Study 24 08 09 TM

Combating Impunity for Crimes
and Human Rights Abuse

Against Journalists in Syria:
Domestic and International
Mechanisms
by Toby Mendel, Executive Director, Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD)
on behalf of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression
August 2024
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................................................................................................1
FOREWORD..........................................................................................................................................................1
ACRONYMS..........................................................................................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................................................................1
1. THE SITUATION IN SYRIA...............................................................................................................................3
2. BASES FOR SYRIAN RESPONSIBILITY................................................................................................................13
3. INTERNATIONAL OPTIONS FOR REDRESS.........................................................................................................15
3. 1 Universal Periodic Review............................................................................................................15
3. 2 Treaty Systems............................................................................................................................17
3. 3 Specialised Mechanisms for Syria................................................................................................22
3. 4 Other General UN Mechanisms...................................................................................................25
4. NATIONAL OPTIONS FOR REDRESS.................................................................................................................27
5. CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES............................................................................................................................30
CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................................................33
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Foreword
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Acronyms
ACHR African Charter on Human Rights
CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women
CERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination
COI Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab

Republic
CPJ Committee to Protect Journalists
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSO Civil Society Organisation
HRC Human Rights Council
HRCttee Human Rights Committee
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ILA International Legislation Atlas
IIIM Independent Mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution

of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under International
Law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011
IIMP Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab

Republic
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PPT Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal
RSF Reporters Without Borders
RTI Right to Information
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SANA Syrian Arab News Agency
SNHR Syrian Network for Human Rights
SYP Syrian Pound
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UPR Universal Periodic Review
USD United States Dollar
YPG People's Protection Units
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Introduction
The al-Assad family has dominated Syrian politics since 16 November 1970, when Minister
of Defence Hafez al-Assad seized power in a peaceful coup. Hafez al-Assad held the
presidency of Syria for nearly 30 years until he died on 10 June 2000 and, a month later, his
son, Bashar al-Assad, was elected president, garnering 97.29% of the vote, according to
official statistics. The al-Assads both ruled the country with an iron hand, refusing to
countenance any challenge to their political supremacy and demonstrating a willingness to
resort to brutal force to maintain that status.
There were periodic incidents of violence in the 40 years between 1970 and 2011, both
internal and due to conflict with Israel, but no serious challenges to the dominance of the al-
Assad family. That all changed dramatically in March 2011 when, inspired by the Arab
Spring which was sweeping the region, protests broke out in Damascus and other cities
across the country.
This led to a complex civil war in which numerous foreign countries – including
Iran, Russia, Turkey and the United States – and other foreign actors – including Al-Qaeda,
the Islamic State and Hezbollah – have been involved. As of today, Syria is effectively
fractured into numerous different parts. These include the rump Syrian Arab Republic,
comprising nearly two-thirds of the country, still governed by al-Assad and defended by the
Syrian Arab Armed Forces, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria,
representing about one-quarter of the country and largely liberated by its military force,
the Syrian Democratic Forces, and smaller pockets controlled by various Syrian opposition
forces, comprising just over 10% of the country.
As of today, an uneasy ceasefire prevails in most of the country, albeit with regular flareups,
including between the Turkish army and Syrian Democratic Forces, which are comprised of
Kurdish, Arab and Assyrian fighters but are largely under the command of People's
Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia which Turkey views as a terrorist group. A report
issued on 15 March 2024, on the 13th anniversary of the beginning of the uprisings, by the
Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), On the 13th Anniversary of the Start of the
Popular Uprising, tracks a number of types of atrocities, such as extrajudicial killings,
arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances, and deaths due to torture, among others. It shows
dramatic improvements over the last four years, in particular, but with atrocities still at
concerning levels, for example with 1054 civilian deaths in the year to March 2024, 1682
arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances, and 62 deaths due to torture.1
A detailed report by the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression chronicles the
atrocities committed against journalists and other media workers during the approximately
ten years from March 2011 to December 2020, Syria: The Black Hole for Media Work: 10
Years of Violations.2 It chronicles a total of 1670 violations by all parties over this period,
including 720 extrajudicial killings (of which 375 were committed by the ruling regime), 434
arbitrary detentions (of which 430 were committed by the ruling regime), 140 enforced
1
See pp. 7, 11 and 15. Available at https://snhr.org/blog/2024/03/18/on-the-13th-anniversary-of-the-start-of-the-
popular-uprising-231278-syrian-civilians-have-been-documented-killed-including-15334-due-to-torture-
156757-have-been-arrested-and-or-forcibly-disappea/.
2
May 2021, https://scm.bz/en/syria-the-black-hole-for-media-work-eng/.
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disappearances and kidnappings, 61 attacks on media premises and 222 cases of injuries
caused by direct and indirect targeting.3
These introductory comments are provided merely to situate, very generally, readers vis-à-vis
the wider context in Syria. This report focuses on crimes and human rights abuses against
journalists and other media workers in Syria and, in particular, the various means to combat
impunity for those acts from outside of the country. The focus is primarily on the part of the
country, approximately two-thirds, which is still governed by al-Assad. The leaders of this
part of the country still formally represent Syria within the UN system and most reports on
Syria focus on this part as well.
This report covers actual crimes, i.e. the perpetration of criminal offences against journalists,
and legal and other actions which breach the human rights of journalists, most obviously their
right to freedom of expression but also contributing human rights breaches such as a lack of
due process protections during criminal cases. Many of the mechanisms which exist and
which might be used to combat impunity for these actions have their own focused mandates.
For example, mechanisms which exist under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)4 only cover actions which represented a breach of the rights it
guarantees, namely a range of civil and political rights, while the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)5 only covers breaches of those
rights of women which it recognises.
For purposes of this report, the notion of combating impunity is understood broadly to cover
not only direct, legal mechanisms to combat impunity, of which only very limited options
exist in relation to Syria.6 It also includes a wide range of mechanisms which allow for the
highlighting and condemnation of crimes and human rights abuse against journalists, even if
they do not provide for individual remedies or redress.
The first part of this report provides a brief overview of The Situation in Syria regarding
illegitimate legal provisions, cases under them and other illegitimate actions against
journalists and the media. The aim is to provide readers with a sense of the scale and nature
of the need for mechanisms to combat impunity by illustrating how abuses against journalists
generally manifest themselves in Syria, as well as how widespread they are. The second part,
which forms the main body of the report, looks at International Options for Redress, focusing
mainly on a range of UN mechanisms for the protection of various human rights. The third
part focuses on National Options for Redress, with a focus on systems of universal
jurisdiction over international crimes, which are available in many countries around the
3
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
4
UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights.
