NUREG/IA-0222

-International

Agreement Report

Analysis of RELAP5/MOD3.3
Prediction of 2-Inch Loss-of-Coolant
Accident at KrSko Nuclear Power Plant
Prepared by:
I. Parzer, B. Mavko

Jo2ef Stefan Institute

Jamova cesta 39
SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia

A. Calvo, NRC Project Manager

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

March 2010

Prepared as part of
The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange
Under the Thermal-Hydraulic Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP)

Published by
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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 NUREG/IA-0222

International
Agreement Report

Analysis of RELAP5/MOD3.3
Prediction of 2-Inch Loss-of-Coolant
Accident at Kr'ko Nuclear Power Plant
Prepared by:
I. Parzer, B. Mavko

Jo2ef Stefan Institute

Jamova cesta 39
SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia

A. Calvo, NRC Project Manager

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

March 2010

Prepared as part of
The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange
Under the Thermal-Hydraulic Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP)

Published by
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 ABSTRACT

The purpose of this analysis was to perform calculations of the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)
for simulator verification and validation and to study the thermal-hydraulic response of the
reactor coolant system.

For the thermal-hydraulic analysis, the RELAP5/MOD3.3 code and input model provided by
Kr~ko Nuclear Power Plant was used. A small-break LOCA scenario was analyzed to estimate
plant response to the opening of a break in cold leg No. 2 between the reactor coolant pump
and the reactor pressure vessel. For the purpose of the analysis, the equivalent diameter of the
cross-sectional area of the break was set to 5.08 centimeters (2 inches).

In the presented study, the 2-inch LOCA scenario for the Kr.ko Nuclear Power Plant was
analyzed with regard to the differences between the Henry-Fauske and the Ransom-Trapp
critical flow model. In addition, the study investigated the effect of the special offtake flow model
at the break. Some variation cases were also run to capture the effect of flow bypasses in the
reactor vessel on the loop seal clearing phenomena.

iii
 CONTENTS
Paoe
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iII

Acknow ledgem ent .................................................................................................................... vii

A bbreviations ..................................................................................................... ............... ix

1. Introduction .................................................................................... ...................................... 1

2. Plant description ............................................................................................................ 3

3. Theoretical Background ................................................................................................ 5

3.1 Ransom-Trapp Model ........................................ ..... 5
3.2 Henry-Fauske M odel ................................................................................................... 5
3.3 Phase Separation and Offtake Model ........... 7....................... 6

4. Input M odel Description ........................................................................................................ 9

.4.1 Hydrodynam ic Com ponent Description ........................................................................ 9
4.2 Regulation and Protection Logic ................................................................................ 11

5. Results ............................................................................. ................................................. 13

5.1 Base Analyses- Com parison of Critical Flow M odels ................................................ 13
5.2 Variation Analyses ..................................................................................................... 25
5.2.1 Vessel Bypass Configuration Influence ......................................................... 25
5.2.2 Offtake Model Influence ................................................................................ 30

6. RELA P5/M O D3.3 Run Statistics........................................... ...................................... 35

7. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 39

8. References ........................................................................................................................... 41

V
 Figures

Page
1. NPP Kr~ko nodalization scheme ........................................................................................... 12
2 . P R Z le v e l...................................... ........................................................................................ 15
3 . P R Z p re ss u re ........................................................................................................................ 15
4 . Bre a k flo w ............................................................................................................................ 16
5 . P rim a ry m a s s ........................................................................................................................ 16
6. Cold leg No. 1 temperature .............................................................................................. 17
7. Cold leg No. 2 temperature ............................................................................................... 17
8. SG-1 pressure ........................................ :.................................................... 18
9 . S G -2 p re ss u re ....................................................................................................................... 18
10 . S G -I le ve l ............................................................................................................................. 19
1 1. S G -2 le ve l ............................................................................................... . .............. . . 19
12. Accumulator No. 1 pressure .................................................................... 20
13. Accumulator No. 2 pressure .......................................... 20
14. Accumulator No. 1 level ...................................................................................... 21
15. Accumulator No. 2 level .................................................................................................. 21
16. Core collapsed level ............................................... 22
17. Loop seal No. 1 reactor side collapsed level ................................................................... 22
18. Loop seal No. 1 SG side collapsed level .......................................................................... 23
19. Loop seal No. 2 reactor side collapsed level ................................................................... 23
20. Loop seal No. 2 SG side collapsed level .......................................................................... 24
21. Loop seal No. 1 pressures ............................................................................................... 24
22. Primary pressure- vessel bypass variation ..................................................................... 26
23. Break flow-vessel bypass variation ............................................................................... 26
24. Primary mass- vessel bypass variation ........................................................................ 27
25. Core collapsed level- vessel bypass variation ................................................................ 27
26. Loop seal No. 1 reactor side collapsed level-vessel bypass variation ........................... 28
27. Loop seal No. 1 SG side collapsed level- vessel bypass variation .................................. 28
28. Loop seal No. 2 reactor side collapsed level- vessel bypass variation ........................... 29
29. Loop seal No. 2 SG side collapsed level- vessel bypass variation .................................. 29
30. Primary pressure- offtake model ...................................................................................... 30
31. Void fraction at the break- offtake model ........................................................................ 31
32. Break flow--offtake model .............................................................................................. . 31
33. Core collapsed level- offtake model ................................................................................. 32
34. Loop seal No. 2 reactor side collapsed level- offtake model ........................................... 32
35. Loop seal No. 2 SG side collapsed level- offtake model ................................................ 33
36. Consumed CPU time for two base analyses cases (H-F and R-T) .................................. 35
37. Mass error for two base analyses cases (H-F and R-T) .................................................. 36
38. Time step for two base analyses cases (H-F and R-T) ..................................................... 36
39. Courant At for two base analyses cases (H-F and R-T) .................................................. 37

