Case Digest 1st Syllabus
Case Digest 1st Syllabus
Case Digest 1st Syllabus
ADDITIONAL CASES:
Title
Trillanes IV vs. Castillo-Marigomen
Case
G.R. No. 223451
Decision Date
Mar 14, 2018
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV is sued for damages after
making defamatory statements about Antonio L. Tiu, with
the court ruling that Trillanes' statements were not
protected by parliamentary immunity and that Tiu's
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for
damages.
Facts:
The case involves a Petition for Certiorari filed by
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV against Hon.
Evangeline C. Castillo-Marigomen, Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101,
and Antonio L. Tiu.
Trillanes challenges the RTC's orders dated May
19, 2015, and December 16, 2015, which denied
his motion to dismiss Tiu's complaint for
damages. accusing him of being a "front" or "dummy" for
Tiu's complaint arose from Trillanes' alleged former Vice President Jejomar Binay in relation
defamatory statements made during media to the Hacienda Binay.
interviews, accusing Tiu of being a "front" or Tiu claimed that these statements tarnished his
"dummy" for former Vice President Jejomar reputation and caused him financial losses.
Binay regarding the so-called Hacienda Binay. Trillanes argued that his statements were
Tiu, a businessman, claimed these statements protected by parliamentary immunity and that Tiu
tarnished his reputation and caused a significant failed to state a cause of action.
drop in the stock prices of his companies, Court's Ruling on Parliamentary Immunity
AgriNurture, Inc. and Greenergy Holdings, Inc. The court ruled that Trillanes' statements were
Trillanes argued that his statements were not protected by parliamentary immunity.
protected by parliamentary immunity and his Trillanes made the defamatory statements
constitutional rights to free speech and during media interviews, which are not part of his
expression. official duties as a senator.
The RTC denied Trillanes' motion to dismiss, Parliamentary immunity only applies to
leading to the filing of the present petition. statements made within the context of official
Issue: duties.
1. Did the RTC err in denying Trillanes' motion to Therefore, Trillanes' statements were not
dismiss based on parliamentary immunity and protected by parliamentary immunity.
failure to state a cause of action? Court's Ruling on Cause of Action
2. Are Trillanes' statements protected by The court found that Tiu's complaint sufficiently
parliamentary immunity under the 1987 stated a cause of action for damages.
Constitution? Tiu's complaint provided enough evidence to
3. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case, or support his claim that Trillanes' statements
should it be handled by the Senate or the voters? caused him harm.
Ruling: Trillanes' argument that Tiu failed to state a
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, cause of action was rejected by the court.
affirming the RTC's orders denying Trillanes' Trillanes' Petition for Certiorari
motion to dismiss. Trillanes filed a petition for certiorari with the
The Court ruled that Trillanes' statements made court after his motion to dismiss and motion for
during media interviews are not protected by reconsideration were denied.
parliamentary immunity. He argued that there was a threat to his
The Court held that the RTC has jurisdiction over parliamentary immunity and his rights to freedom
the case, as the statements were made outside of speech and expression.
the legislative process and are not covered by Trillanes sought direct application to the court
parliamentary immunity. without observing the doctrine of hierarchy of
Ratio: courts.
The Supreme Court emphasized that Court's Dismissal of the Petition
parliamentary immunity under Section 11, Article The court dismissed Trillanes' petition, stating
VI of the 1987 Constitution protects lawmakers that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should
from being questioned for any speech or debate have been observed.
in Congress or its committees. Trillanes failed to present an "exceptionally
This immunity does not extend to statements compelling reason" to justify his direct
made outside the legislative process, such as application to the court.
media interviews. The court held that Trillanes' statements in
The Court cited the case of Jimenez v. media interviews were not covered by
Cabangbang, clarifying that the privilege of parliamentary immunity.
speech or debate applies only to utterances Trillanes' rights to freedom of speech and
made in the performance of official functions expression were not violated by the court's ruling.
within the legislative sphere. Court's Decision on Preliminary Hearing
Trillanes' statements were made during media The court ruled that a preliminary hearing was
interviews and were not part of any legislative not warranted in this case.
activity, thus falling outside the scope of Trillanes' defense of lack of cause of action
parliamentary immunity. required a full-blown trial to determine the
The Court also noted that the RTC has veracity and probative value of the evidence.
jurisdiction over the case, as it involves a civil Therefore, a preliminary hearing was not
action for damages based on alleged defamatory necessary and the court affirmed the lower
statements, which is within the courts' authority court's orders denying Trillanes' motion to
to adjudicate. dismiss and motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether Tiu's complaint sufficiently
stated a cause of action should be determined
based on the allegations in the complaint, which, Title
if hypothetically admitted, would enable the court Dela Cruz vs. Ochoa, Jr.
to render a judgment. Case
The Court concluded that the petition lacked G.R. No. 219683
merit and should be dismissed. Decision Date
Jan 23, 2018
Case Summary (G.R. No. 223451) The case involves the constitutionality of the Motor
Background of the Case Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program in the
Antonio L. Tiu filed a defamation lawsuit against Philippines, with the Court ruling that the appropriation
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV. for the program was valid and constitutional, and that no
Trillanes made defamatory statements about Tiu, unconstitutional transfer of funds took place.
appropriations of money were detailed in the FY
Facts: 2014 Budget, providing the necessary specificity
The case "Dela Cruz v. Ochoa, Jr." (G.R. No. for a valid line-item appropriation that the
219683) was decided on January 23, 2018, by the President could veto.
Philippine Supreme Court En Banc. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari
Petitioners: Hon. Jonathan A. Dela Cruz and Hon. and prohibition, declaring the use of the
Gustavo S. Tambunting, Members of the House appropriation under the 2014 GAA for the MVPSP
of Representatives and taxpayers. as constitutional.
Respondents: Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa Jr., The temporary restraining order issued on June
Executive Secretary; Hon. Joseph Emilio A. 14, 2016, was lifted.
Abaya, Secretary of the DOTC; Hon. Florencio B.
Abad, Secretary of the DBM; and Hon. Rosalia V.
De Leon, National Treasurer.
Petitioners challenged the implementation of the
Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization
Program (MVPSP) by the LTO using funds from
the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA).
The case followed Jacomille v. Abaya, where the
Court dismissed the petition due to the 2014
GAA's appropriation for the MVPSP, rendering it
moot.
Petitioners argued the transfer of funds for the
MVPSP was unconstitutional and deprived the
President of veto powers.
The DOTC, through the LTO, initiated the MVPSP
to supply new standardized license plates,
starting the procurement process on February 20,
2013.
The project faced delays and irregularities,
including inadequate budgetary appropriations in
the 2013 GAA and lack of required Multi-Year
Obligational Authority (MYOA) from the DBM.
The project was eventually funded under the
2014 GAA.
The Commission on Audit (COA) issued several
Audit Observation Memoranda and a Notice of
Disallowance, citing irregularities.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality
of the MVPSP's implementation using 2014 GAA
funds.
Issue:
1. Did the 2014 GAA include an appropriation for
the implementation of the MVPSP?
2. Was the use of the appropriation under the 2014
GAA for the implementation of the MVPSP
constitutional?
Ruling:
1. The Court ruled that the 2014 GAA did include an
appropriation for the MVPSP.
2. The Court declared that the use of the
appropriation under the 2014 GAA for the
implementation of the MVPSP was constitutional.
Ratio:
The Court's decision was based on the principle
of stare decisis, referencing its earlier ruling in
Jacomille v. Abaya.
The 2014 GAA contained an appropriation for the
MVPSP, which "cured" any defects in the
procurement process.
The doctrine of stare decisis was applied to
ensure consistency and stability in judicial
decisions.
The appropriation for Motor Vehicle Registration
and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services in the
2014 GAA naturally included the MVPSP, as plate
-making is integral to the registration process.
Title
The increase in the LTO's 2014 budget to cover Araullo vs. Aquino III
the MVPSP was discussed and approved during
Case
budget hearings in Congress, indicating
G.R. No. 209287
legislative intent to fund the MVPSP.
Decision Date
The Court clarified that the specific
Feb 3, 2015 statutory definition of savings violated Section
The Araullo v. Aquino III case involves the challenge to 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Cross-border transfers of savings from the
Program (DAP) in the Philippines, with the Court ruling Executive to other branches of government are
that certain aspects of the DAP are unconstitutional, explicitly prohibited.
including the withdrawal of unobligated allotments and Unprogrammed funds could only be used if
cross-border transfers of savings, while also applying the actual revenue collections exceeded the original
doctrine of operative fact to protect the validity of certain revenue targets, a condition that was not met.
projects and programs. The doctrine of operative fact was applied to
protect the validity of completed projects and
Facts: programs funded by the DAP, recognizing the
The case of Araullo v. Aquino III was decided on potential inequity and injustice of nullifying these
February 3, 2015. projects.
Petitioners, including Maria Carolina P. Araullo, This doctrine did not extend to the officials
Judy M. Taguiwalo, and Henri Kahn, challenged responsible for the DAP, who could still be held
the constitutionality of the Disbursement accountable in proper tribunals
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was implemented by President Benigno Case Summary (G.R. No. 209287)
Simeon C. Aquino III, Executive Secretary Paquito Summary of the Araullo v. Aquino III Case
N. Ochoa, Jr., and Budget Secretary Florencio B. The case involves the challenge to the
Abad. constitutionality of the Disbursement
The DAP aimed to accelerate government Acceleration Program (DAP) in the Philippines.
spending to stimulate economic growth. The Court ruled that certain aspects of the DAP
Petitioners argued that aspects of the DAP, such are unconstitutional, including the withdrawal of
as the withdrawal of unobligated allotments and unobligated allotments and cross-border
cross-border transfers of savings, violated the transfers of savings.
1987 Philippine Constitution. The Court applied the doctrine of operative fact
The Supreme Court initially ruled on July 1, 2014, to protect the validity of certain projects and
that specific acts under the DAP were programs.
unconstitutional. The respondents filed a Motion for
Both respondents and petitioners filed motions Reconsideration, arguing that the Court
for reconsideration, leading to the February 3, mischaracterized the issues and unnecessarily
2015, resolution. constitutionalized the case.
