Valley23 – Doubles – 1AC vs.

Scarsdale DH
1AC
 1AC – Overview
1AR theory is legitimate – anything else means uncontested negative abuse which
makes affirming impossible.
 1AC – Framework
I value morality. The Meta-Ethic is Non-Naturalism.
1] The naturalistic fallacy – examples of goodness fail to define the ultimate good.
Moore 03,
[Moore, G. E. “Principia Ethica” http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica/. Published 1903] SHS ZS

Good, then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition,
in the most important sense of that word. The most important sense of definition is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this

sense good has no definition because it is simple and has no parts. It is one of those innumerable objects of thought which
are themselves incapable of definition , because they are the ultimate terms of reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined. That there
must be an indefinite number of such terms is obvious, on reflection; since we cannot define anything except by an analysis, which, when carried as far as it will go, refers us to something,
which is simply different from anything else, and which by that ultimate difference explains the peculiarity of the whole which we are defining: for every whole contains some parts which are

good denotes a simple and indefinable

common to other wholes also. There is, therefore, no intrinsic difficulty in the contention that

quality. There are many other instances of such qualities. Consider yellow, for example. We may try to define it, by describing its
physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may perceive it. But a moment’s reflection is

sufficient to shew that those light-vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow. They are not what we perceive . Indeed, we should never
have been able to discover their existence, unless we had first been struck by the patent difference of quality between the different colours. The most we can be entitled to say of those

a mistake of this simple kind has commonly been

vibrations is that they are what corresponds in space to the yellow which we actually perceive. Yet

made about good. It may be true that all things which are good are also
something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are
those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when

they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in
fact, were simply not other, but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the naturalistic fallacy and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose.

2] Only transcendental idealism explains agency—the mechanistic world reliant on

physics necessitates determinism, but freedom lives in the noumenal realm
Scholten 20, Scholten, M. Kant is a soft determinist. Eur J Philos. 2022; 30: 79–
95. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12634
On a second serious interpretation of the Kantian labels, they bring to the fore that in Kant's view, the tenability of compatibilism depends on transcendental idealism. In line with this, Korsgaard warns us that describing Kant's
conception of freedom as compatibilist is “potentially misleading.” It is potentially misleading, she continues to explain, because “most compatibilists […] want to assert both freedom and determinism (or, both responsibility and
determinism) from the same point of view […] but Kant does not do this” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 187). Note first that to determine whether Kant is a compatibilist, it is irrelevant “what most compatibilist assert.” The reason is that the
label “compatibilism” does not refer to representatives of a philosophical movement but to authors who accept the compatibilist thesis. But this is only a minor point. The more interesting question is whether the Kantian labels
adequately convey the idea that the tenability of compatibilism depends on transcendental idealism. Roughly three interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism can be found in the literature: the epistemic two-aspect view
(Allison, 2004), the ontological two-aspect view (Langton, 1998), and the two-world view (Guyer, 1987). On the first view, Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves is a distinction between two ways in which
an object can be epistemically considered; on the second view, the distinction is one between ontologically distinct phenomenal and noumenal properties of one and the same object; and on the third view, the distinction is one

transcendental idealism is the view that

between two ontologically distinct objects. I will here assume the two-aspect view for ease of exposition. On this interpretation,

things, including our actions, can be considered either as appearance or as a thing in itself:
considered as appearance, things are subject to the necessary conditions of experiential
cognition, in particular the forms of intuition (i.e., time and space) and the categories of the
understanding (e.g., substance and causality); considered as they are in themselves, they are
not subject to these conditions. Kant considers transcendental idealism as “the key” to the solution of the antinomy between freedom and determinism (A490-7/B518-25). Unlike other
compatibilists, he holds that the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility is compatible with

determinism only if transcendental idealism is true (A535-41/B563-9). If transcendental freedom is considered on the level of appearances, he observes, “the
necessity in the causal relation can in no way be united with freedom; instead they are opposed to

each other as contradictory” (KpV 5:94). “If one still wants to save [freedom],” he infers, no other path
remains than to ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is determinable in time, and so too its causality in
accordance with the law of natural necessity, only to appearance, and to ascribe freedom to the same being as a thing in itself (KpV 5:95). The

Kantian labels could be interpreted as bringing to the fore the unique feature of Kant's theory of freedom that the possibility of the sort of freedom required for moral

responsibility depends on transcendental idealism. Strictly speaking, however, they fail to do precisely this. The reason is that transcendental idealism is either
true or false. Consequently, there are only two options: if transcendental idealism is true, “nature […] does not conflict with

causality through freedom” (A558/B586); if transcendental idealism is false, nature and freedom “are opposed to each other as contradictory” (KpV 5:94). In other words, if transcendental
idealism is true, the compatibilist thesis is true, and if it is false, the incompatibilist thesis is true. Consequently, in no possible scenario the “compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism” would be true. One could respond by
saying that at least the Kantian labels make clear that, in contrast to classical compatibilism, Kant's compatibilism depends on strong metaphysical assumptions. This is an interesting point. As a first rejoinder, the claim that Kant's
transcendental idealism depends on strong metaphysical assumptions is contested. In fact, Allison (2004) has developed strong arguments to the effect that it does not. As we have seen, however, not everyone agrees with Allison's
epistemic two-aspect reading of transcendental idealism. Let us thus set aside this rejoinder for the sake of the argument and assess whether a compatibilist's reliance on strong metaphysical assumptions gives us any reason to
withhold the label “compatibilist” or to use the label only in a qualified way. Imagine free will theorist Janet. Janet accepts the principle of alternate possibilities and the conditional analysis of ability. On her analysis, an agent could
have done otherwise if and only if she would have done otherwise had she wanted to do so. Jane also accepts Lewis's (1973) analysis of counterfactuals. Accordingly, she holds that the statement “if Joe had wanted to do
otherwise, then he would have done otherwise” is true in the actual world if and only if there is a possible world in which Joe wanted to do otherwise and did so which is closer to the actual world than any possible world in which
he wanted to do otherwise and did not do so. Suppose, finally, that Janet accepts Lewis's (1986) modal realism, according to which possible worlds are just as real as the actual world. Consequently, Janet's claim that the sort of
freedom required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism commits her to affirming the existence of possible worlds. Janet's compatibilism depends on rather strong metaphysical assumptions. Even so, calling Janet
an “incompatibilist” or a “libertarian compatibilist” seems unfounded. Janet accepts the compatibilist thesis and hence rejects the incompatibilist thesis—and that is all there is to be said about it. The strong metaphysical