Tables

Page
1. Run-Time Statistics ................................................................................ 35

vi
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The RELAP5/MOD3.3 NPP Kr~ko base input model and nodalization diagram are courtesy of
Kr~ko Nuclear Power Plant.

vii
 ABBREVIATIONS
AFW auxiliary feedwater
CPU central processing unit
ECCS emergency core cooling system
H-F Henry-Fauske
HPIS high-pressure injection system
KFSS Kr~ko full-scope simulator
kg/s kilogram per second
LOCA loss-of-coolant accident
LPIS low-pressure injection system
m meter
MCR main control room
MFW main feedwater
mm millimeter
MPa megapascal
MWt megawatt thermal
NPP nuclear power plant
PRZ pressurizer
PWR pressurized-water reactor
RAM random access memory
RCS reactor coolant system
RCP reactor coolant pump
RPV reactor pressure vessel
R-T Ransom-Trapp
s second
SI safety injection
SG steam generator

ix
 1. INTRODUCTION

Kr~ko Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) obtained the Krko full-scope simulator (KFSS) as part of the
modernization project in 1999. KFSS supports, in real time, training for the complete range of
operation which can be performed from the main control room (MCR) and some selected plant
areas (e.g., remote shutdown panels).

Various activities have been undertaken for the purpose of simulator annual verification. Initially,
these activities included simulator verification for the normal plant operation (normal power.
evolutions, plant heatup and cooldown), plant transients, and steady-state conditions at different
power levels. The data recorded in the past and obtained from the MCR instrumentation and
process information system were used.

When conducting the simulator annual verification for selected design-basis accidents and
certain transients, it is important to use the results of the best estimate analysis. This approach
complies with American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society
(ANSI/ANS)-3.5-1998, "Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training and
Examination (Revision of ANSI/ANS-3.5-1993 and ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985)" (Ref. 1).

The purpose of the present analysis was to perform loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)
calculations for verification and validation using the KFSS and to study the thermal-hydraulic
response of the reactor coolant system (RCS) (Ref. 2).

Several analyses during the past few years have proved that the original Ransom-Trapp break
flow model has certain deficiencies and its predictions do not match experimental data. Thus,
the older Henry-Fauske (H-F) break model has been again coded into RELAP5/MOD3. At first,
the H-F model was an option, and the Ransom-Trapp (R-T) model was considered the main
prediction tool. A longer testing period has established that the H-F model performs better for
various test cases; it is now the main modeling tool in the code. The R-T model remains as a
user option in the code.

During the assessment program for the application of the RELAP5 code to Westinghouse's
proposed advanced passive design (i.e., the AP600), the following two shortcomings of the
default R-T choking model were observed:

(1) Two-Phase Critical Flow at Low Pressure: If the slip ratio is not forced to be nearly unity,
the values calculated using the default choking model could be as much as an order of
magnitude lower than the homogeneous equilibrium values.

(2) Subcooled Break Flow: For thin orifice plates (used to model the break) and liquid
conditions near the saturation point, the default choking model predicted values of the
critical flow were 40-50 percent less than those observed experimentally.

The most serious shortcoming occurred at low pressure (P - 2 bar) and low quality conditions.
Another significant, but less serious, shortcoming of the default critical flow model was observed
when the experimental break configuration was a thin orifice plate (t - 10 millimeters (mm)) and
the flow was slightly subcooled.

1
In addition to the shortcomings discussed above, several users have reported problems, noting
apparent discontinuities in the predicted critical flow values for the single-phase to two-phase
transition and the appearance of a noncondensable gas in a two-phase mixture. Several users
have also reported that the default critical flow model predicted values that were considerably
"noisier" than those predicted by earlier versions of RELAP5 employing the H-F critical flow
model. For these reasons, a modified form of the H-F critical flow model was reintroduced into
the RELAP5 code.

In the present study, the 2-inch LOCA scenario for the Kr~ko NPP was.analyzed with regard to
the differences between the H-F and R-T critical flow models. The effect of the special offtake
flow model at the break was also investigated. Some variation cases were run to capture the
effect of flow bypasses in the reactor vessel on the loop seal clearing phenomena.

2
 2. PLANT DESCRIPTION

Kr.ko NPP is a Westinghouse two-loop pressurized-water reactor (PWR) plant with'a large dry
containment. The plant has been in commercial operation since 1983. After modernization in
2000, the plant's fuel cycle was gradually prolonged from 12 (cycle 17) to 18 months (cycle 21).

The power rating of the Kr.ko NPP nuclear steam supply system is 2,000 megawatt thermal
(MWt) (1,882 MWt before the plant modernization and power uprate), comprising 1,994 MWt
(1,876 MWT before the plant modernization and power uprate) of core power output plus 6 MWt
of reactor coolant pump (RCP) heat input. The nuclear steam supply system consists of a PWR,
RCS, and associated auxiliary fluid systems. The RCS is arranged as two closed reactor
coolant loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel, each containing an RCP and a steam
generator (SG). An electrically heated pressurizer is connected to one of the loops.