Issue: The Court denied the motion, stating that the
1. Did the DAP violate the 1987 Philippine issues raised in the case are constitutional in
Constitution by allowing the withdrawal of nature and that the Court has the power of
unobligated allotments and cross-border judicial review.
transfers of savings? The Court clarified its ruling on the definition of
2. Can the President augment appropriations from savings, stating that unobligated allotments
savings that were not legitimately generated? cannot be declared as savings without first
3. Is the use of unprogrammed funds without determining if any of the three instances of
exceeding the original revenue targets savings exist.
constitutional? The Court also clarified that cross-border
4. Does the doctrine of operative fact apply to the transfers of savings are unconstitutional.
DAP and its implementors? The Court further clarified that unprogrammed
Ruling: funds can only be released if the total revenues
1. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier decision exceed the target.
that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments The Court addressed the respondents' argument
and cross-border transfers of savings under the that the presumption of good faith was violated,
DAP were unconstitutional. stating that the presumption of good faith still
2. The Court clarified that augmentation from stands and that the doctrine of operative fact
savings is only valid if the savings were does not apply to the authors, proponents, and
legitimately generated, which was not the case implementors of the DAP unless there are
for many DAP-funded projects. concrete findings of good faith in their favor.
3. The use of unprogrammed funds without The Court upheld the efficacy of the DAP-funded
exceeding the original revenue targets was projects under the doctrine of operative fact.
declared void and illegal. Background of the Araullo v. Aquino III Case
4. The doctrine of operative fact applies to the DAP- The case involves the Disbursement Acceleration
funded projects that can no longer be undone but Program (DAP) in the Philippines, which was
does not apply to the authors, proponents, and declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
implementors of the DAP unless there are
The Court ruled that the DAP violated the
concrete findings of good faith by the proper
principle of separation of powers and the
tribunals.
prohibition against the transfer and
Ratio:
augmentation of funds under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court's decision was based on The DAP allowed the transfer of appropriations
several constitutional principles and legal
from one branch of government to another, used
interpretations.
funds that were not savings, and funded projects
The power to augment appropriations is strictly that were not included in the General
limited by the Constitution to savings that are Appropriations Acts.
legitimately generated. Application of the Doctrine of Operative Fact
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments and The Court discussed the doctrine of operative
their reallocation as savings without fulfilling the fact, which allows the effects of an
unconstitutional law or act to remain in place if civil, and administrative liability.
nullifying them would result in inequity and The operative fact doctrine recognizes that acts
injustice. done in good faith and in reliance on an
The Court applied this doctrine to the DAP- unconstitutional law prior to its invalidity are
funded projects, recognizing the impact on the effective and cannot be undone.
beneficiaries and the country as a whole if the However, this doctrine does not apply to the
projects were nullified. authors, proponents, and implementors of the
However, the Court clarified that the doctrine unconstitutional DAP, as they did not rely on its
does not validate or constitutionalize an validity.
unconstitutional law. The Court clarified that it does not have
Court's Decision on the Motion for Reconsideration jurisdiction to determine criminal, civil, or
The Court partially granted the motion for administrative liability, and any ruling on good
reconsideration filed by the respondents, but faith or bad faith is only for the purpose of the
denied the motion for partial reconsideration filed constitutional issue before the Court.
by the petitioners. Conclusion of the Case
The Court modified its previous decision to The Court found that the DAP was
declare certain acts and practices under the DAP unconstitutional and illegal for violating the
unconstitutional, including the withdrawal of Constitution and the doctrine of separation of
unobligated allotments and the cross-border powers.
transfers of savings. The Court applied the operative fact doctrine to
The Court also declared void the use of the projects, works, and programs funded by the
unprogrammed funds without exceeding the DAP, as they were undertaken in good faith and
original revenue targets. cannot be undone.
Justices' Opinions and Clarifications The doctrine does not apply to the authors,
The Chief Justice and several Justices concurred proponents, and implementors of the DAP, as
with the decision, while one Justice filed a they did not rely on its validity.
separate opinion and another Justice took no The Court recommended that the Commission
part in the case. on Audit conduct an audit of the projects funded
The Court upheld its exercise of judicial review in by the DAP.
the case, stating that it had the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion had
been committed by the government.
The Court clarified that its interpretation of the
Constitution and the laws governing the national
budget was necessary in resolving the case.
Details of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP)
The DAP was a budgetary program implemented
by the Executive Department in the Philippines.
It allowed the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments from implementing agencies and the
cross-border transfer of savings to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the
Executive.
Arguments and Rulings on Constitutionality and
Augmentation
The petitioners argued that the augmentations
made under the DAP were unconstitutional and
illegal because they exceeded the maximum
amount recommended by the President in the
proposed budget and because they augmented
items that were not deficient.
The Court found this argument unavailing, as
there is no limit set in the Constitution on the
power to augment, and the magnitude of the
augmentations is not a ground to declare them
unconstitutional.
The burden of proof is on the challengers to
show that the augmentations were done with
grave abuse of discretion, such as to defeat the
legislative will or without a real deficiency in the
original appropriation.
The Court also addressed the issue of whether
the President has the power to discontinue slow-
moving projects, and found that the President
does have this power under certain provisions.
The Court found that the DAP program led to
economic growth and there is no proof to the
contrary.
Clarifications on the Operative Fact Doctrine and
Liability
The Court discussed the distinction between the
operative fact doctrine and the issue of criminal,
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants from holding any
other office or employment during their tenure.
This prohibition is absolute and covers both public
and private offices or employment.
The Court noted that the practice of holding
multiple offices became prevalent during the
Marcos regime, leading to abuses and self-
enrichment by public officials.
The 1987 Constitution sought to remedy these
abuses by imposing stricter prohibitions on high-
ranking officials.
The Court clarified that the prohibition does not
apply to ex-officio positions held without
additional compensation, as these are
considered part of the primary functions of the
Title officials' offices.
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary The Court concluded that Executive Order No.
Case 284, by allowing multiple positions, directly
G.R. No. 83896 contravened the express mandate of Section 13,
Decision Date Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Feb 22, 1991 Consequently, the Court ordered the respondents
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners in Civil to relinquish their additional positions and
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, declaring Executive declared Executive Order No. 284 null and void.
Order No. 284 unconstitutional and clarifying that Cabinet
members can hold additional positions in an ex-officio Case Summary (G.R. No. 83896)
capacity or positions necessary for their primary functions, Case Background and Petitioners' Argument
but not unrelated positions.
The case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Facts:
Secretary involves the constitutionality of
The case involves two consolidated petitions (G.R. Executive Order No. 284.
Nos. 83896 and 83815) filed by the Civil Liberties
Executive Order No. 284 allows members of the
Union and the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines,
Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant
Inc., along with Crispin T. Reyes.
secretaries to hold additional government
The petitions are against the Executive Secretary
positions in addition to their primary positions.
and several Cabinet members.
The challenge is against the constitutionality of The petitioners argue that this executive order
Executive Order No. 284, issued by President
violates Section 13, Article VII of the Philippine
Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Constitution, which prohibits Cabinet members
Executive Order No. 284 allowed Cabinet members, from holding any other office or employment
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and other during their tenure.
appointive officials of the Executive Department to Supreme Court Ruling and Explanation
hold up to two additional positions in the The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
government and government corporations, with petitioners and declared Executive Order No. 284
corresponding compensation. unconstitutional.
Petitioners argued that this Executive Order violated The Court clarified that Cabinet members can
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. hold additional positions in an ex-officio capacity
Section 13, Article VII prohibits the President, Vice- or positions necessary for their primary functions,
President, members of the Cabinet, and their but they cannot hold unrelated positions.
deputies or assistants from holding any other office The prohibition in Section 13, Article VII applies
or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise specifically to the President, Vice-President,
provided in the Constitution. Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
Petitioners sought a declaration of the assistants.
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 and Intent of the Framers of the Constitution
the issuance of writs of prohibition and mandamus. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was
The case was decided by the Supreme Court of the to prevent abuses and conflicts of interest that
Philippines on February 22, 1991, with Chief Justice may arise from public officials holding multiple
Fernan as the ponente.
offices.
Issue:
The practice of designating Cabinet members to
1. Does Executive Order No. 284, which allows Cabinet
head or sit as members of various government
members and other high-ranking officials to hold
agencies and corporations became prevalent
additional positions in the government, violate
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution? during the martial law regime of former President
2. Can the exceptions provided under Section 7, Ferdinand Marcos, leading to abuses and self-
paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution enrichment by unscrupulous officials.
be applied to the prohibition under Section 13, Ex-Officio Positions and Related Duties
Article VII? The prohibition in Section 13, Article VII does not
Ruling: cover ex-officio positions held without additional
1. The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. compensation and required by the primary
284 is unconstitutional. functions of the official's office.
2. The Court held that the exceptions under Section 7, Ex-officio positions are derived from the official's
paragraph (2), Article IX-B do not apply to the title or office and performed as a consequence of
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII. that office.
Ratio:
Additional duties and functions imposed on
The Supreme Court emphasized the framers' Cabinet members must be related to their
intention to impose a stricter prohibition on the
primary functions and should not result in the MVPSP's implementation using 2014 GAA
conflicts or inconsistencies. funds.
Practical Concerns and Efficient Government Issue:
Functioning 1. Did the 2014 GAA include an appropriation for the
The Court acknowledged the practical concerns implementation of the MVPSP?
raised by the respondents regarding the 2. Was the use of the appropriation under the 2014
GAA for the implementation of the MVPSP
operations of the government if a strict
constitutional?
application of the prohibition is followed.
Ruling:
However, the Court emphasized that the
1. The Court ruled that the 2014 GAA did include an
concentration of attention, knowledge, and
appropriation for the MVPSP.
expertise of Cabinet members in their primary 2. The Court declared that the use of the appropriation
positions is crucial for the efficient and effective under the 2014 GAA for the implementation of the
functioning of the government. MVPSP was constitutional.
Conclusion and Qualification Ratio:
The Court granted the petitions and declared The Court's decision was based on the principle of
Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional. stare decisis, referencing its earlier ruling in
Any per diem, allowances, or other emoluments Jacomille v. Abaya.
received by the respondents for actual services The 2014 GAA contained an appropriation for the
rendered in the questioned positions may be MVPSP, which "cured" any defects in the
retained by them. procurement process.