we should not refer to Kant's

implications of her theory are simply irrelevant to the question whether she should be categorized as a compatibilist or an incompatibilist. Similarly,

solution of the free will problem as “the compatibility of compatibilism and incompatibilism”
for the reason that this solution depends on a metaphysically demanding version of
transcendental idealism. In sum, the Kantian labels highlight that Kant is not a run-of-the-mill
compatibilist and that his solution to the free will problem relies on transcendental idealism . Yet the
labels convey this only to the extent that they are interpreted loosely—and that is, inaccurately. Strictly speaking, the Kantian labels fail to convey what they are intended to convey. In philosophical discussions on topics as complex
as the problem of free will, concepts must be used in strict and well-defined ways to avoid misunderstanding. For this reason, I propose to discontinue using Kantian labels such as “the compatibility of compatibilism and
incompatibilism” (Wood, 1984, p. 74), “non-conflicting compatibilism” (Xie, 2009, p. 57) and “libertarian compatibilism” (Ertl, 2014, p. 410).
That results in practical reason as the source of goodness –
A] Bindingness – Any obligation must not only tell us what is good, but why we ought
to be good or else agents can reject the value of goodness itself. That means ethics
must start with what is constitutive of agents since it traces obligations to features
that are intrinsic to being an agent – as an agent you must follow certain rules. Only
practical agency is constitutive since agents can use rationality to decide against other
values but the act of deciding to reject practical agency engages in it.
B] Action theory – every moral analysis requires an action to evaluate, but actions are
infinitely divisible into smaller meaningless movements. The act of stealing can be
reduced to going to a house, entering, grabbing things, and leaving, all of which are
distinct actions without moral value. Only the practical decision to steal ties these
actions together to give them any moral value.
That justifies universalizability.
A] The principle of equality is true since anything else assigns moral value to
contingent factors like identity and justifies racism, and the principle of non-
contradiction is true since 2+2 can’t equal 4 for me and not for you meaning ethical
statements true for one must be true for all.
B] Ethics must be defined a priori because of the is ought gap – experience only tells us
what is since that’s what we perceive, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to
derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori
premises to make a moral theory. Applying reason to a priori truth results in universal
obligations.
This requires a system of property – mere empirical possession is insufficient and
contrary to freedom, Hogdson 10:
Louis Philippe Hogdson, 2010, “Kant on Property Rights and the State”
http://www.yorku.ca/lhodgson/kant-on-property-rights-and.pdf //LHP AV

What does it mean to say that property rights are essential for freedom? For our purposes, the crucial feature of property is the possibility of rightfully excluding
others from the use of a certain object.8 If I own a certain apple, then that means that you wrong me if you use the apple without my permission, and hence that you can forcibly be
prevented from doing so. Importantly, this is the case regardless of whether I am physically holding the apple or not.9 The point is worth stressing. I

can exclude you from using an apple simply by holding it. I then exclude you physically, since we cannot both hold the
apple at the same time; I also exclude you normatively, since using force to wrestle the apple from me would violate my right to

freedom (assuming that you have no property right in the apple).10 Still, this form of exclusion falls short of what is required for genuine property, because it makes my right to the apple
entirely derivative from my right to bodily integrity, and hence leaves me with no complaint if I accidentally drop the apple and you pick it up. Genuine
property rights do not depend on physical possession in that way: if an apple is genuinely mine and I drop it, then you wrong me if you pick it up and walk away
with it; that I was not physically holding the apple at the time is irrelevant.11 The question we need to ask, then, is why freedom demands that it

be possible for me to exclude others from using certain objects even though I am not in physical
possession of them. How can freedom place such demands with respect to objects that are external to me – objects that are neither physically connected to my body, nor essentially connected to me in the way my
body is? Kant’s answer has two parts . First, he tells us that the possibility of property is the object of the postulate of private right: It is

possible for me to have any external object of my choice as mine, that is, a maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an object of choice would in itself (objectively) have to
belong to no one (res nullius) is contrary to right.12 Second, he explains the necessity of this postulate as follows: an object of my choice is
something that I have the physical power to use. If it were nevertheless absolutely not within my rightful power to
make use of it, that is, if the use of it could not coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law ( would be wrong), then freedom would be

depriving itself of the use of its choice with regard to an object of choice, by putting usable objects
beyond any possibility of being used; in other words, it would annihilate them in a practical respect and make them into a res
nullius, even though in the use of things choice was formally consistent with everyone’s outer freedom in accordance with universal laws.13 The problem is that this seems to get things precisely backwards. Kant stresses that

external freedom demands that the use of some objects be rightful. That seems obvious enough: there would be no external freedom to speak of if the
external world were entirely off limits. But that hardly establishes a link between freedom and property in the stronger sense that concerns us here. Kant explains why it is not
possible for every object to be off limits to all; the question we need to ask is how it is possible for any object that I am not physically holding to be off limits to others. The difficulty I am pointing to can be brought out by
considering an alternative to a system of property: a system of mere empirical possession in which everything in the world can rightfully be used, so long as it is not under someone’s physical control. In this system, the ground on
which I stand and the objects I carry around with me are off limits to you, but the rest of the world – including objects I put down or dropped a moment ago – is up for grabs. Such a system does not put ‘usable objects beyond any
possibility of being used’ in any straightforward sense. Yet, if Kant believes that freedom demands the possibility of full-fledged property rights, he must think that a system of empirical possession unjustifiably restricts freedom.