The reactor core is composed of 121 fuel assemblies. Square spacer grid assemblies and the
upper and lower end fitting assemblies support the fuel rods in fuel assemblies. Each fuel
assembly is composed of 16 x 16 rods; of these, only 235 places are used by fuel rods. Of the
21 remaining places, 20 are evenly and symmetrically distributed across the cross-section of the
assembly and are provided with thimble tubes which may be reserved for control rods and one
control instrumentation tube for in-core thimble.

The RCPs, one per coolant loop, are Westinghouse vertical, single-stage, centrifugal pumps of
the shaft-seal type.

The SGs, one per loop, are vertical U-tube, Siemens-Framatome type SG 72 W/D4-2 units,
installed during the plant modernization in 2000. These new SGs replaced highly degraded
Westinghouse D-4 SGs, each having preheating section.

Engineered safety features are provided to prevent accident propagation, or to limit the
consequences of postulated accidents, which might otherwise lead to damage of the system
and release of fission products. The plant includes a number of engineered safety features,
which include the following:

* containment spray system

0 hydrogen control system
• emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
* component cooling water system
0 essential service water system
* auxiliary feedwater system

At present, activities are underway to replace the turbine and to gain additional power from new
SGs.

3
 3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 Ransom-Trapp Model

The two-phase choking model employed in RELAP5 is based on the model described by Trapp
and Ransom (Ref. 3) for nonhomogeneous, nonequilibrium flow. These researchers developed
analytic choking criteria using a characteristic analysis of a two-fluid model that included relative
phasic acceleration terms and derivative-dependent mass transfer. During the original
development and implementation of this model, both frozen flow and thermal equilibrium
assumptions were employed to test the analytic criteria. Comparisons to existing data (Ref. 4)
indicated that the thermal equilibrium assumption was the more appropriate and is thus
assumed in the following development.

The two-fluid model employed in the development of the RELAP5 two-phase choking criteria
includes an overall mass conservation equation, two-phasic momentum equations, and the
mixture energy equation written in terms of entropy. This equation set includes interface force
terms due to relative acceleration; these terms have a significant effect on wave propagation.
Energy dissipation terms associated with interface mass transfer and relative phase
acceleration have been neglected in the mixture entropy equation. The characteristic velocities
of the system of equations are the roots (Ai, i < 4) of the characteristic polynomial:

AA -B=O (1)
The real part of any root Aj gives the velocity of signal propagation along the corresponding path
in the space/time plane. Ifthe defined system of equations is considered for a particular region
defined by 0 < x < L, the number of boundary conditions required at L equals the number of
characteristic lines entering the solution region. At x = L, as long as any of the A\are less than 0,
some information is needed at the boundary to get a solution. If all \j are greater than or equal
to 0, no boundary conditions are needed at L and the solution of 0 < x < L is not affected by
conditions outside the boundary at L. This situation defines the choking criteria:

2A = O for j]<•4 and Ai > O forall i # j (2)

Reference 1 provides further detailed derivation of the choking criteria.

3.2 Henry-Fauske Model

The steady-state, one-dimensional momentum equation for one-component, two-phase flow can
be written as follows:

- AdP = d(mv uv + ml u, ) + dFv (3)

For high-velocity flows in a converging nozzle, the wall shear forces are negligible compared to
the momentum and pressure gradient terms, allowing the mass flux at the throat to be
approximated by the following equation:

5
 G =-{ d[xu+ dP
(I1-x)uJ I} t (4)

At critical flow, the mass flow rate exhibits a maximum with respect to the throat pressure.
Equations (3) and (4) can be combined to give the following expression for the critical flow rate
for an isentropic homogeneous mixture with flashing:

C -1 (5)
fx V -Vv -V

Embedded in this equation is the assumption that the two phases move with the same velocity;
that is, that the slip ratio is unity. While at low pressure, this is certainly not the case. Henry and
Fauske argued that the effects of thermal nonequilibrium were more important and that the
effect of slip could be ignored. Equation (5) then serves as the choking criterion; however, to
evaluate the Critical mass flux, the quantities in this expression must be evaluated at the local
conditions occurring at the throat. Thus, it is assumed that the phase velocities are equal. For
normal nozzle configurations, there is little time for mass transfer to take place, and it is
reasonable to assume that the amount of mass transferred during the expansion is negligible.
Similarly, the amount of heat transferred between the phases during the expansion is also
negligible, so that the liquid temperature is essentially constant. Since wall shear, heat transfer
with the environment, and interfacial viscous terms were neglected, the system entropy during
the expansion was assumed constant.

The above assumptions eliminate the need to calculate the liquid-specific Volume and the
quality at the throat and also provide a relation for the vapor-specific volume in terms of the
throat pressure and the upstream conditions. Evaluation of the throat pressure and the three
differential terms remains. Putting all of the above assumptions into Equation (5), the final
expression for the critical value of the mass flux is further determined in Reference 1.

3.3 Phase Separation and Offtake Model

Phase separation usually results from gravitational forces, which cause the liquid phase to pool
at the bottom of a vertical volume or on the bottom of a large horizontal pipe. This can occur if
the flow rates of the phases in the volume are low enough so that gravitational forces overcome
the frictional force between the phases that tends to keep the phases well mixed. The phase
separation caused by gravitational forces is called flow stratification in RELAP5, and both the
vertical and horizontal flow regime maps show stratification regions (Ref. 1).