The doctrine of stare decisis was applied to ensure
consistency and stability in judicial decisions.
The appropriation for Motor Vehicle Registration
and Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services in the
2014 GAA naturally included the MVPSP, as plate-
making is integral to the registration process.
Title The increase in the LTO's 2014 budget to cover the
Dela Cruz vs. Ochoa, Jr. MVPSP was discussed and approved during budget
Case hearings in Congress, indicating legislative intent to
G.R. No. 219683 fund the MVPSP.
Decision Date The Court clarified that the specific appropriations
Jan 23, 2018 of money were detailed in the FY 2014 Budget,
The case involves the constitutionality of the Motor Vehicle providing the necessary specificity for a valid line-
License Plate Standardization Program in the Philippines, item appropriation that the President could veto.
with the Court ruling that the appropriation for the program The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and
was valid and constitutional, and that no unconstitutional prohibition, declaring the use of the appropriation
transfer of funds took place. under the 2014 GAA for the MVPSP as
constitutional.
Facts: The temporary restraining order issued on June 14,
The case "Dela Cruz v. Ochoa, Jr." (G.R. No. 219683) 2016, was lifted.
was decided on January 23, 2018, by the Philippine
Supreme Court En Banc. Case Summary (G.R. No. 219683)
Petitioners: Hon. Jonathan A. Dela Cruz and Hon. Case Background and Petitioners
Gustavo S. Tambunting, Members of the House of The case involves the constitutionality of the
Representatives and taxpayers. implementation of the Motor Vehicle License Plate
Respondents: Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa Jr., Executive Standardization Program (MVPSP) in the
Secretary; Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Secretary Philippines.
of the DOTC; Hon. Florencio B. Abad, Secretary of The petitioners are members of the House of
the DBM; and Hon. Rosalia V. De Leon, National Representatives and taxpayers.
Treasurer. They argue that the program was funded through
Petitioners challenged the implementation of the an unconstitutional transfer of funds and
Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization undermined the President's veto power.
Program (MVPSP) by the LTO using funds from the Previous Ruling in Jacomille v. Ochoa Jr.
2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA). The case originated from a previous ruling in
The case followed Jacomille v. Abaya, where the Jacomille v. Ochoa Jr., which challenged the legality
Court dismissed the petition due to the 2014 GAA's of the procurement for the MVPSP.
appropriation for the MVPSP, rendering it moot. The Court dismissed Jacomille's petition as moot
Petitioners argued the transfer of funds for the and academic due to the appropriation of funds for
MVPSP was unconstitutional and deprived the the project.
President of veto powers. The Court stated that Congress had appropriated
The DOTC, through the LTO, initiated the MVPSP to the full budget for the MVPSP, and therefore, it
supply new standardized license plates, starting the could not question the wisdom of the legislative
procurement process on February 20, 2013. department in appropriating the funds.
The project faced delays and irregularities, including Implementation of the MVPSP
inadequate budgetary appropriations in the 2013 The Department of Transportation and
GAA and lack of required Multi-Year Obligational Communications (DOTC) is responsible for
Authority (MYOA) from the DBM. implementing the MVPSP.
The project was eventually funded under the 2014 The MVPSP aims to supply new standardized
GAA. license plates for motor vehicles.
The Commission on Audit (COA) issued several The Land Transportation Office (LTO), a line agency
Audit Observation Memoranda and a Notice of of the DOTC, is tasked with registering motor
Disallowance, citing irregularities. vehicles and issuing license plates.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari The MVPSP was formulated to address issues such
and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of as the proliferation of dilapidated and illegible
license plates and the difficulty in identifying The Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of Neri,
counterfeit plates. upholding the claim of executive privilege and finding the
Unconstitutionality of the Appropriation for the MVPSP Senate Committees to have committed grave abuse of
The petitioners argue that the appropriation for the discretion.
MVPSP under the Motor Vehicle Registration and The Senate Committees filed a motion for reconsideration,
which is the subject of the resolution dated September 4,
Driver's Licensing Regulatory Services in the
2008.
General Appropriations Act (GAA) was
Issue:
unconstitutional. 1. Whether there is a recognized presumptive presidential
They claim that the MVPSP did not appear as a communications privilege in the Philippine legal system.
specific item in the 2014 National Expenditure 2. Whether the communications elicited by the three
Program (NEP), and therefore, it constituted a lump- questions are covered by executive privilege.
sum appropriation that undermined the President's 3. Whether the Senate Committees have shown that the
veto power. communications elicited by the three questions are
critical to the exercise of their functions.
Court's Rejection of the Petitioners' Arguments
4. Whether the Senate Committees committed grave abuse
The Court rejects the petitioners' arguments and of discretion in issuing the contempt order.
affirms that there was a valid appropriation for the Ruling:
MVPSP under the GAA. 1. The Supreme Court affirmed that there is a recognized
It explains that the appropriation for motor vehicle presumptive presidential communications privilege in the
registration naturally included plate-making, as Philippine legal system.
plate-making was an integral component of the 2. The Court held that the communications elicited by the
three questions are covered by executive privilege.
registration process.
3. The Court found that the Senate Committees failed to
The Court also notes that the increase in the LTO's show that the communications elicited by the three
2014 budget, which covered the MVPSP, was questions are critical to the exercise of their functions.
approved by Congress. 4. The Court ruled that the Senate Committees committed
Therefore, the Court concludes that the MVPSP was grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order
properly funded and implemented. against Neri.
Application of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis Ratio:
1. Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege:
The Court emphasizes the doctrine of stare decisis,
which means that once the Court has laid down a The Court recognized that presidential
principle of law, it should adhere to that principle in communications are presumptively privileged,
future cases with substantially similar facts. citing previous cases such as Almonte v.
Vasquez and Chavez v. PEA.
The Court applies this doctrine to the present case, as
the legality of the MVPSP had already been settled in a
This privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and is rooted in the separation of
previous ruling.
powers under the Constitution.
Conclusion and Decision
The presumption is not absolute and can be
The Court dismisses the petition and declares the use
overturned by a compelling need for disclosure.
of the appropriation for the MVPSP as constitutional.
2. Coverage of Executive Privilege:
The temporary restraining order that had been issued The Court held that the communications
to halt the release and distribution of license plates is between Neri and President Arroyo are covered
lifted by executive privilege.
The privilege applies to communications that
Title relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers power of the President, are received by a close
and Investigations advisor, and where there is no compelling need
Case for disclosure shown by the Senate Committees.
G.R. No. 180643
The privilege is meant to protect candid and
Decision Date
objective discussions necessary for presidential
Sep 4, 2008
decision-making.
The case of Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
3. Critical Need for Information:
Officers and Investigations involves a dispute over the invocation of
executive privilege by the President to prevent the disclosure of The Court found that the Senate Committees
certain information during a legislative inquiry, ultimately resulting failed to demonstrate a compelling need for the
in the Supreme Court ruling in favor of the President's claim of information covered by the executive privilege.
executive privilege and finding the Senate Committees to have The Senate could still legislate on the NBN
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a contempt order project without the specific details of the
against Neri. The case delves into the complexities of executive privileged communications.
privilege, the balancing of public interests, and the interpretation of The Senate Committees had other sources of
the Senate's rule-making power, with a focus on the specific details information and witnesses to rely on for their
of the NBN-ZTE broadband deal and the communication between investigation.
Neri and the President. 4. Grave Abuse of Discretion:
The Court ruled that the Senate Committees
Facts: committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Romulo L. Neri, then Chairman of the National Economic the contempt order against Neri.
and Development Authority (NEDA), was involved in a The Court highlighted several procedural lapses,
dispute with the Senate Committees on Accountability of including the failure to provide Neri with an
Public Officers and Investigations, Trade and Commerce, advance list of questions and the lack of a
and National Defense and Security. majority vote in the Senate Committees'
The conflict arose from Neri's refusal to answer questions decision to cite Neri for contempt.
during a Senate inquiry into the National Broadband The Senate Committees acted arbitrarily and
Network (NBN) project awarded to Zhong Xing precipitately in issuing the contempt order
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). without adequately addressing Neri's claim of
Neri invoked executive privilege, claiming the information executive privilege.
sought was confidential communications between him
and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Case Summary (G.R. No. 180643)
The Senate Committees issued a contempt order against Case Background and Facts
Neri for his refusal to answer, leading to his arrest and The case revolves around the invocation of executive
detention. privilege by the President to prevent the disclosure of
Neri filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, certain information during a legislative inquiry.
challenging the Senate's contempt order. The National Broadband Project (NBN Project) is at the
center of the case, a project awarded by the Department Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and
of Transportation and Communications to Zhong Xing Arthur C. Yap as acting secretaries.
Telecommunications Equipment. The appointments were made while Congress was in
Petitioner Romulo Neri disclosed during a Senate hearing session, and the Commission on Appointments was
that he was offered a bribe in exchange for his approval constituted on August 25, 2004.
of the NBN Project.
Respondents took their oath of office and assumed
Neri refused to answer questions regarding the their duties as acting secretaries.
President's involvement, invoking executive privilege.
On September 23, 2004, President Arroyo issued ad
Court's Ruling on Executive Privilege
interim appointments to the respondents as
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the President's claim
secretaries of their respective departments.
of executive privilege.
Petitioners argued that these appointments were
The Court found that the communications elicited by the
unconstitutional as they were made without the
questions were covered by executive privilege, as they
consent of the Commission on Appointments while
related to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
Congress was in session.
President and were received by a close advisor of the
President. Issue:
The Court also found that the respondent Committees Is the appointment of respondents as acting
failed to show a compelling need for the information that secretaries by President Arroyo without the consent of
would justify the limitation of the privilege. the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
Importance of Executive Privilege session constitutional?
The Court emphasized that executive privilege exists to Ruling:
protect public interest and ensure candid and objective The Supreme Court ruled that the petition has no merit
communication between the President and his/her and dismissed the petition for certiorari and
advisors. prohibition.
It recognized the importance of confidentiality in matters Ratio:
involving foreign negotiations and the potential impact on The Court held that the power to appoint is essentially
diplomatic and economic relations. executive in nature, and the legislature may not
The Court highlighted the need to balance the public's interfere with the exercise of this executive power
right to information and the President's need for except in instances where the Constitution expressly
confidentiality in the exercise of her functions. allows it.