The problem, in a nutshell, is that a system of empirical possession only allows me to pursue
How is that the case?

projects taking place within the space I occupy at a given moment and involving objects that I can hold
for the entire duration of the project. Any other project – and this means any remotely complex project – will involve objects whose use I cannot rightfully determine through my
choices, and for whose use I am therefore inevitably dependent on the choices of others. Put differently, a system of mere empirical possession makes my (eminently restricted) ability to occupy space and to hold objects the
measure of my ability to make objects into my means, and thus to set and pursue ends for myself. This unjustifiably restricts my external freedom, because there is no reason why my having only two hands (to name only one

suppose that I want to build myself a house. Suppose that one of the
obvious physical limitation) should determine what means I can rightfully secure for myself. To illustrate the point,

means I need to pursue this project is a hammer, and that I happen to find just the hammer I need. The problem that a system of mere empirical possession poses is not that it

makes the hammer off limits to me, as Kant seems to suggest in the passage I quoted above, but, rather, that it makes my right to stop you from taking the hammer

contingent on my ability to hold on to it. As soon as I put it down for a second, you are perfectly entitled to pick it up and walk away with it. Worse, once you have grabbed the
hammer, it is yours in the sense appropriate to the system, and I cannot rightfully take it back so long as you are holding it. The same holds for the land on which I plan to build my house: my right to exclude others from it only
extends to the ground on which I am standing at a given time. You are perfectly entitled to move around on the rest of the land I intend to use, regardless of whether I have fenced it off or started building on it. Indeed, if you

That I would be wronging you

decide to stand on part of the land that I claim, you make it off limits to me, and thereby make it impossible for me to realize my project without wronging you.

is important here: it shows how your interference differs from other unforeseen circumstances I may face in
pursuing my project. An earthquake could destroy most of what I have built, and thereby hamper my pursuit far more than you would by grabbing the hammer. But the earthquake does not raise normative problems for how I may
pursue my end. If it destroys my house, then I can just rebuild it; indeed, if I have the means, I am justified in stopping the earthquake from happening altogether. In this way, the earthquake only presents me with an instrumental
problem: it requires me to revise my calculations for how I am to achieve my goal. Interference of that kind does not restrict my ability to set and pursue ends; it is simply part of what exercising that ability involves for a finite

a rational agent, you are not just some circumstance that I have to work
being. Your interference raises a different problem. As

around: your right to freedom means that you can make things off limits to me simply by holding on to them. If you choose to stand on the
ground where I intended to build, you thereby put a stop to my project of building a house there; if you choose to pick up an object I left lying around, you make it impossible for me to use it for my project. All a

system of mere empirical possession allows me to do to avoid such occurrences is to plead with you not
to interfere with my project. In other words, on such a system, it is always partly up to you whether I can rightfully make use of an object that I am not currently holding, or of a piece of land on which I am not currently standing.

The only means I can have at my disposal to set and pursue my ends with are objects to which I am physically connected. As I said above, this makes my limited ability to hold objects the measure of what means I can have at
my disposal, which arbitrarily restricts my ability to set and pursue ends for myself.14 Now on Kant’s view, as I said at the outset, such a restriction can be

justified, but only if it is required by freedom. In our case, this means that the restriction imposed by the system of mere empirical possession is

acceptable only if my having a full-fledged property right in the hammer – that is, my being allowed to stop you from using it even when I
am not holding it – would somehow be incompatible with your freedom . We can easily show that this is not the case. One way to make the point is to stress that

your freedom depends on your ability to set and pursue ends for yourself, which does not depend on your access to
any particular object; therefore, I do not restrict your freedom by making the hammer off limits to you.15 There is also a more direct way to make the
point in the present context. One can simply note that, from the point of view of you r access to the hammer, there is no relevant difference

between a system of full-fledged property rights and a system of mere empirical possession, since both systems allow me to exclude you entirely from using the hammer. Of
course, on the latter system, I can do so only by physically holding on to the hammer for the rest of my life, whereas the former system allows me to set the hammer down while still excluding you. But from your

standpoint the two scenarios amount to the same thing , since what matters is simply that I exclude
you from using the hammer, not how I do it. A full-fledged system of property thus brings about no further restriction on your freedom. Consequently, any restriction of
freedom associated with a system of mere empirical possession cannot be grounded in the need to
protect freedom itself and hence must be unjustified on Kant’s view . Let me close this section by stressing the general character of the conclusion
we have reached. We have seen that freedom requires property. This is not to say that freedom requires the specific form of private property found in modern capitalist societies. Kant’s argument
only requires some system of rights allowing one to exclude others from using a certain object for a certain amount of time, regardless of whether one is holding it or not. That could be achieved by a system under which the means
of production are communally owned, so long as it appropriately determines who has the right to use a given object at a given time.16 The considerations presented here thus do not amount to an endorsement of capitalism, or of

if rational agents are to live together without

the sort of absolute private property rights advocated by libertarians.17 They support a broader thesis: that,

undermining one another’s freedom, then they must have a system that allows them to control
certain objects through their choices without having to hold on to them physically . Nothing more is required for the rest of our
argument. objects through their choices without having to hold on to them physically. Nothing more is required for the rest of our argument.

However, we are rational and impulsive – this nonideal situation requires a state with
coercive authority that secures equal outer freedom and property, Koch 92:
*bracketed for gendered language* Koch, Andrew M. "Immanuel Kant, The Right of Necessity, and the
Liberal Foundation of Social Welfare" Southeastern Political Review, 20: 2 (Fall 1992) 295-314.
https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/koch_andrew_1992_Immanuel_Kant.pdf //LHP AV DOA: 9/14/21
Immanuel Kant, Ontology, Morality, and the Law The discussion of "necessity" in the writings of Immanuel Kant takes place within a broad context, linking the Kantian epistemology, ontology, and claims regarding civil society.