Syria ratified the ICCPR on 21 April 1969. See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND.
5
UN General Assembly Resolution 34/180, 18 December 1979, entered into force 2 September 1981,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-elimination-all-forms-
discrimination-against-women.
6
Among other things, Syria has not ratified the (first) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966, entered into force 23
March 1976, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/optional-protocol-international-
covenant-civil-and-political, which allows individuals to submit complaints about individual breaches of human
rights to the UN Human Rights Committee, the body which oversees implementation of the ICCPR. See
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&clang=_en.
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world. The fourth and final part looks at Civil Society Initiatives, such as the People's Trials
which some civil society organisations (CSOs) have conducted for Syria and other countries.
1. The Situation in Syria
Overall, Syria ranks as one of the worst countries in the world for freedom of expression and
media freedom. For example, in the 2024 Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters
Without Borders (RSF), it ranked in 179th place out of 180 countries, earning just 17.41
points out of a possible total of 100, just slightly ahead of Eritrea with 16.64 points. This was
down significantly from 2023, when it ranked in 175 th place, again out of 180 countries, and
earned 27.22 points, and again down from 2022 when it ranked in 171 st place with 28.94
points.7 More generally in terms of freedoms, it also ranks near the bottom of Freedom
House’s 2024 Freedom in the World assessment, earning just one point out of a possible total
of 100 in 2023, tied with South Sudan and above only Tibet and Nagorno-Karabakh, which
are both territories rather than States. 8 Syria earned the same score on the 2023 and 2022
Freedom in the World assessments.9 These assessments, however, appear to relate only to the
approximately two-thirds of the country which is still governed by al-Assad (and not to take
into account the situation in the rest of the country).
Formally, freedom of expression and of the media are guaranteed in Articles 42(2) and 43 of
the 2012 Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic. 10 However, these are not proper
guarantees, i.e. in the sense of them constraining government behaviour, since they may be
limited by law, with no conditions placed on such laws. Thus, Article 43 states:
The state shall guarantee freedom of the press, printing and publishing, the media and its
independence in accordance with the law.
Prior to 2011, the government retained almost complete control over all media in the country,
whether directly through control of media which were State or party organs, or indirectly, via
licensing, control over distribution via the General Corporation for the Distribution of
Publications (GCDP), control over printing via the official printing agency, 11 or control over
news content via the central news agency, the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). As of
2016, however, there were reportedly 196 media outlets present throughout the country,
representing a plurality of political viewpoints, albeit most operating outside of regime-held
areas.12 In its 2021 Compilation on the Syrian Arab Republic, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that UNESCO had indicated: “All
publications and television and radio stations were controlled by the Government, as were
most printed press institutions.”13 This presumably refers only to regime-controlled areas.
7
See https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2024, https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2023 and https://rsf.org/en/index?
year=2022.
8
Available at https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores.
9
See https://freedomhouse.org/country/syria/freedom-world/2023 and
https://freedomhouse.org/country/syria/freedom-world/2022.
10
Available at https://www.voltairenet.org/article173033.html.
11
Created by Decree Law No. 15 of 2008.
12
Antoun Issa, Syria’s New Media Landscape: Independent Media Born Out of War, MEI Policy Paper 2016-9
(2016, Middle East Institute), Summary,
http://education.mei.edu/files/publications/PP9_Issa_Syrianmedia_web_0.pdf.
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In terms of formal processes involving Syria, the most recent Universal Periodic Review for
Syria held its hearing on 24 January 2022. The government of Syria “supported” a number of
recommendations arising from that UPR process. These included three on the release of
human rights defenders (which includes journalists), political prisoners and prisoners of
conscience (namely recommendations 133.169, 133.170 and 133.171) and one general one on
adopting measures to guarantee the cessation of persecution and harassment of human rights
defenders (recommendation 133.165). One called generally for Syria to ensure respect for
freedom of expression (recommendation 133.167). And the following one called somewhat
more specifically for the adoption and implementation of access to information and press
freedom legislation:
133.166 Adopt and implement legislation granting the rights to freedom of information and of the
press aligned with international standards and revoke all the restrictions to those rights, including
those in counter-terrorism laws (Portugal).14
In terms of its periodic reporting under the ICCPR, the last full reporting cycle was Syria’s
third, which was completed in 2005. However, the fourth reporting cycle is currently
underway, with Syria having submitted its State report in 2022, the UN having compiled its
List of Issues in Relation to the Fourth Periodic Report of the Syrian Arab Republic in March
2023, and various civil society organisations having made submissions, mostly in June
2024.15 In the area of freedom of expression, the UN’s List of Issues document called on
Syria, among other things, to respond to reports of media censorship, including through
licence revocation, forcing journalists to reveal their sources, monitoring of broadcasting by
the Ministry of Information, and “attacks against and harassment, intimidation, arbitrary
arrests and detention, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings of activists,
journalists and media professionals for exercising their right to freedom of expression,
including online”, as well as to provide information about any protection being provided to
journalists.16 It also called on Syria to report on measures taken to protect media
independence, efforts to decriminalise defamation and to ensure that harsh penalties are not
applied, and efforts to bring the Cybercrimes Law, the Penal Code, the Media Law and the
Counter-terrorism Law into line with international standards.17
In terms of national legislation, Syria has a number of laws which impose undue restrictions
on media freedom. The Media Law18 was adopted in August 2011 in what was supposed to be
an attempt to liberalise the media sector. It did improve the legal environment as compared to
the regime under the highly repressive 2001 Publications Law, 19 which it repealed, along with
the Law on Communication with the Public on the Internet, 20 Legislative Decree relating to
13
17 November 2021, A/HRC/WG.6/40/SYR/2, para. 36,
https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g21/338/46/pdf/g2133846.pdf?
token=eqYXr2gouMUMCuAMhh&fe=true.
14
Available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/sy-index.
15
All of these documents are available at
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/countries.aspx?CountryCode=SYR&Lang=EN.
16
5 April 2023, CCPR/C/SYR/Q/4, para. 22,
17
Ibid., para. 23.
18
Legislative Decree No. 108 of 2011, 28 August 2011, available in Arabic at
https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/20747.
19
Legislative Decree No. 50 of 2001.
20
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private commercial radio,21 and inconsistent provisions in the Radio Basic Law. 22 However, it
contains a number of illegitimate restrictions on content and, in any case, is largely
ineffective in its liberalising impact due to its continued recognition of other, more
repressive, rules.
