerably, but nature of ground above that, towards the snowline, is much the same and typically alpine. Northern valley slopes and lower levels contain deciduous forests. Above 1500m forests become coniferous with variable belts of mixed deciduous softwood trees. From 1800 to 2500m open alpine meadows are found. On the southern side of the range, at the 1200-1500m altitude, great forests of beech can be found. The area also includes mixed and coniferous forests of fir and aspen. High pastures for grazing animals lie above these forests. 3-28. The WHITE Sea is GREENLANDs window to the world as a whole since the BLUE Sea is totally landlocked. YELLOWLAND AND BROWNLAND both have railroad connections to GREENLAND. However, BROWNLANDs railroad uses a non-standard broad gauge for its railroads which inhibits the transfer of goods and services between the two countries. 3-29. Highway 1 takes advantage of the natural east-west movement corridor within GREENLAND to bind the countries economic system together. Highway 1 exits the narrow mountain passes west of THEBSOL into the broad ALBA river valley. In recent years the GREENLAND government and the federations previous governments have spent a great deal of money and other resources with the help of GERMAN civil engineering firms to make it a hard surface, four-lane divided highway. 3-30. The LUSK RESERVOIR has three primary functions. It is the major source of hydroelectric power for GREENLAND. The reservoir is the major source of water for use in irrigation for the agricultural sector in the eastern half of the country. Lastly, it evens out the seasonal flow of water in the ALBA RIVER to prevent the flooding of downstream communities.
WEATHER
3-31. The main peculiarities of the GREENLAND region are related to the altitude zoning and exposition of the mountain systems to the prevailing western direction of winds. These winds reduce the utility of any REDLAND chemical, biological, or radiological weapons because the agents will tend to be blown back toward REDLAND forces. 3-32. Below 2000m winter lasts from December to February. Above that altitude it lasts from October to April. Daytime temperatures on the lower slopes remain at about -2 degrees to -5 degrees C, and higher up, -6 degrees to -16 degrees C; at night, -7 degrees to -10 degrees and -10 degrees to -21 degrees C, respectively. Snowfall is abundant and snow storms are frequent in the high mountains. Trafficability of all but cleared roads is limited and cross-country mobility is highly restricted. In winter snows may be up to 3meters deep in the valleys. Cloud cover marks half the winter season and severely restricts the utility of air support. 3-33. Summers are cool and isolated fog banks frequently occur. These fog banks also restrict the utility of air support. In valley areas summer lasts from May to September with temperatures of from 16 degrees to 20 degrees C. These high temperatures coupled with the altitude severely impact the carrying capability of cargo helicopters. Nights are cold, sometimes with frost. Precipitation is mostly in the form of brief heavy showers, sometimes with thunder storms.
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
3-34. Military commanders take into account the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, peoples, and events (ASCOPE) indigenous to their areas of operations. GREENLAND political leaders have mixed support for the changes taking place within their country and the pace at which those changes are taking place. However, they are fully supportive of coalition military efforts to expel REDLAND military units from GREENLAND. The US and its coalition partners enjoy full domestic political support for the coalitions military actions largely because its actions are internally and internationally perceived as a just response to unprovoked aggression by REDLAND. At this time most national and international media are supportive of coalition goals and objectives. UN and European community support for military action is uncertain because of the economic ties of individual countries to REDLAND. International BROWNLAND political leaders see continued ethnic tensions in the GREENLAND and surrounding countries as favoring its economic interests. YELLOWLAND civic leaders believe that the economic
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development of GREENLAND is in YELLOWLANDs best long term interests. However, YELLOWLAND has its own disgruntled ethnic minority which precludes it from having a military role in developments in GREENLAND. 3-35. From the cultural perspective over the centuries many different ethnic groups invaded or migrated into this area endowing GREENLAND with its unfathomable ethnic and linguistic complexity. Even today more than 40 languages are still spoken by the ethnic groups within GREENLAND and its surrounding countries. This diversity, and persistence, of languages is best explained by geography, but also by societies whose loyalties are to clan and family as much as to nation. The dips and depressions of the regions mountain chains created near-isolated communities, with relatively little contact between them even today. Most of these isolated societies have a high degree of ethnocentrism. Societal openness and legal penalties for violations of cultural, legal, or religious norms almost varies inversely with the distance of the each population hub from the major cities and major ground lines of communications. Western culture has only been superficially adopted by the GREENLAND elites. Basic western concepts, such as democracy, equality, and rule of law have not yet taken extensive hold in the minds of the civilian population outside the major cities. Only minor adjustments to take into account local cultural variances will need to be made by most mid-career NCOs and officers because of their prior experiences in similar tribal cultures in IRAQ. Junior soldiers and officers on their initial deployments will need cultural awareness training. 3-36. The religious structure of GREENLAND is heterogeneous as well. Most civilians are followers of Islam. The Atropians in eastern GREENLAND are Shia Muslims. Christianity is represented predominately by the different Orthodox Church sects with scattered Catholic and Protestant groups and is largely confined to western GREENLAND. There are also small numbers of other religions traditions like Judaism, Yezid, Krishnaism, and Bahaism scattered throughout the country. Most Suni Muslims within GREENLAND are not inclined to impose their religious views on outsiders although scattered clerics are more militant. 3-37. The internal economy of GREENLAND largely based of agriculture although its exports are dominated by petroleum products. Its annual GDP is less than $50 billion. It is highly self-sufficient for basic goods and services but is almost totally dependent on international imports in high-tech finished goods, machine tools, and technical expertise. Its transportation infrastructure is overdeveloped for its current needs because the basic infrastructure was developed in anticipation of significant future growth. Second wave industrial development is responsible for less than 20% of the nations GDP. Many of GREENLANDs industrial sites contain significant quantities of toxic-industrial materials. Electrical production capabilities exceeds the demand although electrical distribution systems are largely limited to towns and cities and do not extend into rural areas. Telecommunications infrastructure between GREENLAND towns and cities is a mixture of microwave and fiber-optic cable. 3-38. By international standards GREENLAND has a small population with less than 25,000,000 people. Recently the rate of population growth has increase to a rate of almost 2% as western medical care becomes more available. The general educational level of the GREENLAND population is poor with less than 60% of its citizens receiving a high school or technical education. The life expectancy of GREENLAND citizens is less 60 years. At the start of this scenario refugees fleeing REDLAND forces have a significant impact on military operations by severely congesting the major east-west roads and occupying potential tactical assembly areas. (This congestion gradually reduces throughout the scenario as the refugees are placed into camps operated by the GREENLAND government and various international and private volunteer organizations.) 3-39. Prior to its invasion by REDLAND, the GREENLAND military was very small and consisted of less than 200,000 soldiers, airmen, and sailors. GREENLAND had only a limited armaments production capacity largely limited to small arms and small-caliber munitions.
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SECTION II DIVISION CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
MISSION
3-40. 1st Division deploys, conducts RSOI, and defends its assigned AO to prevent further REDLAND advances into GREENLAND with the no penetration line being PL DARLING. On order, it attacks to destroy REDLAND forces and affiliated insurgents and terrorist groups within its AO out to the limit of advance (PL HARRIS) to force the withdrawal of occupying enemy forces. Simultaneously the division conducts stability operations designed to ensure civil security, alleviate human suffering, maintain or restore GREENLAND civil control and essential services in order to create a viable civil society and prevent insurgent or terrorist recruitment of the civilian population.
COMMANDER'S INTENT
3-41. The purpose of this operation is to return control of the land, people and resources in country to the internationally recognized government of GREENLAND by destroying or forcing the withdrawal of REDLANDs occupying forces and affiliated insurgents and terrorist groups. The desired end state is a secure and stable GREENLAND to include the restoration of essential services.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
3-42. This operation will be conducted in four phases. Key tasks include: Rapid deployment of divisional forces and attachments sequenced first for defensive operations, followed by the deployment of forces capable of offensive operations and a minimum level of stability operations. Maximize the use of joint fires and limited attacks during the defense to reduce those portions of the REDLAND 10th Tank and 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Groups that are located in our AO to less than 50-percent effectiveness before offensive operations begin. Conduct stability operations simultaneously with division offensive and defensive operations. These stability operations encompass a myriad of subordinate tasks designed to enable the GREENLAND government to provide civil security, establish civil control, and restore essential services in order to reinstate a viable civil society within GREENLAND borders. These subordinate tasks include, but are not limited toproviding humanitarian assistance to the civilian population within the divisions AO, preventing the unnecessarily destruction of civilian infrastructure, training and logistically supporting local GREENLAND security forces, and restoring essential public services disrupted by combat operations. This will be the predominate task after the division achieves its combat objective. Seize OBJECTIVE DIANA, the road junctions and bridges located north and east of KILLEAN to isolate the REDLAND 20th Tank and 52nd Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Groups currently trying to secure the major mountain pass northwest of THEBSOL that leads into the ALBA RIVER valley. Destroy those parts of the REDLAND 10th Tank, 51st Motorized Infantry, and 26th Mechanized Infantry Division Tactical Groups located in our AO up to the limit of advance (PL HARRIS). Establish defensive positions along international boarder to prevent REDLAND forces from invading or providing support to insurgents.
PHASE I DEPLOYMENT (THIS PHASE IS CURRENTLY ONGOING AND ENDS APPROXIMATELY C+65 WHEN ALL
DIVISIONAL FORCES ARE SCHEDULED TO CLOSE THEIR TAAS.)
3-43. The main effort for this phase is the deployment of the 1st deployment package. This package contains the necessary command and control and maneuver and logistical capabilities for the division to conduct initial defensive operations and conduct shaping operations focused on setting conditions for civil security and the restoration of essential public services within the division AO.
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3-44. The divisions shaping operations, those actions with respect to the enemy that facilitate the division deployment, will mostly be conducted by C/JFLC assets. This includes creating an integrated air defense systems and developing the ISR pictures within the theater of operations. Insurgent or terrorist groups encountered during deployment will be attrited within unit capabilities and their locations reported to the joint security area coordinator for later resolution in accordance with the joint security area plans. The divisionin coordination with host nation authoritieswill commit up to one battalion task force to augment GREENLAND authorities conducting area security operations designed to secure civilian population centers from insurgent and terrorist attacks. The division will assist GREENLAND authorities to immediately restore disrupted essential public services 3-45. Sustaining operations are conducted by the home installations and later deploying units of the division that conduct deployment related tasks to assist the first deployment package in rapidly moving from fort-to-port and loading national transportation assets. The C/JFLC also conducts shaping operations by providing assets to conduct the RSOI of incoming forces. Once the 27th Sustainment Brigade and 44th Medical Brigade assets arrive in theater and complete their own RSOI, they assume control of the divisions sustaining and FHP operations.
PHASE II DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS (THIS PHASE BEGINS ON ARRIVAL AND RSOI OF DEPLOYMENT
PACKAGE 1 AND ENDS ON ORDER WHEN THE DIVISION ATTACKS.)
3-46. The main effort for this phase is preventing REDLAND forces from penetrating PL DARLING as a result of a successful area defense of the divisions area of operations. 3-47. Division shaping operations during this phase are the actions of the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade, 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, and 75th Fires Brigade to set the conditions that allow the 1st Division to transition to the offense. This includes the identification of potential enemy attack forces. Determination, if possible, of enemy intentions. The delay or disruption of enemy offensive operations to allow defending BCTs more time to prepare their defenses. They also include the successful preparation for offensive action by the 2nd and 5th HBCTs. Insurgent and terrorist groups encountered during the defense will be attrited within unit capabilities and tracked for later destruction or capture as required. The division will conduct area security operations designed to protect division forces and civilian population concentrations from attack and mitigate the effects of these attacks. As appropriate other stability tasks, related to governance and administration, infrastructure recovery, and humanitarian relief and assistance are initiated during this phase. Synchronized by the G-7, division controlled assets conduct offensive IO to explain our presence in GREENLAND to local civilians and international audiences. These operations will explain that we are here at the request of their government to help them resist REDLAND, insurgent, and terrorists forces that have committed numerous atrocities and violations of international law and will leave when GREENLAND is secure and free from extralegal coercion. 3-48. Division sustainment operations encompass the completion of RSOI by all division elements and the sustainment of divisional units in contact. They also include the efforts of the 34th CSB(ME) Brigade to provide area security, ground lines of communications maintenance, and CBRNE reconnaissance within the division sustainment area. (Area security includes both route and convoy security.)
PHASE III OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (THIS PHASE BEGINS ON ORDER AND ENDS WHEN ENEMY FORCES
ARE EXPELLED FROM GREENLAND.)
3-49. The main effort for this phase is the seizure of OBJECTIVE DIANA by the 2nd HBCT which, in conjunction with the attack of the 2nd Division, seizes key terrain that isolates the majority of REDLAND combat power in GREENLAND from their support and sustainment bases. 3-50. The 1st Division has three primary shaping operations during this phase. First is the 5th HBCT attack along Highway 1 to destroy enemy forces and seize OBJECTIVE JOHN and OBJECTIVE BEM in order to create the condition for the commitment of the 2nd HBCT. The second is the 87th IBCT attack to fix enemy forces to deny them the ability to counterattack into the flank of division forces advancing along Highway 1. Insurgent and terrorist groups encountered during the attack will be fixed until sufficient combat power can be brought to bear to destroy them and capture or kill the personnel associated with
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these groups. The third accomplishes tasks designed to maintain or return GREENLAND governmental control, security, and essential public services over territory controlled by the division as it advances. This third shaping operation contains five logical lines of operationsrestoring security and control to GREENLAND authorities, governance and administration, infrastructure recovery, perception management, and humanitarian relief and assistance. The G-9 coordinates the divisions stability operations with appropriate GREENLAND civil and military authorities. This becomes more important as the division begins recovering previously occupied GREENLAND territory containing significant numbers of civilians. 3-51. Division sustaining operations continue to provide logistics and personal support to the divisions BCTs and supporting brigades. The 34th CSB (ME) remains responsible for ensuring that division MSRs remain unobstructed for movement.
PHASE IV STABILIZATION AND ENABLING CIVIL AUTHORITY (THIS PHASE BEGINS AFTER
REDLAND FORCES ARE EXPELLED FROM GREELAND AND ENDS WITH THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 1ST DIVISION.) 3-52. Those stability activities along the five logical lines of operations initiated in the previous phase as a shaping operation continue during this phase. The security and control line of operation is the divisions decisive operation. GREENLAND civil authorities will never be able to meet the legitimate needs of their civilian population without the existence of a secure environment in which to work. The divisions BCTs have the responsibility for conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and providing area security within their respective AOs. The 92nd MP Brigade has the mission of restoring the GREENLAND police force throughout the division AO. 3-53. The other four lines of operationgovernance and administration, infrastructure recovery, perception management, and humanitarian relief and assistance are division shaping operations. The 555th Engineer Brigade is responsible for coordinating the infrastructure recovery line of operation within priorities and guidance established by the commander and the G-3. Likewise, the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion is responsible for coordinating the governance and administration line of operation within those same priorities and guidance. All the divisions brigades contribute to the accomplishment of these four lines of operations. 3-54. The divisions sustainment operations throughout this phase continue to focus on the logistical and personal support to the divisions BCTs and support brigades. The 27th Sustainment Brigade will have numerous challenges during this phase supplying CLASS X and other supply items not normally required by US forces.
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Chapter 4
Deployment Operations
4-1. The 1st Division is a modular division stationed at Fort Riley, KS. The division has training and readiness oversight responsibilities for a mix of brigade combat teams and support brigades including two heavy BCTs (2nd HBCT, 5th HBCT) from Fort Riley, one heavy BCT from Fort Bliss, TX, (10th HBCT), and one infantry BCT from Fort Knox, KY (87th IBCT). In addition to these four BCTs, FORSCOM has assigned five support brigades to the divisionthe 11th Aviation Brigade (Medium), Fort Riley; 27th Sustainment Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, MO; 75th Fires Brigade, Fort Sill, OK; 56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Fort Huachuca, AZ; and the Mississippi Army National Guard 34th Combat Support Brigade (ME). Appendix H contains the brigade internal task organization for units assigned to the 1st Division. For the past sixteen months, these brigades and the 1st Division have been designated as a Ready Expeditionary Force package, part of the ready force pool. This mix of brigades was assigned by FORSCOM based on strategic requirements and force availability. Because 1st Division forces within the Ready Expeditionary Force package did not have a specific contingency or overseas commitment while they were in the ready force pool, they have trained with a full-spectrum METL that is oriented on offensive operations, stability operations, and defensive operations (in that priority). Training included collective training center rotations for the BCTs, exportable training center exercises, and one battle command training seminar and warfighter exercise.
Active Component
XX
1
Reserve Component
X
2 56
X
75
X
11
X
34
X
27
X
SUST
X
5
ATK
MP
CSSB SPT SPT
X
10
U ASLT
X
87
ASB GS
Figure 4-1. The 1st Division as configured as a ready and contingency expeditionary force package 4-2. At the beginning of the fiscal year, FORSCOM moved the 1st Division and its assigned brigades into the available force pool and designated them as a Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) package with priority for planning toward Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Figure 4-1 illustrates the makeup of the CEF package built around the 1st Division.
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4-3. Because of its orientation to the Northeast Asia region, the 1st Division continued to focus its training and preparation on conducting combat operations against North Korean forces. The division participated in a virtual training exercise with the USARPAC Operational Command Post (OCP) and refined its part in contingency plans for that region. G-5 planners from the division Main CP participated in PACOM deployment planning conferences. 4-4. Five weeks into its CEF rotation, the crisis in GREENLAND prompts deployment of US forces to the region. The 1st and 2nd Division CEF packages are alerted and begin planning for deployment to GREENLAND. The 7th Army (ASCC) staff recommends that the 1st Division package be deployed as it has trained, with the addition of the following forces One unmanned aircraft system (UAS) battalion attached to the 11th Aviation Brigade. One EOD company attached to the 34th CSB (ME). One CBRNE battalion attached to the 34th CSB (ME). One additional ground reconnaissance squadron attached to the 56th BFSB. One additional combat service support battalion (CSSB) and 44th Medical Brigade attached to the 27th Sustainment Brigade. One tailored engineer battalion attached to each BCT to provide necessary mobility (to include gap crossing), countermobility, and survivability support. (See Appendix H.) FORSCOM and 7th Army coordinate with USACAPOC to attach a civil affairs battalion to the division. FORSCOM concurs and provides the necessary assets from the force pool. (Figure 4-2 depicts the results of FORSCOM and 7th Army tailoring of the 1st Division. The internal organization of the BCTs and the various battalions depicted can be found in Appendix H.)
XX
Active Component
1
Reserve Component
X
2 56
X
75
X
11
X
34
X
27
X
SUST
X
5
ATK
MP
CSSB SPT SPT CSSB
X
10
U ASLT
X
87 II 418
ASB
x
48
CA
GS
EOD
Figure 4-2. The 1st Division as tailored by 7th Army and FORSCOM 4-5. Simultaneously the division directs its units to begin predeployment activities to include Reviewing and updating database information regarding on-hand equipment and containers. Identifying equipment shortages and inventories of unit basic loads. Reviewing unit training status to include
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Collective training status. Individual and crew-serve weapons qualifications. CBRNE training status. Driver certification. Rail, sea, and air loading team training and certification. Identifying personnel shortfalls and prioritizing fills. Conducting required theater training, such as ROE and cultural awareness. Conducting final individual preparations for overseas movement, such as updating inoculations, DNA samples, wills, dental records, powers of attorney, etc. Identifying the unit rear detachment 4-6. The 1st Division depends on the installations where its units are stationed or mobilized to coordinate the movement of those forces with the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to seaports of embarkation (SPOE) and aerial ports of embarkation (APOE). The division staff coordinates requirements with the installation management activity (IMA) of the installations supporting the divisions deployment. The Home Station Operations Centers at each of the affected Army installations conduct 24hour operations. The division has limited control of the deployment because its units are deploying from multiple installations, but should actively monitor and coordinate to set priorities and resolve conflicts. 4-7. In the JOA, the C/JFLC provides the majority of communications, intelligence, protection, and sustainment support to the divisions deployed units until adequate division resources are deployed into the JOA to provide these functions. Initially, this support is provided by the 292nd Sustainment Brigade (organized to conduct the theater opening), the 5th Signal Command, and the 32nd AAMDC, which was coordinated through the 21st TSC DCP and the 7th Army OCP. 4-8. REDLAND special purpose forces, terrorists, and GREENLAND insurgent elements will attempt to interdict or disrupt the divisions deployment. Among other enemy means, the threat from MANPADS and mines will delay the flow of forces into and throughout the theater deployment bases.
MISSION
4-9. 1st Division, on order, rapidly deploys to the assigned AOs and completes RSOI in preparation for full-spectrum operations. Divisional elements will assume defensive positions as soon as possible, protect the deployment process, and begin coordinating and preparing to conduct S&RO within their AO.
COMMANDER'S INTENT
4-10. The purpose of this operation is to return control of the land, people, and resources to the internationally recognized government by destroying or forcing the withdrawal of occupying forces, reestablishing the international border, and restoring a stable environment for the nation of GREENLAND. The key tasks in the deployment phase of this operation are: Rapidly deploy all divisional forces and attachments to the AO. Monitor the status of the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of all division forces moving into theater. Prepare for defensive operations immediately upon arrival within the theater. Begin working with existing GREENLAND and interagency assets to prepare to restore a stable environment in those areas occupied or affected by REDLAND, insurgent, or terrorist forces.
COMMANDER'S PLANNING GUIDANCE

4-11. Organize the division into deployment packages that provides the correct mix of forces that match the anticipated missions. Sustainment units deploy early to receive combat units and expedite the buildup of capabilities in preparation for defensive and offensive operations. Division C2 nodes deploy early to
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conduct required coordination and planning with the 7th Army OCP and the 21st TSC DCP conducting RSOI. The division coordinates with and uses C/JFLC C2 nodes, force protection assets, intelligence capabilities, and CSS assets that are in theater before the divisions arrival to expedite the divisions deployment process. Units will focus first on protection during deployment, then preparation for defensive operations, and then begin planning for the S&RO actions that can be immediately implemented.
1ST DIVISION CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT

4-12. The division uses the force-sequencing information developed in conjunction with the C/JFLC headquarters and organizes units into deployment packages that match available USTRANSCOM assets according to time-phased force deployment data. These deployment packages match the request for forces packages submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval. (See FM 3-35.4 for deployment procedures.) All units prepare personnel and equipment to meet the deployment timeline established in deployment directives and orders. 4-13. The decisions on the composition of the deployment packages are made by analyzing the required capabilities in the AO using the factors of METT-TC. The deployment package compositions used in this scenario are just one of many possible ways of organizing the divisions forces for deployment. 4-14. The concept of Phase I (Deployment) is to deploy the EECP by air, followed by Deployment package one, consisting of The remaining assets of TAC 1 augmented by sufficient individual CA personnel and equipment from the 418th CA Battalion to establish a bare-base CMOC. MCG. 10th HBCT. 87th IBCT. 56th BFSB to include the attached ground reconnaissance squadron. 11th Combat Aviation Brigade headquarters with one attack/reconnaissance squadron, an assault battalion, the MP battalion from the 34th CSB (ME), two CSSBs from the 27th Sustainment Brigade reinforced with medical assets, and the 418th CA Battalion. Deployment package two, consisting of TAC 2. 5th HBCT. 75th Fires Brigade headquarters with two missile battalions. Aviation support battalion. UAS battalion. 34th Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) headquarters. 27th Sustainment Brigade headquarters with the two remaining CSSBs and the rest of the 44th Medical Brigade. Deployment package three, delivers the remainder of the division to include the Main CP. 4-15. This sequencing of forces allows the division to accomplish the commanders intent by placing critical capabilities required in the AO first and increasing the divisions capabilities over time. The division must rely on theater-level assets to provide those warfighting functions not included in its initial force package. This requires there to be a degree of trust between the ASCC/JFLC commander and the division commander that the necessary intelligence, command and control, sustainment, and protection assets will be available to support the division during its RSOI. Figure 4-3 on page 4-5 depicts the divisions illustrative deployment packages used in this scenario. (During the deployment, the division is expected to perform offense, defense, and stability missions in proportion to the box in the lower righthand corner of Figure 4-3.)
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Figure 4-3. 1st Division deployment packages

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Chapter 4
4-16. The division plans for convoy security with local police agencies and other available agencies responsible for security, such as port and railroad security authorities, during their movement from their garrison location to the point of embarkation. The division coordinates with the various installations and monitors the movement of forces not assigned to the same installation as the division headquarters. The C/JFLC headquarters arranges for operational protection over and above the divisions local security efforts throughout the divisions conduct of RSOI within the theater. This operational protection is in addition to the self protection measures accomplished by individual deploying units.
DIVISION COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-17. Once the division is alerted for deployment the entire staff contributes to the MDMP process to put together the plans necessary to alert all assigned or attached division units, mobilize those reserve component units, conduct necessary individual and collective training, accomplish necessary activities to prepare the divisions equipment for deployment and then deploy division personnel and equipment into the theater of operations. The staff will also develop a base plan and various branches and sequels to guide its actions once it initiates operations. The entire staff will also be involved in the dispatch of LNOs to appropriate headquarters. Intelligence, engineer, and CMO staff collect information about the JOA.
C4 CMO
Long Haul Communications

HELP DESK
OGA
ALO AMD FS A2C2 CUR OPS CUR OPS SOF SWO JAG
CHOPS
DTO/AMLO
SUSTAINMENT IO EN
CoS
CBRN PMO
PROTECTION
ISR
CG/ DCG
Life Support and Security

Figure 4-4. Division EECP as tailored for this scenario
EARLY ENTRY COMMAND POST

4-18. As introduced in Chapter 1 the divisions EECP provides temporary C2 until one of the divisions TAC CPs is able to close within the area of operations. The EECP is mission tailored to reflect the prevailing factors of METT-TC. For this scenario the equipment forming the EECP was built largely from the TAC 1 base and will eventually revert back to their parent CPs once those CPs close into the division area of operations. However, the individuals assigned to the EECP are individually selected by the division chief of staff based on their competence and the expertise required by the factors of METT-TC. The EECP has a designated acting chief of staff to facilitate continuous and efficient staff support to operations. This scenario uses the EECP depicted in figure 4-4. For scenario purposes the 1st Division EECP deployed with 14 HMMWVsincluding 1 USAF HMMWV, 13 SICPS shelters, 2 SSET shelters, 65 Army personnel, 8
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USAF personnel, 2 SOCEUR personnel, and 3 individuals from other governmental agencies (OGA) in order to perform critical C2 functions on a continuous basis for 7 to 14 days. These totals do not include the commander or the division mobile command group with its associated equipment. The three nonmilitary individuals have at least secret security clearances so their presence does not disrupt ongoing EECP command and control activities. This EECP configuration is approximately 75% mobile with its vehicles. The HMMWVs contain all communications and computer equipment that can be used either in the HMMWV, remoted to the SICP shelter, or in a combination of both. The HMMWVs have associated trailers for additional cargo capability and generator support. A brief description of the roles and functions of each area follows along with illustrative personnel and equipment layouts. 4-19. For this scenario the EECP requires a CMO element consisting of four Soldiers with one HMMWV, with three OGA liaison officersone each from the Department of State, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Justice. Most of the CMO elements communications equipment is dismounted from the vehicle so that CMO personnel can use that vehicle to drive to the offices of GREENLAND authorities and other necessary locations. The presence of these other governmental agencies allows for the early coordination of stability activities with interested agencies. COMMAND GROUP SUPPORT CELL 4-20. The command group support cell provides a private workplace for the CG or DCG. The command group support cell in this scenario consists of one HMMWV and four Soldiersthe EECP chief of staff, a driver, and two clerks. The EECP chief of staff alternates with the EECP chief of operations from the current operations cell to provide continuous supervision of EECP activities. The two clerks provide continuous records management support to the entire CP in addition to supporting the CG or DCGs needs. This includes physically preparing fragmentary orders issued by the EECP. It contains ABCS equipment sufficient to display the COP updated in almost real time with friendly and enemy unit locations depicted to the commanders desired scale and selected other information, such as future plans, force flow information, and national and international media feeds. The CIC is located next to the current operations cell within the EECP configuration to facilitate the flow of information with the other staff elements. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER CELL 4-21. The movement and maneuver cell controls all deployed division units. It is the information hub of the EECP. It is the focal point into which all EECP cells provide information to enable the commander to see his area of operations and answer his CCIR. For this scenario it is comprised primarily of TAC 1 personnel with two HMMWVs and nine personnel. Two additional SOF liaison officers from SOCEUR are located in the movement and maneuver cell. It is the net control station for the EECP and receives, logs, and posts information received from tactical and situation reports, and personal recovery. Assisted by the clerks from the command group support element, it issues warning orders and fragmentary orders to control current operations. It maintains the combat capability status of all committed forces two levels down. 4-22. Two additional SJA officers are located in the cell to inform the commander on legal ramifications of operations and courses of action. These officers are knowledgeable of the GREENLAND legal system, procedures, and laws. The SJA function is a critical element in the EECP during the early stages of the deployment. These two individuals also participate in targeting meetings. 4-23. The four-man A2C2 element coordinates and deconflicts the use of airspace with the C/JFLC and controls airspace users within the divisions airspace. This continues until TAC 1 is fully operational within the AO. This element maintains control of airspace to facilitate attack helicopter, joint fires, and unmanned aerial system operations as well as Air Force transport flights into and out of division airfield(s). The A2C2 element works closely with the AMD element. INTELLLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE CELL 4-24. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) element in the assault CP performs those functions primarily associated with a TAC CP ISR operations element. It consists of one HMMWV and
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Chapter 4
four personnel. These personnel are augmented by USAF weather personnel. The ISR cell is primarily manned by ISR personnel from TAC 1. They receive, post, and analyze intelligence data and reports received from committed units and provide them to the command center and higher headquarters. They also receive intelligence information from higher intelligence assets and pass it down to maneuver brigade combat teams, supporting brigades, and independent battalion S2s for their use. They maintain that information from intelligence assets that support the CCIR to see current and future enemy and civil capabilities and courses of action and assess friendly intelligence asset capabilities. FIRE SUPPORT CELL 4-25. The Army fire support, joint fires, and offensive information operations functions of TAC 1 are performed by this cell until TAC 1 can close within the divisions AO. It consists of one HMMWV and four personnel. These personnel are augmented by a USAF TACP. The fire support cell coordinates and synchronizes all fire support assets committed to current operations. Until the arrival of the 75th Fires Brigade headquarters, this cell within the EECP may perform some of that brigades targeting functions, depending on the situation. The fire support cell synchronizes fire support and tactical air support for units committed to combat operations. It also monitors the arrival and progress of additional division and joint fire support assets through the RSO&I process. It maintains information to support the commanders critical fire support information requirements and assesses the combat capability of committed units. SUSTAINMENT CELL 4-26. The sustainment cell consists of two HMMWVs and six personnel augmented by two USAF AMLO personnel. The G-1 element maintains contact with subordinate unit S-1s to have an accurate picture of the personnel strength of division units arriving in the theater, divisional units undergoing RSO&I, and committed units. It advises the commander and G-3 on the arrival of individual personnel and replacements into the AO. The G-1 receives and maintains reports that support the personnel information requirements. 4-27. The G-4 element within the sustainment cell of the EECP has two primary functions. The first is to monitor the divisions flow into the AO, influencing the process where and when possible to support the commanders concept of operations. This function is primarily the responsibility of the DTO assisted by the USAF AMLO. These two elements perform any necessary coordination associated with incoming flights and their reception with USTRANSCOM, 7th Army/CFLC, and 21st TSC agencies. They also input the division commanders desires regarding the disposition of personnel and cargo offloading into the RSOI system and keep the rest of the EECP and division CPs aware of the divisions current deployment status. They maintain contact with aircraft on the ground, inbound to the AO, and at the departure airfield. They advise the commander on the status of deployment and arrival of division units. The DTO is also involved in the onward movement of divisional units after they finish reception and staging. The DTO and AMLO use automated systems, such as GCCS-A and TC-ACCIS, to assist them in this process. The second primary function of the G-4 is the status of committed unit class I, III, and V. The G-4 maintains an accurate status of the quantity and location of critical logistics supplies as they arrive in the AO and recommends their allocation to the G-3, the chief of staff, and the commander. 4-28. The sustainment cell will also be the home base for a contingency contracting team from the Field Army Support Brigade. The team will initially be responsible for contracting goods and services in support of division operations until sufficient contracting resources can flow into theater to establish a more formal competitive bidding process. This contracting team is not depicted in figure 4-4 since they will normally be absent from the EECPs location, but will receive direction as far as what goods and services are needed by the division and life support from the EECP. PROTECTION CELL 4-29. The protection cell is responsible for coordinating the divisions operations process as it applies to CBRNE threats, air and missile defense, counterterrorism/force protection measures, security to operational forces. It consists of one HMMWV and eight personnel. In coordination with the fire support cell and C4 cell it also is responsible for coordinating the divisions defensive information operations. The senior MP
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officer within this cell is initially responsible for division detainee operations until the division PMO is able to assume those responsibilities. 4-30. The four-man AMD element within the EECP maintains positive control of any AD assets attached or OPCON to the division. This element works closely with the A2C2 element to proactively prevent fratricide. The AMD element also coordinates its activities within the protection cell of the EECP to assist in accomplishing all aspects of the area AMD protection function. This element maintains their airspace SA via their ABCS systems and provides that information as appropriate to the other cells within the EECP. C4 CELL 4-31. This cell is responsible for establishing internal and external communications nets for the EECP. It consists of two HMMWVs and eight personnel. This includes the command posts intranet, long-haul communications, and internet connections. It provides the webmaster for the EECP and provides troubleshooting support to EECP elements as necessary. SECURITY AND LIFE SUPPORT ELEMENT 4-32. This element from the STB TAC support platoon is responsible for local security of the EECP and providing minimal life support. It consists of two HMMWVs and eight personnel. This element has a burner unit capable of heating MREs and providing hot water for beverages. One of the Soldiers assigned is a medic. The NCOIC of this element is responsible for overseeing the field sanitation of the EECP. This element provides the minimum force necessary for continuous security. Upon the detection of a threat to the EECP, this element will notify the EECP chief of staff or CHOPS of the threat and receive the necessary additional manpower to conduct a static defense of the EECP.
MAIN COMMAND POST

4-33. The primary role of the Main CP during deployment operations is to coordinate with the installations providing the deployment platforms for the divisions brigade combat teams, supporting brigades, and other divisional elements. This includes the conduct of individual and collective training in preparation for the deployment or projected future missions. It also must coordinate through FORSCOM with USTRANSCOM and its major subordinate commands for movement from unit locations, to mobilization sites (for the divisions reserve component units), to air and sea ports of embarkation as required. The Main CP will make extensive use of liaison officers to various organizations throughout the deployment process. Until the Main CP deploys, it remains a fully functioning CP working at home station, conducting planning and analysis, and tracking the deployment and intheater status of divisional units throughout the RSO&I process. FM 100-17 outlines the mobilization process. FM 3-35.4 describes the deployment process. 4-34. The Main CP continues to collect information from home station. The information is provided forward initially to the EECP and the deployed brigades and then to TAC 1 when that organization is functioning within the AO. The Main CPs equipment is deployed in deployment package three and the personnel continue to perform their mission from the division headquarters until the TACs are established in the AO and the commander decides to deploy the Mains personnel. The ISR cell of the Main CP begins a focused collection effort on the AO as soon as the division is alerted. This collection effort continues as the Main CP personnel deploy to the AO. While at home station, the ISR personnel will have easy access to joint and national assets using well established communications networks. The ability to access information may be degraded when the Main CP personnel arrive in theater depending on the status of theater information networks provided by the 5th Signal Command. The Main CP plans cell continues to conduct planning for the upcoming major operations. The plans cell continuously coordinates with the higher headquarters the subordinate brigades and the EECP, once it deploys. 4-35. As mentioned in the paragraphs discussing the EECP, the G-9 (Civil-Military Operations) deploys early as part of the EECP and, in conjunction with the civil affairs units already in theater and liaison officers from other governmental agencies, begins initial assessments of the planned AO and establishes
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contact with other US governmental agencies, GREENLAND local authorities, and international and nongovernmental organizations present within the theater. His planning capabilities will continue to increase as additional CA organizations deploy into theater and a civil affairs planning team is available to augment the G-9 staff section. 4-36. The division commander may choose to deploy following the arrival of the second BCT. Once the division commander has two BCTs in the AO, he is capable of conducting division-level operations. The division commander may decide to deploy earlier to develop a relationship with the C/JFLC commander, multinational commanders, and other key personnel or to assemble a group of brigade commanders and key staff to conduct an initial leaders reconnaissance. He travels within the JOA using his mobile command group, with a security detachment from the STB. In this scenario he planned to spend time in the 10th HBCT and 87th IBCT AOs, observing defensive preparations, and at the EECP and then TAC 1 ensuring the future operations planning and coordination is consistent with his estimate and intent.
TAC 1
4-37. The division deploys the EECP, comprised mainly from TAC 1, as the initial C2 headquarters to coordinate and monitor RSO&I, coordinate area wide protection requirements with the C/JFLC headquarters, coordinate with the 7th Army Main CP, conduct initial tactical planning, and refine the plan prepared prior to deployment in conjunction with the Main CP at home station. One of the divisions DCGs deploys with the EECP. In this scenario, the EECP deploys to and co-locates with the deployable command post of the 21st TSC performing theater-opening functions. The EECP is absorbed into TAC 1 when the remainder of the TAC 1 personnel and equipment arrive in the JOA. Once the division finishes the RSO&I process TAC 1 begins preparing to conduct offensive operations to include conducting rehearsals with those subordinate staffs that can be made available and LNOs from committed divisional units.
TAC 2
4-38. While the divisional units are deploying from different installations, the personnel from TAC 2 and the Main CP monitor the status of the deployment, exchange standard operating procedures with newly attached units, and plan and conduct virtual C2 exercises with the assigned and attached subordinate units. Since this may be the first time some of the attached units have worked for this division, it is important to conduct exercises to integrate the attached units into the command climate of the division. The division commander meets and coordinates with the attached unit commanders and informs them of his concept, intent, and command philosophy. It is important during this stage to develop personal relationships between the division commander, his staff, and the commanders and staffs of the newly attached brigades.
Main CP Main Maint Sec Main Med Spt Sec Main Field Feeding Main Trans Sec Main Security TAC 1 TAC 2
TAC 1 Maint Sec TAC 1 Med Spt Sec TAC 1 Field Feeding TAC 1 Trans Sec TAC 1 Security
TAC 2 Maint Sec TAC 2 Med Spt Sec TAC 2 Field Feeding TAC 2 Trans Sec TAC 2 Security
Figure 4-5. STB Task organized to support the CPs
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4-39. The STB task organizes to deploy appropriate assets with the CPs of the division as they deploy (see Figure 4-5). The equipment of the MCG is sent so it will arrive in theater before the anticipated arrival of the commander.
2ND HBCT, 5TH HBCT, 10TH HBCT, AND 87TH IBCT

4-40. The BCTs normally deploy as complete BCTs and that is the case in this scenario. The 10th HBCT and 87th IBCT deploy in the first deployment package. As they complete RSOI they are attached to 2nd Division to strengthen the C/JFLC defense. The units not deploying in the first deployment package perform deployment related tasks to assist the units in the first deployment package in order to facilitate rapid movement. After equipment is loaded on transportation assets, the Soldiers continue predeployment training until time for air transport to the AO. The 5th HBCT deploys in the second deployment package and the 2nd HBCT deploys in the third deployment package. Each BCT was augmented with an engineer battalion prior to its deployment.
11TH COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE

4-41. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade deploys its headquarters with an attack/reconnaissance battalion and the assault battalion in deployment package one. This allows the brigade to conduct attack and reconnaissance, aerial logistical, personnel transport, and long-range surveillance (LRS) insertion missions soon after arrival in the AO. The aviation support battalion and the UAS battalion are in deployment package two. The second attack and reconnaissance battalion is in deployment package three with the general support battalion. This sequencing provides for aviation capabilities to be available as their requirement is anticipated. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade operates from an airfield in the division rear area until after the start of offensive operations. When a suitable site is secured in the division AO, The brigade moves forward to remain within supporting distance of the divisions BCT AOs.
27TH SUSTAINMENT AND 44TH MEDICAL BRIGADES

4-42. The 27th Sustainment Brigade headquarters deploys in deployment package one with two support battalions. These CSSBs may have element from the medical brigades (MEDBDEs) area support medical companies (ASMCs) and a forward surgical team (FST) providing in support. The sustainment brigade deploys the other two support battalions in deployment package two. The rest of the 44th Medical Brigade is in deployment package two. This sequencing allows sustainment capabilities to arrive with or before the majority of the divisions other units. The 27th Sustainment Brigade is also responsible for movement control through out all phases of the operation. During the deployment phase, the majority of movement is from the staging areas forward to the unit AOs.
34TH COMBAT SUPPORT BRIGADE (MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT)

4-43. The 59th MP Battalions capabilities are required early and are therefore in deployment package one. The 59th MP battalion deploys early to facilitate maneuver and mobility support operations along the routes leading from the staging areas to the division AO. It also provides area security to support units operating along these routes. Such operations may include the establishment of a mobility corridor within the division AO to assist in the protection and security of critical division assets along potential high threat areas. In addition, the 59th MP Battalion prepares for the conduct of detainee operations. The 34th CSB (ME) headquarters is in deployment package two. The 527th Engineer Battalion, the 4-44th Air Defense Artillery Battalion and the 325th CBRNE Battalion capabilities are not expected to be required initially since 7th Army assets, such as the 32nd AAMDC and the 555th Engineer Brigade, are providing those functions and therefore are in deployment package three.
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56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

4-44. The 56th BFSBs mission requires it to deploy early in the troop flow in order to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in support of the divisions operations. As the preponderance of the 1st Divisions AO is under division control in this phase, it is the 56th BFSBs mission to gather information, answer CCIR, and assist in developing the division common operational picture. The 56th BFSB will immediately ensure the proper linkage to a full range of reconnaissance and intelligence assetsto include national, joint, and interagency systemsand host nation assets in addition to those systems organic to the divisions brigades to answer those CCIR. The 56th BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance to answer specific information requirements (SIRs) for both current and follow on phases. 4-45. The 56th BFSB in its entirety is in deployment package one. This sequencing allows the division to begin collecting information with organic resources as soon as possible. Initially located close to the EECP and then to TAC 1, the BFSB headquarters displaces to located itself in the vicinity of TAC 2 after the later headquarters completes its RSO&I as the division begins its defensive preparations. The BFSB manages all assigned assets by integrating and synchronizing technical and manned collection assets and dynamically tasking and re-tasking available assets to satisfy CCIR and other IR in support of the division ISR plan. Soon after arrival, the 56th BFSB is tasked to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to answer the 1st Division Commanders CCIR related to decision points in the defense. 4-46. The 56th BFSB conducts RSO&I to rapidly build its capability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations to facilitate 1st Division operations to force the withdrawal of REDLAND forces from GREENLAND. On order, the 56th BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance operations in the divisions unassigned areas to support current and future operations to enable the precise employment of division and joint combat power. Key tasks for the BFSB during this phase are Conduct RSO&I. Establish all required links to joint, interagency, and multinational (to include host nation) ISR assets. Identify potential enemy attack forces threatening 1st Division forces. Locate and identify REDLAND units, attack positions, and C2 nodes. Locate key infrastructure and symbols of GREENLAND/REDLAND national pride. Identify key leaders and powerbrokers within the 1st Division areas of operations and interest. Locate REDLAND, insurgent, or terrorist CBRNE weapons prior to their employment. 4-47. The 56th BFSB staff continuously interacts and collaborates with the division staff, particularly the G-2 and G-3. Once the division commander approves his CCIR and other information requirements are determined, the G-3 prioritizes these requirements and tasks 1st Division units to collect the required information using mission orders. These mission orders focus on answering CCIR. Based on the information requirements and priorities established in the division ISR plan, the BFSB develops its ISR plan. 4-48. This process begins with the receipt of the division commanders intent, guidance, and/or orders from the C/JFLC headquarters. The tasks and intelligence requirements that set collection priorities come from the division headquarters. The BFSB staff develops the BFSB reconnaissance and surveillance plan based on the tasks it is assigned by division, a prioritized list of information requirements, and any gaps in collection that are identified. The BFSB staff conducts mission analysis and develops an initial set of information requirements. Course of action analysis and requests for information from various sources will also feed into the continued development of information requirements. These information requirements are analyzed with the threat and the environment to develop CCIRs and other information requirements. When combined with indicators and warnings, the BFSB staff develops SIRs. The staff develops its reconnaissance and surveillance tasks from the SIRs. A capability assessment is done to determine what asset best collect on the SIRs, or what resources are required. The staff assigns the tasks, allocates resources, develops graphics, and issues the surveillance and reconnaissance plan/order to subordinate units. The subordinate units follow the same process and work in collaboration with the BFSB and division staffs to ensure the integration of different echelon plans. The subordinate units then conduct the
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reconnaissance and surveillance tasks and report to the BFSB staff. Some information is combat information that is of immediate value and is acted on. Other information must be analyzed and fused with other sources and then disseminated and used to update the common operational picture (COP). The information is also assessed to determine if the retasking of assets is required, either because an information requirement is answered or it is not gathering what is required. The assessment leads back into determining the information requirements and the cycle continues. 4-49. As the commanders primary collection agent, the 56th BFSB will generally be tasked to satisfy information requirements linked to 1st Division CCIR in the divisions unassigned areas. The G-2/G-3 has a series of decision points linked to trafficability and conditions of key bridge and river crossing sites. The commander is also interested in the readiness and morale of the REDLAND forces in the divisions AO. The presence of REDLAND multiple rocket launchers capable of delivering CBRNE weapons gives REDLAND the ability to shape the battlefield in its favor. Lastly, the division is interested in the location of key REDLAND C2 nodes. All of the information requirements in the 1st Division area are identified and prioritized. The BFSB is assigned those information requirements that fall within the divisions unassigned areas or that are beyond the capabilities of the other brigades. If a requirement cannot be answered by division assets the divisions ends an RFI to its higher headquarters. 4-50. As part of the planning process, the BFSB determines what information is being collected by C/JFLC/7th Army and joint, interagency, and multinational assets. It allocates its own assets to fill in the gaps. The BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance using unmanned aerial systems, ground reconnaissance troops, and long-range surveillance (LRS) teams operating forward of the BCTs AO to identify a potential attack and identify/confirm the REDLAND Armys unit positions and intentions. Once REDLAND forces have been located, the reconnaissance troops and LRS teams deploy to conduct surveillance of specified REDLAND units to provide early warning of an attack. The ground reconnaissance and surveillance assets work in concert with unmanned aerial systems and other technical surveillance systems in the BFSB to provide the required information. 4-51. The BFSB requests and receives an extended range/multipurpose (ER/MP) unmanned aerial system (UAS) OPCON from the 11th Aviation Brigade to conduct reconnaissance deep in the divisions AO to locate REDLAND rocket launchers capable of employing CBRNE weapons. The aviation brigade launches the ER/MP UAS and passes control to the BFSB using a ground control station (GCS) organic to the BFSB. Once the ER/MP UAS locates suitable targets, that information is passed to the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade and 75th Fires Brigade for further target development and possible attack. 4-52. The 1st Division G-3 tasks the BFSB to conduct surveillance of NAIs in order to identify and locate key REDLAND C2 nodes. One means of accomplishing the mission is through the use of organic PROPHET SIGINT assets. These may be employed in the UA in conjunction with the reconnaissance troops in the R&S battalion. They may also be employed in another brigades AO with local security being provided by that brigade. This requires coordination between the BFSB and the brigade in whose AO they will operations. As REDLAND C2 nodes are located, the information is distributed both vertically and horizontally. The information collected is sent vertically to the Main CP ISR element to answer CCIR and to be analyzed so as to provide intelligence to support the divisions defensive and other future operations. It also distributes the information horizontally to the other brigades within the division. 4-53. The 56th BFSB provides assets from its organic collection and exploitation company in general support to the 1st Division Detainee Facility, where they come under the command of the MP Detainee Facility commander, to facilitate document exploitation, interrogation, and other counterintelligence and human intelligence operations.
75TH FIRES BRIGADE

4-54. The 75th Fires Brigade headquarters along with two of the rocket battalions and one cannon battalion is in deployment package two. The third rocket battalion and second cannon battalion are in deployment package three. This sequencing allows the fires brigade to conduct strike operations at the expected time of assumption of the defense and prior to the start of ground offensive operations.
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418TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION

4-55. The 418th CA Battalion deploys early to conduct an initial assessment of the AO. After completion of RSOI, its various civil-military operations centers either start or continue previous coordination with local authorities, other governmental agencies, and international and nongovernmental organizations in support of division operations. The battalion must determine the critical civilian infrastructures within GREELAND so steps can be taken to protect them or quickly restore them to functionality even before the conclusion of combat operations. (This includes areas, societies, capabilities, organizations, politics, and economies [ASCOPE] within or capable of influencing events in the divisions AO.) The G-9 should be prepared to contract CMO assessment and analysis capability from civilian business or educational sources if functional expertise is not immediately available. The G-9 and the battalions civil affairs Soldiers must assess the ability of local police and security forces to retain control of the civilian population centers that are still in occupied areas once offensive operations begin.
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Chapter 5
Defensive Operations
This chapter using an illustrative scenario to demonstrate one of many ways in which a division commander can use the fundamentals of defensive operations defined in FM 3-0 and FM 3-90 to conduct tactical defensive operations within the framework of full spectrum operations. The characteristics of defensive operations, types of defensive operations, operational framework has not changed. Also remaining unchanged are the planning, preparation, and execution considerations and defensive control mechanisms and graphic control measures expounded in those manuals. In all cases the factors of METT-TC will influence and modify their specific application of the doctrinal concepts contained in this chapter. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that regains the initiative (FM 3-0). Other reasons for conducting defensive operations include the following: Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy. Attriting or fixing the enemy as a prelude to offensive operations. Increasing the enemy's vulnerability by forcing them to concentrate their forces. Surprise action by the enemy. Provide a secure environment for stability operations. Each of these reasons for defending has implications for how the division deploys its forces. Without a compelling reason to defend, however, Army divisions continue the attack. The tactical defense is a temporary state that permits the division to survive an enemy attack, halt the enemy, and create conditions for offensive and stability operations.
SCENARIO CONTINUED
5-1. REDLAND initiated a conventional ground invasion of GREENLAND before the 1st Division could deploy into that country. The objective of REDLAND forces was to defeat coalition forces in theater, secure those portions of GREENLAND predominately inhabited by Atropians, and seize positions controlling the mountain passes west of THEBSOL. These passes providing access to the ALBA river valley and to those areas of GREENLAND now under REDLAND control and will greatly facilitate the conduct of a successful defense until the UN Security Council would impose a ceasefire. 5-2. REDLAND forces initially successfully overwhelmed the outnumbered and scattered GREENLAND forces. They occupied those GREENLAND areas predominately inhabited by Atropians and pushed on toward their goal of securing the mountain passes in the vicinity of THEBSOL. In a coordinated manner, the GREENLAND insurgency was able to delay the onward movement and integration of the 2nd Division by attacking C/JFLC surface lines of communication (LOCs) and main supply routes (MSRs) from ports located along the WHITE SEA. Nevertheless, the EUCOM commander was able to employ Joint air interdiction to delay, disrupt, and attrit REDLAND forces long enough for the 2nd Division to arrive to bolster coalition defensive efforts. Coalition airpower gained air superiority rapidly after the deployment of
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C/JFAC fighter assets. However, their rapid deployment into theater greatly restricted the throughput of ground forces until their deployment was completed due to crowding at the APODs. This forced the EUCOM commander to deploy the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to secure his MSRs and use the BCTs in the 1st Division deployment package 1 to provide sufficient forces to enable the 2nd Division to conduct a successful defense. 5-3. Joint intelligence determined that the REDLAND assault force, the 26th Mechanized Infantry Division Tactical Group, was attrited to less than 50-percent effectiveness. However, the actions of the 26th DTG have created favorable conditions for the commitment of the REDLAND exploitation force, the 10th Tank Division Tactical Group, in an attempt to secure the mountain pass southwest of the city of THEBSOL, as well as the vital road node formed by that city, while the 20th Tank Division Tactical Group secures the pass to the citys northwest. Coalition Joint fires continue to attrit REDLAND ground forces. In reaction REDLAND forces have dispersed into smaller platoon and company size groups that can more easily conceal themselves. This is especially effective for those REDLAND motorized infantry forces
XX
1
X
2
II
X
75 I HHB 56
X
11
X
34 II
X
27 SUST
CA X
II
HHC
ATK
MP
II
II
U ASLT
I CSSB I I CSSB I CSSB CSSB
II II
II
MI
X
87
II 44 II I
GS
X
2
II BSB
Detached from 2 nd Division; attached to 1st Division
II
II
ASB
2-165
EOD
II BSB
Detached from PANG 28th Stryker Bde; attached to 56th BFSB
operating in the more mountainous parts of the theater. Figure 5-1. Units available for the defense 5-4. At the beginning of this vignette, the C/JFLC is defending along PL MAMMEL with the one US division (the 2nd) and three GREENLAND divisions. 1st Division has completed the RSOI of two of its three deployment packages. Figure 5-1 depicts the 1st Divisions task organization for this phase of the operation. Appendix H contains the internal task organization of the brigades and battalion contained in the figure.
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Figure 5-2. Schematic of 1st Divisions initial battlefield dispositions 5-5. On order the 1st Division assumed command of the 2nd SBCT and the 87th IBCT. These two BCTs were previously committed under the control of 2nd Division with the mission of conducting an area defense within their respective AOs along PL MAMMEL to prevent REDLAND penetration of PL DARLING. TAC 1 is coordinating with the 21st TSC and C/JFLC headquarters during the reception, staging, and onward movement of 1st Division forces and controlling the integration of these forces into the division. TAC 2 controls the defense. The Main CP is just now starting to flow into theater and is occupying a fixed facility in the vicinity of the divisions A/SPODs. It will remain in that location throughout the defense because of the advantages that location has in available communication infrastructure and available security. From that location it continues its planning and analysis functions while using the common operational picture (COP) established and maintained by the controlling TAC currently TAC 2using available strategic communications. Figure 5-2 depicts the battlefield arrangement of forces for this defensive vignette. The box in the lower-left portion of the figure indicates the relative proportion of division assets devoted to that category of full-spectrum operations. 5-6. The division conducts an area defense by assigning contiguous AOs within the division area to its two committed BCTs. Since the 2nd SBCT and the 87th IBCT were already involved in combat operations and integrated into the C/JFLC defensive scheme, the C/JFLC commander assigned the division responsibility for their combined AOs and an additional area sufficient to allow the division to assemble the remainder of its units and conduct shaping operations that set the conditions for transitioning to the offense and divisional sustainment operations. In this scenario, the 2nd SBCT and the 87th IBCT continue their defensive operations while the rest of the division assembles in support of the defense or in preparation for offensive operations.
MISSION
5-7. The 1st Division defends along PL MAMMEL to prevent further loss of GREENLAND territory to allow the build up of combat power in anticipation of offensive operations.
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COMMANDER'S INTENT
5-8. The purpose of this operation is to stop the advance of REDLAND forces to set the conditions for offensive operations. Key tasks are stopping the advance of REDLAND forces and completing the RSOI of 1st Division forces. End state is REDLAND forces halted and the division ready to assume the offensive.
CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

Table 6-1. 1st Division Internal Task Organization for the Defense MVR 2nd HBCT 2nd SBCT 5th HBCT 87th IBCT 11th AVN 27th SUST 44th Med 34th CSB(ME) 56th BFSB 75th FIRES 418th CA Bn A-1/68 AR 1/5 FA (GSR) B Co 418th CA C Co 418th CA D Co 418th CA ISR Fires Sustainment C2 Protection
A Co 418th CA 3 UAS Bn
rd
DECISIVE OPERATION
5-9. The 1st Division continues to defend along Phase Line MAMMEL with the 2nd SBCT and the 87th IBCT to prevent REDLAND forces from penetrating Phase Line DARLING. 2nd SBCT, with an additional armor company from the 5th HBCT and a cannon battalion general support-reinforcing (GS-R) from the fires brigade, initially has the priority of support for this phase. It is located in the maneuver corridor in the north of the divisions AO (see Table 6-1). Priority of support then goes to the 87th IBCT and the 11th CAB in that order. The 75th Fires Brigade provides GS-R assets to the 2nd SBCT and GS assets to the rest of the division. The 5th HBCT (-) is the division reserve.
SHAPING OPERATIONS
5-10. The 56th BFSB uses its assets to collect information in the division AO forward of the defending BCTs. Missions include surveillance of named areas of interest (NAIs), conducting route reconnaissance along Route 1, and confirming the location and disposition of the motorized infantry brigade tactical group operating to the 87th IBCTs front. Target identification priorities are units preparing to attack followed by battalion or higher C2 nodes. Locating infantry units and the small concentrations of armored combat vehicles that are tactically significant in this terrain will be difficult. When and where appropriate, the division commander will establish a temporary AO within which the 56th BFSB can accomplish its missions. The 56th BFSB staff coordinates the placement and movement of the brigades assets within the AOs of the 2nd SBCT and 87th IBCT. 5-11. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) conducts spoiling attacks in the form of mobile strikes to delay and disrupt REDLAND units preparing to attack with priority to engaging REDLAND uncommitted and follow-on forces. The commander assigns the 11th CAB the mission of delaying their approach to PL MAMMAL and disrupting their combined arms cohesion. The 11th CAB staff works with the division staff and the staffs of the appropriate BCTs is establish aerial movement corridors and other required Army airspace command and control (A2C2) graphic control measures.
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5-12. The 75th Fires Brigade engages non-mobile targets, with priority to the REDLAND air defense, fire support, and command and control warfighting functions to block REDLAND combined arms formations from penetrating PL MAMMEL. (The 75th Brigade staff during their MDMP process will identify their essential fire support tasks to accomplish this mission.) The division commander requested and the C/JFLC established a Purple Kill Box in the area of the REDLAND tank brigade tactical group in the northwest of the divisions AO. (See figure 5-2.) 5-13. All divisional units provide humanitarian assistance as required to alleviate the immediate suffering of GREENLAND civilians affected by combat operations and move themin cooperation with GREENLAND civil and military authoritiesto areas where the probability that they will be exposed to future combat operations is significantly reduced. Priority is on keeping division LOCs open. The 1st Division's civil-military operations center (CMOC) operated by the 418th CA Battalion and the BCT CMOCs operated by the 418th CA Battalions companies coordinate with GREENLAND civil and military authorities, international organizations, and private volunteer organizations to ensure humanitarian relief efforts do not conflict with planned military operations and to coordinate movement of displaced civilians through the 1st Divisions defensive positions and into GREENLAND established displaced civilian camps.
SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
5-14. TAC 1 completes the RSOI of division units and then begins preparing for offensive operations. The 27th Sustainment Brigade and 44th Medical Brigade priority is the BCTs in the defense, followed by the 75th Fires Brigade and 11th CAB, and lastly other division units in preparation for offensive operations. The 34th Combat Support Brigade (ME) ensures MSRs in the division AO stay open and provides a reaction force for Level II threats in the division AO. The 34th Combat Support Brigade (ME) commander is the 1st Division rear area commander.
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE DEFENSE

5-15. Like maneuver forces, the modular divisions C2 nodes can be task organized to meet mission requirements. The Mobile Command Group may co-locate with a TAC or a TAC co-locate with the Main CP to provide the necessary capabilities to control the mission.
DIVISION MAIN CP
5-16. The Main CP is primarily responsible for planning (sequels and branches to the defensive operation), intelligence analysis, staff estimates, and TAC 1 and TAC 2 support. Through the orders process, units may be task organized, missions assigned, and priorities set for fires, intelligence collection, support functions, and force protection. The ISR analysis element is located at the Main CP and provides analysis of all information collected. The fire support element planners at the Main CP develop target priorities for subordinate units. Likewise, the collection management element develops collection priorities for further development by the 56th BFSB. In this scenario, the Main CP fulfills its role from a base in the theater joint security areaafter it finishes its deploymentusing strategic communications and digital battle command systems to send and receive information. Staff elements located at the Main CP will normally coordinate information with corresponding elements at the TACs, C/JFLC, adjacent unit, and supported unit headquarters through multi-user voice and data networks augmented by liaison officers. The 418th CA Battalions Civil Affairs Planning Team (CAPT) augments the division G-9 staff section in support of the divisions current operations, future operations, and future plans.
DIVISION TAC 1 AND TAC 2

5-17. The division commander uses his two division TACs to control multiple parts of an operation, which are separated by geography, mission focus, phase of operation, or other logical dividing points. Care is taken to ensure that the principal of unity of command is not violated. In this scenario, the division EECP was the 1st Divisions initial C2 element in theater and began coordinating the RSOI of the remaining 1st Division forces in addition to gaining situational awareness of ongoing diplomatic, information, military,
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and economic regional activities within and external to GREENLAND. TAC 1 assumed that function once it had closed within the theater of operations. After TAC 2s arrival in country, the C/JFLC commander task organized two of the BCTs that were under the control of the 2nd Division to the 1st Division, and assigned the 1st Division an AO to defend. This was done in anticipation of the arrival of seven BCTs and one MEB into the theater. TAC 2 takes control of the defense while TAC 1 continues with the RSOI of the remaining division elements. While controlling the defense, TAC 2 may locate in one of the BCT AOs or co-locate with a BCT TOC. TAC 2, as the controlling TAC, maintains the divisions COP so the entire division staff may develop their understanding of the situation, maintain their running estimates, and develop plans. The commander tasks organizes his division by placing those brigades currently actively supporting the defense under the control of TAC 2 while the remaining division forceslargely the 2nd and 5th HBCTsfall under the control of TAC 1. 5-18. After all 1st Division units arrive in the AO, TAC 1 begins preparation for offensive operations by issuing FRAGOs and conducting rehearsals for the offense. It will be almost impossible for the commander and staffs of the committed brigades2nd SBCT and 87th IBCTto fully participate in ongoing preparations for the offense, since they are involved in ongoing defensive operations. Their LNOs will represent them for planning purposes and during rehearsals. These TAC 1 FRAGOs are issued through TAC 2 since TAC 2 is currently in charge of the divisions current full-spectrum operations. During operations, staff cells and elements located at the controlling TAC will exchange information with corresponding staff cells and elements at the BCTs and supporting brigade CPs and maintain the COP for the division so that all division leaders and staffs can develop SU of current and future full-spectrum operations.
DIVISION MOBILE COMMAND GROUP

5-19. The division mobile command group gives the division commander flexibility to move the commander and a small staff element to critical positions. He will split his time between TAC 2 and TAC 1. Most of the time, he will be involved with TAC 2 directly the divisions defensive operations. From there he will use the mobile command group to displace forward into BCT AOs to directly influence critical actions. He will also use his mobile command group to move to TAC 1 for the conduct of offensive rehearsals; the C/JFLC operational command post; and to conduct his battlefield circulation as he visits divisional units, civilian agencies, and work sites.