The ontology of Immanuel Kant asserts that the human being is both phenomenal, part of the physical world of experience, and noumenal, part of the
"realm of the mind." (Kant 1977b, 196-198) As a part of the physical environment a person is subject to all the laws which

govern the interaction of objects in physical space. However, Kant suggested the possibility that the individual, having the power of
transcendental reason, has the capacity for thought which is independent of the deterministic features of the phenomenal world. This seemingly abstract philosophic notion is very significant with respect to Kant's claim
about the possibility of freedom and morality. If the power of the will operates in a realm outside the determinism of the phenomenal world then the freedom of the will to direct the body's actions may be assumed. If there is an
undetermined element in the make-up of the human being, said Kant, the individual "may" be provided with the possibility of autonomous action. Here it should be noted that Kant does not claim he can "prove" the autonomy of

the principle of autonomy is the sole principle of morals." (Kant

the will, only that the possibility for it exists. He does, however, assert emphatically that, "...

1977b, 188) Kant argues that without freedom no moral accountability is possible. If individuals do not choose their actions they cannot be held morally accountable for those actions. When a person is

not free to do otherwise, that person bears no responsibility for the outcome of an act . So while freedom of the will
cannot be proven within the Kantian scheme, it must be assumed if morality is to have any meaning. For Kant, the interaction of individuals creates problems.

If human beings are truly free, the social environment in which they pursue their happiness will
generate "antagonisms." (Kant 1977c, 429) As both reason and impulse, selfish egoism would reign unchecked should some
mechanism to control the impulsive side of the human character not be present. Kant concluded that in society man is in need of a "master." (Kant 1977a, 122)
The aggression and selfishness in human nature can be mitigated if reason is used to keep impulse
under control. (Kant 1977a, 119) Reason allows for the creation of an external body of rule which can serve to
regulate social interaction. This regulation of freedom is designed to produce the maximum amount of
freedom that can be shared by all. (Kant 1977a, 121) Kant indicated that he did not believe every problem could be solved by creating laws. No matter how
perfect a system of laws, the perfectibility of the human being is still in doubt. As Kant stated, "...a complete solution is impossible.
One cannot fashion something absolutely straight from wood which is as crooked as that of which man is made." (Kant 1977a, 123) The best that one can hope for is an

approximate solution. That consists of creating an external body of laws that will regulate the behavior of individuals in their social interactions. Here Kant is making a very specific claim regarding the role of law in
civil society. Freedom of interaction is to be maximized for everyone equally. The role of the law is to deter

those who would subvert the attainment of a common level of freedom for all. The use of force, that is organized and legitimated as
the externalization of human reason, serves a deterrent function in society . Those that would inhibit the freedom of others would be, according to Kant, deterred by the threat of

punishment. Law, and the collective force that it represents, checks the impulsive and egoistic elements in

human nature. Only when the natural antagonisms among people are checked can [hu]mankind reach
its fullest potential. A functioning set of laws designed to regulate human intercourse is essential to
civil society. The collection of those laws Kant referred to as a "civil constitution." Kant stated that joining into civil society is the first duty of those
who cannot avoid having mutual influence on one another. (Kant 1977c, 415) A union of people in a
commonwealth involves the externalization of duties into a formal set of standards based on the
principle of freedom. (Kant 1977c, 415) Kant is emphatic with regard to the standard that is to govern the conduct of individuals in civil society. Kant declared that people should
always act to treat others as "ends" not merely as means. Thus Kant has linked the idea of personal obligation
and morality to the formulation of law in civil society. In Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals, a section entitled The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Kant explored
this further by asserting what he called the "Universal Principle of Justice." Every action is just if its maxim is such that the freedom of the will of each can coexist with the freedom of everyone....(Kant 1965, 35) This statement
contains a variety of elements relevant to the notion of freedom in Kant's moral and political philosophy. The primary characteristic of justice is the maintenance of freedom in social intercourse. It is also important to note that

In fact, he specifically states that the content of social interaction is not

Kant makes no reference to the content of interaction or of its goals.

the specific concern of justice. "[T]he content of justice does not take into consideration the matter of the content of the will . . . " (Kant 1965, 34) Only the form of
interaction is relevant for Kant. Relations must be such that the participants share a common and
equal level of freedom in the conduct of their affairs. Rights and duties within the state ultimately derive from the principle
of freedom. (Kant 1977c, 415) The state has the role of both legal adjudicator and coercive apparatus in the
maintenance of freedom. The strategy of civil society is to create an external set of duties, "publiccoercive law," in which every person's rights are secured against interference from any other person
in the society. (Kant 1977c, 415) The state, said Kant, "is a union of men under juridical laws." (Kant 1935, 182) The state, as a collection of laws, is a legitimate

instrument of coercion if it uses its power for the maintenance of the maximum level of freedom that
all the members of society can share. (Kant 1965, 36-39) The state's system of justice, positive law, emerges in order to protect each citizen from the natural antagonisms that arise as
individuals seek to maximize their happiness in the social environment. (Kant 1977c, 416-417) The state has both the obligation and the force to compel

compliance to the laws which protect the freedom of all.

Thus, the standard is consistency with a system of equal outer freedom through the
omnilateral will. For spec, (deontological, weigh between imperfect and perfect
duties, and rights violations constitute general offense, defend metaphysical
kantianism)
Prefer –
1] Kantian autonomy escapes problems of free will, Velleman 06:
David Velleman, [J. David Velleman is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Bioethics at New York
University and Miller Research Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. He primarily works
in the areas of ethics, moral psychology, and related areas such as the philosophy of action, and
practical reasoning.] “A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN ETHICS,” 2006,
https://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/34651 //LHP AV