Role of Congress and Limitations on Investigative Limitations on the executive power to appoint are
Powers
construed strictly against the legislature.
The Court rejected the argument that the information
The Commission on Appointments, although
sought by the respondent Committees was critical to their
composed of members of Congress, exercises
legislative functions.
executive powers when it gives or withholds consent
It emphasized that the role of Congress is to make laws,
to presidential appointments.
not to determine guilt or investigate wrongdoing.
The Court addressed the issue of mootness, stating
The Court stated that investigations conducted solely to
that the question of the constitutionality of the
gather incriminatory evidence are indefensible and that
President's appointment of department secretaries in
Congress cannot supplant the executive or judicial
an acting capacity while Congress is in session is
branches in their respective roles.
Conclusion
capable of repetition yet evading review, thus
warranting resolution.
The Court upheld the President's claim of executive
privilege and found the respondent Committees to have Regarding the petitioners' standing, the Court found
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the that only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-
contempt order against Neri. Estrada, and Osmeña, who were members of the
The Court emphasized the importance of executive Commission on Appointments, had standing to file the
privilege, the need to balance public interests, and the petition. The other petitioners, who were not members
limitations on Congress's investigative powers. of the Commission, did not have standing.
On the constitutionality of the appointments, the Court
ruled that the President can issue appointments in an
acting capacity to department secretaries without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments even
Title
while Congress is in session.
Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita
Case The Court cited Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
G.R. No. 164978 Constitution and Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III
Decision Date of Executive Order No. 292, which allows the President
Oct 13, 2005 to temporarily designate an officer already in the
A group of senators filed a petition to declare unconstitutional government service or any other competent person to
the appointments made by President Arroyo without the perform the functions of an office in the executive
consent of the Commission on Appointments, but the Supreme branch.
Court ruled that the appointments were constitutional, stating Acting appointments are temporary and cannot
that the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature and exceed one year, thus preventing abuse.
the legislature cannot interfere except in instances when The Court found no abuse in the present case as
limitations on the executive power to appoint are strictly President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
construed against the legislature. the respondents immediately upon the recess of
Congress.
Facts:
In "Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita," G.R. No. 164978, decided Case Summary (G.R. No. 164978)
on October 13, 2005, a group of senators filed a Case Background and Appointments Made
petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the case of Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, a group of
Petitioners included Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Edgardo senators filed a petition to declare unconstitutional the
J. Angara, Juan Ponce Enrile, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, appointments made by President Arroyo without the
Jinggoy E. Estrada, Panfilo M. Lacson, Alfredo S. Lim, consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Jamby A.S. Madrigal, and Sergio R. Osmeña III. The appointments were made to Florencio B. Abad,
They sought to declare unconstitutional the Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H.
appointments made by President Gloria Macapagal- Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene
Arroyo through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita. C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap as acting secretaries of
Appointments were made to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino their respective departments.
J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, The appointments were made between August 15,
2004, and August 23, 2004. as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on
Argument of the Petitioners Good Government (PCGG) on October 30, 1998, and
The petitioners argued that the appointments were later as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC).
unconstitutional because they were made without Petitioners' Argument: Elma's concurrent
the consent of the Commission on Appointments appointments violated Section 7, paragraph 2,
while Congress was in session. Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution due to the
They contended that only undersecretaries could be incompatibility of the offices.
designated as acting secretaries in case of a Duties of CPLC: Include giving independent and
vacancy in the office of a secretary. impartial legal advice and reviewing investigations
They claimed that appointments, whether regular or involving heads of executive departments, including
acting, to a vacant position of an office needing the PCGG Chairman.
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, Lower Court Ruling: In favor of the petitioners,
could not be made while Congress was in session declaring the concurrent appointments
without first obtaining its consent. unconstitutional.
Supreme Court's Ruling on Constitutionality Respondent's Action: Elma sought reconsideration
The Supreme Court ruled that the appointments and clarification of the decision and elevation of the
were constitutional. case to the Court en banc through an Omnibus
The Court held that the power to appoint is Motion dated August 14, 2006.
essentially executive in nature and cannot be Solicitor General's Action: Filed a similar Omnibus
interfered with by the legislature, except in Motion on behalf of the respondents on August 11,
instances when the limitations on the executive 2006.
power to appoint are strictly construed against the Issue:
legislature. 1. Are the concurrent appointments of Magdangal B.
The Court stated that the scope of the legislature's Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC unconstitutional
interference in the executive's power to appoint is due to the incompatibility of the offices?
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications 2. Does the ruling render both appointments void?
to an appointive office. 3. Should the case be elevated to the Court en banc
The Court emphasized that Congress cannot for resolution?
appoint a person to an office in the guise of Ruling:
prescribing qualifications to that office, nor can it 1. Unconstitutionality: Yes, the concurrent
impose on the President the duty to appoint any appointments of Magdangal B. Elma as PCGG
particular person to an office. Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional due to the
Standing of the Petitioners incompatibility of the offices.
The Court addressed the issue of standing, stating 2. Effect on Appointments: No, the ruling does not
that only the members of the Commission on render both appointments void. Instead, Elma had
Appointments who were petitioners in the case had effectively vacated his first office as PCGG
standing. Chairman when he accepted the second office as
The prerogatives of the members of the CPLC.
Commission on Appointments were impaired by the 3. Elevation to Court en banc: No, the case should not
President's appointments, giving them standing in be elevated to the Court en banc as it does not
the case. involve the constitutionality of any treaty, law, or
agreement, but merely the application of
The other petitioners, who were members of
constitutional provisions.
Congress but not members of the Commission on
Ratio:
Appointments, did not have standing in the case.
Conclusion and Dismissal of the Petition Constitutional Violation: The Supreme Court ruled
that the concurrent appointments of Magdangal B.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling
Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were
that the appointments made by President Arroyo
unconstitutional because they violated Section 7,
without the consent of the Commission on
paragraph 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
Appointments were constitutional.
which prohibits holding incompatible offices.
The Court held that the President has the power to
appoint acting secretaries even while Congress is in
Conflict of Interest: The duties of the CPLC include
providing independent and impartial legal advice
session.
and reviewing investigations involving heads of
Congress cannot interfere with the executive's
executive departments, including the PCGG
power to appoint, except in prescribing
Chairman, creating a conflict of interest and making
qualifications to an appointive office.
the offices incompatible.
Section 13, Article VII: This section, which restricts
the holding of multiple offices, did not apply in this
case as neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is
Title
a secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Public Interest Center, Inc. vs. Elma
Primary Functions: Even if Section 13, Article VII did
Case
apply, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman
G.R. No. 138965
do not require the appointment as CPLC, and the
Decision Date
waiver of remuneration for the second appointment
Mar 5, 2007
does not cure the defect of incompatibility.
The court declares the concurrent appointments of Elma as
PCGG Chairman and CPLC as unconstitutional due to being
Vacating Office: Elma's acceptance of the second
office as CPLC effectively vacated his first office as
incompatible offices, but the ruling does not render both
PCGG Chairman, following the common-law rule on
appointments void.
incompatibility of offices.
Facts: Motion Denied: The Court denied the respondents'
motion for reconsideration and for elevation of the
Petitioners: Public Interest Center, Inc., Laureano T.
case to the Court en banc, stating that the case did
Angeles, and Jocelyn P. Celestino.
not involve the constitutionality of any treaty, law, or
Respondents: Magdangal B. Elma and Ronaldo
agreement, and thus did not require en banc
Zamora.
consideration.
Appointments: Magdangal B. Elma was appointed
No Modification: The decision did not modify the
ruling in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
and Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 specifies that Title
the Court en banc is not an appellate court for Career Executive Service Board vs. Commission on
decisions or resolutions of a Division Audit
Case
Background and Appointments G.R. No. 212348
The case involves the concurrent appointments of Decision Date
Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman of the Presidential Jun 19, 2018
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and The court rules that the Commission on Audit did not
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC).
commit grave abuse of discretion in disallowing
Elma was appointed as PCGG Chairman on October monetary benefits granted by the Career Executive
30, 1998, and later accepted the appointment as
Service Board, but officials and employees are not
CPLC.
required to refund the amounts due to their good faith.
Elma waived any remuneration for the second Facts:
appointment.
The case "Career Executive Service Board v.
Unconstitutionality of Concurrent Appointments
Commission on Audit" (G.R. No. 212348) was
The Court declared that the concurrent
decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines
appointments of Elma as PCGG Chairman and
on June 19, 2018.
CPLC were unconstitutional.
The Court ruled that this violated Section 7, par. 2, The petitioner, Career Executive Service Board
Article IX-B of the Constitution. (CESB), was represented by Executive Director
Maria Anthonette Velasco-Allones.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution did not apply in this case, as Respondents included the Commission on Audit
neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a (COA), the Audit Team Leader of CESB, and the
secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Supervising Auditor of the National Government
However, if the rule under Section 13, Article VII Sector.
were applicable, the incompatibility of these two The dispute arose from COA Decision No. 2010-
offices would be even more evident. 121, which upheld a Notice of Disallowance (ND)
Section 13, Article VII allows for the concurrent regarding payments made to CESB officials and
holding of positions only when the second post is employees for Calendar Years 2002 and 2003.
required by the primary functions of the first Payments were made under a Collective
appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio Negotiation Agreement (CNA) with the employee
capacity. organization Samahan ng Kawaning Nagkakaisa
In this case, the primary functions of the PCGG sa Diwa, Gawa at Nilalayon (SANDIGAN).
Chairman do not require the appointment as CPLC. The questioned benefits included fringe benefits,
Effect on Appointments rice subsidy allowances, birthday cash gifts,
The Court ruled that Elma's concurrent Christmas groceries, loyalty awards, retirement
appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were benefits, and funeral assistance.
unconstitutional.
An Audit Observation Memorandum raised
However, this did not render both appointments concerns about the legality of these payments,
void.
leading to ND No. 2004-67, which claimed the
According to the common-law rule on payments lacked legal authority.
incompatibility of offices, Elma effectively vacated
CESB's appeals against the disallowance were
his first office as PCGG Chairman when he
unsuccessful, resulting in COA's affirmation of
accepted the second office as CPLC.
the decision.