5-20. The Special Troops Battalion provides assets for the movement of CPs as required. It continues to task organize to support all division CPs with life support, communications, and security.
2ND SBCT, 2ND HBCT, 5TH HBCT, AND 87TH IBCT IN THE DEFENSE
5-21. BCTs are assigned AOs for defensive operations. Each BCT staff reports and coordinates through its controlling TAC. In this scenario, 1st Division assumed control of 2 BCTs, which already had AOs assigned. The 2nd SBCT has the northern AO consisting of the most open terrain, while 87th IBCT has the southern AO consisting of highly restricted terrain. The division's no-penetration line is PL DARLING, which is 2nd SBCT and 87th IBCT common rear boundary. The 2nd SBCT is the divisions main effort. The area defense conducted by these two BCTs consists of a mixture of static and dynamic actions and requires the assistance of the divisions supporting brigades to accomplish. These BCTs report to TAC 2, which is controlling the defense. The 5th HBCT is planning and preparing to respond to REDLAND attacks as the division reserve. It, with the 2nd HBCT (after closing on the division AO), is also planning and preparing for offensive operations in their respective AOs behind the 2nd SBCT.
56TH BFSB
5-22. The 56th BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance operations to enable the 1st Division commander to shape the battlefield by focusing organic and Joint combat power with precision that
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simultaneously support the 1st Divisions defense and set the conditions for offensive operations to restore the territorial integrity of GREENLAND. During this phase, the 56th BFSB receives the reconnaissance squadron (2nd Squadron, 165th Cavalry) from the 28th SBCT and the 3rd UAS Battalion to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in division controlled areas. Its key tasks during this phase are to Identify and locate REDLAND reserves. Identify and locate insurgent forces and terrorist groups operating within the divisions area of interest, along with their associated base areas. (This is a difficult task and will require the CI/HUMINT teams within the brigade and division military intelligence analysts to work closely with GREENLAND intelligence agenciesboth civil and military, other coalition partners, the C/JFLC C/J2X, the theater joint intelligence center, Department of the Army and DOD intelligence agencies, and other governmental agencies, such as the Department of State, Department of Justice, and Central Intelligence Agency. Division intelligence analysts may even need to contact selected offices within the National Intelligence Council on specific matters.) Identify and locate REDLAND multiple rocket launchers capable of influencing division operations. Conduct surveillance of key bridges along the projected 1st Divisions avenue of approach to support the commanders decision point to use existing bridges or conduct river crossing operations. Conduct reconnaissance of key fording sites. Conduct surveillance of the Lusk Reservoir Dam. Conduct route reconnaissance of key, secondary, and alternate routes along the 1st Divisions projected avenue of approach. (This will involve an extensive list of NAIs and may require that the 56th BFSB request the controlling TAC to task other divisional assets to examine some of the NAIs in order to provide required information in time to influence the division commanders decisions.) 5-23. The BFSB mission during the defense is multifaceted. The BFSB continues to collect information that support the commanders decisions that maintain the continuity of the divisions defense, while simultaneously conducting ISR to satisfy information requirements for planning future operations. The 56th BFSB focuses its collection assets on the area between the BCTs forward boundary and the divisions forward boundary (after the BCTs assume control of their AOs and the 34th Combat Support Brigade (ME) assumes control of the 1st Divisions sustainment area). The BFSB conducts reconnaissance and surveillance of intermediate objectives (NAIs tied to the division commanders decision points) and the final objective. The BFSB supports the current defensive fight primarily with HUMINT and CI assets, and secondly with technical collection assets (with TUAS) to fulfill 1st Division information requirements inside subordinate BCT AOs (after appropriate A2C2 coordination). 5-24. The BFSB headquarters will move from TAC 2 to TAC 1 to support offensive planning and preparations for the offense at the appropriate time during the conduct of the defense. The brigade staff continues parallel and collaborative planning with the division and BCTs staffs, as well as direct coordination to support reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Information received from the brigade controlled sensor is quickly assessed by the staff and passed to the G-2 for analysis, fusion, and further dissemination. Information related to CCIR is reported through command channels as required. 5-25. The G-3 tasks the BFSB to conduct surveillance of two key bridges over the Alba River. These two NAIs are tied to a division decision point to use the bridges for crossing the Alba River or conduct river crossing operations in the event the bridges are not trafficable. A second tasking directs surveillance of the Lusk Reservoir Dam, which is a major source of hydro-electrical power for GREENLAND, irrigation for the entire eastern portion of the country, and a flood-control element of the Alba River. (The division commander is concerned about the possibility that REDLAND forces will destroy the dam or the generators to negatively affect the civilian population due to a lack of electricity that supports daily activities, to include farmland irrigation).
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5-26. These two G-3 taskings require the 56th BFSB staff to task its LRS assets to conduct surveillance of the two key bridges and the Lusk Reservoir Dam. Each of these NAIs requires continuous all-weather coverage that the divisions technical collection assets cannot always provide. Therefore, the BFSB employs the 2nd Squadron, 165th Cavalry, to conduct route reconnaissance along Highway One to provide detailed information about the route, location, and suitability of alternate and secondary routes. The squadron also conducts assessments of possible fording sites along the Alba River in the event key bridges over the Alba River are not trafficable. 5-27. The task organization change providing OPCON of the 3rd UAS Battalion to the 56th BFSB facilitates the execution of ISR throughout those parts of the division AOs not assigned to its major subordinate commandsdivision unassigned areasto support information requirements for future operations. The 3rd UAS Battalions ER/MP UASs conduct reconnaissance to locate and identify REDLAND logistical activities for targeting. Additionally, they conduct reconnaissance to locate and identify the REDLAND reserves. Finally, the additional UASs complement the 56th BFSBs organic TUASs by providing additional information on REDLAND troop positions on the two intermediate objectives (JOHN and BEM) and final objective (DIANA), which is outside of the range of the brigades TUASs. 5-28. The brigade also conducts counter-intelligence operations to protect against espionage, sabotage, or other terrorist activities. This is especially important as battalion-sized components of deployment package 3 begin conducting troop movement from theater staging areas to assembly areas located within the division AOs. HUMINT teams continue identifying friendly civilians, vital infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance requirements.
75TH FIRES BRIGADE

5-29. The primary task of the 75th Fires Brigade is to plan, prepare, execute, and assess fire support missions designed to block REDLAND combined arms formations from penetrating PL MAMMEL. A secondary task is to conduct strike operations within the division AO, based on mission orders from the division. 5-30. The current operations cell within the controlling division TAC CP determines target sets and fire support priorities taking into account planned division future operations. Initially these target set priorities are to REDLAND air defense, fire support, and command and control warfighting functions. Priority of support is initially to the 2nd SBCT, then the 87th IBCT, the 56th BFSB, and then to the 11th CAB. Priority of fires will shift on order to the 11th CAB to fire SEAD missions as part of its mobile strike operations against the identified enemy tank brigade tactical group once preparatory fires for that mission begin. 5-31. The 75th Brigade staff during their MDMP process will identify their essential fire support tasks and sequence of fires required to accomplish this and other missions as they are assigned. The 75th Fires Brigade Fire Direction Center assigns brigade assets to accomplish those essential fire support tasks and sequence of fire support developed during the brigades MDMP process. 5-32. The brigade may also provide additional DS assets or reinforcing fires to the BCTs. In this scenario, the 75th Fires Brigade assigns one of its cannon battalions a GS-R support relationship to the 2nd SBCT while using its rockets systems to engage targets in the division AO beyond the forward boundary of the two defending BCTs.

5-33. Initially the primary task of the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade is to provide reconnaissance and surveillance assets to the 56th BFSB to develop an accurate COP of the divisions AO. The brigades secondary task is to conduct spoiling attacks in the form of mobile strike operations to delay and disrupt REDLAND units preparing to attack with priority to engaging REDLAND uncommitted and follow-on forces. In support of this later task the 11th CAB has the mission of delaying these REDLAND forces approach to PL MAMMAL and disrupting their combined arms cohesion.
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X X 27 SUST X 44 56
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EL CL AR K DA RL IN G M PL PL FA HR
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SRO
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AM M NI
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Figure 5-3. 11th Combat Aviation Brigade mobile strike 5-34. The current operations cell within the controlling division TAC CP determines target sets and support priorities for 11th CAB assets remaining under brigade control. The current operations cell takes into account planned division future operations when determining those target sets and support priorities. However, once the controlling division TAC establishes target sets and support priorities for the brigade, the brigade staff conducts its own their own MDMP. This includes but is not limited to Airspace C2 coordination. Theater air-ground system (TAGS), airspace control order (ACO), Air Tasking Order (ATO), and special instructions (SPINS). Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) movement, composition, and emplacement. Weather checks and analysis. AD status. Communications planning. Identification friend or foe (IFF) procedures and Mode 4 settings.
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PL
1 (US)
XX
5-9
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Chapter 5
5-35. The 11th CAB commander must prioritize and allocate how he task organizes his remaining assets to include the operational cycle to which each unit adheres. He may chose to form aviation task forces, which include one or more attack companies and assault elements, to support different division-directed efforts. In this scenario, the brigade commander task organizes his available aviation resources into two mission packages. One package is designed to be placed under the control of one of the divisions two committed BCTs to conduct close combat attack missions to support their maneuver efforts. The other package remains under brigade control. As shown in Figure 5-3, the 11th CAB conducts a mobile strike operation directed against an enemy tank brigade tactical group in the division's AO. This action relieves enemy pressure on the 2nd SBCT and helps set conditions for transition to the offense. See FMI 3-04.111 for additional information on aviation brigade planning, preparations, execution, and assessment. In addition, the 11 th CAB coordinates air ambulance support operations with the division and the 44 th MEDBDE.
27TH SUSTAINMENT AND 44TH MEDICAL BRIGADES

5-36. These two brigades provide a full suite of sustainment services and force health protection (FHP) to the division and forces attached to it. The 27th Sustainment Brigade provides C2 headquarters for specialized teams coming from the theater-level organizations, in addition to its normal supply, transportation, field service, and maintenance functions. It coordinates the distribution-based replenishment of the divisions brigades with the 21st TSC and monitors the execution of those sustainment activities. Priority of support is firstly to the 2nd SBCT, secondly to the 87th IBCT, thirdly the 11th CAB and 75th Fires Brigade, and lastly to other units assigned to the division. (Appendix C discusses division sustainment operations.) The 44th MEDBDE commander provides C2 for FHP operations. The 44th MEDBDE is capable of Providing a rapidly responsive operational command post (OCP) that can quickly integrate into the early entry deployment sequence for crisis management. Providing full spectrum continuous C4I in support of all Army divisions/corps and joint (when augmented with joint medical detachment [JMD]) forces. Providing operational medical plugs augmentation to Level II MTFs supporting brigade/brigade combat team (BCT) medical companies. Advising division/corps commanders on the medical capabilities of their operations. Providing medical staff planning, operational and technical supervision, and administrative assistance for multifunctional medical battalions (MMB) and combat support hospitals tasked organized under the MEDBDE. Coordinating with the supporting theater patient movement requirements center (TPMRC) for medical regulating and medical evacuation from MMB and hospitals to supporting corps/Army level MTFs and CONUS. Providing medical consultation services and technical advice in the following areas: Preventive medicine (PVNTMED) (medical surveillance, occupational environmental health (OEH), sanitary engineering, and medical entomology). Nursing services. Dental services. Mental health (MH) (to include combat operational stress control [COSC]) and neuropsychiatric (NP) care. Veterinary services (including food safety and inspection, animal medicine, and veterinary PVNTMED services). Nutrition care and medical food service. Providing a joint-capable C4I capability when augmented with appropriate joint assets (joint
5-10 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006
Providing advice and recommendations for the conduct of civil-military operations (CMO). manning document). Coordinating Army support to other Services (ASOS) for the ship-to-shore/shore-to-ship medical evacuation mission. Providing prompt medical treatment consisting of those measures necessary to locate, acquire, resuscitate, stabilize, and prepare patients for evacuation to the next level of care and/or RTD. Employing standardized ground medical evacuation units/resources. The use of air ambulance (AA) is the primary and preferred means of medical evacuation on the battlefield. Its use, however, is METT-TC driven and can be affected by weather, availability of resources, CBRN conditions, and air superiority issues. Providing a flexible, responsive, and deployable medical support designed and structured to support a Force Projection Army and its varied missions. This capability includes hospitalization resources to provide essential care to all patients who cannot recover within the theater evacuation policy and are stabilized and evacuated out of theater and definitive care to those Soldiers capable of returning to duty. Providing a medical logistics system (to include blood management) that is anticipatory and tailored to continuously support missions throughout full spectrum operations. Establishing PVNTMED programs to prevent casualties from DNBI through medical and OEH surveillance, behavioral surveillance, health assessments, PMM, and personal protective measures. Providing veterinary services to protect the health of the command through food inspection services, animal medical care, and veterinary PVNTMED. Providing dental services to maximize the RTD of dental patients by providing operational dental care and maintaining the dental fitness of theater forces. Providing COSC/MH to enhance unit and Soldier effectiveness through increased stress tolerance and positive coping behaviors. Providing medical laboratory functions in FHP operations to Assess disease processes (diagnosis). Conduct OEH surveillance laboratory support. Monitor the efficacy of medical treatment. Identify and confirm use of suspect biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents by enemy forces. Deploy medical C2 units capable of providing the requisite command and control to enhance split-base operations capability. Ensure maximum use of emerging technology to improve battlefield survivability.

5-37. The 34th Combat Support Brigade (ME) executes shaping and sustaining operations to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile action against the division. The brigade is responsible for protection of specific locations, facilities, and capabilities in the division sustainment area and other locations designated by the division commander. In this scenario, the brigadewhen deployment is completeincludes military police, engineers, air defense and CBRNE defense elements, civil affairs, and EOD units. During the defense, the brigade is responsible for area security within its assigned AO, ground LOC security and maintenance, and facilitating air defense coverage of the division area. 5-38. The division staff positions the 34th CSB(ME) to provide support to the 1st Divisions BCTs and supporting brigades. Likes the other supporting brigades within the division, the current operations cell within the controlling division TAC CP determines the missions, tasks, and support priorities for the 34th CSB(ME). Initially, these are
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The construction of survivability positions for the 75th Fires, 11th CAB, and 27th Sustainment/ 44th Medical Brigades (in that priority). Provision of area security to units within the 34th CSB(ME) AO to include response forces constituted from brigade assets and a tactical combat force if so designated at a later time. The maintenance and security of division MSRs within the 34th Brigades AO. The construction and operation of a division detainee holding area to include the designation of its commander. (Brigade will supervise the engineer battalions in the BCTs as the conduct their initial detainee holding facilities.) The detection and identification of REDLAND use of CBRNE weapons within the division AO. Conduct an inventory of toxic industrial chemicals/materials within the 34th CSB (ME) AO designed to mitigate environmental damage within the AO. The construction and operation of camps for GREENLAND civilian displaced persons. Provide local security against ground threats and sustainment to the 4/44th AMD Battalion which is ADCON to the brigade. Survey of existing GREENLAND infrastructure and its capacities to include water treatment and distribution systems, electrical generation and distribution systems, ground transportation networksroad, rail, and pipeline, sewer collection and treatment systems, and habitability and structure soundness of civilian facilities used by the division. (This survey will be performed in coordination with GREENLAND authorities and functional experts from the civil affairs community, other governmental agencies, and a wide variety of civilian commercial and international organizations.) 5-39. The controlling division current operations cell takes into account the 34th Brigades capabilities and planned division future operations when determining the missions and tasks assigned to the brigade. Once the controlling division TAC assigns those missions and tasks, the 34th CSB (ME) staff conducts its own their own MDMP to determine situationally appropriate and feasible courses of action. 5-40. As part of his selected a course of action, the 34th CSB(ME) commander allocates his forces to accomplish his divergent assigned missions. In this scenario, the presence of an additional task-organized engineer battalion in each of the divisions BCTs means that the 52nd Engineer Battalion is not required to provide mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability engineer support to the BCTs in contact. The 52nd Engineers will provide mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, and general engineering support to the 34th CSB(ME) and other divisional units operations in the 34ths AO. This includes creating or improving roads, repairing or maintenance of bridges and other improvements to existing division MSRs. The engineer battalion has only a limited capability to conduct local or area damage control operations necessitated by enemy action or accidents. 5-41. The 59th MP Battalion and its three companies will be fully involved in providing first, maneuver and mobility support, then area security, and then detainee operations within the 34th CSB(ME) AO in the priority in which they are listed. The battalion will protect critical functions, facilities, and forces within the brigades AO. The 59th will provide support to enhance the movement of BCT and supporting brigade units and the flow of supplies through the brigade AO. The battalion exercises positive control over all persons captured, detained, confined, or evacuated by divisional forces. This could cause the 59th MP Battalion to establish one or more mobility corridors within the 34th CSB(ME) AO, working with movement control teams from the 27th Sustainment Brigade to control division MSRs and provide circulation control, working with the GREENLAND government through the 418th CA Battalion to control the GREENLAND civilian population to include the collection and evacuation of civilian detainees. Lastly the MPs will provide response forces to assist bases and base clusters located within the 34th CSB(ME)s AO to respond to Level I and II attacks. 5-42. The 325th CBRNE Battalion and the 802nd Ordnance Company (EOD) will provide detection, identification, and mitigation of CBRNE point devices and area threats within and external to the brigades AO. This will require the battalion and 34th CSB (ME) staffs to work closely with division, BCT, and supporting brigade staff to coordinate the tasking, movement, and sustainment support of CBRNE teams transiting the division AO to accomplish their assigned missions.
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5-43. The battalion headquarters establishes a division-level CMOC within the division area. That CMOC is located where it can best influence those individuals and organizations that affect civil considerations throughout the division AO. In this scenario, at this time, this is within the 1st Division tactical assembly area. A CMOC may be forced to move frequently to interact with different parties, which may distance it from the division Main CP or TAC CPs. This will inhibit life support and security needs. The battalions four subordinate companies establish brigade-level CMOCs within the AOs of the brigades they support. The 418th provides a CAPT to the division headquarters to help the G-9 integrate CMO into the divisions operations. Figure 5-4 depicts the initial location of the five CMOCs within the division AO. 5-44. Civil affairs functional assessment teams from EUCOMs supporting civil affairs command or 7th Armys supporting civil affairs brigadein cooperation with functional experts from engineer organizations, other governmental agencies, international organizations, and civilian contractorswill conduct survey operations within the divisions AO. The results of these surveys provide a basis for reconstruction planning by divisional forces and higher headquarters.
(Deployment Package 3) RSO&I in Progress

5th HBCT CMOC
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34th CSB CMOC (ME)
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SRO
NG DA RL I
38th (GN) Div

CL AR K PL M PL FA HR NI AM M EL
XX
Defense
Figure 5-4. 1st Division initial CMOC positions 5-45. The security situation and force protection posture dictate the general location of each 1st Division CMOC. Normally, each CMOC locates itself within the sustainment area of the supported echelon to prevent nonmilitary traffic in and around the CMOC from interrupting military operations. Also, the echelon sustainment area is more suitable for transition operations when the responsibility for CMO within a given area is transferred from one agency to another. (Appendix C discusses division sustainment operations.)
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PL
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(BLANK PAGE)
Chapter 6
Offensive Operations
This chapter using a scenario to illustrate one of many ways in which a division commander can use the fundamentals of offensive operations defined in FM 3-0 and FM 3-90 to conduct tactical offensive operations within the framework of full spectrum operations. The characteristics of offensive operations, types of offensive, and the operational framework have not changed. Neither have the planning, preparation, nor execution considerations and offensive control mechanisms and graphical control measures expounded in those manuals changed. In all cases, the factors of METT-TC will influence and modify the specific application of the doctrinal concepts illustrated in this chapter. Offensive operations seek to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to decisively defeat an enemy. Army forces attack simultaneously throughout the AO to throw enemies off balance, overwhelm their capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure their defeat or destruction. The offense ends when the force achieves the purpose of the operations, reaches a limit of advance, or approaches culmination. Additional tasks offensive operations accomplish include Disrupting enemy coherence.
Securing or seizing terrain. Denying the enemy resources. Fixing the enemy. Gaining information.
Each of these reasons for conducting offensive operations has implications for how the division employs its forces. The conduct of tactical offensive operations is its own objective. It must fit within a national and theater strategy that employs all four instruments of national power. This chapter provides doctrinal concepts for a division conducting primarily offensive operations. It provides an example of one of the many ways in which the division could conduct offensive operations within the fullspectrum operations framework. In all cases the factors of METT-TC will influence and modify their specific application of the doctrinal concepts contained in this chapter.
SCENARIO CONTINUED
6-1. The C/JFLC defense was successful and caused the REDLAND army to culminate. Figure 6-1 depicts the situation as the C/JFLC transitions to the offense. All committed REDLAND forces in GREENLAND are estimated as being less than 50-percent effective due to losses suffered from coalition air attack and ground defensive actions. Air interdiction and direct action missions by coalition SOF are successful in preventing any operationally significant regeneration of attrited REDLAND forces by the movement of war reserve stocks and replacements from their depots in REDLAND. That portion of the 10th Tank Division Tactical Group located within the 1st Division AO is estimated at less than 33-percent effective. The 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group is estimated at 40-percent effective but can muster detachments in company-size strength to counterattack into the southern flank of the 1st Divisions east-west movement corridor. The 26th Mechanized Infantry Division Tactical Group is estimated at 35-
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percent strength. Additionally the insurgency remains capable of temporary interdicting C/JFLC ground LOCs at times and places of their choosing with up to platoon-size forces. Terrorists based along the international border between REDLAND and GREENLAND are not a significant factor affecting the 1st Divisions tactical operations within GREENLAND at this point in time because they lack the combat power to attack coalition military targets along the forward edge of the battle area and have no effective way to penetrate coalition front lines in a timely manner to attack GREENLAND civilian targets located within GREENLAND administered territory.
PL
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Figure 6-1. Situation as the C/JFLC transitions to the offense 6-2. The readiness of C/JFLC ground forces is mixed. Both 1st Division and 2nd Division are at approximately 90-percent strength. The GREENLAND 38th Division located on the southern flank of the division is at 75-percent strength and is capable of attacking to fix those portions of the REDLAND 53rd and 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Groups located within its AO. The GREENLAND 62nd Division located on the northern flank of the 2nd Division is at 70-percent strength and is capable of attacking to defeat the 52nd Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group. The GREENLAND 67th Division is at 65-percent strength and can only attack to fix the 20th Tank Division Tactical Group. The 5th MEB remains the C/JFLC reserve with a secondary mission of securing the joint security area. 6-3. In this phase of the operation, the 1st Division attacks with the 2nd and 5th HBCT, the 87th IBCT, and the 2nd SBCT. While the defensive scenario in Chapter 5 unfolded, additional forces continued to deploy to or be constituted within the JOA. The reinforcements made available to the 1st Division for the conduct of offensive operation are The 75th MP Battalion. The 3rd Battalion 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade of the GREENLAND Army.
6-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006
The 555th Engineer Brigade consisting of three engineer battalions, two EOD companies, and topographic support team. The division has been given OPCON of the 555th Engineer Brigade because of the number of rivers that it will have to cross during its planned advance and the need to maintain mobility during the advance. The MP and GREENLAND Army motorized infantry battalions were added to help the division provide security for the conduct of its sustainment operations. Figure 6-2 depicts the 1st Divisions troops available for the offense.
XX
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Figure 6-2. 1st Division troops available for the offense 6-4. TAC 1 is the controlling CP for offensive operations while TAC 2 focuses on the divisions current and future stability shaping operations. The main CP remains in its base in the theater security area and maintains coordination with higher headquarters. The plans element at the main CP continues to refine sequels to the current operations and plans for those branches that are beyond the capability of TAC 1 to plan. This plans elementin coordination with TAC 2conducts planning for future division stability operations for execution in the next phase of the joint force commander campaign. The intelligence element at the main CP is providing updated intelligence products to the divisions major subordinate commands as they begin offensive operations. Figure 6-3 is a schematic showing the divisions intent graphics as it transitions to the attack. The box in the upper right-hand corner of the figure indicates the level of effort given to each category as the division conducts full-spectrum operations.
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THEBSOL
X 103 X 10
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X X A 101 A B X 512 X 511 51 51
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iver
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261 X 262
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AM
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AR
IS
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Figure 6-3. Schematic showing intent graphics for the offense
MISSION
6-5. On order, the 1st Division attacks from PL MAMMEL to seize OBJ DIANA, as part of a CJFLC offensive operation designed to restore the territorial integrity of GREENLAND.
COMMANDERS INTENT
6-6. The purpose of this operation is to isolate REDLAND forces from their support and sustainment bases. Insurgent and terrorist personnel encountered during this operation are to be killed or captured. The key task is to seize OBJ DIANA which will lead to either the encirclement of the majority of REDLAND forces or a political settlement resulting in their withdrawal from GREENLAND. The desired end state is the withdrawal or destruction of REDLAND forces from the AO, which returns control of the land, people, and resources in country to the internationally recognized government of GREENLAND.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
6-7. The 1st Division attacks with the 5th HBCT in the north to destroy the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM so they can serve as bridgehead to enable the forward passage of the 2nd HBCT to secure OBJ DIANA and destroy the 261st Mechanized Brigade Tactical Group. The axis of advance is Highway 1. PL HARRIS is the division limit of advance for this attack. The 2nd SBCT is the division reserve and follows the 5th HBCT and the 2nd HBCT along Highway 1 to an assembly area centered on the intersection of Highway 1 and PL Fahrni after completing its mission staging operations. The 87th IBCT attacks to fix the 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group in their
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current locations. The 75th Fires and 11th Combat Aviation Brigades assist the BCTs in the accomplishment of these tasks. The disposition of enemy forces and the separation of key terrain compel the division to conduct non-linear operations that occasionally involves the use of noncontiguous AOs. 6-8. The division commander task organized his capabilities in response to the current factors of METTTC. Table 6-2 shows the divisions revised internal task organization for offensive operations. (The division commander, based on his staffs mission analysis, determined that the primary stability operation during this phase of the operation will be providing temporary humanitarian assistance to GREENLAND civilians affected by his offensive combat operations until the GREENLAND government can assume responsibility for their welfare. Thus he does not request additional forces to accomplish large-scale stability operations.
Table 6-2. 1st Division Internal Task Organization for the Offense
2nd HBCT 2nd SBCT 2-227th AVN (ATK) 555th Engr (DS) D Co (-) 513th MI (CI/HUMINT) F-2/22 INF (LRS) A Co (-)-513th MI (TUAS) 372nd Sust Bn C-418th CA Bn Maneuver 1-227th AVN (ATK) ISR Fires 1-5th FA (155 SP) Det 1, D CO 513th MI E Co-513th MI (CI/HUMINT) 1-14th FA (155 SP) Logistics 271 Sust Bn 272nd Sust Bn
st
C2 A-418th CA Bn D-418th CA Bn B-418th CA Bn
Protection
5th HBCT
87th IBCT
11th Avn Bde 27th Sust 34th CSB (ME) 56th BFSB 75th Fires BDE 418th CA Bn 555th Engr Bde
Det 1, 803rd EOD Co Det 1, C Co 513th MI (C&E) 3rd UAS Bn
DECISIVE OPERATION
6-9. Once the 5th HBCT secures Objective BEM, the 2nd HBCT conducts a forward passage of lines through the 5th HBCT, east of OBJ BEM, and attacks to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and seize the key terrain vicinity of OBJ DIANA. This isolates REDLAND forces from their support and sustainment bases. The 5th HBCT is initially the divisions main effort. The 2nd HBCT becomes the divisions main effort once it begins its forward passage of lines through the 5th HBCT. Priority of support once the 2nd HBCT becomes the main effort is to the 2nd HBCT and then to 5th HBCT, the 87th IBCT, and 2nd SBCT and the 34th CSB (ME) in that order. The 555th Engineer Brigade is initially
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in direct support of the 5th HBCT and integrated into the 5th HBCTs order of march. The 75th Fires Brigade provides a reinforcing cannon battalion to the 2nd and 5th HBCTs. (Figure 6-4 is a schematic showing the planned disposition of the divisions BCTs and the 34th CSB (ME) at the conclusion of this phase. The other supporting brigades occupy bases and base clusters within the 34th CSB (ME)s AO. Notice that the size of each BCT AO is based on their areas of influence and the division occupies noncontiguous areas along Highway 1.)
DA RL IN G PL
THEBSOL
X OBJ JOHN 5
Def
Stability Offense
X 34
56
Alba Rive r
X 2
XX
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X 87
Hi gh w
ay
KILLEAN
AM EL M
PL
OBJ DIANA
Lusk Reservoir
FA HR N I PL KE EL ER
PL
PL
R HA
IS
XX
Figure 6-4. Schematic showing planned disposition of the 1st Divisions BCTs at the conclusion of the attack
SHAPING OPERATIONS
6-10. The 5th HBCT (the initial main effort) attacks in the northern portion of the division's AO along Highway 1 to destroy enemy forces (101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group) and secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM. The FSCL is initially PL FAHRNI. 6-11. The 2nd HBCT initially follows the 5th HBCT. It becomes the divisions main effort after conducting a forward passage of lines with 5th HBCT east of OBJECTIVE BEM and attacks to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVE DIANA. This assists in the C/JFLC envelopment of the remaining REDLAND forces west of PL HARRIS. 6-12. The 87th IBCT attacks to fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group in the southern part of the division AO to protect the 2nd BCT from attack. The 2nd SBCT becomes the division reserve after the 5th HBCT conducts its forward passage of lines through the 2nd SBCTs positions.
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6-13. The 75th Fires Brigade's priority of fires are the destruction of the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group and other REDLAND forces located along the 5th HBCT axis of advance (Highway 1); blocking enemy forces currently in the 87th BCT AO from moving to where they can influence 1st Division movement and maneuver along Highway 1, and the continued execution of the divisions counterfire program in the divisions AO. 6-14. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade initially places an attack helicopter battalion OPCON to the 5th HBCT to help destroy previously detected enemy forces in the 5th HBCT AO and react to REDLAND attempts to interdict traffic along Highway 1. This battalion remains OPCON to the 5th HBCT throughout this phase of the operation. The 11th Aviation places another attack battalion OPCON to the 2nd HBCT once the 2nd HBCT becomes the divisions main effort to help the 2nd HBCT destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJ DIANA. Prior to the commitment of the 2nd HBCT that second attack battalion supports 87th IBCT efforts to fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group in its current position and block other 51st Motorized Division Tactical Group elements from moving to where they can influence 1st Division movement and maneuver along Highway 1. 6-15. The 56th BFSB uses its assets to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations primarily to determine the presence and composition of REDLAND forces on objectives JOHN, BEM, and DIANA and other forces capable of interdicting Highway 1. The second priority is to detect REDLAND and insurgent forces trying to move to positions from which they could interdict friendly movements along Highway 1.
SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
6-16. The BCTs will provide the minimal amount of humanitarian assistance to GREENLAND civilians encountered during their conduct of offensive operation consistent with international law during this operational phase. Humanitarian assistance operations relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. Military support provided by a BCT during these offensive operations is only intended to temporarily supplement other agencies. It may include establishing temporary control of and providing security to concentration of civilians encounter during the course of offensive military operations. It will probably include the provision of Temporary emergency medical treatment to civilian casualties of combat operations. Food. Water. Shelter. Transportation out of danger areas. The BCTs will use their CMOCs to expedite the transfer of responsibility for the civilians they encounter to GREENLAND civil authorities and appropriate international organizations. 6-17. The 27th Sustainment Brigade and 44th Medical Brigade continue to provide logistics, personal, and FHP support to the divisions BCTs and supporting brigades. Priority is to the 5th HBCT until the 2nd HBCT begins its forward passage of lines and becomes the divisions main effort. Sustainment operations in the offense are characterized by high-intensity operations that require anticipatory support as far forward as possible. Sustaining operations plans ensure agile and flexible capabilities to follow exploiting forces and continue support. Commanders and staffs of these two brigades plan for increased quantities of fuel, ammunition, and selected other classes of supply, as well as for maintenance and recovery of damaged equipment. Planners address projected casualty rates and preposition medical treatment and evacuation capabilities forward to efficiently evacuate casualties to where they can receive the appropriate medical care. The divisions lengthening LOCs is a major challenge during this offensive operation. Transportation support must be closely coordinated to deliver essential support to the right place at the right time with security provided by organic and external elements.
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6-18. When developing the force health protection (FHP) plan for the offense, the FHP planner must consider many factors (FM 4-02.55). The forms of maneuver, as well as the threats capabilities, influence the character of the patient workload and its time and space distribution. The analysis of this workload determines the allocation of FHP resources and the location or relocation of medical treatment facilities (MTFs). FHP for offensive operations must be responsive to several essential characteristics. As operations achieve success, the areas of casualty density move away from the supporting MTF. This causes the routes of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) to lengthen. Heaviest patient workloads occur during disruption of the threat's main defenses, at terrain or tactical barriers, during the assault on final objectives, and during threat counterattacks. The accurate prediction of these workload points by the FHP planner is essential if MEDEVAC operations are to be successful. As advancing combat formations extend control of the battle area, supporting medical elements have the opportunity to clear the battlefield. This facilitates the acquisition of the wounded and reduces the vital time elapsed between wounding and treatment. 6-19. There are two basic problems confronting the supporting medical units and MEDEVAC elements. First, contact with the supported units must be maintained. Responsibility for the contact follows the normal FHP patternhigher echelon evacuates from lower echelon. The forward deployed air and ground evacuation resources maintain the contact. Secondly, the mobility of the MTFs supporting the combat formations must be maintained. The requirement for prompt MEDEVAC of patients from forward MTFs requires available ambulances to be echeloned well forward from the outset. MEDEVAC support (both air and ground ambulances) beyond the capabilities of the BSMC is requested through the division surgeon section. 6-20. The 34th CSB (ME) remains responsible for security within its assigned AO and the security and maintenance of division ground LOCs in that same AO. Through separate, but connected episodes, it will be assigned temporary AOs to allow it to establish and secure movement corridors for ground LOCs between the noncontiguous AOs of the BCTs. This allows the 27th Sustainment Brigade to conduct periodic resupply of the forward support companies and CSSBs operating within those BCT AOs. The brigade supports the divisions stability operations by conducting initial damage assessments, repairing critical civil infrastructure within its capability, and providing local security to population centers within its AO until local control is established. This becomes more important as the division begins recovering previously occupied GREENLAND territory containing significant numbers of civilians and the boundaries of the brigade are adjusted based on METT-TC.
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE OFFENSE

6-21. The division MCG continues to give the commander the flexibility to movewith a small staff elementto critical positions on the battlefield where he can best employ his battlefield presence to assess the situation and make adjustments by seeing, hearing, and understanding what is occurring.
DIVISION MAIN CP
6-22. The main CP remains in its previous location in the joint security area throughout the conduct of this phase. The main CP retains primary responsibility for planning sequels to current operations, intelligence analysis, estimates, and provides support to the controlling TAC. This support may include planning branches to current operations that the controlling TAC is unable to conduct the necessary planning. Through the orders process, units may be task organized, missions assigned, and priorities set for fires, intelligence collection, support functions, and force protection. All elements of the main CP coordinate with higher headquarters to remain synchronized with their intent and efforts, and will normally coordinate information with corresponding elements at the TACs through multi-user voice and data networks. 6-23. The plans element continues planning sequels for the next phase of the operationwhich will focus more on stability operations than offensive operations. They are assisted in this task by a civil affairs (CA) planning team from the 418th CA Battalion. The intelligence element provides analysis of all information collected. The current operations element provides the division's common operational picture (COP) developed by TAC 1 as the controlling TAC at this timeto all main CP elements to enable the main CP staff to provide estimates and plans based on accurate information of forces available and the enemy
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situation. The CMO element maintains liaison with the 418th CA Battalion CMOC and the CA companies supporting the BCTs. 6-24. The fire support element (FSE) at the main CP continues to synchronize the planning of Army indirect fires, joint fires and offensive IO to support the division commanders intent through physical destruction, information and denial, enemy system collapse, and erosion of enemy will. The FSE does this by taking into account the current factors of METT-TC to accomplish its functions previously outlined in Chapter 2. Specifically this includes consolidating, synchronizing, and distributing targeting lists and all fire support coordinating measures in support of the division's mission, such as No Fire Lists and Restrictive Fire Lists. The FSE routinely coordinates operational- and tactical-level targeting, immediate, and planned close air and air interdiction requests. 6-25. The coordinating and special staff sections within the main CP remain fully involved with the C/JFLC/7th Army sustainment directorate (in their role as the ASCC) and the TSC staff. They retain responsibility for ensuring the provision of sustainment to division current and future operations. This will require flexibility and foresight on their part as they begin obtaining those CLASS X items needed for the conduct of stability operations beyond humanitarian assistance in the next operational phase of the joint force commanders campaign. Indeed some orders for especially long-lead items will need to have been placed even before the division deployed into the theater of operations.
DIVISION TAC 1 AND TAC 2

6-26. TAC 1 is the controlling headquarters for offensive operations. During the divisions conduct of defensive operations discussed in the previous chapter it assumed responsibility for planning and overseeing the divisions preparations for offensive operations even while it supervised divisional elements processing through theater RSO&I activities. This included the conduct of rehearsals. Of course those divisional units not currently actively committed to current operations2nd and 5th HBCTswere more free to participate in all preparatory activities that those divisional units, such as the 2nd SBCT, 87th IBCT, 75th Fires, and 11th Combat Aviation Brigades, that were conducting defensive combat operations. For example in the case of these later organizations liaison officers often had to represent their respective commanders during the conduct of division-level rehearsals. 6-27. When the offense begins, control of the forces currently in defense passes to TAC 1. TAC 1 coordinates for the forward movement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) from PL FAHRNI to PL KEELER, and later to PL HARRIS. The FSCL movement is coordinated with the C/JFAC ASOC through the C/JFLC fires directorate and BCD in conjunction with the forward movement of division units. During the offense, the TAC 1 FSE provides input to FRAGOs, monitors the current fight, monitors shaping operations, recommends reallocation of fires/effects assets, and recommends changes to fires/effects priorities. 6-28. TAC 1, as the controlling headquarters, is responsible for coordinating the activities of the supporting brigades with the actions of the divisions BCTs. It supervises the handover of time-sensitive target information from the 56th BFSB to the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade or 75th Fires Brigade as appropriate. If necessary, TAC 1 can designate an AO for the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade to help the brigade engage the enemy and direct the divisions reconnaissance and surveillance assets, such as unmanned aerial systems or other sensors, conduct combat assessment after the conclusion of strike operations. The TAC 1s involvement is necessary to integrate division-directed warfighting functions, such as ISR and fire support activities, in the unassigned areas of the division AO. Additionally, TAC 1 will designate temporary AOs that the 34th CSB (ME) can use as movement corridors to ensure the security of supply convoys moving between the division sustainment area and the BCTs brigade support areas. The 56ths BFSBs reconnaissance squadron may also be assigned an AO to facilitate its activities. 6-29. TAC 2 is assigned responsibility for synchronizing the divisions ongoing stability operations once the division transitions to the offense. This is especially important as the division begins recovering previously occupied GREENLAND territory. This requires TAC 2 to provide stability input for the FRAGOs issued by TAC 1 and orchestrate division responses to humanitarian assistance requirements during this phase to include the handling of displaced persons. TAC 2 takes advantage of the G-9 staff
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section at the main CP and the 418th Civil Affairs Battalions civil affairs planning team as it coordinates its actions with the GREENLAND government and various local and international volunteer organizations. 6-30. TAC 2 is also given two be prepared missions. The division commander wants TAC 2 to be prepared to produce a division river crossing plan as a branch to the current operation and act as the crossing force headquarters if the complexity of the divisions river crossing operations during the attack exceed the capability of a BCT to command and control. Alternatively, the division commander knows that he may need TAC 2 to develop a branch plan and control division air assault operations designed to secure the Lusk Reservoir dam to prevent its destruction by REDLAND forces and the resultant long-term negative effects on the GREENLAND civilian economy.

6-31. The STB continues to support each division command post with life support, communications, and security throughout the divisions conduct of offensive operations. It provides or coordinates for additional assets to support the movement of the various CPs as required.
BCTs IN THE OFFENSE

6-32. The operational concept of full-spectrum operations and the divisions transition to a focus on offensive operations means that while the majority of the division is conducting offensive operations, simultaneously, some division elements are conducting simultaneous defensive and stability operations. In this illustrative scenario, while the 2nd HBCT and 5th HBCT conduct the divisions decisive operations, the 2nd SBCT will conduct local security operations as it prepares to be committed as the division reserve. 6-33. During this operational phase focused on offensive operations the divisions BCTs conduct of stability operations are largely concentrated on ending or alleviating human suffering. This humanitarian assistance only temporarily supplements or complements the efforts of the GREENLAND civil authorities or agencies that have primary responsibilities for providing relief. The health and infrastructure conditions encountered by the BCTs during their advance will vary extensively ranging from adequate to nonexistent. The potential for violence, crime, theft, escalation of terrorist acts, and further destabilization is always present. The potential for shifts in the perceptions and attitudes of the local GREENLAND populace is always present. As a minimum, the BCTs are responsible for providing a secure environment for humanitarian relief efforts conducted by other agencies to progress. 6-34. The engineer elements within the BCTs will concentrate on providing mobility support to their respective BCTs, to include the use of their task-organized dry and wet-gap crossing and minefield breeching capabilities. Their respective commander will employ their countermobility, survivability, and general engineer capabilities as necessary to accomplish their assigned missions.
2nd SBCT
6-35. The 2nd SBCT initially conducts an area defense during this phase. It establishes two passage lanes Alpha and Bravoand assists in the forward passage of the 5th HBCT and 2nd HBCT through its AO. PL MAMMEL is the battle handover line. After the 5th HBCT completes its forward passage, the 2nd SBCT begins mission staging operations (MSO). The 2nd SBCT becomes the division reserve following the completion of its MSO. The 2nd SBCT must be prepared to conduct a battalion air assault to secure the northern dam and outlets of LUSK reservoir to prevent REDLAND forces from releasing the water stored there and/or destroying the dam and generators located there and thereby causing significant long-term disruption of the GREENLAND civilian economy. The 2nd SBCT must also be prepared to counter REDLAND attempts to interdict Highway 1. Priority of planning goes to air assault followed by reaction plans to any attempts by elements of the 10th Tank or 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Groups or insurgent forces to interdict Highway 1 and then to countering any REDLAND attempt to counterattack from north to south across the ALBA Riverthe terrain feature forming the divisions northern boundary. On order the brigade displaces from its current location and follows the 5th HBCT and 2nd HBCT to an assembly area centered on the intersection of PL FAHRNI and Highway 1.
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6-36. MSO is a deliberate process planned in advance by the division as part of the overall operation. During MSO, the division cycles BCTs in and out of offensive and defensive operations, and a BCT will refit, rearm, and replenish for three to seven days at high tempo. Mission staging for a single brigade normally requires 24- to 72-hours. In this scenario, the 2nd SBCT stays in its current location. The 2nd SBCTs MSO remains under the control of the 2nd SBCT commander. He determines the order and pace at which his battalions are restored to a high level of combat effectiveness. The 27th Sustainment Brigade, working with the 21st TSC, arranges for enough supplies and repair parts to restock the brigade. Available replacements are also integrated into the 2nd SBCTs subordinate battalions and companies during the MSO. While conducting MSO, the 2nd SBCT is not available for tactical tasks other than local security.
5th HBCT
6-37. The 5th HBCT is initially the divisions main effort as it conducts a forward passage of line through the 2nd SBCT to attack to destroy the remnants of the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group. Following the destruction of the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group, it maneuvers along the axis of advance formed by Highway 1 to secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM. After seizing OBJECTIVE BEM, the 5th HBCT establishes two passage lanes through which the 2nd HBCT can be committed to seize OBJECTIVE DIANA. Securing OBJECTIVE BEM enables and expedites the forward passage of lines of the 2nd HBCT. 6-38. While the 5th HBCT will attempt to seize the existing Highway 1 bridges, the brigade prepares to conduct river crossing operations as part of operations designed to secure both OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM. The existence of bridges over the various tributaries to the ALBA RIVEReither existing ones seized relatively intact or emplaced as part of the brigades river crossing operationsare key to the divisions continued advance. Therefore the brigade secures each objective with at least a combined arms battalion. (FM 90-13 discusses river crossing operations.)
2nd HBCT
6-39. Until the 5th HBCT seizes and secures OBJECTIVE BEM, the 2nd HBCT follows the 5th HBCT along the axis of advance formed by Highway 1. On order, the 2nd HBCT conducts a forward passage of lines through the 5th HBCT, attacks to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group, and secures OBJECTIVE DIANA, the bridges north and east of KILLEAN. Securing OBJECTIVE DIANA in conjunction with the operations of the 2nd Divisioncompletes the isolation of the majority of REDLANDs combat power. It also prevents REDLAND from reconstituting an operational reservethe 26th Mechanized Infantry Division's Tactical Group.
87th IBCT
6-40. The 87th IBCT attacks to fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group in the southern part of the 1st Division AO. This will deny the enemy the ability to expeditiously reposition elements of the 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group to conduct a counterattack into the flank of the divisions advance along Highway 1 or interdicting that traffic artery.
SUPPORTING BRIGADES IN THE OFFENSE

6-41. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade receives priorities and mission orders from TAC 1. It provides an attack battalion OPCON to 5th HBCT to support their attack to destroy the 101st Tank Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVES JOHN and BEM. That attack battalion will remain OPCON to the 5th HBCT to assist in securing the axis of advance (Highway 1). The brigades second attack battalion initially provides support to the 87th IBCT to help fix the 512th Motorized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and block the movement of other 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group and insurgent forces to positions that would allow them to interdict Highway 1. It also provides assault lift capabilities to the 87th IBCT to enable the infantry to fix 51st Motorized Infantry Division Tactical Group elements in their current
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locations or block their movement to position where they could interdict Highway 1. 1On order it provides an attack battalion OPCON to the 2nd HBCT to support their attack to destroy the 261st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Tactical Group and secure OBJECTIVE OBJ DIANA. The aviation brigade provides ER/MP UAS assets OPCON to the 56th BFSB. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade must be prepared to provide assault lift capabilities to the 2nd SBCT, if the 2nd SBCT is ordered to secure the LUSK reservoir dam. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade provides CH-47 support to the 27th Sustainment Brigade for the purpose of conducting aerial resupply of critical items. It also provides its aerial medical evacuation assets in general support to the division.
27TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE AND 44TH MEDICAL BRIGADE

6-42. These brigades initially provide sustainment and FHP support from their locations in the division sustainment area. The 27th Sustainment Brigade begins MSO to resupply the 2nd SBCT after the 5th HBCT completes its forward passage of lines. The brigade continues to support the 5th HBCT and 2nd HBCT using a combination of hasty and deliberate replenishment operations and MSO as they continue the attack and cycle battalions and companies out-of-combat to replenish supplies. The 27th Sustainment Brigade supports the 87th IBCT and all other divisional units using a mix of supply-point and distribution-based support. It uses its available assets to provide this support, to include the use of USAF fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to deliver supplies and personnel when needed. 6-43. The 27th Sustainment Brigade normally provides movement control assets, such as a movement control team, to the division transportation officer (DTO) to help him plan the movement of logistical convoys throughout the division AO. The division current operations element in TAC 1 integrates these convoys and their associated convoy escorts into the divisions ongoing operations. Other movement control teams stationed at key locations along the divisions main supply routes help the DTO control and assess the conduct of convoy operations within the division area of operations. 6-44. The first scheduled deliberate replenishment operation for the 5th HBCT occurs in OBJECTIVE JOHN after it is secured. The first scheduled deliberate replenishment operation for the 2nd HBCT occurs along the axis of advance in the vicinity of PL KEELER before its forward passage through 5th HBCT forces on or around OBJECTIVE BEM. The second deliberate replenishment operation for the 5th HBCT occurs on OBJECTIVE BEM after the BCT secures that objective; the 2nd HBCT conducts its forward passage of lines and is advancing toward OBJECTIVE DIANA. The second scheduled deliberate replenishment operation for the 2nd HBCT is scheduled to occur after it secures OBJECTIVE DIANA. The division commander chooses to conduct a MSO for the 2nd SBCT because a MSO rapidly restores the maximum possible combat effectiveness to a BCT. However, because a BCT undergoing MSO can only perform local security tasks, the division commander must ensure that the tactical situation allows the 2nd SBCT to stand down from operations for the one to three days it takes to conduct a MSO. 6-45. The 27th Sustainment Brigade's can support the divisions BCTs and support brigades with aerial delivery equipment and systems, to include parachute packing, air item maintenance, and rigging of supplies and equipment. The brigade can use airdrop resupply operations to support all of the divisions elements. The 27th Sustainment Brigade's airdrop supply company may also support the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. As a vital and flexible link in the distribution system, it provides the capability of supplying the force even when land LOCs are disrupted. (FM 100-27 addresses the aerial delivery of supplies.)

6-46. As offensive operations commence the 34th CSB (ME)s MP and engineer forces clear, maintain and secure the movement routes to ensure freedom of movement for sustainment elements and follow on maneuver forces. Engineer forces, in conjunction with CBRNE elements, conduct initial damage assessments and repair critical civil infrastructure within their capability. MP forces, in conjunction with the GREENLAND 3rd Battalion 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade, provide local security to population centers to create a stable and secure environment. Additionally, AMD efforts are integrated into the maneuver formations to ensure AMD coverage throughout the movement of the Division.
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6-47. The extended size of the division AO as the division attacks toward OBJ DIANA means that the 34th CSB (ME) cannot secure the entire length of the divisions main supply routes (MSRs) from aerial and ground attack even though it was reinforced by the addition of both a MP and GREENLAND motorized infantry battalion. (The distance between PLs MAMMEL and PL Harris is approximately 175km.) The complex mountainous terrain in the southern portion of the division AO means that there is a high probability that small REDLAND forces will penetrate through 87th IBCT positions and attack friendly forces moving along Highway 1. Therefore, the brigade provides convoy security to sustainment convoys traversing division MSRs in accordance with division taskings. Another technique is for TAC 1 to periodically assign the 34th CSB (ME) temporary AOs along Highway 1 to allow the 34th to establish mobility corridors that allow sustainment convoys to move between the division sustainment area and brigade support areas. 6-48. The 34th CSB (ME) engineer elements will construct the division detainee holding area operated by the 591st MP Company (CS) of the 59th MP Battalion. The 34th CSB (ME) may also be called on to assist in the construction of one or more BCT initial detainee collection points. The 34th CSB (ME) also prepares for the operation of dislocated civilian (DC) facilities before they return to their own homes. DCs should be evacuated from areas they may interfere with the division's current or future operations. Alternatively, GREENLAND authorities can assume responsibility for them. The brigade coordinates its DC activities with GREENLAND civil authorities using the division CMOC established by the 418th CA Battalion since the CA company that previously supported the 34th CSB (ME) during the defense is now supporting the 2nd HBCT. 6-49. The 325th CBRNE Defense Battalion conducts chemical reconnaissance and decontamination as required to ensure that division operations along ground MSRs are not degraded by REDLAND employment of CBRNE weapons or the release of toxic industrial chemicals and materials (TIC/TIM). Chemical reconnaissance elements assess sensitive sites within the AO to identify potential hazards to military and civilian personnel. 6-50. The 34th CSB (ME) remains responsible for the conduct of CMO within its AO even though it no longer has a supporting CA company. This will require commanders and staffs within the brigade to maintain previously established relationships or establish new personal relationships with GREENLAND civil authorities, local informal leaders, and a variety of international and private volunteer organizations to ensure the successful conduct of brigade stability operations without the presence of Army-trained civil affairs specialists.
56TH BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE

6-51. As the 1st Division transitions from the defense into the attack, the 56th BFSB continues to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations designed to satisfy the divisions information requirements. The brigade focuses its collection efforts on the divisions multiple intermediate objectives as well as the final objective. Concurrently, the 56th BFSB staffin collaboration with the 1st Division staff and in concert with the staffs of the divisions BCTs and supporting brigadesturn their collective planning efforts toward sequels focused more on stability operations rather than combat operations. Its collection tasks during this phase are to Track the movements and activities of previously identified REDLAND units, to include their tactical and operational reserves, in addition to insurgent forces and terrorists groups. Continue Surveillance of the LUSK reservoir dam and key bridges along the divisions avenue of approach to support the commanders decision point to use existing bridges or conduct river crossing operations. Reconnaissance of fording sites and key, secondary, and alternate routes along the divisions avenue of approach. Detect the movement of REDLAND, insurgent, or terrorist elements into the flank of the divisions advance.
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Gather detailed information about applicable civil considerations in the area projected to be occupied by the division after the conclusion of conventional combat operations. 6-52. This last bullet includes a lot of non-standard information. Examples of this non-standard information include the location and condition of critical infrastructure; cultural, religious, and historical monuments or points of national or regional pride; and local and regional power brokers in the 1st Divisions AO. The G-2 must be able to recommend which areas should be occupied by specific 1st Division units; matching terrain and enemy situation to specific units. Whenever possible, these areas should closely match existing GREENLAND political boundaries to assist in handing authority back to the GREENLAND government once the security situation permits. Additionally, the division commander should match the personalities of his BCT and supporting brigade commanders with their GREENLAND counterparts in an attempt to make more cohesive teams. The 56th BFSB must prepare to supply this information as the divisions post-conflict responsibilities begin to be more clearly defined. 6-53. The BFSB staff is able to respond to the extremely varied requests for information during this phase with help from C/JFLC, JFC, and nationally controlled assets. For example, a JSTARS aircraft could detect significant vehicle movement within a BCT AO. The BFSB staff would conduct analysis to determine the source and probable composition of the vehicle movement. The staff would also determine if there is additional information required. In this case the 56th BFSB could re-task a UAS to the location determined by the JSTARS, confirming that the vehicle traffic was in fact a REDLAND tank company and not a line of farm trucks and tractors carrying GREENLAND refugees. This in turn could drive a requirement to use a long range surveillance (LRS) team to satisfy division information requirements if weather and terrain prevents the UAS from determining what this REDLAND tank company is doing and its current strength. 6-54. As the 5th HBCT secures the 1st Divisions intermediate objectives, LRS teams observing those objectives are relieved and moved to secure locations for resupply, rest, and later reinsertion. The LRS company headquartersin conjunction with the 3rd Squadron 23rd Cavalry and 56th BFSB staffscontinue to conduct follow-on mission planning for the LRS teams. The 3/23rd Cavalry and the 56th BFSB staffs are crucial to providing intelligence that support not only LRS operations, but employment of all brigade associated sensors both organic and task organized. In a similar manner, the squadrons two ground reconnaissance troops conduct ground route and area reconnaissance of selected targeted areas of interest. 6-55. Supporting the attack, the 56th BFSB reinforces the 1st Division main effort by providing task organized CI/HUMINT teams OPCON to the 5th HBCT and 2nd HBCT to conduct tactical questioning and document exploitation. The brigade provides additional task organized CI/HUMINT teams OPCON to the 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT as they begin to transition to area security and force protection operations within their assigned AOs. The bulk of the 513th MI Battalions Collection and Exploitation (C&E) Company continues to support interrogation and document exploitation at the 1st Division's detention center. Information from the C&E company is provided to the G-2 and BFSB for intelligence target refinement for future operations. 6-56. For example, integrators from the 513th MI Battalions C&E company conducting an integration of a REDLAND Soldier at the 1st Division Detention Center provide actionable intelligence about the location of a previously unidentified multiple rocket launcher (MRL) battery. That information quickly passes through the C&E company to the 56th BFSB and the division ACE for further analysis. The 513th MI Battalionin conjunction with the BFSBconducts mission planning to redirect a technical sensor (in this case an ER/MP UAS from the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade that is TACON to the 56th BFSB) to investigate the suspected MRL location. The 513th MI Battalion staff conducts the technical planning to redirect the USAS sensor, while the 56th BFSB staff determines if some other theater asset has already discovered the MRL batterys location. The brigade staff conducts coordination with the division staff as well as the 75th Fires Brigade and 11th Combat Aviation Brigade to begin setting the conditions that would enable the conduct of a strike operation against the MRL battery if the information is confirmed and the situation and ROE permit the engagement of that battery. The BFSB staff continues to coordinate with the BCTs not only for areas within which the brigades PROPHET teams can operate to collect against REDLAND C2 nodes, but also local security for those same teams.
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75TH FIRES BRIGADE

6-57. The 75th Fires Brigade executes strike operations before and after the start of ground offensive operations. It conducts detailed planning and targetingturning division targeting guidance into specific targets and a fire support plan. It executes the divisions counterfire program to prevent REDLAND artillery from massing fires against the divisions northern two brigades. It provides suppressive fires against enemy forces located in the southern portion of the division AO to deny enemy forces the ability to reposition against the divisions main effort in the north. It attrits priority targets, such as identified enemy company-sized elements, using its organic artillery systems. It provides SEAD in support of 11th Combat Aviation Brigade strike and air assault operations. The 75th Fires Brigade also provides cannon artillery battalion to provide reinforcing fires to the two HBCTs in the northern part of the division AO in support of the division's main effort. 6-58. The fires brigades fire support element participates in the targeting process with the division fire support cell and coordinates and synchronizes the various targetsand the desired effects on those targetsassigned to the fires brigade. The fires brigade fire support element leads the decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting process for both lethal and non-lethal fires for the fires brigade. It integrates available fire support, joint fires, and offensive IO. The fire support element coordinates the brigade fire support plan with adjacent, higher, and subordinate fire support elements.