In terms of its illegitimate content restrictions, Article 4(1) of the Media Law protects the
right to freedom of expression, “as long as it is exercised consciously and responsibly”. 23
Article 3 provides that the work of the media must be based on certain values including “the
national values of the Syrian society and the responsibility to spread knowledge and express
the interests of the people and protect the national identity”. 24 According to The Tahrir
Institute for Middle East Policy, the Media Law prohibits media outlets,
from publishing any content related to the armed forces unless they are official statements or have
received approval for publication. It also bars outlets from publishing any information that harms
“national unity,” “national security,” or “state symbols”; “incites sectarian strife”; “insults”
religious beliefs; or incites others to commit crimes, acts of violence, or terrorism. 25
Similarly, according to the International Legislation Atlas (ILA):
The Law also replicates the provisions contained in the earlier statute prohibiting journalists from
reporting on several matters, including national security, the activities of the army and religious
issues, especially insofar as it might incite sectarian strife or defame religions. The publication by
media outlets of any content related to incitement to acts of violence or terrorism is prohibited
alongside anything that might harm state’s symbols or might be in breach of an individual’s
privacy.26
There are a number of problems with these provisions from the perspective of freedom of
expression. International law requires restrictions on freedom of expression to meet a three-
part test, the first part of which is that they shall be “provided by law”. This requires not only
that restrictions be set out in a law but also that they be sufficiently clear that it is possible to
foresee in advance what is prohibited and what is not. Vague references to notions such as
“consciously and responsibly”, “national values”, “the interests of the people” and protecting
“national identity” manifestly fail to meet this standard. Indeed, they appear to be designed
precisely to be flexible (“rubber laws”), such that they might be applied whenever the
government does not like certain media reporting.
The second part of the test is that restrictions must aim to protect a legitimate interest. Those
interests are listed in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR and are the rights or reputations of others,
national security, or public order, health or morals. This list is exclusive and only restrictions
which seek to protect one of those aims are legitimate. Many of the interests protected by the
media law go beyond this. For example, interests or notions such as “national values”,
“interests of the people”, “national identity” and “state symbols” do not correspond to the list
in Article 19(3) and hence are not legitimate. Of course it is always open to the media to
21
No. 10 of 2002.
22
No. 68 of 1951.
23
Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Study: The Right of Access to Information and
Protection of Sources in Syria, June 2022, p. 16, https://scm.bz/en/right-to-know-and-protection-of-the-source-
in-syria-en/.
24
Ibid., p. 24.
25
Organizing in Syria: Legislative Fact Sheet, 26 March 2021, p. 1, https://timep.org/2021/03/26/organizing-in-
syria-legislative-fact-sheet/.
26
Syria: ILA Country Report, 2015, p. 2, https://internetlegislationatlas.org/data/summaries/syria.pdf.
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choose to respond to these values and aims, but it is not legitimate for the government to
require them to do so.
With respect to insulting religious beliefs, this could arguably fall within the scope of public
morals, which is one of the interests listed in Article 19(3). However, the UN Human Rights
Committee has made it clear in General Comment No. 34 that: “Prohibitions of displays of
lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are
incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances envisaged in article 20,
paragraph 2, of the Covenant.”27 This means that it is not legitimate to protect religious
beliefs, as such, which the Media Law does, while it is appropriate to protect those who hold
religious beliefs against incitement to hatred against them based on those beliefs.
Furthermore, the Committee also noted that “’limitations... for the purpose of protecting
morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition’. Any
such limitations must be understood in the light of universality of human rights and the
principle of non-discrimination.”28 This again means that it is not legitimate to protect the
beliefs of specific religions.
It is legitimate to protect national security and to protect against incitement to sectarian hatred
or to crimes or terrorism. However, the third part of the test is that restrictions must be
“necessary” to protect the interest. This requires restrictions to be set out narrowly so that
only speech which really does post a threat to the protected interest is covered. National
security is a concept which has often been interpreted significantly overbroadly in countries
around the world and especially in the Arab World. It is thus important to define it clearly in
legislation and not to prohibit all reporting which relates to national security, only that which
specifically undermines it. In practice, while it may be legitimate to prohibit officials from
disclosing national security secrets, media reporting very rarely poses a threat to national
security.
It is also legitimate to protect privacy, as long as appropriate limits to this are established, in
particular that freedom of expression prevails over privacy when this is in the overall public
interest. The Media Law does not appear to provide for such a public interest balancing.
Indeed, Article 13 provides that “it does not violate personal privacy to criticise or publish
information about those charged with a public service or service provided that the media
content is closely related to their work and targeting the public interest”. 29 This is somewhat
positive although it is cast too narrowly. The actions of officials which relate to their work
generally do not fall within the scope of privacy, with the exception of certain privacy issues
such as performance assessments. As such, when reporting on such actions, it should not be
necessary additionally to show that the reporting was in the public interest.
When it comes to sanctions, it is positive that the Media Law does away with arrests and
prison sentences for most media offences and provides only for fines. 30 Fines can extend up
to SYP 1,000,000 (currently only approximately USD 77) 31 but media outlets can be
27
General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, 12 September 2011, para. 48.
Available in all six UN languages at: http://undocs.org/ccpr/c/gc/34.
28
Ibid., para. 32.
29
Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Legal Environment for Media in Syria, p. 24.
30
See, for example, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Organizing in Syria: Legislative Fact Sheet, p.
1 and Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Legal Environment for Media in Syria, p. 25.
31
Media Landscapes: Expert Analysis of the State of Media: Syria,
https://medialandscapes.org/country/syria/policies/media-legislation.
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temporarily suspended and even, in some contexts, have their licences terminated for
violating its provisions.32 In addition, the Media Law preserves punishments in other laws.
Thus, Article 79 refers media professionals who violate the prohibitions contained in its
Article 12 to “the laws in force”, while Article 99 states: “For every crime for which no text
is stipulated in this Law, the Penal Code and the laws in force shall apply”.33
Other apparently positive aspects of the Media Law are also ultimately undermined in
practice. Thus, Article 4(2) protects, “[t]he right of media professionals to obtain and use
information, subject to the provisions of this Law.” 34 However, Syria does not have a proper
right to information (RTI) law, or law giving individuals the right to access information held
by public authorities.35 As such, this limited provision cannot deliver that right. Among other
things, it fails to set out the scope of application of this right, the procedures for making
requests, the exceptions to the right of access and the opportunities to lodge appeals against
refusals to provide access. The report Study: The Right of Access to Information and
Protection of Sources in Syria, by the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression,
details clearly the failures of Syria in relation to RTI.