Motion for Reconsideration and Referral to Court En
Banc
Issue:
The Court denied the respondents' motion for Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in
reconsideration, as no substantial arguments were affirming the disallowance of the monetary
presented that had not already been addressed. benefits granted by the CESB?
The Court also rejected the respondents' motion to Did the COA err in ordering the refund of the
refer the case to the Court en banc. amounts received by the CESB employees?
The issue at hand was the constitutionality of Ruling:
Elma's concurrent appointments, not the The Supreme Court ruled that the COA did not
constitutionality of any treaty, law, or agreement. commit grave abuse of discretion in disallowing
The mere application of constitutional provisions the monetary benefits granted by the CESB.
does not require the case to be heard and decided The Court modified the COA's decision, stating
en banc. that CESB officials and employees who received
The decision in this case does not modify the ruling the disallowed benefits were not required to
in another case. refund the amounts due to their good faith.
The Court en banc is not an appellate court to Ratio:
which decisions or resolutions of a division may be The Court emphasized the COA's role as the
appealed. guardian of public funds, as established by the
Conclusion 1987 Constitution.
The Court declared the concurrent appointments of The COA acted within its constitutional mandate
Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC as to prevent irregular and unauthorized
unconstitutional due to being incompatible offices. government expenditures.
The Court denied the respondents' motion for The CESB's argument that the benefits were
reconsideration and for elevation of the case to the
justified by savings and authorized by the
Court en banc.
Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
was rejected.
The Court noted that the DBM lacked authority to
determine benefits under the CNA, and CESB had
no legal authority to use its savings for such Therefore, the Court declared that the CESB
payments. officials and employees are not required to
Benefits provided were not subject to negotiation refund the disallowed amounts due to their good
under existing laws. faith.
The Court acknowledged the good faith of CESB Conclusion
officials and employees, asserting they acted The Supreme Court upheld the disallowance of
under the honest belief that the payments were the monetary benefits granted by the CESB.
lawful. However, the officials and employees of CESB
This good faith was deemed sufficient to absolve are exempted from refunding the amounts due to
them from any obligation to refund the their good faith.
disallowed amounts, aligning with previous
jurisprudence emphasizing fairness in public
service.
Title
Lagman vs. Pimentel III
Case Background and Disallowed Monetary Benefits
Case
The case involves the disallowance of monetary G.R. No. 235935
benefits granted by the Career Executive Service Decision Date
Board (CESB) to its officials and employees. Feb 6, 2018
The Court upholds the constitutionality of the extension of martial law
The CESB granted various monetary benefits in in Mindanao, citing an ongoing rebellion and the President's discretion,
2002 and 2003 based on a Collective Negotiation while emphasizing the Congress' authority to extend martial law if
Agreement (CNA) with the Samahan ng public safety requires it.
Kawaning Nagkakaisa sa Diwa, Gawa at
Facts:
Nilalayon (SANDIGAN), an organization of its
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
employees. Proclamation No. 216, declaring martial law and suspending
The benefits included fringe benefits, rice the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao due to
subsidy allowance, birthday cash gift, Christmas the rebellion by the Maute Group and other rebel factions.
grocery, loyalty award, retirement benefits, and The initial proclamation was for 60 days, and Congress
supported it after the President's report.
funeral assistance.
Notice of Disallowance by the Commission on Audit The Supreme Court upheld the proclamation's
constitutionality in Lagman v. Medialdea.
(COA)
On July 22, 2017, Congress extended martial law until
The Commission on Audit (COA) issued a Notice December 31, 2017.
of Disallowance (ND) stating that the payment of Despite the liberation of Marawi City on October 17, 2017, the
these monetary benefits had no legal support. President requested another extension on December 8, 2017,
The COA argued that the benefits were not citing ongoing threats from various rebel groups.
allowed under existing laws and regulations and Congress, in a joint session on December 13, 2017, adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, extending martial law in
were not negotiable under the CNA.
Mindanao for another year, from January 1 to December 31,
The COA also found that the CESB did not have 2018.
the legal authority to use its savings for the Several petitioners challenged this decision, leading to
payment of these benefits. consolidated cases before the Supreme Court.
Appeal and Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition Issue:
1. Does the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao justify the
The CESB appealed the COA's decision, but the extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
COA affirmed the disallowance of the monetary of the writ of habeas corpus?
benefits. 2. Does public safety require the extension of martial law in
Mindanao?
The CESB then filed a petition for certiorari and
3. Is the inclusion of the New People's Army (NPA) rebellion as
prohibition before the Supreme Court, arguing a basis for the extension valid?
that the COA committed grave abuse of 4. Is the one-year period of extension reasonable and justified?
discretion in affirming the disallowance and Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that there is sufficient factual basis
ordering the refund of the amounts received by
for the extension of martial law in Mindanao, as the rebellion
the CESB employees. persists.
Supreme Court Decision and Legal Grounds 2. The Court found that public safety requires the extension of
The Supreme Court upheld the COA's martial law in Mindanao.
3. The inclusion of the NPA rebellion as a basis for the
disallowance of the monetary benefits, stating
extension is valid.
that it was based on cogent legal grounds. 4. The one-year period of extension is reasonable and justified.
The Court emphasized that the COA has the Ratio:
power to determine and disallow irregular, The Court emphasized that the persistence of rebellion by
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or various groups, including the Maute Group, the Bangsamoro
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group
unconscionable expenditures of government
(ASG), justifies the extension of martial law.
funds.
The Court noted that these groups continue to recruit, train,
The CESB's argument that it had the authority to and plan attacks, posing a significant threat to public safety.
grant the benefits based on a Department of The inclusion of the NPA rebellion was deemed valid as it
Budget and Management (DBM) circular was intensified its activities, contributing to the overall threat in
rejected by the Court, as the DBM did not have Mindanao.
the authority to determine and authorize the The Court found the one-year extension reasonable, given the
complexity and scale of the threats, and the need for a
additional compensations agreed upon in the comprehensive approach to ensure public safety and order.
CNA. The Court underscored the importance of the President's
Recognition of Good Faith discretion and Congress' authority in determining the
The Court recognized the good faith of the CESB necessity and duration of martial law, provided there is
sufficient factual basis and adherence to constitutional
officials who authorized the payment of the
safeguards.
benefits and the employees who received them. Additional Facts:
The Court cited previous rulings that good faith The case involves the extension of martial law in Mindanao,
can be a valid defense for public officials and Philippines, initiated by President Rodrigo Duterte.
employees who received disallowed payments. On December 8, 2017, President Duterte requested Congress
to extend martial law and the suspension of the privilege of Court's Ruling
the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao for one year, from The court ruled that the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) must
January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2018. associate an act of rebellion with terrorism in order to involve
This request was based on letters from AFP Chief of Staff itself during a state of martial law.
General Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero and Secretary of National The court clarified that martial law does not automatically
Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana, citing ongoing threats from curtail civil liberties and individual freedom, as the
various terrorist groups, including remnants of the Maute Constitution provides safeguards to protect human rights.
Group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
The alleged human rights violations are deemed irrelevant in
determining the sufficiency of factual basis for extending
The President's letter highlighted the continued recruitment martial law.
and training activities of these groups, their financial and
logistical build-up, and their plans for future attacks.
The court held that the President cannot be sued during his
tenure due to presidential privilege of immunity from suit.
Congress, after a joint session and extensive debate,
The Congress was deemed an indispensable party to the
approved the extension through Resolution of Both Houses
case, and the court found that the failure to implead the entire
No. 4 on December 13, 2017.
Congress was a procedural misstep.
The petitioners challenged the extension, arguing that there
The court clarified that the doctrine of conclusiveness of
was no sufficient factual basis for it and that the extension
judgment does not bar the examination of the persistence of
violated constitutional limits on the duration of martial law.
rebellion in Mindanao.
Additional Issue:
1. Is there sufficient factual basis for the one-year extension of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Mindanao?
2. Did Congress act within its constitutional authority in
extending martial law for one year?
3. Does the extension of martial law violate the constitutional
mandate of a limited duration for such declarations? Title
Additional Ruling: Saint Wealth Ltd. vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue
The Supreme Court ruled that there was sufficient factual Case
basis for the extension of martial law in Mindanao.
G.R. No. 252965
The Court found that the threats from various terrorist groups,
Decision Date
including the Maute Group, BIFF, and ASG, justified the
extension. Dec 7, 2021
The Court held that Congress acted within its constitutional The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of tax
authority in extending martial law for one year. regulations and laws challenged by offshore-based
The Court determined that the extension did not violate the Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs), ruling
constitutional mandate of a limited duration for martial law that they do not violate the constitutional rights of the
declarations.
petitioners and are within the powers of the Bureau of
Additional Ratio:
Internal Revenue (BIR).
The Court's decision was based on the evidence presented by
the President and the AFP, which showed that the remnants
of terrorist groups continued to pose a significant threat to Facts:
public safety in Mindanao. The case involves consolidated petitions by Saint
The Court noted that the recruitment and training activities of Wealth Ltd. and other offshore-based Philippine
these groups, their financial and logistical build-up, and their
Offshore Gaming Operators (POGOs) against the
plans for future attacks justified the extension of martial law.
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
The Court emphasized that the Constitution grants Congress
the authority to determine the period of extension for martial Department of Finance (DOF).
law, and that Congress had acted within this authority in Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of
approving the one-year extension. Section 11 (f) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
The Court further held that the extension did not violate the 11494, also known as the Bayanihan to Recover
constitutional mandate of a limited duration for martial law
declarations, as the Constitution allows for extensions if the
as One Act (Bayanihan 2 Law).
conditions for martial law persist. They also contested Revenue Regulations (RR)
No. 30-2020, Revenue Memorandum Circular
Case Summary (G.R. No. 235935) (RMC) No. 64-2020, RMC No. 102-2017, and RMC
Background of the Case
No. 78-2018.