One consequence of stratification in a large horizontal pipe is that the properties of the fluid
convected through a small flowpath in the pipe wall (i.e., a small break), called an offtake,
depend on the location of the stratified liquid level in the large pipe relative to the location of the
flowpath in the pipe wall. If the offtake is located in the bottom of the horizontal pipe, liquid will
flow through-the offtake until the liquid level starts to approach (but not reach) the bottom of the
pipe, at which time some vapor will be pulled through the liquid layer and the fluid quality in the
offtake will increase. If the phase separation phenomenon is ignored, vapor will be passed
through the offtake regardless of the liquid level in the pipe. Likewise, if the offtake is located at
the top of the pipe, vapor will be convected through the offtake until the liquid level rises high
6
enough so that liquid can be entrained from the stratified surface. The flow quality in the offtake
will decrease as the liquid level rises. If the phase separation phenomenon is ignored, liquid will
pass through the offtake for all stratified liquid levels regardless of their height relative to the
offtake. Lastly, if the offtake is located in the side of the large horizontal pipe, the same
phenomenon of gas pullthrough or liquid entrainment will occur, depending on the elevation of
the stratified liquid level in the pipe relative to the location of the offtake in the wall of the pipe
(Ref. 1).

The results of the experiments showed that in most cases the depth or height (i.e., the distance
between the stratified liquid level and the elevation of the offtake) for the onset of liquid
entrainment or gas pullthrough could be defined by an equation of the following form (Ref. 1):

hb C WkO(P
4 .2 (6)

where subscript k refers to the continuous phase in the offtake, which is the phase flowing
through the offtake before the onset of pullthrough or entrainment of the other phase. For an
upward offtake, the gas phase is the continuous phase. For a downward offtake, the liquid
phase is the continuous phase. For a side offtake, the gas phase is the continuous phase when
the liquid level is below the offtake center, and the liquid phase is the continuous phase when
the liquid level is above the offtake center. The variable Wk is the mass flow rate of the
continuous phase in the offtake.

For the specific case of a 2-inch LOCA at Kr.ko NPP, a variation case was calculated for each
analyzed break model (H-F and R-T), in which the break was situated at the side of the cold leg
between the RCP and reactor vessel. Each time, the side offtake model was assumed. Based
on the experimental studies, it may be concluded that the use of Equation (6) should give a
reasonable representation of the test data if the following values are adopted for the correlation
constant C (Ref. 1):

o C = 0.75 for side offtake gas pullthrough

o C = 0.69 for side offtake liquid entrainment

The correlation for the flow quality through a side offtake has the following form (Ref. 1):

x c1 + 0.5R(1+ R)XO (7)

where
1.15h
Xo 1.15 and R = h- (8)
1+ E (fq10 hb

In Equation (7), C = 1.09 for gas pullthrough and C.= 1.00 for liquid entrainment.

7
 4. INPUT MODEL DESCRIPTION

To perform this analysis, Kr.ko NPP provided the base input model or "master input deck,"
which is described in Krko NPP proprietary documents (Refs. 5 and 6). Figure 1 presents the
scheme of the Kr.ko NPP nodalization for the RELAP5/MOD3.3 code (Ref. 1). A full two-loop
plant model was developed, including the new Siemens-Framatome type SG 72 W/D4-2
replacement SGs.

The model consists of 469 volumes, connected with 497 junctions. Plant structure is
represented by 376 heat structures with 2,101 mesh points. The reactor protection and
regulation systems and the safety systems' operational logic and plant instrumentation is
represented by 401 logical conditions (trips) and 575 control variables.

4.1 Hydrodynamic Component Description

Components numbered from 101 to 165 represent the reactor vessel in the following manner:

171, 173, and 175 lower downcomer

101 and 103 lower head
105 lower plenum
107 core inlet
111 reactor core
115 core baffle bypass
121 core outlet
125, 131, and 141 upper plenum
151 and 153 upper head
165 upper downcomer
113 and 145 guide tubes

Components numbered 51, 53, and 55 represent the pressurizer surge line and volumes 61, 63,
65, 67, and 69 represent the pressurizer vessel. Pressurizer spray lines (80, 81, and 84) are
connected to the top of the pressurizer vessel and include the spray valves numbered 82
and 83. Valves numbered 28 and 32 represent the two pressurizer power-operated relief valves
and valves numbered 14 and 22 represent pressurizer safety valves.

Primary piping is represented by the following components:

201,203, 205, 207, 209, and 211 hot leg No. 1

251,253, 255, 257, and 259 intermediate leg No. 1 with cold leg No. 1 loop seal
265,271, 273, 275, 277, and 279 cold leg No. 1 with the primary coolant pump No. I
301,303, 305, 307, 309, and 311 hot leg No. 2
351,353, 355, 357, and 359 intermediate leg No. 2 with cold leg No. 2 loop seal
365,371, 373, 375, 377, and 379 cold leg No. 2 with the primary coolant pump No. 2

Loops are symmetrical except for the pressurizer surge line and chemical and volume control
system connections layout.

Hydrodynamic components numbered from 701 to 882 represent the ECCS piping nodalization

9
and connections. The hydrodynamic components representing the high-pressure injection
system (HPIS) pumps are time-dependent junctions 703 and 803, and time-dependent junctions
750 and 850 represent the low-pressure injection system (LPIS) pumps. Accumulators are
numbered 701 and 801, and their lineup provides cold-leg injection only. The ECCS connects to
both cold legs (junctions 719-01 and 819-01). Direct vessel ECCS injection through
junctions 746 and 748 opens simultaneously upon generation of a safety injection (SI) signal.