I think that Kant's mistake was to claim that we must act under the idea of freedom; what he should have said, I think, is that we must act under the idea of autonomy. Let me
explain the difference between these concepts. 'Autonomy' is derived from the Greek word for self-rule or self-governance. Our behavior is autonomous when it is self-

governed, in the sense that we ourselves are in control of it; it is not autonomous—or, as Kant would say, it is heteronomous—when it is controlled by
something other than ourselves. To say that behavior is controlled by something other than ourselves is not to say that it is controlled from outside our bodies or our minds. A sneeze or a hiccup is

not under our control; neither is a startle or an impulsive cry of pain; but all of these heteronomous
behaviors originate within us. What makes them heteronomous is that, while originating within, they don't originate with us:
they aren't fully our doing. Only the behaviors that are fully our doing qualify as autonomous actions. The fact that we act autonomously doesn't necessarily

entail that we have free will—not, at least, in the sense that Kant had in mind. In Kant's view, our having free will would require not only that we sit
behind the wheel of our behavior, so to speak, but also that we face more than one direction in which it would be causally possible that we steer it,
so that our future course is not pre-determined. One might suspect that if our future course was pre-
determined, then we wouldn't really be in control of our behavior, and hence that autonomy really does require freedom. Yet there is a way
for us to follow a pre-determined course and yet steer that course in a meaningful sense. Our course might be
pre-determined by the fact that there are reasons for us to do particular things and that we are rationally responsive to
reasons. So long as we are responding to reasons, we remain autonomous, whether or not those
reasons pre-determine what we do. Consider here our autonomy with respect to our beliefs. When we consider the sum of 2 and 2, we
ourselves draw the conclusion that it is 4. The thought 2+2=4 is not dictated to us by anyone else; it is not due to an involuntary mental association, not forced on our minds by an
obsession or fixed in our minds by a mental block; in short, it isn't the intellectual equivalent of a sneeze or a hiccup. When we consider the sum of 2 and 2 , we make our own way to the

answer 4. And yet there is no other answer that we could arrive at, given that we are arithmetically
competent and that, as any reasoner can see, the sum of 2 and 2 is 4 . So when we consider the sum of 2 and 2, we are pre-
determined to arrive at the answer 4, but to arrive there autonomously, under our own intellectual
steam. We aren't free to conclude that 2+2 is 5, and yet we are autonomous in concluding that it is 4.
Perhaps, then, we can steer our behavior as we steer our thoughts , in directions that are pre-determined , not by

exogenous forces, but by our rational ability to do what there is reason for doing, just as we think what there is reason for thinking. In that case, we could have

autonomy without necessarily having free will.

2] It’s the best methodology to solve oppression –
A] ethical egoism - allowing subjective conceptions of what oppression is based upon
your circumstances allow for bias to seep in - only by abstracting from our material
conditions can we keep our empirical character in check and account for
intersubjectivity
B] recognizing that each agent is a meaning producer is key to recognize everyone’s
equal value – independently means if you’re unsure what the good is, preserve
freedom since it wills everyone to pursue their own conception of the good
3] Motivation – The categorical imperative is intrinsically motivational since it respects
the nature of agency, which is the mechanism by which we can set and pursue any
end – absent the motivation to pursue ends you would no longer be an agent, which
means to be an agent necessitates being motivated to act.
4] Regress – other theories result in a regress—they generate requirements
conditional on some further principle, which must itself be derived. The AC framework
escapes this because it is derivable from the concept of an unconditional law in
general.
 1AC – Offense
I affirm: The United States ought to guarantee the right to housing. Specification is
irrelevant per the aff – we will defend any enforcement as long as it reasonably
follows per normal means. Affirm –
Agency is contingent on recognizing the rights of individuals, which require social
utilities like housing – the realization of agency necessitates a right to housing.
Saadat et al. 20 [Saadat Niaki, H., & Taheri, A. F., 5-18-2020, "Evaluating the Redistribution Policy and
the Right to Social Welfare in Kant’s Philosophy," Wiley Online Library, 84–95.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/heyj.13572, accessed 7-11-2023] Vik recut david

The concluding clauses of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are dedicated to the classification
and listing of socioeconomic rights that are, in fact, second generation human rights. For example, Article 25 of the
declaration is specifically concerned with the right to social welfare: Everyone has the right to a standard
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.6 The said rights are detailed more extensively
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which lists the following: the right to social security (including
security in the event of unemployment, illness, disability, orphanage, or old age), the right to food, housing, clothing, medical care, and
different types of education, employment, fair and proper working conditions, unemployment support, fair and proper wages, recreation
and leisure (including periodic paid vacations). It also includes that every person has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the
society, benefit from the arts, and have a share in scientific development and enjoy its fruits. The above rights are occasionally
referred to as ‘new human rights’, because their advent is the result of changed perspectives in the 20th
century regarding the proper state duties and the responsibility the state has toward the welfare of its
citizens.7 Historically, these types of rights (the welfare rights) are subsequent to option rights, which are fundamentally tied to freedom
of choice, while welfare rights are tied to merit and deserving to benefit from a commodity or privilege, such as the right to an elementary
education, proper housing, and adequate healthcare.8 To this point, we have discussed what has been historically stated regarding social
welfare and what has been reflected in international documents about it. A point of debate about social welfare brought about by human
rights philosophers concerns the ascription of the concept of right to them. That is, whether or not social welfare is a right. The proponents
of welfare rights reason that studying the justifying basis of right reveals its relationship with social welfare. Some philosophers hold two
fundamental bases for rights that together can justify human rights: human dignity, and agency. The
argument that, according to
human rights, all humans—irrespective of any classification— deserve to benefit from something is
based on the principle of human equality. This raises the question of what human equality means, because what is seen in
reality indicates the inequality of humans based on their positions in society. The answer is that the equality of humans refers to their
equality in inherent worth. Put
differently, rights are absolute (unconditional) values for the being of each
individual irrespective of his or her relative worth.9 Based on this view, no human must be utilized as a
mere means to an end for others. Although the principle of equality has surfaced in different forms throughout history, in the
enlightenment era of the 18th century, the view shifted from seeing human worth as based on one’s social class to their human position
stemming from their humanity; thus, the inherent worth of a human and the principle of equality became the center of attention. The works
of thinkers such as Roseau and Kant addressed this subject. The most philosophical analysis of human dignity as the foundation of equality is
provided by Kant. In his second formulation of the categorical imperative as the principle of ends, he states: ‘Behave such that in practice,
humanity, be it for yourself or for others, is never merely a means, but the end.’10 Later, in the 19th century, John Rawls Kant’s Idea of
Social Welfare 5 followed Kant’s description to put forth his principle of equality as the tendency of community members to treat others as
the ends, not the means.11 Nevertheless, throughout human history, the principles of human dignity and equality have always been
violated in social, political, and economic grounds, resulting in the trampling of human rights. The
realization of human dignity
and the subsequent principle of equality require another presumption as the justifier of rights. This
presumption is agency. If preserving human dignity is contingent upon considering rights for humans,
and if the realization of such rights requires the realization of such affairs as education, healthcare, and
the like, then logic dictates that the ‘agency’ of humans must be presumed, so that the executive and
practical aspects of rights are justified. Agency is the human ability to walk the path of actualizing an image of valuable life that
he has chosen using his autonomy (independence), where nothing precludes the pursuit of what is perceived as the preferred life
(freedom).12 Robert Nozick argues the same.13 Also, Gewirth believes that agency is the key to rights. 14 The agency of human beings is
endangered by the lack of some facilities and resources, because without certain things, man cannot pursue and realize his desired life as an
independent, free actor. Hence, the core of agency can be known to consist of three elements: (1) human
independence and autonomy, (2) the freedom of man from obstacles obstructing his path to pursuing
his desired life, and (3) facilities and resources. From one perspective, it can be said that the realization of agency is the
guarantee for human dignity; that is, human dignity is respected when one’s agency is guaranteed. On the other hand, the
realization of agency and, hence, the preservation of human dignity is dependent upon facilities and
resources. Therefore, man deserves to benefit from such facilities and resources. As mentioned earlier, the idea
of rights— irrespective of their types—is a point of debate among theorists when it comes to welfare commodities. On the opposite front to
the proponents of social welfare as a right, a group believes that viewing social welfare as a right requires policies that contradict more
fundamental human rights, i.e. the right to freedom and ownership. Hence, some people challenge the legitimacy of state actions toward
welfare in many areas where such actions violate the rights of individuals. It goes so far that even liberals and social democrats sometimes
doubt whether considering such facilities as rights actually leads to a proper moral system for addressing the concerns of distributive justice.