Another ostensibly positive provision in the Media Law is Article 7(b), which states that “no
one may ask the media professional to disclose their sources of information except through
the judiciary and in a secret session”. However, according to the Syrian Center for Media and
Freedom of Expression, this has failed to be effective and Syrian journalists continue to be
required to disclose their confidential sources of information.36
The Media Law also introduced a number of repressive rules relating to funding for and
ownership of the media. Article 15, for example, imposes strict limits on advertising revenues
while the Law also limits individual ownership to a maximum of 25% for radio and 20% for
television.37 It is actually positive to impose certain restrictions on concentration of media
ownership,38 but these limits are too stringent and would impede the successful development
of the sector.
Article 19 of the Media Law also established a new oversight body, the National Council of
Information, which was nominally independent both financially and administratively.
However, the Council did not have the power actually to issue licences to the media, merely
to make recommendations to the Cabinet, which would make the final decision. 39 In any case,
even that approach came to an end in 2016 when the National Media Council was
32
The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Organizing in Syria: Legislative Fact Sheet, p. 1.
33
Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Legal Environment for Media in Syria, pp. 25-26.
34
Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Study: The Right of Access to Information and
Protection of Sources in Syria, p. 16 and The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Organizing in Syria:
Legislative Fact Sheet, p. 1.
35
See RTI Rating, Country Page, https://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/ (which does not list Syria as one of
the 140 countries which have RTI laws).
36
Study: The Right of Access to Information and Protection of Sources in Syria, p. 2.
37
38
See, for example, Toby Mendel, Ángel Garcia Castillejo and Gustavo Gómez, Concentration of Ownership
and Freedom of Expression: Global Standards and Implications for the Americas (2017, Paris, UNESCO).
39
Syria: ILA Country Report, 2015, p. 2 and Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Legal
Environment for Media in Syria, pp. 26-28.
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abolished,40 and its powers in relation to licensing were transferred to the Ministry of
Information.41
It may be noted that a new, draft Media Law is currently before the parliament, which the
Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression suggests “constitutes a retreat even from
Law 108 of 2011 [the current Media Law]”. 42 Among other things, the draft Media Law
imposes additional vague content restrictions on the media, expands licensing requirements,
limits access to funding for the media and expands the extent of control of the Ministry of
Information over the media.
A new law establishing the Ministry of Information was adopted in April 2024 which already
significantly expands the powers of the Ministry. 43 Among other things, it provides for the
Ministry to licence 13 different categories of information actors, including broadcasters, print
media, online media, social media, media training centres, opinion polling centres and
printing and publishing houses.44
The Penal Code45 also contains a large number of restrictions on the content of what may be
disseminated. It is beyond the scope of this report to analyse these in detail, but some of the
more problematical provisions are reviewed below. As noted above, where the Media Law is
silent as to these issues, the provisions of the Penal Code continue to apply to the media.
For example, Article 285 of the Penal Code, as amended in 2022, criminalises the
dissemination of statements which “undermine the civic or national identity, trigger racial or
sectarian strife” while Article 286 criminalises anyone who “disseminates despair or
weakness among the members of the society.” Article 287 prohibits the broadcasting from
abroad of false or exaggerated news which “undermines the prestige of the state or its
financial status”, while a second paragraph was added prohibiting the dissemination of “news
that would polish up the image of an enemy state with the aim of undermining the status of
the Syrian State”. Breach of this provision may be sanctioned by fines and imprisonment for
at least six months. Article 307 prohibits: “Every writing and every speech intended or
provoking sectarian or racial strife or inciting conflict between sects and the various elements
of the nation are punishable by imprisonment from six months to two years and by a fine of
one hundred to two hundred pounds.”46
Many of these provisions do not pass the provided by law part of the test for restrictions on
freedom of expression due to the vague language they employ, including phrases like
“national identity”, “prestige of the state”, “financial status” and “status of the Syrian State”.
Most of them also do not correspond to legitimate interests, the second part of the test. And
others fail the necessity part of the test. It is, for example, well established that general
prohibitions on false news, let alone exaggerated news, are not legitimate. Prohibitions on
40
Legislative Decree No. 23 of 2016, 6 September 2016.
41
42
The New Media Draft Law in Syria – 2024 Liberating the media from government control: One step back…
two steps back, 2024, https://scm.bz/en/the-new-media-draft-law-in-syria-2024/.
43
Law on Ministry of Information, No. 19 of 2024, 23 April 2024, https://sana.sy/?p=2075689 (in Arabic).
44
Ibid., Article 12.
45
Legislative Decree No. 148 of 1949, 1 August 1949,
https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/10918.
46
See, for example, Syria: ILA Country Report, 2015, p. 1 and Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of
Expression, Legal Environment for Media in Syria, pp. 25-26.
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incitement to hatred are not only allowed by also required by Article 20(2) of the ICCPR, but
it is important to use clear and precise language in framing such rules, which the language of
Article 307 fails to do.
A number of provisions in the Penal Code, including Articles 375-378, are criminal
defamation rules. Among other things, these include special rules for defaming the president,
courts, military or public authorities, and also provide for penalties of imprisonment of
varying lengths.47 It is now clear that criminal rules on defamation are not legitimate and that
sentences of imprisonment are particularly problematical. As the UN Human Rights
Committee has indicated: “States parties should consider the decriminalization of defamation
and, in any case, the application of the criminal law should only be countenanced in the most
serious of cases and imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty.” 48 Providing special
protection to the president is not legitimate; instead, public figures should be required to
tolerate a greater degree of criticism than ordinary citizens. And public bodies such as the
courts, military and other public authorities should not benefit from any protection in
defamation at all.
The Law Regulating Communication on the Web and Countering Cybercrime (Cybercrimes
Law),49 adopted only in 2022, shows that the government has not resiled from its historic
practice of using broad, flexible laws to control statements, including by the media, that are
critical of it. The Cybercrimes Law replaces Legislative Decree No. 17 of 2012, but many
commentators have criticised it for being broader, introducing new crimes and imposing
harsher penalties.
One of the problems with the earlier law was that it did not distinguish between original
authors and others who merely promoted or even just liked a statement. While historically
republication of a statement was deemed to attract the same penalties as the original
publication, this is no longer legitimate in the digital era when very minor, thoughtless
actions can be said to constitute republication. As the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom
of Expression noted in relation to arrests under the earlier law:
Most of them had been arrested by security forces for minor activities on social media ranging
from likes and comments on Facebook, condemning the increasingly difficult living conditions,
and criticizing the government, to statements condemning corruption.50
The Cybercrimes Law retains this problem, with Article 35 providing that online resharing of
content shall be treated as a new post in terms of criminal responsibility and punishment.51
As with the Penal Code, the Cybercrimes Law contains a large number of prohibitions on
content and it is beyond the scope of this report to detail them all. But a few are highlighted
here to give a sense of the problematic nature of this Law. Article 23 generally prohibits the
use of digital devices to take pictures of or record other people without their consent, subject
47
See, for example, Syria: ILA Country Report, 2015, p. 1, Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of
Expression, Study: The Right of Access to Information and Protection of Sources in Syria, p. 18 and Syrian
Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Legal Environment for Media in Syria, p. 25.