The case involves consolidated petitions challenging the
constitutionality of the extension of martial law and These regulations imposed various taxes on
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in POGOs, including a 5% franchise tax on gross
Mindanao, Philippines. gaming revenues and other taxes on non-gaming
The petitioners argue that there is insufficient factual basis operations.
for the extension and that the President should be held
Petitioners argued that these tax impositions
accountable for non-compliance with constitutional
requirements. violated their constitutional rights and were
The Court is asked to determine the scope and standards of beyond the powers of the BIR.
judicial review in this case. The Supreme Court decided the case on
Arguments of the Petitioners December 7, 2021, with Justice Gaerlan as the
The petitioners argue that there is no sufficient factual basis ponente.
for the extension of martial law in Mindanao.
Issue:
They claim that there is no actual rebellion in Mindanao and
1. Whether Section 11 (f) and (g) of the Bayanihan 2
that the President and Congress failed to provide clear
evidence to justify the extension. Law and the Assailed Tax Issuances are
Petitioners also raise concerns about human rights violations unconstitutional for being riders and violating the
and the suppression of civil liberties under martial law. "one subject, one title" rule.
Arguments of the Respondents 2. Whether the BIR's imposition of taxes on
The respondents argue that the extension of martial law is offshore-based POGO licensees violates the
necessary due to the ongoing rebellion in Mindanao and the
principles of territoriality and uniformity of
threat to public safety.
taxation.
They assert that the burden of proof lies with Congress and
that the extension enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. 3. Whether the BIR's revenue issuances have a
Issues to be Determined by the Court statutory basis and are within the scope of its
The Court must determine whether there is sufficient factual quasi-legislative powers.
basis for the extension of martial law in Mindanao. Ruling:
The Court must also determine whether the extension The Supreme Court granted the petitions.
violates the Constitution.
Section 11 (f) and (g) of the Bayanihan 2 Law, RR The case discusses the issue of whether
No. 30-2020, RMC No. 64-2020, RMC No. 102- offshore-based POGO licensees are considered
2017, and RMC No. 78-2018 were declared null to be "doing business" in the Philippines and
and void. subject to taxation.
The Court ruled that these provisions and Various tests are discussed, including the
issuances were unconstitutional and had no Substance Test, Contract Test, Intention Test,
statutory basis for imposing taxes on offshore- and Actual Performance Test.
based POGO licensees. The court concludes that offshore-based POGO
Ratio: licensees are not considered to be "doing
The Court found Section 11 (f) and (g) of the business" in the Philippines.
Bayanihan 2 Law unconstitutional for being riders, Limited presence in the Philippines and
as they introduced new tax measures not related transactions not performed within the country's
to the law's subject of providing COVID-19 relief. jurisdiction support this conclusion.
The Bayanihan 2 Law was intended as a Challenges of Taxing the Digital Economy
temporary relief measure, not a tax measure, and The court acknowledges the complexities
the imposition of new taxes was not brought about by the digital economy, particularly
contemplated by its title or purpose. in relation to online gaming and gambling.
The BIR's revenue issuances lacked statutory Revised tax treaties and laws are needed to
basis, as the PAGCOR Charter did not authorize address these challenges.
the imposition of taxes on offshore-based POGO Unconstitutionality of Section 11 (f) and (g) of the
licensees. Bayanihan 2 Law
The principle of territoriality in taxation was The court declares that these provisions are
violated, as the income-generating activities of unconstitutional for being riders.
offshore-based POGOs occurred outside the They go beyond the scope of the law's title and
Philippines. are not related to its purpose.
The BIR overstepped its quasi-legislative powers Conclusion and Validity of Tax Impositions
by issuing regulations that effectively amended Offshore-based POGO licensees are not subject
existing laws without congressional approval. to taxation in the Philippines.
Section 11 (f) and (g) of the Bayanihan 2 Law are
invalidated.
Case Summary (G.R. No. 252965) The validity of the imposition of a 5% franchise
Case Background and Petitions tax on POGO Licensees should be resolved in a
The case involves the constitutionality of tax separate case.
regulations and laws challenged by offshore-
based Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators
(POGOs). Title
Two petitions were filed by Saint Wealth Ltd. and Mohamed vs. Republic
other offshore-based POGO licensees. Case
The petitioners sought to annul and set aside G.R. No. 220674
various tax issuances, including Section 11 (f) Decision Date
and (g) of the Bayanihan 2 Law. Dec 2, 2021
The tax issuances imposed a 5% franchise tax on A Sudanese national's application for Philippine citizenship
is denied by the Supreme Court due to failure to comply with
the gross bets or turnovers earned by POGOs, as
filing period, lack of sufficient evidence, and void premature
well as income tax, value-added tax (VAT), and
administration of oath of allegiance.
other applicable taxes on income from non-
gaming operations.
Facts:
Constitutional Rights Violation Claims
Sefyan Abdelhakim Mohamed, a Sudanese national,
The petitioners argued that the tax regulations married Filipino citizen Lailanie N. Piano.
and laws violated their constitutional rights,
Arrived in Manila in 1991 and recognized as a
including the right to equal protection and due convention refugee in 2005.
process.
Works as a Public Relations Officer at the Qatar
They claimed that there was no reasonable Embassy with a monthly income of $800.
classification between offshore-based POGO Applied for Philippine citizenship on June 2, 2006,
licensees and Philippine-based entities. and filed a Declaration of Intention with the Office
They also argued that the tax impositions were of the Solicitor General (OSG).
arbitrary and confiscatory. Submitted a Supplemental Declaration of Intention
Supreme Court Decision on July 20, 2007, stating an additional name.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Bureau Filed a Petition for Naturalization before the
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and upheld the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch
constitutionality of the tax regulations and laws. 114, on August 21, 2007.
Offshore-based POGO licensees are not liable to RTC granted his application on October 7, 2009,
pay a 5% franchise tax for income derived from ruling he had all qualifications and no
their gaming operations. disqualifications for naturalization.
Offshore-based POGO licensees are not liable to Moved to take his oath as a Filipino citizen on
pay income tax, VAT, and other applicable taxes September 20, 2011; RTC granted this motion on
for income derived from their non-gaming September 24, 2012.
operations. Took his oath on October 24, 2012.
Section 11 (f) and (g) of the Bayanihan 2 Law are OSG appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), citing
unconstitutional for being riders, as they were not procedural and evidentiary deficiencies.
related to the purpose of the law. CA reversed the RTC's decision on February 25,
Clarification on Taxability of Offshore-based POGO 2015, dismissing Mohamed's petition for
Licensees naturalization without prejudice.
Mohamed sought reconsideration, which was The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision,
denied, leading to this petition before the Supreme emphasizing the importance of ensuring that only
Court. fully qualified individuals are granted Philippine
Issue: citizenship through naturalization.
1. Did Mohamed comply with the one-year period The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to
required for filing the Declaration of Intention before show strict compliance with the requirements of
the petition for naturalization? the law.
2. Did Mohamed provide sufficient evidence to prove Mohamed failed to comply with the one-year filing
his qualifications and absence of disqualifications requirement and introduced a substantial change in
for naturalization? his declaration of intention, affecting the
3. Was the administration of Mohamed's oath of government's ability to investigate his qualifications.
allegiance valid? Mohamed also failed to provide sufficient evidence
Ruling: of his qualifications and character, and his
1. No, Mohamed did not comply with the one-year witnesses' testimonies were general and lacked
period required for filing the Declaration of Intention personal knowledge.
before the petition for naturalization. His premature oath of allegiance was rendered void.
2. No, Mohamed did not provide sufficient evidence to Clarification on the 1951 Refugee Convention
prove his qualifications and absence of
The Court clarified that the 1951 Refugee
disqualifications for naturalization.
Convention, to which the Philippines is a signatory,
3. No, the administration of Mohamed's oath of
does not waive all the legal requirements for
allegiance was not valid.
naturalization.
Ratio:
While the Convention aims to facilitate and expedite
The Supreme Court emphasized that naturalization the naturalization of refugees, it must be read in
is a statutory privilege, not a right, requiring strict
consonance with Philippine statutory requirements.
compliance with all legal requirements.
Mohamed's status as a convention refugee does
Mohamed's filing of his petition for naturalization not exempt him from complying with the law.
less than one year after submitting his
Denial of Mohamed's Petition and Remand to the RTC
Supplemental Declaration of Intention was a
The Court denied Mohamed's petition and affirmed
jurisdictional defect.
the CA's decision, with modifications.
The one-year period is crucial for the OSG to
The case was remanded to the RTC for further
investigate the applicant's qualifications.
proceedings.
Mohamed failed to provide sufficient evidence,
The OSG was given a fresh period of one year to
such as a medical certificate, to prove his mental
conduct its investigation and submit compliance to
and physical fitness.
the RTC.
The testimonies of his witnesses were general and
This decision aligns with the intent of the 1951
lacked specific facts to support his qualifications.
Refugee Convention and the country's commitment
The administration of Mohamed's oath of to facilitating the naturalization of refugees.
allegiance was premature, occurring before the
expiration of the Government's period to appeal,
rendering it void.
The Court reiterated that naturalization laws must
be strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant.
The case was remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings, with the OSG given a fresh one-year
period to investigate Mohamed's qualifications, in
line with the Philippines' international commitments
under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Title
Republic vs. Provincial Government of Palawan
Case
Background of the Case G.R. No. 170867
Sefyan Abdelhakim Mohamed, a Sudanese national, Decision Date
applied for Philippine citizenship through Jan 21, 2020
naturalization. The case revolves around the entitlement of the Province
Mohamed is married to a Filipino citizen and is of Palawan to a share in the proceeds of the Camago-
recognized as a convention refugee. Malampaya Natural Gas Project, with the Supreme Court
He filed his application in 2006 and was granted ultimately ruling that the province is not entitled to such
naturalization by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in share due to its limited territorial jurisdiction and the
2009. absence of a basis for equity.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed
the decision, arguing that Mohamed failed to Facts:
comply with the required filing period and provide The case "Republic of the Philippines v.
sufficient evidence. Provincial Government of Palawan" involves the
Reversal of Decision by the Court of Appeals entitlement of the Province of Palawan to a share
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's in the proceeds from the Camago-Malampaya
decision in 2015. Natural Gas Project.
The CA found that Mohamed filed his petition for The Republic, through the Department of Energy
naturalization less than one year after submitting
(DOE), Department of Finance (DOF), and
his Supplemental Declaration of Intention, violating
Department of Budget and Management (DBM),
the one-year filing requirement.
entered into Service Contract No. 38 on
Mohamed also failed to provide competent
December 11, 1990, with Shell Philippines
evidence to prove his mental and physical fitness.
Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines for
His oath of allegiance was administered
drilling natural gas reservoirs in the Camago-
prematurely.
Malampaya area, about 80 kilometers from
Supreme Court's Affirmation of the CA's Decision
mainland Palawan. Malampaya area, which is located in the
The contract established a 60-40 production continental shelf and beyond the province's land
sharing scheme, with the national government area.
receiving 60% of the net proceeds and the The Court emphasized that a local government
service contractors receiving 40%. unit's territorial jurisdiction is limited to its land
Over time, the service contractors were replaced area unless expanded by law to include maritime
by a consortium including Shell B.V., Shell areas.
Philippines LLC, Chevron Malampaya LLC, and The Constitution and the Local Government Code
PNOC Exploration Corporation. do not grant Palawan jurisdiction over the
On February 17, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos continental shelf where the natural gas reservoirs
issued Administrative Order No. 381, indicating are located.
that part of the national government's 60% share The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
would be allocated to the concerned local Sea (UNCLOS) confers rights over the continental
government units, including Palawan. shelf to the sovereign state, not to any local
The Department of Finance later opined that government unit. Therefore, the rights over the
Palawan was not entitled to a share as its Camago-Malampaya area pertain to the national
territorial jurisdiction did not extend beyond 15 government.
kilometers from its coastline. The Court ruled that the State cannot be
Despite this, negotiations continued, and various estopped by the acts of its officials, such as the
agreements were made, including an Interim issuance of Administrative Order No. 381 and
Agreement in 2005 and a Provisional Executive Order No. 683, which recognized
Implementation Agreement in 2007, which Palawan's share in the proceeds. These acts do
allowed for the release of funds to Palawan for not have the force of law to alter the territorial
development projects. jurisdiction defined by the Constitution and the
The Province of Palawan filed a Petition for Local Government Code.
Declaratory Relief in 2003, seeking judicial The principle of equity does not apply in this case.
determination of its rights under various laws The environmental and socio-economic impacts
and orders. of the Natural Gas Project have been addressed
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of through the Environmental Compliance
Palawan in 2005, but the Republic filed a Petition Certificate issued to the Shell Consortium, which
for Review with the Supreme Court in 2006. includes provisions for an Environmental
The case was consolidated with another petition Guarantee Fund to cover any potential damages.
filed by Bishop Pedro Dulay Arigo and others, The funds released to Palawan under Executive
who challenged the validity of Executive Order No. Order No. 683 were intended to augment the
683 and the Provisional Implementation province's resources for its constituents and
Agreement. should not be returned.
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled on December
4, 2018, that Palawan was not entitled to a share Background of the Case
in the proceeds, a decision reaffirmed upon The case involves the entitlement of the Province
motions for reconsideration in 2020. of Palawan to a share in the proceeds of the
Issue: Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas Project.
1. Is the Province of Palawan entitled to a 40% The Supreme Court ruled that the province does
equitable share in the proceeds from the not have territorial jurisdiction over the project
Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas Project under and is not entitled to a share.
Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution and Contract and Expectations
Section 290 of the Local Government Code? The Republic, through the Department of Energy,
2. Does the Province of Palawan have territorial entered into a service contract with Shell
jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya natural Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental
gas reservoirs? Philippines for the drilling of natural gas
3. Can the State be estopped by the acts of its reservoirs in the Camago-Malampaya area.
officials in recognizing Palawan's share in the The contract provided for a 60-40 production
proceeds? sharing scheme, with the national government
4. Is the Province of Palawan entitled to a share in receiving 60% of the net proceeds and the
the proceeds based on equity? service contractors receiving 40%.
Ruling: Later, the service contractors were replaced by a
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the Province of consortium of Shell B.V., Shell Philippines LLC,
Palawan is not entitled to a 40% equitable share Chevron Malampaya LLC, and PNOC Exploration
in the proceeds from the Camago-Malampaya Corporation.
Natural Gas Project. President Fidel V. Ramos issued a directive
2. The Court held that the Province of Palawan does stating that the Province of Palawan was
not have territorial jurisdiction over the Camago- expected to receive about US$2.1 billion from the
Malampaya natural gas reservoirs. total government share of US$8.1 billion
3. The Court ruled that the State cannot be throughout the contract's 20-year period.
estopped by the acts of its officials in The Department of Finance took the position that
recognizing Palawan's share in the proceeds. the province did not have a share in the national
4. The Court found that the Province of Palawan is wealth from the proceeds of the Natural Gas
not entitled to a share in the proceeds based on Project.
equity. Petition for Declaratory Relief
Ratio: Negotiations were held between the national
The Supreme Court clarified that under existing government and the Province of Palawan to
law, the Province of Palawan does not have determine the province's expected share in the
territorial jurisdiction over the Camago- net proceeds of the project.
Since the national government would not grant respect and should be upheld unless in clear
the province's expected share, the province filed conflict with the law.
a petition for declaratory relief seeking a judicial Proximity and Environmental Repercussions
determination of its rights. The Province of Palawan argues that it should be
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the entitled to its share based on equity, considering
Province of Palawan, but the Republic filed a its proximity to the Natural Gas Project and the
petition for review before the Supreme Court. potential environmental repercussions.
Supreme Court Decision The Court notes that the environmental and
In its December 4, 2018 decision, the Supreme socio-economic impact of the project has been
Court reversed the trial court's decision and addressed through an Environmental Compliance
declared that the Province of Palawan was not Certificate, which includes provisions for
entitled to a share in the proceeds of the Natural environmental monitoring, rehabilitation, and
Gas Project. compensation for affected fisherfolks.
The Court held that the province did not have Executive Order and Funds
territorial jurisdiction over the project, as its The Court also considers the Executive Order
jurisdiction is limited to its land area and does issued by then President Macapagal-Arroyo,
not extend to marine waters beyond 15 which authorized the release of funds to the
kilometers from its coastline. Province of Palawan for development projects.
Motion for Reconsideration The Court finds that the Province of Palawan
The Province of Palawan filed a motion for need not return the funds it received, as it was a
reconsideration, arguing that the Camago- reasonable presumption that both the national
Malampaya gas reservoirs are within its territorial government and the province intended to provide
jurisdiction. for the general welfare at the time the funds were
It also argued that it is entitled to its share based made available.
on equity, as it is the nearest local government Final Decision
unit capable of providing immediate assistance In conclusion, the Supreme Court denies the
and services in the area. motions for reconsideration and affirms its
The Republic countered that there is no law previous decision.
granting the province territorial jurisdiction over The Province of Palawan is not entitled to an
the continental shelf where the gas reservoirs are equitable share in the proceeds of the Natural
located. Gas Project, as the Camago-Malampaya
The Court upheld its previous decision, stating reservoirs are not within its territorial jurisdiction.
that the province's territorial jurisdiction does not The Province of Palawan is also not required to
extend to the gas reservoirs and that the return the funds it received under functus officio.
principle of equity does not apply in this case.
Interpretation of Local Government Code
This case involves the interpretation and
implementation of Article 290 of the Local
Government Code, which provides for the
equitable share of local government units in the
proceeds of natural resources within their
territorial jurisdiction.
The specific issue in this case is whether the
Province of Palawan is entitled to an equitable
share in the proceeds of the Natural Gas Project.
The Supreme Court clarifies that the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit extends
not only to the land area but also to the waters
found inland and any area that is part of its
seabed, subsoil, or continental margin.
However, the Court notes that none of the maps
or relevant laws conclusively prove that the
Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoirs are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of
Palawan.
Prior Acts and Recognition
The Court also considers the prior acts of the
Republic, which repeatedly recognized the
Province of Palawan's entitlement to its claimed
share in the Natural Gas Project.
The Court acknowledges that the Province of
Palawan relied on these prior recognitions and
cannot be faulted for doing so.
The executive branch also made efforts to fulfill
its commitments to the Province of Palawan,
including the execution of an Interim Agreement
and a Provisional Implementation Agreement.
However, the Court emphasizes that the
executive branch's interpretation and
Title
implementation of the equitable share and
Rehman Sabir vs. Department of Justice-Refugees and
territorial jurisdiction provisions in Article 290 of
Stateless Persons Protection Unit
the Local Government Code are entitled to great
Case Partial Reconsideration
G.R. No. 249387 In the case of Rehman Sabir vs. Department of Justice-
Decision Date Refugees and Stateless Persons Protection Unit (DOJ-
Mar 8, 2023 RSPPU), the Supreme Court addressed a Motion for Partial
The Supreme Court denied Rehman Sabir's motion for Reconsideration filed by Sabir. Sabir sought to be declared a
partial reconsideration, upholding the remand of his refugee bona fide refugee due to religious persecution in Pakistan.
application to the DOJ-RSPPU for further proceedings, The Court upheld its previous decision to remand the case
emphasizing the shared burden of proof between the to the DOJ-RSPPU for further proceedings, emphasizing the
applicant and the protection officer in evaluating claims of need for a fair and thorough evaluation of Sabir's claims.
persecution. Sabir filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
He sought recognition as a bona fide refugee due to
Facts: religious persecution.
Petitioner Rehman Sabir sought to be declared a The Supreme Court upheld its decision to remand
bona fide refugee due to fear of religious the case for further evaluation.
persecution in Pakistan. Introduction of DOJ Circular No. 024, Series of 2022
Sabir claimed he faced forced conversion to Islam The Court noted the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 024,
and threats to his life, supported by country of series of 2022, which introduced significant changes to the
origin information (COI) on Christian persecution in refugee status determination process. These changes
Pakistan. included the principle of non-refoulement and a streamlined
The Department of Justice-Refugees and Stateless application procedure. The Circular also clarified the shared
Persons Protection Unit (DOJ-RSPPU) initially burden of proof between the applicant and the protection
denied his application, focusing on his non- officer.
prosecution for blasphemy rather than the core DOJ Circular No. 024, series of 2022, was
issue of religious persecution. introduced.
Sabir's appeal to the Court of Appeals was also Significant changes included the principle of non-
denied, leading him to file a petition with the refoulement.
Supreme Court. The application procedure was streamlined.