The primary side of the SG is represented by inlet and outlet plenum, among which a single
pipe represents the U-tube bundle, as follows:

215, 217, and 219 SG 1 inlet plenum (hot side) and tubesheet inlet
223,225,227,233, 235, and 237 SG 1 U-tubes
241, 243, and 245 SG 1 tubesheet outlet and outlet plenum (cold side),
315, 317, and 319 SG 2 inlet plenum (hot side) and tube sheet inlet
323,325,327,333, 335, and 337 SG 2 U-tubes
341, 343, and 345 SG 2 tubesheet outlet and outlet plenum (cold side)

The following hydrodynamic components represent the parts of the SG secondary side:

415, 417, and 419 SG 1 riser

421 and 427 SG 1 separator and separator pool
411 and 413 SG 1 downcomer
423, 425, and 429 SG 1 steam dome
515, 517, and 519 SG 2 riser
521 and 527 SG 2 separator and separator pool
511 and 513 SG 2 downcomer
523, 525, and 529 SG 2 steam dome

The main steamlines are represented by volumes 451, 453, 455, 457, 459, and 461 (SG 1) and
551, 553, 555, 557, 559, and 561 (SG 1), divided by main steam isolation valves (458 and 558).
SG relief (482 and 582) and safety valves (484, 486, 488, 492, and 494 and 584, 586, 588, 592,
and 594) are situated upstream of the isolation valves. Turbine valve (604) and steam dump
(611) flow is regulated by corresponding logic.

The main feedwater (MFW) piping is represented by volumes 471, 473, 475, 407, and 409
(SG 1) and 471, 573, 575, 507, and 509 (SG 2), branching from the MFW header (500).

Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) is injected above the SG riser (via volumes 437, 443, 445, and 447),
and its piping is represented by volumes 671, 673 (motor-driven AFW 1), 675 and 677 (AFW 2),
and 681, 683, 685, 687, 695, and 697 (turbine-driven AFW).

10
4.2 Regulation and Protection Logic

To accurately represent the Kr~ko NPP behavior, the model includes a considerable number of
control variables and general tables. These represent the protection, monitoring, and simplified
control systems used only during steady-state initialization, as well as the following main'plant
control systems:

o rod control system

• pressurizer pressure control system
a pressurizer level control system
• SG level control system
o steam dump

The rod control system has been modeled for point kinetics. The present model can be used for
transient analysis with either of the following two options:

(1) with constant or predefined core power transient as a function of time (including decay
power calculation)

(2) with rod control system in auto or manual mode

The following plant protection systems are defined using trip logic:

* reactor trip
* Sl signal
* turbine trip
* steamline isolation
• MFW isolation
• AFW start

11
 I-

CD

'A

0
z

0
CL

(A
(D

3~0

MDAFW
 5. RESULTS

5.1 Base Analyses-Comparison of Critical Flow Models

This set of analyses evaluated the differences between the default H-F and the R-T critical flow
models.

After the break occurred, the primary system started draining and the pressurizer pressure
dropped very quickly to the saturation pressure of the hot legs. The pressurizer emptied
(Figure 2) in 34 seconds using the H-F model and in 30 seconds using the R-T model after the
break opening and stayed empty. Primary pressure (Figure 3) is one of the most important
parameters during a small-break LOCA event, since it dictates the tripping sequence and many
setpoints used in the analysis. The reactor was tripped when the filtered primary pressure
(LEAD-LAG) dropped below 12.994 megapascals (MPa).

An SI signal was produced when the primary pressure dropped to 12.27 MPa. Soon after that,
the HPIS pumps started to deliver cold borated water into the primary system, reaching the
break location. At the point where the highly subcooled liquid entered the break, the R-T model
calculated a significantly higher break flow (Figure 4) than did the-default H-F model. As a
consequence, the primary inventory (Figure 5) was depleted much faster in the R-T case than in
the default H-F case. This led to further important differences in the transient predictions.

The power produced in the core was transferred out of the primary system; therefore, both
hot-leg temperatures decreased. At the beginning of the transient, the temperatures of the cold
legs (Figures 6 and 7) decreased because of a pressure drop of the primary system to the
saturation temperature. Later, the cold-leg temperatures followed the loop seal behavior. When
the loop seal was cleared, the cold-leg temperature suddenly dropped; when the loop seal
refilled, the temperature increased.

Initially after the reactor trip, the MFW was isolated and the turbine valves were closed. Closure
of the turbine valves caused a shrink effect. The heat generated in the core started to heat the
SGs. The heat input caused the pressure in the SGs (Figures 8 and 9) to increase. Later, the
AFW pumps started to inject the cold water into the SGs, which then started to cool. When the
SG narrow range levels (Figures 10 and 11) reached 72 percent, the AFW pumps were stopped
and the SG pressures stabilized 1,000 seconds later.

The closure of the turbine valves caused the SG narrow range levels (Figures 10 and 11) to
shrink. Both levels increased when the AFW pumps started to inject into the SGs.

When the primary pressure reached 4.96 MPa, the accumulators started to inject. As the
accumulators discharged, the accumulator pressure (Figures 12 and 13) decreased. The
accumulators (Figures 14 and 15) were not emptied by the end of calculation time in the H-F
case. This phenomenon happened much earlier in the R-T case.

The core partly uncovered (Figure 16) because of the loop seal formation (Figures 17, 18, 19,
and 20). When the loop seal was first cleared, the liquid in the downcomer refilled the core.
Later, the core stayed partially uncovered and the core level oscillated slightly because the cold
water injected from the accumulator into the cold leg and downcomer evaporated in the core.