48
General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, 12 September 2011, para. 47.
49
Legislative Decree No. 20 of 2022, 18 April 2022, https://www.moct.gov.sy/sites/default/files/%‫قانون‬
2020%‫رقم‬20%‫المعلوماتية‬20%‫الجريمة‬20.pdf.
50
Legal Review of the Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022: Restriction of the right of expression and the right to
access information, p. 8, https://scm.bz/en/legal-review-of-the-cybercrime-law-no-20-of-2022/.
51
Ibid., p. 21.
- 14 -
to imprisonment of one to six months and a fine of between SYP 500,000 and 1,000,000
(approximately USD 37-77). The penalty is increased to imprisonment of 6-12 months and a
fine of between SYP 1,000,000-2,0000 (approximately USD 77-153) if the wrong is
committed against a civil servant.52 This is not inherently inappropriate but there need to be
clear public interest overrides, as with all protections for privacy, including so that the media
can discharge their role of reporting in the public interest. It is also illegitimate to provide for
greater protections for officials who, as in the case of defamation, have to tolerate a lower
degree of protection for their privacy than ordinary citizens.
Article 24 effectively provides for a parallel rule on digital defamation, providing for
imprisonment of one to three months and a fine of between SYP 300,000 and 500,000
(approximately USD 22-37). Once again, the sanctions are increased for public servants with
penalties of imprisonment of 3 to 12 months and a fine of between SYP 500,000 and
1,000,000 (approximately USD 37-77). As noted above, criminalisation of defamation, and
especially imprisonment, is not legitimate and officials should never benefit from greater
protection under defamation law than ordinary citizens. Article 25 also introduces the offence
of “Electronic libel or disdain”, which appears to be even broader than Article 24.53
Article 27 of the Cybercrimes Law makes it a crime against Syria’s constitution to “establish
or manage a website or a webpage or publish any item of content on the web with the
intention of instigating acts that aim to change or call for changing the constitution
unlawfully; to strip any part of the Syrian territory away from the state’s sovereignty; to
instigate an insurrection against the authorities established in accordance with the
constitution, preventing said authorities from discharging their duties as stipulated by the
constitution, or to attempt to topple the ruling regime in the state.” This shall be punished by
imprisonment of between 7 and 15 years and a fine of SYP 10-15 million (approximately
USD 770-1160).54 Article 28 makes it a crime to “disseminate false news online that could
undermine the prestige of the state or compromise national unity”, and is punishable by
imprisonment of between 3-5 years and a fine of SYP 5-10 million (approximately USD 385-
770).55 Article 29 provides for a crime of undermining the financial integrity of the State
while Article 31 provides for a crime relating to offending religious sensibilities. 56
These provisions suffer from the same problems as their counterparts in the Media Law and
Penal Code, with many failing to meet the standard of provided by law, many failing to
protect legitimate interests and all failing the meet the standards of necessity as required
under international law.
The Syrian Network for Human Rights had, as of 18 August 2023, i.e. just 15 months after
the Cybercrimes Law came into force, documented no fewer than 146 cases of individuals
who had been arrested/detained under this law. Of these, 17 were media workers and 13 were
arrested in relation to their social media posts. At the time of that report, 59 had been
52
Ibid., p. 17.
53
Ibid., pp. 17-18.
54
Syrian Network for Human Rights, Law No. 20 of 2022, p. 4, https://snhr.org/blog/2023/08/18/law-no-20-of-
2022-promulgated-by-the-syrian-regime-further-perpetuates-the-oppression-of-freedom-of-opinion-and-
expression-and-has-been-used-as-grounds-for-dozens-of-cases-of-arbitrary-arrest-and-to/.
55
See Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Legal Review of the Cybercrime Law No. 20 of
2022: Restriction of the right of expression and the right to access information, p. 19 and RSF, Syria,
https://rsf.org/en/country/syria.
56
Syrian Network for Human Rights, Law No. 20 of 2022, pp. 5-6.
- 15 -
released, one had died in custody, likely due to torture, and the remaining 86 were still being
detained.57 The Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression has also highlighted a
number of cases against journalists under this law.58
In addition to these content restrictions, the Cybercrimes Law also requires online
intermediaries to retain identifying personal data relating to individuals who send
communications through their services.59 This is in clear breach of international standards,
which rule out indiscriminate official requirements to retain data.
Some other laws which were commonly cited as being used to criminalise media workers and
others include the Counter-terrorism Law, 60 and the rule on the “Application of the provisions
of the Law on Network Communication and Combating Information Crime”.61
The justice problem in Syria is not limited to the laws themselves but also extends to the
courts, including the Military Field Court and the Counter-Terrorism Court. 62 According to
the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, following the creation of the latter,
in 2012:63 “Most of peaceful activists, human rights defenders, media professionals,
journalists and others are being tried since that time before the Anti-terrorism Court.” 64 It is
obvious that, to the extent that a specialised anti-terrorism court is legitimate at all, it could
only be appropriate for actual terrorism offences to be dealt with there. However, these courts
often issue death penalties as final verdicts, which are then carried out forthwith. 65
More generally, many of the documents referred to in this report highlight the lack of
independence of the Syrian judiciary and the whole of the system for the administrative of
justice, the lack of respect for basic due process rights in criminal and other trials and other
serious problems the with legal system. It is beyond the scope of this report to analyse these
failures deeply, but it is patently clear that the local legal system offers not possibility of
redress against the abuses that have and are being suffered by journalists in Syria.
Further exacerbating these problems are laws granting impunity to various security actors for
violations. For example, Article 16 of the Law establishing the General Intelligence
Directorate provides: “The Directorate personnel shall not be prosecuted for any offenses
committed while implementing their tasks unless upon a prosecution order issued by the
director”.66
57
Law No. 20 of 2022, pp. 11 and 13.
58
Legal Review of the Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022: Restriction of the right of expression and the right to
access information, pp. 22-24.
59
Ibid., p. 13.
60
61
62
Created, respectively, by Legislative Decrees No. 64 of 2008 and No. 55 of 2011.