6-59. The 418th CA Battalion task organizes its companies by placing all four OPCON to the divisions four BCTs. These CA companies either establish or maintain previously established brigade-level CMOCs and coordinate with local mayors and community leaders to include those individuals returning to coalition control during the conduct of the divisions offensive operations. The focus of this coordination is the temporary provision of humanitarian assistance to GREENLAND civilians until those civilian population groupings can return to GREENLAND civil control. As situationally allowed, the 418th and functional assessment teams from higher echelon civil affairs and other organizations will conduct many different types of surveysto include such things as the determination of civilian food stock levels, inventories of the condition and capabilities of the existing civil infrastructure, and civil population opinion poles designed to provide the information necessary for the effective planning of future stability operations.
555TH ENGINEER BRIGADE

6-60. The 555th Engineer Brigade provides engineer support, primarily bridging and other mobility enhancing assets, to the two HBCTs attacking along Highway 1 in the northern part of the division AO and provides C2 for river crossing operations. Initially in direct support of the 5th HBCT, the 555th Engineer Brigade is integrated into the 5th HBCTs movement columns and combat formations. Once the 5th HBCT secures OBJECTIVE BEM, the 555th Engineer Brigade is in direct support of the 2nd HBCT for the duration of the offense. However, if REDLAND countermobility efforts are successful, situationally appropriate elements of the 555th Engineers will be left in support of the 5th HBCT to ensure the continued trafficability of Highway 1. 6-61. During the offense, the 555th Engineer Brigade also conducts engineer-related critical infrastructuresuch as sewer, water, electrical generation and distribution, and trash collection and dispositionconservation, maintenance, and reconstruction tasks in the areas behind the lead BCTs. At the end of the offensive phase, the 555th must be prepared to rapidly support construction of division base camps with priority to survivability tasks.
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Chapter 7
Stability Operations
Stability operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct and establish services and support civilian agencies. Stability operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of the range of military operations. Stability operations lead to an environment in which, in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power can predominate in an effort to achieve long term stability.
7-1. The following pages continue the scenario introduced in Chapter 3 of this manual and illustrates one of many ways in which a division could conduct FID after the conclusion of offensive operations. This manual includes the FID scenario because it is the more likely of the two types of stability operations to be conducted by divisions during the projected lifespan of this field manual-interim. (Peace operations encompass the other type of stability operations that will likely require an entire modular division with multiple BCTs and the full suite of supporting brigades to conduct.) A division headquarters may be involved in the planning of the other types of stability operations, but the actual execution is usually left to a BCT or support brigade. (FM 3-07 discusses each type and form of stability operation.) 7-2. The C/JFLC offensive succeeded in causing those REDLAND forces not destroyed during the coalition attack to withdraw from GREENLAND territory. However, a small percentage of REDLAND Soldiers assigned to divisions destroyed during coalition offensive operations chose to disperse and join forces with the ongoing insurgency or terrorists groups rather than be captured and placed into EPW facilities for later repatriation to REDLAND. Their motivation for joining the insurgency varies widely from religious fanaticism to ethnic affinity with the Atropian insurgents. Their motivation for joining terrorist groups might include a willingness to act out their pathological desires. The military training and equipment that these individuals possess make them welcome to insurgent forces and terrorist groups operating within both rural and urban areas of the country. Intelligence determines that REDLAND covert support to that insurgency remains active. Small terrorist base camps remain active in the border region between GREENLAND and REDLAND. 7-3. In addition, combat operations resulted in the extensive devastation of much of GREENLANDs limited modern infrastructure. The ability of GREENLAND authorities to provide basic governmental services to the entire civilian population is doubtful. The GREENLAND political leadership believes their ability to mitigate the worst effects of those combat operations and meet the expectations of the civilian population will directly affect the continued stability of the GREENLAND federation. The dissolution of the federation would in turn negatively impact the continued ability to extract oil from the region with corresponding effects on the local, regional, and international economy. The net result of these factors is that the 1st Division will remain deployed in GREENLAND for an unspecified period to conduct fullspectrum operations focused on stability.
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Figure 7-4. C/JFLC task organization of 1st Division for Stability Operations (troops available) 7-4. The C/JFLC changed the divisions task organization to better fit the divisions new mission. (See Figure 7-4.) The division lost the 4-44th ADA Battalion within the 34th CSB(ME) because the division no longer required air defense capabilities after the successful conclusion of major combat operations. (The theater Army air and missile defense command provides air and missile defense support to the division.) The division lost the 75th Fires Brigadeless the 1-75th FA (MLRS)because the projected workload no longer supported the need for a force artillery headquarters. The division lost the 5th HBCT because the existing factors of METT-TC no longer required two HBCTs in the division. 7-5. However, the C/JFLC provided the division increased capabilities in those areas more relevant to the conduct of its stability mission. The C/JFLC assigned the division the 28th SBCT because its wheeled combat vehicles were of greater utility, given the factors of METT-TC now existing, than the tracked combat vehicles of the 5th HBCT in the divisions AO. The 92nd MP Brigadewith its additional functional unitsprovides greater expertise in law enforcement and crowd control. (The 75th MP Battalion was also transferred to the 92nd MP Brigade from the 34th CSB(ME).) The 555th Engineer Brigade received additional engineer capabilities to accomplish infrastructure restoration. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade received additional lift assets to provide the division with the required degree of mobility. The 56th BFSB received an additional MI battalion to provide the division the additional HUMINT capability required to conduct counterinsurgency operations and the 4-6th Air Cavalry Squadron for aerial reconnaissance. The division also received the recently constituted 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade of the GREENLAND Territorial Armyand the mission of training this new organizationas part of C/JFLC revised task organization of the division.
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MISSION
7-6. 1st Division conducts stability operations within its assigned AO to enable the GREENLAND government to secure the civilian population and provide essential governmental services to its citizens until GREENLAND authorities and security forces can assume responsibility.
COMMANDER'S INTENT
7-7. The 1st Division conducts protracted FID operations within its AO. The desired end state is that our AO is secure and stable with essential services restored, all under the control of GREENLAND authorities.
COMMANDER'S PLANNING GUIDANCE

7-8. The division conducts stability operations to secure the population and improve the environment to facilitate the resumption of essential services and prepare for the transition of governmental and civil services to designated GREENLAND civil or military authorities. C/JFLC tailored this division with additional capabilities to assist in the conduct of stability operations. This includes the 92nd Military Police Brigade headquarters with its related functional branch assets, another MI battalion (the 591st) tailored to conduct HUMINT, the 4-6th Aerial Reconnaissance Squadron, two additional explosive ordnance disposal companies (the 803rd and 804th), and other assets. 7-9. The division conducts operations along five logical lines of operations: security and control, perceptions, governance and administration, infrastructure recovery, and humanitarian relief and assistance. The security and control of the civil population is the divisions decisive operation; all other lines of operations are shaping operations with perceptions being the first among these four interrelated lines due to its cascading preparatory effects and influence on all other lines of operations. 7-10. The insurgent and terrorist organizations operating within the division AO will attempt to counter US and GREENLAND activities along all lines of operations. Less overtly, those individuals currently profiting from the existing instability will seek to hinder US and GREENLAND governmental efforts to imposed stability and reconstruct the regions governmental, social, informational, and economic structure and thereby prolong the process to their individual benefit. 7-11. The C/JFLC plan for GREENLAND stability operations designated a division AO to the east of OBJECTIVE DIANA. The area is predominantly rural with scattered small towns and no large urban areas. Figure 7-5 depicts the divisions brigades and their assigned AOs. These brigade AOs are based on existing GREENLAND county boundaries to ease military-to-civilian contact. The C/JFLC wants the division's BCTs to share responsibility for the entire division AO. The support brigades will position the majority of their assets inside the AOs of the BCTs to provide the most effective support while maintaining adequate force protection based on the factors of METT-TC. The remaining elements of the division headquarters and supporting brigades will co-locate at Camp Riley (the division's base camp). Figure 7-5 also shows Camp Riley as a base within the 2nd SBCTs AO. The blocks in the lower right side of the figure indicate the relative priority of effort given to each category of operations during this phase. 7-12. The division maintains the capability to conduct offensive operations to identify and assist local security forces in identifying and apprehending local insurgent force elements and destroying terrorist cells and insurgent main and local force elements within the AO. Our remaining heavy brigade combat team 2nd HBCTwill be reinforced to conduct a defensive cover operation along the border to prevent crossborder infiltration of supplies and personnel to insurgent groups and terrorists currently operating within GREENLAND, deter any future cross-border invasion by REDLAND conventional forces, and, in the event that deterrence fails, provide time for the rest of the division to deploy to defensive positions.
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7-4
Figure 7-5. Assigned AOs for 1st Division brigades 7-13. Each BCT commander is responsible for the security of coalition assets within his AO. Establish bases and base clusters within that AO as required in accordance with the factors of METT-TC and adjust force protection measures to reflect existing threat conditions. The supporting brigades have elements that need to be positioned within these BCT AOs to support activities along the 1st Divisions five lines of operation for this phase. The appropriate BCT will approve the location of the field sites and bases occupied by these support elements prior to their occupation. Each BCT commander designates reaction and response forces for all the bases and base clusters in his AO and updates his security plan in response to the changing situation. (FM 3-90, Appendix E, provides details on the conduct of base security.) 7-14. The C/JFLC commander assigned the division the recently constituted GREENLAND 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade along with the mission of training and certifying its readiness. I am assigning the 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT commanders training responsibility for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the 99th Brigade, respectively. The division chief of staff, assisted by the division staff, is responsible for training the 99th Brigade staff. The division special troops battalion is responsible for training the GREENLAND 15th Signal Company, 99th Brigade. The 27th Sustainment, 44th Medical, 56th BFSB, and 555th Engineer Brigades are responsible for training their counterparts within the 99th Motorized Infantry Brigadethe 99th Support Battalion, the support battalions medical company, the 14th Reconnaissance Company, and the 13th Sapper Company. 7-15. Discipline, cultural awareness and understanding, respect for the rule-of-law, and effective current ROE are central to success. Actions speak louder than words and one incident of over-reaction; one picture of a GREENLAND civilian being mistreated or US troops acting in an undisciplined and destructive manner will counteract days, weeks, and months of favorable media coverage, the development of favorable perceptions, and the development of realistic expectations.
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1ST DIVISION CONCEPT FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

7-16. Each of the four BCTs assigned AOs2nd HBCT, 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT assisted by the divisions supporting brigades will conduct tasks in support of the five lines of operations. These brigade AOs constitute the entire division AO. The 2nd SBCT AO currently consists of two countiesKREEL and GONGKA. After the 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade completes its training and certification, it will assume responsibility for GONGKA (the western county). The 2nd SBCT AO will retain responsibility for the KREEL (the eastern county). 7-17. Roughly 50-percent of the divisions combat power should be involved in offensive actions designed to track down and kill or capture insurgents and terrorists. Only about 25-percent should be devoted to static security operations designed to protect the divisions own facilities and critical civilian infrastructure. This leaves roughly 25-percent involved in rest, training, sustainment, and other activities. 7-18. The functional brigades assigned to or OPCON to the division11th Combat Aviation, 27th Sustainment, 34th CSB (ME), 44th Medical, 92nd MP, and 555th Engineer support the BCTs in their conduct of activities along the divisions five lines of operations. This requires most of their assets to be under the operational control of the BCTs. Direct liaison is authorized between all division units. 7-19. The 1st Division Main CP, TAC 1, and TAC 2 will be co-located in the division base camp, Camp Riley, during this protracted phase of the joint campaign. This recognizes the complexity of the stability tasks that the division is conducting and greatly facilitates face-to-face coordination. It also simplifies the provision of security to the various CPs. The Main CP retains responsibility for planning branches and sequels to the divisions lines of operations. TAC 1 focuses on setting priorities, ensuring the synchronization, and assessing the execution of division activities along all five lines of operations. TAC 2 focuses on the counterinsurgency objective within the security line of operation. The commander uses his MCG to maintain contact with ongoing operations throughout the division AO as he moves to the location where his presence can make the greatest contribution. 7-20. The BCTs will establish a number of bases and base clusters within their AOs. The location and configuration of these facilities must be carefully considered to reduce their static security requirements to free additional resources for the protection of critical civilian infrastructure. Camp Riley, the division base camp, is a large facility housing the division headquarters and those elements of the divisions supporting brigades not task organized out to the BCTs. It is centered on the division airfield. (See Figure 7-6.) The 34th CSB (ME) commander is the commander of Camp Riley and is responsible for operating the Camp Riley Base Operations Center (BOC). He responds to the base security directives of the 2nd SBCT commander since Camp Riley is a base located within the AO of the 2nd SBCT. Camp Riley is organized with those organizations most vulnerable assigned areas within the center of the base. The size of the area assigned within the base directly relates to the area needs of the organization to perform its functions and its organic capabilities to secure that area. For security reasons those GREENLAND civilians residing in the area occupied by Camp Riley were relocated after receiving compensation for the use of their land. 7-21. The divisions transition to a focus on stability operations makes it necessary to adjust the divisions operational tempo and the timelines associated with its conduct of operations. For example, the divisions current operations elements now need to be involved in making adjustment decisions out to a week before execution. The divisions plans element is developing branches to current operations that will not be executed for more than a week and sequels to the current operation which may not take place for more than a month. The division fire support element may have twice-weekly meetings to prioritize target sets instead of daily. The chief of staff adjusts the divisions battle rhythm as appropriate. The planning and operations of the divisions BCTs and supporting brigades will also be extended. However, division responsibilities for personal recovery have been expanded as additional civilian personnel (both DOD and contractor) arrive in the AO. (See FM 3-50.1 for details on the divisions responsibilities for personal recovery.)
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7-6
Figure 7-6. Schematic of Camp Riley 7-22. The division plans and current operations cells, assisted by the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion and 555th Engineer Brigade as required, integrate division operations along those lines of operations for which they have the division lead. They synchronize the operations of the divisions brigades, higher echelons, and outside organizations (such as other governmental agencies (OGA), the GREENLAND government, and international and nongovernmental organizations) to accomplish the divisions mission. The key element to coordinate with is the US Embassys Deputy Chief of Mission and the Ambassadors Country Team. Meetings with these two organizations will occur on at least a weekly basis. (The division and its BCTs task and coordination lists will be discussed at those meetings.) 7-23. Interagency elements possess technical expertise rather than numbers and resources. Their method of planning and operation is consensus-building (majority). The critical items that division personnel must have before departing Country Team Coordination Meetings includeinteragency personnel names, their contact information (such as landline and cell telephone numbers, email addresses, URLs, building addresses and room numbers), and the skill sets these personnel bring toward reconstruction operations. Lists of the supplies and other resources these interagency elements need from the division to accomplish their assigned tasks and any resources (to include funds) the division will in turn receive for accomplishing specific projects are required. Additional required details include where and when these interagency resources will be delivered and what the division must do to get these resources. Finally, staff officers attending country team meetings must determine applicable Federal Contracting Regulations and any other issues of which commanders and their contracting representatives must be knowledgeable. 7-24. The 101st Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) provides liaison between any special operations forces operating in the division AO and the division staff. This liaison element integrates and synchronizes the actions of SOF operating within the divisions AO (less the 418th CA Battalion and 308th PSYOP Company which have a command relationship with the division). The SOCCE assists the SOCEUR commander in fulfilling his supporting commander responsibilities in several ways. It provides a positive means for the SOCEUR commander to ascertain the division commanders needs. The SOCCE may provide a responsive reporting capability in those situations where the SOCEUR commander has been requested to provide information requirements of the division commander, such as SR reporting. The SOCCE can exercise C2 of designated ARSOF units when the SOCEUR commander determines the
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need for such a command relationship to facilitate his supporting commander responsibilities. The SOCCE can also provide a monitoring capability should the EUCOM or SOCEUR commander decide to place ARSOF in a command relationship to the division. An example of this could be the attachment of SF detachments under the control (OPCON or TACON) of the division to improve the division commanders ability to employ subordinate multinational forces. The SOCEUR commander could transfer these forces and pass control to the division with appropriate mission restrictions IAW his determination on the employment of those forces such as "no reorganization of forces authorized or for use only in an advisory assistance role with the designated multinational force." 7-25. The division requires the following critical capabilities. It must have a market research capability to provide the division timely and accurate feedback on the civilian populations perception of the divisions progress along all five lines of operations to include determination of their top reconstruction priorities. The areas civilian populationas well as the insurgents and terrorists operating within the divisions AOmust receive the divisions information and media operations if the division is going to be able to influence and shape their perceptions and actions. Therefore, the division will use all means and modes to deliver information. (This includes assisting in the rebuilding of radio and television transmitters and establishing new ones to ensure that coalition and GREENLAND official broadcasts can be received. It may include the procurement and distribution of radios and satellite dishes capable of receiving coalition and GREENLAND official broadcasts.) The division must be able to identify different audiences and employ repetitive and plausible themes. It must be able to correctly identify critical infrastructure nodes within its area and then analyze the most probable and most dangerous threats to those nodes. In this way it can marshal assets to protect these nodes. Lastly, it must be able to integrate its lethal and nonlethal capabilities so that their application is appropriate to specific situational employment, thus reducing collateral damage.
Table 7-1. 1st Division Internal Organization for Stability Operations

Maneuver ISR A Co 513th MI (TUAS) B Co 513th MI (Tech Collection) F-2/22 Inf (LRS) Fires 1/75th FA (MLRS) 1-1-308th PSYOP 2-1-308th PSYOP Logistics 271st Sust Bn Construction TF from 555th Engr C2 Protection
2nd HBCT
528th Cbt Engr Bn
A-418th CA
591st MP Co
1-99th Mot Inf (GN) 2nd SBCT 1/318th Inf-28th SBCT 2-99th Mot Inf (GN)
Det 1 D Co-513th MI (CI/HUMINT)
2-308th PSYOP
272nd Sust Bn CA Functional Tms Construction TF from 555th Engr 273rd Sust Bn Construction TF from 555th Engr 372nd Sust Bn Construction TF from 555th Engr
B-418th CA
592nd MP Co
28th SBCT
D Co (-)-513th MI (CI/HUMINT)
1-3-308th PSYOP 2-3-308th PSYOP 3-1-308th PSYOP 3-3-308th PSYOP
C-418th CA
593rd MP Co
87th IBCT 11th Avn Cbt
3-99th Mot Inf (GN)
Det 1 D Co-591st MI (CI/HUMINT)
D-418th CA
627th MP Co
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Logistics 99th Spt Bn (GN) (-) Det 1, 803rd EOD Co Med Co, 99th Spt Bn (GN)
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Div TOC/STB
15th Co (Sig) 99th Mot Inf Bde (GN) 101st SOCCE
418th CA Bn
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7-8
7-26. The division commander task organized previous and new capabilities to better respond to the revised factors of METT-TC in a manner similar to that done by the C/JFLC commander. Table 7-1 shows the divisions revised task organization. Appendix A contains the original brigade internal task organizations.
SECURITY AND CONTROL

7-27. There are three major objectives for a security and control line of operation. First Objective. Securing the GREENLAND civilian population to isolate the insurgents and terrorists from the population. While executing this task, we must identify and apprehend insurgent and terrorist political infrastructure personnel and supporters within local neighborhoods to cut off their flow of intelligence and support. A critical piece of this task is the provision of force protection to division assets and requires the division to fortify its various bases and facilities while simultaneously providing area and local security to selected locations. We will execute this concurrent with securing the population. Second Objective. After the first objective is met, focus efforts on the re-establishment of the local government and the placement of police officers in neighborhoods and rural areas. The police will support the legitimacy of the reestablished government and deter insurgents and terrorists from gaining access to the civilian population (within the divisions AO). Third objective. Eliminate outside support for GREENLAND insurgent forces and terrorist elements operating across the international border. This requires the division and its combat elements to conduct offensive operations designed to interdict the flow of supplies to insurgent and terrorist groups, destroy their base areas, and kill or capture associated personnel. 7-28. Accomplishing these objectives are preconditions for the re-establishment of basic government and civil services. The first step to achieving all these objectives along the security line of operations is the establishment of an effective intelligence collection and fusion system and effective intelligence staff representation in the operations directorate. The local population and the local police are effective sources for collecting and exploiting actionable intelligence. Our Soldiers constant presence on the streets in joint patrols with the GREENLAND police and the development of passive informer networks will provide indigenous HUMINT. The associated force protection postures of our Soldiers and these local police officers during these joint patrols should be roughly equivalent. 7-29. The key to success in security and control is effective and actionable intelligence at the local level. Local personnel are necessary to identify insurgents and terrorists to local authorities and to US forces. The use of GREENLAND security forces is essential to developing a legitimate government and thriving society that provides long-term security and an overall better quality of life. Where possible this
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intelligence must be fused between intelligence disciplines and shared laterally and vertically while protecting sources. Nevertheless, local exploitation and fusion requirements share an equal priority with regard to access to this intelligence. 7-30. The division will establish a secure environment within which political, economic, and social progress is possible. Therefore, governmental legitimacy and micro-economic development must be encouraged, facilitated, and enhanced while neutralizing the insurgents and terrorists. In addition to governmental presence and legitimacy, an additional critical solution set is the microeconomic development of areas and neighborhoods. This includes the provision of jobs and incomes for family workers to keep the young men occupied while developing them into stakeholders in local economic success. 7-31. GREENLAND security forces will operate in conjunction with US forces and assume the major burden in operations when capable of so doing. This will occur in different areas within the division AO at different times. These security forces consist of the civil police, paramilitary forces, and regular GREENLAND military forces. That is why it is important for the GREENLAND 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade and reconstituted GREENLAND civil police forces to complete their training and certification as soon as possible. While these military and paramilitary forces have an accelerated training schedule, standards must be maintained. GREENLAND elements that fail to meet standards will be retrained until they do meet the standards. Together, US and GREENLAND forces will secure and separate the population from the insurgents and terrorists while they neutralize and defeat the threats. 7-32. Friendly forces must neutralize the ability of insurgent forces and terrorists to conduct operations designed to negatively influence the GREENLAND civilian population as the first objective of eliminating these groups. This requires US forces to work at the local level with local authorities to identify, fix, and apprehend or destroy local insurgent and terrorist cells that seek to exert control in rural communities, cities, and towns within the AO. These local insurgent cells and terrorists groups are normally small but comparably well armed. They are currently moving freely within the population and using raids, ambushes, and small hit-and-run attacks to cause a constant stream of coalition and GREENLAND casualties in their attempt to eventually drive coalition forces from GREENLAND while bringing into question the legitimacy of the local representatives of the GREENLAND government. 7-33. The establishment of law and order is not as well documented in doctrine. It has the following four basic components: Law. A basic code of law must be enforced to protect persons and property and provide for a stable and secure environment (to include laws for public safety, such as traffic regulations and curfew). Police. Responsible for enforcing the local laws and serve as the populations first line of defense. They must be out in the neighborhoods and involved directly with the local population, enforcing the law and collecting information that may become actionable intelligence. They cannot be allowed to sit in their police stations where they are vulnerable to attack. The police apprehend criminals and those accused of breaking the law. Courts. Administer justice and process suspected criminals to determine innocence and guilt so as to release the innocent and detain the guilty for punishment and later reintegration into civil society when their risk to the population is minimal. Detention and Corrections. A legitimate government must have the ability to hold in detention facilities and punish violators to deter crime and protect communities. 7-34. Policing in failed states is the art and science of collecting and exercising legitimate use of authority and force for public order and safety. A legitimate police force requires the authority and training to effectively employ force to protect the people and society. Their success ultimately depends on achieving the trust and confidence of the local people. Trust and confidence develops when people are treated equally under the law so they can effectively conduct commerce, go to school and otherwise interact within their local communities. Policing must be a community based function as soon as possible. This starts with establishing police stations and a policing force that has access to and serves the community. It is critical to have the best ethical and moral training available to initiate this force while training a new police force on2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 7-9
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the-street. Communication skills and interpreters are a key issue for police training. There is a real danger of involving the police in the resolution of individual agendas and vendettas. This is in addition to threats to the safety of local personnel involved in the provision of public safety.
Division Command Post

7-35. The intelligence cell is responsible for conducting those types of intelligence threat analysis appropriate to this line of operation. (This includes pattern analysis, link analysis, cultural-tribal-religious analysis, and communications-linguistic analysis necessary to understanding insurgent and terrorist strengths, weaknesses, objectives, and probable courses of action.) The division G-9 civil-military operations (CMO) team, acting as liaison with the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion assists in this process. The Provost Marshal's (PM) office, assisted by the CID group supporting USAREUR/7th Army, is specifically responsible for integrating forensic analysis and police intelligence operations in general, into the COP while staying within legal and regulatory restrictions on their activities as they pertain to US citizens. 7-36. The intelligence cell accesses required additional intelligence resources external to the division using secure information systems. These resources can be adjacent units, joint intelligence activities, and government and nongovernmental centers of excellence internal and external to the theater of operations for such things as cultural intelligence, information operations/perception experts, and political-economic intelligence. As part of this process the intelligence cell determines the prevailing authoritative-social structures (governmental, tribal, and religious) and personalities in various localities within the divisions AO. It must continuously assess existing tribal rivalries, jealousies, and ethno-religious fault lines within local communities. 7-37. The intelligence cell provides tailored intelligence, combat information, and civil-military operations information to the divisions decision makers and their staffs. The personnel manning the ISR analysis element should consist of the following: Intelligence and cultural specialists. Security personnel. Antiterrorism/force protection specialists. Major subordinate command (MSC) LNOs. Linguists. Contracting specialists. Department of State (DOS) representatives (if available). Political-military specialists (contractor or foreign-area officers). Engineers and public works specialists. PSYOPS personnel. Media relations specialists. Economic advisors. 7-38. The intelligence cell analysis element collects, analyzes processes, defines possible courses of action for insurgent and terrorist forces, and then disseminates the necessary intelligence to vetted GREENLAND security forces, and US forces in the AO. The primary benefit derived from the involvement of specialized personnel in cross-functional analysis over a protracted time period is an increased ability to understand insurgents and terrorists operating in the division area and thus predict their actions with a higher degree of fidelity. The analysis element provides the division and 2nd HBCT indicators and warnings regarding the movement of REDLAND conventional forces and REDLAND affiliated unconventional forces across the restored international border. 7-39. The division current operations element within TAC 1working with the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) operated by the 418th Civil Affairs Battalionseeks to create unity of effort with those organizations over which the commander does not enjoy a command relationship. This includes other US governmental agencies, GREENLAND coalition military, GREENLAND civilians, international governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. This is because TAC 1 is responsible for
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integrating all aspects of political, economic, and military power remembering the power of perception and influence in this environment. It must orchestrate the distribution of reconstruction and relief funds, food, medicine, educational services, fuel, employment, and the bestowing of recognition and respect on local leaders. It does all this while seeking to maintain a high tempo of actions that forces the insurgents and terrorists to always react to friendly operations instead of vice versa. 7-40. The division chief of staff is responsible for orchestrating the efforts of the division headquarters as they educate, train, and certify the 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade headquarters staff. He takes advantage of division information systems to reach back to CONUS and deliver training support packages developed and maintained by TRADOC schools and centers. The English language skills of the GREENLAND brigade staff and the availability of machine and human translators will impact the speed at which the process will be complete. 7-41. The FSE in TAC 1 is responsible for synchronizing fire support, joint fires, and offensive information operations in support of division operations. It is important that lethal and nonlethal effects and means be integrated at all levels from a company-level reconnaissance patrol to the division. The division is involved in a war of ideas, a battle for the mind and must react intelligently to intelligence and combat information. It ensures that the actions of the BCT FSEs are integrated and synchronized with division and C/JFLC operations. The FSE in TAC 2 is responsible for ensuring that fires delivered in support of BCT counterinsurgency operations do not cause unintended second or third order effects on the divisions overall stability mission. The divisions four USAF tactical air control parties are placed in support each of the BCTs while the air support operations center remains integrated with the divisions co-located CPs. This provides the division commander and his BCT commanders ready access to available joint fire support. 7-42. The division employs information operations, nested with C/JFLC and EUCOM/JTF information operations, to dissuade insurgents and terrorists of the legitimacy of their cause and convince GREENLAND civilians and external audiences of the legitimacy of coalition actions. This will take several different themes that must be deconflicted because of the different motivations of the insurgents and terrorists within GREENLAND and the different civilian target audiences. There is a moral and mental aspect to the divisions operations. At times this means that lethal means will be employed less often and with greater restrictions because of the second and third order effects resulting from their employment. 7-43. The division PAO will accurately report division activities to the outside media (from the US, HN, and other international affiliates) covering division operations. He will take every opportunity that occurs in the process of describing division operation to educate the media on the character and abilities of US forces in general and of those units assigned to the division in specific. Likewise, he takes every opportunity to educate the media on the true horrific nature of insurgent and terrorist groups operating within the division AO and the short- and long-range implications of any coalition failure to suppress these groups. He constantly reinforces division and higher headquarters developed themes into his interactions with the media to cause them to have an overall favorable opinion of the US mission and activities within GREENLAND; since a favorable opinion translates into media and popular understanding ofand active support forUS actions designed to provide area security within the AO. 7-44. The division G-6 is responsible for planning voice and data connectivity between all division assets and coordinating voice and data connectivity with J/CFLCC.
Special Troops Battalion

7-45. This unit remains responsible for providing local security, communications, and life support for the divisions co-located CPs.
2nd Heavy BCT (Reinforced)

7-46. This unit is responsible for conducting covering force activities designed to protect the rest of the division from conventional and unconventional threats coming out of REDLAND into the division AO until the divisions other forces and joint fires have time to react to their advance. It is also responsible for
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conducting offensive operations designed to destroy terrorist and insurgent base camps and kill or capture terrorist and insurgent personnel located within its AO. Itand the other BCTswork closely with the division intelligence cell and the divisions SOF liaison element to determine those threat locations. The intent is to establish a secure environment for the GREENLAND civilian population located within its AO to enable humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations to take place.
2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT

7-47. These units are responsible for establishing a secure environment for the GREENLAND civilian population located within its AO. This enables the conduct of humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations to take place within their respective AOs. 7-48. The BCTs concentrate on the elimination of the insurgents and terrorists, not on terrain objectives. They maintain their offensive operational tempo throughout the length of the deployment. They do not let the limited cross-country trafficability and lack of paved roads impede their conduct of offensive action. Limited offensive operations are preferable to passive defensive measures. 7-49. At least 50-percent of the combat forces available to the BCTs should be devoted to the conduct of offensive counterinsurgency and counter terrorism operations. These operations need to be in the locations occupied by insurgent and terrorist groups. These forces must share the same environment as do the insurgents and terrorists. The BCTs should be conducting offensive operations in the fields and forests of their AO since the GREENLAND insurgency is largely rural-based. (Although the insurgents do have cells operating in the small towns found within the divisions AO.) The BCTs should use the assault aviation assets available within the division to conduct vertical envelopments designed to encircle identified insurgent forces, staying off of roads and trails whenever possible. Commanders and staffs should consider the use of all mobility means to include aircraft, tracked and wheeled vehicles, boats, animals, and even porters. No more than 25-percent of the force should be devoted to defensive measures with the remainder being a held as a reserve or conducting rest, maintenance and training. 7-50. The BCTs must plan for and use all available resources, both regular military and unconventional methods and means, such as developing an understanding of tribal relationships, to isolate insurgent and terrorist groups. They should avoid the establishment of semi-permanent patrol bases whose locations are soon determined by these threats along with these bases areas of influence. Special attention should be paid to ensure the motorized and mechanized units do not become bogged down in inappropriate terrain or tied to static defensive locations. 7-51. Secrecy and surprise should be goals of every operation. OPLANs and OPORDs should provide for effective and secure communications and take into account the likelihood that GREENLAND security forces will be infiltrated by insurgent or terrorist personnel. BCTs should use a wide variety of methods and unorthodox tactics and techniques to avoid establishing operational patterns that insurgent forces and terrorist groups can recognize and to which they can develop counters or coping mechanisms. 7-52. Both US Soldiers and HN Soldiers should receive constant indoctrination on the mission and purpose of US forces within GREENLAND and on the proper treatment of civilians, insurgents, and terrorists. This can transpire during the conduct of regular training and during preparations for offensive action. Those training programs should stress developing the offensive spirit, physical and mental stamina, and the desire to seek out the insurgents and terrorists and destroy them to prevent the commission of more atrocities on the civilian population of the region. The training of GREENLAND military, paramilitary, and police forcesand their continued operational and logistical supportdirectly relates to this line of operation. 7-53. BCT command and staff actions should emphasize centralized planning and decentralized execution of small-scale tactical operations. They should always retain unity of command, or in the case of operations involving forces that the division does not command, such as SOF and OGA direct action elements, the retention of unity of effort. Extensive contingency planning for employment of reserve forces must be conducted to avoid the development of a pattern for their commitment that insurgent or terrorist groups can target.
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7-54. The BCT staffs must be involved with the intelligence cell at the main CP and with the 56th BFSB to insure the detailed coordination of the intelligence collection effort. Both civilian and paramilitary intelligence networks within the area must be incorporated into the analysis efforts. This requires the detailed planning and coordination of military activities with those of civilian officials in the AO. HUMINT nets must be established within the local population to include the use of informants paid for the delivery of useful information. Interrogation of prisoners and suspects can provide extremely useful, although usually time-sensitive information. Combat information must be rapidly passed to the division analysis element from whatever the source and intelligence products disseminated to all concerned units and individuals so that security forces can take immediate action to destroy identified insurgent forces, terrorist groups, and individuals before they have the opportunity to carry out their planned activities or disperse before being engaged by friendly forces. 7-55. The BCTs must incorporated and monitor activities along the other four lines of operations for their impact on security operations. This includes such things as planning for and augmenting a plan for military civic action, propaganda, and population control to remove insurgent influence from a target population. It may include the requesting and distribution of resettlement suppliesbuilding materials, food, water, and toolsto the civilian population of a small area (humanitarian relief and assistance line of operations). 7-56. The BCTs must be judicious in the application of combat power in view of the overriding requirement to minimize the alienation of the civilian population. This directly relates to the information line of operation. The application of massive firepower can allow insurgent forces to break contact after having inflicted casualties on friendly forces. 7-57. The 2nd SBCT will designate one of its four US battalions as the division ready reaction force. That battalion establishes liaison with the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade.
99th Motorized Infantry Brigade, GREENLAND Territorial Army

7-58. This newly constituted unit is a key to providing the local force essential to establishing a secure environment. However, before it can be effective, its leaders and Soldiers must be trained and educated. Each of the brigades battalions is being trained by a BCT or counterpart support brigade. After its component parts complete their training and certification process, the brigade can be reassembled and given an AO. This, in turn, will allow the 2nd SBCT to return the 1-318th Infantry to the 28th SBCT. It is envisioned that further GREENLAND Territorial Army brigades will be formed after the 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade completes its training. Over time this allows GREENLAND to take over complete responsibility for its ground security without the need for further US ground forces.
11th Combat Aviation Brigade

7-59. The brigade is responsible for providing attack and reconnaissance assets to support the 2nd HBCT. It also provides attack and reconnaissance assets in support of all BCT offensive operations. This may require the brigade to establish forward arming and refueling points within each BCT base camp. Attack assets are also provided as part of the division ready reaction force in response to ground assaults on the division and brigade base camps and scheduled convoys and other troop movements. (The division G-3 resolves conflicts between the 11th CAB and the supported brigades when there are not enough aviation assets to provide the requested support.) 7-60. The 11th CAB provides lift and assault assets in support of maneuver and functional brigade stability operations. The brigade also provides manned attack and reconnaissance and unmanned aerial surveillance support to division operations to include support of major convoys. It is responsible for securing its assigned area within the division base camp.
27th Sustainment Brigade

7-61. This brigade is responsible for the conduct of those logistical and personnel operations necessary to sustain the divisions operations (minus medical operations and those acquisition, technology, and contracting functions provided by teams from the European Army Field Support Brigade, a theater-level
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organization). The brigade is also responsible for training the staff and personnel of the GREENLAND 99th Support Battalion in sustainment operations and the provision of technical services (maintenance, supply, and transportation). It is responsible for securing its assigned portion of the division base camp perimeter.
34th Manuever Enhancement Brigade

7-62. This brigade staff runs the base operations center for Camp Riley, the division base camp, and sets security policy for all units in the division base camp. It is responsible for establishing and training the base defense force to include the response force. It plans the defense of the base camp, ensuring that each tenant within the base camp participates as an integrated part of the base defense. It coordinates with the 2nd SBCT for response force and tactical combat force operations. It coordinates with the division staff for joint assets that support the defense of the division base camp. It is responsible for securing its assigned portion of the division base camp perimeter. 7-63. The brigade will also provide forces to conduct various missions within the divisions AO in support of BCT or functional brigade operations. These missions include the following: Critical asset and high risk personnel security. Area and local security operations. Construction and repair of fighting and survivability positions, airfields, and main supply routes. Assessment and mitigation of damage to GREENLAND infrastructure and industrial facilities. Assessment and mitigation of damage to GREENLAND industrial facilities and other environmental hazards, such as toxic industrial materials. Support to efforts designed to neutralize any REDLAND CBRNE weapons stored or employed within GREENLAND.
44th Medical Brigade

7-64. This brigade is responsible for the conduct of those FHP operations necessary to sustain the divisions operations and is attached to the 27th Sustainment Brigade. It is also responsible for advising and assisting their GREENLAND civilian and military counterparts (within the limits of legal and regulatory guidance) in the reconstruction of GREENLAND public health support within the divisions AO. The 44th Medical Brigade is responsible for training and certifying the Medical Company of the GREENLAND 99th Support Brigade.
56th BFSB
7-65. As the division transitions from an emphasis on offensive operation toward stability operations the 56th BFSB continues to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence operations to provide the division commander the information he needs to make logical decisions in a complex and ever changing environment. The brigade focuses its organic reconnaissance and surveillance assets and leverages joint and national level assets to support division operations. Those commanders and staffs served by the brigade need information to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the divisions operations. The division staff previously tasked the 56th BFSB to provide the information to support stability planning. During this phase the brigade continues to refine previously provided information and answer new requirements for information. The transition to stability operations means that the brigade will acquire a far larger percent of the necessary information for CI/HUMINT source than it will from its technical sensors. This requires the 56th BFSB to serve as a force provider of CI/HUMINT assets for the BCTs, as well as an intelligence collector. Key tasks for the brigade during this phase include the following: Conducting interrogations. Manning and managing the divisions document exploitation facility. Providing CI/HUMINT teams to BCTs and the 34th CSB (ME). Conducting division-level reconnaissance and surveillance. Providing early warning of REDLAND attack.
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7-66. The 56th BFSB staffin collaboration with the 2nd HBCT and the division staffplans to provide sustained layer coverage of the restored international border between REDLAND and GREENLAND to detect the movement of conventional and unconventional REDLAND forces, insurgent groups, and terrorist cells between the two countries. Although the division-level information requirements are physically located in a BCTs AO, the division tasked the 56th BFSB to collect on the requirement, thus reducing the requirements on the 2nd HBCT. This planning focuses on airspace management for brigade tactical unmanned aerial systems (TUAS); manned aerial and ground reconnaissance, insertion and support of LRS teams; and the 2nd HBCTs organic TUASs. (Long-range surveillance teams are used in conjunction with TUAS and the 3rd of the 23rd Cavalrys two ground reconnaissance troops to provide allweather surveillance of selected NAIs along the border.) The 56th BFSB coordinates for security and sustainment support for its elements operating in the 2nd HBCTs AO with the 2nd HBCT, as required. 7-67. Division consolidates all PROPHETs under the control of the 56th BFSB to establish a baseline across the division AO. As SIGINT is gathered, it is assessed for targeting and the raw information is passed to the G-2 for analysis and fusion. 7-68. The 56th BFSB is the primary force provider for CI/HUMINT teams supporting the BCTs. These teams are OPCON to the BCTs to facilitate collection from the population in their AOs. These additional assets provided by the 56th BFSB allows each BCT to operate its own interrogation facility and collect information specific to their AO. The 513th MI Battalion, Communications and Electronics Company, continues to support interrogation and document exploitation at the Division Detention Facility. 7-69. Outside those assets supporting the 2nd HBCT along the border, the 56th BFSB provides continual TUAS and ER/MP support to the 1st Division. The TUAS focuses on the division AO as a whole, instead of focusing on a particular BCT AO. The TUAS in the BCTs also reinforce BCT surveillance efforts, eliminating redundancies and economizing efforts. 7-70. The 3/23rd Cavalry is also responsible for training and certifying the 14th Company (Reconnaissance) of the GREENLAND 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade. Other 56th BFSB elements will participate in the training process as appropriate.
92nd MP Brigade
7-71. This brigade is responsible for providing critical asset protection for major convoys traversing division major supply routes. This may be accomplished through direct convoy security patrols or the temporary establishment of a mobility corridor along potential high threat areas. It provides a reaction force for the Camp Riley. It is responsible for securing its assigned portion of the division base camp perimeter and for conducting security patrols beyond that perimeter as directed to the base operations center. The 75th MP Battalion performs these functions. 7-72. The brigade is also responsible for establishing and executing detainee operations at the detainee holding area (DHA). The MP company commander operating the DHA has operational control over all assetsmedical, military intelligence, and otherswhen those elements are operating inside the holding area. However, that MP company commander does not establish medical or interrogation priorities. The MP company coordinates for the evacuation of detainees from the BCT IDCP through the DHA to the higher-echelon theater internment facility. 7-73. The 92nd MP Brigade headquarters works closely with the Department of Justice and the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion to stand up and train local GREENLAND police forces. The development of local police is an important activity along this line of operations.
418th CA Battalion
7-74. This brigades 418th CA Battalion is responsible for establishing and running the division CMOC. Information collected in the course of CMOC operations will routinely be provided to the divisions intelligence cell.
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555th Engineer Brigade

7-75. This brigade is responsible for the conduct of those mobility, countermobility, and survivability engineer operations necessary to support the divisions security operations. The brigade is also responsible for technical oversight and training of the GREENLAND 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade sapper company. It is responsible for securing its assigned portion of the division base camp perimeter
PERCEPTIONS
7-76. The active support and participation of the local GREENLAND civilian population is important to accomplishing the 1st Divisions mission of conducting stability operations. The image that the 1st Division wants to have in the minds of US, GREENLAND, and international civilians observing the divisions conduct of stability operations is that the division is doing what it can reasonably do to provide security to those GREENLAND civilians entrusted to its care. It respects the cultural heritage and religious beliefs of the civilian population. And it is actively trying to restore GREENLANDs battle damaged infrastructure and civil governmental institutions as quickly as is prudent. This line of operations is a shaping operation for the division. The 1st Division G-7 is the division lead for this line of operation. 7-77. The 418th CA Battalions civil information officer, the 308th PSYOP Company, the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) supporting the EUCOM commander, and the division PAO are integrated into delivering information that contributes to developing favorable perceptions of divisional activities among GREENLAND civilians and international observers by the G-7. Close coordination for timing and dissemination of messages is critical for success. Accurately informing the public about ongoing activities will broaden popular support for the divisions operations and mission. 7-78. One of the foundations of the divisions information operations is ensuring that friendly information operations are capable of influencing the civilian inhabitants of the region and the insurgents and terrorists operating within it. This may required the division to make the repair of public electronic communications sites and the acquisition and distribution of battery or solar charged radios a priority. However, the electronic communications means provided by US forces can also be used by insurgents and terrorists to distributed their own propaganda and themes. (The other foundation is an accurate analysis of the various target audiences for our IO both within and external to the region.)

7-79. The division intelligence cell tasks the 56th BFSB and other divisional units to answer information requirements related to this line of operation. These include those information requirements necessary to conduct a target audience analysis, composition and exact nature of the target audience. Target audiences may be defined based on the following factors: Language. Social studies. Religious beliefs. Location. Occupation. Race. Military and political affiliation. Education levels. 7-80. Collecting intelligence on the composition and exact nature of the target audience is the first step in developing IO products. The definition of a target audience depends on a number of internal and external conditions, as well as historical events and norms that have developed over time. 7-81. Intelligence assists in this process by describing the beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions of different target audiences how they perceive their environment. The more specific the information about the target audience, the more successful the IO product or program will be. Much of this intelligence can be derived from intelligence data bases and open source documents that include information about historical and
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current events relevant to the particular target audience. Requests for information not available in materiel available to the division are forwarded to other appropriate agencies as necessary. These agencies include the C/JLCC operational intelligence and fires directorates, the joint intelligence center, and the DOS. 7-82. The G-7 incorporates information operations into all division operations in accordance with the conduct of information operations as outlined in FM 3-13. The routine integration of lethal and nonlethal capabilities in the accomplishment of division objectives reduces collateral damage and second and third order unintended effects. 7-83. The information environment extends down to the average civilian and Soldier. Local events and the immediate impressions of individuals about those events can have international significance as the global media broadcasts them. The goals of the divisions information operations is to reassure, persuade, and influence the local within the divisions AO and the local region to consent to our stability operations and to work with divisional units. Since the GREENLAND civilian population was previously subject to REDLAND propaganda and may still be recipients of that propaganda; they need objective, factual, truthful, and credible information. The divisions IO need to propagate the core message, explaining the objectives and role of the forces, and update the message and information in a consistent manner. 7-84. Additionally, the G-7 orchestrates the dissemination of information, such as minefield locations, how to report or turn in weapons, and new or revised ordnances. He requests joint PSYOP assets to assist the 308th Tactical PYSOP Company as necessary to produce and disseminate this information using various means to include: leaflets, posters, handbills, interviews, as well as loudspeaker, radio, and television broadcasts. Tactical units within the BCTs will disseminate most of the printed material assisted by the loudspeaker teams OPCON to those units. 7-85. The divisions information operations may also require the use of electronic warfare assets to locate and counter REDLAND radio/television transmitters trying to destabilize the situation while simultaneously securing our own use of the electronic spectrum. These transmitters can then either be destroyed using a variety of lethal means or their transmissions jammed. Alternatively, if the ROE allow, the wavelengths used by these transmitters can be electronically capturedthis is most easily done on the FM spectrumand used by coalition broadcasts. 7-86. The PAO assists the G-7 efforts by conducting public affairs planning, developing information strategies, and facilitating media operations that contribute to enhancing key audiences knowledge of US intentions, capabilities, and alliances. This includes the internal audience of operation participants, the American public, the citizens of the AO, and international audiences. The PAO is responsible for establishing and running the divisions visitors bureau in a facility in close proximity to the co-located division CPs. Other division staff elements will support the visitors bureau as required. Within the visitors bureau the PAO will conduct regular information sharing sessions with local, national, and international media. The division commander, assistant division commanders, and primary staff officers will also conduct regular briefings to media and government officials. The divisions primary briefer will not be the PAO. While the PAO will be involved in setting up press conferences and background briefings the G-3 will be the primary division briefer. As appropriate other senior individualssuch as the division commander, the deputy division commanders, or chief of staffwill brief on high media interest topics.
2nd HBCT, 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, 87th IBCT, and 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade (GN)
7-87. These units activities along the other lines of operation helps to ensure that the GREENLAND civilian population has a favorable perception of the mission and goals of US forces and are willing to support US forces in attaining those goals. These brigades can bring overwhelming force upon their choice of objectives. To do so without consideration of the political, economic, and social consequences creates the possibility of needless social instability subsequent to the military operation. Such resultant instability may not be supportive of the divisions long-term objectives. As a result, wherever and whenever possible 1st Division maneuver forces employ nonlethal methods and systems to achieve their objectives. For example, they routinely employ non-lethal systems to control individuals and unruly crowds.
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7-88. Additionally, the maneuver brigades participate in community relations-type activities, such as adopting schools located near their bases and assisting GREENLAND charitable organizations, whenever possible to promote a favorable view of coalition forces, their activities, and goals. They assist division IO by distributing leaflets, posters, and handbills developed in response to the IO plan. If required they will help distribute the means, such as radios, televisions, antennas, satellite dishes, and prerecorded media players (CD players, VCRs, and IPODs), to enable the civilian population to listen to electronic media explaining US goals and objectives.

7-89. On a case by case basis, when tasked by the G-3, it provides lift assets to support the divisions information operations that support the development or retention of favorably perceptions by the GREENLAND civilian population toward the 1st Divisions mission and presence within the country. Missions that it might be called on to support include the delivery of PSYOP products via helicopter mounted loudspeakers. The transport of media to and from high priority events that they could not get to in time to meet their deadline requirements by use of their private ground transportation or when it would be too risky for them to use that ground transportation is another potential mission. Another example could be the transport of GREENLAND civilian leaders or important leaders of international organizations to CMOC or other meetings. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade also participates in community relationstype activities.
27th Sustainment Brigade, 34th CSB (ME), 44th Medical Brigade, 92nd MP Brigade, and 555th Engineer Brigade
7-90. The Soldiers of these units support the IO line of operation by performing their day-to-day duties in a professional manner while treating GREENLAND civilians of the AO with respect. They also conduct community relations activities and distribute printed and other media that helps inform GREENLAND civilians of coalition, C/JFLC, and division goals and objectives, and other useful information, 7-91. The 308th PSYOP Company assigned to the 34th CSB (ME), provides PSYOP staff planning support to the division in addition to conducting tactical PSYOP in support of division operations. The 308th PSYOP Company coordinates with the C/JFLCs supporting PSYOP battalion (10th PSYOP Battalion) and other appropriate agencies for the development and production of PSYOP products to meet the 1st Division commanders requirements. 7-92. The 308th PSYOP Companys organic product development and production capability is augmented by additional assets from the ASCCs supporting PSYOP dissemination battalion (15th PSYOP Battalion). These assets include a Flyaway Broadcast System that provides the company (and its supported division) a DS broadcast asset. In addition, the company has a Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC) from the 15th PSYOP Battalions print company. This tactical vehicle mounted, light print asset provides the 308th with a responsive and mobile digital print capability. The DPPC provides a capability to produce limited PSYOP products, such as leaflets, handbills, posters, and other printed material (within the guidance assigned by the JPOTF and authorized by the product-approval authority for themes and objectives) that directly support this line of operation. 7-93. The 308th PSYOP Company works with the G-2 and the 56th BFSB to conduct market research and market surveys designed to determine if the desired messages are being received and understood by their various target audiences in the manner in which they were intended. Adjustments to the means, messages, and methods used to deliver the divisions themes and messages are then made (within higher guidance) in response to that market research.
418th Civil Affairs Battalion

7-94. Since by definition CMO include all activities that establish and maintain positive relations between 1st Division forces and the nonmilitary entities in the AOcivil authorities and institutions, the general population, international and nongovernmental organizations, and nonmilitary resourcesthe 418th CA Battalion will have a major part to play in this line of operations. The CMO taking place as part of the
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other lines of operations that help to harmonize civilian and military activities and thus maximize the use of resources designed to redress the deprivation and suffering of the people is a large part of the battalions contribution to this line of operation. 7-95. Personnel assigned to the 418th CA Battalion meet regularly with local GREENLAND formal and informal leaders. This process occurs at multiple levels within the division using not only the division CMOC operated by the 418th Civil Affairs Battalion, but also in the BCT CMOCs operated by the CA companies attached to those brigades, and their CA teams that support each maneuver battalion within the division. This provides these civilian leaders with a means of influencing the divisions actions and priorities. The personal relationships established in these meetings provide another avenue for informing influential GREENLAND civilians of US goals and objectives. 7-96. The conduct of public meetings are an effective vehicle for widely demonstrating trust and cooperation between divisional and GREENLAND civilian political, economic, and social leadership. Public meetings also help establish an air of permanence and, thereby, add to the legitimacy of the efforts of the leadership. They are also useful when there is limited literacy or public written and electronic communications means have been disrupted. 7-97. Coordinating public meetings to promote the exchange of information and solicit local input for setting priorities can be extremely difficult. As the number of local and international spectators attending the meeting goes up, the physical requirements increase drastically. Security and safety issues also become more acute. Organizations considering conducting such meetings must weigh concerns for security against the advantages gained by such public displays of stability.
GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

7-98. The division objective for this logical line of operation is the re-establishment of government agencies to facilitate development in support of a democratic society within GREENLAND. This line of operation is a shaping operation for the division. The division is concentrating on achieving a strategic and operational-level end-state objective along this logical line of operation. That objective is to stabilize the GREENLAND government. This objective has more civil than military characteristics, with the former usually focusing on the degree of stability or unrest of the population. The 418th Civil Affairs Battalion is the division lead for this logical line of operation in recognition that an understanding of the political implications of the divisions action is an essential element to effective civil administration. The CMOC established by the 418th CA Battalion will employ centralized direction and decentralized execution of governance and administration activities by the divisions BCTs. 7-99. The division is responsible for performing basic governmental functions within its AO because the GREENLAND government formally asked the EUCOM commander and US Ambassador to provide temporary civil administration for those areas liberated from REDLAND occupation and the President approved the request. As the situation stabilizes, responsibility for those governmental functions performed by the division will return to GREENLAND civilian agencies. This transition will be a gradual one and require detailed and formal planning. 7-100. Based on directions received from the President, the American Ambassador in GREENLAND negotiated a civil administration support agreement with the nations government. This agreement outlines the nature and extent of the support needed. It defined the limits of authority and liability of US military personnel. The EUCOM and C/JFLC legal staff was involved in the coordination for this support agreement and reviewed and recommended approval of the final product. 7-101. The division commander maintains liaison with US diplomatic representatives in the GREENLAND embassy to ensure maximum efficiency and unification of policy. An executive order covers the scope of authority and provides procedural guidance.

7-102. The intelligence cell provides the CMOC information of the AO and estimates the influence of existing political, economic, and social factors on the divisions military operations. The intelligence cell
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has the G-3 current operations element task appropriate elements to conduct reconnaissance operations designed determine the actual location and status of selected sensitive sites. The intelligence cell reviews material contained in archives located within the division AO for information of tactical or operational interest. With C/JFLC approval the intelligence cell may open this archival material to OGA, GREENLAND authorities, and other groupsto include international news organizations and contractorsto expedite its examination and exploitation. 7-103. The current operations element receives a revised sensitive location list that includes things such as historical sites, religious shrines, and critical infrastructure that should be protected from the CMOC and intelligence cell. This list updates the information provided on similar lists prepared during the previous phases of operations as on the site inspections of these locations can finally be accomplished. The current operations element propagates that list to all divisional units and the C/JFLC so that they can be taken into account when developing courses of action and schemes of maneuver and fire support. It recommends the adjustment of BCT tactical plans to prevent the destruction or looting of sensitive sites. It may assign a tactical unit the mission of securing selected sensitive sites. It adjudicates disputes between the CMOC and other major divisional subordinate commands when the other logical lines of operations are affected by the allocation and priority of civil assistance activities. 7-104. The G-7, in coordination with the G-6 and G-2 counterintelligence, recommends security measures associated with the restoration of public communications to the CMOC. This includes the review of communications media policy to ensure that OPSEC is maintained to the maximum extent possible. The PAO, in cooperation with the G-7, develops a media plan that facilitates informing US and international audiences of US aims and goals related to the divisions conduct of temporary civil administration 7-105. Since GREENLAND population must be willing to accept the temporary civil administration requested by their political leadership, the division information operations will reinforce EUCOM and C/JFLC information operations themes that stress the message that the American administration was requested by their legitimate government, it is temporary in nature, it exists to help the people, and it will turn over governmental responsibility as soon as possible. 7-106. The division G-9 provides staff supervision of the division CMOC for the division staff, since the 418th CA Battalion has the division lead for the governance and civil administration logical line of operation. 7-107. The divisions special staff officers provide technical advice and assistance to the G-3, G-9, and the BCTs in determination of the need for assistance, measures to restore, and recommendations for the restoration of public services. For example, the PM advises the BCTs on the provision of US military, HN, third nation, or contract security for GREENLAND critical infrastructure, financial institutions, government offices, and significant cultural artifacts.

7-108. The STB continues to support the operations of the division CPs with communications and life support while providing them with local security.
2nd HBCT, 2nd SBCT, 28th SBCT, and 87th IBCT

7-109. These units will provide additional local security for CA companies and functional teams primarily responsible for the governance and administration line of operation operating in their AOs. Likewise the engineer teams from the 555th Engineer Brigade responsible for repairing or constructing those public facilities, such as public schools, necessary for the provision of civil administration will also be attached for sustainment support and security to the BCT within whose AO they are working. This command relationship will continue throughout the life of the specific engineer project or projects they are assigned the mission of completing. This simplifies responsibilities for area security within each brigades AO. Additionally, the BCTs will provide local security for OGAs and international agencies and organizations that are responsible for providing civil administration within their respective AOs.
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7-110. Each brigade CMOC will do its best to coordinate the activities of OGAs and international and nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort within the brigade AO. This allows their activities to be synchronized with ongoing BCT operations. However, it is likely that some international or nongovernmental organization will freelance its activities at some point. The BCTs must be prepared to react appropriately to their presence within the AO. Thus each BCT maintains an appropriately sized, equipped, and trained reaction force. The BCT commander must remember that public opinion will determine if the mission is successfully accomplished when reviewing his options for dealing with the offending freelancing organization.

7-111. The 11th Combat Aviation Brigade provides lift assets to support the operations of functional teams from the 418th CA Brigade, OGAs, and international agencies and organizations responsible for providing civil administration within the divisions AO. This support is provided on a case-by-case basis in response to taskings from the division G-3.

7-112. The 27th Sustainment Brigade provides logistical support to the operations of the CA companies and functional teams responsible for providing civil administration within the divisions AO. The brigade will be directly involved in the establishment of public civilian supply, public transportation, and food and agriculture support with the appropriate functional civil affairs teams. This includes supporting these teams with specialized Class X supply items. This support is provided on a case by case basis, in response to taskings from the division G-3.
34th CSB (ME)

7-113. The 34th CSB (ME)s role in the line of operations is fairly small. The 34th CSB (ME) responds to G-3 taskings to provide specific resources from its assigned units to accomplish directed activities, such as sensitive site exploitation or providing local security to OGAs and contractors temporarily conducting operations within the division area.

7-114. The battalions role in governance and administration is one of support to the 1st Division Commanders operational and support functions with respect to the continuity of government in a foreign nation. The battalions general tasks are Identifying, validating, or evaluating GREENLAND infrastructure. Understanding the needs of the indigenous populations and institutions in terms of civil affairs functional specialties. Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of GREENLANDs civilian populations and institutions in terms of these functional specialties. Performing liaison functions between the division, OGAs, and civilianGREENLAND, international, and private volunteeragencies. Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational support to civil administration activities. Participating in the execution of selected support to civil administration activities, as needed or directed. Performing quality-control assessments of support to civil administration activities and costs. Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of support to civil administration operations. Coordinating and synchronizing transition of support to civil administration operations from the 1st Division to the GREENLAND government.
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7-115. The 418th CA Battalion is the lead divisional organization for the governance and civil administration logical line of operations. They must be augmented CA-functional specialists from the CA brigade supporting the C/JFLC (501st CA Brigade) and the CA command supporting the EUCOM commander (352nd CA Command) to conduct its temporary civil administration mission. These functional specialists seek out various resources, some military, but mostly combinations of civil organizations that can jointly restore good governance to the GREENLAND society as it emerges from war. FM 3-05.401 outlines the activities of each of these functional specialists. In this vignette the 418th CA Battalion distributes its available functional specialist teams to the BCTs to provide each BCT with a full set of CA functional specialists. 7-116. The division CMOC is organized and led by 418th CA Battalion personnel. The CMOC recommends to the division G-3 those public services, in priority, which should be restored and estimates the amount of public utilities required to discharge the civil activities essential to the physical and psychological well being of the area. That recommendation is based on the tactical situation and economic situation affecting the divisions AO. These recommendations are made after coordination with the engineering specialists available in the 555th Engineer Brigade. The 418th CA Battalions personnel will meet with local GREENLAND leaders on a regular basis, assess their needs, and pass the appropriate information to the correct actions.

7-117. The brigade will be directly involved in the establishment of public health support within the divisions AO in cooperation with the appropriate functional civil affairs team, GREENLAND medical authorities, and international health organizations.
56th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

7-118. The 56th Brigade can be tasked by the G-3 to provide information of interest to CA companies and functional teams, such as crop distributions and projected yields and the locations of concentrations of displaced civilians. The brigade coordinates with the BCTs for permission to deploy brigade retained assets within the BCT AOs to obtain the necessary information since in this vignette there is no higher controlled area in which the brigade can deploy its assets without such coordination. The brigade can also use its access to other national- and theater-level sensors and databases to provide the necessary information.
92nd MP Brigade
7-119. The brigade will be directly involved in the establishment of public safety support within the divisions AO in cooperation with the appropriate functional civil affairs team, the Department of Justice, and GREENLAND law enforcement agencies. The MP function of police intelligence operations is specifically highlighted in stability operations. MP planners consider those factors captured in the acronym POLICEpolice and prison structures, organized crime, legal systems, investigations, crime conducive conditions, and enforcement mechanisms and gapsto assist in formulating courses of action for directing MP assets in these type of operations. MP planners must effectively plan for and coordinate with CA and MI assets in the collection of vital police/criminal information that is indicative of a functioning society, such as crime, law and order, security, etc. The brigade coordinates with the BCTs when deploying its elements into BCT AOs in support of these activities.

7-120. The engineer brigade, augmented by functional teams from the Corps of Engineers, provides additional technical expertise to support the 418th CA Battalions public works and facilities, civil defense, and public transportation functional teams. In this vignette the brigade placed a multi-engineer specialty construction task force OPCON to each BCT to assist the BCTs in the rapid restoration of essential governmental services. The 555th Brigade coordinates with the BCTs when deploying additional subject matter experts or capabilities into BCT AOs in support of these activities. It makes recommendations to the G-3 when necessary to redeploy engineer assets from one BCT to another.
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INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY
7-121. Infrastructure recovery refers to actions by military and civilian authorities within an AO that enables the process of permanently repairing, rebuilding, or relocating critical power generation, water distribution, sewage, public communications, transportation systems, and mitigating future service interruptions. As recovery progresses within an AO, the process expands to encompass the rebuilding of private residences; replacing personal property, such as trucks and tractors; resuming employment; and restoring businesses. 7-122. This logical line of operation is a shaping operation for the division. It requires centralize planningdetermining priorities, assigning resources, monitoring progress, and adjusting as required and decentralized execution. The divisions four objectives for this line of operation are the restoration of the regional electrical grid, water distribution, sewage treatment, and ground transportation networks. Since these objectives are largely general engineering in nature, the 555th Engineer Brigade is the division lead for this line of operation. The 555th Engineer headquarters, assisted by the division plans element, is responsible for the centralized planning. The BCTs are responsible for the decentralized execution. The 555th will coordinate with the various CMOCs operated by the 418th CA Battalion to ensure that maximum possible use is made of local contractor provided resources and laborers in an effort to provide increased opportunities for GREENLAND entrepreneurs and laborers which will assist in stabilizing the local economy. 7-123. Contractors will play a large role in this line of operation. Each staff section within the division headquarters and MSCs must understand the procurement and accounting rulesand timelines associated with the award of contracts in this environment. There will be a tension between commanders wanting to meet operational demands in an active theater of operations and congressionally imposed procurement procedures designed for peacetime conditions. The division must work closely with its supporting team from the theater Army Field Supporting Brigade to meet operational requirements and stay within legal guidelines. FM 100-10-2 provides additional information on battlefield contract support.

7-124. The division intelligence cell tasks the 56th BFSB and other divisional units to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to answer information requirements related to this line of operation. The determination of what facilities the local civilian population wants repaired and in what order, is a key piece of information that commanders and staffs at all levels within the division need to know. The division plans element is heavily involved in this line of operation due to The protracted time period required to rehabilitate key infrastructure. The need to coordinate reconstruction plans with multiple organizations and agencies external to the division. The lead time necessary to obtain required resourcesboth financial and specialized equipment. 7-125. Both the plans and current operations elements within the headquarters will be monitoring the current status of this line of operation. As a result they will constantly be providing and receiving appropriate information from the CMOCs, maneuver brigades, and higher headquarters. 7-126. The division G-8 arranges for the provision of the resources necessary to conduct reconstruction operations and accounting for the expenditure of resources. Operational needs and the chaotic conditions existing in a war-torn country will require the division to deviate from peacetime contracting procedures and accounting standards. The G-8 will work closely with the SJA to ensure that the proper waivers by competent authority are received in a timely fashion to avoid impacting ongoing operations. The G-8 will establish a tracking system to ensure that funds expended are expended against authorized projects and to reduce fraud. The SJA works with Department of Justice and GREENLAND civil authorities to restore a functioning judiciary.
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7-127. This unit does not participate in activities related to this line of operations except by employing vetted local vendors for labor and services.

7-128. These units participate in the conduct of infrastructure recovery operations within the division AO in the following ways: They adapt their concepts of operations and schemes of maneuver to project critical infrastructure and prevent further damage to critical infrastructure system whenever and wherever possible. They used vetted local vendors whenever possible to provide general labors and other services, such as dining, laundry, and bath that are necessary to support mission accomplishment over a prolonged period. They provide area security for reconstruction teams operating in their areas. These reconstruction teams may be from the 555th Engineers, international or local civilian contractors, multinational civil engineers, GREENLAND civil authorities, or a combination of these sources. (Those military teams working in a BCTs AO should be either assigned, attached, or OPCON to the BCT.)

7-129. This unit contributes to this line of operations by employing vetted local vendors for labor and services. On a case-by-case basis, when tasked by the G-3, it provides lift assets to support the reconstruction operations of other divisional units, US governmental agencies, the GREENLAND government, contractors, international, and private organizations.

7-130. The 27th Sustainment Brigade works with the CA public transportation and civilian supply functional teams. These teams are from the 501st CA Brigade or the 351st CA Command that supports the C/JFLC or EUCOM commander, contractors, and GREENLAND civil authorities. This support restores civilian transportation, distribution capabilities, and skills within the AO. It employs vetted local vendors for labor, supplies, and services. The logistics support base established by the 27th Sustainment Brigade (within the division's base camp) receives all reconstruction supplies coming from venders located outside the divisions AO and checks them against their shipping documentation to ensure that the quality and quantities of supplies received match contracted specifications. These supplies are then sent to individual job sites within the division AO according to G-3 priorities of resupply.
34th CSB (ME)

7-131. This unit contributes to this line of operations by employing vetted local vendors for labor and services. On a case-by-case basis, when tasked by the G-3, it provides assets to support the reconstruction operations of other divisional units, US governmental agencies, the GREENLAND government, contractors, international, and private organizations. The 308th PSYOP Company works closely with the 418th CA Battalion, the 56th BFSB, and the 1st Division G-2 to determine what infrastructure elements the civilian population wants repaired and the priority they place on the repair of each element through its market research and attitudinal survey capabilities.

7-132. This unit contributes to this line of operations by advising and assisting the 418th CA Battalions public health team, international health organizations, and local GREENLAND medical organizations in restoring medical care to GREENLAND civilians. It also employs vetted local vendors for common medical supplies authorized for local procurement and services.
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7-133. This unit responds to the intelligence cells reconnaissance taskings related to this line of operation. It also employs vetted local vendors for laborers, common supplies, and services.
92nd Military Police Brigade

7-134. This units actions along the secure line of operations also applies on this line of operations by advising and assisting the 418th CA Battalions public safety and civil defense team, Department of Justice, and local GREENLAND law enforcement agencies in restoring the rule of law within the divisions area. This includes the establishment of local police stations, detainee collection points and holding areas. In this vignette, the brigade recommends that the BCTs station a squad in each police station as they are activated to serve as mentors and trainers for GREENLAND police to reinforce the training the GREENLAND police received at the national police academy. The brigade escorts select commercial and military convoys containing high priority reconstruction-related supplies and special equipment to prevent their destruction by terrorists and insurgents. Those movements are coordinated by the division current operations and element with all affected organizations, such as the BCT within whose AO those convoys will base and the 11th Combat Aviation Brigade for aerial support. It also employs vetted local vendors for laborers, common supplies, and services.