The state is justified in providing welfare through coercion when it is necessary to

maintain human standards of life for individuals that cannot procure the goods
necessary to do so in the first place.
That justifies a free right to housing with conditions that protect form the state of
nature with components of survival.
Saadat et al. 20 [Saadat Niaki, H., & Taheri, A. F., 5-18-2020, "Evaluating the Redistribution Policy and
the Right to Social Welfare in Kant’s Philosophy," Wiley Online Library, 84–95.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/heyj.13572, accessed 7-11-2023] Vik recut david

In Kant’s philosophy, social welfare is tied to the redistribution policy . Accordingly, it is linked to state actions for
establishing social justice. As such, we had better first explain Kant’s theory of state and then move to the subject of the paper. In Critique of
Pure Reason, Kant puts forth the idea of a perfect state, admitting that he has borrowed the idea from Plato. Based on this idea, it is
essential to develop a constitutional law that supports primary human freedom and gives every
individual equal freedom compared to others. This idea must be the basis of the initial draft of a nation’s constitution and
serve as the foundation of all laws. In Kant’s view, such a notion is idealistic; that is, it can never completely be achieved in practice, and there is
always a gap between the idea and its execution.15 As such, the state must do its utmost to approach the idea of perfect state and,
consequently, progress further toward equal freedom for its citizens. In his other work, ‘On the Common Saying: “This May Be True in Theory,
but Does Not Apply in Practice”’ Kant
argues that the original contract, the same as an absolute rational idea, is
the basis for the constitution of a civil state and describes this civil state with equality in actions and
reactions related to the free, 6 Hamidreza Saadat Niaki and Ali Fath Taheri willful acts that limit anyone
according to the general law of freedom.16 In the same work, he designates the constraints of freedom. In his view, right in itself
implies limiting the freedom of each individual in accordance with the freedom of others under the provisions of general laws. Hence, in mutual
human relationships, freedom is the basis of right; i.e., it is the freedom that makes external right possible.17 Clearly, by placing the
establishment of equal freedom for the citizenry as the state objective in the heart of his political philosophy, Kant proposes his own idea of
classical liberalism. Another point that emphasizes this inference is the investigations of Fleischacker on the history of distributive justice and its
development in Kant’s thoughts. Fleischacker believes that when using the term distributive justice, Kant interprets a peculiar implication for it
that differs from the traditional interpretation. In Kant’s view, public justice consists of protective, commutative, and distributive justice.
Corresponding to the epistemological trichotomies in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces the said three types of justice as indicative of
possibility, actuality, and necessity of law. Protective justice is the form of law (i.e. what law makes possible), commutative law is the content
(actuality) of law, and distributive justice is the provider of the system that enforces the law (makes it necessary). The system of law
enforcement for making them necessary consists of using courts to enforce regulations in certain cases. In
this sense, distributive
justice is what differentiates between benefiting from a civil state and living in a natural circumstance.
Hence, in Kant’s terminology, distributive justice possesses an unconventional meaning which is the
same as law enforcement. According to Fleischacker, the fact that Kant changes the traditional meaning of distributive justice in such
a way is a witness for the claim that he had little familiarity with the classic works on the philosophy of law and political philosophy This
negligence of law traditions helps explain his radical understanding of ownership rights. In Kant’s view, the principle of right that
determines the borders of freedom has no exceptions, and the justification of justice—his opinion of the
highest example of right—has to give the ownership of something to the individual against all possible
claimants and in all possible situations. Therefore, Kant can be seen as a good source of a strict libertarianism interpretation of
law and politics. In practice, some contemporary libertarians also consider him a citable source in these regards.18 However, Kant also
defends the redistribution policy, a policy that is inconsistent with the freedom of those with better
financial circumstances because commodities/wealth are to be taken from them and given to the poor.
In fact, despite adhering to the negative concept of justice in the Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Kant admits that the state must
act in accordance with positive freedom with regard to social welfare.19 To elaborate, it is noteworthy that in Kant’s
opinion, philosophy can be divided into two major parts: the theoretical part dealing mostly with the is and are and the practical part which
mainly deals with must(s). The practical section itself consists of two parts: the technical-practical component that deals mainly with conditional
must(s) and the ethical-practical component that deals mainly with unconditional, absolute must(s). 20 The practical-ethical section is further
divided into two parts: the philosophy of law and the philosophy of ethics. Kant differentiates between the two according to different forms of
law-making and norm-making. For instance, in his view, a duty is a notion through which one commits to a task. The main attribute of a duty is
an obligation. An obligation refers to the necessity of a free action governed by reason and ‘a practical rule through which what is
spontaneously possible becomes necessary.’21 Kant’s idea is that the state is obliged to adopt the redistribution
policy and coercively take from the wealthy in order to provide the means for feeding those who cannot
even procure the barest necessities of their biological life. As such, redistribution is not enforced merely
by voluntary participation; here we are faced with a legal right and not a moral one. The legal right Kant’s Idea of
Social Welfare 7 requires the obliged to carry out the duty and carries with it the fear of punishment if they fail to obey.22 Therefore, the