63
Legislative Decree No. 22 of 2012, 26 July 2012.
64
Syrian Arab Republic: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee at its 130th Session for its
List of Issues Prior to Reporting, 28 August 2020, p. 4, available at:
65
See Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Syria: The Black Hole for Media Work: 10 Years of
Violations, note 2, p. 47. The same report lists numerous examples of journalists who have been killed in that
way.
66
Legislative Decree No. 14 of 1969. This is backed up by Article 74 of Decree No. 549 of 1969 on the Internal
Regulations of the Genearal Intelligence (State Security) Directorate. See ibid., p. 47.
- 16 -
Looking beyond the legal provisions, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) provides
longitudinal information about journalists and other media workers who have been killed in
Syria since 1992, listing 142 such cases with confirmed motives (i.e. directly due to their
work as journalists), all of them since 2011, as shown in the chart immediately below. The
largest number of deaths was in 2012, at 31, followed by 30 in 2013. CPJ also tracks the
number of journalists and media workers who have been imprisoned. Once again, 2012 was
the worst year, with 16 journalists and media workers having been imprisoned, followed by
2013 with 13 (see second chart below).
Confirmed Motive Journalists and Media Workers Killed in Syria67
Journalists and Media Workers Imprisoned in Syria68
67
See https://cpj.org/data/killed/all/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&type%5B
%5D=Journalist&type%5B%5D=Media%20Worker&cc_fips%5B
%5D=SY&start_year=1992&end_year=2024&group_by=year.
68
See https://cpj.org/data/location/?cc_fips=SY&start_year=1992&end_year=2024&report-builder-
type=year&status%5B%5D=Imprisoned.
- 17 -
According to RSF, as of 2024, 25 journalists and other media workers remained in detention
in Syria.69
In a report released on 3 May 2024 (World Press Freedom Day), the Syrian Network for
Human Rights recorded 717 journalists and media workers who had been killed between the
beginning of the conflict in March 2011 and 3 May 2024, including 9 foreign journalists and
53 journalists who died due to torture.70 The same report indicates that over the same period
there were a total of 1,358 cases of “arrest and abduction involving journalists and media
workers at the hands of the parties to the conflict and controlling forces in Syria”, of whom
486 remain in detention or have disappeared. 71 Looking just at the year from May 2023 to
May 2024, two journalists had been killed and there were 49 cases of arrest or abduction, of
whom 34 had been released and 15 have now been listed as “forcibly disappeared”. A range
of different parties are responsible for these violations. 72 As noted above, the report Syria:
The Black Hole for Media Work: 10 Years of Violations, by the Syrian Center for Media and
Freedom of Expression, lists 720 extrajudicial killings of journalists between March 2011 and
December 2020.73 For its part, the People's Tribunal on the Murder of Journalists chronicles
426 journalists and other media workers who were killed in Syria between 2011 and 2020.74
Foreign journalists are not spared. The Black Hole report documented 118 cases of violations
against foreign journalists in Syria.75 In January 2019, the US district court for the District of
Columbia found that the Government of Syria deliberately targeted journalists and held it
responsible for the 2012 death of American journalist Marie Colvin, ordering it to pay $300
million in punitive damages due to the “outrageous” circumstances surrounding the attack.
Colvin and French photojournalist Rémi Ochlik died when a rocket attack hit the temporary
media centre they were working out of in the city of Homs in February 2012.76
2. Bases for Syrian Responsibility
It may be noted that, in part, freedom of expression requires States not to interfere with this
right. One aspect of this is not to adopt and then prosecute journalists or other media workers
under laws which go beyond the restrictions on freedom of expression which international
law authorises. This right also imposes an obligation on States and State actors not to attack
journalists or to engage in other actions or measures which constitute reprisals for exercising
their right to freedom of expression. But this right even places a positive obligation on States
69
RSF, Syria, https://rsf.org/en/country/syria.
70
Statement on World Press Freedom Day, p. 4, https://snhr.org/blog/2024/05/03/on-world-press-freedom-day-
717-journalists-and-media-workers-have-been-documented-as-killed-by-the-parties-to-the-conflict-and-
controlling-forces-in-syria-since-march-2011-including-53-who-died-due/.
71
Ibid., p. 5.
72
Ibid., pp. 6-9.
73
Note 2.
74
See Judgment Session on the murder of Journalists: November 2021 to September 2022, pp. 80-92,
https://ptmurderofjournalists.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/FPU_Permanent-Peoples-
Tribunal_engels_online.pdf.
75
See p. 3.
76
Owen Bowcott, “US court finds Assad regime liable for Marie Colvin's death in Syria”, 31 January 2019, The
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/jan/31/us-court-finds-assad-regime-liable-marie-colvin-
death-homs-syria. The Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression provided support in the case,
presenting evidence, including testimonies from witnesses and defectors from the those suspected of bombing
the media centre, as well as documentation from open sources.
- 18 -
to, among other things, provide protection to journalists who are at risk of being attacked for
exercising their right to freedom of expression.77
However, the attacks against journalists in Syria also raise concerns under other areas of both
human rights and wider international law. In terms of human rights, everyone has a right not
to be subjected to “torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (see
Article 7 of the ICCPR and the whole of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment or CAT).78 The ICCPR and other human
rights conventions also protect the right to life (see Article 6 of the ICCPR), the right to non-
discrimination, including on the basis of gender (see Articles 2 and 3 of the ICCPR, the
whole of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
or CEDAW79 and the whole of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (CERD)),80 the rights to liberty and security of the person (see
Article 9 of the ICCPR), the right to be treated with humanity and respect even when
deprived of liberty (see Article 10 of the ICCPR), the right to have any criminal charge
determined through a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law” (see Article 14 of the ICCPR) and the right to peaceful assembly
(see Article 21 of the ICCPR), among other things.
States also have obligations under international humanitarian law. The different conflicts in
Syria are, variously, of an international or non-international nature, depending on the
combatants. Syria has ratified the four main Geneva Conventions 81 and well as Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).82 These conventions place a number of
obligations on States, mainly in relation to international armed conflicts, so these rules apply
to those parts of the Syrian conflict which are international in nature. It is beyond the scope of
this report to delve into detail into the details of the rules in these conventions. But
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War sets out
detailed rules relating to the treatment of civilians, which encompasses journalists and other
media workers (as long as they do not become engaged directly in hostilities). These include,
among many other things, prohibitions on “murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation
77
See, for example, the 2012 Joint Declaration on Crimes Against Freedom of Expression of the special
international mandates on freedom of expression, 25 June 2012, https://www.law-democracy.org/live/legal-
work/standard-setting/.