7-135. The 418th CA Battalion plays a key role for the infrastructure recovery line of operation. Through the operations of its various CMOCs, it is responsible for ensuring that GREENLAND civilian requirements and priorities are included into the 1st Divisions infrastructure reconstruction plans.

7-136. The 555th Engineer Brigade is the division lead for the infrastructure recovery line of operation. The 555th is responsible for advising and assisting their GREENLAND civilian and military counterparts (within the limits of legal and regulatory guidance) in the reconstruction of GREENLAND infrastructure highways, railways, sewer, area power, and public water treatmentwithin the division AO. 7-137. In this vignette, in response to these requirements, the 555th brigade commander task organizes his assets into four engineer construction task forces and OPCONs them to the four BCTs. The brigade headquarters, in conjunction with the division plans element, provides centralized direction to this line of operation but allows the engineer task forces OPCON to the BCTs to conduct decentralized execution. It advises the division commander on changing priorities and task organization. The brigade headquarters retains responsibility for conducting any required environmental studies. 7-138. The engineer task force surveys their respective areas to determine the current condition of the public infrastructure and prepare plans to repair damage and build new facilities to meet C/JFLC standards with emphasis on the restoration of the regional sewer, water, electrical, trash collection and disposal systems, and the ground transportation network. These task forces provided the collected survey information to the 555th Brigade staff for collation and analysis. They consult with the 555th brigade staff and engineer centers of excellence internal and external to the theater as necessary to resolve the complex engineering problems associated with this line of operation. 7-139. The brigade will coordinate its actions with contracting teams from the Army Field Support Brigade so that both US and international civilian engineering firms and GREENLAND engineering companies can participate in the infrastructure recovery effort. One of the aims of that coordination is to ensure that the money spent to repair infrastructure will also result in providing unemployed or underemployed civilians within the AO constructive work as a means of returning stability to the area. The engineer task forces within the BCTs, assisted by 555th Engineer and Corps of Engineer subject matter experts, serve as contracting officers technical representatives overseeing the execution of these contracted engineering projects. These technical representatives ensure that the results of these engineering projects match or exceed contract specifications.
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HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND ASSISTANCE

7-140. The availability of food and water, shelter, means of economic self-sufficiency, transportation, and communications contributes to civil stability. Military forces conduct civil assistance/humanitarian relief in the aftermath of natural or man-made calamities or disasters. The division conducts these activities to Maintain order. Provide potential life-sustaining services. Control the distribution of goods and services. 7-141. The divisions civil assistance efforts provide short-term military support to the GREENLAND government and civilian population. The effective provision of civil assistance/humanitarian relief requires the division to Conduct an assessment to determine the current and projected status of the civilian population. Determine the capabilities of the existing GREENLAND civil administration. Develop plans to reinforce or restore the existing GREENLAND civil administration. Coordinate civil assistance/humanitarian relief plans with C/JFLC, OGAs, multinational partners, and those international and nongovernmental organizations operating within the division AO. Coordinate the transfer of authority between the division and GREENLAND civil administration. 7-142. International organizations, such as the International Red Cross, and a wide variety of private volunteer organization, such as Doctors without Borders, will play a large role in this line of operation. Each of these organizations will have its own agenda and specialization which may or may not match what the division perceives is needed or desired. Obtaining unity of effort from these different organization will require those division Soldiers working with them in the CMOC and on job sites to exercise a great deal of tact and professionalism. Personal relationships and trust are vital to getting things done when unity of command is not possible. Soldiers assigned to the CMOC should be assigned for extended periods to allow the development of those personal relationships and not routinely rotated. 7-143. Each staff section within the division headquarters and MSCs must understand that some of these organizations will work closely with division elements to provide a coordinated and synchronized response to human needs. Other organizations will actively seek to distance their efforts from those conducted by the division. The various CMOCs established by the 418th Civil Affairs are vital to this line of operation. JP 308 and FM 3-07 are sources of additional information on working with international organization and private volunteer organizations.

7-144. During the conduct of operations pertaining to the humanitarian relief and assistance line of operation the division staff continues to perform their normal duties. The intelligence cell continues to update its IPB and provide intelligence updates, to include weather forecasts, to the rest of the staff and divisional units. The current operations cell adjudicates conflicts between activities along all of the different lines of operations. They also direct the execution of branch plans to current operations. The plans cell continues to refine long term plans for the region and develop sequels in conjunction with GREENLAND authorities, C/JFLC planners, and OGAs. The G-4 ensures the logistical supportability of division and subordinate brigade plans. The G-8 ensures that the division has the fiscal authority to conduct operations and account for the expenditure of funds. The divisions special staff officers also contribute to the identification of solutions to those circumstances that result in suffering on the part of the GREENLAND civilian population.

7-145. This unit provides limited humanitarian relief and assistance to those GREENLAND civilians initially located in the vicinity of its portion of the division base camp to mitigate their immediate suffering. It continues to provide this assistance within the limits of its available resources until those
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civilians finish relocating to areas far enough removed from the division CP so that they pose no conceivable threat to the critical command and control node

7-146. These units conduct humanitarian relief and assistance using their organic resources to provide immediate assistance to the civilians located within their respective AOs. These assistance activities includeproviding rudimentary medical, dental, and veterinary care; minor repair of surface transportation systems; construction of basic sanitation facilities; and the detection and marking of unexploded ordnance.

7-147. This unit also provides humanitarian relief and assistancewithin the limits of its organic capabilitiesto GREENLAND civilians located near its portion of the division base camp. On a case by case basis, when tasked by the G-3, it provides lift assets to support the humanitarian relief and assistance operations of other divisional units, US governmental agencies, the GREENLAND government, and international and nongovernmental organizations.

7-148. The logistics support base established by the 27th Sustainment Brigade (within the division's base camp) receives all humanitarian relief and assistance supplies not specifically intended for the maneuver brigades. These supplies are sent to life-support centers within the division AO according to priorities of resupply established by the G-3. At the top of the priorities list is the distribution of Class I, Class IV, ice, and portable toilets. Strict accountability is maintained on all donated relief items. Additionally, the unit provides humanitarian reliefwithin the limits of its organic capabilitiesto GREENLAND civilians located near its area of the division base camp.
34th CSB (ME)

7-149. This unit supervises the provision of humanitarian relief to relieve immediate suffering in those parts of the division AO near Camp Riley until that support can be provided by other agencies. It will also be tasked to assist the maneuver BCTs in Debris removal that affects public sanitation and safety. Construction of life support shelters within Camp Riley and shelter construction. Specialized support for search and rescue operations, such as cranes. Demolishing unsafe structures.

7-150. This brigade supports the humanitarian relief and assistance efforts of the medical companies located within the BCTs in addition to directly providing humanitarian relief to those civilians located near its portion of the division base camp.

7-151. The Brigade continues to use technical and manned reconnaissance and surveillance to report on distribution and effectiveness of humanitarian aide in the divisions AO. The 56th BFSB continues to provide CI/HUMINT teams GS to the BCTs for source reporting. This will provide humanitarian relief and assistance in those areas where positive effects can be leveraged by the local commander to help counter REDLAND insurgent forces and terrorist groups. UASs provide information on division-wide infrastructure and agricultural projects and ground scout and LRS teams continue to monitor the international border for illegal movement of international aide across the border into REDLAND. 7-152. The brigade leverages its technical collection assets to locate and monitor local media outlets. The BFSBs MI battalions collect and process information from the GREENLAND press agencies, as required.
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CI/HUMINT teams GS to the BCTs monitor activities and sermons in local mosques and churches to detect anti-coalition rhetoric or messages from religious leaders. This information may be used for future targeting with non-lethal operations. UASs are used during public demonstrations to reduce US presence and to monitor crowds for targeting by non-lethal means, both immediately and in the long-term.
92nd Military Police Brigade

7-153. The MP teams assigned to this brigade support the operations along the divisions humanitarian relief and assistance line of operation primarily by reporting the locations and extent of human suffering to appropriate authorities that then encounter as they conduct their standard military police mission, such as maneuver and mobility support and police intelligence operations. These teams do provide humanitarian assistance within their limited organic capabilities until relieve by other competent authority provided that the rendering of such assistance does not impeded the accomplishment of these teams assigned missions. The brigade also directly provides humanitarian relief to those civilians located near its portion of the division base camp.

7-154. The battalion conducts CMOC meetings as a means of encouraging available international and nongovernmental organizations to address civilian needs for humanitarian assistance. The division wants to use its assets for relief and assistance only if an international or nongovernmental organization capability does not exist, military requirements for those assets have been met on the other lines of operation, and use of those assets will help promote mission accomplishment. Any humanitarian relief or assistance activity undertaken by division elements that is or should be the responsibility of a civilian organization or government agency will be transferred to that organization or agency as soon as possible in a coordinated and synchronized manner.

7-155. This unit provides humanitarian reliefwithin the limits of its organic capabilitiesto GREENLAND civilians located near its portion of the division base camp until that support can be provided by other agencies. It will also be tasked to assist the maneuver BCTs in Debris removal that affects public sanitation and safety. Construction of life support shelters within the maneuver BCT and shelter construction. Specialized support for search and rescue operations, such as cranes. Demolishing unsafe structures.
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Appendix A
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
FM 90-26 is the capstone manual for airborne operations. A higher headquarters may tailor the division with one or more airborne infantry brigade combat teams (BCTs) based on the divisions anticipated missions. These airborne infantry BCTs have the capability to strategically deploy and conduct forcible entry operations. It is most likely that the planning and preparation of an airborne operation, especially the initial forcible entry into a joint operations area (JOA) or a multiple airborne BCT operation, will be conducted by specialized planners on the ASCC or FORSCOM staff. Transfer of command authority for the airborne BCT to the division commander occurring on commencement of the parachute assault. The discussion of airborne operations in this appendix assumes that the division has one airborne BCT assigned and that the division staff is augmented with airborne planners. The planning, preparation, and execution of airborne operations consists of the following four plans: Ground tactical plan. Landing plan. Air movement plan. Marshaling plan.
GROUND TACTICAL PLAN

A-1. The ground tactical plan is the base from which all other plans are developed. The ground tactical plan must be completed before finalizing the landing plan, air movement plan, and marshaling plan. It provides the commanders intent, concept of the operation, fire support plan, and task organization for the initial assault. Ground combat in airborne operations is conducted along conventional lines but initially with limited assets and a heavy reliance on air support.
PLANNING
A-2. After the airborne force commander receives the initiating directive or warning order, he begins planning. This directive or warning order includes the following information: Missions for subordinate units. Higher commanders concept of the operation. Command structure for the operation. Time and duration of the operation. Intelligence and security requirements. Allocation and distribution of airlift assets. Unit deployment list and sequence. Departure airfields, remote marshaling bases (REMABs), and intermediate staging bases (ISBs). Signal requirements and instructions. Link-up and withdrawal concept.
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Appendix A
Estimate of the Situation

A-3. The military decision-making process incorporates the estimate of the situation in a course of action as in any other operation. Unit commanders and staff officers cannot afford to deviate from this accepted procedure for the development process. As a technique, the ground tactical plan will normally be developed as the basic OPORD or OPLAN. This is the most critical phase of an airborne operation because all other plans are based on it. Mission A-4. The mission of an airborne infantry BCT is to close with the enemy by fire and maneuver to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. These missions usually require the seizure and defense of objectives and surrounding terrain. (See FM 90-26 for detailed information on the application of the IPB process as it relates to airborne operations.) A-5. An airborne BCT defends only the airhead and the required maneuver space if the ground tactical plan envisions a rapid link-up with other ground maneuver forces. If the plan calls for a rapid buildup of forces in the airhead, followed by a break out; the BCTs tactical operations begin with an initial assault and then pass to the defense of the established airhead unit until enough forces can be delivered to the objective area. On reinforcement or on linkup with other ground forces, the BCT resumes the offensive within the commanders concept of the operation or prepares for subsequent operations. Enemy Forces A-6. The commander and division staff analyze available information to determine the enemy situation. The following issues are considered: Enemy morale, leadership, and probable intentions. Enemy capabilities. Enemy tactics. Probable enemy reactions to an airborne assault. Enemy reserves and paramilitary organizations (gendarmeries, police, border guards, and militia) and their ability to mobilize and react. Enemy capability to conduct guerrilla, partisan, or sabotage activities and the enemys relationship to the local population. Terrain and Weather A-7. Within this category, the staff must consider the following factors: Availability of drop zones (DZs), landing zones (LZs), and extraction zones (EZs). The availability and selection of DZs should not influence the selection of assault objectives, the airhead line, or unit boundaries. Obstacles within the airhead line and out to the maximum effective range of direct- and indirect fire weapons, with emphasis on those that can be prepared or reinforced with minimal engineer effort. Enemy avenues of approach. This consideration weighs heavily in determining the location of assault objectives. Key terrain that can assist the force in best defending the area in depth. Friendly and enemy observation and fields of fire. Cover and concealment for assembly and reorganization. A-8. The staff must also consider the effects of climate and weather on Flight formations. Trafficability. Visibility.
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Close air support. Logistics. Personnel and equipment. Troops and Support Available A-9. The division commander considers all forces available to accomplish the mission. These include assigned, attached, and supporting forces. A-10. The commander considers the plans, missions, capabilities, and limitations of US ground forces available to support the operation. He must consider whether artillery or Army aviation can support the airborne BCT and whether the forces will perform a linkup or passage of lines. A-11. The commander must consider joint capabilities to support the airborne BCT in the accomplishment of its mission. This includes the United States Air Force's (USAF's) ability to support the airborne BCT and ground maneuver elements trying to linkup with the BCT. He brings knowledgeable airlift and tactical air planners together early. Close air support can often make up for the lack of armor and heavy artillery. The commander also examines the availability and feasibility of naval surface fire support and United States Navy or United States Marine Corps air support. He must arrange early for liaison and coordination to support the operation. Time Available A-12. There are several time considerations unique to an airborne operation. Significant time may be required to mass USAF aircraft. The time between the initial assault and deployment of follow-on forces must be considered. Supply and CSS planning are driven by the amount of time before linkup or withdrawal. Civil Considerations A-13. The commander must consider national and regional characteristics, such as Religion and customs. Politics and tribal affiliations. Support (or lack of it) for central and local governments or occupying powers. Loyalty to political or military leaders. Available labor. Support (or lack of it) for US forces.
Development of the Ground Tactical Plan

A-14. The ground tactical plan incorporates considerations for those actions to be taken in the objective area. It must focus on accomplishing the commanders concept of the operation. It is developed as any other tactical plan; however, the initial goal of the airborne operation is establishment and defense of an airhead. A-15. The ground tactical plans essential elements are developed in the following sequence: airhead line and assault objectives, security area, and reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) forces, boundaries and assault task organizations, and reserves.
Selection of Assault Objectives and the Airhead Line

A-16. Based on an analysis of the situation, the commander selects specific assault objectives. (See Figure A-1.) Although the airhead line is developed and the assault objectives determined concurrently, assault objectives dictate size and shape of the airhead.
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Appendix A
OBJ
OBJ
OBJ
OBJ
OBJ
Figure A-1. Assault objectives A-17. This selection does not necessarily include objectives the force must seize to secure the airhead line. An appropriate assault objective is one which the force must control early in the assault to accomplish the mission or enhance security of the division. A-18. Objectives should allow for accomplishing mission-essential tasks while meeting the commanders intent. They can include key terrain within the airhead or terrain required for linkup. The airborne BCT is vulnerable from the time it lands until follow-on forces can be delivered to the airhead. A mobile enemy unit attacking the airhead immediately following the airborne assault can completely disrupt the operation. Therefore, the commander selects assault objective terrain that dominates high-speed enemy avenues of approach into the airhead. Enemy positions which threaten the mission and are within the airhead can also be selected as assault objectives. Assault objectives must be seized immediately to establish the airhead and provide security for follow-on forces. A-19. Subordinate commanders decide the size, type, or disposition of the force to gain and maintain control. The division commander will select the airborne BCTs assault objectives, while the airborne BCT commander selects battalion assault objectives. Battalion commanders select company assault objectives. A-20. Assault objectives are ranked in order. Priorities are chosen based on the most likely threat or mission requirements. Assault objectives are secured before the airhead line defense is established. The airhead is then cleared of organized enemy resistance and forces are positioned to secure the airhead line. A-21. At the same time commanders select assault objectives, they consider the extent of the airhead. The airhead includes the entire area under control of the airborne BCT. It acts as a base for further operations and as the lodgment that allows the airborne force to buildup combat power. Once the force secures the airhead, it must clear enemy forces within it to defend it.
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AIRHEAD LINE
Figure A-2. Airhead line A-22. The airhead line delineates the specific area to be seized and designates the airhead. (See Figure A2.) Several factors determine the location, extent, and form of the airhead line The actual trace of the airhead line reflects the control of key or critical terrain essential to the mission. The airhead line anchors on obstacles, and the airhead itself takes advantage of existing natural and man-made obstacles. The airhead contains enough DZs, LZs, and EZs to ensure interior rather than exterior lines of communication and to permit mass rather than piecemeal assault. The airhead must allow enough space for dispersion to reduce vulnerability to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The airhead must be large enough to provide for defense in depth, yet small enough for the unit to defend. Although this depends largely on METT-TC, a battalion can defend an airhead 3 to 5 kilometers in diameter. An airborne BCT can occupy an airhead 5 to 8 kilometers in diameter.
Reconnaissance and Security Forces

A-23. Security in all directions is an overriding consideration in any airborne operation since the airhead is a perimeter defense. In ground operations, there are several security echelons ahead of the forward edge of the battle area. A-24. Security forces are landed in the assault echelon. A reconnaissance and security line is established immediately 4 to 6 kilometers from the airhead line to provide security to the airborne force. In the early stages of an airborne operation, the security force acts as a screening force. In later stages when assault missions have been accomplished and the airhead is relatively secure, it acts as a guard or covering force. The mission of the security force is to Give the airhead early warning. Develop intelligence, including the location, direction, and speed of an enemy attack.
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Appendix A
Initially deny the enemy observation of, and his fires on, the airfield. Deceive the enemy as to the actual location of the airhead. Delay and disrupt the enemy. A-25. The security force includes scouts, antiterrorism weapons, engineers, Army aviation, and (sometimes) light armor. When possible, mobile forces are selected to facilitate rapid initial movement to positions, withdrawal, and/or adjustments. An aggressive R&S effort at lower echelons augments the security force. The following considerations apply to the selection of positions for the screening force: Locate within radio communications and fighter squadron range. Range can be extended, if necessary, with retransmission stations; split section indirect-fire operations; and attachment of vehicles, mortars, or other assets. Locate roadblocks, obstacles, ambushes, patrols, or sensors on dominant terrain. This allows long-range observation and fields of fire out to the maximum range of support fires. Locate to observe, control, and dominate high speed avenues of approach into the airhead. Locate to deny enemy long-range observation and observed indirect tire into the airhead. Locate with routes of withdrawal to the airhead. A-26. Designated forces under control of the airborne BCT commander perform R&S missions beyond the security zone. Emphasis is on likely enemy avenues of approach. The mission of these forces is to gain and maintain contact with enemy units reacting to the airborne assault. This force is mobile and not used to defend a particular part of the airhead. It can include Army aviation, air cavalry, or light armor; it can be supported with fire from USAF assets, naval surface fire support, or Army long-range rocket systems. These forces orient on enemy high-speed avenues of approach to develop intelligence, including the location, direction, and speed of any enemy advance. A-27. Employed beyond the airhead at a distance based on the tactical situation, security forces protect the main force from surprise attack. The airborne BCT commander can extend their range if communications permit. Aviation assets can extend to 50 kilometers or more, although the commander must consider loiter time so forces can provide continuous coverage. (FARPs can increase this distance.) Long-range surveillance teams from the battlefield surveillance brigade may observe enemy garrisons and major routes into the airhead. Reconnaissance forces must be mobile and task-organized for the mission from cavalry, armor, scout, launch and recovery site, and anti-armor units.
Boundaries and Task Organization

A-28. The division commander visualizes employment of the airborne BCT and organizes it for combat commensurate with its assigned missions.
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1-17 II 1-501 7 2 1-501 II 2-501

II II
DZ ABLE
BDE SECURITY 2 AREA

X
319 2
AIRHEAD LINE
II II
DZ EAGLE
822 BSB 17
282 BTB
1-501 II 2-501
11
DZ CHARLIE
2 CLF (2BCT/10DIV)
2-501 II 1-17
BDE REAR AREA
071800 JUN 99
Figure A-3. Boundaries: BCT airhead A-29. The airborne BCT commander uses boundaries to assign area of operations to his major subordinate combat elements, which then clear their assigned AOs of enemy forces. (See Figure A-3.) In Figure A-3, the 2nd BCT (Airborne) commander split responsibility for the entire area within his airhead line between his two airborne infantry battalions and the brigade sustainment or rear area. He has the option of assigning responsibility for the brigade rear area to several different headquarters. He normally uses his BTB commander as his rear area commander because his other functional battalion commandersfield artillery, reconnaissance, and brigade supportare fully committed to the accomplishment of their respective functions. His reconnaissance squadron commander is responsible for reconnaissance and surveillance within the brigade security area. The reconnaissance squadron may be given additional attachments from brigade assets that will allow it to conduct screen or guard operations based on the factors of METT-TC. A-30. To assign boundaries, commanders subdivide his AO into smaller AOs with fairly equal tasks (not necessarily into equal-size AOs). This requires a careful analysis of the enemy, tasks to be accomplished, and terrain within the objective area. A-31. Boundaries should avoid splitting (between two units) the responsibility for the defense of an avenue of approach or key terrain. Boundaries should provide adequate maneuver space including key terrain features. Boundaries should provide adequate room to permit maneuver on both sides of the assault objectives. A-32. Boundaries must be recognizable both on the map and ground. Roads should not be used as a boundary because they represent high-speed avenues of approach and need to be covered with a clear understanding of responsibility. Instead, commanders can use such landmarks as rivers, streams, railroad tracks, or the edge of a town, woods, or swamp. A-33. Ideally, each AO should include at least one DZ and LZ to enable the unit and its attachments to land within the assigned sector during the assault. This also facilitates resupply and evacuation of enemy prisoners of war and casualties. Having an LZ and DZ reduces the problem of coordination with adjacent units.
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Appendix A
A-34. Boundaries should not require a unit to defend in more than one direction at once. Boundaries should extend beyond the trace of the security force as far as necessary to coordinate fires. This allows subordinate units to operate forward of the airhead with minimal coordination. Commanders should plan coordinating points at the intersection of the airhead line and security force ground trace boundaries. Task Organization A-35. Once the BCT commander has determined the principal features of the ground assault plan (scheme of maneuver and fire support), he task organizes his units to execute their assigned missions. To ensure unity of effort or to increase readiness for combat, part of or all subordinate units of any command can be formed into one or more temporary tactical grouping (teams or task forces), each under a designated commander. No standard task organization meets all conditions. A-36. The airborne infantry battalions within the BCT usually form the nucleus of the BCTs tactical groupings. These teams are tailored for initial assault by the attachment of functional capabilities, such as intelligence sensors or short-range unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), from within or external to the BCT in accordance with the factors of METT-TC. These functional capabilities are attached as soon as possible in the marshaling area. Many of these functional capabilities are detached from these task forces as soon as the BCT can regain centralized control and their parent unit headquarters can establish itself on the ground. Other elements, such as sensitive site exploitation teams are attached to the airborne BCT for the movement only. Organization for Assault Landing A-37. After the task organization of Soldiers for the assault landing is announced, units organize into assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. The assault echelon comprises those forces required to seize the assault objectives and the initial airhead, plus their reserves and supporting Soldiers. The follow-on echelon is not needed by the airborne force in the objective area during the initial assault, but is needed for subsequent operations. When needed, the follow-on echelon enters the objective area as soon as practical by air, surface movement, or a combination of the two. It includes additional vehicles and equipment from assault echelon units, plus more combat, CS, and CSS units. The existence of any one of the following conditions requires an airborne unit to have a follow-on echelon: Shortage of aircraft. Inability of aircraft to land heavy items of equipment. Any enemy situation, terrain, or weather that makes it impossible to land certain Soldiers or equipment in the assault echelon. A-38. The rear echelon includes the part of an airborne unit that is not considered essential for initial combat operations. It also includes people left at the brigades garrison location or and intermediate staging base to perform sustaining functions that cannot be done efficiently in the JOA. The rear echelon is normally small for a brigade or battalion. Command of the airborne BCTs rear echelon normally remains with division commander unless the BCT deploys directly from its CONUS garrison location. In this situation close coordination of between the division and FORSCOM staffs ensure that the airborne BCT remains properly supported. The rear echelon can rejoin the unit when the brigade remains committed to sustained combat for a prolonged or indefinite period. Also, if the airborne force continues in the ground combat role after linkup, the rear echelon maybe brought forward.
Designation of Reserve
A-39. The employment of the reserve element follows the normal employment of a reserve unit in a ground operation. The size of the reserve will vary based on the uncertainty associated with all aspects of the airborne operations to include the completion of linkup operations. However, the division will try to retain a BCT as the reserve to avoid the loss of synchronization that occurs when a BCT is broken up into its constitute parts. The location of the division reserve will depend on how the division expects to employ the reserve. It can be held in the vicinity of a PZ ready to be committed via air assault or in a departure area ready to be committed by airdrop or air-landing when and where the situation dictates. This may occur
Airborne Operations
during the conduct of large-scale airborne operations involving multiple airborne BCTs when suitable airfields in the airhead are not available; however, it can cause delays in commitment if Signal communications fail. The air move is very long. Flying weather is unfavorable. Time is added for coordination of air cover. Regardless of its locations, the commander of the reserve must continue planning for possible future contingencies that would involve the commitment of his forces in so far as geospatial information, photos, and situational information permit. A-40. Airborne BCT and battalion reserves enter the airhead as part of the assault echelon. They provide depth to the airhead by blocking penetrations, reinforcing committed units, and counterattacking the enemy. They consist of not more than a company at brigade level or a platoon at battalion level; however, their small size is dictated by tactical considerations and assigned missions. Commanders should organize, task, and position the reserve to ensure its size is compatible with likely missions. The reserve comes from the unit with the fewest priority tasks and is Not assigned assault objectives or a part of the airhead perimeter to defend. Near Areas of likely employment, such as near the main enemy avenues of approach, to speed commitment. A line of communications that is in a covered and concealed location that provides ease of movement to reinforce or to block. Mobile. (This can be achieved using organic vehicles, such as those found in the anti-armor company, support platoon, light armor, and so on.) Located In an assembly area (both initial and subsequent) or battle position, so that it does not interfere with units assigned assault objectives. Within the area of operations of one unit, if possible. A-41. The reserves location allows for dispersion of the force. The reserve commander prepares and rehearses commitment contingencies according to guidance received from the commander designating the reserve.
EXECUTION
A-42. Execution of the ground tactical plan involves the initial seizure of DZs and LZs in and around the airfield or the actual seizure of an airfield.
Conduct of the Assault

A-43. The initial assault emphasizes the coordinated action of small units to seize initial BCT or battalion objectives before the surprise advantage has worn off. As assault objectives are seized, the airborne force directs its efforts toward consolidating the airhead. A-44. Tactical surprise and detailed planning should enable units to seize their assault objectives and to establish the airhead before the enemy has time to react in force. Missions of units are changed as required by the enemys defense of initial objectives. The enemy can be expected to quickly launch uncoordinated attacks along major avenues of approach using local forces. The degree of coordination and strength of these attacks increase progressively; the airborne force must develop correspondingly greater strength in its defensive positions. Preparation of early defense against armored attack is a major consideration.
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Appendix A
A-45. Elements of the reconnaissance squadron assigned reconnaissance and surveillance missions land in early serials so that they can establish roadblocks, locate enemy forces, disrupt enemy communication facilities, and provide the commander with early warning, security, and information. Since ground reconnaissance by unit commanders is seldom possible before the airborne operation, it must begin as soon as the unit lands. The flow of information must be continuous. Information requirements do not vary from those employed by other ground units. However, the units method of arrival in the combat area makes immediate and thorough reconnaissance and transmission of information to higher headquarters necessary. A-46. The bulk of the BCT has the task of seizing these objectives if the initial objectives are heavily defended. When initial objectives are lightly defended, the bulk of the BCT can clear its assigned AO and prepare defensive positions in depth. Extensive patrolling is initiated early between adjacent defensive positions within the airhead line and between the airhead and the outer limits of the brigade security area. Short-range UASs and Army aircraft are well suited for support of this patrolling effort. Contact with any friendly special operating forces in the area is established as soon as possible. A-47. BCT personnel are briefed on unit, adjacent and higher units, and alternate plans. This helps units or personnel landing in unplanned areas to direct their efforts to accomplishing the mission. Units or personnel parachuting into locations outside of their designated drop zones establish contact with their respective HQ as soon as practical. A-48. Sufficient communications personnel and equipment must move into the airhead in advance of the BCT command post to ensure the timely installation of vital communications. Commanders at all echelons within the airborne BCT regain centralized control as soon as communications and the tactical situation permit. Immediate establishment of the following is necessary: Fire control channels within the airborne force. Communications with Supporting air and any naval forces. Airlift forces concerned with buildup, air supply, and air evacuation. Bases in friendly territory. Communications between widely separated airborne or ground forces, such as the divisions link-up forces, with a common or coordinated mission. A-49. The commander influences the action by shifting or allocating fire support means. He may also Move forces. Modify missions. Change objectives and boundaries. Employ reserves. Move to a place from which he can best exercise personal influence, especially during the initial assault. A-50. With initial objectives secured, subordinate units seize additional objectives to expedite establishing a coordinated BCT defense or the conduct of future operations. Defensive positions are organized, communications supplemented, and reserves reconstituted. These and other measures prepare the force to repel enemy counterattacks, minimize the effects of CBRNE weapons, or resume the offensive. A-51. Reserves prepare and occupy blocking positions, pending commitment. Typical missions for reserves committed include taking over the missions of units that do not arrived in their designated drop zone, dealing with unexpected opposition in seizing assault objectives, and securing the initial airhead.
Development of the Airhead

A-52. After the force makes the initial assault landings and accomplishes its initial ground missions, commanders must organize the airhead line.
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Size A-53. The airhead line extends far enough beyond the landing area to ensure uninterrupted landings of personnel, equipment, and supplies. It secures requisite terrain features and maneuver space for such future offensive or defensive operations as the mission calls for. Occupation and Organization A-54. Units occupy and organize the airhead line to the extent the situation demands. Commanders adjust the disposition of units and installations to better fit the terrain and the situation. The degree to which the airhead line is actually occupied and organized for defense is largely determined by the factors of METTTC. Units take additional reconnaissance and surveillance measures. Buildup A-55. This proceeds concurrently with seizure and organization of the airhead line. As more combat personnel arrive and commanders organize them by unit, frontline positions are reinforced, reserves are constituted, and preparations are made for such offensive operations as the mission requires.
Buildup of Combat Power

A-56. The buildup of combat power is the introduction of the follow-on echelon into the airhead. This increase of combat power yields an ability to conduct defense of the airhead and short-term sustainment of forces. The intent of the buildup is to provide a secure operating logistics base for forces working to move the airhead away from the original point of attack. Usually, this distance is equal to the enemys direct fire capability to harass and destroy incoming aircraft or landing craft (5 to 10 kilometers). A-57. The composition of the follow-on echelon depends on the factors of METT-TC. It can comprise a light or long-range field artillery and combat engineers as well as a significant amount of additional functional capabilities, such as Infantry. Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker equipped platoons and companies. Rocket artillery. Engineers, in addition to those in the assault echelon. Air defense artillery assets under the tactical control of the Army Air & Missile Defense Command. Sustainment assets. A-58. The time involved in defensive operations, if any, varies. It depends on the mission assigned, composition and size of the force, enemy reaction, and type of operation contemplated. A well prepared defense in short-duration missions in isolated objective areas may not be required. Security can be accomplished by completely, or almost completely, destroying or dispersing the enemy forces in the immediate objective area during the assault; then, airlifting the airborne assault force out of the objective area before the enemy can execute a coordinated counterattack. Defense of an Airhead A-59. The airborne force usually defends an airhead by securing key terrain with the airhead and dominating likely avenues of approach. Units deny the enemy areas between the occupied positions with a combination of patrols, mines, fire, and natural and manmade obstacles. Units aggressively reconnoiter between positions within the airhead, then forward of the airhead. The airhead configuration allows the commander to shift forces, reserves, and supporting fires quickly to reinforce another sector of the airhead. Regardless of the form of defense chosen, the force prepares positions in depth within its capabilities.
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Appendix A
Defense During Withdrawal A-60. Should withdrawal from the initial positions be required, the final area to which the airborne force withdraws must contain adequate space for maneuver, for protection of critical installations, and for planned air landing or air evacuation operations. Defense Against Armor A-61. During the initial phases of an airborne operation, one main defense against enemy armored forces is close air support. Aircraft attack enemy armored targets as they appear, as far as possible from the objective area, and continue to attack and observe them as long as they threaten the airborne force. Strong points defending the airhead use natural obstacles, minefields, tank traps, demolitions, and other man-made obstacles. Units emplace antitank weapons in depth along avenues of approach favorable for armored forces. They cover all dangerous avenues of approach with planned fires. The anti-armor systems of the BCTs rifle and weapons companies supported by attack helicopters from the divisions supporting aviation brigade give the airborne force a substantial amount of antitank firepower. Some of the antitank weapons, organic to battalions that are holding portions of the airhead not under armored attack, can be moved to reinforce threatened sectors. Defense Against Guerrilla Action and Infiltration A-62. The defense must include plans for countering enemy guerrilla attacks or infiltrated forces attacking the airhead area.
LANDING PLAN
A-63. The commander finalizes the landing plan after completing the ground tactical plan. The landing plan phases forces into the objective area at the correct time and place to execute the ground tactical plan. The execution of the landing plan is vital to the swift massing of combat power, protection of the force, and subsequent mission accomplishment.
PLANNING
A-64. The landing plan links air movement with the ground tactical plan. The landing plan is published at the BCT level and below, but is informal and not published at the joint level. The landing plan is a tabulation of the sequence, method, and destination of paratroopers and materiel into the objective area. The landing plan has five elements Sequence of delivery. Method of delivery. Place of delivery. Time of delivery. The assembly plan.
REQUIREMENT
A-65. To develop the landing plan, commanders at each level need to know their commanders priorities, airlift tactics, landing area study, parent and subunit task organization and ground tactical plans, and subunit landing plan. During the backbrief of the ground tactical plan, the BCT commander establishes airlift and delivery priorities and airlift tactics. He provides as much of this information as possible to his battalion commanders at the end of the ground tactical plan backbrief. A-66. Commander's Priorities. The BCT commander must set the priorities for each assault objective to determine the delivery sequence for units to secure these objectives. This does not necessarily match the sequence in which the units secure objectives. The commander must also know the Priorities for Deliveries on each DZ (heavy drops (HDs), cargo delivery system (CDS), personnel drops).
Airborne Operations
Delivering the remainder of the force. Use of EZs. DZ sequence. Method of delivery for units and equipment. Location of the heavy equipment point of impact (HEPI) and the personnel point of impact (PPI). A-67. Airlift Tactics. The USAF element responsible for selecting airlift tactics develops them with the Army element to best support the ground tactical plan. These tactics include aircraft formations and sequence of personnel drops and heavy drops. The Army element chooses the sequence and time interval between serials, which are groups of like aircraft (C-130s, C-17s) with the same delivery method (personnel drops or heavy drops) going to the same DZ. A-68. Landing Area Study. The division staff, working with its supporting engineer geospatial information team and the USAF, develops the landing area study and provides it to the airborne BCT staff and its subordinate airborne battalions if the airborne BCT is already deployed within a JOA. (FORSCOM takes the place of the division staff if the airborne BCT is not yet deployed into the JOA.) This study enables these subordinate battalions to select the location, size, and orientation of DZs to best support their scheme of maneuver. A-69. Battalion Landing Plans. Subordinate airborne battalion commanders should develop landing plans to support their own respective schemes of maneuver. These battalion commanders then backbrief their landing plans so that the BCT headquarters can finalize the plan. Units must also know the initial locations of their supporting elements. This information should become available as the battalions backbrief their ground tactical plan.
Considerations
A-70. Commanders should examine the following considerations when developing the landing plan. A-71. Attacking an Objective. There are three basic methods of attacking an objective Jumping or landing on top of the objective works best for attacking a small objective that is specially fortified against ground attack. However, an airborne landing into an area strongly defended against air attack requires surprise to succeed. Jumping or landing near the objective works best for the capture of a lightly defended objective which must be seized intact (such as a bridge). If the enemy has strong defenses against air attack, only surprise can enable the unit to achieve success with few casualties. Jumping or landing at a distance from the objective is the least often used method of attack. Airborne forces use this method for large complex objectives that must be seized by deliberate attack. The DZ is selected to emphasize security and preservation of the force. The attack plan is based on proper consideration of the factors of METT-TC and should capitalize on the principle of surprise. A-72. Landing Methods. There are two basic landing methodsmultiple and single drop zones. With multiple drop zones, there are a number of small airheads in the objective area. This technique supports the principle of mass by placing the maximum number of paratroopers in the objective area in the minimum amount of time. Additionally, the commander can capitalize on the principle of surprise because the main effort is not easily determined by the enemy. This technique is normally used when employing multiple BCTs. A single airborne BCT and smaller-sized airborne forces often establish their airhead by conducting the airborne assault onto a single drop zone. This technique allows the assaulting unit to assemble quickly and mass combat power against the enemy. A-73. Time-Space Factors. Commanders schedule the delivery sequence and the time between serials to provide the least time and distance separation between each aircraft and serial. The airborne force assembles maximum combat power on the DZ as quickly as possible, using either of the following options:
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Appendix A
Land all elements in the same area. Aircraft approach the DZ in a deep, narrow formation and all Soldiers jump into a small area. Land all elements at the same time. Aircraft in a wide formation approach various DZs situated close to each other and all Soldiers jump at the same time or as near to it as possible. A-74. Landing Priorities. Airborne units are cross loaded to land close to their assault objectives. A-75. Organization. Airborne forces try to maintain tactical unity. Battalions or battalion task forces normally land intact on a single DZ. An airborne BCT normally lands in mutually supporting DZs. Two or more battalions can land successively on the same DZ or each can land on a separate DZ within a general BCT DZ area. A-76. The airborne force sends as many assault unit personnel and equipment as possible into the area in parachute serials. Commanders must consider the mobility of equipment after the landing. For example, carriers or prime movers deliverable by parachute but difficult to handle on the ground can accompany the weapons in the assault element. Paratroopers accompany their units principal items of equipment.
Sequence of Delivery
A-77. The commanders priorities within the ground tactical plan determine the sequence of delivery. Neither aircraft allocations nor availability of aircraft should influence these decisions. The commander determines final aircraft allocations after the landing plan backbriefs. Aircraft serials may precede the main airlift column to drop USAF combat control teams (CCTs) and Army reconnaissance and surveillance elements. The USAF CCT places and operates navigation aids on the drop and landing zones. The Armys reconnaissance element provides surveillance on NAI and report to the ground force commander.
Method of Delivery
A-78. This part of the landing plan addresses how the force arrives in the objective area with its needed supplies and equipment. The assault echelon comes in by parachute. The commander can use a number of other means to introduce additional personnel, equipment, and supplies into the objective area. A-79. Personnel Airdrop. The airborne force delivers assault personnel by parachute drop. This method allows quick, nearly simultaneous delivery of the force. Planners choose any terrain free of obstacles that allows the assault force to land on or close to objectives. In some cases and with special equipment, it can deliver personnel into rough terrain. Special teams can use high altitude, high opening or high altitude, low opening techniques. These techniques allow for early delivery of the joint airborne advance party without compromising the objectives location. A-80. Equipment and Supply Airdrop. Airborne forces can airdrop supplies and equipment directly to units behind enemy lines or in other unreachable areas. The advantages of this are Pre-rigging and storing emergency items for contingencies considerably reduces shipping and handling time and increases responsiveness. Since the delivery aircraft does not land, there is no need for forward airfields or LZs or materiel handling equipment for offloading. This reduces flight time and exposure to hostile fire and increases aircraft survivability and availability. Ground forces can disperse more since they are not tied to an airfield or strip. A-81. The disadvantages of airdropping supplies and equipment are Airdrops require specially trained rigger personnel and appropriate aircraft. Bad weather or high winds can delay the airdrop or scatter the dropped cargo. Ground fire threatens vulnerable aircraft making their final approach, especially if mountains or high hills canalize the aircraft.
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Airborne Operations
Since the aircraft do not land, no opportunity for ground refueling exists. Planned aerial refueling can extend aircraft range and should be considered on long flight legs to increase objective area loiter time and mission flexibility. Bulky airdrop rigs for equipment prevent the aircraft from carrying as much cargo as when configured for air landing. The possibility of loss or damage to equipment during the airdrop always exists. Ground forces must secure the DZ to prevent items from falling into enemy hands. Recovery of air-dropped equipment is slow and manpower intensive. A-82. Air-land Operations. Airborne forces can accomplish certain phases of airborne operations, or even the entire operation, by using air-land operations to deliver personnel and equipment to the objective area. (See FM 3-21.20 and FM 3-21.30.) In some cases, air-landing rather than airdropping personnel and equipment may be advantage. Air-landing Provides the most economical means of airlift. Delivers Army aviation elements, engineering equipment, artillery pieces, and other mission essential items in one operation. Provides a readily available means of casualty evacuation. Allows units to maintain tactical integrity and to deploy rapidly after landing. Allows the use of units with little special training and equipment. Does not require extensive preparation and rigging of equipment. Offers a relatively reliable means of personnel and equipment delivery regardless of weather. Precludes equipment damage and personnel injuries units may experience in parachute operations. A-83. The disadvantages are that air landing Cannot be used for forcible entry. Requires moderately level, unobstructed LZs with adequate soil trafficability. Requires more time for delivery of a given size force than airdrop, especially for small, restricted LZs. Generally requires improvement or new construction of air-land facilities, which adds to the engineer workload. Requires some form of airlift control element support at offloading airfields. Mission intervals depend on airlift control element size, offloaded equipment availability, and airfield support capability. A-84. The tactical integrity of participating units is a major consideration in an air-land operation. Small units that are expected to engage in combat on landing, air land organizationally intact with weapons, ammunition, and personnel in the same aircraft whenever possible. Joint planning stresses placing units as close as possible to objectives, consistent with the availability of LZs and the operational capability of the tactical aircraft employed. Because of aircraft vulnerability on the ground, units unload as quickly as possible. A-85. The airborne commander determines the makeup of each aircraft load and the sequence of delivery. The mission, the tactical situation, and the assigned forces influence this decision. A-86. Units should use existing facilities, such as roads and open areas, to reduce the time and effort required for new construction. They should consider layouts that facilitate future expansion and provide maximum deployment and flexibility. As the size and efficiency of an air facility improves, its value to the enemy as a target increases. To reduce this vulnerability, the facilities should be dispersed and simple.
Place of Delivery
A-87. The selection of DZs, LZs, and EZs is a joint responsibility. The airlift commander is responsible for the precise delivery of personnel and cargo to the DZ or LZ and for the selection of approaches to the DZ.
Appendix A
Both the joint and component commanders must base their decisions on knowledge of their respective problems and on the needs of the overall operation. The nature and location of landing areas is important when preparing the scheme of maneuver. The mission governs the general area in which they are to be established. At higher echelons, commanders can assign landing areas in broad general terms. In lower units, leaders must describe their locations more specifically. Drop zones are selected only after a detailed analysis. Commanders should consider the following factors when making their selections. A-88. Ease of Identification. The DZ should be easy to spot from the air. Airlift pilots and navigators prefer to rely on visual recognition of terrain features to accurately deliver personnel and equipment. A-89. Straight-line Approach. To ensure an accurate airdrop, the aircraft should make a straight-line approach to each DZ for at least 10 miles, or about four minutes at drop airspeed, before the start of the drop. A-90. Out of Range. The commander should choose a DZ that allows the units to avoid enemy air defenses and strong ground defenses, and puts them outside the range of enemy suppressive fires. To get to the DZ, aircraft should not have to fly over or near enemy integrated air defense systems, which can detect aircraft at drop altitudes. They should fly over hostile territory or positions for the least possible time. A-91. Close To or On Top of Assault Objectives. If the enemy situation permits, the commander should choose a DZ directly on top of assault objectives. A-92. Suitable Weather and Terrain. The commander must consider seasonal weather and terrain when selecting DZs because these conditions affect their use. Adverse weather effects can be devastating. Ground fog, mist, haze, smoke, and low-hanging cloud conditions can interfere with the aircrews observation of DZ visual signals and markings. However, they do offer excellent cover for blind or area DZs. Excessive winds also hamper operations. A-93. Flat or rolling terrain is desirable; it should be relatively free, but not necessarily clear of obstacles. Obstacles on a DZ will not prevent paratroopers from landing but will increase jump casualties. Sites in mountainous or hilly country with large valleys or level plateaus can be used for security reasons. Small valleys or pockets completely surrounded by hills are difficult to locate and should be used only in rare cases. Commanders must avoid man-made obstacles more than 150 feet (46 meters) above the level of the DZ within a radius of 3 nautical miles. High ground or hills need not be considered a hazard unless the hills pose an escape problem that is beyond the aircrafts capability. High ground or hills more than 1,000 feet (305 meters) above the surface of the site should not be closer than 3 nautical miles to the DZ for night operations. The perimeter of the DZ should have one or more open approach sectors free of any obstacles that would prevent the aircrews sighting of the DZ markings. A-94. Cover and Concealment. Cover and concealment near DZs and LZs is a distinct advantage when the airborne forces assemble and when airland forces land. A-95. Road Net. Having a DZ near a good road net expedites moving personnel, supplies, and equipment from that zone. If the landing area contains terrain that is to be developed into an air-landing facility, a road net is of valuenot only for moving items from the facility but also for evacuating personnel and equipment. A-96. Key Terrain. The DZ site selected should aid in the success of the mission by taking advantage of dominating terrain, covered routes of approach to the objective, and terrain favorable for defense against armored attack. A-97. Minimum Construction for DZs and LZs. Because of limited engineer support in the airborne force, selected landing zones should have a minimum requirement for construction and maintenance. Unless more engineer support is requested and received, construction and maintenance restraints can limit the number of areas that can be used or developed. A-98. Mutual Support. Commanders should select mutually supporting DZs and LZs which provide initial positions favorable to the attack.
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A-99. Configuration. The division commander gives guidance on DZ size in OPLANs or OPORDs. Then unit commanders determine the exact shape, size, and capacity they need. A-100. Shape. The most desirable shapes for DZs are rectangular or round; these permit a wider choice of aircraft approach directions. However, they also require precise navigation and timing to avoid collisions or drop interference. A-101. Size. The DZ should be large enough to accommodate the airborne force employed. One DZ that allows the aircraft to drop all of its load in one pass is desirable. Repeated passes are dangerous because the initial pass can alert enemy antiaircraft and other emplacements. They will be waiting for subsequent drops. A-102. There are certain situations, however, when multiple passes can be used. This occurs mainly when there is no significant air defense threat and orbits can be made over areas where enemy antiaircraft systems are not positioned. This applies especially to the seizure of islands where small DZs are the rule. If enough aircraft are available to deliver the force with less personnel on each aircraft, there is no real problem. However, if there are only enough aircraft to deliver the assault echelon in one lift with each aircraft carrying the maximum number of personnel, then the aircraft will have to make multiple passes over the DZ. A-103. A large DZ can permit several PPIs. Although it is desirable to saturate the objective area in the shortest possible time, there is a reasonable limit to the amount of personnel and heavy drop that can be stacked on a single drop zone. Therefore, it can be desirable to use multiple points of impact on a single DZ, provided the drop zone is large enough. A-104. Capacity. The DZ capacity is based on the expected number of units to be dropped and their dispersion pattern.
AIRHEAD LINE
DZ ABLE
PARALLEL DZs
DZ BAKER
DZ EAGLE
DIRECTION OF FLIGHT
DZ CHARLIE
DZ DOG
ORIENTED IN SAME DIRECTION
Figure A-4. Ideal DZ situation A-105. Orientation. Thoughtful orientation allows the quickest possible delivery of the airborne force into the objective area. Ideal DZs offset and parallel each serial. (See Figure A-4 and Figure A-5.) This allows aircraft to share a flight route until they approach the objective area; then they can split at an impact point (release point) for simultaneous delivery on several DZs.
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Appendix A
AIRHEAD LINE
DZ ABLE
DZ BAKER
DIRECTION OF FLIGHT
DZ DOG DZ CHARLIE
DZs PARALLEL ON-LINE
Figure A-5. DZs parallel on-line A-106. Another technique that can be employed is to make two drops on two DZs in line (thus eliminating a change-of-flight direction between the two drops). The DZs must be far enough apart to permit the navigators to compute the location of the second release point. A-107. Paratroopers are more likely to overshoot the DZ than to undershoot it. Therefore, selection of the trailing edge of the DZ should be at the objective to place personnel responsible for the primary assault objective at the front of the aircraft so that they exit last. A-108. If a fighter aircraft escort or rendezvous is required for the drop, the aircraft must be kept advised of the drop pattern, the direction of all turns to be flown around the DZ, and the areas to look for possible enemy activity. A-109. Drop zones which require intersecting air traffic patterns should be avoided whenever possible. They delay simultaneous delivery of the force because of the safety requirements to stagger delivery times and clear the air by at least a five- or 10-minute formation separation time. They also require that Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (JSEAD) be accomplished for multiple routes instead of one. They may result in piecemeal delivery and an unnecessarily complicated plan, violating the principles of mass and simplicity. A-110. Alternate Drop Zones or Landing Zones. Commanders must select alternate DZs or LZs to compensate for changes that may occur. A-111. Number of Drop Zones or Landing Zones. The number of DZs to be used by the assault parachute element of an airborne infantry brigade depends on the number, size, and relative position of suitable sites; the brigade plan of maneuver; and the expected enemy situation. The battalions of a brigade can land successively on the same DZ, on separate battalion DZs. or on adjacent areas within a single large brigade DZ. A single brigade DZ on which battalions land successively has these advantages: It permits greater flexibility in the plan of maneuver and the plan of supporting fires. It facilitates coordinating and controlling assault battalions. It applies the principle of mass. It makes logistics support easier. It decreases the area of vulnerability.
Airborne Operations
A-112. A single DZ also has disadvantages: It slows the buildup of combat power. It causes later airlift sorties to be vulnerable to enemy air as a result of the loss of surprise. It allows the enemy to focus his efforts. A-113. A separate battalion drop zone has these advantages: It increases readiness for action by deploying the brigade as it lands. It reduces confusion on the DZs during the landing and reorganizing. It tends to deceive the enemy as to the intention and strength of the landing force. It makes capture of the brigade objective easier when there is strong opposition on one drop zone. It increases the freedom of maneuver of the assault battalions. A-114. A separate battalion drop zone has these disadvantages: It makes C2 more difficult. It reduces flexibility because units are dispersed. A-115. Landing battalions on adjacent areas within a single large brigade DZ has, although to a lesser degree, the same advantages and disadvantages of dropping on separate DZs.
Time of Delivery
A-116. No set rule can be prescribed for the timing of an airborne operation. It varies with each situation; however, the airborne force will try to conduct airborne assaults during limited visibility to protect the force and to surprise the enemy. The commander sets the specific time of delivery. However, for the landing plan, times are stated in terms of P-hour (when the first paratrooper exits the aircraft). The following considerations affect the timing of the operation. A-117. Support of the Decisive Operation. The airborne assault can be a shaping operation. If so, the time of commitment of the airborne forces in relation to the decisive operation is usually directed by orders from higher headquarters. It is determined in advance according to the mission, the situation, and the terrain. For example, the airborne force can be committed in advance of the decisive operation to give the airborne attack an increased element of surprise. It can be committed at the same time as the decisive operations to neutralize specific areas or to block the movement of enemy reserves. It can also be committed after the decisive operation to assist a breakthrough or to block an enemy withdrawal. A-118. Visibility. Whether to commit the airborne force by night or by day depends on the estimated degree of air superiority, the need for security from enemy ground observation, the relative advantage to be gained by surprise, and the experience of both airlift and airborne personnel. A-119. Night airborne operations offer advantages. They greatly increase the chance of surprise and survivability and reduce the chance of attack by enemy aircraft during the air movement. They also reduce vulnerability to antiaircraft tire, conceal preparations for takeoff from the enemy, and reduce the effectiveness of the defenders fires. A-120. Night airborne operations have disadvantages. In zero visibility, they require well-trained Soldiers and aircrews to locate the DZ and assemble rapidly. They provide more air and land navigation problems and offer slower rates of assembly than daylight operations. Night operations also reduce the effectiveness of close air support. A-121. Daylight operations provide better visibility both from the air and ground, more accurate delivery, quicker assembly, and more effective friendly fires than night operations. However, daylight operations increase vulnerability to enemy air defense, ground fires, and air attack. They also result in loss of surprise. A-122. Intervals. The time interval between delivery of the assault echelon (P-hour) and the follow-on echelon depends on the availability of aircraft, the capacity of departure airfields, the number of aircraft
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Appendix A
sorties that can be flown on D-day, the availability of DZs or LZs within the objective area, and the enemy situation. A-123. For example, if there are unlimited aircraft, ample departure airfields, numerous DZs or LZs within the objective area, and little or no enemy air defense, the commander could deliver the follow-on echelon immediately after the assault echelon. A-124. Thus, the time interval could be so brief that it would be hard to determine which was the last aircraft of the assault echelon and which was the first aircraft of the follow-on echelon. Regardless of the timing selected, a pattern must be avoided.
ASSEMBLY AND REORGANIZATION

A-125. Success or failure of the mission can depend on how fast the airborne force can regain tactical integrity. The first goal of any airborne assault must be to deliver and assemble all available combat power as quickly as possible. The sooner Soldiers assemble and reorganize as squads, platoons, and companies, the sooner they can rig their equipment and start fighting as cohesive units. How efficiently and rapidly this happens is a direct result of detailed planning, cross loading on the assault aircraft, and assembly on the DZ. A-126. Cross loading of key personnel and equipment is important in rapid assembly. It must be given careful attention in training and on combat jumps. The separation of key personnel is necessary in case any aircraft aborts or fails to reach the DZ. This prevents the loss of more than one key officer or NCO of any one unit. Plans for heavy-drop loads must also consider the possibility that one or more aircraft will abort before they get to the DZ, or the equipment will streamer in and become unserviceable.
AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

A-127. After development, backbrief, and approval of the landing plan, planners begin to develop the air movement plan. This plan is the third step in planning an airborne operation and supports both the landing plan and the ground tactical plan. It provides the required information to move the airborne force from the departure airfields to the objective area. The plan includes the period from when units load until they exit the aircraft. The air movement annex to the OPORD contains the air movement plan.
JOINT PLANNING
A-128. Although the USAF component commander is solely responsible for executing the air movement phase, the air movement plan is the product of joint Army and USAF consulting and planning. The Army contributes its landing plan and the procedures for the control and disposition of personnel at the departure airfields. The USAF controls takeoff times and, based on the Armys landing plan, coordinates timing between different departure airfields to ensure the proper arrival sequence at the DZ, LZ, or EZ. The USAF also designates rendezvous points and develops the flight route diagrams. The combination of METT-T and the orientation of DZs, LZs, and EZs determine the orientation of the flight routes.
ELEMENTS
A-129. The air movement plan contains the information required to ensure the efficient loading and delivery of units to the objective area in the proper sequence, time, and place to support the ground tactical plan. The air movement table is the main part of the air movement plan. It includes the following essential elements: Departure airfield for each serial. Number of aircraft for each serial. Chalk numbers for each aircraft, serial, and departure airfield. (Aircraft tail numbers correspond to aircraft chalk numbers.) Unit identity of the airlift element. Name and rank of each USAF serial commander.
Airborne Operations
Number and type aircraft. Employment method for each aircraft (passage point, HD, and CDS). Army unit identity. Name and rank of each Army commander. Load times. Station times. Takeoff times. Designated primary and alternate DZs for each serial. P-hour for the lead aircraft of each serial (given in real time). Remarks such as special instructions, key equipment, and location of key members of the chain of command. A-130. Besides the air movement tables, the air movement plan also contains the following information Flight route diagram. Serial formation. Air traffic control. Concentration for movement. Allowable cargo loads (ACLs). Airfield maximum on-ground aircraft maneuver space. Aircraft parking diagram. Army personnel and equipment rigging areas at the departure airfield. Army control procedures during preparation for loading. Emergency procedures including personal recovery (see FM 3-50.1). Weather considerations. JSEAD, counterair, and air intelligence considerations.
TYPES OF MOVEMENT
A-131. The type of movement must be considered when determining how to load the aircraft. Is it nontactical or tactical? Airborne units can conduct nontactical movement to an ISB or REMAB, and then transload into assault aircraft by using tactical loading. A-132. Nontactical movements are arranged to expedite the movement of Soldiers and equipment and to conserve time and energy. Maximum use is made of aircraft cabin space and ACL. A-133. Tactical movements organize, load, and transport personnel and equipment to accomplish the ground tactical plan. The proper use of aircraft ACL is important, but it does not override the commanders sequence of employment.
AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS
A-134. When the airborne unit deploys, planning guidance from higher headquarters indicates the type of aircraft available for the movement. Based on this information, the unit commander determines and requests the number of sorties by the type of aircraft required to complete the move. The air movement planner must ensure that each aircraft is used to its maximum capability. This is based on the information developed on unit requirements, ACLs, and available passenger seats. Methods of determining aircraft requirements are weight and type-load.
WEIGHT METHOD
A-135. This method is based on the assumption that total weight, and not volume, is the determining factor. Since aircraft sometimes run out of space before exceeding the ACL, this method is no longer widely used. It has been replaced by the type-load method. However, during recent operations, it was
Appendix A
discovered that aircraft can actually exceed their ACL before running out of space. The long distances involved in reaching an objective area, the necessity of the aircraft to circle for extended periods before landing, and the large amounts of fuel needed to sustain the aircraft can result in the aircraft having to reduce its ACL. As a rule, the longer the deployment, the lower the ACL.
TYPE-LOAD METHOD
A-136. In any unit air movement, a number of the ACLs contain the same items of equipment and numbers of personnel. Identical type loads simplify the planning process and make the tasks of manifesting and rehearsing much easier. Used for calculating individual aircraft sortie requirements, the type-load method is the most common and widely accepted method of unit air movement planning. It requires consideration of load configuration and condition on arrival at a desired destination, rapid off-loading, aircraft limitations, security requirements en route, and anticipated operational requirements. The type-load method, therefore, is more detailed and is used in planning unit movements.
MARSHALING PLAN
A-137. After the air movement plan has been developed, backbriefed, refined (if necessary), and approved, the next plan to be developed is the marshaling plan. It supports the previous three plans. The tactical, landing, and air movement plans are used to determine the number of personnel and vehicles to be stationed at or moved through each airfield. The marshaling plan provides the necessary information and procedures by which units of the airborne force complete final preparations for combat, move to departure airfields, and load the aircraft. It also provides detailed instructions for facilities and services needed during marshaling. The procedures in this chapter assist airborne commanders and staffs in planning for marshaling and CSS. A-138. The marshaling plan appears as an appendix to the service support annex of the airborne force OPORD or as an annex to an administrative or logistics order. The G-4 is the principal assistant to the commander for the marshaling plans of specific units. Marshaling begins when force elements are sealed in marshaling areas and terminates when the departure airfield control group (DACG) accepts the chalk at the alert holding area. Procedures are designed to facilitate a quick, orderly launching of an airborne assault under maximum security conditions in minimum possible time.
PREPARATION BEFORE MARSHALING

A-139. Units complete the following preparations before marshaling-especially for airdrops. Last minute marshaling activities include briefing personnel, inspecting, preparing airdrop containers, issuing rations and ammunition, and resting. A-140. As soon as a unit is notified of an airborne operation, it begins the reverse planning necessary to have the first assault aircraft en route to the objective area in 18 hours. The N-hour sequence contains the troop-leading actions that must take place within a flexible schedule, ensuring that the unit is prepared and correctly equipped to conduct combat operations on arrival. A-141. Rehearsals are always conducted at every echelon of command. They identify potential weaknesses in execution and enhance understanding and synchronization. Full-scale rehearsals are the goal, but time constraints may limit them.
MOVEMENT TO MARSHALING AREA

A-142. Unit marshaling areas should be located near departure airfields to limit movement. The division headquarters can either control the movement to the marshaling area completely, or it can get a copy of the march table and use it to control the traffic out of the assembly area, along the route of march, and into the marshaling area. Advance parties assign Soldiers to areas. A-143. The S-4 of the unit to be marshaled notifies higher headquarters on the number of organic vehicles that the unit can furnish to move its personnel and equipment to the marshaling areas. This information and
Airborne Operations
the personnel list furnished by the S-3 must be available early enough during planning to procure any other transportation required for the movement. A-144. When marshaling areas are on airfields, they are temporarily placed at the disposal of the airbase headquarters. The air base commanders permission is obtained by the tactical units that must conduct activities outside of their assigned camp area.
PASSIVE DEFENSE MEASURES

A-145. Uncommitted airborne forces pose a strategic or operational threat to the enemy. Concentration of forces during marshaling should be avoided to keep impending operations secret and to deny lucrative targets to the enemy. Dispersal techniques include the following: Units move rapidly under cover of darkness to dispersed marshaling areas near air facilities. Commanders control movement to loading sites so most personnel arrive after the equipment and supplies are loaded on the aircraft. Commanders prepare for loading before arrival at the loading site. Commanders avoid assembling more than 50-percent of the BCT at a single point at any time.
DISPERSAL PROCEDURES
A-146. The degree of dispersal is based on an intimate knowledge of the operations problems and what is best for the overall operation. Regardless of the dispersed loading procedures, the airlift commander ensures that aircraft arrive over the objective area in the order required by the air movement plan. Depending on the situation, one of the following dispersed loading procedures is used. A-147. Movement to departure air facilities moves airborne personnel and equipment to departure air facilities where airlift aircraft may be dispersed. Movement to the ISB is another procedure. Before the mission, airlift aircraft fly to an ISB to pick up airborne personnel and equipment. Personnel and equipment are airlifted to dispersed departure airfield the mission originates from these facilities. A-148. A third procedure combines the above two. Airlift aircraft fly to ISBs for the equipment before the mission. The equipment is airlifted to the dispersed departure airfields and the mission originates from these facilities, or airlift aircraft stop en route at ISBs to pick up personnel. Crews load aircraft quickly so that the fewest possible aircraft are at the ISB atone time.
SELECTION OF DEPARTURE AIRFIELDS