13
The generated steam increased the pressure, which reduced the accumulator flow.

Rather unphysical oscillations in primary pressure were observed during multiple loop seal
clearings. One possible explanation is that primary pressure spikes were in the range of 2 MPa,
while the pressure difference needed to clear a loop seal of approximate 3 meters in height
should not exceed 0.025 MPa. Observing the pressure difference on both sides of the loop seal
(Figure 21) provides more detailed insight into the phenomena. It can be deduced that the HPIS
injection flow caused the main pressure rise. Since the upper parts of the system had emptied
by the time of the first loop seal clearing, pressure spikes could propagate through the reactor
vessel upper head bypass, empty hot legs, and SG tubes to the SG side of the loop seal. Thus,
the additional pressure rise resulting from vapor generation in the core, which was the origin of
the driving force for the loop seal clearing, was only superposed to the main pressure spike.
This pressure was only about 0.03 MPa, as can be estimated from Figure 21.

14
60

5 I I •

4- 0- -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

3 0- - - - - - - - - - - - -t- - - - - - - -

10
/u-
20 3
0.., -10 ,I.. Time [s]
CLL
Figure 2 PRZ level

180.. I

16 ---------- - -------------- - - - - - - -- - - - - - ..

S12 ---------------- *-

-10 -- - -- - -- [s]
- -- - -Time -----
,., 4 -------
1 --8---- - Figure 3 PRZpressuel

10
0 200 400 600 800 100
v•,• ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Tm ....... [s] .....

Figue3[R rss] r

15
 250

200

3 150
0

• 100

50

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 4 Break flow

0
140
0
0
x
120

100
r."
CD
80

60

40

20

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 5 Primary mass

16
 600

550

2 500

a'450
E

400

350

300
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 6 Cold leg No. I temperature

600

550

500

a 450
E
400

350

300
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 7 Cold leg No. 2 temperature

17
 8

7
F-6
0-

L5

w4

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 8 SG 1 pressure

7 - -- - -- -- --- - - - --- - - - --- -

M6 7 - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -
i

'-5

U,, I ~II
0.3
-----------
2-
0.
-------------------------
-------------- ---------
0 LR-T

0 2000 T4000 6000 8000 10000

Time [s]

Figure 9 SG 2 pressure
18
 80

70

60

i50

w 40

30

20

10

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 10 SG 1 level

80

70

60

50

a 40

30

20

10

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 11 SG 2 level
19
 6

u3
U)

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 12 Accumulator No. 1 pressure

u)3

U)

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 13 Accumulator No. 2 pressure

20
 70

60

C50
40
.. 4I

30

20

10

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 14 Accumulator No. 1 level

70

60

50

Z 40

30

20

10

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 15 Accumulator No. 2 level

21
 4.0

3.5

3.0

'2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 16 Core collapsed level

3.0

2.5

•2.0

0)1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 17 Loop seal No. 1 reactor side collapsed level

22
 4.0

3.5

3.0
E2.5

-J 2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 18 Loop seal No. 1 SG side collapsed level

3.0

2.5

-'2.0

-J 01.5
-I-------------

1.0

0.5
I R-T
0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 19 Loop seal No. 2 reactor side collapsed level

23
 4.0

3.5

3.0

"E2.5

2.0
,-I

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 20 Loop seal No. 2 SG side collapsed level

4.6 b

4.4
4.2
4 -

3.8 -

w
a- 3.6 .- .- .-
- - --- - - - - . - .- .-
- -.. . . .--... .

1.. 3.4 S - -r - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - .- .- - .- .--..

0L 3.2
I -

3
2.8 - - - I-- - - - - - - - - - -

2.6 - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2.4
2.2
7600 7800 8000 8200 8400 8600 8800
Time [s]
Figure 21 Loop seal No. 1 pressures
24
5.2 Variation Analyses
Two variation analyses were performed to investigate the vessel bypass configuration and the
influence of the offtake model at the break.

5.2.1 Vessel Bypass Configuration Influence

For this analysis, the bypass flow from the reactor vessel downcomer to the upper plenum of the
reactor vessel was closed. This assumption is acceptable because temperature changes in the
reactor vessel structures can cause some structures to expand more than others, enabling the
circular opening between the core barrel and downcomer (where the hot leg loosely enters the
core barrel) to reclose (junction 171-02 between downcomer inlet volume 171-01 and upper
plenum 125.01).

The other bypass flow was modified at junction 151-01 between upper head volume 151-01 and
upper downcomer volume 165-03. For this junction, an additional friction coefficient, FJUNF
(and FJUNR), of 10 was introduced.

However, as can be observed from the next set of figures, this change did not significantly
influence the transient's course. The case with reduced vessel bypasses is marked "H-F
byp.red." on the figures.

The primary pressure (Figure 22) was oscillatory and decreased slightly faster in the H-F
byp.red. case than in the default H-F case, which caused HPIS and accumulator injection earlier
in the transient. In the first part of the transient, break flow was similar on average to the default
H-F case, but somewhat smoother. In the later phase of the transient, more oscillatory break
flow can be observed in the H-F byp.red. case, which is slightly higher on average than in the
H-F case (Figure 23). As a result, primary mass depletion was no deeper; however, more
oscillatory behavior can be observed in the H-F byp.red. case (Figure 24).