state’s permission to tax the rich, for instance, is enforceable through punishment and fines and is a
legal right. Further to the sanctions of punishment and fines, Kant also mentions the element of externality as the difference between moral
and legal rights. Externality indicates that the external relationship between subjects incurs a legal right insofar as their actions externally affect
each other.23 This attribute is nonexistent in the moral right and duty. As a result, state coercion does not include moral affairs such as charity,
because charity, as the feeling of satisfaction for the happiness (wellbeing and welfare) of others, is different from the manifestation of
satisfaction in a smiling face.24 Another
point is that the poor and the needy have to be supported by legal taxes
and not by gradually accumulating commodities, because such a mechanism does not turn poverty into
a means for gaining income or an unfair burden that the state imposes on people. 25 In fact, while Kant is a
citable source for some of the contemporary libertarians, he worries about neither a total conflict between ownership rights and taxation nor
the probability that using tax income for distributive purposes can conflict with the state’s duty to protect the ownership rights of individuals. In
contrast, he persistently demands that the state also be tasked with running schools, hospitals, and other institutions so as to keep the poor or
orphaned persons away from the taxpayers’ pockets. In
fact, he explicitly argues that assisting such institutions must
be mandatory for all citizens and the required financial resources must be provided by taxation rather
than lotteries supervised by the state. Hence, while some of his reasoning might be valuable to extreme libertarians, his proposals
for practical policies put him farther to the left compared to many liberals supporting a welfare state. As such, Kant’s philosophy presents a
challenge that we call ‘a challenge between freedom and redistribution policies for public welfare.’ In his moral philosophy, Kant presents
another deduction based on human dignity to justify the duties of the state for supporting the poor. In his Lectures on Ethics, he mentions that
being charitable increases the pride of the giver while humiliating the one who receives it. In his opinion, the needy person had better be
assisted by another means that do not lead to humiliation because of receiving charity.26 In Lectures on Ethics, Kant says no more on an
alternative means of assisting; however, in the Metaphysics of Morals, he introduces state action as being responsible for this task, saying that
the state must oblige the rich to provide for those who cannot provide for their most basic biological needs .27
Because in Kant’s
political philosophy, the state is the manifestation of public will be based on the social contract, his
reasoning here is better suited to the view that poses support of the poor as an obligation of everyone
to each other. Everyone must see themselves as part of a community that supports others. Thus, it is not
strange that many supporters of the welfare state see Kant as a source of inspiration.
 1AC – Normative Truth Testing
The role of the ballot is to evaluate the truth or falsity of the resolution through a
normatively justified framework via fair, safe, and educational arguments. To clarify,
skepticism is not included. Prefer it –
1] Reciprocity – normative frameworks provide a reciprocal burden of justifying an
obligation with the ability to turn them – other frameworks are arbitrarily impact
exclusive and don’t articulate a 1-1 burden
2] Philosophy – only our role of the ballot incentivizes nuanced discussions over the
interactions of different ethical theories while retaining topic ed. That outweighs on
constitutivism – LD debate is uniquely a values debate which means the intrinsic
purpose of the activity is philosophical discussion
3] Collapses – A] any framing presupposes a motivation to vote one way or another
which means all framings concede the validity of normativity B] Ethics comes prior to
logical truth, Peirce 02:
CS Peirce, “CP 2.198” 1902, https://colorysemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-
collectedpapers.pdf //LHP AV

Ethics †3: is another subject which for many years seemed to me to be completely foreign to logic. Indeed I doubted very much whether it was anything more than a practical science, or
Peirce: CP 2.198 Cross-Ref:†† 198.

intimacy of
Art; although I had always been interested in ethical systems. About twenty years ago, I began to be impressed with the importance of the theory; but it has only been within five or six years that all the

its relation to logic has been revealed to me. It may very easily happen that the over-development of a man's moral conception should interfere with his progress in
philosophy. The protoplasm of philosophy has to be in a liquid state in order that the operations of metabolism may go on. Now morality is a hardening agent. It is astonishing how many abominable scoundrels there are among
sincerely moral people. The difficulty is that morality chokes its own stream. Like any other field, more than any other, it needs improvement, advance. Moral ideas must be a rising tide, or with the ebb foulness will be cast up. But
morality, doctrinaire conservatist that it is, destroys its own vitality by resisting change, and positively insisting, This is eternally right: That is eternally wrong. The tendency of philosophers has always been to make their assertions
too absolute. Nothing stands more in the way of a comprehension of the universe and of the mind. But in morals this tendency acquires triple strength. The practical side of ethics is its most obviously important side; and in
practical matters, the first maxim is that everything may be exaggerated. That is the substance of Aristotle's Ethics. The moral spirit may very easily be carried to excess: all the more so, that the essence of that spirit is to insist upon
its own absolute autocracy. All that is one side of the shield; but the other side is quite equally important. We are too apt to define ethics to ourselves as the science of right and wrong. That cannot be correct, for the reason that
right and wrong are ethical conceptions which it is the business of that science to develope and to justify. A science cannot have for its fundamental problem to distribute objects among categories of its own creation; for