A-149. Departure airfield selection is based on the proposed air movement and the capability of airfields to handle the traffic. Marshaling areas near departure airfields are designated after the selection of departure airfields. For any specific situation or operation, one or a combination of the following factors can determine the selection Mission. Airfields (number required, location, and type). Runway length and weight-bearing capacity. Communications facilities. Navigational aids and airfield lighting. Location of participating units and marshaling areas. Radius of action required. Vulnerability to enemy action, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear. Other TACAIR support available or required Logistics support available, required, or both. Facilities for reception of personnel and cargo. Facilities for loading and unloading of personnel and cargo.
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Appendix A
Facilities for dispatch of personnel and cargo.
SELECTION AND OPERATION OF MARSHALING CAMPS

A-150. The marshaling area is a sealed area with facilities for the final preparation of Soldiers for combat. Commanders select marshaling camps within the marshaling area based on the air movement plan and other considerations. Another way to avoid concentration of personnel is to time-phase the movement of Soldiers from their home bases through the marshaling area to the departure airfield, minimizing the buildup of forces. After departure airfields and marshaling areas are selected, loading sites are then selected near the airfields. The following factors are considered when selecting marshaling areas Distance to airfields. Time available. Existing facilities. Availability of personnel and materials for construction. Availability and access of maneuver and training areas. Communications requirements. Briefing facilities. Location of participating units. Security or vulnerability to enemy action. Logistics support available or required.
SUPPORT AGENCIES
A-151. When the airborne brigades deploy and marshaling areas close, the DISCOM acts as the provisional logistics unit at the home station. The theater commander responsible for the AO provides the provisional logistics support unit for the ISB. If a support unit cannot preposition at the ISB, a support unit from the home station command is included in the advance party. Marshaling control agencies assist the airborne and airlift force in the execution of the operation. A-152. To enable the majority of the airborne force to concentrate on preparing for planned operations, support agencies are designated by division headquarters to provide most of the administrative and logistics support. These nonorganic units and certain organic units not participating in the airborne assault are organized into a provisional unit known as the MACG. The MACG commander is the principal logistics operator for the deploying force; he executes the logistics plan. Typical assistance provided by this unit includes Transportation. All classes of supply. Communications. Campsite construction, operation, and maintenance. Messing. Maintenance. Rigging. Recreation and other morale services. Local security personnel to augment the USAF, when required. Health service support. A-153. The airlift control element (ALCE) coordinates and maintains operational control of all airlift aircraft while they are on the ground at the designated airfield. This includes aircraft and load-movement control and reporting, communications, loading and off-loading teams, aeromedical activities, and coordination with interested agencies. The ALCEs support function includes activities that relate to the airfield.
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Airborne Operations
A-154. The DACG ensures that Army units and their supplies and equipment are moved from the marshaling area and loaded according to the air movement plan. The DACG may be a provisional unit or nondeploying element of the deploying force. The deploying force or MACOM commander identifies who executes the DACG support mission. A-155. The organization of the airfield control group (AACG) is similar to the DACG's. When personnel, supplies, and equipment are arriving on aircraft and need to be moved to marshaling camps or holding areas, the AACG off-loads them. The AACG may be provided by a unit already located at the arrival airfield or an element of the deploying force that is with the advance party and positioned at the airfield. As the echelons above division (EAD) forces arrive, an air terminal movement control team (ATMCT) may replace the requirement for an AACG.
OUTLOAD OPERATIONS
A-156. Complex outload operations are more difficult because they are usually conducted at night under blackout conditions. Since most of the airborne units vehicles are rigged for air delivery, airborne units rely on the supporting unit for transportation during outload. These requirements are closely related to and dictated by the loading plans developed for the operation.
Contents of Loading Plan

A-157. Loading preparations are included in the marshaling plan. Loading plans outline the procedures for moving personnel and HD loads from the alert holding area to plane side. They also outline the use of available materiel handling equipment. Loading plans are closely coordinated with the supporting airlift units.
Formulation of Loading Plan

A-158. A loading plan is formulated at joint conferences. It contains information about the number of personnel, amount of equipment to be airlifted, ACLs, and general sequence of movement.
Adherence to Loading Plan

A-159. Strict adherence to the loading timetable is needed. Loading of equipment and supplies must be completed in time to permit inspection, a joint pre-take-off briefing, and personnel loaded by the designated station time.
Loading Responsibility
A-160. Loading responsibilities in the airborne operation are as follows. The airlift commander Develops plans for specific loads and sequence of movement in conjunction with the unit being moved. Establishes and disseminates instructions for documenting and manifesting all cargo and personnel. Provides instructions for loading and unloading of aircraft and for tie down of cargo. Parks aircraft according to the parking plan. Provides loading ramps, floor conveyors, tie downs, load spreaders, and other auxiliary equipment, such as operation ejection equipment. Prepares aircraft for ejection of cargo and safe exit of parachutists from aircraft in flight. Cargo to be ejected in flight is tied down by AF personnel. Ensures that an AF representative is present to provide technical assistance and supervise the loading unit during the loading of each aircraft. Verifies documentation of personnel and equipment. Furnishes and operates materiel handling equipment required in aircraft loading and unloading if the Army unit needs it.
Appendix A
A-161. The airborne commander establishes the priority and sequence for movement of airborne personnel, equipment, and supplies. Further, he Prepares cargo for airdrop, air landing, or extraction according to applicable safety instructions. Marks each item of equipment to show its weight and cubage and, when appropriate, its center of gravity. Ensures hazardous cargo is properly annotated on DD Form 1387-2. Documents and manifests all loads of Army personnel and equipment. Directs and monitors movement of ground traffic to the departure airfield or loading area, and accepts delivery at the destination. Delivers properly rigged supplies and equipment to the aircraft according to the loading plan. Loads, ties down, and unloads accompanying supplies and equipment into and from the aircraft with technical assistance from an AF representative. Cargo to be ejected in flight is tied down and ejected by USAF personnel. Assigns chalk leaders for each chalk.
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Appendix B
AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

FM 90-4 is the Armys basic doctrine for air assault operations. Air assault operations are those in which assault forces (combat, CS, and CSS) maneuver on the battlefield by helicopter under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander to engage and destroy enemy forces or seize or hold key terrain. Air assault operations are deliberate, precisely planned, and vigorously executed. During air assault operations, the supporting aviation elements are task-organized with other members of the combined arms team to engage enemy forces. The division routinely integrates army aviation and infantry units with other members of the combined arms team to conduct air assault operations. Air assaults provide the division another means to project combat power within its AO without regard to terrain barriers. Limitations on the geographical depth from which air assault operations can take place are imposed by Distance from the aviation units assembly area/forward arming and refuel point (FARP), the pickup zone (PZ), and the landing zone (LZ). Requirements associated with the linkup of the air assault force with ground maneuver forces. Sustainment requirements of both the air assault force and the assault and attack aviation conducting the operation. A division, supported by a single aviation brigade, normally has the capacity to conduct up to a battalion-sized air assault based on the assignment of a single assault aviation battalion to the supporting aviation brigade. A divisions capability to conduct simultaneous multi-battalion air assaults requires an aviation brigade to be task-organized with two or more assault aviation battalions or the assignment to the division of one or more additional aviation brigades. Before directing one of his BCTs to conduct an air assault operation, the division commander must carefully consider many factors. As a minimum, he must consider time, assets, and impact. Is there sufficient time remaining for the BCT to properly plan, coordinate, and synchronize such a complex operation with the aviation brigade and the fires brigade? (An air assault operation cannot be hastily conceived and coordinated.) Are there sufficient assets available to properly conduct the air assault? (Placing forces piecemeal into an air assault operation is dangerous.) What is the impact of air assault operations on the divisions capability after the air assault has been completed? (Normally, aircraft assets will have to be borrowed from other missions to properly conduct the air assault. The impact of an air assault operation on crew rest, helicopter maintenance, and the divisions sustainment operations can be detrimental to the divisions overall operations.) Air assault operations are different in concept and execution from airmobile operations. Airmobile operations are those operations involving the use of Army
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airlift assets for other than air assaults. Airmobile operations are conducted to move troops and equipment, or transport ammunition, fuel, and supplies. During airmobile operations, aviation units are released to return to their parent units when an airlift is completed.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

B-1. Command and control in an air assault is basically the same as for other types of tactical operations. The air assault is planned and coordinated in the command post of the higher headquarters of the unit assigned the air assault mission. Thus, a BCT will plan the conduct of a battalion-sized air assault. One of the divisions tactical command posts, supported by the G-5, will plan and supervise the preparation and execution of a brigade-sized air assault in the event that sufficient lift assets are available to conduct a multi-battalion air assault. B-2. However, air assault operations differ from other tactical operations in the designation of key personnel and their planning and command responsibilities. The following terms relate specifically to air assault operations: An air assault task force (AATF) accomplishes air assault operations and is a group of integrated forces tailored to a specific mission and under the command of a single headquarters. The air assault task force commander (AATFC) designated by the ground or air maneuver commander, commands the AATF and is normally one of the divisions BCT commanders. The air mission commander (AMC) commands and controls all aviation elements and advises the AATFC on aviation-related matters on a specified mission or operation. The AMC is subordinate to the AATFC and serves as his technical advisor throughout the conduct of air assault missions. The ground tactical commander (GTC) commands and controls the assaulting elements before pickup at the PZ and after insertion into the LZ. (If the GTC is not the AATFC, he is subordinate to the AATFC.) B-3. For example, the battalion commander serves as the AATFC while the AMC will be the assault aviation company commander, and the rifle company commander will serve as the GTC in a companylevel air assault.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
B-4. An AATF is normally a highly-tailored force designed to hit fast and hard. It is best employed in situations that provide a calculated advantage due to surprise, terrain, threat, or mobility. Some basic air assault planning guidelines include the following: Assign missions that take advantage of the air assault task forces mobility. Do not employ in force roles requiring deliberate operations over an extended period of time. Always task organize the air assault force as a combined arms team. Allow extra time for planning and preparing for night and adverse weather air assaults. Maintain unit integrity throughout air assault planning to ensure fighting unit integrity on landing. Plan and posture fire support to provide suppressive fires along flight routes and on LZs, and to suppress enemy air defense systems.
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Figure B-1. Air assault operationsplanning sequence
PLANNING STEPS
B-5. Five separate, but integrated plans, are required to conduct an air assault operation. The ground tactical plan is the first and dictates the content of all others. These plans are developed in reverse order of execution. (See Figure B-1.) The normal sequence of air assault planning is to 1. Develop a ground tactical plan (GTC). 2. Develop a landing plan (AMC). 3. Develop an air movement plan (AMC). 4. Develop an aircraft loading plan (GTC). 5. Develop a staging plan (GTC).
GROUND TACTICAL PLAN

B-6. The foundation of a successful air assault operation is the commanders ground tactical plan around which subsequent planning is based. The AATF staff prepares the ground tactical plan (with input from all task force elements). All aircrews must be familiar with the ground tactical plan and the ground commanders intent. B-7. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation comprises essentially the same elements as any other infantry attack but differs in the requirements for speed and mobility. Assault units are placed on or near the objective and organized so as to be capable of immediate seizure of objectives and rapid consolidation. If adequate combat power cannot be introduced quickly into the objective area, then the air assault force must land away from the objective and build up combat power. The air assault force then assaults like any other infantry unit and the effectiveness of the air assault operation is diminished. The scheme of maneuver may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the situation and METT-TC. B-8. Following are considerations for the ground tactical plan supported by an air assault operation. General considerations include Choose appropriate assault objectives. Designate LZs available for use. Consider distance from LZs to the objectives. Establish D-day and H-hour (time of assault). Identify special tasks required to accomplish mission. Identify means to accomplish the mission: organic troops, aviation resources, engineers, signal, MEDEVAC. B-9. Fire support considerations include the following:
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Close TACAIR support. Field artillery within range (rocket, missile, cannon). Other indirect fire weapons (mortar, naval gunfire). Preparation fires for LZs (signals for lifting and shifting). Flight corridors. Air defense suppression (ground/air, air/air, ground/ground). Control measures needed. Subsequent operations (defense, link-up, withdrawal) that may be conducted. B-10. Intelligence considerations include the following: Enemy locations to include air defense positions and type. Ground and aerial reconnaissance of objective area (if practical). Sensor reports, terrain study, weather forecast. Intelligence summary.
LANDING PLAN
B-11. The landing plan must be synchronized with and support the ground tactical plan. The landing plan sequences elements into the AO, ensuring that units arrive at designated locations and times prepared to execute the ground tactical plan. There are three primary elements of the landing plan. The landing plan Involves the selection of LZs by the AATFC and his staff with input from the AMC or his liaison officer. Considers landing formations to be used by the aircraft on the LZ to facilitate off-loading and deploying for the assault. Addresses fires required to support the landing. B-12. It may be preferable to make the initial assault without preparatory fires in order to achieve tactical surprise. However, fires are always planned for each LZ so that they can be fired if needed. Planned fires for air assault operations are intense and short but with a high volume of fire to maximize surprise and shock effect. All fires should end just before the first assault elements landing. B-13. The following are considerations for the air assault landing plan Selection of primary and alternate LZs with regard to proximity to cover and concealment, obstacles, identification from the air, exits from the LZ, capacity of LZ, enemy disposition and capabilities, and LZ security plan. Selection of single or multiple LZs as appropriate for the ground tactical plan. Landing formations. Approach and departure directions. LZ preparation fires to support landing plan and ground tactical plan. Use of aircraft after personnel have been landed. Use of pathfinders to mark LZ.
AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

B-14. The air movement plan specifies the schedule and provides instructions for air movement of troops, equipment, and supplies from PZs to LZs. The air movement plan is normally developed by the AMC or the aviation liaison officer. It coordinates instructions regarding air routes, air control points (ACPs), and aircraft speeds, altitudes, and formations. The air movement plan requires consideration of the following factors: Development of flight routes. Designation of start point and release point. Air movement table. Flight corridor.
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Flight axis. Expedient flight routes. Flight route control measures. Terrain flight modes. Supporting fires along the flight route. Alternate communications.
LOADING PLAN
B-15. The loading plan is based on the air movement plan. It ensures that troops, equipment, and supplies are loaded on the correct aircraft and unit integrity is maintained when aircraft loads are planned. However, assault forces and equipment may be cross-loaded so that assets, all types of combat power, and a mix of weapons arrive at the LZ ready to tight. Aircraft loads are placed in priority to establish a bump plan. This ensures that essential troops and equipment are loaded ahead of less critical loads in case of aircraft breakdown or other problems. B-16. Loading plans should be an integral part of the unit SOP below brigade level. The following are considerations for developing the loading plan: Cross-load requirements. Bump plan. PZ assignment by unit (primary and alternate), bump and or straggler contingency plan, and PZ control and security responsibilities. Holding areas. Routes from assembly areas to holding area to PZs. Refueling for multiple lifts. Attack helicopter utilization during PZ operations.
STAGING PLAN
B-17. The staging plan is based on the loading plan and prescribes the arrival time of ground units (troops, equipment, and supplies) at the PZ in the proper order for movement. Loads must be ready before aircraft arrive at the PZ; usually, ground units are expected to be in PZ posture 15 minutes before aircraft arrive. B-18. The staging plan also restates the PZ organization, defines flight routes to the PZ, and provides instructions for linkup of all aviation elements. Air-to-air linkup of aviation units should normally be avoided, if possible.
Air Mission Brief

B-19. The air mission brief (AMB) is the final coordination meeting of key personnel involved in an air assault mission. The AMB is a working briefing covering all aspects of the mission. Any uncertainties must be addressed during the AMB as no changes are normally authorized subsequent to its completion without the consent of the AATFC. The AMB is a coordinated staff effort requiring input from all participants of the air assault operation. An AMB checklist, air movement table, and sketches of all primary PZs and LZs should be issued to the AATFC, GTC, and AMC. (See FM 90-4 for details on the AMB.)
Aircraft Specification
B-20. Throughout the concept development and planning for the air assault at the division level, the staff will require some types of generalized information concerning infantry units and air craft strengths, capabilities, and specifications. These planning specifications may change, depending on the situation, but will help determine feasible courses within the capabilities of available resources. Aviation and infantry units are normally composed as shown in Figure B-2. Figure B-3 and Figure B-4 provide additional aircraft specifications.
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Appendix B
Aviation Units
Assault Bn Assault Co GS Bn GS Bn 30 UH-60 A/C (3 companies of 10 A/C each) 10 UH-60 A/C 12 UH-60 A/C (4 configured for C2) 12 CH-47 A/C
UH-60 carries 14 troops in seats, 21 without seats Ch-47 carries 33 troops in seats
Infantry Units
Infantry Battalion Infantry Company Heavy Weapons Company 664 Personnel 141 Personnel 71 Personnel
Figure B-2. Air assault operationscomposition of infantry and aviation units

HH-53H (USAF) PAVELOW 6 65 78 134 468 16 42,000 28,150 20,000
AIRCRAFT NAME NORMAL CREW FUSELAGE LENGTH OPERATING LENGTH EXTREME HEIGHT MAIN ROTOR DIAMETER TAIL ROTOR DIAMETER MAX LIFT TAKEOFF BASIC WEIGHT MAX RECM XTNL LOAD UNIT EA FT/IN FT/IN FT/IN FT/IN FT/IN LBS LBS LBS
OH-58A KIOWA 2 323 4011.8 97 354 52 3,000 1,586 N/A
UH-1H/V IROQUOIS 2 4111 571 146 48 86 9,500 5,132 4,000
UH-60A BLACKHAWK 3 507.5 538 171 538 11 20,250 10,500 8,000
CH-47C CHINOOK 4 509 99 1812 60 60 46,000 20,481 20,000
CH-47D CHINOOK 4 51 99 188 60 60 50,000 22,499 28,000
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TROOP/ PARATROOPS LITTER/ AMBULATORY MAX FLIGHT TIME
EA EA HR/ MIN
2/0 2/2 3/00
11/8 3/4 2/20
11/8 4/6 2/20
33/28 24/33 2/00
33/28 24/33 2/00
35/20 6/30 5/00 Refuel
Figure B-3. Rotary wing aircraft specifications
I S R
F-1 to F-0:15 Receive timely data from ACE, pass to 11th Avn Bde. Update enemy locations. Final SPOTREP before crossing FLOT.
F-0:15 to F-HR
F-HR to F+0:20
F+0:20 to F+0:40
F+0:40 to F+1
QUICKFIX Jaming 1/227 Atk Avn (-) breaks contact and egresses back to FLOT. 1/101 Avn completes LZ opns and egresses back to FLOT.
M A N E U V E R F I R E S C 2 S U S T P R O T E C T D E C I S I O N P T S
1/227 Atk Avn (-) provides security for AA. 1/101 Avn arrv at PZ.
1/227 Atk Avn (-) crossing FLOT. 1/101 Avn crossing FLOT.
1/227 Atk Avn (-) in overwatch position. 1/101 Avn at LZ1.
1/227 Atk Avn (-) at FAARP. 1/101 Avn at FAARP preparing for sling opns.
Execution matrix initiated. Final checks. Activate A2C2 plan.
AI into EA. FAC controls CAS.
1-101 Avn calls for fires in support of LZ.
A-2/101 Avn establishes two FARPs. Execute ingress SEAD. Execute egress SEAD. Aircraft/personnel lost or missing?
C-1/227 Atk Avn conducts deception opn. UAS confirm target location? Is there a clear picture of enemy locations? Did UAS go forward? Weather abort? Use AH-64 for security? Commits additional AH-64 to security.
Did air assault meet Cdrs intent/CCIR? Reinforce air assault? Do AH-64 need to remain on station.
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Appendix B
B C T K E Y A C T
Coordinate FLOT crossing and air assault. On-order attack begins. Request additional Arty Spt? IO Spt? CAS? Synch FS Means.
Prepare for another air assault or attack.
Figure B-4. Example assault operationsplanning matrix
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Appendix C
Combat Service Support in the Modular Division

Successive operations for the past two decades show that Army of Excellence organizations were not as responsive and flexible as Army commanders required. Commander's needs were met with high costs in organizational disorder, inefficiency, and unsatisfactory response times. The Army regularly disassembled division and corps structures, assigned specialist units to purpose-built task forces, and left unusable remnants in Garrison. These challenges, together with the changed strategic and operational environment, drove the Army to undertake the most comprehensive redesign of its field forces since World War II. The modular division is one part of the transforming Army, which provides commanders with ready and relevant warfighting capabilities that are mission-tailored and scalable. Modular combat service support (CSS) organizations provide a mix of capabilities that can be organized for any combination of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, or civil-support operations. This appendix describes the fundamentals of modular sustainment operations, how sustainment operations are executed, and what CSS functions commanders of the modular division can expect on todays battlefield.
FUNDAMENTALS OF MODULAR CSS OPERATIONS

C-1. The modular force CSS operational concept is a major step forward in achieving required future force operational capabilities that will meet the challenges of the 21st Century. Its design incorporates transformation imperatives established by the Army Chief of Staff for a modular force capability that improves near-term operational capabilities in a joint operating environment and achieves joint interdependence in logistics. Specifically, this concept provides A modular, brigade-based Army that is more responsive to regional combatant commanders needs by streamlining joint capabilities, facilitating force packaging and rapid deployment, and fighting as self-contained units in non-linear, non-contiguous battlespaces. An Army logistics structure that is responsive to the needs of a joint and expeditionary campaign-quality Army by leveraging emerging technologies and linking support to supported and joint organizations (CONUS to areas of responsibility (AORs) or within AORs). Elimination of redundancy and reduction of unnecessary layers. C-2. The purpose of CSS is to generate and sustain combat power, which expands operational reach. CSS commanders and staff officers must understand the commanders intent so that they can provide the support needed to achieve the desired end state. By embedding CSS within brigade-level structures, CSS is inextricably linked to operations. This provides the division commander with organizations that can be employed in any environment without first task organizing CSS for the brigade. Above the brigade level, sustainment capabilities provided by CSS elements extends the modular divisions operational reach by maximizing the distribution architectures throughput (FM 4-0) efficiency and leverages host nation (HN) and contracting support to supplement logistics requirements. C-3. The G4 leverages actionable logistics data provided by logistics and command and control (C2) automation systems to determine the sustainability and supportability of current and planned operations. These systems provide near real time (NRT) logistical, personnel, and medical information that links the division to the sustainment brigade and theater logistics planners. Combined with an embedded, modular CSS structure, the G4 has the capability to quickly and more accurately plan sustainment operations. To
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understand the fundamentals of sustainment operations in the division, one needs to be familiar with CSS planning throughout the range of military operations, CSS C2, and how replenishment operations (ROs) are executed by modular CSS units. Note: The terms logistics, CSS, and sustainment are sometimes used interchangeably. However, these terms are not synonymous. Logistics is a broad term describing both planning for and execution of sustainment operations; it encompasses everything from the industrial base to the requirements of Soldiers on point. Sustainment is mainly about the execution of key combat support (CS) and CSS functions necessary to support the mission until complete. Sustainment is finite, while logistics is integral to any standing military force. CSS comprises personnel and logistical functions performed before, during, and after sustaining operations.
CSS PLANNING
C-4. CSS planning to support offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil-support operations requires a thorough mission analysis, careful identification of the supported force, and an understanding of the commanders intent and concept of operations. CSS planners in the modular division must consider all specified and implied requirements and be aware of resources available, including other US services, the HN, and theater contracting capabilities. CSS planning is essential to identifying the criticality of each of the eleven CSS functions (see Figure C-1). This aspect of modular sustainment operations sets the tone and characterizes the mindset with which logisticians will proceed.
CSS in the Offense

C-5. CSS in the offense is characterized by CSS FUNCTIONS high-intensity operations that require Supply anticipatory support as far forward as Field Services possible. Commanders and staffs ensure adequate support for continuing the Transportation momentum of the operation as they plan and Maintenance synchronize offensive operations. Plans Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support should include agile and flexible CSS Force Health Protection capabilities to follow exploiting forces and Human Resource Support continue support. Commanders and staffs Financial Management Operations plan for increased quantities of fuel and Legal Support selected other classes of supply, as well as Religious Support maintenance and recovery of damaged Band Support equipment. Division planners consider casualty rates and preposition medical Figure C-1. Planning identifies CSS treatment and evacuation capabilities forward functions to clear the battlefield efficiently. The biggest challenge to plans for supporting a rapidly moving brigade combat team (BCT) may be the lengthening lines of communication (LOCs). Transportation support must be closely coordinated to deliver essential support to the right place at the right time. CSS assets must follow exploiting forces to ensure continuity of support. Plans for all offensive phases must enable CSS elements to react quickly to changing needs. The digitization of the modern battlefield helps CSS and maneuver commanders quickly reprioritize assets as situations dictate. C-6. During offensive operations, the most important supply commodities are typically Class III(B) and Class V. Service support plans direct the movement of Class III(B) and Class V resupply to meet forecasted requirements. As advancing combat formations extend control of the area of operation (AO), human resource management personnel face similar challenges to reconcile and report command strength information, casualty information, and conduct replacement operations.
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CSS in the Modular Division
C-7. Offensive operations put a high demand on maintenance elements. To continue momentum, field maintenance teams (FMTs) are designed to operate with forward elements. Similarly, widely dispersed forces and longer LOCs require all means of transportation, including aerial delivery assets, to deliver supplies well forward. Movement control personnel manage movement priorities according to the commanders priorities. C-8. The higher casualty rates associated with offensive operations increase the burden on medical resources. Medical treatment facilities may move forward to prepare for offensive operations. If the increased numbers of casualties overwhelm medical resources, nonmedical transportation assets may be needed for evacuation. Following an offensive operation, combat stress casualties may be more prevalent and require moving combat stress teams forward. C-9. Plans should also provide for religious support (RS), which may become critical during offensive operations. Chaplain support through counseling and appropriate worship can help reduce combat stress; increasing unit cohesion and productivity. C-10. Using contractors in offensive operations entails great risks. However, the force commander may be willing to accept risk and use contractors in forward areas. Contractor support outside of AOs may help minimize Army CSS force structure at locations such as intermediate staging bases.
CSS in the Defense

C-11. The commander positions CSS assets to support the forces in the defense and survive. CSS requirements in the defense depend on the type of defense. For example, increased quantities of ammunition and decreased quantities of fuel characterize most area defensive operations. However, in a mobile defense, fuel usage may be a critical part of support. Barrier and fortification materiel to support the defense often has to move forward, placing increased demands on the transportation system. The maintenance effort focuses on returning primary weapon systems and critical equipment to mission capable status. Defensive operations may allow CSS assets to provide field services and refit degraded units. CSS planners and operators also prepare to resume support to the offensive operations projected to follow the defense. C-12. CSS managers direct routine resupply of forecasted requirements to designated units, as stated in the service support plan. They should push Class IV directly to battle positions, when possible, and give Class V the highest priority. The increased expenditures of ammunition significantly impact transportation assets. Throughput of supplies from the echelons-above-division to the lowest-level supply support activity (SSA) expedites deliveries. C-13. The task of medical units is to triage casualties, treat and return to duty, or resuscitate and stabilize for evacuation to the next higher echelon of medical care or out of the theater of operations. Medical treatment facilities should locate away from points of possible hostile actions. C-14. Using contractors in forward areas during defensive operations may entail unacceptable risk. If not, they may provide support in rear areas of forward deployed units.
CSS in Stability Operations

C-15. CSS in stability operations involves supporting US and multinational forces in a wide range of missions. These operations range from long-term CSS-focused operations in humanitarian and civic assistance missions to major short-notice peace enforcement missions. Some stability operations may involve combat. Tailoring CSS to the requirements of a stability operation is important to the success of the overall mission. In stability operations, small task-organized CSS forces may operate far from traditional chains of command and support agencies that cannot sustain themselves. This may also include large-scale operations that support peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These operations may or may not involve direct hostile action to US forces and may have nearly the same CSS requirements as offensive or defensive operations. Contracted services and support may significantly augment Army CSS capabilities in major stability operations.
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Appendix C
C-16. In addition to the movement control challenges typically presented by joint and multinational operations, large numbers of nongovernmental organizations sharing the same LOC and node facilities usually complicate movement control in stability operations. As in any major multinational operation, forces may establish a multinational movement control center (MCC) to prioritize usage. C-17. Maintenance units often have to support civilian assets as well as those of other military forces. In UN operations, the UN may purchase US equipment for other multinational forces. In such cases, those forces may not have the capability to service the equipment. US units may provide support or identify support packages. Also, the desired end state may require that maintenance support for stability operations include reestablishing or upgrading the infrastructure maintenance capabilities. This may entail providing tools and equipment. C-18. For medical personnel, stability operations often result in more frequent and direct contact with the local population. Planners consider the mix of care-provider skills, instrument sizes, drugs, and supplies to support pediatric, geriatric, and obstetric missions. Human resources support (HRS) activities (such as postal and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) services) may have a higher priority and be a more immediate requirement during long-term stability missions than during offensive and defensive missions; long-term stability missions operate at a reduced tempo. These morale-related services become a major focus to both commanders and Soldiers. Using contracted services and support may augment some CSS units. (See FM 3-07.)
CSS in Civil Support

C-19. CSS is often the primary focus of a civil support operation. Although Army forces do not conduct stability operations within the United States, they often provide assistance to federal and state authorities and respond to natural or man-made accidents and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities. In many civil support operations, Army CSS units conduct key operations. The ability of Army forces to move large amounts of equipment and supplies under adverse conditions and provide small tailored forces on short notice makes Army CSS forces a valuable asset to lead agency authorities. Distributing food, water, supplies, field services, and medical support is often the primary emphasis of civil support operations; the Army has trained personnel and deployable assets to provide such support. Transportation, supply, and medical units are the most often requested. C-20. The key to success in many civil support operations is interagency coordination. Only in the most extreme situations does the US military provide relief directly to those in need. In most civil support operations, the US military assists government agencies in providing the required support. Private and voluntary organizations may reduce the demands on transportation, medical, food, water, and housing resources. (See FM 3-07.)
CSS COMMAND AND CONTROL

C-21. C2 is the exercise of authority and direction, by a properly designated commander, over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (see FM 3-0). C2 has two components: the commander and the C2 system. The C2 system is the framework in which modular sustainment operations are managed. C-22. For CSS commanders, this framework is built on a logistics structure that provides unity of command from the strategic to the tactical level. For the logistician, this means streamlined systems for C2, theater opening, and theater distribution where similar and related functions are combined. Interdependencies among the Services are designed to achieve greater efficiencies. Logisticians must be prepared to conduct a broad spectrum of simultaneous operations to support deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and refitting of units in a regular cycle. C-23. The command structure must be enabled by total visibility of the distribution system, its content, and theater infrastructure to include main supply routes (MSRs) and multi-nodal/multi-modal operations.
C-4 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) 2/6/2006
Command visibility provides logistic planners the capability to identify, prioritize, and modify support moving through the distribution system. Logistics commanders must couple this visibility with clear lines of C2 to be able to identify and re-route assets as they move throughout the area of operations along multiple lines of operation. C-24. The sustainment command (theater) or SC(T) is the senior Army logistics headquarters in a theater of operations. It consolidates most of the functions previously performed by corps support commands and theater support commands into a single operational echelon and is responsible for C2 of logistics operations conducted in support of Army as well as joint, interagency, and multinational forces. The SC(T) is regionally focused, and together with its sustainment commands (expeditionary) or ESCs, globally employable. Its modular design provides the SC(T) commander with the flexibility to adapt his C2 as requirements develop; with ESCs providing an additional measure of responsiveness, agility, and flexibility for employment or deterrence. C-25. Sustainment brigades are subordinate commands of the SC(T). They consolidate selected functions previously performed by corps and division support commands and area support groups (ASGs) into a single operational echelon and provide C2 of the full range of logistics operations conducted at either the operational or tactical levels. The brigade headquarters are identical in organizational structure and capabilities. Their core competency is C2 of logistics operations; providing C2 and staff supervision of life support activities, materiel distribution management, and movement control as an integral component of the theater distribution system. Their level of assignment and mission determines the mix of functional and multifunctional subordinate battalions under their control. They are an integral component of the joint and Army battlefield communications network; employing satellite- and network-based communications that enable C2; visibility of the distribution system; and identification of support requirements. They perform theater opening, distribution, and sustainment functions. C-26. One facet of the Army transformation is that the BCTs have an organic brigade support battalion (BSB) with forward support companies (FSCs) that provide support to the brigade. The BSB headquarters consolidates many of the CSS functions for C2. The sustainment brigade support operations section may be required to synchronize tactical support to BSB operations. In the early stages of an SSC, the BSB may link directly into the deployed SC(T) element, often the sustainment brigade for direct support (DS). This implies that the SC(T) deployed element may be required to provide temporary tactical-level sustainment, as well as operational-level support interface for the BCT during early entry operations.
Materiel Management
C-27. The SC(T) centrally controls and executes the materiel management function for Army forces in a theater of operations. Subordinate sustainment brigades and divisions are linked to the SC(T) via a satellite-based communications network that facilitates real-time transaction management and oversight. The division G4 and supporting sustainment brigade will be focused on the current fight, while the SC(T) is focused on the distribution system and broader, theater-level materiel management issues. The G4 (providing plans, policy, and oversight) will be continuously linked with the SC(T) to prioritize the divisions requirements while providing plans and guidance to the supporting sustainment brigade. This theater-wide approach to materiel management streamlines the process, eliminates redundant management layers, and provides the means to effectively and efficiently weigh the logistics effort in support of ongoing and future operations. C-28. The G4 predominately has visibility to manage internal command critical materiel and readiness across the units footprint. He provides oversight, plans and policy for all units and operations within assigned division AO. The G4 will have a logistics common operating picture (LCOP) through BCS3 and other STAMIS to maintain oversight of materiel readiness and internal stocks within the division. Brigade level ASL are considered consumed therefore not accessible from the CTASC and thus do not penetrate to the BSBs SARSS-1. The G4 has the ability to direct cross-leveling of BCT level materiel to support readiness requirements. The G4 manages those command regulated items that the division commander deems necessary. The G4 also works in concert with his G8 counterpart to establish fiscal/expenditure limits on requisitions.
Appendix C
Battle Command Sustainment and Support System

C-29. The Battle Command Sustainment and Support System (BCS3) provides actionable logistics information to commanders and, for the first time, a visual logistics picture of the battlefield. It provides an NRT, continuous graphical representation of the current situation within the land AO, to include all friendly and enemy (known and suspected) locations, identification, and unit status. The situation is displayed over topographic details selected by the user from a menu of available mapping features. BCS3 supports the warfighting C2 and battle management process by rapidly processing large volumes of logistical, personnel, and medical information. The BCS3 facilitates quicker, more accurate decision making by providing a more effective means for force-level commanders and CSS commanders to determine the sustainability and supportability of current and planned operations.
Very Small Aperture Terminal

C-30. A satellite communications system, the CSS's very small aperture terminal, gives forward-deployed CSS units communications capabilities on par with those used in garrison. It can be operational within an hour and when used in connection with the Multi-Media Communications System and the CSS Automated Information Systems Interface, provides worldwide voice, video, and data communications capability. CSS units can share documents, process requisitions, conduct online meetings, send and receive text messages with this system. They can also use it as a short-range telephone. The systems software enables the user to set up a satellite communications link and acquire non-secure internet protocol router network access, almost anywhere in the world.
SUSTAINMENT
C-31. Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until the successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective (see FM 4-0). It involves providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel required to sustain the operation throughout its duration. Sustainment or sustaining operations encompass the execution of key CS and CSS functions necessary to support decisive and shaping operations until the mission is complete. C-32. Logistics concepts, organizations, and systems in the modular division support the requirement for expeditionary agility and responsivenessas well as speed, precision, and staying power. Logisticians and CSS units of the modular division must meet simultaneous demands across a potentially large AO with a greater CSS presence forward. To do this, the Armys system of support has become more streamlined, efficient, and flexible to meet these demands. The modular divisions logistics system is designed to function efficiently under the stringent conditions of operational maneuver from strategic and operational distances, with greater operational reach to CONUS-based support. In a theater of operations, with the divisions forces widely distributed and operating in non-contiguous areas, support is provided by leveraging technology. The sustainment brigades role with enabling RO is especially important when combat units are widely distributed over a non-contiguous battlefield with LOCs that can only be secured temporarily.
Replenishment Operations
C-33. Replenishment operations (ROs) are preplanned sustaining operations that allow combat forces to replenish routinely. An RO is a deliberate, time sensitive logistics operation. It can be conducted by the BSB to replenish its FSCs and by the FSC to replenish the combat loads of individual Soldiers and weapons platforms. These operations, which may be augmented with assets from the sustainment brigade, are quick and in-stride with the supported commanders battle rhythm. The purpose of RO is to replace used stocks within a BCT or support brigade (see Figure C-2). It may be either deliberate or hasty if circumstances allow. Typical CSS activities that take place during RO include rearming, refueling, fixing, medical support, and personnel replacement to meet immediate needs.
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Replenishment Operations Supporting the Brigade

3d Combat Load 2d Combat Load 1st Combat Load
X
I
MSO
X
II
FSC
I CO
SUST
RO
BSB
RO
FSC
RO
I CO
Objec t
ive
FSC
I CO
Figure C-2. Replenishment operations
Mission Staging Operations

C-34. Mission staging operations (MSO) are initiated by order of the division commander, conducted by the BCT, and enabled by the sustainment brigade at a forward location usually within the BCT AO. MSO tasks are METT-TC based, but typically includes mission preparation conducted in coordination with sustainment tasks. The sustainment brigade provides replenishment to the BSB along with field services and other services as required. MSO takes place away from the battle, preferably in a location cleared beforehand by the CS brigade (maneuver enhancement [ME]). The purpose of mission staging is to prepare for an upcoming mission through an intense, time-sensitive operation that may include reorganization, planning, troop leading, rehearsals, training, reconnaissance and surveillance, force tailoring, information operations, to ensure the success of the combat operations.
CSS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MODULAR DIVISION

C-35. The key to a more modular support structure is to organize it based on what support organizations can do for the commander, rather than what functional branch organizations can do for the force as a whole. Under the modular construct, organizational designs incorporate multifunctional, modular, selfreliant sustainment capabilities as part of the BCT and combat arms battalion organizations. This provides them with all the necessary logistics support to sustain operations internally for a period of time while minimizing the need for external support. The sustainment brigade, the BSB, and the FSC are the fundamental building blocks of modular sustainment structure.
SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE
C-36. The sustainment brigade is designed to be a flexible organization that is task organized to meet mission requirements. The sustainment brigade has a command and staff structure capable of providing logistics management at either the operational or the tactical level. It does not have the organic capacity to execute its assigned mission without the assignment of modular support units like the combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB) or functional logistics units (for example, a transportation battalion). The sustainment brigade headquarters may also be augmented by a number of different types of modular
Appendix C
elements. The types and quantities of these attachments are dependent upon the mission and the number, size, and type of organizations the sustainment brigade must support. C-37. The sustainment brigades only organic subordinate unit is its brigade troops battalion (BTB). The BTB provides C2 for assigned and attached personnel and units. It directs logistics support operations for the BTB and provides logistics advice to supported commanders in the BTB. The BTB has a headquarters and headquarters company. It integrates the functions of the battalion's S1 through S4 staff sections and provides the company to which brigade and BTB personnel are assigned.
X SUST
II II
BTB
I I
CSSB
HHC
FIN
HR
AMMO
TRANS
MAINT
S&S
Task Org based on: JSCP,TRO, Stationing and / or Specific Operations
Figure C-3. Sustainment brigade C-38. Three to seven CSSBs may be assigned to a single sustainment brigade depending on the brigades mission. The CSSB is under the C2 of the sustainment brigade commander. It is the base organization from which logistics force packages are tailored for each operation. Through task organization, the CSSB is capable of providing logistics support during all phases of operations. The CSSB is structured to optimize the use of logistics resources (through situational understanding and common operational picture) and, therefore, minimize the logistics footprint in the AO. The mission of the CSSB is to C2 organic and attached units, provide training and readiness assistance, and provide technical, equipment recovery, and mobilization assistance to supported units. (See Figure C-3.)
II
CSSB Organic Attached

HHC FIN HR TRANS MAINT AMMO SUPPLY
MA
AIRDRP SPT
FIELD SVC
WATER
FUEL
HR and Finance units are usually attached to the BTB, but they may receive administrative support from a CSSB.
Figure C-4. Combat sustainment support battalion
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BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION

C-39. As mentioned before, BSBs are organic to brigades and BCTs. The BSB headquarters provides C2 over BCT logistics operations, materiel distribution management, and movement control over all sustainment ROs. BSB units provide medical support, field maintenance, and distribution of supplies to elements of the BCT (see Figure C-5). FSCs organic to the BSB provide habitual support to the brigades combat arms battalions. C-40. The BSB is a modular organization comprising an HHC; brigade support medical company (BSMC), which is located only in BCTs; distribution company; field maintenance company; and four FSCs. While the composition of each individual company of the BSB may vary somewhat depending upon the supported force (heavy, infantry, or Stryker), each BSB is designed to operate with the same basic concept of support. FSCs replenish combat arms battalions, the distribution company replenishes each FSC, and the BSB is replenished by the sustainment brigade. Stryker BSBs do not have FSCs and task organize support to meet mission requirements.
SPT
HQ
MED
FSC FSC FSC FSC
Figure C-5. Brigade support battalion
FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY

C-41. The FSC is multi-functional and includes supply, transportation, ammunition transfer, and maintenance capabilities (see Figure C-6). Although the FSCs are organic to the BSB, they will have a habitual relationship with their supported maneuver battalion. FSCs provide all classes of supply (minus Class VIII) and field maintenance to its supported battalion. It can operate either a consolidated or split battalion distribution point or logistics release point, based on METT-TC.
I FSC
HQ
Figure C-6. Forward support company C-42. The distribution platoon processes receipts, closes out the supply shipments, achieves accountability of items, and processes retrograde material. It is not designed to carry an authorized stockage list items, except as necessary to support issue and turn-in operations. It may potentially carry critical logistical
Appendix C
replacement units and combat spares as authorized or directed. The distribution platoon of the FSC supporting an infantry battalion (in the lighter IBCT) also has a mobility section. This section has the capability of moving one company of infantry tactically in one lift. The maintenance platoon is equipped to support work order requests and to manage the shop stock. FMTs are assigned one per supported company and provide dedicated automotive, track field maintenance, and recovery capability to a combat arms company. Communications connectivity (VSATS/FBCB2) is critical to the success of submitting requisitions and tracking assets, work and repair production, and readiness visibility.
SUPPLY AND FIELD SERVICES

C-43. Supply and services consist of wide-ranging functions that extend from determining requirements at the strategic level to delivering items and services to the user at the tactical level. Supply involves acquiring, managing, receiving, storing, and issuing all classes of supply except Class VIII. Field services involve feeding, clothing, and providing personnel services to Soldiers. It consists of clothing exchange, laundry and shower support, textile repair, mortuary affairs, preparation for aerial delivery, food services, billeting, and sanitation. The method or frequency by which a unit receives supplies or services varies, but in most cases the determination is predictive or on demand.
SUPPLY SYSTEM
C-44. The supply system spans all levels of war. The following is a discussion of the considerations at the operational and tactical levels, and how these considerations correspond to sustainment operations at the modular division and BCT levels. Key to the timely and efficient distribution of supplies to and within the modular division involves the implementation of expeditionary support packaging and a pure pallet methodology. An explanation of these programs also follows.
Operational Considerations
C-45. Supply at the operational level involves requisitioning or acquiring, receipt, limited storage, protection, maintenance, distribution, and salvage of supplies. Supply planners and managers must understand the JTF/ASCC/ARFOR commanders priorities and the requirements for supporting campaigns and major operations involving the modular division. Requirements also include considering the needs of joint and multinational forces. The division G4 must communicate his requirements so that operational planners can prepare the distribution system. C-46. Supplies are throughput whenever possible from the port of debarkation (POD) or local sources to the appropriate SSA or receiving unit of the modular division. Multiple consignee cargo comes to a supply activity for sorting before trans-shipment to the appropriate SSA or receiving unit. C-47. The supply system depends on an efficient and effective materiel management system. The distribution management centers (DMCs) of the sustainment brigade must know the prioritized requirements of the division and the status of available resources. They manage distribution in coordination with movement control elements that know the capabilities of the transportation system to move required supplies. This management requires an effective automated supply system and extensive coordination. Materiel management, which is mainly a function of the SC(T), links strategic and tactical supply and transportation elements to provide total asset visibility. C-48. Improved information systems allow management elements to perform split-based operations from CONUS or forward-presence locations while critical capabilities required in theater deploy early in an operation. For example, part of the SC(T) may remain at its home station while ECPs deploy to the AO with the force they support. The SC(T) continues to support the stay-behind force while concurrently interfacing with the ECP to provide the required support forward. This split-based capability ensures only required elements deploy. This eliminates unnecessary forces in theater with related CSS demands. It also minimizes strategic lift requirements.
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Tactical Considerations
C-49. Tactical-level supply focuses on readiness and supports the commander's ability to fight battles and engagements or accomplish his stability or support mission. CSS planners work with supporting commanders and distribution managers to ensure required supplies are available when and where the user needs them. Units typically carry a basic load of supplies with them to support their operations until the system can resupply them. When time and mission constraints require, a "push system" provides supplies. Under this type of system, planners estimate the supply requirements and arrange to have supplies delivered to supported elements. As the theater matures and stocks become readily available, supply elements convert by commodity to a "pull system." Requests generated by supported elements are the basis of a pull system. C-50. Within the BCT, there are three combat loads. The first combat load, found on the Soldier or the combat system, is replaced in whole or part by the FSC during ROs. The second combat load, carried by the FSC, is replaced in whole or part during RO conducted by the BSB. The distribution company of the BSB generally carries the third combat load. The sustainment brigade replenishes the BSB, while the BSB replenishes the FSCs in stride with combat operations and the supported combat arms battalion commanders battle rhythm. Note: The term combat load is not synonymous with basic load, which is the quantity of supplies required to be on hand that can be moved by a unit. Combat loads are the minimum mission-essential equipment and supplies required for Soldiers to fight and survive immediate combat operations. C-51. Both operational and tactical supply systems include SSAs operated by distribution companies or quartermaster support units. Quartermaster-support companies assigned to the sustainment brigade establish SSAs from the communications zone (COMMZ) as far forward as the brigade support area (BSA). On a temporary basis, quartermaster-support elements may operate even farther forward with the BSA to reduce the distances users have to travel to receive support. The support structure within the BCT and the sustainment brigade includes a distribution management capability to manage supply and maintenance operations. Repair parts, for example, are managed by maintenance control sections as combat spares and are requested through the BSB. This requisition may be filled by a supporting sustainment brigade or a supply depot in CONUS. (See Figure C-7.) Water and other classes of supply may be distributed in a similar manner.
TSC
DMC
CONUS or another Sustainment BDE
BSB SUS FSC

CRO RO
LRP I
Request Unit Distribution Supply Point Distribution
DIST FMT
CBT Spares
UMCP
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C-11
Appendix C
Figure C-7. Class IX flow in the BCT C-52. Under a pull supply system, a support brigade submits a request to its supporting DS supply element. If stocks are available, the DS element fills the request and notifies the distribution manager, who initiates replenishment. If it cannot fill the request, the request is passed from the sustainment brigade to the DMC. In that case, the manager directs issue from theater stocks to the DS unit or passes the requisition to another sustainment brigades distribution division to meet the requirement. C-53. Retrograde of materiel usually involves unused supplies and repairable equipment that are evacuated during RO and MSO. Repairable items generally end up in sustainment maintenance facilities and are returned to supply channels when restored to serviceable condition. Salvage items are unserviceable and uneconomically repairable. They are evacuated through the supply system, destroyed, or demilitarized based on theater policy and commodity center instructions.
Expeditionary Support Package

C-54. Expeditionary support packages (ESPs) is a program that performs a service to provide both standard and customized ESPs for training exercises; deployments; war reserve, pre-positioned stocks; and predictable demands to meet the unit commanders requirements. C-55. Brigades will use customized ESPs for training exercises, home station deployments, and during the deployment phase of operations for which requirements are forecasted. The modular division will use both standard and customized ESPs in conjunction with a pure palleting methodology to provide responsive support for meeting actual requirements during the sustainment phase of operations. ESPs are appropriate for all classes of supply, except some Class VII major end items.
Pure Palleting
C-56. Pure palleting is a process that collects all supply requisitions for a given DODAAC, configures standard ESP packages and other supply items into loads, then throughputs them to their destination. Time limit for the collection process is usually three days. Packages not filling a whole pallet are then combined with other packages to produce consolidated loads, destined for multiple DODAACs/SSAs, which will be sorted out in theater. C-57. Pure palleting is used for the following supplies: Class II (NBC, clothing, and religious supplies). Class III(P) (packaged petroleum oil and lubricants). Class IV (construction and barrier materials). Class IX (batteries and repair parts).
FIELD SERVICES
C-58. All field services receive the same basic priority. The commander decides which are most important. The ASCC influences priorities through the time-phased force and deployment data. For example, laundry and shower units may be top priority in desert operations, while preparing loads for aerial delivery may be more important in mountain operations. The location and suitability of MSO sites can be an important factor in the decision to provide Soldier hygiene support and clothing repair. C-59. During stability operations, the priority depends on the support requirements. In some circumstances, field service units or activities may be the only support provided. The modular division is unlikely to have the units assigned to perform field services in civil support operations but may be asked to provide other types of support in order to help facilitate food preparation, water purification, and mortuary affairs operations.
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Force Provider
C-60. The Armys Force Provider is a modular system, principally designed to provide the Soldier with a brief respite from the rigors of a combat environment. Modular division Soldiers may benefit from this system during entry operations or possibly during MSO. Each Force Provider company consists of six platoons. Each platoon, when augmented, can operate one 550-soldier module. Each module can support 550 Soldiers separately or a brigade-sized force of 3,300 Soldiers if all six modules are combined. The modules can work independently or with one another. Each module provides the following: Climate-controlled billeting activities. Food service. Shower and latrine facilities. Laundry service. Facilities for MWR activities.
Aerial Resupply, UASs, and Integrated Logistics Aerial Resupply

C-61. The Integrated Logistics Aerial Resupply (ILAR) program is a holistic approach to aerial re-supply (airland, airdrop, and slingload) distribution operations that are in balance and synchronized with surface distribution-based logistics operations. The intent of ILAR is to provide a full range of aerial distribution. ILAR takes advantage of Joint intermodal enablers and is largely transparent to commanders. ILAR supports commanders in the modular division by developing a capability to support full spectrum operations. It helps to enable non-contiguous, non-linear operations, and also reduces the logistics footprint, risk to air crews, and exposure and risk to CSS ground assets. C-62. ILAR supports and improves force reception by enabling immediate employment of the modular division and is unconstrained by sea and airports and host nation support (HNS). ILAR, which includes Army helicopters, fixed-wing (for example, Sherpa) aircraft, and the use of joint precision airdrop system and other enablers, supports the modular division and BCTs requirement for the use of aerial delivery as a routine method of re-supply. C-63. Unmanned aerial systems (UASs) help logistics organizations accomplish their missions through a variety of different applications at different echelons. UASs can provide surveillance of supply caches or retrograded items that have been temporarily left unsecured. UASs may be employed to support the inspection and maintenance operations of petroleum and water pipelines and water purification sites. UASs may be used to conduct the dynamic identification and or re-direction of critical supplies transported by convoy. UASs may be used to deliver supplies to remote areas, in a non-permissive or hostile environment, or when LOCs are not secure. Finally, UASs may be used for ship-to-shore delivery of supplies when the use of manned rotary wing aircraft is not feasible or desirable.
TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT
C-64. Innovative transportation systems and techniques are the key to enabling the modular distribution system. Modular cargo containers and other conveyances pre-loaded for combat in CONUS or at major overseas logistics facilities can be subsequently loaded on a ship or plane and then trucked directly from a port to units in the field. Minimizing the handling of materiel while maintaining NRT visibility as it flows through the distribution system is essential to giving the modular division the reach and flexibility to perform its wartime mission. C-65. Redundant, networked information systems are replacing personnel in the military supply chain. This reduces the resources needed to support the modular division while increasing the confidence of commanders in knowing that mission essential supplies and equipment will be delivered without hampering combat operations. Modular transportation units bring the capabilities and expertise necessary to support the division in all phases, from deployment to employment to redeployment. C-66. The Armys deployment goals are to deploy and employ a BCT in four to seven days; deploy and employ three BCTs or support brigades in ten days; deploy three modular divisions in 20 days, and deploy
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Appendix C
five divisions in 30 days. The BCT must confront an adversary before setting the conditions in its favor to meet the deployable imperative. The BCT design capitalizes on the widespread use of common vehicular platforms. Highly mobile, medium-weight combat/CS tactical vehicles like the palletized load system or heavy expanded mobile tactical truck-load handling system, combined with the necessary personnel, a reduced logistics footprint, and state-of-the-art automated information systems form the backbone of the support structure.
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL TRANSPORTATION

C-67. The variety and complexity of military operations require the Army to establish a transportation system that is expandable and tailorable. The objective is to select and tailor required transportation capabilities at the operational and tactical levels to achieve total integration of the system. These capabilities include movement control, terminal operations, and mode operations. At the theater strategic and operational levels, sufficient force structure deploys early to conduct reception, staging, and onward movements, which includes opening ports, establishing inland LOCs, and providing C2 for movements. An important facet of building combat power during the reception, staging, and onward movement phase of the operation is receiving the force and sustainment supplies at the POE. This same transportation force structure is required to redeploy the force when operations conclude. Ports, terminals, and inland LOCs are critical nodes in the distribution system. At the theater strategic and operational levels, transportation supports the reception of units, personnel, supplies, and equipment at PODs and provides for their movement as far forward as required. C-68. Theater transportation requirements largely depend on the factors of METT-TC. Modular division planners must participate in the logistics preparation of the theater essential in determining requirements. When directed by the combatant commander or joint force commander (JFC), transportation units in the modular division may provide support to other services and multinational partners. Establishing communication links to other than Army forces is a challenge; however, transportation planners in the division headquarters and the sustainment brigade must integrate all requirements and support considerations into movement plans and programs.
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Ground Transportation Request Process

++
SC(T) X X SUST
SP
SUST
(TD
SPO BDE S4
+
DCP
TRANS S
II
MCB
MCT
II
BSB
SP
II
II
MCT
SP SP
II
CSSB
+
G4 DTO
I
MCT
BN FSC
Information Flow
Reques Commitmen Tasking Coordination
Echelons Above Division
Figure C-8. Ground transportation request flow
MOVEMENT CONTROL
C-69. Movement control is the linchpin of the transportation system. In coordination with the modular division transportation officer (DTO), movement control units operating in the divisions AO plan, route, schedule, and control common user assets. They maintain in-transit visibility (ITV) of personnel, units, equipment, and supplies moving over LOCs. Units normally request transportation support through their brigade/battalion S4. The S4 sends requests for transportation to the BSB support operations officer (SPO), who may task assigned transportation assets to perform the mission. If the request for support exceeds the BSBs lift capabilities, the SPO forwards the request to the DTO. The DTO sends the request to the servicing movement control team (MCT), which may be co-located with a sustainment brigade. Under certain circumstances, the DTO may coordinate with the G3 to temporarily reallocate or task transportation assets within the division to provide the required lift. As delineated by order or SOP, non-routine transportation requests are sent to the DTO. Figure C-8 shows the routine ground transportation request flow. C-70. The DTO is the modular divisions transportation staff planner. The DTO and movement managers at each echelon perform movement control activities. Movement control is integral to distribution managers. They coordinate the efforts of the movement control units with distribution elements. Movement control personnel coordinate routinely with operations planners and other CSS personnel, because movement control is tied directly to maneuver as well as distribution. C-71. Movement control also relies on support from CSB (ME) military police in their mobility support role. All these staffs work together to plan and execute movements. Otherwise, congestion on LOCs and at terminals hinders movements and degrades combat effectiveness. Movement control units implement priorities established by the commander to support his concept of the operation. The distribution system in
2/6/2006 FMI 3-91 (Final Draft) C-15
Appendix C
the modular force is essentially the warehouse. As such, movement control is the information conduit for supplies, personnel, and units moving from the strategic sustaining base to the AO.
G4 Transportation Branch
C-72. The G4 transportation branch, comprising the DTO and a mobility warrant officer, develop the traffic circulation plan, road movement tables, and highway regulation plan of service support annexes to division orders. They serve as the primary technical advisors to the G4 on all matters pertaining to the theater transportation policy, the transportation system, movement planning and execution, ITV, and automation systems to support the deployment and redeployment of forces and distribution of material. The G4 transportation branch performs the following actions: Recommends division priorities for transportation and movement to support division plans and orders. Recommends the allocation of division transportation assets and the establishment of MSRs and provides movement managers with policies and priorities. Assists the G4 in preparing, updating, and maintaining the transportation portion of the logistics estimate. Conducts operational and tactical planning to support movement control and mode and terminal operations. Coordinates with the G5 for HNS. Coordinates special transport requirements to move the command post (CP). Coordinate with G1 and G3 on transporting replacement personnel and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). Coordinates with the G3 for logistics planning of tactical troop movement. Coordinates common user transportation assets.
Movement Control Team

C-73. At least one movement control team will augment the division G4 and be placed under the control of the DTO to provide the ability to maintain visibility of movements throughout the division area, as well as, link the division to the EAD movements system. The MCT and/or its sub-elements must be placed with a command and control headquarters (e.g. TACs, BCTs, CSB (ME)) to gain and maintain situational awareness and the common operational picture (COP). Modular in design, one or all of the MCTs four identical sections may be employed throughout the division AO as a movement regulating team (MRT) to provide ITV at critical nodes or within mobility corridors. C-74. While functioning as an MRT, a section of the modular MCT does the following: Movement reporting. Convoy control. Security coordination. Route regulation and status reporting. Route reconnaissance and surveillance. March unit deconfliction. Contact reporting. Assistance to military police with battlefield circulation control (BCC).
Brigade Support Battalion SPO

C-75. The BSB support operations section provides transportation staff and technical expertise to the BCT commander. This sections transportation specialists conduct movement management of all brigade transportation assets; allocates brigade transportation assets; and coordinates transportation support from other echelons/organizations for requirements that exceed the brigades resources.
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Mobility Officer
C-76. The mobility officer in the brigade provides commanders with full-time deployment expertise and is a skilled technician who Executes the rapid transmission of movement requirements in the Defense Transportation System. Develops and conducts unit training on the tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with unit movements operations. Identifies and remedies force projection and strategic deployment deficiencies. Plans and coordinates deployment and redeployment. Provides distribution management expertise while in the AO.
ORDNANCE SUPPORT
C-77. Success on today's battlefield demands that forces maintain, recover, repair, or replace equipment as quickly as possible. Good maintenance practices, forward positioning of maintenance units, effective repair parts and equipment replacement systems, and clear priorities for recovery and repair are vital. Likewise, sound theater policies on repair and evacuation and sufficient sustainment repair and replacement facilities greatly contribute to battlefield success. This section covers the following aspects of ordnance support: Two-level maintenance. Ammunition support. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).
TWO-LEVEL MAINTENANCE
C-78. The overarching principle of replace forward and fix rear remains unchanged. Modular organizations continue to build on the two-level maintenance system, composed of field maintenance and sustainment maintenance. This system combines unit and DS-levels of maintenance (called field maintenance) and also combines the general support (GS) and depot levels (called sustainment maintenance). Field maintenance in the BCT is provided by FMTs and the BSB field maintenance company. At the field maintenance level all functions are focused on replacing damaged components and returning the repaired item to the user. The goal is to reduce repair cycle times by providing capabilities as far forward as possible, maximizing reliance on parts distribution, stock visibility and component replacement. Sustainment maintenance involves off-system/platform tasks that are done primarily in support of the supply system (repair and return to supply) and will not normally be performed inside the modular divisions battlespace.
Field Maintenance
C-79. Field maintenance is the first operation of the Army maintenance system. Field maintenance is characterized by the performance of maintenance tasks on system in a tactical environment using trained personnel, tools, and test, measuring and diagnostic equipment (TMDE). Field maintenance is typically operator/crew maintenance and repair and return to user maintenance operations.
Sustainment Maintenance
C-80. Sustainment maintenance is the second operation of the Army maintenance system. Sustainment maintenance is characterized by the performance of maintenance tasks off system in a secure environment using trained personnel, tools, and TMDE. Sustainment maintenance is typically repair and return to stock and depot maintenance operations.
Support Maintenance Companies

C-81. Support maintenance companies (SMCs) provide field maintenance support for modular division units without organic FMTs and not aligned with a field maintenance company. The SMC conducts area
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C-17
Appendix C
support field maintenance, and it is capable of accepting modules (platoons/sections/teams) from component repair companies (CRCs) and collection and classification companies (C&Cs). Within the modular division, the SMC may also provide reinforcing support for MSO.
Component Repair Companies

C-82. CRCs provide sustainment-level support for the modular division and theater-level units. CRCs can be employed in any location in the distribution pipeline beginning at the national source of repair. The goal is for these units to be pushed forward at the direction of the United States Army Materiel Command (USAMC) into the Joint air operations, only as needed. These units Provide repair and return to the supply system. Operate in conjunction with an SSA. Can attach platoons, sections, or teams to SMC or other sustainment units. Integrate maintenance repair activities with USAMC.
Collection and Classification Companies

C-83. C&Cs establish and operate collection and classification facilities for the receipt, inspection, segregation, disassembly, preservation, and disposition of serviceable and unserviceable Class VII and Class IX materiel and similar foreign materiel (except items peculiar to cryptographic materiel, missile systems, aircraft, airdrop equipment, drones, and medical materiel).
AMMUNITION SUPPORT
C-84. Munitions are a dominant factor in determining the outcome of offensive, defensive, and often stability operations. Munitions provide the means to defeat and destroy the enemy. Due to limited quantities of modern munitions and weapon systems, commanders must manage munitions to ensure availability and enhance combat readiness. Most major military operations are joint and multinational and based on unexpected contingencies. These operations require the munitions logistics system to be modular, tailorable, and easily deployed. Ammunition units deploy based on operational needs and are essential to moving Class V supplies. C-85. Planning logistics munitions support must be coordinated and synchronized across the levels of war. The mission at every level of war is to ensure munitions arrive in the right quantities and proper types at the decisive time and place. Having munitions in the right quantity, type, and place enhances the Armys ability to engage the enemy decisively and sustain the operations culminating with the successful accomplishments of objectives. C-86. Conventional ammunition ordnance elements may be attached to the sustainment brigades CSSB to establish and operate ammunition supply facilities on an area basis. These elements may serve as the theater level ammunition unit. The number and size of ammunition elements attached to the battalion depends on the following: Tactical situation. Requirements. Theater stockage objectives. Existing HNS organization. Transportation assets and effectiveness of throughput. Type and density of weapons supported. Estimated percentage of ammunition tonnage that can be throughput.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