Some differences can be seen in the core collapsed level, which, because of the slightly larger
break flow, stayed at a slightly lower level than in the H-F case, although it was more oscillatory
(Figure 25). The loop seal levels (Figures 26, 27, 28, and 29) also reflect these oscillations.

25
 18
16

,14
a.
212
CD10

S8
a.
6
4
2
0
0 2000 4000 ' 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 22 Primary pressure-vessel bypass variation

250

200

• 150
0

100

50

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 23 Break flow-vessel bypass variation

26
0 140
0
0

x 120

100

80

60

40

20

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 24 Primary. mass-vessel bypass variation

4.0

3.5

3.0

LEI 2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 25 Core collapsed level-vessel bypass variation

27
 3.0

2 .5 ------------
I I
-'2.0 ------- A
- ----- -- -. - ---.
I 'I I

0i.5
1 .5 ---
. . . ... . .
~. .. - .

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000

Time [s]

Figure 26 Loop seal No. 1 reactor side collapsed level-vessel bypass variation

4.0

3.5

3.0

N 2.5

>2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 27 Loop seal No. 1 SG side collapsed level-vessel bypass variation

28
 3.0

2.5 II I I

" 2.0
- - ..--- -- -- - -----------

>€1.5
I I "1 I

1.0

0.5
.1 ~IH-F byp redj

0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 28 Loop seal No. 2 reactor side collapsed level-vessel bypass variation

4.0

3.5

3.0

E 2.5

--I 2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 29 Loop seal No. 2 SG side collapsed level-vessel bypass variation

29
5.2.2 Offtake Model Influence

The next set of figures includes the offtake model, marked as "H-F offtake," at the break and
shows a similar, although smaller, effect to the previous variation in reactor vessel bypass
configuration. Specifically, the enlarged insurge of vapor through the liquid phase into the break
enabled a slightly faster primary pressure decrease (Figure 30) in the later phase of the
transient.

The offtake model reflected a slightly lower void fraction in the vicinity of the break (Figure 31),
since it was transported faster through the break (Figure 32). This had a smaller influence on
the loop seal clearing process (Figure 33) and an even smaller influence on the core collapsed
level development (Figures 34 and 35).

However, many calculation problems appeared in the vicinity of the break during the
accumulator discharge period. These problems may have been the consequence of cold water
flowing into the cold leg, which caused additional problems in calculating water properties in
volume 375-01. The time step was reduced by a factor of 10, which produced significantly larger
consumption of CPU time. In addition, the code aborted on several occasions; thus, after
several restarts with the reduced time step, the calculation was finally interrupted before
5,000 seconds of transient time.

18
16
,., 14
a.
•12
"•10
U)
8

6
4
2
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 30 Primary pressure-offtake model

30
 1.0 -

0.9
--H-F~Offtkej
0.8 -

0.7 -

•0.6 -

> 0.5-
0.4 -

0.3 -

L
0.2 - ------ -- -

0.1 -

0.0 1 ir

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000

Time [s]

Figure 31 Void fraction at the break-offtake model

250

200
0)

3 150
0

100

50

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 32 Break flow-offtake model

31
 4.0

3.5

3.0
"E 2.5

S2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 33 Core collapsed level-offtake model

3.0

2.5 ,
-
I.I
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

-2.0 Si I

-------- ------ ---- -------- -------------

1.5 - - - •. - - :I. ""-- I

-
I
I
,II I

I I

1.0 -. II

0.5
SE-s- H-F offtake
0.0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 34 Loop seal No. 2 reactor side collapsed level-offtake model

32
 4.0

3 .5 I
- ---- -------- II]
• •,i.•i•••:• :!: :•j

3 .0 ------ ------
. 2I - I

2.0

1 .0- ,

----- ----
1 .5 - .- ... - ---.- ..

0 .50..... . .

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000

Time [s]

Figure 35 Loop seal No. 2 SG side collapsed level-offtake model

33
 6. RELAP5/MOD3.3 RUN STATISTICS

MOD3.3 calculations were performed on a SUN FIRE V880 server with four UltraSPARC III
750-megahertz processors and 16 gigabytes of main RAM, running under the SOLARIS 9
operating system.

Table 1 shows run-time statistics for the two analyzed base cases, H-F and R-T.

Table 1 Run-Time Statistics

Computer CPU Total number of Total number of Grind time
Analyzed case time (s) time steps (NT) volumes (N) CPU/(NT*N)
both cases - 1000 s of steady state 3516.21 26303 469 2.85E-04
Henry-Fauske (H-F) - default 38525.94 292310 469 2.81 E-04
Ransom-Trapp (R-T) 49307.04 373392 469 2.82E-04

Figure 36 illustrates the CPU time consumed for the two base analyses cases (H-F and R-T).

Figures 37 to 39, respectively, show the mass error, time step, and Courant At for the two base
analyses cases (H-F and R-T).

60

x
50

E
i30

20

10

0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 36 CPU time consumed for two base analyses cases (H-F and R-T)
35
 600

I I

400 --..........

- -- -
..........
-•300 ---------------------- .. ---
.... ...........

200
10i- - -- - - i --
- - - - --- i- - -

0 I -I

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000

Time [s]

Figure 37 Mass error for two base analyses cases (H-F and R-T)

0.10 -

008 A ------- -------------

- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i - - -- - - - - - - -- -

0.03
""0.0261 ------
0.004I
0.01 ----- ------- ----- - -- - -

0.00 ......