On August 2, 2022, the Supreme Court partly The Circular clarified the shared burden of proof.
granted his petition, reversing the Court of Appeals' Emphasis on Fair Evaluation and Active Assistance
decision and remanding the case to the DOJ-RSPPU The Court stressed that refugee applications should be
for further proceedings. evaluated on their merits. It emphasized that the protection
Sabir filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration on officer must actively assist applicants in substantiating their
December 27, 2022, seeking to be declared a bona claims. The case was remanded to the DOJ-RSPPU for re-
fide refugee outright. examination in accordance with the new guidelines.
The Supreme Court found no cogent reason to Refugee applications should be evaluated on their
reconsider its initial ruling. merits.
Issue: Protection officers must actively assist applicants.
1. Should Rehman Sabir be declared a bona fide The case was remanded for re-examination under
refugee based on his claims of religious new guidelines.
persecution? Shared and Collaborative Burden in Refugee Status
2. Did the DOJ-RSPPU fail in its duty to ascertain and Determination
evaluate all relevant facts in Sabir's case? The Philippine Supreme Court case involves the application
Ruling: process for refugee status, emphasizing the shared and
1. The Supreme Court did not declare Rehman Sabir a collaborative burden between the applicant and the
bona fide refugee outright. protection officer. The applicant must provide a full and
2. The Court affirmed that the DOJ-RSPPU failed in its accurate account of their claim, while the protection officer
duty to ascertain and evaluate all relevant facts, must ascertain and evaluate all relevant facts.
necessitating a remand for further proceedings. The application process involves a shared and
Ratio: collaborative burden.
The Supreme Court emphasized that determining Applicants must provide a full and accurate account
refugee status involves a shared and collaborative of their claim.
burden between the applicant and the protection Protection officers must ascertain and evaluate all
officer. relevant facts.
The applicant must provide an accurate, full, and DOJ-RSPPU's Failure and Remand for Re-examination
credible account of their claim. The Court found that the Department of Justice-Refugees
The protection officer has a duty to actively assist and Stateless Persons Protection Unit (DOJ-RSPPU) failed
in ascertaining and evaluating all relevant facts. to fulfill its duty, leaving the Court without a factual basis to
The DOJ-RSPPU failed in this duty by focusing on rule definitively on the petitioner's refugee status. The case
irrelevant issues and not adequately considering the was remanded for re-examination by the DOJ-RSPPU,
COI on Christian persecution in Pakistan. following guidelines that balance the State's duty to protect
The Court highlighted changes introduced by DOJ refugees with the need to ensure only qualified individuals
Circular No. 024, series of 2022, which aims to are granted refugee status. The motion for partial
establish a fair and efficient procedure for status reconsideration was denied with finality.
determination and institutionalize mechanisms for DOJ-RSPPU failed to fulfill its duty.
assisting Persons of Concern (POC). The Court lacked a factual basis to rule definitively
The Circular emphasizes the principle of non- on the refugee status.
refoulement and enumerates specific rights for The case was remanded for re-examination.
applicants, including access to legal counsel and Guidelines balance the State's duty to protect
protection from forcible return. refugees with ensuring only qualified individuals are
The Court concluded that Sabir's application should granted refugee status.
be evaluated on its merits following the guidelines The motion for partial reconsideration was denied
laid out in the 2022 Circular, and remanded the case with finality.
to the DOJ-RSPPU for further proceedings.
Case Summary (G.R. No. 249387)
Supreme Court's Decision on Rehman Sabir's Motion for
supported by sufficient evidence?
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the suspension of
Roberto's proclamation was tainted with grave
Title abuse of discretion and violated his right to due
Uy, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections process.
Case 2. The Supreme Court found that the COMELEC En
G.R. No. 260650 Banc's declaration of Frederico as a nuisance
Decision Date candidate was also tainted with grave abuse of
Aug 8, 2023 discretion and lacked sufficient evidence.
The case involves the suspension of the winning Ratio:
candidate's proclamation and the cancellation of a The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC En
nuisance candidate's Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), with Banc's suspension of Roberto's proclamation
the Supreme Court ruling that the suspension was a was improper because it was based on an
violation of due process and lacked sufficient evidence, undated and irregular order, and Roberto was not
while also affirming the proper assumption of office by given an opportunity to be heard, violating his
the winning candidate as a Member of the House of right to due process.
Representatives. The Court emphasized that the COMELEC's
authority to suspend proclamations is limited to
Facts: cases involving disqualification under specific
In the 2022 elections, four candidates vied for the grounds, which did not apply to the nuisance
position of Zamboanga del Norte's first district candidate proceedings against Frederico.
representative: Roberto "Pinpin" T. Uy, Jr. The Court also found that the COMELEC En
(Roberto), Romeo "Kuya Jonjon" M. Jalosjos, Jr. Banc's declaration of Frederico as a nuisance
(Romeo), Frederico "Kuya Jan" P. Jalosjos candidate was unsupported by substantial
(Frederico), and Richard Amazon. evidence.
On November 16, 2021, Romeo filed a Verified The COMELEC failed to adequately prove that
Petition before the Commission on Elections Frederico had no bona fide intention to run for
(COMELEC) to declare Frederico a nuisance office, and the alleged similarity in nicknames
candidate and to cancel his Certificate of was insufficient to declare him a nuisance
Candidacy (CoC). candidate.
Romeo alleged that Frederico had no bona fide The Court noted that Frederico's membership in
intention to run for public office and that his a political party and his campaign activities
nickname "Kuya Jan" was confusingly similar to indicated a genuine intention to run.
Romeo's nickname "Kuya Jonjon." Consequently, the Court set aside the COMELEC
Frederico countered that he had a genuine En Banc's Order and Resolution, annulled
intention to run, supported by his membership in Romeo's proclamation, and directed the
the National Unity Party (NUP) and his campaign COMELEC to proclaim Roberto as the winner.
activities.
On April 19, 2022, the COMELEC Second Division Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
declared Frederico a nuisance candidate, leading The Supreme Court ruled that it had jurisdiction
to the cancellation of his CoC. to review the decisions and orders of the
Frederico sought reconsideration, but the COMELEC.
elections proceeded on May 9, 2022. The Court held that the House of Representatives
Romeo then filed a motion to suspend Roberto's Electoral Tribunal (HRET) did not have
proclamation based on partial and unofficial jurisdiction over the case.
results, asserting that Frederico's votes should The Court emphasized its constitutional duty to
be credited to him. review the COMELEC's decisions.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC)
received an "advanced copy" of a COMELEC En Case Summary (G.R. No. 260650)
Banc Order to suspend Roberto's proclamation, Background of the Case
which was undated and lacked complete The case involves the suspension of the winning
signatures. candidate's proclamation and the cancellation of
Despite initial dissent, the PBOC eventually a nuisance candidate's Certificate of Candidacy
suspended Roberto's proclamation. (CoC).
Roberto filed an urgent petition before the The Supreme Court ruled that the suspension of
COMELEC and later a Petition for Certiorari, the winning candidate's proclamation was a
Prohibition, and Mandamus before the Supreme violation of due process and lacked sufficient
Court. evidence.
On June 7, 2022, the COMELEC En Banc denied The Court affirmed the proper assumption of
Frederico's Motion for Reconsideration and office by the winning candidate as a Member of
directed that his votes be credited to Romeo. the House of Representatives.
Frederico then filed a Petition for Certiorari Allegations against Frederico P. Jalosjos
before the Supreme Court. Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr. filed a petition to declare
The Supreme Court issued a Status Quo Ante Frederico P. Jalosjos a nuisance candidate and
Order, and the case was consolidated for review. to cancel his CoC.
Issue: Romeo alleged that Frederico had no bona fide
1. Was the suspension of Roberto's proclamation intention to run for public office and that his
by the COMELEC En Banc proper and in surname and nickname were confusingly similar
accordance with due process? to Romeo's.
2. Was the declaration of Frederico as a nuisance The COMELEC Second Division declared
candidate by the COMELEC En Banc justified and Frederico a nuisance candidate and cancelled his
CoC.
Suspension of Roberto "Pinpin" T. Uy, Jr.'s
Proclamation
After the elections, Romeo filed a motion to
suspend the proclamation of the leading
candidate, Roberto "Pinpin" T. Uy, Jr., based on
the partial and unofficial results.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC)
received an "advanced copy" of a COMELEC En
Banc Order directing the suspension of Roberto's
proclamation.
The PBOC suspended Roberto's proclamation
based on this order, despite its irregularities.
Petitions before the COMELEC and Supreme Court
Roberto filed a petition before the COMELEC to
direct the PBOC to proclaim him as the winning
candidate.
Roberto also filed a petition before the Supreme
Court, questioning the suspension of his
proclamation.
The COMELEC En Banc denied Frederico's
motion for reconsideration and directed that his
votes be credited to Romeo.
Both Roberto and Frederico filed separate
petitions before the Supreme Court, which were
later consolidated.
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court ruled that it had jurisdiction
to review the decisions and orders of the
COMELEC.
The Court held that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) did not have
jurisdiction over the case.
The Court emphasized its constitutional duty to
review the COMELEC's decisions.
Violation of Due Process
The Court ruled that the COMELEC's suspension
of Roberto's proclamation was a violation of due
process.
The suspension order was based on an
"advanced copy" of the COMELEC En Banc Order,
which lacked necessary signatures and
certifications.
Roberto was not given the opportunity to be
heard before his proclamation was suspended,
violating his right to due process.
Declaration of Frederico as a Nuisance Candidate
The Court found that the COMELEC's declaration
of Frederico as a nuisance candidate was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC failed to provide sufficient
evidence to support its finding that Frederico had
no bona fide intention to run for public office.
Frederico's membership in a political party and
his financial capacity to wage a campaign were
evidence of his bona fide intention.
There was no significant possibility of voter
confusion due to the similarity of the candidates'
surnames and nicknames.
Ruling of the Supreme Court
The Court ruled that Roberto should be
proclaimed as the winning candidate and
affirmed his assumption of office as a Member
of the House of Representatives.
The COMELEC En Banc Order and Resolution
were declared null and void.
The Court dismissed the petitions and lifted the
Status Quo Ante Order.
The HRET was directed to proclaim Romeo as
the winner of the election.