78
General Assembly Resolution 39/46, 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-
inhuman-or-degrading.
79
General Assembly Resolution 34/180, 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cedaw.pdf.
80
General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cerd.pdf.
81
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
(Geneva), 12 August 1949, Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva), 12 August 1949, Convention (III) Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva), 12 August 1949, and Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva), 12 August 1949, all available at https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-
law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions#:~:text=The%20Geneva%20Conventions%20and%20their
%20Additional%20Protocols%20form%20the%20core,are%20no%20longer%20doing%20so. Syria ratified all
of them on 2 November 1953, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/public/refdocs/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf.
82
8 June 1977, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977. Syria ratified this convention on 14
November 1983, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/public/refdocs/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf.
- 19 -
and medical or scientific experiments”, as well as “any other measures of brutality” (Article
32).
Syria has not ratified the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
II),83 which deals specifically with non-international armed conflicts. However, Common
Article 3 of the four main Conventions, titled “Conflicts not of an international character”, is
applicable due to Syria’s ratification of those Conventions. Common Article 3 states, in part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
This, then, applies to Syria as a party to those treaties in respect of areas experiencing non-
international armed conflict.
The rules of international criminal law are also relevant here, in particular as set out in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).84 This provides for
individual criminal responsibility under international law for those who commit the crimes
spelled out in the Statute. For current purposes, the key relevant crimes are war crimes and
crimes against humanity. War crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law
norms (i.e. the norms found in the Geneva Conventions). Crimes against humanity are serious
criminal acts, including murder, torture and persecution, committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population, of which the perpetrator had
knowledge. Syria has not ratified the Rome Statute, so it cannot be applied to responsible
actors in that country, but these crimes are relevant to the question of universal jurisdiction,
addressed below.
3. International Options for Redress
This section, the main body of this report, looks at a number of international options for
redress for impunity for crimes and human rights abuse of journalists, other media workers
and media outlets. There are a large number of different types of mechanisms and this section
is broken down into sub-sections, namely the Universal Periodic Review, Treaty Systems
83
8 June 1977, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/apii-1977.
84
17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf.
- 20 -
(further sub-divided into different treaties), Specialised Mechanisms for Syria and Other
General UN Mechanisms. Most of these different mechanisms focus exclusively or at least
primarily on human rights issues, given that there are limited options for international
humanitarian law review of State behaviour and that Syria has not signed onto the key
international criminal law option, namely the International Criminal Court (ICC).
3. 1 Universal Periodic Review
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is run directly by the UN Human Rights Council
(HRC), the peak UN body for dealing with human rights. The HRC is comprised of 47 UN
Member States, elected by majority vote from among the 193 UN Member States for three-
year terms, renewable once. Terms are staggered and elections take place each year, with
one-third of the members being renewed each year, and the seats being distributed equitably
among the five UN regional groups.
Given its status as a direct HRC procedure, the UPR can be described as the leading global
human rights review system. As the name suggests, it is universal in the sense that it applies
in an equal manner to all 193 UN Member States, and it is periodic, taking place every 4½
years for each State. The UPR process is currently in its fourth cycle, with Syria due to be
considered in January or February 2027.85 The third cycle review of Syria was held on 24
January 2022.86
The UPR is, at heart, a peer review system whereby UN Member States review the human
rights performance of each other, and it is styled as an interactive discussion between States.
The reviews are conducted by the UPR Working Group, which is the 47 members of the
HRC, but any State can participate and groups of three States, known as troikas, assist in each
review. Three sets of documents feed into each review. First, the State under review provides
a national report on its performance. Second, the review looks at official reports from
different UN bodies such as treaty bodies, special procedures (like UN special rapporteurs)
and other UN entities, which are brought together in what is called a Compilation of UN
information. UNESCO normally contributes information on freedom of expression, media
freedom and the right to information to this Compilation.
Third, other stakeholders – such as civil society organisations and national human rights
institutions – can also make submissions to the UPR process, which is compiled into what is
known as a Summary of stakeholders' information. Unfortunately, it is not always very easy
to locate the different underlying submissions and while individual submissions are referred
to by the acronym of the submitting body (such as SNHR for Syrian Network for Human
Rights), the many joint submissions are just referred to by their number (as in JS1, JS2). Civil
society organisations can submit one individual and one joint submission and participate in as
many other joint submissions (i.e. led by other groups) as they wish. The word limit for
submissions is 2815 words for an individual submission and 5630 words for a joint
submission.87
85
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/upr-home.
86
Information about the third review of Syria is available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/sy-index.
87
See Universal Periodic Review: A Guide For Civil Society For The Fourth Cycle,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/upr/sessions/2022-10-24/UPR-4th-cycle-civil-
society-guide.pdf.
- 21 -
The scope of the review covers the extent to which States respect their human rights
obligations set out in: (1) the UN Charter; (2) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
(3) human rights treaties which the State has ratified; (4) voluntary pledges and commitments
made by the State (such as national human rights policies and/or programmes); and (5)
applicable international humanitarian law.
During a 3½-hour review, which is at the centre of the whole process, any State may ask
questions or make comments or recommendations to the State under review. Following this,
an outcome report is prepared setting out the comments and recommendations of States and
the response of the State being reviewed, which is either to accept (support) a
recommendation or to note it. This report is then formally adopted by the HRC, during a
session at which not only HRC members but also other States, national human rights
institutions and civil society organisations can make comments. This is the key outcome
document of the UPR review.
States are expected to take action to implement the recommendations they support, while
other States can offer to provide assistance to this end. And States are expected to report at
their next UPR session on the progress they have made.88 The UPR also has a voluntary mid-
term reporting system, whereby States report on progress in between UPR reviews. To date,
Syria has not made a mid-term report.
A strength of the UPR process is that since it is universal and run by the HRC, most States
collaborate with it in a reasonably timely fashion. Thus, Syria had its first review on 7
October 2011, its second on 31 October 2016 and its third on 24 January 2022. In contrast
(see below), Syria simply failed to cooperate with the ICCPR reporting system between 2005
and 2022. All States can make recommendations to States under review and the latter needs
either to support or merely note those recommendations, all of which will appear in the final
report. Often, these recommendations are very general in nature, such as to review laws
restricting freedom of expression and to bring them into line with international standards. It is
very easy for States under review to agree to such recommendations, since any law reform
efforts they make can be counted towards this. However, where civil society organisations
prepare clear and specific submissions on reform needs, and have also made sure that these
get distributed to those States which are likely to make strong recommendations on freedom
of expression, the quality of State recommendations on freedom of expression has generally
been much better.