The fundamental problem of ethics is not, therefore, What is right, but, What am I
underlying that problem must be the task of establishing those categories.

prepared deliberately to accept as the statement of what I want to do, what am I to aim at, what am I
after? To what is the force of my will to be directed? Now logic is a study of the means of attaining the
end of thought. It cannot solve that problem until it clearly knows what that end is. Life can have but
one end. It is Ethics which defines that end. It is, therefore, impossible to be thoroughly and rationally
logical except upon an ethical basis. Had I fully comprehended this great principle early in life, I should undoubtedly have been over-influenced by the moral spirit, and my present
understanding of logic which, although it is far in advance of anybody else's, is, as compared with what it ought to be, as the scrawl on an infant's slate to a cartoon of Raphael, would have been even narrower and poorer than it
now is--probably almost worthless. Before my logic was brought under the guidance of ethics, it was already a window through which much important truth could be seen, but dim with dust, distorting details by striæ. Under the
guidance of ethics I took it and melted it down, reduced it to a fluid condition. I filtered it till it was clear. I cast it in the true mould; and when it had become solid, I spared no elbow-grease in polishing it. It is now a comparatively
brilliant lens, showing much that was not discernible before. I believe that it will only remain to those who come after me to perfect the processes. I am as confident as I am of death that Logic will hereafter be infinitely superior to
what it is as I leave it; but my labors will have done good work toward its improvement.
 1AC – Method
Rights constrain the state---their critique of rights leads to a more fascist state.
Ishay Landa 19. Associate Professor of modern history at the Israeli Open University, in Ra’anana. The
Magic of the Extreme: On Fascism, Modernity, and Capitalism, The Journal of Holocaust Research, 33:1,
43-63, DOI: 10.1080/23256249.2019.1553539

That this staggering mass killing did not amount to a full-scale genocide did not reflect the taming
influence of the state, but rather the fact that Italian fascist ideology, virulently racist though it was, did
not entertain an image of ‘the Ethiopian’ as an archenemy of mankind that needed to be systematically
eradicated. Nor did the Turkish state, for instance, prevent the Armenian genocide. The state, for that
matter, can only effectively stand in the way of fascist and otherwise authoritarian abuse to the extent
that it remains bound by the rule of law and the constitutional defense of liberties, of civil and human
rights, and enjoys a sufficient measure of independence vis-à-vis the ruling elite. In other words, it can
tame dictatorship only to the extent that it remains a state properly embedded in normative
modernity. Under fascism, both in Italy and Germany, this was not the case, as the state was to a large
extent de-modernized, and in some respects, it had even reverted to norms and procedures resembling
those of absolutism. ‘Mussolini is always right’ – a counter-modern-constructed certitude condensed
into a slogan – ought to be seen as a reversion to pre-modern political ideals, reminiscent of Louis XIV’s
‘L’Etat, c’est moi.’ As the Duce expressly stated, the ‘executive power’ was above all other ‘powers of
the state.’ 42 Here lies the error in seeing fascism as a Hegelian state worship: ignoring the fact that the
state, as envisaged by the German philosopher, was a constitutional monarchy – a highly progressive
ideal for its time – embodying reason and bound by impersonal law and individual and political rights
rather than at the mercy of personal caprice.43

The point I am making here is not that a modern state is a sufficient guarantee against atrocities; rather,
the more specifically modern a state is, the less likely these atrocities are to occur. Moreover, the
specific kinship with absolutism that has been underlined should not be taken to mean that the fascist
state in general consisted merely of a restoration of the status quo ante, a simple reversion to the pre-
modern condition. Here, as elsewhere, fascism was also radically counter-modern, comprising many
innovative positions that developed as a response to the consolidation of modernity, such as the Italian
‘ethical state’ or the ethnically homogenous state of Nazism. Indeed, one of the trademarks of fascism
was the way it strove to reconcile nostalgia for the era preceding the supposed fall of 1789 with a radical
leap forward, meant to transcend the ‘decadence’ of modernity. Below I will offer more on this typically
fascist – and sometimes contradictory – hybrid of reaction, conservatism, and radicalism.

Only ideal theory can justify the K. Shelby 13,

Shelby, Tommie [Tadwell Titcomb Professor of African-American Studies and Philosophy, Harvard
University]. https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.1.2.0145 “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A
Reply to Charles Mills.” Critical Philosophy of Race 1.2 (2013): 145-162.
 nonideal theory—the study of the principles
The trouble with Mills’s view is that he regards nonideal theory as independent of ideal theory, indeed as an alternative to it. But

that should guide our responses to injustice—cannot succeed without knowing what the standards of justice are (and

perhaps also what justifies these standards). It is not clear how we are to develop a philosophically adequate and complete theory of how to respond

to social injustice without first knowing what makes a social scheme unjust. When dealing with gross injustices, such
as slavery, we may of course be able to judge correctly that a social arrangement is unjust simply by observing it or having it described to us, relying exclusively on our pre-theoretic moral

when our political values seem to conflict, or when

convictions. We don’t need a theory for that. But with less manifest injustices, or

we’re uncertain about what justice requires, or when there is great but honest disagreement
about whether a practice is unjust, we won’t know which aspects of a society should be
altered in the absence of a more systematic conception of justice. Without a set of principles that enables us to identify the
injustice-making features of a social system, we could not be confident in the direction social change should take, at least not if our aim is to realize a fully just society. In light of these
considerations, I have two questions about Mills’s project: If we abandon the framework for ideal theorizing, how do we determine which principles of justice should guide our reform or
revolutionary efforts, and how do we justify these principles if we must rely exclusively on nonideal theory? Unless Mills is prepared to relinquish the goal of realizing a fully just society, he
owes an answer to these questions.