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 1.0000

Time [s]

Figure 38 Time step for two base analyses cases (H-F and R-T)
36
 0.50
0 .4 5 - - -- ;TL
0.40 - - ........................

0 .3 5 -------- -
'"0.30 - -

• 0 .15 7. . . . . ..... . .. . . . .

0.205. . . ... .•. . .

0.00 "
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
Time [s]

Figure 39 Courant At for two base analyses cases (H-F and R-T)

37
 7. CONCLUSIONS

The 2-inch LOCA transient was analyzed for Kr.ko NPP using the KFSS for verification. The
results indicated standard LOCA behavior with fast initial primary pressure decrease and loop
seal clearing phenomena.

The ECCS mitigated the consequences of the LOCA accident initiated by the break in cold leg
No. 2 between the RCP and reactor vessel.

In the later phase of the transient, somewhat oscillatory behavior of the various parameters was
observed, which caused multiple loop seal clearing cycles. This was found to be the
consequence of the periodic flooding of both loop seals by the cold borated water from the
HPIS, accumulators, and LPIS.

The mechanism of loop seal clearing phenomena was investigated for this specific case. It was
shown that large pressure spikes originate in ECCS behavior and do not represent
nonphysical results.

Using some variation cases, the influence of the vessel bypass configuration and the offtake
model at the break location was also studied. The results showed that these two model
variations do not significantly affect the transient course.

The ECCS model should be improved, since the HPIS and LPIS pumps are modeled as
time-dependent junctions, although their flow depends on filtered primary pressure to smooth
the time-dependent junction response.

39
 8. REFERENCES
1. American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society, "Nuclear Power Plant
Simulators for Use in Operator Training and Examination (Revision of
ANSI/ANS-3.5-1993 and ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985)," ANSI/ANS-3.5-1998.

2. I. Parzer and A. Pro.ek, SB LOCA thermal-hydraulic analysis for Kr~ko full scope
simulator validation, Proceedings of International Conference Nuclear Energy for New
Europe 2005, September 5-8, 2005, Bled, Slovenia. Proceedings. Ljubljana: Nuclear
Society of Slovenia, 2005, pp. 015-1-015-9.

3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "RELAP5/MOD3.3 Code Manual," Vol. 1, "Code

Structure, System Models, and Solution Methods"; Vol. 2, "Users' Guide and Input
Requirements"; Vol. 3, "Developmental Assessment Problems"; Vol. 4, "Models and
Correlations"; Vol. 5, "Users' Guidelines"; Vol. 6, "RELAP5/MOD3 Code Manual-
Validation of Numerical Techniques in RELAP5/MOD3.0"; Vol. 7, "Summaries and
Reviews of Independent Code Assessment Reports"; and Vol. 8, "Programmers
Manual," NUREG/CR_5535, Rev. 1, December 2001.

4. V. H. Ransom and J. A. Trapp. "The RELAP5 Choked Flow Model and Application to a
Large Scale Flow Test." Proceedings of the ANS/ASME/NRC International Topical
Meeting on Nuclear Reactor Thermal-Hydraulics, Saratoga Springs, New York, October
5-8, 1980, pp. 799-819.

41
NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER
(9-2004) (Assigned by NRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev.,
NRCMD 3.7 and Addendum Numbers, Ifany.)
NUREG/IA-0222
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET
(See instructions on the reverse)

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

Analysis of RELAP5/MOD3.3 Prediction of 2-Inch Loss-of-Coolant Accident at Krko MONTH YEAR
Nuclear Power Plant March 2010

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

Iztok Parzer, Borut Mavko Technical

7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, and mailing address;if contractor,
provide name and mailing address.)

Jo2ef Stefan Institute

Jamova cesta 39
S1-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type 'Same as above'; if contractor,provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission,
and mailing address.)
Division of Systems Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
A. Calvo, NRC Project Manager
11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)
The purpose of this analysis was to perform calculations of the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) for simulator verification
and validation and to study the thermal-hydraulic response of the reactor coolant system.

For the thermal-hydraulic analysis, the RELAP5/MOD3.3 code and input model provided by Krko Nuclear Power Plant
was used. A small-break LOCA scenario was analyzed to estimate plant response to the opening of a break in cold leg
No. 2 between the reactor coolant pump and the reactor pressure vessel. For the purpose of the analysis, the equivalent
diameter of the cross-sectional area of the break was set to 5.08 centimeters (2 inches).

In the presented study, the 2-inch LOCA scenario for the Krtko Nuclear Power Plant was analyzed with regard to the
differences between the Henry-Fauske and the Ransom-Trapp critical flow model. In addition, the study investigated the
effect of the special offtake flow model at the break. Some variation cases were also run to capture the effect of flow
bypasses in the reactor vessel on the loop seal clearing phenomena.

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words or phrasesthat will assist researchersin locating the report.) 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) unlimited
Thermalhydraulic code calculations 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RELAP5/MOD3.3 (This Page)
Kr~ko NPP unclassified
Henry-Fauske (This Report)

Ransom-Trapp unclassified
*Westinghouse two-loop pressurized-water reactor (PWR) plant 15. NUMBER OF PAGES
Jo.ef Stefan Institute
Republic of Slovenia 16. PRICE
Nuclear steam supply system
NRC FORM 335 (9-2004) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
FodoralRecycling Program
NUREG/IA-0222 Analysis of RELAP5/MOD3.3 Prediction of 2-Inch Loss-of-Coolant Accident at March 2010
Krgko Nuclear Power Plant

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

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