C-87. Army EOD forces are designed to simultaneously support two regional combatant commanders conducting major operations. An ASCC supporting a JFC is allocated an EOD group. The EOD group is
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aligned as a theater additional asset. Three or more EOD battalions require an EOD group headquarters to provide C2. An EOD battalion is attached to the CS Brigade (ME) (for administrative and logistical support) to support explosive hazard (EH) operations in the modular division AO. An EOD battalion headquarters will provide C2 for three to seven companies. EOD support is determined by METT-TC. EOD groups and battalions position their EOD companies and teams at locations where they can best support the maneuver commander. The EOD group headquarters provides technical assistance to all EOD operations in a theater. The senior EOD commander in theater will function as the ASCC or ARFOR EOD special staff officer responsible for EH operations. (See FM 4-30.5 and FM 4-30.16.) C-88. The EOD planning staff is integrated into the modular division and ME brigade headquarters to facilitate EH planning. They are the commanders subject matter experts on all EH: unexploded explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices, captured enemy ammunition, and weapons of mass destruction. The EOD staff recommends the implementation of EODs unique skills to protect the force. The EOD staff advises the commander on EOD requirements and capabilities.
FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

C-89. The Armys health service support system conducts the force health protection (FHP) mission that conserves the force by preventing disease and non-battle injuries (DNBIs); clears the battlefield of casualties; provides medical treatment and hospitalization; conducts enroute care during medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), veterinary, dental, combat and operational stress control, preventive medicine (PVNTMED), and laboratory services; and ensures Class VIII supplies, medical equipment maintenance, and blood support are available.
FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION IN THE MODULAR FORCE

C-90. The Medical Deployment Support Command (MDSC) directs FHP to all operational-level Army medical elements in the AO. When the Army is the lead service for medical support, it also supports joint and multinational commands and other elements under the guidance of the ARFOR surgeon. The ARFOR surgeon provides policy and technical guidance to the MDSC and all Army medical units in the theater. The MDSC maintains a technical relationship with the ARFOR's staff surgeon to assist in establishing medical policy for the theater. It also maintains technical linkages to various medical support activities at the strategic level. C-91. The MDSC is responsible for developing plans, procedures, and programs for FHP in the AO to include patient evacuation, patient care and movement, hospitalization, stress control, preventive medicine services, dental services, veterinary services, and laboratory services. The MDSC supports the JFC surgeons joint patient movement requirements center in accordance with lead service directives. It provides staff planning, staff supervision, training, and administrative support of Army medical brigades engaged in operational level medical support. It provides combat health logistics, including medical requirements determination and medical supply control. If only a module of the MDSC deploys, the commander of the MDSC (Forward) is the deputy commanding general rostered from the MDSC. C-92. The MDSC early entry module (EEM) provides the following capabilities: C2 of medical subordinate organizations; technical and clinical supervision and assistance; lead service responsibility for veterinary services as required, as well as for Class VIII and blood product management; medical planning, operations, and regulating services; preventive medicine; and information management services. The MDSC specialized module, along with the EEM functions it has subsumed, provides the following capabilities to the theater: C2 of medical units. Medical personnel assignment and the Professional Officer Filler Systems coordination. Patient evacuation coordination. HN medical support coordination. Telemedicine services. Contracting for medical services.
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Geneva and Hague Conventions advice and staff legal assistance for medical services. Lead service support for Class VIII and blood products management as required. Theater-wide FHP operations planning and theater medical intelligence services. C-93. The command monitors the flow of Class VIII supplies and makes necessary adjustments in coordination with the sustainment brigade support operations section, the ARFOR commander G4, and the Medical Logistics Management Center. It directs relocation of stocks and medical equipment if necessary. C-94. The MDSC also coordinates medical regulation operations with the medical regulating office and the joint theater patient movement requirement center, as well as the sustainment brigade support operations section. It tracks medical treatment facility (MTF) locations, capabilities, and workloads to plan and manage medical regulating, evacuation, and mass casualty (MASCAL) operations. C-95. Among the other services planned and coordinated by the MDSC in coordination with the ARFOR staff surgeon and the sustainment brigade support operations section are the following services or operations: Preventive medicine operations. Medical professional service. Dental service support operations. Nursing support services. Veterinary services.
Multifunctional Medical Battalion

C-96. The multifunction medical battalion is organized to provide C2 to attached and assigned units of a medical task force; and provide Level I and Level II combat health support to include far forward surgical capabilities, advanced trauma life support, sick call, patient holding, dental services, diagnostic services, preventive medicine, mental health, optometry, and ground evacuation services on an area support basis.
Brigade Support Medical Company

C-97. The BSMC operates a Level II MTF and provides Level II FHP to all units in the BCT. This Level II MTF care is predominantly done from within the BSA. The BSMC is responsible for providing MEDEVAC from supported units to its Level II MTF. It also provides Level I care to units without organic medical personnel and augments and reinforces maneuver battalion Level I MTF. Some of the functions of the BSMC include the following: Medical treatment of DNBI, combat operational stress reactions, and trauma injuries. MEDEVAC (ground ambulance). Class VIII resupply. PVNTMED. Operational (emergency) dental care. Medical equipment repair. Dental care. Patient holding. Radiological services. Laboratory services. Level II plus surgical resuscitative services when augmented by a forward surgical team.
Medical Reporting
C-98. The Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care (MC4) and Theater Medical Information Program (TMIP) support the information management requirements for the BCT surgeons section (BSS) and BCT medical units. The BSS uses BCS3, FBCB2, and MC4-TMIP to support mission planning, coordination of orders and subordinate tasks, and to monitor/ensure execution throughout the mission.
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C-99. The MC4-TMIP is an automated system, which links health care providers and medical support providers, at all levels of care, with integrated medical information. The MC4-TMIP receives, stores, processes, transmits, and reports medical C2, medical surveillance, casualty movement/ tracking, medical treatment, medical situational awareness, and medical logistics data across all levels of care.
MEDICAL EVACUATION
C-100. Evacuation of injured Soldiers is categorized into the following two types: MEDEVAC is the use of either ground or air ambulances to evacuate from the point of injury to an MTF while providing enroute care. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) is the use of non-medical vehicles or other means for patient movement without providing enroute care. C-101. The MEDEVAC plan is the key to the FHP plan. The battalion medical platoon is responsible for MEDEVAC of casualties from the point of injury to the battalion aid station (BAS). The battalion S1/S4 must ensure there is a coordinated MEDEVAC plan from all battalion locations to the BAS, and to the BSMC in the BSA. The battalion S4 and the BCT S4 coordinate the ambulance exchange points (AXPs), and posts them on his support graphics in FBCB2. The battalion S4 also coordinates any available ambulance support from the battalion. Internal vehicles for mass CASEVAC are identified and positioned for use as required. The battalion S4 tracks active and inactive AXPs, and disseminates that information to battalion CPs and companies. C-102. As casualties occur, the battalion S4 directs assets to assist with CASEVAC. MEDEVAC outside the battalion may be accomplished by ground or air. Recovery responsibility does not end until casualties are evacuated back to its Level I MTF/BAS. Responsibility for further evacuation from the BAS, is the mission of the BSMC ground ambulances or supporting air ambulances that are evacuated to the BSMC Level II MTF in the BSA or other supporting MTFs. Medical patients are evacuated no further to the rear than their condition requires, and returned to duty as soon as possible. C-103. The BCT surgeon section coordinates the MEDEVAC plans of battalion medical platoons and the BSMC. Battalion medical platoons often attach combat ambulances to companies in anticipation of casualties. The BSMC ambulance teams will evacuate patients from maneuver BAS back to the BSMC Level II MTF located in the BSA. Pre-positioning BSMC ambulance teams with supported maneuver unit's BASs, will reduce ambulance turnaround times. The BCT surgeon also plans the landing sites for aerial evacuation. Plans and exercises should include the use of aerial evacuation (when available) to transport litter-urgent patients. C-104. The preferred method of MEDEVAC is by air ambulance, but their use is METT-TC dependent. Usually, the aviation brigade positions a forward support medical platoon (FSMP) with three UH-60 Blackhawk aircraft in support of a BCT. They are usually positioned in the BSA. These aircraft are not DS to the BCT, but provide area support to all units in the area. The brigade aviation element and BCT surgeon coordinate the use and positioning of the FSMP. They integrate air ambulance support, to include coordination of A2C2 requirements, establishing clear lines of authority to launch a MEDEVAC, and identification of pickup zones and loading zones. C-105. Planners must anticipate the potential of high casualty rates and long evacuation distances. They identify and coordinate AXPs along the axis of advance and on the objective. The locations of AXPs must be identified for all phases of the operation and triggers developed for their displacement to their next locations. Planners must retain the flexibility to shift nonstandard evacuation assets to support MASCAL or CASEVAC as required. Planners also ensure responsive medical support is preplanned to support crossFLOT extraction of BCT reconnaissance elements by a maneuver or quick reactionary force.
CLASS VIII
C-106. Usually medical units deploy with a three to five day supply of consumable medical supplies, and all companies deploy with complete combat lifesaver bags. Initially, sustainment supplies are pushed to the BSMC, based on theater casualty estimates. Individual Soldiers should deploy with a 90-day supply of
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Appendix C
their personal prescribed medications. As they deploy, Soldiers must advise their supporting medical unit of their specific needs so the medical logistics system can sustain these prescriptions. C-107. Resupply of medical supplies is through medical channels. The BSMC and maneuver platoon medical personnel are responsible for maintaining their medical equipment sets. Combat lifesavers and company/platoon medics receive replenishment of Class VIII for their aid bags from their unit medical platoons. The BSMC provides Class VIII resupply and medical equipment repair to the unit medical platoons. To prevent unnecessary depletion of blankets, litters, splints, and other equipment, the receiving medical facility exchanges like property with the BAS when it accompanies the patient. Class VIII resupply may also be accomplished via UAS and the Precision Aerial Delivery System. (See FM 4-02.1 for definitive information on the medical logistics system.)
HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT

C-108. The objective of HRS is to maximize operational effectiveness and to facilitate enhanced support to the armed forces. Reliable, responsive, and timely HRS in the operational area is critical to supporting the operational commander and the force. It relies on secure, robust, and survivable communications and digital information systems. These provide a common operational picture, asset visibility, predictive modeling, and exception reportingimportant to making accurate and timely manning decisions.
HUMAN RESOURCES CORE COMPETENCIES

C-109. HRS encompasses nine fundamental capabilities, or core competencies. Each of these core competencies includes tasks that support Army theater tactical and operational-level operations. These core competencies are Personnel readiness management (PRM). Personnel accountability and strength reporting (PASR). Personnel information management (PIM). Reception, replacement, redeployment, rest and recuperation, and return-to-duty (R5). Casualty operations. Essential personnel services (EPS). Postal operations. MWR. Band operations.
MODULAR DIVISION G1
C-110. The modular division G1 serves as the senior HR advisor to the division commander. The mission of the G1 is to enhance the readiness and operational capabilities of forces and ensure HRS is properly planned and executed. The G1s responsibilities include the following: Integrate all HRS activities within the division. Establish division-unique HR policies and procedures. Provide technical oversight of HR units within its AOR. Coordinate and synchronize HRS for its AO with the HR operations cell in the sustainment brigade. Coordinate the preparation of plans and orders for all HRS activities to include the chaplain, surgeon, civilian personnel officer, and staff judge advocate (SJA). Ensure HR plans support the tactical plan, its branches and sequels, and the commanders desired end-state. Direct the military and civilian HR systems. Manage the Soldier readiness program.
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Recommend replacement allocations and priorities of fill to the division commander and G3. Track division personnel combat power. Manage services to the Soldier and civilians. Synchronize the division HR network. Coordinate with the division G1 to obtain external HRS for the division. Direct and synchronize MWR and Army band activities. Direct the Army Substance Abuse Prevention program. Direct the equal opportunity program.
BRIGADE/BCT S1 SECTION
C-111. The personnel support system has evolved in both access and organizational structure to enable the delivery of personnel services as close to Soldiers and commanders as possible. Battalion and brigade S1 sections are the focal point for providing personnel services. The BDE/BCT S1 Section is employed with the BCT to provide EPS, PASR, PRM, PIM, casualty information management, and military pay customer service as well as provide policy, procedure, and training information and oversight to the battalion S1 sections within the BDE/BCT. The S1 section has all the necessary system accesses and permissions to enter data to or receive from the top of the HR system (Human Resources Command and Defense Finance and Accounting Service) without intermediate steps at the division and ARFOR G1.
HUMAN RESOURCES COMPANY

C-112. An HR company provides postal, R5, and casualty support to the modular division with modular teams. This company is very modular, flexible, and scalable, which allows commanders to tailor their support in the most effective and least invasive manner.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

C-113. The modular division G8 is the principal staff officer responsible for Title X financial management functions within the division AO. The G8 acquires, distributes, reports, and controls funding resources. He monitors budget execution for compliance with fiscal law and current policy directives. The G8 also provides finance and accounting policy, advice, assistance and technical oversight to financial management units assigned to the modular division. His responsibilities also may include the following: Reviewing of theater-wide international agreements to assess financial management implications. Participating in the theater war planning process. Supporting acquisition and logistics processes. C-114. The financial management detachments mission is to provide area financial support to a BCT or equivalent-sized unit, or as directed by the financial management company commander. The financial management detachment provides timely and accurate payment for contractor and commercial vendor services support, disbursing and funding support, EPW pay support, non-US pay support, and US pay support to division or ARFOR units. The financial management must have sufficient transportation and communication assets to perform numerous and simultaneous support missions, and must be able to move day or night. Mobility is required to provide effective finance support for units over geographically dispersed locations on the battlefield. In addition, the requirement to conduct multiple and simultaneous support missions increases the requirement for a financial management detachment to have adequate transportation, maintenance, communication, global positioning, and life support assets. Financial management detachments are equipped with financial management tactical platform, which enables effective operations through the use of real time data and online capability. C-115. The financial management detachment is co-located with a BCT or equivalent-sized unit, and is responsible for all financial management operations on an area basis. The financial management detachment performs the following functions:
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C2 and supervision of widely dispersed, assigned, or attached financial management support teams. Procurement support. Disbursing operations. Pay support.
LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

C-116. Legal support to operations encompasses all legal services provided by judge advocates and other legal personnel in support of units, commanders, and Soldiers in the modular divisions AO and throughout full spectrum operations. Legal support to operations falls into three functional areas: C2, sustainment, and personnel service support (referred to as support). C-117. Command and staff functions include advice to commanders, staffs, and Soldiers on the legal aspects of command authority, command discipline, applying force, and the law of war (LOW). Some examples of judge advocates' C2 responsibilities are Interpreting, drafting, and training commanders, staffs, and Soldiers on rules of engagement. Participating in Targeting cells. The military decision-making process. Information operations. Applying the LOW. Advising commanders on policies prescribing Soldier conduct and ensuring discipline (jurisdictional alignment, convening authority structure, and authority to issue general orders). Generally, issues directly affecting the commander's operational decision making process on the battlefield. C-118. Sustainment functions include negotiating acquisition and cross-servicing agreements and status of forces agreements (SOFAs), combat contingency contracting, fiscal law, processing claims arising in an operational environment, and environmental law. C-119. Personnel service support functions include Soldier discipline advocacy services (courts-martial, nonjudicial punishment, and other routine matters in administering military justice), legal assistance services, and basic Soldier-related claims issues. C-120. In the BCT, the brigade judge advocate (BJA) advises the commander on compliance with environmental laws, regulations, treaties, and conventions. He also writes or interprets SOFAs. The BJA helps determine environmental assessment requirements and manages civilian claims resulting from environmental damage. He helps other staff officers to understand the legal aspects involved in their respective specialties. C-121. In conjunction with the BJA, the civil-military operations officer (S-9), advises the commander on his legal obligations concerning the local population. In many areas of the world, these obligations include protecting critical environmental resources. The S-9 and the BJA are responsible for being familiar with local environmental laws, especially in overseas deployment areas. The S-9 may also supervise civil affairs units who assist local governments with environmental protection services. He also serves as the focus of coordination for HNS and indigenous labor, and coordinates with the BJA on civilian claims against the US government for environmental damage.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
C-122. Chaplains, on behalf of the commander, provide and perform RS in the Army to ensure the free exercise of religion. Chaplains are obligated to provide for those religious services or practices that they cannot personally perform. Chaplains perform RS when their actions are in accordance with the tenets or
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beliefs of their faith group. Chaplain assistants assist the chaplain in providing or performing this RS. The division chaplain and deputy chaplain are the divisions RS planners. C-123. Like the division chaplain, the brigade chaplain is a special staff member who serves as a confidential advisor to the commander on the spiritual fitness, ethical, and moral health of the command. Chaplains are assigned to US military units to assist commanders in providing the right of free exercise of religion to all personnel. He is responsible for the professional oversight of the battalion unit ministry teams (UMT). Each UMT is composed of a chaplain and one enlisted chaplain's assistant. C-124. UMTs orders consumable chaplain supplies as necessary. These supplies are considered Class II. C-125. Each battalion normally has a UMT, consisting of a chaplain and chaplain assistant, to provide RS to their Soldiers. The brigade chaplain serves the brigade commander as a personal staff officer. The brigade chaplain plans, synchronizes, and coordinates RS within the brigade AOR. The brigade UMT is responsible for the technical oversight of the UMTs in subordinate units. S1s provide coordinating staff oversight of UMTs. C-126. The brigade UMT has the complex job of organizing the efforts of UMTs that work for subordinate commanders. The brigade UMT must ensure there is RS to all Soldiers in the brigade AO. Often, companies or detachments will be attached to the brigade without UMT support. Members of other services and authorized civilians may require area support. The brigade UMT prepares an RS plan, often as an appendix to an order, to ensure coordinated RS for the Soldiers of the brigade. This RS plan should consider the following: Area support. Denominational coverage. Use of lay ministers. Potential for MASCALs. Augmentation of the BSB for patients in the BSMC. Coordination with the American Red Cross for family problems. Stress management after combat operations (for example, battle fatigue). Pastoral care and counseling to key leaders. C-127. Chaplains advise their commanders on the moral and ethical nature of command policies, programs, and actions as well as their impact on Soldiers. They are sometimes referred to as the "conscience of the command." C-128. UMTs have a staff role as well as a religious role. As staff officers, chaplains can research and interpret cultural and religious factors pertinent to a given operational area. They may work with civil affairs personnel in analyzing local religious organizations, customs and practices, doctrines, symbols, and the significance of shrines and holy places. Chaplains may conduct liaison with, and support humanitarian efforts by working with, humanitarian relief agencies, civil affairs, and public affairs where appropriate.
BAND SUPPORT
C-129. The division G1 coordinates band support, which can be a powerful commanders tool to promote goodwill and good relations to members of a local population. Army bands entertain Soldiers and citizens of the United States, its allies, and host nations in both garrison and battlefield environments as evidenced by participation in Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Joint Endeavor, and Operation Urgent Fury, as well as task forces Eagle, Falcon, and Andrew. (Details on Army band support are covered in FM 12-50.)
CEREMONIAL SUPPORT
C-130. Army bands perform music that is connected to American heritage, military history, unit lineage, and individual honors. Among Soldiers, ceremonial music helps build enthusiasm, maintain motivation, and increase devotion to the unit, the Army, and the United States. Army band participation in a ceremony
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adds dignity, solemnity, tradition, and honor. Music creates an emotional bond that leaders can use to draw a unit closer together, to show honor and devotion to a leader, and to remind them of friends and family back home. Music highlights history and draws attention to sacrifices and hardships as well as victory and heroism.
CIVIC SUPPORT
C-131. Music, with its inherent ability to raise emotions, highlight events past and present, and promote optimism and determination for the future, is the ideal tool for a commander to use in supporting civic events. The Army band supports and participates in public events because the Army belongs to the American people. Common ownership requires that Army resources be used to support events and activities of common interest and benefit. A successful community relations program enhances the communitys perception of the Army and fosters an appreciation and spirit of cooperation for the military installation, the Soldiers and their families, and civilians who are part of the installation C-132. Civic events that may be appropriate for Army band participation include parades, holiday and community concerts, sporting events, dedications, cultural events, and ribbon cutting ceremonies.
RECRUITING SUPPORT
C-133. Army bands are an important tool for use in recruiting. Bands highlight the Army and support local recruiting activities. Musical selections may be drawn from many styles ranging from patriotic to popular music in a single performance. All Army bands in CONUS are directly charged to support recruiting efforts.
OTHER SUPPORT
C-134. In addition to the types of support mentioned previously, Army bands may participate in most events not prohibited by AR 360-1 and AR 220-90. These regulations and DODD 5500.7, govern off duty participation in unofficial events.
ENGINEERING SUPPORT
C-135. Operational-level engineer units maintain a support/coordination relationship to theater-level CSS functional assets. The Army senior engineer commander provides general engineering support throughout the theater. This support extends from the COMMZ to well forwardpossibly into the division area. The numbers and types of operational-level engineer units depend on the size of the support base required, HN infrastructure, the mission, the availability of existing engineer support in the theater, and perceived threat in the rear area. (See FM 100-7 for more details.)
SUPPORT/COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS
C-136. The senior engineer commander task organizes operational assets to best satisfy the priorities of effort and support established by the JFC. Within the COMMZ, the commander aligns engineer assets to provide GS on an area basis, as they receive service support on an area basis from the CSS community. Current and evolving doctrine would place an engineer brigade in DS to the SC(T), with subordinate engineer groups in DS to the ASGs.
CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT
C-137. In accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, the JFC establishes broad standards and policies for theater construction that guide engineer operations, whether they are performed by the United States Air Force, Army, or United States Navy units. They are based on coordinated planning by construction representatives from all service components. Theater construction policies establish standards, priorities, and the theater construction management structure. The JFC may retain control at his level or delegate construction management to a regional contingency engineering manager (RCEM). When the Army is the
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RCEM, the senior engineer commander (usually from the engineer command) performs this function. The RCEM manages all construction, repair, and facility modifications in the COMMZ. This structure provides centralized control and decentralized execution. The RCEM also manages all troop, contract, and HN construction repair operations in the COMMZ. Such a structure ensures that theater construction assets are employed according to JFC-established priorities and policies.
REAL ESTATE PLANNING AND ACQUISITION

C-138. US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) theater elements provide technical real estate guidance and advice to the theater commander. In addition to recommending real estate policies and operational procedures, they acquire, manage, dispose of, administer payment for rent and damages, handle claims, and prepare records and reports for real estate used within the theater.
REAL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE

C-139. The JFC has overall responsibility for real property maintenance activities (RPMA). He normally delegates authority to the ASCC/ARFOR, who may further delegate to the SC(T). The SC(T) and installation commanders (in most cases an ASG/IMA) normally provide the needed RPMA support. Principal RPMA in the AO includes operation, repair, and maintenance of facilities and utilities; fire prevention and protection; and refuse collection and disposal. RPMA requirements that exceed the CSS organizations capabilities are forwarded to the local senior engineer commander (in most cases, the engineer group providing support to an ASG/IMA on an area basis) or USACE element for execution according to theater priorities. The SC(T) provides technical RPMA guidance to subordinate CSS organizations. The subordinate CSS organizations provide RPMA support to all Army facilities in the theater, including leased facilities, unless HNS is available for leased facilities.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
C-140. Protection of natural resources has become an ever-increasing concern. It is the responsibility of all unit leaders to decrease, and if possible eliminate, damage to the environment when conducting all types of operations. C-141. In addition to common staff responsibilities, the senior engineer commander advises the commander on environmental issues. He coordinates with other staff offices to determine the impact of operations on the environment and helps the commander integrate environment considerations into the decision-making process. C-142. In the division AO, the engineer coordinator (ENCOORD) is the special staff officer for coordinating engineer assets and operations for the command. As the senior engineer officer in the force, the ENCOORD advises the commander on environmental issues. Working with other staff officers he determines the impact of operations on the environment and integrates environmental considerations into the decision-making process. A-1. The ENCOORD works with the S4 to perform site assessments for installations and facilities. He and the SJA advises the commander on the environmental protection and military operations needed to ensure that environmental assessments meet HN or executive order requirements. Also, the ENCOORD is responsible for advising the S2 of significant environmental factors and ensuring these factors are considered during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process.
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Appendix D
USAF Planning Considerations Applicable to Division Operations

This appendix will describe those Army and United States Air Force (USAF) organizations that are involved in the coordination and control of air support to the division. It will briefly discuss each of the air operational functions that the division can use to support its operations. Lastly it introduces common air space control measures and provides a reference for additional information on the subject. Air support is vital to the conduct of successful division operations. The division is dependent on Joint fires and maneuver provided by fixed-wing aircraft to conduct many of the divisions shaping operations to include reconnaissance and surveillance, air interdiction (AI), offensive information operations, such as electronic warfare (EW), and airlift missions. The USAF also provides close air support (CAS) in support of brigade combat team (BCT) battles and engagements. The multiple systems provided by the USAF also enhance the conduct of Army strike operations whether those operations are conduct by the fires or aviation brigades. The division requires Joint fires, maneuver, intelligence, and EW support from the USAF for the conduct of shaping operations between the forward boundary of its subordinate BCTs and the divisions forward boundary and in those parts of the division AO that have not been further sub-allocated to the divisions BCTs and supporting brigadesthe divisions unassigned areas. Air support of the divisions sustaining operations may involve airlifting critical supplies or augmentation units and providing counter air support to preempt or counter enemy air attacks. While CAS is not usually allocated to units in the division rear area, it may be diverted from other missions to help counter a Level II or III threat.
AIR SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

D-1. To achieve the necessary degree of Joint coordination, the Army and USAF provide qualified personnel to work with each others headquarters. The supporting USAF personnel remain under the USAF chain of command and receive logistical support from the supported Army unit.
BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT

D-2. The senior ARFOR headquarters in a theater of operations provides a liaison element, the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) to the service component commander designated as the Joint force air component commander (JFACC) and is co-located with the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). The BCDs basic mission is to facilitate the synchronization of air support for Army operations. The BCD monitors and interprets the land battle for the JFACC staff. It passes ARFOR/Joint force land component operational data and operational support requirements from the ARFOR/JFLCC to the JFACC and participating multinational forces, to include requests for the following: CAS. AI.
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Manned and unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance. Joint suppression of enemy air defense (J-SEAD). D-3. The BCD is responsible to the ARFOR or JFLCC and coordinates with and receives objectives, guidance, and priorities from his operations officer (G-3) through the Army senior fire support element (FSE) or fire and effects cell (FEC). Specific missions include processing land forces' requests for tactical air support, monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation for the JAOC, providing the necessary interface between the JFLCC for the exchange of current intelligence and operational data, and coordinating air and missile defense and airspace control matters. The BCD expedites the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with JAOC elements D-4. The BCD understands the ARFOR commanders priorities and guidance and possesses the necessary knowledge of the battlefield situation. It processes ARFOR requests for air support, monitors and interprets the land battle situation, and exchanges current intelligence through face-toface coordination with elements of the AOC. The division will not normally have a BCD available for its use unless the division is an ARFOR in a crisis response contingency operation.
HQ
AIR AIRLIFT DEFENSE
INTEL
OPNS
PLANS
ASM
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Figure D-1. Internal structure of the BCD D-5. The BCD is organized in seven sections: headquarters, operations, plans, intelligence, air defense (AD), airspace management (ASM), and airlift. (See Figure D-1.) The BCD eases planning, coordination, and execution of the following functions: battle command, intelligence, fires, ASM, AD, information operations, airlift support, and Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD). In order to integrate the TAMD battle, the BCD supports the ARFOR/JFLC TAMD cell responsible for TAMD in theater. The ARFOR or JFLCC specifies the role of the BCD to help in coordination of TAMD active defense and attack operations with the JAOC. Additionally, the BCD exercises supervision over the Army's air reconnaissance liaison officer teams and ground liaison officer augmentation teams that provide coordination between Army forces and USAF reconnaissance, fighter, and airlift wings. (See FM 3-100.13 for additional BCD doctrine.)
AIR FORCE AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER

D-6. The Air Force Air and Space Operations Center (AFAOC) is the USAF component commanders means of turning the JFCs guidance into a component air operations plan. It allocates resources and tasks forces through air tasking orders (ATOs). When the USAF component commander is also the JFACC, he will augment the AFAOC with elements from other components to create a JAOC. (See JP 3-30 for more information on JAOC.)
AIR COMPONENT COORDINATION ELEMENT

D-7. The USAF component commander establishes an air component coordination element (ACCE) to interface and provide liaison with the ARFOR/JFLCC. The ACCE is co-located with the ARFOR/JFLC staff. The ACCE is the senior USAF element assisting the ARFOR/JFLC staff in planning air component supporting and supported requirements. The ACCE interface includes exchanging current intelligence and operational data, support requirements, coordinating the
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integration of AFFOR/JFACC requirements for airspace control measures, Joint fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs), and CAS. The ACCE is organized with expertise in the following areas: plans, operations, intelligence, ASM, and airlift. The ACCE is not an air support operations center (ASOC) or tactical air control party (TACP), but acts as the AFFOR/JFACC senior liaison element and can also perform many air support planning functions.
AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER

D-8. The ASOC is the primary control agency component of the theater air control system (TACS) for the execution of CAS. Co-located with the senior Army echelons FSE/FEC, the ASOC coordinates and directs air support for ARFOR or JFLC operations. In a multi-corps/division environment, there will normally be one ASOC with each senior tactical ground force headquarters that is assigned an AO by the JFLCC. In a multi-ASOC operation, each ASOC reports individually to the JAOC. The JAOC may grant the ASOC control (launch or divert authority) of missions designated to it on the ATO. D-9. The ASOC processes Army requests for immediate CAS that are submitted by ground maneuver forces over the Joint Air Request Net directly to the ASOC. (See Figure D-2.) Once the Army approves these immediate requests, the ASOC tasks on-call missions or diverts scheduled missions (with Army approval) to satisfy those approved immediate requests. The ASOC may be granted launch or divert authority over all or some of these missions. If the ASOC has not been given control of oncall or scheduled missions, they must contact the AFAOC or JAOC to launch or divert CAS missions. If the division has an assigned ASOC, it will co-locate with the tactical command post (TAC 1 or TAC 2) controlling current operations.
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Figure D-2. Theater air control system
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FSE/FEC AND ASOC/TACP INTERFACE

D-10. The FSE/FEC is the link for the CAS mission area between the Army unit and the ASOC/TACP. The FSE/FEC is responsible for fire support and planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization of lethal fire support, Joint fires, and offensive information operations delivered on surface targets by all fire-support assets under their control, or in support, of the unit. As part of this responsibility, the FSE/FEC coordinates the airspace usage with the units A2C2 element co-located with the FSE/FEC. The FSE/FEC and ASOC/TACP synchronize and integrate CAS for the unit. CAS coordination occurs through the ASOC and the units ALO or TACP in conjunction with the fire support coordinator and operations officer (G-3/S-3). If the United States Navy or United States Marine Corps CAS is available, the air and naval gunfire liaison company may provide the division, brigade, and battalion FSEs/FECs with supporting arms liaison.
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CAS A/C
ASOC
JOAC
C2
HIGH FREQUENCY (HF) SATELLITE COMMUNICATION (SATCOM) HF SATCOM ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY (UHF) VERY HIGH FREQUENCY/ AMPLITUDE MODULATION (VHF/AM) UHF
TACP
WOC
NET
FREQUENCY
USAF REQUEST NET
# X
AIR CONTROL NET
TACTICAL AIR DIRECTIO N NET INFLIGHT REPORT NET GUARD
UHF VHF/AM UHF VHF HF VHF/FREQUENCY MODULATION (FM)
# X
X X
X X
# X
X X X X
# X
X X
# X #
TACP ADMIN X NET VOICE X X PRODUCT NET HIGH VALUE UHF X ASSET NET X Indicates normal participation in the specified net. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
# Indicates participation when directed, or as required.
Figure D-3. Component air C2 communication nets D-11. The provision of CAS is expedited when the ASOC supporting the division can talk directly with the aircraft conducting the CAS mission. Figure D-3 is a reproduction of Figure II-3 from JP 309.3 and shows the USAF and Army air command and control (C2) agencies and their communication nets. The single greatest operational limitation of the ASOC is the lack of robust, persistent UHF beyond line-of-sight communications. The distance out to which the ASOC can effectively control aircraft depends on the terrain and other communications enablers such as FAC(A), JSTARS, and manual radio relay. When alternative means are used to pass information to aircraft, these often introduce delays that decrease the number of aircraft the ASOC can direct in a given time period. Location of the ASOC has to be balanced between its need to be co-located with the senior FEC/FSE,
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JSTARS
AWACS
CRC
FAC
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its UHF communications capability, and security concerns. The location of the divisions main CP, TAC1, and TAC2 impacts the divisions ability to employ CAS.
TACS/ARMY AIR-GROUND SYSTEM TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROL AGENCIES AND PERSONNEL

D-12. Army Air-Ground System (AAGS). When appropriate, the AAGS may be clearly related to and interconnected with the USAF TACS. Together, these systems are known as TACS/AAGS. Terminal attack control of CAS assets is the final step in the TACS for CAS execution. There are both ground and air elements of the TACS to accomplish this mission. Figure D-4 illustrates the alignment between Army units and TACS terminal attack control agencies and personnel. D-13. Tactical Air Control Party. The TACP is the principal USAF liaison element aligned with Army maneuver units from the battalion through the corps commander. The primary mission of TACPs assigned to the brigade-level and above is to advise their respective ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of air power and assist the ground commander in planning, requesting, and coordinating CAS. The TACP provides the primary terminal attack control of CAS in support of ground forces. The division will typically have one division level TACP and four brigade-level TACPs assigned. While each BCT typically is supported by a brigade-level TACP, the fires, aviation, and maneuver brigades could be supported by a brigade-level TACPdepending on their assigned mission and the applicable factors of METT-TCby shifting a BCT TACP to support these other types of brigades. The division is responsible for providing transportation to move these TACP personnel. D-14. Air Liaison Officer (ALO). The ALO is the senior TACP member attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operations. Above the battalion level, an ALO is an aeronautically rated officer and is an expert in the capabilities and limitations of air power. The ALO plans and executes CAS in accordance with the ground commanders guidance and intent. OPCON of all USAF personnel assigned to the unit is exercised through the senior ALO.
Legend: X officer / X enlisted (X JTAC)
XX
Comb Arms Battalion
MAIN
TAC 1
TAC 2
ASOC Capability
******Liaison Team 4/5 (2)
TACP Capability******
HBCT TACP***** Comb Arms Battalion Comb Arms Battalion TACP* TACP* RECON SQDN TACP**
IBCT TACP*****
SBCT TACP***
Fires Brigade
Aviation Brigade
*****Liaison Team 2/4 (1) *****Liaison Team 2/4 (1)
***Liaison Team 3/4 (1)
Maneuver Maneuver Battalion Battalion TACP* TACP* RECON SQDN TACP**
Maneuver Maneuver Battalion Maneuver Battalion Battalion TACP* TACP* TACP* *Liaison Team 0/4 (2) RECON SQDN TACP**
**Liaison Team 0/4 (2)
TAC Teams TAC Teams provide flexible capability to deploy
down to the company level in selected cases 0/2 (1)
25 26
Figure D-4. Alignment between Army units and TACS terminal attack control agencies and personnel
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D-15. Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC). The JTAC is the forward Army ground commanders CAS expert. JTACs provide the ground commander recommendations on the use of CAS and its integration with ground maneuver. They are members of TACPs and perform terminal attack control of individual CAS missions. In addition to being current and qualified to control CAS, the JTAC must Know the enemy situation, selected targets, and location of friendly units; supported unit's plans, position, and needs. Validate targets of opportunity. Advise the commander on proper employment of air assets. Submit immediate requests for CAS. Control CAS with supported commanders approval. Perform battle damage assessment.
AIR OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS THAT SUPPORT DIVISION OPERATIONS

COUNTER AIR
D-16. The objective of counter air operations is to gain control of the aerospace environment to achieve air supremacy. Counter air operations protect friendly forces, ensure freedom to perform other missions, and deny that freedom of use to the enemy. It is conducted in a manner or at a distance to render unnecessary detailed integration with fires and the movement of friendly ground forces. It is consistent with the JFCs objectives, and may initially involve the highest priority of all air operations. Counter air operations involves the performance of OCA and DCA operations in addition to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). The JFACC determines ratio of forces assigned between these three types of counter air operations based on JFC guidance. Level of enemy air threat. Vulnerability of friendly forces to air attack. Enemy AD capability. Offensive counter air (OCA) operations are essential to gaining air superiority and should be conducted at the start of hostilities to seize the offensive. They are typified by attacks against C2 facilities. Munitions and missile storage sites. Aircraft on the ground or in the air. Any target that contributes to the enemys air power capability. D-17. SEAD operations are a form of OCA and are designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy AD systems and thus detract from the enemys air power capabilities. Their goal is to allow friendly aviation forces to effectively perform other missions without interference from enemy AD. The divisions surface-to-surface weapons complement the efforts of Joint systems. The JFACC conducts SEAD against surface-to-air defense systems. SEAD operations are planned and conducted in localized areas by battalion and larger land units to protect fixed and rotary wing aircraft using available field artillery cannon and rocket systems, attack helicopters, direct fire weapons, and offensive information operations, such as EW. D-18. Defensive counter air (DCA) operations detect, identify, intercept, and destroy enemy air power attempting to attack friendly forces or penetrate friendly airspace. Initially they may be the mission of emphasis if the enemy has seized the initiative through surprise or friendly political constraints. They involve active measures such as using combat fighter aircraft and AD artillery. It also involves passive measures, not involving weapons systems, such as Radar coverage for early warning.
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Protective construction (for example, hardened sites). Cover, camouflage, deception, dispersion, and frequent movement of personnel and equipment. D-19. See JP 3-01 for additional information on countering air and missile threats.
COUNTERLAND
D-20. Counterland is air and space operations against enemy land force capabilities to create effects that achieve JFC objectives (Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3). The main objectives of counterland operations are to dominate the surface environment and prevent the opponent from doing the same. Although historically associated with support to friendly surface forces, counterland operations may encompass the identical missions, either without the presence of friendly surface forces or with only small numbers of surface forces providing target cueing. This independent or direct attack of adversary surface operations by air and space forces is the key to success when seizing the initiative during early phases of a conflict. Counterland provides the JFC two discrete air operations for engaging enemy land forces: AI, in which air maneuver indirectly supports land maneuver or directly supports an air scheme of maneuver, and CAS, in which air maneuver directly supports land maneuver. D-21. AI delays, disrupts, or destroys the enemys potential before he can use it effectively against friendly forces. It may Reduce the enemys capability to mount an offensive. Restrict the enemys freedom of action and increase vulnerability to friendly attack. Prevent the enemy from countering an increase in friendly strength. Decrease the enemys battlefield reserves. D-22. AI is normally executed by the JFACC as part of a systematic and persistent campaign in support of the JFCs strategy. They include actions against land force targets nominated by the division, which are in a position to have a near-term effect on the divisions operations but are not yet in close proximity to the divisions BCTs. Division nominated AI targets are prioritized by the ARFOR/JFLCC, who is responsible for prioritizing the nomination of all ground force nominated targets. The ARFOR/JFLCC priorities are submitted to the JFACC along with those of all the other functional or service components in theater and the JFCs objectives. AI requires Joint coordination during planning. D-23. AI operations destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemys military potential before he can effectively use it against friendly forces. AI occurs at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. D-24. The conduct of accurate and effective attacks on targets far beyond the divisions forward line of their own troops help to establish the conditions necessary for the conduct of the divisions decisive operation. The JFLCC may provide a portion of the sorties allocated to AI to the division commander. Normally, however, the division commander may only nominate targets for the air commander to attack. D-25. The execution of AI is the responsibility of the JFACC. AI in support of the Army commander disrupts the continuity of the enemys operations. Objectives may include Reducing the enemys capability to employ follow-on forces. Preventing the enemy from countering friendly maneuver. Hindering the enemys ability to resupply his committed forces. D-26. In truly Joint interdependent operations, the Army commander may be the supporting commander during AI operations by using his fire and maneuver forces to cause the enemy to mass or break cover, thus increasing their vulnerability to air attack. The following vignette describes one such scenario.
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OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AIR INTERDICTION om REDLAND forces anticipating a coalition air attack have dispersed their land combat forces into urban areas in an effort to protect and preserve its combat forces in anticipation of a coalition land campaign. The REDLAND forces operating in the 1st Divisions AO are estimated to be operating at 80-percent effective, and are believed to be able to mass into a full capable fighting force in less than 24 hours. REDLANDs battle plan is to launch an effective counterattack against the 1st Division while insurgent forces interdict C/JFLCC lines of communication and logistics. In this phase of the operation, the 1st Division plans to launch an aerial envelopment with a Battalion of the 82nd IBCT on OBJ KAT, an enemy airflield capable of supporting C-130 and C-17 resupply efforts. The 1st Division will follow up the air envelopment with an attack from the 2nd and 5th HBCT and the 2nd SBCT. MISSION At XXXXYYZZZZ, the first Battalion of the 82nd IBCT conducts an aerial envelopment into OBJ KAT in order to seize a forward logistics airfield. COMMANDERS INTENT The purpose of the operation is to seize a forward logistics airfield and to force REDLAND to begin massing its forces in reaction to the operation. The key task is to force the REDLAND forces to mass so they become vulnerable to coalition air attacks, thus reducing their effectiveness to oppose the linkup of the 1st Division at OBJ KAT. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS The 1st Division initiates the air envelopment with 1st BN of the 82nd IBCT to seize OBJ KAT in order to secure a forward logistics base. The JFACC maximizes combat fires against REDLAND forces massing to oppose the seizure of the airfield and any follow on land action by coalition forces. The 1st Division attacks with the 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT in order to link up with the 82nd IBCT at OBJ KAT. PL DAVID is the division limit of advance for this attack. DECISIVE OPERATION The JFACC conducts an air campaign against REDLAND forces to render them combat ineffective to oppose coalition land forces attacking along Highway 1. SHAPING OPERATIONS The 82nd IBCT, the initial main effort, attacks OBJ KAT with an air envelopment in order to capture a forward logistics airfield and to force REDLAND forces to mass its forces to oppose coalition forces. The 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT maneuver to maximize combat power along the FLOT in anticipation of attacking along Highway 1 to link up with 82nd IBCT at OBJ KAT. Once JFACC sufficiently reduced the combat effectiveness of massing REDLAND forces the 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT conduct attack to PL DAVID in order to link up with 82nd IBCT and to conduct a forward passage of lines with 1st HBCT to array forces along PL DAVID. The 1st HBCT follows the 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT. It becomes the divisions main effort after conducting a forward passage of lines with the 2nd HBCT at OBJ KAT and attacks to array forces along PL DAVID. The 75th Fires Brigade priority of fires are the destruction of enemy forces in accordance with JFLACC air offensive; destruction of enemy forces threatening OBJ KAT, destruction of enemy forces along 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT axis of attack, and the continued execution of the divisions counterfire program in the division AO. The 11th Aviation Brigade reinforces the 82nd IBCT in the defense and supply of OBJ KAT; reinforces the 2nd HBCT and 2nd SBCT link up with the 82nd IBCT; and reinforces 1st HBCT effort to secure PL DAVID. The 56th Battle Field Surveillance Brigade supports the JFACCs air campaigns efforts to find, fix, track, and target REDLAND forces massing to oppose 82nd IBCT seizure of OBJ KAT.
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Appendix D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 D-27. Although it is possible to nominate AI targets by specific unit, time, and place of attack, it is generally more effective to describe to the air commander the desired results or objectives. This use of mission-type targets allows the air commander greater flexibility in planning and executing the attack. However, commanders can recommend or request specific munitions against a target that is particularly vulnerable to the munitions requested. An example of a mission-type target is, Delay the 20th Tank Division east of the Orange River until 271800ZOCT." D-28. The divisions AI targeting process does not stop with nomination of the targets or mission-type requests. Refinement of target intelligence is continuous from the time the target nomination is made, to when the target is detected and tracked, and until it is finally attacked. D-29. The division staff must allocate intelligence and surveillance asset to support the combat assessment of targets attacked by both CAS and AI. The division and USAF must share close and continuous intelligence, particularly for targets that have limited dwell time or cannot be accurately located until just prior to attack. (See JP 3-03 for additional information on Joint interdiction operations.) D-30. CAS is an attack against hostile surface forces that are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration into the supported commanders scheme of fires and maneuver. To be successful, CAS must be responsive to the ground commanders needs. CAS targets are selected by the ground commander. CAS is planned, directed, and controlled by elements of the TACS. It enhances surface force operations by providing the capability to deliver a wide range of weapons and massed firepower at decisive points. CAS is conducted to Blunt an enemy attack on a friendly position. Help obtain and maintain the land offensive. Provide cover for friendly movements. D-31. The JFLCC normally distributes his allocation of CAS to subordinate Army commanders who can then sub-distribute their CAS distribution to their subordinate commanders, and so forth. By retaining control over a significant portion of the CAS sorties, the Corps/Division commander can shift priorities, weight his effort, and rapidly respond to emerging opportunities without shifting CAS sorties from one BCT to another. The combination of CAS with attack helicopters and artillery can produce a highly effective Joint air attack team. D-32. Recent technological advances in aircraft capabilities, weapons systems and munitions have provided JTACs additional tools to maximize effects of fires while mitigating risk of fratricide when employing air power in close proximity to friendly forces. GPS-equipped aircraft and munitions, laser range finders/designators and digital system capabilities are technologies that can be exploited in the CAS mission area. The following terminal attack control procedures exploit advances in technology. D-33. There are three types of terminal attack control. Each type follows a set of procedures with an associated risk. The commander considers the situation and issues guidance to the JTAC based on recommendations from his staff and associated risks identified in the tactical risk assessment. The intent is to offer the lowest-level supported commander, within the constraints established during risk assessment, the latitude to determine which type of terminal attack control best accomplishes the mission. The following three types of control are not ordnance specific: TYPE 1used by JTACs when the risk assessment requires them to visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target under attack. It may have been determined, during the tactical risk assessment process, that analysis of attacking aircraft nose position and geometry is the best method of ensuring first pass success and fratricide mitigation under the existing conditions. Language barriers when controlling coalition aircraft, lack of confidence in a particular platform, ability to operate in adverse weather, aircrew capability, or troops in contact situations are examples where visual means of terminal attack control is the method of choice. TYPE 2used when the JTAC desires control of individual attacks but assesses that either visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or
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when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons release/launch. Examples are night, adverse weather, high threat tactics, and high altitude and standoff weapons employment. Successful CAS attacks under these conditions depend on timely and accurate targeting data. When delivering GPS/INS or unguided weapons on GPS coordinates, attack aircraft will confirm targeting location with the JTAC or the FAC(A). When employing unguided munitions using Type 2 control, consideration must be given to host aircraft navigation/weapons system accuracy. Inaccurate navigation/weapon systems can result in extensive miss distances. Weapon time of flight will be a factor relative to movement of enemy targets and friendly forces when employing standoff weapons incapable of receiving targeting updates throughout the duration of flight. Detailed planning and preparation by both the JTAC and the aircrew are required to identify the situations and locations conducive to standoff weapons attacks, and to address flight profile and deconfliction (aircraft/weaponry/terrain) considerations. Digital or data link systems capable of displaying aircraft track, sensor point of interest, etc., significantly enhance situational awareness that better enable the JTAC to authorize weapons release when the JTAC is unable to visually acquire the attacking aircraft. TYPE 3used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose low risk of fratricide. When commanders authorize Type 3 control, JTACs grant a blanket weapons release clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a target or targets which meet the prescribed restrictions set by the JTAC. Attack aircraft flight leaders may then initiate attacks within the parameters imposed by the JTAC. Observers may be equipped and in a position to provide terminal guidance to attack aircraft. The JTAC will monitor radio transmissions and other available digital information to maintain control of the attacks. The JTAC maintains abort authority throughout the attack. D-34. Because there is no requirement for the JTAC to visually acquire the target or attack aircraft in Type 2 or 3 control, JTACs may be required to coordinate CAS attacks using targeting information from an observer. An observer may be a scout, COLT, FIST, UAS, SOF, or other asset with real time targeting information. The JTAC maintains control of the attacks, making clearance or abort calls based on the information provided by other observers or targeting sensors. The JTAC must consider the timeliness and accuracy of targeting information when relying on any form of remote targeting. (See JP 3-09.3 for additional information on CAS.)
AIRLIFT
D-35. Airlift is the transportation of personnel and materiel through the air, which can be applied across the entire range of military operations to achieve or support objectives and can achieve tactical through strategic effects. Airlift provides rapid and flexible mobility options that allow military forces as well as national and international governmental agencies to respond to and operate in a wider variety of circumstances and time frames. It provides US military forces the global reach capability to quickly apply strategic global power to various crisis situations worldwide by delivering necessary forces. The power projection capability for airlift supplies is vital since it provides the flexibility to get rapid-reaction forces to the point of a crisis with minimum delay. Airlift can serve as American presence worldwide, demonstrating our resolve, as well as serve as a constructive force during times of humanitarian crisis or natural disaster. D-36. USAF airlift missions encompass passenger and cargo movement, combat employment, and sustainment, aeromedical evacuation, special operations support, and operational support airlift. These missions can be tasked in a variety of ways: Channel, Air Mobility Express (a special category of Channel), special assignment airlift mission (SAAM), special air mission (SAM), Joint airborne/air transportability training (JA/ATT), or exercise and contingency missions. These missions are executed using four delivery concepts that work together to provide efficient and effective mobility: airland, airdrop, hub-and-spoke, and direct delivery. D-37. Airlift is designed to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces by the timely movement, delivery, and recovery of personnel and equipment. Airlift allows the JFC to maneuver fighting forces to exploit an enemys weakness. Airlift may be categorized as either strategic or theater. Divisions
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Appendix D
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requests for strategic or intertheater airlift are handled by the USAF AMLO supporting the division through TRANSCOM channels. Division requests for tactical or intratheater airlift support are handled through Army logistic channels, with variations for the immediacy of the request. D-38. Airlift may involve the airdrop, extraction, or air-landing of ground forces and supplies when supporting division full spectrum operations or when evacuating casualties. Airlift may also support the division operations by transporting an airborne BCT or battalion to conduct a vertical envelopment or by conducting aerial resupply when the division is conduct nonlinear and noncontiguous operations. See JP 3-17 for additional information concerning air mobility.
SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE

D-39. Surveillance is the function of systematically observing air, space, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance is a continuing process, not oriented to a specific target. In response to the requirements of military forces, surveillance must be designed to provide warning of enemy initiatives and threats and to detect changes in enemy activities. D-40. Air and space-based surveillance assets exploit elevation to detect enemy initiatives at long range. For example, its extreme elevation makes space-based missile-launch detection and tracking indispensable for defense against ballistic missile attack. Surveillance assets are now essential to national and theater defense and to the security of air, space, subsurface, and surface forces. D-41. Reconnaissance complements surveillance by obtaining specific information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy through visual observation or other detection methods; or by securing data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. This can be an important part of the divisions targeting process. The locations and activities targeted for reconnaissance and surveillance can also reveal important civil considerations during operations focused on the conduct of stability operations. Reconnaissance generally has a time constraint associated with the tasking. The division G-2 normally handles preplanned requests for aerial reconnaissance; the appropriate TACP handles immediate requests. (See Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5.2 for additional information on this air operational function.)
WEATHER SERVICES
D-42. Weather services conducted by the USAF provide timely and accurate environmental information, including both space environment and atmospheric weather, to commanders for their objectives and plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Weather services gathers, analyzes, and provides meteorological data for mission planning and execution. Environmental information is integral to the decision process and timing for employing forces and planning and conducting air, ground, and space launch operations. Weather services also influences the selection of targets, routes, weapon systems, and delivery tactics, and are a key element of information superiority. (See JP 3-59 for additional information on this subject.)
COMMON AIRSPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL MEASURES

D-43. A high concentration of friendly surface, sub-surface, and air-launched weapon systems must share the airspace without unnecessarily hindering the application of combat power in accordance with the JFCs intent. The primary goal of airspace control is to enhance combat effectiveness of the Joint force. Basic principles of airspace control include the following: The airspace control system (ACS) must support JFC objectives and facilitate unity of effort. A major reason for close coordination between airspace control, air traffic control (ATC), and AD elements is to reduce the risk of friendly fires and increase the effectiveness of AD. Close liaison and coordination among all airspace users inside and outside the operational area is necessary to promote timely and accurate information flow to airspace managers.
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Airspace control procedures provide maximum flexibility through an effective mix of positive and procedural control measures. Procedural control measures need to be uncomplicated and readily accessible to all forces. The ACS in the combat zone must have a reliable, jam resistant, and secure communications network. Air control assets comprising the overall ACS need to be survivable and redundant because they are likely to be prime targets for an attacker. The structure of the ACS needs to be responsive to developing enemy threats and to the unfolding operation. Airspace control functions rely on ASM resources, but these functions are separate and distinct from real-time control of air vehicles and the terminal ATC environment. Flexibility and simplicity must be emphasized throughout to maximize the effectiveness of forces operating within the system. Airspace control needs to support 24-hour operations in all-weather and environmental conditions. D-44. The methods of airspace control range from positive control of all air assets in an airspace control area to procedural control of all such assets, or any effective combination of the two. Air control points and systems need to accommodate these methods based on component, Joint, and national capabilities and requirements. Positive control relies on radars, other sensors, identification, friend or foe/selective identification features, digital data links, and other elements of the AD system to positively identify, track, and direct air assets. Procedural control relies on airspace coordinating measures such as Comprehensive AD identification procedures and rules of engagement. Low level transit routes. Minimum-risk routes. Aircraft identification maneuvers. Fire support coordinating measures. Coordinating altitudes. Restricted operations zones/restrictive fire areas. Standard-use Army aircraft flight routes. High-density airspace control zones. D-45. See JP 3-52 and FM 3-52 for additional information concerning airspace C2 measures. Multiservice publication, FM 3-09.34, discusses the use of kill boxes as an FSCM.
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Appendix E
Network Operations
This appendix provides division commanders and staff members an understanding of systems and personnel that comprise the communications network at division and below. It also provides brief overviews of the related mission responsibilities of the division G-6 and division network support company (NSC) and the brigade and battalion level communications capabilities and responsibilities.
OVERVIEW
E-1. As the primary tactical and operational war fighting headquarters the division requires a robust communications and network architecture supported by network operations personnel at division and below. The division is supported by organic G-6 section network operations (network management, information dissemination management and information assurance) personnel and by the network transport personnel and assets within the division NSC. These personnel and assets install, operate, maintain, manage and defend the federations of networks. The federation of networks collectively enables joint and expeditionary battle command. The network enables leaders with minimal forward presence to command and control (C2) maneuver formations, sustain the force, and achieve broad political-military objectives across the full spectrum of operations. It is an integrated entity and pervasive throughout the battlespace and touches every entity, to include the individual Soldier. The network as a critical weapon in the fight must be robust, redundant, flexible and adaptive to the commander.
DIVISION G-6
E-2. The division G-6 is the senior signal officer in charge of the division information network and has the level of experience to anticipate the need to dynamically change the network in support of division commanders scheme of maneuver. The G-6 derives his authority to control the network from the division commander; this authority empowers him to utilize all signal equipment and personnel for the successful completion of his mission. The successful accomplishment of the mission implies that all signal training requirements are met prior to employment. The G-6 is accountable for all network transport, network services and the viability of information systems across the force. He controls these network assets via the Network Operations and Security Centers (NOSCs) and utilizes the technical service order (TSO), much like the division G-3 uses the FRAGO to control the maneuver forces under the division. The G-6 network responsibilities encompass all the management and control of the entire federation of networks. The NOSC enables the G-6 to monitor the health of the network in support of the command. The division G-6 is organized and resourced to provide NETOPS support to the division command posts (TAC1, TAC2 and the main CP). The G-6 utilizes NETOPS functions to synchronize disparate division unit networks into one division information network, as a part of the Land-War-Net and Global Information Grid (GIG). It should be noted that the NETOPS functions performed in the subordinate support brigades and BCTs provide a second echelon of NETOPS management that the division G-6 coordinates as part of the greater NETOPS plan. Figure E-1 provides a recommended G-6 organization.
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Appendix E_____________________________________________________________________________
Figure E-1. G-6 Section Organization
DIVISION G-6 ORGANIZATION

E-3. C4 Plans Division. The C4 plans division is responsible for developing future plans and Annex K to the order, performing joint task force and ASCC coordination, and service provisioning planning for the division. E-4. C4 Operations Division. The C4 Operations division consists of the command post (CP) G-6 section and the NETOPS section. E-5. CP G-6 Section. This section performs the following functions: CP operations. Help desk and trouble tickets. Information system support (for example, Army Battle Command System [ABCS]). LAN management. Battlefield video teleconferencing. TOC collaboration services. TOC combat net radio systems. Services for division. Server operations. Messaging services. Storage and discovery services. IDM services. Information management/ISSO mission. E-6. NETOPS Section. This section performs the following functions:
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________________________________________________________________________Network Operations
Division wide area network (WAN) operations. Network management. Information assurance. Spectrum management. Develops and implements current plans. Develops TSOs. E-7. C4 Support Division. This division Coordinates and tracks modernization, sustainment, and maintenance. Coordinates contractor support and collective training. Training, readiness, and oversight (TRO) for BCT joint network node (JNN) teams.
DIVISION G-6 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

E-8. The G-6 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning communications and networks. The G-6 has the technical authority over the division information networks to include TRO of the NSC. The G6 is responsible for planning, designing, and directing the NSC to execute the C4 plan in support of the division commanders intent. In executing the commanders intent, the G-6 directs any technical changes to the network. To make physical moves to signal equipment, the G-6 recommends FRAGOs to direct such movement to the G-3. He is responsible for advising the division commander, staff, and subordinate commanders on C4 operational matters (staff responsibilities, technical authority, and TRO).
Staff Responsibilities
E-9. G-6 staff responsibilities include the following: Prepares, maintains, and updates C4 operations estimates, plans, and orders. Such orders often will cause for configuration management changes across multiple brigades. Monitors and makes recommendations on all technical C4 operations. Acts as the ARFOR G-6 when needed. (Equipment and personnel augmentation will be required to support this mission). Advises the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders on C4 operations and network priorities for battle command (for example, changing bandwidth allocation to support the division main efforta brigade reinforced with additional ISR assets). Directs technical changes to all portions of the division network via the TSO process. Act as the JTF J-6, if required. (Equipment and personnel augmentation will be required to support this mission and will be provided by the corps and/or ASCC as necessary.) Develops, produces, changes/updates, and distributes SOI. Prepares/publishes C4 operation's SOPs for division CPs. Coordinates, plans, and manages division spectrum within its area of operations. Plans and coordinates with higher and lower headquarters regarding information systems upgrade, replacement, elimination, and integration. In coordination with G-2, G-3, and G7, coordinates, plans, directs all IA activities and C4 operations vulnerability and risk assessments. In coordination with the staff, actively coordinates with a variety of external agencies to develop the information and communications plans, manages the information network, obtains required services, and supports mission requirements. Confirms and validates user information requirements in direct response to the tactical mission. Establishes C4 policies and procedures for the use and management of information tools and resources.
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Technical Authority Responsibilities

E-10. G-6 technical authority responsibilities include the following: Provides signal unit operations sections with direction and guidance during preparation of network plans and diagrams establishing the information network (WAN), including business and intel WANs. Plans and integrates information systems and battle command equipment due to unit task organization/reorganization. In coordination with the ASCC and JTF, plans and directs all NETOPS activities within the division AO. Utilizes the NOSC as his eye and ears to the network, also leverages the tools provided by the NOSC to manage and reconfigure the network as warranted.
TRO Responsibilities
E-11. G-6 TRO responsibilities include the following: Ensures the development of required skills to all signal personnel within the division AO. In coordination with the G-1, identifies requirements and manages the distribution of signal personnel within the division. In coordination with the G-3, monitors and provides oversight for information dissemination to change warfighting function priorities and control measures within the division AO. Ensures automation systems and administration procedures for all automation hardware and software employed by the division are compliant with the GIG procedures and standards or Army specifications. Ensures, in coordination with the special troops battalion (STB) staff, the division NSC is trained to support division missions and tasks during home station training events and deployments.
DIVISION G-6 NETWORK OPERATIONS AND SECURITY CENTER

E-12. The division G-6 employs a fully integrated NOSC providing NETOPS functions for the division. All division signal elements must coordinate with the NOSC during the engineering, installation, operation, maintenance, management and defense of the division information network. The division NOSC has overall responsibility for establishing the division information network and provides the operational and technical support to all of the division signal elements in its AO. E-13. The division NOSC performs the NETOPS activities, functions, and tasks required to create a dynamic and responsive network that quickly shifts priorities in order to support the ground tactical plan. This management function extends the strategic GIGs capabilities into the responsive, dynamic tactical formations. In order to increase responsiveness of a complex network and to facilitate the bandwidth required to support the division headquarters and brigade networks, the division employs a NETOPS cell with the network service center. The network service center flattens the disparate time-division-multipleaccess (TDMA) satellite network structure and increases the bandwidth capability from approximately 6 Mbps to 40 Mbps, while the embedded NETOPS cell provides the management to enable the division network. The personnel composition of the NETOPS cell is supporting the network service center is METT-TC driven. E-14. In addition to expanding bandwidth, the division has the capability to dynamically reassign the bandwidth so that the communications support plan can match the division commanders ground tactical plan. An example of this capability is the division designating a BCT as the main effort for an assault. As the main effort, the division commander gives the BCT a direct UAS/sensor feed that must be broadcasted across the entire network. The division G-6 matches the communications support plan enabling the added, non-organic, capability by allocating a larger segment of the division enabled bandwidth. The division
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network service center provides an unprecedented capability that quickly provides capabilities to those who need it to enable the ground tactical plan. E-15. Division NOSC responsibilities include the following: in coordination with subordinate organizations, monitors, manages and ensures implementation of ESM/NM, CS/IDM, and IA/CND activities. Provides near real-time awareness of division networks and systems to the division G-6 and supporting service theater network operations and service center (STNOSC). Coordinates actions to resolve attacks/incidents on the division network with the STNOSC and subordinate organizations. Coordinates operational procedures and requirements for IA/CND and information systems security (ISS) with the supporting ASCC Regional Computer Emergency Response Team (RCERT). in coordination with division NSC monitors, manages, and controls intra-division information network components. Monitors the operation of the networks in the divisions subordinate units. Provides support and assistance to the subordinate NOSCs as required. Administers the organizational message system (Defense Message System) in the division, including managing network addresses and sub-domains. Coordinates operation and maintenance support of C4 systems attached to support deployed division forces with the split-base and reach operations capability to the home base. Shares ESM/NM information with other management or monitoring centers. Provides the supporting STNOSC with near real-time information on the status and performance of inter-division networks. Orders and accounts for all forms of COMSEC material, including storing keys in encrypted form and performing key generation and automatic key distribution. Performs COMSEC material accounting functions and communicates with other COMSEC elements. Performs CS/IDM functions to support all aspects of relevant information dissemination. Provides near real-time awareness of division networks and system that support the joint backbone to the JTF JCCC when the division is serving as the ARFOR. Informs the G-6 of network outages and shortcomings that require the electronic maintenance shop to rectify.
Division Network Support Company Organization

E-16. The division NSC is subordinate to the division special troops battalion and consists of the headquarters and network extension and the CP support detachments. In order to ensure the support of the division commanders intent, the division NSC installs, operates and maintains the network under the technical authority and oversight of the division G-6. The divisionG-6 technical authority and oversight ensures the division network personnel and equipment are trained and maintained at the levels required to be successful.
Headquarters and Network Extension Detachment

E-17. The headquarters and network extension detachment links the main CP with higher, adjacent, and subordinate HQs and support activities. It provides logistics and maintenance support to the division NSC and consists of the company headquarters section, and the signal maintenance section and the network hub platoon and main CP support platoon. The detachment provides network control and configuration, spectrum management, information management/CND, network hubs, TDMA and FDMA satellite connectivity, and configures the main CP data network.
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Company and Detachment Headquarters. The company headquarters provides C2 to the company and is responsible for the administration and logistics support. The detachment headquarters provides the detachment C2 and limited NETOPS support. Signal Maintenance Section. The signal maintenance section provides limited maintenance and logistics support for organic division NSC signal equipment. The section performs unit level maintenance on special organic network equipment, such as the JNN suite of equipment. The maintenance section prioritizes repairs based on commanders, NETOPS and G-6 assessments. It also facilitates troubleshooting of all other C-E equipment in the company and manages the companys C-E prescribed load list (PLL) stock. The C-E maintenance team evacuates equipment that cannot be repaired at the unit level to the brigades sustainment battalion contact team. If further maintenance is needed, the equipment will either be supported by contract maintenance (COTS replacements) or depot level rebuild. Network Hub Platoon. The Network Hub Platoon consists of the TDMA and FDMA multiband sections, the Baseband and Hub Support Sections. It installs, operates and maintains the network hubs and satellite connectivity to the GIG. Main Support Platoon. The main support platoon installs, operates and maintains the JNN supporting the main CP.
CP Support Detachment
E-18. The CP Support Detachment consists of two platoons designed to support the division TAC1 and TAC2 CPs. These platoons have like capabilities and personnel and provide the following services for the two CPs BLOS and LOS connectivity. Tactical messaging. Secure voice (tactical and DSN). NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS (Limited). Defense Red Switch Network. Video teleconferencing. Install and administers CP networks. Voice radio (SC SATCOM, HF, SINCGARS). Voice radio range extension. Help desk.
COMMUNICATIONS AT BRIGADE AND BELOW

E-19. The brigade and battalion S-6s have the overall responsibility for the information network at brigade and below, positioning themselves and S-6 section members where best to control and manage the network. Though not in direct control of all signal assets, the S-6 plans, coordinates, and directs the execution of the communications support plan. The equipping and fielding of increased network and systems enablers (for example BFT, CSS SATCOM, and JNN) require the brigade and battalion S-6 coordinate, both internal and external, more than in the past to ensure the success of the communications plan. E-20. The brigade S-6 is the primary mentor for the brigade signal staff, NSC commander and the battalion S-6s. This relationship is even more critical with the addition of embedded wideband signal connectivity down to the battalion level and the SIGCEN recommendation to move all NETOPS personnel from the NSC under the brigade S-6. This mentorship relationship extends into the technical employment and capability apportionment of wideband resources to his subordinate S-6s. Although the BCT S-6 does not direct any physical movement to the subordinate communications elements, he does provide technical guidance on the installation techniques, as well as the services used on the network assets.
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E-21. The battalion S-6 is responsible for supervision of all automated information systems, NM, and IA. As an active member of the staff planning cell performing MDMP, he is the primary signal operations planner. He determines the supportability and feasibility of the signal plan versus the scheme of maneuver. Early involvement in the MDMP by the battalion S-6 is critical to the successful development of a comprehensive and complimentary signal plan.
DIVISION COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

E-22. This chapter provides an overview of the different systems that comprise the federation of networks installed, operated, maintained, managed and defended by the division G-6, brigade and battalion S-6s and supporting NSCs. Commanders and staff within the division must be familiar with the capabilities of these communications systems. The network enables leaders with minimal forward presence to C2 maneuver formations, sustain the force, and achieve broad political-military objectives across the full spectrum of operations. It is an integrated entity and pervasive throughout the battlespace and touches every entity, to include the individual Soldier. The network as a critical weapon in the fight must be robust, redundant, flexible and adaptive to the commander. These signal leaders must be aware of the various networks that are required by the different warfighting functions, many of which are not directly installed, operated or maintained by signal personnel.
COMBAT NET RADIO

E-23. The primary role of the CNR is voice transmission for C2 and assumes a secondary role for data transmission where other data capabilities do not exist. The CNR is primarily designed around the SINCGARS, the single-channel TACSAT, and the HF radio but more tactical radios with these or like capabilities are found at division and below. Each of these systems has different capabilities and transmission characteristics. E-24. Table E-1 provides a sampling of the different CNR and tactical radio systems available to elements of the division staff. (See FMI 6-02.43 for additional capability and planning information on CNR and tactical radio systems.)
Table E-1. CNR and Tactical Radios Listing FM SINCGARS AN/PRC-127A Soldier Intercom Land Warrior ICOM F43G Single Channel Satellite AN/PSC-11 AN/PSC-3 AN/PSC-5 HF AN/VRC-100 AN/PRC-104A AN/GRC-194A AN/GRC-213A Multi-band AN/PRC-150 AN/PRC-117F AN/PRC-148 Data EPLRS JTIDS MIDS NTDR
JNTC-S EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

E-25. The JNTC-S JNN is the network enabler fielded to provide timely, network enabled support to tactical modular formations. This JNTC-S capability provides connectivity from battalion to the GIG. The major components of the JNTC-S are the network service center (fixed, mobile and tactical) and the JNN assemblages employed at the different echelons. These systems, to include the terrestrial and non-terrestrial communications systems, are covered below.
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Command Post Node

E-26. The CP node is primarily fielded to the battalion-level headquarters but can be used to augment CP at other echelons. It consists of a support vehicle, a trailer mounted 2.4-meter satellite dish, and two transit cases. The CP node operates in the TDMA satellite architecture providing Secret data and voice over internet protocol (VOIP) phone services. This architecture allows the battalion data network to terminate into the JNN and network service centers.
JNN
E-27. The JNN is the communications package deployed at division and brigade levels. The JNN enables independent operations and direct termination into the theater network, GIG or directly into a joint headquarters. The JNN has voice and data switching equipment allowing independent operations and enabling both circuit switching and Internet Protocol (IP) based networking. The JNN will work with existing terrestrial transport (high capacity line-of-sight [HCLOS] and LOS), ground mobile forces (GMF) (AN/TSC-85/93), TROPO Scatter (AN/TRC-170), Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T) (AN/TSC-154), and when available, commercial Ku-band satellite or Ka-band satellite. Ku-band Satellite Terminals E-28. The Ku-band satellite terminal uses commercial bandwidth and satellites to fill existing military satellite capabilities gap and comes in three sizes to perform three different missions: The regional network service center utilizes the 4.2-meter satellite dish. The ASCC and division network service centers utilize the 3.7-meter satellite dish. The CP node and JNN utilize the 2.4-meter satellite dish. The satellite dishes are capable of entering both the FDMA Ku-band and TDMA Ku-band networks (See Figure E-2 and E-3).
Figure E-2. 3.7 meter satellite dish
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Figure E-3. 2.4 meter satellite dish E-29. The FDMA capability allows for dedicated bandwidth to provide circuit connectivity to joint headquarters or to existing teleports. The TDMA network allows deployed units to directly manage and allocate satellite bandwidth. AN/TRC-190(V)3 E-30. The AN/TRC-190(V)3 is paired with a JNN and equipped with three High Capacity Line-of-Sight Radio Systems (HCLOS) providing a high bandwidth LOS capability when terrestrial LOS exists. The HCLOS is a terrestrial, microwave radio system capable of eight Mbps of data throughput.
Network Service Center

E-31. The network service center links the TDMA and FDMA Ku-band architectures. Additionally, the network service center allows for the termination, reallocation, and control of network bandwidth. Network support centers are fielded in three variants: a fixed regional network service center, mobile ASCC network service center and tactical division network service centers. Regional Network Service Center. The regional network service center is a fixed center located in each RCC AOR and supported by ASCC signal force structure. Complimenting the strategic, fixed brigade are the NETCOM strategic tactical signal brigades. ASCC tactical signal brigades will employ mobile network service centers to reinforce the division with general support communications and ASCC deployable units with direct support communications. The ASCC signal brigade commanders, under the direction of NETCOM, are primarily responsible for connecting the forward deployed ARFOR into the GIG. Division Network Support Center. The division network service center is a smaller tactical communications platform that allows a division headquarters to control and prioritize network resources. The division network service center also enables the headquarters to receive the larger bandwidth data files required at that level of command.
MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT

E-32. MSE has various integrated components to ensure mobile and static subscribers have voice, data, and video capabilities. These capabilities support the subscribers communications no matter where they are in the MSE network area of operation. Major MSE components and their capabilities are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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Node Center Switch

E-33. Node centers provide essential switching, traffic control, and access points for MSE. After determining the coverage area, node centers are allocated to establish a corps MSE grid network. Node centers are primarily linked by LOS radios to provide communications throughout the system via the node center switch. Cable connects TACSAT and TROPO systems to the node center. If one node center is disabled, the system automatically routes communications through another node center. The node center switch serves as an access point for Large Extension Nodes (LENs), Small Extension Nodes (SENs), Radio Access Units (RAUs), system control center-2s (SCC-2s), and ISYSCON.
Forced Entry Switch (FES)

E-34. The FES combines the essential functions of the node center switch, LEN, NMF, and an RAU into one shelter. The FES, combined with an LOS AN/TRC-198, comprises the contingency communications package (CCP). LEN. The LEN switch provides wired communications for personnel at large CPs. A LEN switch enables up to 164-wired subscribers to communicate freely using automatic flood search routing. SEN. The SEN switch supports the communications needs of smaller CPs. The AN/TTC-48(V)1 can support 26-wired subscribers and the (V)2 can support 41 wired subscribers. RAU. The RAU, AN/TRC-191, is a fully automatic radio interface for MSRT subscribers. It connects directly to the node center by cable or remotely via LOS radio. The planning range between the MSRT and RAU is 15 kilometers (9.3 miles).
Integrated Systems Control Center (ISYSCON)

E-35. ISYSCON is the automated, theater-wide, tactical-communications network-management system used to plan, configure, monitor and control the entire spectrum of military tactical-communications systems. ISYSCON features include mission-plan management, network planning and engineering, battlefield-frequency-spectrum management, tactical-packet-network management and wide-area-network management. AN/TRC-190(V)1. The AN/TRC-190(V)1 is an LOS multichannel radio terminal. It provides point-to-point UHF radio links using the AN/GRC-226(P) radio set between various nodes of the MSE system. The (V)1 is equipped with one AB-1339 mast with Band I and Band III antennas. The planning range of the UHF radio is 40 kilometers (28 miles). AN/TRC-190(V)2. The AN/TRC-190(V)2 is an LOS multichannel radio terminal. It provides point-to-point UHF radio links using the AN/GRC-226(P) radio set between various nodes of the MSE system. The (V)2 is equipped with two AN/GRC-226(P) radio sets (one online and one spare) and one AB-1339 mast with Band I and Band III antennas. The planning range of the UHF radio is 40 kilometers (28 miles). The (V)2 typically deploys as an analog interface to NATO forces. AN/TRC-190(V)3. The AN/TRC-190(V)3 is an LOS multichannel radio terminal. It provides point-to-point UHF radio links using the AN/GRC-226(P) radio set between various nodes of the MSE system. The (V)3 is equipped with four AN/GRC-226(P) radio sets (three online and one spare) and three AB-1339 masts with two Band I and two Band III antennas. The planning range of the UHF radio is 40 kilometers (28 miles). Each radio link supports a single, full-duplex, group-level connection and a single DVOW channel. The (V)3 typically deploys with the node center switch and is a radio relay. AN/TRC-190(V)4. The AN/TRC-190(V)4 is an LOS multichannel radio terminal. It provides point-to-point UHF radio links using the AN/GRC-226(P) radio set between various nodes of the MSE system. Each radio link supports a single, full-duplex, group-level connection and a single DVOW channel. The AN/TRC-190 (V)4 is equipped with two AN/GRC-226(P) radio sets (two online) and two AB-1339 masts with Band I and Band III antennas. The planning range of the
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UHF radio is 40 kilometers (28 miles). If the AN/TRC-190 (V)4 has an AN/GRC-224(P) radio set installed, it can provide a short-range, down the hill, and point-to-point.
COMMAND POST OF THE FUTURE

E-36. The command post of the future (CPOF) is a collaborative application that allows users to collect, collate, display, map, and analyze data collectively or individually in real time. It provides planning and mapping tools to support the Commanders battle management and information operations processes by rapidly processing and correlating combat information from all available sources. It provides commanders and their staff with an advanced distributed, collaborative decision making environment, thus eliminating fixed CPs and enable a true mobile, distributed command. E-37. CPOF is an information-centric tool that provides real-time knowledge sharing that impacts team effectiveness and decision making. The highly intuitive visualizations allow officers to quickly review one anothers data to support the unique demands of battlefield awareness. E-38. CPOF is a client-server application. Multiple CPOF clients are connected to a common suite of core servers through standard socket connections, utilizing a variety of different protocols. The CPOF client hosts the MAYA Viz CoMotion/CPOF (referred to as the CoMotion Client), the Oculus Command Sight application, the underlying MapManager map cache, and the CPOF Open Phone client.
ARMY BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM

E-39. ABCS is the integration of primarily user-owned and operated battlefield automated systems (BAS) in tactical environments, in developed and undeveloped theaters, and in fixed installations and mobile facilities. These information subsystems access critical warfighting functional area information resident on other systems in a seamless and secure manner. The ABCS sub-systems are listed below: Global Command and Control System-Army (GCCS-A). Maneuver Control System (MCS). All Source Analysis System (ASAS). Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS) and Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3). Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System (AMDPCS). Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2). Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS). Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS). Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS). Integrated Systems Control (ISYSCON).
BLUE FORCE TRACKING (BFT)

E-40. The BFT system is a satellite-based tracking and communication system that provides the commander eyes-on the friendly forces and can also be used to send and receive text messages. It operates with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) software. The BFT contains the computer hardware and software, interconnecting cables, L-Band satellite transceiver, a Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR), a Mission Data Loader to transfer larger files, and an installation kit appropriate to the host vehicle type (if applicable).
TROJAN SPIRIT
E-41. Trojan SPIRIT is primarily a military intelligence Soldier operated system that is a critical network enabler for the commander and the intelligence warfighting function. It is currently the primary network
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capability connecting the deployed user to Top Secret/Secret Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) networks including the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and the National Security Agency (NSA) net. E-42. Seventeen locations within the division have now been identified as requiring TS/SCI points of presence or connectivity (to include three per BCT). Currently there are two Trojan SPIRITs designated for the division, one Trojan SPIRIT for the BCT headquarters, and the remaining will be tunneled through the CP node at maneuver battalion level. Figure E-4 depicts Trojan SPIRIT network components with TS/SCI being tunneled through the CP node at maneuver battalion level.
Figure E-4. Trojan SPIRIT network components
CSS SATCOM
E-43. The CSS SATCOM is a user-owned and operated system that provides increased throughput meeting speed of service requirements; provides a robust and redundant communications architecture; provides a constant connection that supports portable fixed IP addressing, quality of service and NM; and distributes logistics information in a flat network topology. CSS SATCOM enables the logistical support elements in the brigade to travel with the maneuver formation during combat operations, set up at the quick halt, and continue to provide connectivity to joint logistics through all subsequent phases of operations from stability to redeployment. E-44. CSS SATCOM inserts commercial C2 technology directly into the maneuver and support platform to allow combat operations on the move. CSS SATCOM inserts commercial technology directly enabling the management of support platforms equipped with radio frequency identification, Movement Tracking System, Defense Transportation Reporting and Control System, Vistar's Global Wave and other commercial tracking systems, allowing support operations on the move. CSS SATCOM integrates existing
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COTS hardware and software and management schemes into new and standardized packages, enabling a modular force. Figures E-5 provides an example of the unclassified CSS SATCOM connectivity and additional CSS SATCOM features.
Figure E-5. Unclassified logistics network connectivity
SECURE ENROUTE MISSION PLANNING IMPROVED (SECOMP-I)

E-45. SECOMP-I is an integrated voice and data communications system providing collaborative, en-route mission planning and rehearsal capabilities through high-quality voice and data communications for forces en-route aboard U.S. Air Force aircraft to the area of deployment. E-46. SECOMP-I enables joint tactical forces to arrive at their deployment destinations fully briefed on the most current situation, intelligence reports and plan updates available. Figure E-6 provides an example of a mission thread performed with SECOMP-I. Dismountable capability for initial ground communications. Noise cancellation headsets allow operators to monitor or transmit on any of the radios in a noisy environment. Roll-on/roll-off capability allows system to be easily loaded onto USAF C-17/C-130 aircraft using self-contained, wheeled transit cases. Operates on-board Army Theater Support Vessels. Enables Army and joint C2 application collaboration. Hatch-mounted antennas for VHF/UHF LOS, TACSAT and INMARSAT requirements on C130J aircraft. GPS capability.
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Figure E-6. Example of SECOMP-I mission thread
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Appendix F
Army Airspace Command and Control at Division

Joint forces use airspace to conduct air operations, deliver fires, employ air defense artillery (ADA) assets, and conduct intelligence operations. Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) is the Armys operational approach to accomplishing the functional activity of airspace control. A2C2 does not denote that any airspace contiguous to the battlefield or any other geographical dimension of airspace is designated Army airspace, but refers to the Army users of the airspace. Neither does it imply command of any asset that is not assigned or under operational control to an Army commander (FM 3-52, Chapter 2). Division commanders use A2C2 to command and control (C2) the divisions airspace users while integrating division operations with other Joint airspace users. A2C2 is part of the Army Air Ground System (AAGS), which is a component of the Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS). A2C2 Enhances C2 and synchronizes forces using the airspace. Aims to maximize the combat effectiveness of all airspace users and minimize restrictions and adverse impact on capabilities.
THEATER AIR-GROUND SYSTEM

F-1. To fully understand the relationship of the A2C2 systems to TAGS, A2C2 personnel must understand each services system and its composition and structure. F-2. TAGS is not a complete and separate system for airspace management within a theater of operations. It combines each services airspace management system that supports the JFC. Nor is TAGS a transparent airspace management system. It provides the framework that allows each service's system to exist in a Joint and coalition force environment that supports the JFC. TAGS is not a formal system in itself, but rather the sum of the component air-ground systems operating in the theater. It applies to all theater operations to include air, ground, maritime, and amphibious operations. (Figure F-1 is a notional arrangement used to demonstrate TAGS. Not all of the elements must be in place for all operations.) F-3. In addition to AAGS, TAGS integrates the United States Air Force (USAF) Theater Air Control System, the Navy Tactical Air Control System, and the Marine Air Command and Control System. F-4. As the airspace management component of the AAGS, A2C2 elements develop standing operating procedures (SOPs) to facilitate A2C2 operations, which consistently follow Joint airspace procedures defined in JP 3-52. A2C2 staff elements are organic to modular forces, brigade and higher. The modular BCT and support brigades (except sustainment) contain a version of an Air Defense Airspace Management/Brigade Aviation Element (ADAM/BAE) responsible for integrating brigade A2C2, to include air and missile defense and aviation functions. Both the division and the corps (3-star UEx) contain an A2C2 cell in their TAC CP(s). The ASCC contains an A2C2 cell in the Operational Command Post (CP). The ASCC also has airspace managers as part of the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), which is the ASCCs combined arms LNO organization to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) airspace control authority (ACA) air operations center (AOC).
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Appendix F
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
DIVISION A2C2
F-5. The division A2C2 cell is the G-3s principal organization responsible for managing airspace use. The A2C2 cell is part of the TAC CPs force application element that integrates the airspace use of other division elements of the AAGS, such as FEC. Air mobility division (AMD) operations cell. Aviation and air component planning and execution cell with an air liaison officer (ALO), air support operations center (ASOC), and tactical air control party (TACP). Subordinate brigades. F-6. The A2C2 cell also supports other C2 elements of the division, the main CP, and the mobile command group (MCG), none of which have an organic A2C2 cell.
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Figure F-1. Example of a TAGS arrangement
ORGANIZATION
F-7. Each TAC contains a seven-person A2C2 cell with one OIC (a lieutenant colonel in TAC 1, a major in TAC 2), a captain, four air traffic service (ATS) NCOs, and one AMD NCO. The teaming of aviation, ATS, and AMD Soldiers, coupled with close integration with the FEC, is key to the flexibility of the A2C2 cell. Their complimentary skills help the A2C2 section perform the full range of its functions (integration, identification, coordination, regulation) necessary to control Army users of airspace. The TAC 1 A2C2 OIC is the division A2C2 officer, while the OIC of the TAC 2 A2C2 cell is the deputy A2C2 officer. Each TAC has an A2C2 operations officer (captain), an AMD NCO (responsible for coordination with the AMD
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section for the integration of the air and missile defense plan and air picture with A2C2), and four ATS NCOs who plan and coordinate airspace, produce the division's unit airspace plan, and integrate airspace use with the FEC and Air Component Planning and Execution Cell. F-8. Each TAC A2C2 cell is equipped with a full suite of airspace workstations, ground to air radios, and communications equipment necessary to bring in the Joint air picture, independent of the TOC network (see Figure F-2).
TAC CP Joint Airspace Connectivity Air Picture

AWACS JLENS OTHER SOURCES Blue Force Tracker (BFT) LINK 11 Joint Data Network (JDN)
HAWKEYE
FDL LINK 16
LINK 16
ELINT
Multiple UHF/VHF/ HF/FM Voice
HF
SATCOM
MIDS
SATCOM
JTT ABCS PASS
TAIS
ADSI FAAD EO
ADSI AMDWS
TAIS Shelter (TSQ-221) Integrates BFT with JDN. Multiple Voice Gnd to Air Comms
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
ADAM Shelter (TSQ-282) Provides Receipt of Joint Air Picture, Sentinel and EW. Primary Source for TAIS. Sole Source to ABCS
Figure F-2. TAC CP Joint airspace connectivity air picture F-9. The TAC A2C2 cell has the capability to send a two-person A2C2 team with an airspace workstation that can operate in a different area of the TAC if required. This could be in the FEC if the A2C2 section is not co-located with the FEC, in the ASOC if the division is so augmented, or as discussed below, detached to support the G-5 in the Division Main.
A2C2 CAPABILITIES
F-10. The TAC CP's A2C2 section can perform all A2C2 tasks required for a tactical or operational headquarters (see FM 3-52, Appendix B). The division TAC A2C2 cell can operate under an ASCC or function as the ARFOR airspace staff. The division A2C2 cell can perform all functions of a JFLCC or JTF airspace cell and has the digital compatibility to interface with USMC and coalition automation systems (via the digital LNO team). The A2C2 cell does not have the capability to function as a Joint ACA. As a JTF or JFLCC, the division A2C2 cell will work directly with the BCD to interface with the JFACC, ACA.
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Appendix F
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PLANNING
F-11. G-3 (Operations and Plans). The normal planning cycle for air tasking order and airspace control order (ACO) submissions is within the planning cycle of the TAC CPs. The A2C2 cell supports the G-3 in the TAC by producing the daily division input for the Joint ACO. The A2C2 section provides A2C2 planning support for other TAC A2C2 sections and units subordinate to the TAC. F-12. G-5 (Civil Affairs). The G-5 in the Main CP relies on the TAC CPs A2C2 cells for A2C2 support for OPLANs and sequels to OPLANs. The principle A2C2 planning products for an OPLAN or a sequel to an OPLAN are Proposed modifications to the theater airspace control plan (ACP). Changes to task organization. The A2C2 annex. F-13. Higher Headquarters. If the division is subordinate to a higher Army headquarters (corps or ASCC), the A2C2 officer provides divisional airspace requirements for the higher headquarters A2C2 element for inclusion in their A2C2 annex. If the division is the ARFOR or JFLCC, the A2C2 officer provides Army input to the ACAs ACP. F-14. Subordinate Brigades. Each TAC will provides planning support to the brigade ADAM/BAEs to assist the brigades as they plan and execute operations and help integrate the airspace requirements of subordinate brigades. The TAC will integrate the requirements of functional brigades (for example, MP, engineers) that do not have assigned A2C2 personnel. F-15. Current Operations. The A2C2 section is designed to rapidly interface with the BCDs airspace management cell that is within the Joint AOC in order to submit or modify airspace control measures (ACMs) in near real time (NRT) (JP 1-02). The division normally uses procedural ACMs for airspace management. However, when augmented by additional airspace controllers, the TAC A2C2 section has the capability to control limited amounts of airspace such as a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ). These additional controllers can be provided before deployment as long-term augmentation to the division to meet OPLAN requirements or can be short-term augmentation from the ATS company of the aviation brigade to meet temporary requirements for positive control.
DIVISION CP RELATIONSHIPS
F-16. Division A2C2 Lead. Both TAC A2C2 sections are capable of integrating A2C2 for the division (see Figure F-3). Deciding which A2C2 element will be the lead for A2C2 depends on the role of their TAC, as specified in the command and signal portion of the OPORD. Normally the division will designate a particular TAC as the lead TAC for an operation or phase of an operation. The A2C2 section of the lead TAC will integrate the airspace requirements for both TACs. F-17. A2C2 Support to the Division Main. The division A2C2 officer can provide A2C2 support to the G-5 in several ways, to include the following: When the Main CP is co-located with a TAC, the A2C2 officer can task the A2C2 section in the co-located TAC to provide A2C2 planning support to the G-5. When the Main CP is not co-located with either TAC, the division A2C2 officer can provide distributed support to the G-5 by network collaboration or by providing the Main CP with an A2C2 LNO. The TAC A2C2 is capable of exchanging digital documents and digital overlays with the G-5 in the Main CP or using standard collaboration tools. If an LNO is required, the LNO team from one or both TAC A2C2 sections can bring an airspace workstation to the Main CP to support planning. However, detaching A2C2 LNOs to the Main CP potentially degrades the capability of the TAC A2C2 section to support the TAC FEC. The TAC A2C2 cell in the effected TAC will have to ensure positioning near the FEC to ensure that NRT deconfliction of fires and aircraft.
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F-18. A2C2 Support to Division Staff A2C2 Functions. A2C2 is a C2 function that operates according to FM 5.0 and FM 6.0 in the same manner as other staff functions. A detailed listing of A2C2 staff responsibilities is contained in FM 3-52, Appendix B. F-19. Command and Control. A2C2 is a G-3 staff function. The TAC A2C2 cell works for the G-3 and implements the commander's guidance as it affects airspace use. This guidance is published initially in the A2C2 annex to the OPLAN, the divisions unit airspace plan, and in the divisions input to the ACO. When conflicts arise between requirements of different airspace users, the A2C2 section deconflicts airspace use based on commander's and G-3 guidance or seeks a decision from the G-3 or his designated representative (G-3, chief of operations). Determination of A2C2 responsibilities between TACs or subordinate units is based on G-3s C2 instructions in paragraph 3 or 5 of the OPLAN in the same manner that responsibilities such as fires are determined. Figure F-3. Functions common to both TAC A2C2 cells
FUNCTIONS COMMON TO BOTH TAC A2C2 CELLS
UEx
Plans and requests immediate airspace control measures (ACMs) Deconflicts airspace through the appropriate control authority Supports FEC A2C2 requirements Provides A2C2 staff support Serves as A2C2 point-of-contact for subordinate units Inputs future airspace coordination order/ATO requirements Coordinates sensor and Tactical Digital Information Link coverage with the Air and Missile Defense (AMD) cell Communicates digitally and/or by voice to Army and JIM aircraft Establishes A2C2 interface into the Joint Network Capable of interfacing directly with the JTF, other components, or BCD if required
FUNCTIONS OF THE LEAD TAC A2C2 CELL

Develops and submits Army requirements for the Joint Airspace Control Plan (ACP) Writes the A2C2 annex and maintains the A2C2 estimate Monitors subordinate TAC Airspace requirements Provides planning support to the Main Builds collective UEx input to Airspace Control Order (ACO) Coordinates input for the Air Tasking Order (ATO) Coordinates planned airspace requirements with the UEy A2C2 cell while keeping the subordinate TAC informed
FUNCTIONS OF SUBORDINATE TAC A2C2 CELL

Submits airspace requirements to UEx lead TAC for integration into ACO submission Ensures airspace requirements and concept are properly articulated to the lead TAC Coordinates with the UEy A2C2 cell if required
XX
BCT
A2C2 ADAM/BAE
A2C2 ADAM/BAE
A2C2 ADAM/BAE
X
A2C2 ADAM/BAE
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

F-20. Air Picture. The A2C2 cell has a critical dependency on the AMD section for providing the Joint air picture and for the coordination of Joint data downlinks. The A2C2 section coordinates with the AMD cell to ensure that the division has the necessary sensor architecture to provide a complete and timely air picture. This is done both in planning and during current operations. The A2C2 cells ADA personnel work with the AMD cells Joint Interface Control Officer to ensure that the A2C2 systems for the tactical digital information link are integrated into the Joint Data Network.
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Appendix F
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F-21. Airspace Integration. The AMD cell provides the Air and Missile Defense Plan to the A2C2 cell for integration into the division unit airspace plan. Although the A2C2 cell will review and deconflict the division air defense plan with other division control measures, the control measures for the air defense plan are normally sent to higher headquarters through AMD channels. The A2C2 section and the AMD section must ensure the division SOP and the respective annexes address the procedures for forwarding air defense ACMs.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

F-22. Airspace Deconfliction. Each TAC A2C2 cell normally provides an airspace workstation with an operator to the TAC FEC to ensure that fires and airspace use is integrated both for planning and during operations in NRT. If the FEC LNO team from the A2C2 cell is used for other purposes (for example, support to the Main CP or the ASOC), the TAC A2C2 officer must ensure tight linkage between the remainder of the A2C2 cell and the FEC. F-23. Airspace Integration. The A2C2 personnel supporting the FEC also ensure that planned fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) are integrated with the unit airspace plan. Although the A2C2 will review and deconflict the Fire Support Overlay, FSCMs are normally sent to higher headquarters through fires channels. In some cases both sections will send up related control measures. This often occurs when there is a need to build ACMs in parallel with FSCMs to achieve the C2 effect desired. An example of this would be an Army Tactical Missile System mission where the FEC establishes FSCMsplatoon area hazard (PAH)/target area hazard (TAH)while the A2C2 uses the PAH/TAH data to establish associated ACMs (surface-to-surface missile areas). This is done because the FSCM's PAH/TAH do not automatically affect the airspace management battle command systems. The A2C2 section and the FEC must ensure the division SOP and the respective annexes address the procedures for forwarding FSCMs and associated ACMs up the appropriate chain of command. This parallel teamwork is also necessary for other complex FSCMs such as kill boxes (JP 1-02). F-24. Air Component Planning and Execution Cell. (ALO/TACP/ASOC). NRT deconfliction involving Joint air assets will require the integration of the A2C2 cell with the USAF control element at the TAC CP because both division and JFACC lines of authority are involved with the TACP/ASOC that represents the JFACC and the A2C2 section of the G-3. As the G-3s representative for airspace management, the A2C2 cell establishes a strong working relationship with the air component execution cell to ensure that rapid deconfliction and integration. The A2C2 cell also provides an integrated air/ground COP and personnel familiar with the COP.
AVIATION SECTION AND AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

F-25. Aviation. Although most aviation mission planning occurs at the brigade, the aviation section performs the mission planning for the TAC staff when necessary. The A2C2 cell supports the aviation section by taking aviation mission planning data and building the appropriate ACM structure necessary to perform the mission. F-26. Air Traffic Service. The A2C2 cell with the ATS NCO provides the aviation section with Air Traffic Services expertise to assist with planning the use of ATS assets when an aviation brigade is not assigned to the division. The A2C2 cell provides the Airspace Information Center (AIC) of the aviation brigade ATS company with current airspace information so that the AIC is integrated into the A2C2 architecture.
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
F-27. PlanningNon-time Sensitive. The A2C2 cell in each TAC CP integrates all airspace requests from the TAC cells and its subordinate units and produces an Airspace Plan. The supporting TAC CP sends its plan to the lead TAC A2C2 section for integration into the division unit airspace plan. This plan is
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forwarded up through G-3/A2C2 channels, integrated at each level, and sent through the BCD to the JFACC/ACA as the Army's submission to the ACO (or as a change to the ACO). F-28. ImmediateTime Sensitive. The A2C2 cell receives immediate time sensitive airspace requests from division cells and subordinate units and processes them according to the JFLCC A2C2 annex. If authorized in the theater A2C2 annex, the division may coordinate directly with the BCD to support immediate airspace requests. If the ARFORs A2C2 annex authorizes it, all immediate ACMs from brigade and higher should go simultaneously to all higher A2C2 sections including the BCD. This provides a significant reduction of processing time by permitting parallel collaborative coordination of time sensitive ACMs. F-29. Division and Brigade A2C2. The division A2C2 role with brigade A2C2 has significantly changed in the modular force due to organizational change and doctrinal change to mission command orders. As a result, the relationship between the division A2C2 cell and the brigade will change based on what mission is being planned and executed and which is the supported and supporting headquarters.
ORGANIZATION
F-30. Modular BCTs, Brigades, and SBCTs. All of the modular BCT/brigades (except sustainment) have a version of an organic ADAM/BAE. This staff section is composed of ADA and aviation personnel and does the A2C2 integration function for the brigade in addition to its AMD and aviation functions. While other members of the brigade staff are key A2C2 members (FEC, ALO/TACP, TUAS), the ADAM/BAE OIC is the A2C2 integrator for the S-3. (The brigade A2C2 tasks in FM 3-52, Appendix B, remain valid for the modular brigade with the ADAM/BAE OIC responsible for the S-3 air tasks). The ADAM/BAE provides the personnel and equipment to execute doctrinal A2C2 requirements that were missing in previous brigade designs, which often lacked ADA or aviation personnel. This resource capability is critical as the change to mission command increases the role of the brigade staff in planning and executing operations. F-31. Functional Brigades. Functional brigades without an organic A2C2 element (MP, engineers) assigned to the division retain the brigade responsibilities for A2C2. If a functional brigade is under the control of a modular brigade (for example, MP brigade under a ME brigade), the modular brigade will integrate the functional brigade A2C2 requirements. If the functional brigade is directly under the control of a division TAC CP, that TAC CP A2C2 section will integrate the brigade A2C2 requirements. F-32. Mission Command. In previous division designs, A2C2 was managed centrally at division. While this is still the case for the overall division airspace plan, the relationship changes when the brigade is tasked to execute a mission and is the supported brigade. When the aviation brigade is tasked to execute a mobile strike (or a fires brigade is tasked to execute a precision strike), the center for planning is the supported brigade and the brigade ADAM/BAE is the lead A2C2 planner for that operation. The TAC A2C2 cell will support the supported brigade, and because of the greater experience level and manning of the TAC A2C2 section, the TAC A2C2 cell may perform much of the airspace integration for the brigade. However, the final decision on how the airspace is integrated should be made based on the supported brigade commanders priorities. This is a significant difference from previous divisions where airspace planning occurred in a division Deep Operations Coordination Cell that provided the plan to the brigades executing the mission. F-33. A2C2 Considerations. While A2C2 staff procedures are the same as other staff procedures, A2C2 has some unique challenges in the division A2C2 design. A2C2 is Joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) and intersects battlefield operating systems. This requires a level of coordination and expertise not usually required in a single staff cell.
JIIM AIRSPACE
F-34. Joint Airspace Control. Airspace is not owned in the sense that assignment of an AO confers ownership of the ground. The JFC commander has varying degrees of control of the airspace dependent on
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the AO and the political and international agreements. Therefore, for each operation (and phase of the operation), the JFC will have more or less authority in controlling the airspace. The JFC designates an ACA (usually the JFACC) to manage airspace for the JFC. Use of airspace is negotiated as the limits of the JFC authority change and commanders priorities (JFC to division) shift. F-35. Division Joint Interface. The division organization is designed to interface with the ACA if the divisions role requires (ARFOR, JFLCC, JTF). The division A2C2 officer has sufficient rank to represent the Army for both component and interagency/international airspace meetings that are critical for the development of the ACP. The A2C2 sections are manned and equipped to interface with the other component airspace management sections as well as with interagency and international airspace organizations (such as the FAA). F-36. JIIM Airspace Users. A2C2 personnel can effectively integrate Joint and coalition airspace users into the current airspace data. The cell has the connectivity to exchange airspace data with USMC elements if the division is OPCON to USMC forces or if the division is under a JFLCC or JTF with a USMC headquarters. The A2C2 element can exchange airspace data with most coalition units when the coalition unit is provided network connectivity by a digital LNO team. The A2C2 cell must understand how the other services and coalition forces employ their aviation assets because they often differ from Army TTP. Use of control measures that are commonplace in an Army/USAF context may be counter productive when the division is integrating other Joint and coalition airspace users. F-37. Limits of Airspace Use. Airspace, like ground space, is not an unlimited resource. The airspace over a division is constantly in use by multiple users (Army, Joint, and often international) and can easily be saturated. One of the key information requirements of A2C2 to the G-3 is identifying when airspace is saturated and COA recommendations for the most effective use of the airspace. The divisions capabilities to increase the density of airspace use is considerably improved with the modular design. The addition of the ADAM/BAE, the A2C2 cell, and the horizontal and vertical digital connectivity (to the ACA) of the modular force enables the division to process, gain approval, and disseminate procedural ACMs in minutes rather than hours. This helps the division G-3 make adjustments to the unit airspace plan as requirements change. The division design allows the transition to limited positive control if needed for combat operations with the augmentation of additional air traffic controllers to the TAC A2C2 sections. As a result, the TAC CP can control a HIDACZ. F-38. Cross Warfighting Functions (WF). Airspace use inherently intersects WF and as small UAS and nonballistic munitions proliferate, the number and variety of airspace users also increase. The design of the A2C2 elements at all levels combines the expertise of two of the major airspace users (AMD and aviation) while ensuring close coordination with the FEC (FA and USAF). Organization and training of a TAC CP should be done with the intent of maintaining strong horizontal coordination between these sections. F-39. Counter Fratricide. Three linkages in the division A2C2 structure are vital to reducing ground to air fratricide (and potentially air to ground). F-40. AMD. The pairing of the AMD personnel and the ATS personnel in the A2C2 cell and pairing of the A2C2 with the AMD section creates synergies that were not possible in previous single-branch organizations. By using aircraft mission information from the brigades and the air picture from the AMD cell, the A2C2 section can ensure division aircraft (manned and unmanned) are properly identified as friendly in the Joint air COP. If division aircraft are identified as unknown or hostile, the A2C2 section should alert the AMD section so that aircraft are properly identified as friendly in the Joint Data Network. The AMD personnel in the TAC A2C2 section ensure all potential engagement areas are disseminated to airspace users and, if engagement operations are imminent, warn aircraft in the vicinity of a potential ground to air engagement. F-41. FEC. The A2C2 NCO supporting the FEC verifies that the FECs fires workstations have the current ACMs to ensure the fires automatic deconflicting capability is functioning. However, not all ACMs are recognized by the fires workstation and there will be aircraft operating outside of procedural control
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measures. Therefore, the A2C2 NCO must work with the FEC to build restrictive FSCMs, such as ACAs. Restrictive FSCMs will deconflict fires from aircraft not operating within the current ACMs.
A2C2 VIGNETTE
J-1. Pre-phase 1: Consolidated A2C2 Section. A2C2 provides support to the development of the division OPLAN. Key tasks include the following: Support to G-5 for COA development. Brigade ADAM/BAE for the development of brigade A2C2 annexes. Deployment package training. Coordination with Division aviation to ensure that adequate ATS support is included in the division deployment package. Division AMD to ensure that there is adequate sensor coverage for the division air picture. Theater Army A2C2 element to ensure airspace requirements are reflected in the Army A2C2 annex and the ACAs Airspace Control Plan (ACP). Key airspace requirements include airspace corridors to assembly areas and airspace areas for in-country pilot training. Development of the division A2C2 annex. F-42. Phase 1: Deployment. The TAC 1 A2C2 element is the division A2C2 lead and the TAC 2 A2C2 element remains at home station. TAC 1 A2C2 element Deploys a portion of their element with an EECP A2C2 element (as needed) and the remainder with the full TAC 1. Functions as the lead A2C2 element for the division. Plans and integrates the A2C2 requirements for TAC 1, TAC 2, and brigades that have arrived in theater. Coordinates with the Army A2C2 element and the BCD and national airspace elements when necessary. Works with the aviation element to secure airspace rights for aircraft (manned and unmanned) from transit to assembly areas and supports in-country proficiency training. TAC 2 A2C2 element Continues planning support to the Main CP to complete the A2C2 annex. Supports A2C2 training for preparing for deployment. Integrates brigade, TAC 2, and Main CP airspace requirements and provides those requirements to TAC 1. F-43. Phase 2: Defensive Operations. The TAC 2 A2C2 element during defensive operations is the division's A2C2 lead. TAC 1 A2C2 element Continues to support RSOI and A2C2 requirements of brigades under TAC 1 control. Supports A2C2 planning requirements of the Main CP. Provides A2C2 planning support to TAC 1. Integrates brigade, TAC 1, and Main CP airspace requirements and provides those requirements to TAC 2. TAC 2 A2C2 element Plans and integrates the A2C2 requirements for TAC 1, TAC 2, and brigades under TAC 2 control.
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Coordinates division airspace requirements with the Army A2C2 element, the BCD, and national airspace elements when necessary. During CAB mobile strike operations, assists the CAB A2C2 personnel in integrating the airspace requirements of the CAB, Fires Brigade, and the BFSB. F-44. Phase 3: Offensive Operations. The TAC 1 A2C2 element is the division's lead A2C2 element during offensive operations. TAC 1 A2C2 element Plans and integrates the A2C2 requirements for TA.C1, TAC 2, and brigades under TAC 1 control. Coordinates division airspace requirements with the Army A2C2 element, the BCD, and national airspace elements when necessary. TAC 2 A2C2 element Supports A2C2 requirements of brigades under TAC 2 control. Supports A2C2 planning requirements of the Main CP. Integrates brigade, TAC 2, and Main CP airspace requirements and provides requirements to TAC 1. F-45. Phase 4: Stability Operations. The Main CP, TAC 1, and TAC 2 are co-located. The TAC 1 A2C2 element is the division's lead A2C2 element during stability and reconstruction operations. TAC 1 A2C2 element Plans and integrates the A2C2 requirements for TAC 1, TAC 2, and brigades under TAC 1 control. Coordinates division airspace requirements with the Army A2C2 element, the BCD, and national airspace elements when necessary. Joint airspace command and control procedures may change in this phase. Airspace will be increasingly reserved for civil airspace use, while some joint enablers for airspace control may deploy out of theater. This may result in a shifting of responsibilities between the JAOC (ACA) and the division A2C2 element. TAC 2 A2C2 element Supports A2C2 planning requirements of the Main CP and TAC CP. Provides TAC 2 and Main CP airspace requirements to the TAC 1 A2C2 element.
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Appendix G
INTEGRATION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES INTO THE DIVISION

In addition to bringing unique capabilities and characteristics, the integration of multinational forces to the division will require division commanders and staff to carefully consider all aspects of integration to the force. Division commanders and staffs should ensure they are fully conversant with and understand the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces assigned to the division. Division commanders and staffs should establish a good rapport with their counterparts from other multinational countries. This will help to establish successful teamwork and increase overall unity of effort. Therefore, division staff should proactively seek out national command element (NCE) staffs for assigned multinational forces as early as possible to establish strong relationships and facilitate early planning. It is essential that guidance for the employment of multinational forces be secured as early as possible because it is the starting point for a military appreciation, analysis, and estimate process. This process, which precedes or is the first step in campaign or operational planning, establishes a common understanding of the key capabilities of the assigned multinational force, including any constraints and limitations imposed under national guidance. NCE staff are the key source of information for national guidance in relation to assigned multinational forces. A clear understanding of multinational force capabilities and national guidance will ensure that such factors as the role of the multinational force, key capabilities and employment options, acceptable risk, and rules of engagement can be determined. This will ensure forces are employed to maximize effect in the division plan.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
G-1. The national authorities providing forces to the division will normally assign national forces under operational control (OPCON) of the division commander. The assignment of these national forces under OPCON may be qualified by caveats from the respective nations in accordance with their national policies. Further assignment to subordinate commanders within the division by the division commander is likely to be under tactical control (TACON) status, subject to approval by the respective NCE. Command-less OPCON of the national forces is retained by the parent national commander and is exercised through the designated national commander of the respective nations within the division. The division commander and national commanders should discuss and clarify their mutual understandings of the command authorities that have been transferred to him. This clarification will ensure there is common understanding of those authorities and preclude potential misunderstandings. Communications are essential to the successful command and control of coalition operations. The division must determine how it will establish links between itself and the national headquarters. A high priority should be given to establishing connectivity
with multinational partners C2 systems, and particularly battlefield surveillance systems, which will 2/1/2006 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) G-1
Appendix G
greatly enhance operational flexibility and reduce fratricide. These links may vary from interfaces
between systems to providing digital liaison teams with command and control systems.
LIAISON
G-2. Regardless of the command structure, effective liaison is vital when multinational forces are assigned to the division. Using liaison is an invaluable confidence-building tool between the division and multinational forces. It also fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitates the transfer of vital information, enhances mutual trust, and develops an increased level of teamwork and capability. Liaison supplies significant information for the division headquarters about multinational force readiness, training, and other factors. It also provides information and guidance back to multinational force on the division. Liaison personnel can serve as cultural interpreters. Early establishment of liaison functions within the division environment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures. The division must establish control of liaison personnel and ensure that they have access to the commander and staff.
INTELLIGENCE
G-3. As every coalition is different, so too are the ways in which intelligence will be collected and disseminated within the coalition. Classification may present a problem in releasing information, but keeping as much unclassified as feasible will improve interoperability and trust within the coalition. The commander must know what his own and other nations positions are on intelligence sharing and determine if any limitations or constraints exist that will impact on the employment of assigned multinational forces.. Early sharing of information during planning ensures that coalition requirements are clearly stated, guidance supports the commanders intent, and the coalition uses procedures supportable by other nations. All nations of the coalition should endeavor to produce information and intelligence in a format that is releasable to all members of the coalition. This should be easily accessible through systems of an appropriate classification.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
G-4. ROE for assigned multinational forces will define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force or actions may or may not be applied. Although the division is likely to have similar ROE in place, the division commander and staffs must establish early in planning any variations in national guidance that may limit or constrain employment of the assigned multinational force. Some multinational force national ROE will be relatively free of constraint while others may be severely constrained. In many cases, commanders of assigned multinational forces may lack the authority to speak for their nation in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE should be sought but may not be achievable. The division commander needs to reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by assigned multinational forces to their national policies.
SUSTAINMENT
G-5. Unity of effort is essential to division sustainment operations. This requires coordination not only between the division and nations providing forces, but also with civilian agencies in the area of operations (AO). Executing division sustainment plans must be a collective responsibility of the division force. When possible, mutual logistic support should be developed for economy of effort. Division sustainment plans should be flexible, responsive, and predictive and provide timely sustainment throughout the entire division environment. The division sustainment plan should incorporate the logistic requirements capacities and capabilities of all assigned forces to ensure sustained and synchronized execution. Consensus on assigned forces sustainment issues and requirements should be formed early. Division staff must thoroughly comprehend assigned multinational forces doctrine and have good relations with subordinate commanders and civilian leaders, as well as cooperation and continuous coordination between all elements providing logistic support and the operational elements. This must begin during the initial planning phase and
G-2 FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) 2/1/2006
_____________________________________________Integration of Multinational Forces Into the Division
continue through the operations termination and redeployment of the contributing nations back to their countries of origin. G-6. Although responsible for logistic support of its national forces, not all assigned multinational forces will have organic logistic capabilities. Such forces will become dependent on the division for all or part of their sustainment support. In these cases, the division must be prepared to provide the required support to assigned multinational forces. Support may include both deployment and sustainment. Varying degrees of mutual logistic support within the division must be planned to incorporate multinational force capabilities and minimize weaknesses.
INTEGRATED FORCES CHECKLIST FOR COMMANDERS

G-7. Keys to unity of effort among nations are certain understandings and agreements with contributing force commanders. Division commanders and staff should make every effort to achieve consensus before planning a detailed operation or deploying forces. As a minimum, commanders should ensure that a common understanding exists for the following: Mandate and terms of reference for the operation. Latitude given each commander by NCA. Means of resolving disputes over use of forces. Types of force available and the usefulness of each. National force capabilities, limitations, and readiness. Command authority or status of command: Command relationships. Transfer of authority to lead nation. Acceptable risk. Authority for staff-to-staff contact. G-8. The following questions also should be considered when integrating forces:
COMMAND
What is the command structure? Have status-of-forces been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? What interoperability factors will affect the mission, for example, command, control, communications, or logistics? 4. Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher authority to resolve inadequacies? 5. What unique capabilities does integrated force bring to the Division? 6. What constraints are imposed on the integrated force by their national authorities? 7. Have standards regarding operational or logistics capabilities been established for certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated a method of resolution? 8. Are forces; command, control, and communications capabilities; and logistic support robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity? 9. Have all integrated force legal constraints been considered in planning for C2? 10. Has the command structure been designed to minimize the number of layers? 11. What differences in standards for force protection exist between the division and assigned multinational forces and what measures need to be implemented to ensure retention of division integrity? 1. 2. 3.
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Appendix G
LIAISON
1. What points within the division (HQ and other) require the establishment of a liaison function to effect integration assigned multinational forces into the division? 2. What LNOs must be sent to the integrated force headquarters and adjacent, supporting, and supported units? 2. Do liaison elements on the staff possess requisite authorities and have a full understanding of both national interest and Division objectives? 3. Do liaison elements have appropriate communications, linguistic, logistics, and office support capabilities in place? 4. Have LNOs been identified? Have key LNOs been interviewed for suitability?
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
1. Have ROE been agreed upon by national authorities or by national military commanders? 2. How will integrated forces ROE affect other division organizations and operations? 3. What are the procedures for commanders to request a change to the ROE?
OPERATIONS
1. Does the division have a SOP that includes reporting requirements and procedures for integrated forces? 2. Has a common map database been established? 3. Have staff visits been coordinated? 4. Have visits by the unit commander to higher headquarters been coordinated? 5. What training is required by the integrated force IAW the division commanders requirements prior to deployment? 6. What training is required once deployed?
PLANNING
1. Have the forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and redeployment from US Strategic Lift assets been included in the supporting nations deployment sequence? 2. To what standard have integrated forces been trained? 3. Does the integrated force have a standard of training? 4. What type of pre-deployment training have coalition forces received?
SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES

1. 2. 3. What areas will come under division control and what areas will remain national issues? What logistic support is the available? What are the unique logistic capabilities of each member of the integrated force? Understanding these capabilities is essential to effective and efficient logistic planning and support. What legal restrictions do national laws impose on logistic support? What is the divisions authority to redistribute or cross-level logistic assets and services under routine and emergency conditions?
4. 5.
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_____________________________________________Integration of Multinational Forces Into the Division
6.
How will the division ensure compatibility and interoperability of communications and information systems, to include automated data processing interfaces, between the coalition and national support systems? 7. How will the division prioritize, allocate, and use common infrastructure capabilities (ports, airfields, roads) to support military and civil operations? 8. How will each class of supply be handled? 9. Do integrated forces have a basic load of ammunition and what are their ammunition procedures? 10. What are the integrated forces special requirements to include tents, cots, reverse osmosis water purification units, laundry, latrines, and batteries?
MAINTENANCE
1. 2. 3. 4. Do integrated forces have maintenance support? Do integrated forces have the means to order and receive repair parts? Do integrated forces have wreckers, stake and platform trailers, or heavy equipment transporters? Do integrated forces have communications repair facilities?
MEDICAL
1. Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service coalition casualties to include recognizing cultural differences in dealing with casualties and procedures and policies for local civilians? Coordinate with national commands. What are the integrated forces capabilities, both air and ground, and procedures for medical evacuation, both intra- and intertheater, that coalition forces will be supported by, or required to support? What are the procedures for tracking patients and coordination requirements for returnto-duty transportation? Does the integrated force have organic Echelon I, II, or III combat health support? For those that do not have this support, what level will the division provide?
2.
3. 4.
COMMUNICATIONS
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Will commercial companies establish telephone service for use by integrated forces? Who is responsible for funding additional communication capability? What is the common identification friend or foe procedure? What are the data-link protocols? What is the communication equipment capability between forces? Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment? Are there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a common tactical picture? Do integrated partners with a lesser C2 capability have appropriate liaison officers, interpreters, operators, and maintainers to enable adequate C2 within the coalition? 9. How and when will the coalition establish its communication architecture? 10. How will the coalition account for and utilize communication networks established by civilian agencies, to include commercially leased circuits, commercial satellite services, as well as high frequency and very high frequency radios? 11. How will the coalition address the need for secure communications?
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(BLANK PAGE)
Appendix H
Brigade Task Organizations

The following charts depict the internal task organization of the brigades, down to company level, assigned to the 1st Division as they deployed to the theater of operations. These charts are provided as a reference to show the parent brigade of company and battalion units that are task organized to different brigades during the phases of the operation detailed in Chapter 4.
2nd Bn 13th Infantry (M)

HHC 2/13 Infantry A-2/13 Infantry B-2/13 Infantry C-3/68 Armor D-3/68 Armor E-2/13 Armor (Engr) 2
1st Bn 16th FA
HHB 1/16 FA A-1/16 FA B-1/16 FA 925th TA Platoon
3rd
Bn 68th Armor
HHC 498th BSB 917th Maint Co 1048th Distro Co st Sqd 9th Cavalry 1 48th Bde Spt Med Co HHT 1/9 Cav (BSMC) A-1/9 Cav 213th Fwd Spt Co (CA) B-1/9 Cav 214th Fwd Spt Co (CA) C-1/9 Cav 215th Fwd Spt Co (FA) th Engineer Battalion 216th Fwd Spt Co (RS) 10 601st Fwd Spt Co (Engr) HHD 10th Engr Bn st Engr Co (Horizontal) 101 2nd HBCT BTB 151st Engr Co (Man Aug) HHC 2nd HBCT BTB 152nd Engr Co (Man Aug) 2nd BST Co (MP/Sec/UAV) 201st Engr Co (Sapper) 44th Sig Co 1001st Engr Plt (DOG) 55th MI Co 1002nd Engr Plt (DOG) 520th Engr Co (MAC) 901st Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
Figure H-1. 2nd HBCT Task Organization
HHC 3/68 Armor A-3/68 Armor B-3/68 Armor C-2/13 Infantry D-2/13 Infantry E-3/68 Armor (Engr)
498th BSB
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H-1
Appendix H
2nd Bn 22nd Infantry (M)

HHC 2/22 Infantry A-2/22 Infantry B-2/22 Infantry C-1/68 Armor D-1/68 Armor E-2/22 Infantry (Engr) 5
3rd Bn 16th FA
1st Bn 68th Armor

HHC 1/68 Armor A-1/68 Armor B-1/68 Armor C-2/22 Infantry D-2/22 Infantry E-1/68 Armor (Engr)
114th BSB
HHC 114th BSB 918th Maint Co 1040th Distro Co 49th BSMC 217th Fwd Spt Co (CA) 218th Fwd Spt Co (CA) 219th Fwd Spt Co (FA) 220th Fwd Spt Co (RS) 602nd Fsd Spt Co (Engr)
1st Squad 14th Cav

HHT 1/14 Cav A-1/14 Cav B-1/14 Cav C-1/14 Cav 20th Engineer Battalion HHD 20th Engr Bn 102nd Engr Co (Horizontal) 153rd Engr Co (Man Aug) 154th Engr Co (Man Aug) 202nd Engr Co (Sapper) 1003rd Engr Plt (DOG) 1004th Engr Plt (DOG) 902nd Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
5th HBCT BTB

HHC 5th HBCT BTB 5th BST Co (MP/Sec/UAV) 445th Sig Co 56th MI Co 521st Engr Co (MAC)
Figure H-2. 5th HBCT Task Organization
H-2
2/1/2006
1st Bn 23rd Infantry (M)

HHC 1/23 Infantry A-1/23 Infantry B-1/23 Infantry C-3/67 Armor D-3/67 Armor E-1/23 Infantry (Engr) 10
2nd Bn 16th FA
3rd Bn 67th Armor

HHC 3/67 Armor A-3/67 Armor B-3/67 Armor C-1/23 Infantry D-1/23 Infantry E-3/67 Armor (Engr) 1st Squad 23rd Cavalry HHT 1/23 Cavalry A-1/23 Cavalry B-1/23 Cavalry C-1/23 Cavalry 30th Engineer Battalion HHD 30th Engr Bn 103rd Engr Co (Horizontal) 155th Engr Co (MAC) 156th Engr Co (MAC) 203rd Engr Co (Sapper) 1005th Engr Plt (DOG) 1006th Engr Plt (DOG) 903rd Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
115th BSB
HHC 115th BSB 919th Maint Co 1050th Distro Co 50th BSMC 221st Fwd Spt Co (CA) 222nd Fwd Spt Co (CA) 223rd Fwd Spt Co (FA) 224th Fwd Spt Co (RS) 603rd Fwd Spt Co (Engr) 10th HBCT BTB HHC 10th HBCT BTB BST Co (MP/Sec/UAV) 446th Sig Co 57th MI Co 522nd Engr Co (MAC)
Figure H-3. 10th HBCT Task Organization
2/1/2006
H-3
Appendix H
1st Bn 87th Infantry

HHC 1/87 Infantry A-1/87th Infantry B-1/87th Infantry C-1/87th Infantry D-1/87th Infantry (Wpn)
87
1st Bn 92nd FA
2nd Bn 87th Infantry

HHC 2/87th Infantry A-2/87th Infantry B-2/87th Infantry C-2/87th Infantry D-2/87th Infantry (Wpn)
187th BSB
HHC 187th BSB 920th Maint Co 1051st Distro Co 51st BSMC 225th Fwd Spt Co (INF) 226th Fwd Spt Co (INF) 227th Fwd Spt Co (FA) 228th Fwd Spt Co (RS) 604th Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
2nd Squad 14th Cav

HHT 2/14 Cavalry A-2/14 Cavalry (Mot) B-2/14 Cavalry (Mot) E-2/22 Infantry (RLS)
15th Engineer Bn
HHD 15th Engr Bn 104th Engr Co (ESC) 301st Engr Co (MRB) 204th Engr Co (Sapper) 904th Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
87th IBCT BTB

HHC 87th IBCT BTB 87th BST Co (MP/Sec/CBRN) 447th Sig Co 58th MI Co 519th Engr Co (Sapper) 523rd Engr Co (MAC)
Figure H-4. 87th IBCT Task Organization
H-4
2/1/2006
HHC
2nd
SBCT
X 2
449th Sig Co 59th MI Co A-30th Inf (AT)
1st Bn 2nd Infantry

HHC 1/2nd Infantry A-1/2nd Infantry B-1/2nd Infantry C-1/2nd Infantry
2nd Squad 10th Cav

HHT 2/10th Cavalry A-2/10th Cavalry B-2/10th Cavalry C-2/10th Cavalry D-2/10th Cavalry (Sur)
2nd Bn 2nd Infantry

HHC 2/2nd Infantry A-2/2nd Infantry B-2/2nd Infantry C-2/2nd Infantry
1st Bn 21st FA (155T)

H&Svc Btry 1/21st FA A-1/21st FA (155T) B-1/21st FA (155T) C-1/21st FA (155T) 29th TA Platoon
3rd
Bn
2nd
Infantry
HHC Infantry nd Infantry A-3/2 B-3/2nd Infantry C-3/2nd Infantry
3/2nd
25th Engineer Bn
HHD 25th Engr Bn 105th Engr Co (ESC) 302nd Engr Co (MRB) 205th Engr Co (Sapper) 905th Fwd Spt Co (Engr) 520th Engr Co (Sapper) 524th Engr Co (MAC)
2nd BSB
HQ & Distro Co 2nd BSB 2nd BSC 52nd BSMC 605th Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
Figure H-5. 2nd SBCT Task Organization
2/1/2006
H-5
Appendix H
HHC 28th SBCT

Sig Co 60th MI Co F-137th Inf (AT) 450th
28

HHC 1/137th Infantry A-1/137th Infantry B-1/137th Infantry C-1/137th Infantry
2nd Squad 165th Cav
HHT 2/165th Cavalry A-2/165th Cavalry B-2/165th Cavalry 2nd Bn 242nd Infantry C-2/165th Cavalry D-2/165th Cavalry (Sur) HHC 2/242nd Infantry
A-2/242nd Infantry B-2/242nd Infantry C-2/242nd Infantry
1st Bn 445th FA (155T)

H&Svc Btry 1/21st FA A-1/445th FA (155T) B-1/445th FA (155T) C-1/445th FA (155T) 445th TA Platoon

HHC 1/318th Infantry A-1/318th Infantry B-1/318th Infantry C-1/318th Infantry
35th Engineer Bn
HHD 35th Engr Bn 106th Engr Co (ESC) 303rd Engr Co (MRB) 206th Engr Co (Sapper) 906th Fwd Spt Co (Engr) 521st Engr Co (Sapper) 525th Engr Co (MAC)
228th BSB
HQ & Distro Co 228th BSB 228th BSC 53rd BSMC 606th Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
Figure H-6. 28th SBCT Task Organization
H-6
2/1/2006
X 56
2/165th Cavalry
(during Defense and Offense) HHT 2nd Sqd 165th Cav A Trp 2nd 165th Cav B Trp 2nd 165th Cav C Trp 2nd 165th Cav D Trp 2nd 165th Cav (Surveillance)
HHC 56th BFSB 56th BTB

HHC 56th BTB 448th Sig Co 221st FSC (BFSB)
591st MI Bn
(in SRO) HHC 591st MI Bn A Co (TUAV) B Co (Tech Collection) C Co (C&E) D Co (CI/HUMINT) E Co (CI/HUMINT)
513th MI Bn
HHC 513th MI Bn A Co (TUAV) B Co (Tech Collection) C Co (C&E) D Co (CI/HUMINT) E Co (CI/HUMINT)
3/23rd Cavalry
HHT 3rd 23rd Cavalry F-2/22nd Inf (LRS) A Trp 3rd 23rd Cav B Trp 3rd 23rd Cav
4/6th Air Cavalry

(in SRO) HHD 4/6th Air Recon A-4/6th Air Cavalry A-4/6th Air Cavalry C-4/6th Air Cavalry 46th AVUM Troop
Figure H-7. 56th BFSB Task Organization
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H-7
Appendix H
X 75
HHB 75th Fires Bde 75th BSB

HHB 75th BSB 449th Sig Co 222nd Fwd Spt Co (Fires)
3/75th Field Artillery

HHB 3/75th FA A-3/75th FA (MLRS) B-3/75th FA (MLRS) Svc Btry 3/75th FA
A-251st FA (TA) 1/5th Field Artillery 1/75th Field Artillery

HHB 1/75th FA A-1/75th FA (MLRS) B-1/75th FA (MLRS) Svc Btry 1/75th FA HHB 1/5th FA A-1/5th FA (155SP) B-15th FA (155SP) Svc Btry 1/5th FA
1/14th Field Artillery 2/75th Field Artillery

HHB 2/75th FA A-2/75th FA (MLRS) B-2/75th FA (MLRS) Svc Btry 2/75th FA HHB 1/14th FA A-1/14th FA (155SP) B-1/14th FA (155SP) Svc Btry 1/14th FA
Figure H-8. 75th Fire Brigade Task Organization
H-8
2/1/2006
X HHC 34th CSB(ME) 34 34th BSB

HHC BSB st Signal Co 451 553rd Distro Co 932nd Spt Maint Co 223rd Fwd Spt Co (Engr) 34th
3rd Bn 99th Mot Inf Bde (GN) (Defensive/Offensive Phases)

HHC 3-99th Mot Inf Bde 9th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 10th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 11th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 12th Co (Wpn)-99th Mot Inf Bde 3rd Bn Spt Co-99th Mot Inf Bde
59th MP Bn
HHD 59th MP Bn 591st MP Co 593rd MP Co 627th MP Co
4/44th ADA Bn (Patriot)

HHB 4/44th Air Defense A-4/44th ADA (Patriot) B-4/44th ADA (Patriot) D-3/56th ADA (Avenger)
75th MP Bn
(for Offensive Phase to 92nd MP Bde during SRO HHD 75th MP Bn 592nd MP Co 594th MP Co 628th MP Co
325th CBRNE Bn
HHD 325th CBRNE Bn A-325th CBRNE (Recon) B-325th CBRNE (Mech Smoke) C-325th CBRNE (Smoke/Decon) 457th CBRNE Co (Mot Smoke)
52nd Engr Bn
HHD 52nd Engr Bn 71st Engr Co (Mobility Aug) 72nd Engr Co (Mobility Aug) 321st Engr Co (Clearance) 527th Engr Spt Co 701st Engr Co (MRB) 702nd Engr Co (MRB) 998th Engr Co (Sapper) 999th Engr Co (Sapper) 6489th Engr Team (AB) (Fire) 6534th Engr Team (Quarry) 6666th Engr Team (Utilities)
802nd Ord Co (EOD) 308th PSYOP Co (during SRO)
Figure H-9. 34th Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) Task Organization
2/1/2006
H-9
Appendix H
X 11
3rd UAV Bn
HHD 3rd UAV Bn 31st UAV Co 32nd UAV Co
HHC 11st Avn Bde 1-101st Avn Bn (Asslt) 11th Avn Spt Bn
HHC 11th Avn Spt bn 11th Air Traffic Svcs Co 111st AVIM Co 1049th Distro Co 543rd Signal Co HHC 1/101st Avn Bn A-1/101st Avn (AHB) B-1/101st Avn (AHB) C-1/101st Avn (AHB) D-1/101st Avn (AVUM) A-2/229th Avn (HvyHC)
1/227th Avn Bn (Attk) 2/101st Avn Bn (Asslt)

HHD 1/227th Avn Bn A-1/227th Avn B-1/227th Avn C-1/227th Avn D-1/227th (AVUM) (during SRO) HHC 1/101st Avn Bn A-2/101st Avn (AHB) B-2/101st Avn (AHB) C-2/101st Avn (AHB) D-2/101st Avn (AVUM) B-2/229th Avn (HvyHC)
2/227th Avn Bn (Attk)

HHD 2/227th Avn Bn A-2/227th Avn B-2/227th Avn C-2/227th Avn D-2/227th Avn
1/292nd Avn Bn (GS)

HHC 1/292nd Avn Bn A-1/292nd Avn (CAC) B-1/292nd Avn (SAC) D-1/292nd Avn (AVUM) 3rd Med Co (Air Ambulance) 20th Med Co (Air Ambulance)
Figure H-10. 11th Aviation Brigade Task Organization
H-10
2/1/2006
X 27 SUST
HHC 27th Sustainment Brigade 27th BTB

HHC 27th BTB 252nd Signal Co 27th BSC 70th Financial Management Co 345th HR Co 37th ALT Team
273rd CSSB
HHD 273rd CSSB 2731st Ord Co (Ammo) 2732nd Trans Co 2733rd Ord Co (Maint) 2734th QM Co (S&S) 3777th Trans Co (Petr) 3821st Trans Co
271st CSSB
HHD 271st CSSB 2711st Ord Co (Ammo) 2712nd Trans Co 2713th Ord Co (Maint) 2714th QM Co (S&S)
372nd CSSB
HHD 372nd CSSB 3721st Ord Co (Ammo) 3712th Trans Co 3713th Ord Co (Maint) 3714th QM Co (S&S) 4021st QM Co (Airdrop)
272nd CSSB
HHD 272nd CSSB 2721st Ord Co (Ammo) 2712th Trans Co 2713th Ord Co (Maint) 2714th QM Co (S&S)
Figure H-11. 27th Sustainment Brigade Task Organization
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H-11
Appendix H
X 44
HHC 44th Medical Brigade 1st CSH

12th Fwd Surgical Team (FST) 36th Fwd Surgical Team (FST)
9th Medical Bn (Area Spt)

HHD 9th MMB 15th Med Co (Area Spt) 22nd Med Co (Area Spt) 34th Med Co (Area Spt) 94th Med Co (Dental) 12th Fwd Surgical Team 36th Fwd Surgical Team 47th Pvnt Med Det 29th Vet Det
24th MMB
HHD 24th MMB 52nd Med Co (Grd Ambulance) 68th Med Co (Grd Ambulance)
Figure H-12. 44th Medical Brigade Task Organization
H-12
2/1/2006
X 555
HHD 555th Engineer Brigade 6701st Topographic Spt Team 803rd Ord Company (EOD) 804th Ord Company (EOD) 53rd Engr Bn
2nd (to HBCT during SRO) HHD 53rd Engr Bn 531st Engr Co (Horizontal) 532nd Engr Co (Horizontal) 533rd Engr Co (Vertical) 5301st Engr Plt (Concrete) KBR Contract Well Drilling Tm 75th Engr Bn 607th Fwd Spt Co (Engr) HHD 75th Engr Bn 9201st Engr Plt (Prime Power) th Engr Bn 69 931st Engr Co (Clearance) th Engr Bn HHD 69 945th Engr Co (MRB)) st Engr Co (Horizontal) 691 9564th Engr Plt (Dog) 692nd Engr Co (Horizontal) 6490th Engr Plt (Fire Fighting) rd Engr Co (Vertical) 693 6491st Engr Plt (Fire Fighting) 6901st Engr Plt (Quarry) 6535th Engr Plt (Quarry) th Fwd Spt Co (Engr) 608 6667th Engr Plt (Utilities) 6668th Engr Plt (Utilities) 609th Fwd Spt Co (Engr)
Figure H-13. 555th Engineer Brigade Task Organization
GPC CMS EHCC FAC Detachment Real Estate Team
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H-13
Appendix H
X 92
MP
HHC 92nd MP Brigade 701st CID Detachment 75th MP Bn

HHD 75th MP Bn 592nd MP Co 594th MP Co
89th MP Bn (I/R)
HHD 89th MP Bn 627th MP Co (PW) 628th MP Co (PW) 629th MP Co (I/R) 630th MP Co (Guard)
Figure H-14. 92nd MP Brigade Task Organization
H-14
2/1/2006
II 418
CA
418th Civil Affairs Bn

HHD (-) 418th CA Bn 418th CA CMOC A Co 418th CA Bn B Co 418th CA Bn C Co 418th CA Bn D Co 418th CA Bn DOS Rep/DOJ/DOC Reps GREENLAND Civil Authority Reps UNHCR Rep International Organization/NGO Reps
Figure H-15. 418th Civil Affairs Battalion Task Organization
2/1/2006
H-15
Appendix H
X 99 GN
HHC 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade 1st Bn 99th Mot Inf Bde
HHC 1-99 1st Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 2nd Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 3rd Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 4th Co (Wpn)-99th Mot Inf Bde 1st Bn Spt Co-99th Mot Bde
13th Co (Sapper) 14th Co (Recon) 15th Co (Signal 99th Spt Bn

HHC 99th Spt Bn QM Co 99th Spt Bn Trans Co 99th Spt Bn Med Co 99th Spt Bn Maint Co 99th Spt Bn
2nd Bn 99th Mot Inf Bde

HHC 2-99 5th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 6th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 7th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 8th Co (Wpn)-99th Mot Inf Bde 2nd Bn Spt Co-99th Mot Bde
3rd Bn 99th Mot Inf Bde

HHC 2-99 9th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 10th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 11th Co-99th Mot Inf Bde 12th Co (Wpn)-99th Mot Inf Bde 3rd Bn Spt Co-99th Mot Bde
Figure H-16. 99th Motorized Infantry Brigade (GREENLAND ARMY) Task Organization
H-16
2/1/2006
Appendix I
Division Staff Training Plans

"Training for warfighting readiness is the Army's number one priority in war and peace."
FM 7-1
This appendix proposes ideas, considerations, and suggestions on how to train the division staff replacing what was traditionally published as Chapter 3 (Training Plans) of the Mission Training Plan (MTP). With advances in information technology and increased web access, the Army will no longer publish paper-based MTPs. Instead, the Army is transitioning to the Digital Training Management System (DTMS) that delivers Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) for each type Army echelon to units in the field. Commanders, staffs and Soldiers will be able to access training matrices (formerly Chapter 2 of the MTP) and Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs) (formerly Chapter 4 of the MTP) using DTMS. This appendix, used in conjunction with the division's unit and functional CATS, is presented to assist commanders and their staffs in planning, preparing, executing and assessing staff training for mission requirements. It is not intended to supplant FM 70 and FM 7-1, which provides the Army's doctrinal foundation for training, but instead supplements existing training doctrine, principles, and procedures. This appendix, as well as other source manuals, materials, and sites referenced throughout the appendix, should be used in conjunction with FM 7-0 and 7-1 to develop division staff training plans.
STAFF TRAINING
I-1. Applying our current training doctrine to staff training is unique in that a staff is considered neither a unit nor organization in the traditional sense, but rather a collection of officers, NCOs and Soldiers organized to support the commander with command and control (C2); the staff is essentially an extension of the commander. Although planning training is inherently challenging for any commander, planning and executing staff training provides the commander, and more directly the chief of staff (COS), with a unique set of challenges. The most severe training challenges are those that deal with time (balancing staff day-today operations while simultaneously supporting subordinate unit training), synchronizing individual and element/cell training with Main and Tactical command post (CP) training, and developing short-range and near-term cell and element staff training. In essence the COS must determine how to train the staff to achieve mission essential task list (METL) proficiency both horizontally and vertically across the main and tactical command posts (TAC CPs). I-2. Only through a comprehensive and well planned and executed training plan can the division staff support the commander during Full Spectrum Operations. By applying the principles in FM 7-1, the division staff can devise an effective training plan.
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I-1
Appendix I
TRAINING MANAGEMENT
TRAINING MANAGEMENT CYCLE
I-3. The COS is the division commanders principal assistant in directing, coordinating, supervising, and training the staff, except in areas the commander reserves (see FM 6-0). In garrison, the COS's number one priority should be staff training. Like the commander, the COS uses the Army Training Management Cycle to continuously plan, prepare, execute, and assess the state of training across the division staff. This cycle provides the framework for developing the division staff METL, establishing training priorities, and allocating resources in support of training.
Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approach to Training

I-4. The top-down/bottom-up approach to training is vital to achieving and sustaining staff METL proficiency in support of division operational mission requirements. It involves a collaborative team effort between the division commander, his deputy commanding generals (DCGs), the COS, subordinate CP cell leaders and element/section/team leaders. The division Commander, in conjunction with the DCGs and COS, provides the training focus, direction, and resources. Subordinate cell, element and section/team leaders provide feedback on the staff's training proficiency in their respective warfighting function. They identify the specific staff training needs for their elements/sections/teams and execute training to standard, IAW the division staff training plan. This team effort helps maintain the training focus, establish training priorities, and enable effective communication between the various division CPs, cells and elements. I-5. Guidance, based on division operational mission and priorities, flows from the top down and results in subordinate elements and elements/sections/teams identifying specific collective and individual tasks that support the division staff METL. Input from the bottom up is essential because it identifies detailed training needs to achieve task proficiency on identified collective and individual tasks within each team/section/element and cell. Leaders at all echelons throughout each CP must communicate with each other on requirements, planning, preparing, executing, and assessing training. I-6. The COS centralizes the planning effort to provide a consistent staff training focus from the top to the bottom of the organization. However, the COS decentralizes detailed planning and execution to ensure that the conduct of mission-related training sustains strengths and overcomes the weaknesses unique to each cell. Decentralized execution promotes subordinate leaders initiative at all echelons. Responsibility for supervising training, developing subordinates, and providing feedback within their respective cells must reside with cell leaders. They in turn, must hold subordinate leaders within each cell accountable for training their individual elements/sections/teams.
Train the Way You Fight - As a Cohesive Staff Team

I-7. Historically, in garrison, division staffs have been organized by function using the traditional "G" staff configuration with administrative C2 processes that bear little resemblance to how staff's actually operate in the field. During training or deployment for real world operations, commanders have traditionally organized their staffs differently by arranging them into various command post configurations. They have used different hardware/software solutions, and employed different C2 processes to communicate information to present a common operational picture (COP). I-8. With today's high OPTEMPO, day-to-day taskings and other distracters competing for time, commanders must structure the staff in garrison the way it will fight. The lack of adequate training time and management of staff training time continues to plague many staffs. Structuring the staff in garrison into tactical command post configuration would enable the division staff to capitalize on training time by reducing time normally required for staffs to organize for an exercise. Configuring the staff in garrison as it
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would fight, and utilizing the same C2 processes in garrison as those used during execution of tactical operations, would better support the battle focus process and increase its overall readiness. Further, it would reduce many of the staff training challenges associated with transitioning from garrison to tactical environments.
PLANNING PROCESS
Staff METL Development
I-9. Staffs have always developed METLs. However, the changes affecting the organization of the division staff and configuration of its CPs now make it prudent to also consider developing a METL for each of the division CPs and their subordinate cells. The process used to develop a staff METL is the same as that of MTOE and TDA units as cited in FM 7-1, but with some subtle differences (see Figure I-1). For example, the COS, not the commander, drives the METL development process for the staff based on the division's wartime mission. The staff METL represents those critical tasks that the CPs and their subordinate cells must be able to perform to assist the commander with C2. Once approved, the METL provides the focus for battle staff training.
Commanders Guidance COSs Guidance

TAC CPs ISR Command Posts Cells MAIN CP ISR Plans Current OPs Coord Staff
CP Leaders Guidance
Staff METL
PROT FAPP LOG
Cell Leaders Guidance

Selected METL Tasks
C4
UEx Battle Staff Tasks
CP METL
Element Leaders Guidance
CP Battle Staff Tasks
Selected METL Tasks
Cell METL
Cell Battle Staff Tasks
Selected Tasks
Element Critical Tasks
Element Leader Tasks Individual Tasks Staff, Command Post (CP) and Subordinate Cell METLs
Figure I-1. Developing a staff METL I-10. The following fundamentals apply to staff METL development: The division staff METL is derived from the divisions war plan, the commanders guidance, and related tasks in external guidance. One key source of external guidance is the Battle Command Staff Tasks for the Division (see Table I-1 at the end of this appendix), approved by
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Appendix I
the CAC commander in April 2005. These tasks and the T&EOs are posted and accessible using DTMS. Mission essential tasks must apply to the entire division staff. METL does not include tasks assigned solely to the Main or Tactical CPs or their subordinate cells and elements. The METLs of the Main CP, TAC CPs, and cells must all support and complement the division staff METL. Note that the METLs of the Main CP, TAC CPs and cells should be mutually supporting, and complement other CP and cell METLs, as well as the division staff METL. The availability of resources does not affect METL development. The METL is an unconstrained statement of tasks required to exercise C2 processes and procedures in support of the commander. The METL is not prioritized; however, all tasks may not require equal training. The COS must integrate the staff horizontally and vertically to ensure synchronization and integration of warfighting functions. Tasks necessary to generate, sustain, and apply combat power are directed toward supporting the commanders decisions.
Commanders Guidance COS Guidance

Division Mission Division METL Division Battle Tasks
Staff METL
Cell Leaders Guidance Element Leaders Guidance
Division Battle Staff Tasks
TAC 1 CP METL TAC 2 CP METL MAIN CP METL
Top Down
Cell Element Element METL Element Element METL METL METL METL Cell Battle Staff Tasks Element
Critical Tasks
TAC 1 CP Battle Staff Tasks TAC 2 CP Battle Staff Tasks MAIN CP Battle Staff Tasks
Cell Element Element METL Element Element METL METL METL METL
Element Cell Battle Staff Tasks

Leader Tasks Individual Tasks
Element
Critical Tasks
Bottom Up
Supports Supports
Cell Element Element METL Element Element METL METL METL METL
Element Cell Battle Staff Tasks Element

Critical Tasks Leader Tasks Individual Tasks
Supports
Element
Leader Tasks Individual Tasks
Relationships Between Division Mission, Staff METL, Battle Tasks and Critical Tasks
Figure I-2. Relationships between staff, CP, and cell METL
Division Staff METL Development Sequence

I-11. The COS involves CP OICs, cell leaders and their SGMs/NCOICs in METL development, to create a team approach to staff training that is battle focused. Participation by CP OICs, cell leaders, and key
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NCOs develops a common understanding of the division staff's critical operational mission requirements, so that METLs developed throughout the staff are mutually supporting and nested with the higher echelon. CP OICs and cell leaders subsequently apply the insights gained during preparation of the staffs METL to the development of their CP and cell METLs. Element leaders (officers and NCOs) must understand the division staff's METL so that they can identify the appropriate Element and individual staff tasks for each collective mission essential task. The relationships of the staff, CP, and cell METLs, are graphically depicted in Figure I-2. It further illustrates that both the selection and prioritization of staff battle tasks and critical tasks and their relationship to METL development reflecting the bottom up approach. I-12. The staff, led by the COS, develops the staff METL. A checklist for staff METL development is shown below: Analyze the division assigned mission and METL and identify specified and implied staff tasks. Analyze the operational environment and other external guidance to identify any other staff tasks. Review the division commander's mission and METL. Use the CP-to-task matrix to identify those collective tasks that are critical for wartime accomplishment. These tasks become the staff METL. Sequence the METL tasks as they are expected to occur during the execution of the wartime mission or CP operations. Back-brief the CG and obtain approval of division staff METL. Provide the approved METL to the staff.
CP and Cell METL Development Sequence

I-13. Upon approval of the staff METL, the sequence for METL development described above is repeated using the same process from higher to lower for each of the division command posts and subordinate cells. The COS initiates the process by providing his guidance and the approved staff METL to the CP OICs (Main and/or Tactical). The CP OICs provide their guidance and CP METL to the cell leaders to develop their METL. Cell leaders in turn provide their METL and guidance to the Element leaders who begin the bottom up approach by identifying critical tasks or battle tasks that support the higher echelons METL. A generic checklist for CP and cell METL development follows: The higher echelon CP/cell initiates the process for subordinates by providing guidance, which includes the division wartime mission and METL, along with the approved staff/CP METL, to the subordinate Elements. CP/cell staffs, led by the OIC, review the higher echelon's METL in conjunction with the division mission and METL. CP/cell staffs review the operational environment and other external guidance to identify other staff tasks. CP/cell staffs use the CP-to-collective task matrix as a starting point to identify the collective tasks that are critical in assisting the commander with C2 during operations. CP/cell staffs sequence METL tasks as they are expected to unfold during the operation. CP/cells back-brief their higher echelon to obtain approval of their METL. Each higher echelon selects specific tasks from their subordinate echelon's METL as their staff battle tasks. A staff battle task, like a unit's, is a subordinate's mission essential task that is so critical that its accomplishment determines the success of the next higher echelon's mission essential task. Staff battle tasks are selected at the Element level. Similar CPs (TAC 1/TAC 2) may have different staff battle tasks selected, depending on their unique responsibilities and functions. Staff battle tasks allow the COS and subordinate staff leaders to define the training tasks that integrate warfighting functions and receive the highest priority for resources, such as training areas, facilities (to include virtual and constructive simulations), materiel and funds.
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Elements identify critical tasks that support the cell's METL. Likewise, the cell develops a METL that supports the CP METL. Figure I-3 describes the process using a TAC CP. Although a TAC CP is used as an example, the process used to develop the METL and associated battle tasks and to identify both critical leader and individual tasks is the same for all command posts. CP/cell OICs provide the approved METL to their CP/cell. Upon approval the CP/cell METLs are normally modified only if changes occur in the divisions mission and/or staff METL.
Figure I-3. Developing a METL that supports the CP
Division as JTF
I-14. The division, when designated a JTF, will be required to develop a Staff Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL). The JMETL is the joint force commander's list of priority joint tasks, derived from plans and orders, along with associated conditions and measurable standards, and constitutes the joint force commander's warfighting requirements. Procedures for JMETL development are found in the JMETL Handbook (see web site: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/JMETLbook.pdf).
Establish Training Objectives

I-15. Once the METL is approved, the COS, assisted by the CP and cell leaders, establishes training objectives for the entire staff. Training objectives include the conditions and standards that describe the situation or environment and ultimate end state criteria that the staff must meet to successfully perform
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each task. Training objectives and standards for the METL can be obtained from approved T&EOs, Soldier Training Publications (STP); higher headquarters command guidance, and local SOPs. It is important that every task have a condition, standard and performance steps so that all training can be evaluated and measured against a benchmark.
COS Training Assessment

I-16. The COS sets specific training goals for the staff. These goals are based on guidance from the division commander, the COS's vision, and guidance provided in appropriate doctrinal manuals. The COS's initial METL assessment serves as the starting point for developing the staff training strategy. The training assessment is the COS's comparison of the staff's current proficiency, to include the proficiency of individual staff officers, CPs, cells and elements, with the proficiency required to support the commander with C2 during Full Spectrum Operations. However, to be most effective, an ongoing evaluation process must be implemented to ensure that the staff remains focused on preparation for its role in assisting the commander with C2. The COS and his primary staff officers, along with their SGMs/NCOICs, assess the organization's current proficiency on mission-essential tasks against the required standard. The COS indicates the current proficiency by rating each task as T (Trained), P (Needs Practice), or U (Untrained). The outcome of the training assessment identifies the staffs training requirements. The METL assessment compares current levels of training with the Army standard and is used to update staff goals and objectives.
Staff Training Assessment

Made by the Chief of Staff Compares current level of training with the Army/Joint standards Is the cornerstone of the long-range planning process Based on first hand observations and input from all leaders Is a continuous process Used to set or update staff goals and objectives Influenced by future events
Figure I-4. METL assessment process I-17. Figure I-4 summarizes the METL assessment process. Table I-2 depicts a sample COS training assessment for a division staff, and compares the overall rating to CP and cell's ratings. Suggestions for conducting the COS's training assessment are listed below: Review all formal and informal (internal/external) evaluations such as Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) after action reports, higher headquarters Command Inspection Program (CIP) results, and simulations training feedback. Pay particular attention to recurring deficiencies. Review past Quarterly Training Briefings (QTBs). Review all equipment availability and readiness reports like past Unit Status Reports (USR) for readiness information and to detect deficiencies.
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Discuss staff training and performance with the division DCGs, division CSM, CP OICs and cell leaders. Review the personnel status report for critical personnel shortages. Note personnel turnover trends. Pay particular attention to low-density military occupational specialty (MOS) turnover. Participate in staff training exercises. Determine operator proficiency on newly fielded equipment; i.e. automation systems, ABCS 6.4 systems and updates, and new computer software. Consult with the DCGs to gain their perceptions of staff training status.
TAC CP 1
TAC CP 2
MAIN CP
OVERALL
M IS S IO N ESSENTIAL TASKS Develop/Update/Maintain COP Prepare/Update/Maintain Staff Estimates Prepare/Make Recommendations Plan Operations using MDMP Assess Execution of Operations Provide C4I Define the Battlefield Environment
T P P P T P P
T P T T T P P
T T T T T T T
T P P P T P P
Table I-2. COS training assessment for a division staff

Establish Training Priorities
I-18. The COS establishes training priorities for staff training METL tasks after completing the training assessment. The priorities established are based on the COS's assessment, the criticality of each task, and the training emphasis the task should receive.
Develop Division Staff Training Strategy and COS Staff Training Guidance
I-19. The training strategy developed and executed by the staff to train to standard in its critical wartime missions is a component of the Army's Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) which is discussed below. It is developed based on the staff METL, training assessment and training priorities established by the COS. Through the training strategy, the COS establishes training goals, describes training objectives, and most importantly, determines the staff's training priorities. The staff training strategy articulates the COS's staff training guidance which includes the commander's training guidance and vision. The commander/COS determines staff training goals by:
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Reviewing higher commander's training goals. Spelling out in tangible terms what the staff will do to comply with training goals. Listing in broad terms the training goals for the staff. Figure I-5 provides a sample of the staff training guidance (STG) with training goals, objectives, and priorities.
Staff Training Guidance (STG)

T RAINING G O ALS :
- A ll staff proficient in pe rfo rm ing ME TL tasks - Refine battle staff p roficiencies and CP b attle tracking p roce dures - Get staff read y to cond uct a w ell plann ed a nd p recisely e xecuted CP X du ring 3d q uarter.
: T RAINING OBJECT IVES

New ly assign ed soldie rs/lead ers con fident on S OPs/ TTPs New ly assign ed o perato rs incorpo rate d into the A BCS netw o rk A ll staff sections capable of con ducting M DM P S taff p repa re d fo r upc om ing BC TP
T RAINING PRIORIT IES :

In divid ual op erato r proficiency sustainm ent M ission collective training S taff s kills S taff battle tracking procedu res CB R N training
Figure I-5. Sample staff training guidance I-20. To develop the division staff training strategy, the COS must rely on input from subordinate staff leaders (CP, cell, element leaders and their SGMs/NCOICs). Their input is crucial to identifying the individual, leader and digital training requirements; the functional and supporting collective tasks; training audience; the type training events that best accomplish the training and meet training objectives; and finally, the estimated resources (facilities, terrain requirements and/or simulations) required to conduct the training events to standard. The end result is a preliminary training strategy which includes an estimation and tentative scheduling of resources, a general understanding of the various training requirements and key events. Training for the staff should be scheduled so that it occurs in a progressive and sequential manner using the Army's crawl-walk-run approach as depicted in Figure I-6. I-21. As the figure depicts, training during the "crawl" phase focuses on achieving individual, section, CP element, and cell task proficiency before progressing to staff group and full staff training. Examples would include: individual specific competencies and digital systems operator training. In the "walk" phase, staff training and drills focus on critical intra-CP element staff control processes and coordination. During the "run" phase of training, staff training is multi-echelon involving the full staff, inter-CP, and cell and element coordination. Training focuses on critical command-oriented staff processes, such as MDMP and IPB, which directly affect full staff proficiency.
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Appendix I
Training for the staff should be scheduled so that it occurs in a progressive and sequential manner using the Army's crawlwalk-run approach
ta f f nS io Walk iv is D
Crawl Walk
in Tra
Run
in g
Run
Crawl
Capstone Capstone CPX CPX
Trained Trained Battle Battle Staff Staff
Simulation Supported
Walk Run
Crawl
Crawl Walk Run Individual Training Problem Solving How-to-Brief Computer User Training ABCS Operator Training The Staff Estimate Battle CPT/Iron MAJ Orientation Cell/Element SOP
Element Training Functional Staff Estimate Practical Application Cell/Element SOP ABCS Integration Training Displaying COP Functional Input to MDMP Intra-Element Coordination UEx Staff SOP Training Cell/Element Set-up
CP/Battle Staff Training The MDMP TAC CP SOP Procedure MAIN CP SOP Procedures Cell/Element Integration Control the Battle Conduct the Battle Inter-CP Coordination Command Post Set-up
Full Battle Staff Training Multi-echelon Staff Training
Cell Training Staff Drills Training Functional CP Training
Element/Team Training Individual Development
Figure I-6. Division staff trainingcrawl, walk, run
The Combined Arms Training Strategy Program

I-22. The Combined Army Training Strategy (CATS) is the Army's overarching strategy for current and future training of the force. CATS is the result of a multi-year effort sponsored by the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Operations, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). CATS establish units, Soldier, and leader training requirements and describes how the Army will train and sustain the Army to standard in the institution, units, and through self-development. The CATS also identifies and quantifies the training resources required to execute training. Unit and function CATS are being developed for all Army units. The strategies contained in CATS will complement and support FM 7-1. CATS will provide commanders and trainers with a baseline for planning, programming and executing unit collective training. The purpose of CATS is to assist commanders in developing unit training plans based on the assessment of the METL by Establishing (unit/staff collective) training requirements. Determining who (staff/unit/individuals) should be trained, when (frequency), where (site), how (method/media) the training should be conducted, and the collective tasks and critical individual tasks that should be trained. Identifying resources required for training and assist in their acquisition. Ensuring unit/staff and individual training proficiency needed to accomplish unit wartime mission, unit/staff METL across Full Spectrum Operations. Guiding and controlling training development. Controlling what training products are produced and maintained.
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I-23. C2 CATS will provide specific training strategies developed to assist staffs in attaining and sustaining a desired level of collective proficiency in mission essential tasks. These strategies are based on mission and critical collective task analysis data and evaluation feedback. Staff CATS will be developed using "objective" TO&E data and the most current collective tasks provided by proponents.
Main Command Post

Quarterly Training Event Task : MDMP Goal: P to T Run
Elem Elem Cells
MAIN Crawl MAIN Crawl MAIN Run MAIN Run MAIN AAR
Dec
Walk
Nov Elem Elem Elem Cells
Crawl
Oct Elem
Week 1
Elem
Week 2
Elem
Week 3
Cells
Week 4
Figure I-7. Example of training options I-24. Once the training strategy is established, subordinate CP, cell and element leaders, and their SGMs/NCOICs conduct the detailed planning necessary to implement the strategy and convert it to a plan using the long range, short range and near-term planning calendars. Figure I-7 provides an example of possible options available to the COS to train the staff and various command posts of the division during a quarter. I-25. As noted in the example, the staff would apply the crawl-walk-run methodology throughout the quarter with the last week of the month consisting of a multi-echeloned training event involving the full staff and inter-CP, cell and element coordination as well as coordination among two or more command echelons to include interaction with higher, subordinate and adjacent units staffs (if available). During the first three weeks of October during the "crawl" phase of training the Elements within each element would focus on the MDMP concentrating on the individual and team responsibilities, steps or aspects of the process peculiar to their warfighting function during the fourth week in October, training on the MDMP would be consolidated at the cell level using a vignette to combine the responsibilities and planning efforts of the various cells and elements, generating intra-element coordination. In November training would continue to focus on MDMP with both the elements and cells progressing to the "walk" phase of training. The elements would continue intra-element coordination and training would progress during the last week with intra-cell coordination and CP functional training. In December, the elements and cells train on the MDMP at the "Run" level with emphasis on inter-CP coordination. Training culminates the last week of December with full staff integration and coordination across all the CPs, cells and elements in a division command post exercise (CPX) conducted using the crawl-walk-run methodology.
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Staff Green-Red Cycle

Green Cycle/Day Activities
- Staff training focus is primarily on collective tasks with individual and leader tasks integrated during multi-echelon training. - Maximum staff attendance at prime time, mission essential training - Staff administrative and support (day-to-day) requirements that keep the staff from participating in training is eliminated to the maximum extent possible. -Leaves and passes are limited to the maximum extent possible CP Echelon Main CP TAC 1 & 2 Main CP Cells Main CP Elements TAC CP Cells TAC CP Elements Dedicated Green Training Days 1st Tuesday of each quarter 1st Thursday of each quarter 1st Tuesday of every month 2nd. 3rd, 4th Tuesdays of every month 1st Thursday of every month 2nd. 3rd, 4th Thursday of every month
Red Cycle/Day Activities

- Majority of the time is dedicated to day-to-day staff responsibilities and supporting subordinate units requirements. - Element and individual training emphasized - Conduct STB required training - Provides time for individuals to attend education and training courses or leave and passes.
Table I-3. Use of red-green cycle to minimize training distractors
Time Management
I-26. Time management is a unique challenge for staff training because the staff must constantly wrestle with balancing day-to-day staff responsibilities with its own training. The key to time management is identifying and then locking in prime-time training periods. FM 7-1 outlines various time management systems that are also applicable to staff training. When the commander and the COS are involved in time management, staff training is greatly enhanced. The level of involvement in time management may vary, but the ultimate goal should be to protect staff training by minimizing training distracters, especially during scheduled staff training. Whatever time management system the staff adopts, it should identify, focus, and fence prime-time training periods so the staff can concentrate on mission essential tasks. Only with the commanders and COSs support and enforcement, can any staff time management cycle succeed. Table I3 uses the Red-Green Cycle, described in FM 7-1 with modifications, to show how the staff might use this time management cycle to minimize training distracters. I-27. The Green-Red Cycle Activities listed in Table I-3 also suggest the types of activities/training the staff would conduct during a particular cycle/day. During the Green cycle/day, staff training focuses on collective staff training at the element, cell or CP level. During the Red Cycle/Day, the staffs primary
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focus is on day-to-day staff responsibilities and support to subordinate units. Some limited individual training or Element training may occur during the Red Cycle/Day.
LONG-RANGE PLANNING
STAFF TRAINING GUIDANCE
I-28. Staff training guidance for the staff is published by the COS based on the division commander's Command Training Guidance (CTG). The STG documents the divisions long-range training plan and is the training analog of the organizations war plan. It must be read and understood by every staff officer and NCO, because it is used as a ready reference to plan, execute, and assess training throughout the longrange planning period.
STAFF LONG-RANGE PLANNING CALENDAR

I-29. Long-range planning is the process of integrating the staffs training strategy into the division longrange training calendar. This process is intended to limit distractions and conflicts by formalizing staff training. An indirect goal is to balance day-to-day responsibilities with planned staff training. It helps to ensure that time is allocated for staff training and that all staff members participate during prime time training cycles/days. Additionally, it synchronizes element, cell and CP training events. The tools used to develop a long-range training plan include: the division CTG, the COS STG, the staff training strategy, and the division long-range training calendar (18-24 months out). Below are basic points to address when developing the staff long-range planning calendar.
Required Training Events That Must Be On The Calendar

I-30. Evaluate the training strategy and determine what areas the staff can train on during training events or other requirements directed by the division commander or higher headquarters. These events can provide excellent training opportunities.
Other Non-Collective Training Requirements

I-31. Identify major activities such as division directed inspections, STB Soldier-required training, schools, new equipment fielding, or community and installation support events that are habitual staff responsibilities.
Time Management
I-32. Identify prime time training cycles/days by using one of the training management cycles systems referred to in FM 7-1, and/or devised by the division. Focus resources and training exercise planning to take advantage of prime time training. Account for holiday periods.
Training Cycle Management

I-33. Insulate staffs from training distracters during prime time training cycles/days. By keeping subordinate units and higher headquarters abreast of the staffs prime time training periods, commanders help reduce the number of outside distractions. However, the staff must remain aware that support to subordinate units often mandates some level of continuous support even during prime time training periods.
Integrate Staff Exercises and Other Training

I-34. Schedule events that will improve or sustain staff METL proficiency in conjunction with the commander's and higher headquarters directed training requirements.
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Army Battle Command Systems

I-35. Consider ABCS and factors that impact it when developing the long-range training plan for the staff. The division command posts are, in effect, information centers that manage massive amounts of data to assist the commander in developing a common operational picture (COP). ABCS is the current automation tool to facilitate this. The nature of ABCS is a dynamic one. As new systems are fielded, others are being updated and upgraded in their hardware and software configurations. This requires system users to remain proficient in the most updated versions of these systems. Information managers must ensure systems are current and systems users are properly trained, to prevent training distraction while maintaining peak efficiency. Integrating ABCS systems into garrison operations will assist the staff in maintaining system proficiency. With its integrated automated planning tools, it can serve as the internal means to collaboratively develop OPLANs and OPORDs while in garrison. In essence, it reinforces staff/individual training on a daily basis.
Constructive Simulations
I-36. Consider and plan use of constructive simulations for staff training during command post exercises (CPXs). Simulations provide a low-cost, low-overhead exercise driver for the division staff. Using simulations is increasingly important, in order to add rigor to a staff-level exercise battlefield effects, which cannot be reproduced unless troops and units are moved to the field and exercised in mass. Coordination with the home station battle simulation center and Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) will ensure availability of appropriate simulation and digital systems/resources, including trained instructors, proper training of workstation personnel, and accurate entry of exercise data.
Future Combat Systems Training

I-37. The FCS family of systems (FoS) will have an embedded capability that is designed to support individual and collective C2 training. Embedded training supports a full range of tasks, individual, element, cell, and CP, all with a capability to support Live-Virtual-Constructive (L-V-C) training environments. Staff leaders will have the capability to train their elements/cells/CPs on tasks that previously required major exercises to accomplish. This capability will greatly reduce the heavy simulation and signal support required for current staff training events. I-38. Every staff element or cell will have embedded training management tools and links to these services via the Army Unit Training Management System (UTMS) and the Army Learning Management System (LMS) to facilitate training management in any training domain. Within these products the leader can use Training Support Packages (TSPs) with scenarios and T&EOs to build training proficiencies and competencies. FCS embedded training is a tool to support training management, it will not replace it. I-39. Modularity with its concepts of plug and play requires that all battle staffs be trained to a common standard. The employment of digital C2 systems such as FCS FoS will greatly support this requirement. Additionally, applying and enforcing the principles of training found in FMs 7-0 and 7-1 will give commanders the training management tools to train and sustain a ready battle staff. I-40. Joint capability will be a part of the FCS FoS for joint force C2, which must be supported by automated data processing (ADP) systems. Modularity again, by its nature demands that Joint doctrine and Joint systems be integrated into battle staff training.
STAFF SHORT-RANGE PLANNING

I-41. The staff's short-range training plan defines in greater detail the broad guidance on training events and other activities contained in the long-range training guidance, and on the long-range calendar. It
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requires the CPs to look out from 3 to 6 months. The CP OICs must publish the short-range training guidance with sufficient lead-time to ensure that the cell and element leaders have time to develop their own short-range training plans. It begins with a review of the COSs training assessment and the division Quarterly Training Guidance (QTG), and results in the quarterly training calendar and Quarterly Training Briefing (QTB) to the COS/Commander. The short-range plan is prepared using the following steps:
Review the Training Program

I-42. The COS reviews the training program described in the long-range planning process to determine whether assessments made during long-range planning are still valid. The COS reviews QTG. Each command post (Main and TAC) publishes short-range (quarterly) training guidance. The CP's QTG enables the COS and Element leaders to prioritize and refine mission essential training guidance contained in the staff's long-range STG. The CP OICs publish their QTG after receiving training guidance from the COS, usually about 90 days prior to the start of each quarter. Important aspect of the QTG development process are the roles of the Element leaders, SGMs/NCOICs and the Special Troops Battalion (STB) commander. Together they help identify the individual and element training tasks that must be integrated into the collective mission training during the short-range planning period. Training Goals and Priorities. Determines whether goals are still valid. Established priorities must support these goals. To update priorities during the short-range planning process, the commander uses the same process used in establishing priorities during the long-range planning process. Long-Range Planning Calendars of the Staff. Note entries that affect short-range planning. Changes to the long-range planning calendar may affect the staff's ability to accomplish its training program. Previous Short-Range Planning Calendars. Identify training accomplished, training preempted, and lessons learned.
Review Current Staff Proficiency

I-43. This review is performed to update priorities. The COS's training assessment is re-looked to provide a snapshot of the staffs current Soldier, leader, and collective task proficiency. Individual and Element training sustainment must be included in the plan.
Review Resources
I-44. This review is performed to determine if required resources are available to execute the program described on the long-range planning calendar.
Review the Training Environment

I-45. This second review of the training environment takes on added importance as training events and activities approach. Factors that affect the training environment and that impact collectively on the training program are: Personnel assigned. Personnel turbulence. Taskings. Morale. Education programs. Mandatory training (higher headquarters and STB). Visits, inspections, and tests.
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Appendix I
Day-to-day staff activities/requirements and support to subordinate units. Short and long-term taskings (for example, funeral detail).
Develop a Detailed Plan of Action

I-46. Develop a detailed plan for the duration of the short-range plan. The detailed plan of action is prepared as described below. Validate the Need for Scheduled Training. The training events identified on the long-range training plan are examined to determine validity. Transfer Valid Training to a Quarterly Training Calendar. Determine Desired Outcomes for Scheduled Training. The COS determines what the staff is expected to accomplish during training and then backward plans to achieve the desired outcome. Analyze Supporting Missions to Determine the Related Individual, Leader, and Collective Tasks. The success of collective training is a function of the training achievement of staff elements, cells, CPs and individuals. Select Specific Training Objectives for Missions and Tasks to be Trained. The division staff T&EOs provide the COS with conditions, standards, task steps, and performance measures for the collective tasks that support the staff's training. Prepare a Quarterly Training Calendar. When preparing the quarterly training calendar the COS reviews the division CTG and the division annual training calendar. The COS refines and expands the annual calendar as appropriate and identifies, allocates, and coordinates short leadtime resources such as local training facilities. The COS pays particular attention to BCTP lessons learned from Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) prior to developing training objectives and tasks. Time is allocated for ABCS network installation and other critical training resources. The COS cross-references each event with specific training objectives and coordinates with the STB Commander, cell leaders, and their SGMs/NCOICs and the CSM. Review Short-Range Plans with the Division Commander. Issue Guidance Specifically Addressing How Training Will Be Accomplished. The COS may pass guidance to the staff in many ways, including: Memorandums of instruction. Training meetings. Staff calls. Published staff notes. Quarterly training guidance.
NEAR-TERM DIVISION STAFF PLANNING

I-47. The staff's near-term planning focuses on scheduling and executing the training specified in the short-range training plan. It provides specifics to the trainers and produces detailed training schedules. It covers a 6 to 8 week period before training.
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Element/Platoon Weekly
Cell/ Company Weekly ISR Plans Current OPs Coord/Special
Training Meetings
CP/Battalion Bi-Weekly UEx Staff/Brigade Monthly
MAIN CP G5
Example PM Element CBRN Ops Element AMD Element ENG Ops Element ISR FAPP Protection Sustainment C4 ISR FAPP Protection Sustainment C4 Food Svc Maint Support 1 Plt 2 Plt 3 Plt Support Signal Co TAC CP 2 Dep G3 TAC CP 1 G3
METL Development Training Guidance Training Meetings Training Schedules Assess Training
Applying the Methodology
STB/G3/G5/COS COS/Division Cdr
Assessment
Assessment
Training Planning Process
METL Training Assessment Training Strategy Commander's Guidance Training Plans Training Execution
HHC STB BN Cdr
Feedback
Training Planning Process
Figure I-8. Training meeting attendees at CPs
TRAINING MEETINGS
I-48. Training meetings are the key to near term planning. They must be conducted on a regularly scheduled basis by the staff at all levels throughout the various command posts. Figure I-8 suggests who should attend meetings at the various CPs by comparing it to platoon/company and battalion-level training meetings. The example suggests that subordinate Element leaders would hold informal weekly training meetings similar to those held at platoon level to discuss individual, team, section and Element level training issues. Cells would conduct weekly training meetings but they would be more formal by following a set agenda similar to those held at company level training meetings. I-49. All CPs would hold formal bi-weekly training meetings facilitated by the OIC, and chaired by the senior officer for the respective CP (for example, the G-3 would facilitate and one of the DCGs would chair the training meeting for the TAC 1 CP). I-50. Figure I-9 depicts the cell attendees present at a TAC CP training meeting. Note that it is suggested that Special Troops Battalion (STB) representatives be present during CP training meetings. I-51. 1-52. Finally, the division staff would conduct formal monthly training meetings chaired by the COS and facilitated by the G-3. Figure I-10 suggests what a training meeting at this level might look like. As FM 7-1 states, training meetings are non-negotiable; they force leaders to be personally involved and participate in the preparation, conduct, and evaluation of all training. Note again that the STB is represented, as well as the representatives from the Installation Management Agency (IMA).
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Appendix I
Training Meetings TAC CP 1

Applying the FM 7-1 Methodology
Prot FAPP FAPP ISR SGM NCO TAC CP Cells G3 ISR OIC
RECOMMENDED TIME LINE
ACTION TIME
Prot NCO
Assessment of Completed Training 15 Minutes Preparation for Near -Term Training 30 Minutes 15 Minutes
Sust
Planning for Short -Range Training
Time Requirements FM 7 -1
C4
G3 SGM
IMA Rep
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLETED TRAINING * ELEMENT ASSESSMENT * Collective, Leader, and Soldier Training * Go and No Go Snapshot * TRAINING SHORTFALLS * Training Planned but not Conducted * Reason for not Executing * Retraining Plan * METL UPDATE * Training Assessment Work Sheet * Element Input * Personal Observation
NBC
STB Support Select Reps Maint Commo
Food Supply
Completed Training
Figure I-9. Cell attendees for a TAC CP training meeting
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Training Meetings CPs/STB

Applying the FM 7-1 Methodology
G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 HHC CDR/1SG IMA IG CHAP SURG SJA CHEMO SOO AMD SIGNAL Co Cdr STB CDR STB CSM
B-1. ..training meetings are key to near-term planning and are non-negotiable. .Training meetings create the bottom-up flow of information regarding specific training proficiency needs of the unit and individual soldiers. (FM 7-1)
TAC CPs
MAIN CP
Note: The STB weekly training meeting synchronizes support for the CPs and Cells with supporting units.
Figure I-10. Example of a division staff monthly training meeting
TRAINING SCHEDULES
I-52. The training schedule is the primary leadership tool to ensure that training is conducted as scheduled, by qualified trainers, and involves the entire staff. Draft training schedules must be initiated and distributed at least 6 to 8 weeks out to ensure that resources are coordinated, external support is requested, and the staff is aware of the training periods/times. Once approved and signed, the training schedule constitutes an official order. Training schedules can be living documents but the COS should approve all changes. The COS ensures that they are up-to-date and posted where the division staff can access them. Training schedules ensure that information is disseminated to include who is to be at the scheduled training, when the training will be conducted, where the training will take place, and what the staff will train on. As stated above the staffs training schedule should be forwarded to higher headquarters and subordinate units. The intent is to limit the number of external disruptions by highlighting division staff prime time training events.
SUMMARY
I-53. The ideas, considerations and suggestions proposed in this appendix are neither revolutionary nor evolutionary, but rather are firmly grounded in our current training doctrine as outlined in FM 7-1. Army transformation, the high OPTEMPO, and the realities of the current COE, have, and will continue to shape all aspects of the Army from doctrine, to restructuring formation, to operating as part of a joint force. The residual effects of transformation are numerous, yet they deserve the same degree of attention as the obvious changes. This appendix focuses on one such area: training the division staff. The leadership of
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SGS PM
COS
I-19
Appendix I
these newly created headquarters can greatly enhance the readiness of their staffs by enforcing and applying the principles of training as espoused in our existing training doctrine. I-54. The Commander, COS, and the primary staff leaders must strive to build and sustain individual and collective task proficiency throughout the headquarters. The suggestions recommended throughout this appendix attempt to address the how to train the staff. I-55. The appendix also suggests that the staff should train as they fight by organizing in garrison as they are organized during deployments. This could yield numerous benefits as Soldiers and leaders will be intimately familiar with the sections, elements, and cells in which they will operate in during Full Spectrum Operations. Team building will be maximized. During garrison the staff should strive to use the same C2 systems, and procedures that are used in the field/deployments. I-56. The future portends no lack of threats to the United States and our way of life. Commanders and leaders at every level have an obligation to ensure that not only are their Soldiers and units trained but that their headquarters are also trained and prepared to the highest degree possible for any contingency. Short notice deployments and ambiguous conditions will be the norm rather than the exception. Previous methods of training the staff may have been adequate during the Cold War but will not suffice in todays ever changing environment. Leaders must ensure that the processes already embedded in current doctrine are formally applied to the staff to guarantee its success in future operations. I-57. Direct questions or comments to the Operations Officer, Battle Command and Training Integration Division (BCTID), Collective Training Division (CTD) Combined Arms Center -Training (CAC-T) at web-CTD@ leavenworth.army.mil or DSN 684-7469 or COMM (913) 684-7469.
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SEQ # 1 2 3 4
T&EO # 20-7-1010 20-7-1020 20-7-1030 20-7-2040 20-7-2041 20-7-2042 20-7-2043
UEx Staff Collective Task Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Coordinate Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Effort Coordinate Intelligence Support to Targeting Plan Tactical Actions Associated with Force Projection and Deployment Coordinate Tactical Deployment/Redeployment Activities Plan Predeployment Activities Plan Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Activities (RSO&I) Control Tactical Maneuver Coordinate Mobility Operations Plan Fires to Influence the Will, and Destroy, Neutralize, or Suppress Enemy Forces Plan Non-lethal Fire Support - Offensive Information Operations Plan Against Air and Missile Attack and Aerial Surveillance Plan Security Operations Coordinate Defensive Information Operations Coordinate Distribution of Classes of Supply Plan Transportation Support Coordinate Movement Control Plan Sustainment Support Coordinate Contracting Support Plan Civil-Military Operations Coordinate Interface/Liaison Between US Military Forces and Local Authorities/NGOs Coordinate Negotiations with and Between Other Governmental and NGOs
5 6 7
20-7-2050 20-7-2060 20-7-3070 20-7-3071
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
20-7-4080 20-7-4090 20-7-4100 20-7-5110 20-7-5120 20-7-5121 20-7-5130 20-7-5140 20-7-5150 20-7-5151 20-7-5152
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I-21
Appendix I
16 17
20-7-6160 20-7-6170 20-7-6171 20-7-6172 20-7-6173 20-7-6174
Establish Command Post Operations Manage Tactical Information Collect Friendly Force Information Requirements Process Relevant Information to Create a Common Operational Picture Display a Common Operational Picture (COP) Tailored to Unit Needs Disseminate Common Operational Picture and Execution Information to Higher, Lower, Adjacent, Supported, and Supporting Organizations Assess Tactical Situation and Operations Monitor Situation or Progress of Operations Evaluate Situation or Operation Develop Staff Estimates Evaluate Combat Assessment Conduct Battle Damage Assessment Plan Operations Using the Military Decision Making Process/Troop Leading Procedures Conduct the Military Decision Making Process Integrate Requirements and Capabilities Develop Commanders Critical Information Requirements Recommendations Establish Target Priorities Provide Operational Law Support Coordinate Space-Based Capabilities and Products Prepare for Tactical Operations Establish and Conduct Coordination and Liaison Conduct Rehearsals Task Organize/Organize for Operations Revise & Refine the Plan Integrate New Units/Soldiers into Force Control Tactical Operations Manage CS/CSS Force Positioning Manage Use and Assignment of Terrain Maintain Synchronization Control Tactical Airspace
18
20-7-6180 20-7-6181 20-7-6182 20-7-6183 20-7-6184 20-7-6185
19
20-7-6190 20-7-6191 20-7-6192 20-7-6193 20-7-6194 20-7-6195 20-7-6196
20
20-7-6200 20-7-6201 20-7-6202 20-7-6203 20-7-6204 20-7-6205
21
20-7-6210 20-7-6211 20-7-6212 20-7-6213 20-7-6214
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20-7-6215 20-7-6216 20-7-6217 22 23 20-7-6220 20-7-6221 20-7-6230 20-7-6231 20-7-6232 20-7-6233
Plan Actions, Sequels, and Branches Make Adjustments to Resources, Concept of Operations, or Mission Coordinate Actions to Produce Maximum Effective Application of Military Power Monitor Continuous Operations Maintain Continuity of Command and Control Plan Public Affairs Operations Develop Information Strategies Facilitate Media Operations Implement Higher Headquarters Public Affairs Themes
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I-23
(BLANK PAGE)
Glossary
A2C2 AAGS ACA ACE ACM ACP ACO ACOS ACT AD ADAM ADC ADCA ADE AFATDS AFSB AIC ALO AMD AMDPCS AO AR ARFOR Army airspace command and control Army air-ground system airspace control authority analysis and control element airspace control measures airspace control plan airspace control order acting chief of staff analysis and control team air defense air defense airspace management assistant division commander Arms Control and Disarmament Agency air defense element Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Army Field Support Brigade airspace information center air liaison officer Air and Missile Defense Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System area of operations Army The senior Army headquarters and all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. See also joint force land component commander (FM 3-0). Army special operations forces Army Strategic Command area support medical company antiterrorism advanced trauma management
ARSOF ARSTRAT ASMC AT ATM
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Glossary-1
FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
ATO ATS ASAS ASOS ATO AUTL AXP BAE BAS BCOTM BCS3 BCT BFSB BFT BLOS BOS BSA BSB BSMC BSS C2 C4 C4IM CA CASEVAC CBRN CBRNE CCIR CD CGS CI CIMP CJCSM
air tasking order air traffic services All Source Analysis System Air Support Operation Squadron air tasking order Army Universal Task List ambulance exchange point brigade aviation element battalion aid station battle command on the move battle command and sustainment support system brigade combat team battlefield surveillance brigade Blue Force Tracker beyond line of sight battlefield operating systems brigade support area brigade support battalion brigade support medical company BCT surgeons section command and control command, control, communications, computers command, control, communications, computers, and information management civil affairs casualty evacuation chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, explosives radiological, nuclear, and high yield
commander's critical information requirements counterdrug common ground station counterintelligence Command Information Management Plan Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
Glossary-2
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___________________________________________________________________ Glossary (DRAG Edition)
CMO CMOC COA COG COMMZ COMSEC CONPLAN CONUS COP COS CP CPOF CR CRO CS CSS CSSB CSSCS CT CTIL DA DAC DBL DC DCG-A DCGS-A DCP DMC DNBI DOD DOS DSO DSP DTES
civil-military operation civil-military operation center course of action center of gravity communications zone communications security concept plan continental United States common operational picture Chief of Staff command post command post of the future community relations combat replenishment operations combat support combat service support combat sustainment support battalion Combat Service Support Control System counterterrorism commanders tracked items list Department of the Army Department of the Army civilian distribution based logistics dislocated civilian Distributed Common Ground Distributed Common Ground Station deployable command post distribution management center disease and nonbattle injury Department of Defense Department of State deception staff officer Defense Support Program Distributed Tactical Exploitation System (see TENCAP)
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Glossary-3
FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
DTSS EA EAD EECP ENCOORD EMT EOD EPW ESP FAIO FBCB2 FES FFIR FHA FHP FID FLO FM FMT FRAGO FSC FSCM FSCOORD FSMP G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9
Digital Topographic Support System electronic attack echelons above division early entry command post engineer coordinator emergency medical treatment explosive ordinance disposal enemy prisoner of war expeditionary support packages(ing) field artillery intelligence officer Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below forced entry switch friendly force information requirements foreign humanitarian assistance force health protection foreign internal defense fighter liaison officer field manual field maintenance team fragmentary order forward support company fire support coordinating measure fire support coordinator forward support medical platoon Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations Assistant Chief of Staff, Information Operations Assistant Chief of Staff, Financial Management Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil-Military Operations
Glossary-4
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GCCS-A GI&S GIG GPS HA HCA HCLOS HEMTT-LHS HIDACZ HMMWV HN HPT HR HUMINT HVT IA IED IG ILAR IM IMETS IMINT INFOSYS IO IPB IR ISB ISR ISS ISYSCON JAOC JFC JFLCC JIM
Global Command and Control System-Army geospatial information and services Global Information Grid global positioning system holding area humanitarian and civic assistance high capacity line of sight heavy expanded mobility tactical truck load handling system high density airspace control zone high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle host nation high-payoff target human resources human intelligence high-value target information assurance improvised explosive device inspector general integrated logistics aerial resupply information management Integrated Meteorological System imagery intelligence information system information operations intelligence preparation of the battlefield information requirements intermediate staging base intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information security system Integrated Systems Control joint air operations center joint forces command joint force land component commander joint, interagency, and multinational
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Glossary-5
FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
JMC JNN JOA JOPES JP JSTARS JTAC JTAGS JTF JWICS LEN LOC LOGCAP LOS LNO LRP MASINT MDSC MCG MCS MCMS MDMP ME MEDBDE MEDEVAC MEDLOG METT-TC MC4 MCT MI MLMC MOOTW MP
joint movement center joint network node joint operations area Joint Operation Planning and Execution System joint publication Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Joint Terminal Attack Controller Joint Tactical Ground Station joint task force Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System large extension node line of communication logistics civilian augmentation program line of sight liaison officer logistics release point measurement and signature intelligence medical deployment support command mobile command group Maneuver Control System mobility, countermobility, and survivability Military Decision Making Process maneuver enhancement medical brigade medical evacuation medical logistics mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations medical communications for combat casualty care movement control team military intelligence medical logistics management center military operations other than war military police
Glossary-6
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MSO MSR MTF MWR NATO NBC NCO NEO NETOPS NGO NIPRNET NOSC NSC OAKOC OCONUS ODSS OGA OPCON OEG OPLAN OPORD PARC PA PAD PE PIR PKO PLS PM PMM PMO PO POD
mission staging operation main supply route medical treatment facility morale, welfare and recreation North Atlantic Treaty Organization nuclear, biological, and chemical noncommissioned officer noncombatant evacuation operations network operations nongovernmental organization non-secure internet protocol router network network operations and security center network support company observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment outside the continental United States offense, defense, stability, and support other governmental agencies operational control operational exposure guidance operational plan operational order principal assistant responsible for contracting public affairs public affairs detachment peace enforcement priority intelligence requirements peacekeeping operation palletized load system provost marshal preventive medicine measures Provost Marshal Office peace operations port of debarkation
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Glossary-7
FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
PRC PSYOP R&S RCC RCERT RFA RI ROE RSTA RTF S1 S2 S3 S4 S6 S7 S9 SA SAMS SATCOM SC(E) SC(T) SECOMP-I SEN SFLE SGS SIAP SIGINT SJA SMART-T SMDC SOCCE SOP SPO
populace and resource control psychological operations reconnaissance and surveillance regional combattant commander regional computer emergency response team restrictive fire area relevant information rules of engagement reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition regional task force personnel staff officer intelligence staff officer operations staff officer logistics staff officer network operations officer information operations officer civil-military operations officer security assistance School of Advanced Military Studies satellite communications sustainment command(expeditionary) sustainment command(theater) Secure En-route Mission Planning Improved small extension node special forces liaison element secretary of the general staff surveillance integration automation project signal intelligence Staff Judge Advocate Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal Space and Missile Defense Command Special Operations Command and Control Element standing operating procedures support operations officer
Glossary-8
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SRO SSA SSO STB STNOSC SU TAC TACP TACAIR TAC CP TACCS TACON TACP TAGS TAIS TAV TCF TENCAP TIM TMIP TOC TRO TSC TSO TTP UAS UN US USACE USAF USAID USCG USNG UXO
sustainment replenishment operations supply support activity Special Security Office special troops battalion service theater network operations and service center situational understanding tactical tactical air control party tactical air tactical command post terminal air command and control specialist tactical control tactical air control party theater air ground system Tactical Airspace Integration System total asset visibility tactical combat force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities toxic industrial material theater medical information program tactical operations center training, readiness and oversight Theater Sustainment Command technical service order tactics, techniques, and procedures unmanned aircraft system United Nations United States United States Army Corps of Engineers United States Air Force United States Agency for International Development United States Coast Guard United States National Guard unexploded explosive ordnance
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Glossary-9
FMI 3-91 (DRAG Edition) ____________________________________________________________________
VOIP VSAT WARNO WF WMD WMD-CST
voice over internet protocol very small aperture terminal warning order Warfighting Functions weapons of mass destruction weapons of mass destructioncivil support team
Glossary-10
2/1/2006

Division Operations, Fmi 3-91 Draft - Feb 06

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*FMI 3-91

USAF PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO DIVISION OPERATIONS ...................................................................................D-1

Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H Appendix I

DESCRIPTION OF FIELD MANUALS-INTERIM

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CJCSM 3500.04B UJTL TACTICAL TASK AREA

PerformCSS & Sustainment

Protect the Force

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NEW OR MODIFIED TERMS

REASONS FOR CHANGE

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FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN CHANGES

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The Modular Force

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Figure 1-1. Force Tailoring and Refinement

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OPERATIONAL READINESS CYCLE

ROLE OF THE DIVISION

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ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION

SPECIAL TROOPS BATTALION

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Figure 1-4. Modular Division CP Structure

Mobile Command Group

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Figure 1-5. Main CP Organization

Figure 1-6. TAC CPs Organization

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Early Entry Command Post

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

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Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

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Combat Aviation Brigade

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Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement)

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OTHER SUPPORTING UNITS

Civil Affairs Battalion/Civil-Military Operations Center

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Tactical PSYOP Company

Other Special Operations Forces

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Figure 1-9. Contiguous and Noncontiguous AOs

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