As noted above, the 2022 UPR for Syria contained a number of recommendations relating to
freedom of expression, including three on the release of human rights defenders, one on
ending persecution and harassment of human rights defenders, one on respecting freedom of
expression generally and one on adopting right to information and press freedom legislation.
Although these are all very general, they do at least focus on the subject matter of this report
and, as such, it would be useful to try to get States to focus on progress on implementing
these recommendations at the next UPR. Since the last Syrian UPR was completed just two
years ago, it will be another three years until there is another one.
3. 2 Treaty Systems
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

88
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/upr-implementation.
- 22 -
Syria has ratified a number of global human rights treaties which are relevant to the
protection of freedom of expression and media freedom. Key among these is the ICCPR,
which Syria ratified in 1969. The ICCPR is the key international treaty guaranteeing freedom
of expression.
For our purposes, there are two main mechanisms of enforcement under the ICCPR. Both are
overseen by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRCttee), the body of 18 independent
experts who are elected by States Parties to the ICCPR in accordance with the terms of that
treaty.
The first, which enables individual complaints about human rights abuses, is unfortunately
not applicable to Syria, since that country has not ratified the (first) Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,89 which is necessary to enable this
mechanism. Briefly, for States covered by this system, anyone can submit a communication
claiming a breach by that State of their human rights. This is screened for admissibility (for
which there are a number of conditions) and the matter is then referred to the State concerned
for its response. The procedure, which is conducted entirely in written form, without any
hearing, allows for some responses by both complainant and State before it goes for
consideration by the HRCttee. The HRCttee then adopts what are called Observations, setting
out the facts that it has determined for the case, the matters at issue in the case, the various
submissions by the parties, and then the decision of the HRCttee, often divided into its views
on admissibility and then the merits of the case.90
For countries like Syria, which do not fall under the jurisdiction of one of the regional
systems of human rights in Europe, the Americas and Africa, the ICCPR individual
complaints system represents virtually the only option for individual consideration of human
rights matters at the international level. As such, it is a very important mechanism. 117 States
have ratified the (first) Optional Protocol, including a number of States in North Africa but
none in the Middle East.91
The second ICCPR mechanism is the regular reporting cycle pursuant to which all States are
expected to report on “the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights
recognized” in the ICCPR (Article 40(1)). Syria’s first cycle was completed in 1977, its
second in 2001, its third in 2005 and it is currently in the midst of its fourth reporting cycle.
According to Article 40(1) of the ICCPR, which mandates these periodic reports, the first
shall be submitted within one year of the entry into force of the ICCPR for the State and
thereafter “whenever the Committee so requests”. Since the ICCPR only entered into force in
1976, Syria’s first cycle was timely. The HRCttee traditionally operated on a five-year cycle
for these periodic reports but there was a 24-year gap between Syria’s first and second cycle,
presumably based on the failure of Syria to present a report. The second and third cycles were
appropriately gapped but there was then a 17-year gap before Syria presented its fourth report
in 2022.
Under the traditional five-year cycle approach, States would present their reports, the
HRCttee would prepare a list of issues, the State would respond and the Committee would
then prepare its Concluding Observations, highlighting successes and concerns and making
89
See https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/OHCHR_Map_ICCPR-OP1.pdf.
90
Information about individual complaints under the ICCPR is available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-
bodies/ccpr/individual-communications.
91
See https://indicators.ohchr.org for a list of States which have ratified the main UN human rights treaties.
- 23 -
recommendations. The HRCttee has now moved to what it calls the Predictable Review
Cycle or simplified reporting procedure,92 which is an eight-year cycle starting with the
HRCttee preparing a list of issues, the State preparing responses, a periodic review if
necessary and then the preparation of Concluding Observations. Since Syria had not prepared
a report for a long time, its current (fourth) cycle is following the traditional approach, i.e.
starting with the State report, which was published on 27 May 2022. The List of issues in
relation to the fourth periodic report of the Syrian Arab Republic was published in March
2023.93 As noted above, it listed a number of freedom of expression issues such as media
censorship, forcing journalists to reveal their sources, monitoring of broadcasting, attacks
against journalists, measures taken to protect media independence, efforts to decriminalise
defamation, and efforts to bring the Cybercrimes Law, the Penal Code, the Media Law and
the Counter-terrorism Law into line with international standards. 94 The deadline for
submissions by civil society organisations was 3 June 2024 and Syria will be considered at
the 141st Session of the Committee, to be held from 1 to 23 July 2024.95
Concluding Observations are typically less than 15 pages, covering all of the rights protected
in the ICCPR, such that only a short section of the Observations is normally focused on
freedom of expression and media freedom, of course depending on the Committee’s view of
the hierarchy of human rights challenges for the country in question.
Civil society organisations are encouraged to make submissions to the HRCttee as part of the
periodic reporting process. There is a schedule for this, which is published on the country
page of the review process, and the Committee has a brief guide on the process. 96
Submissions are limited to 10,000 words or approximately 15 pages. Organisations can also
make oral submissions during the consideration of the State’s report by the Committee.
The HRCttee has a follow-up procedure through which it identifies two to four specific
recommendations from the Concluding Observations which require immediate attention
which it considers can be implemented within a year. The State concerned is requested to
report on the measures it has taken to implement these recommendations one year after the
adoption of the Concluding Observations. A person who has been designated as the “Follow-
up Rapporteur” reviews the State report and the HRCttee decides on appropriate follow-up
measures, after determining whether the State has addressed the issue, has made progress but
needs to do more, has not moved forward or has exacerbated the problem (which decision
will be communicated to the State concerned).
CAT, CRC, CEDAW and CERD

Syria has ratified each of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) (19 August 2004), the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC)97 (15 July 1993), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
92
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/ccpr/predictable-review-cycle.
93
See https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/countries.aspx?
CountryCode=SYR&Lang=EN.
94
Ibid., para. 23.
95
See https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/SessionDetails1.aspx?
SessionID=2734&Lang=en and the NGO Information Note on that page.
96
Available at: https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g12/431/82/pdf/g1243182.pdf?
token=wjdrd1EeBI0R2vHSBD&fe=true.
97
General Assembly Resolution 44/25, 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child.
- 24 -
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (28 March 2003) and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (21 April
1969). Each of these has a similar structure for implementation, each overseen by a
committee of experts (with 18 experts, like the HRCttee, for the CRC and the CERD, 10 for
the CAT and 23 for the CEDAW). Each envisages a similar regular reporting system as under
the ICCPR and each also provides for individual complaints in relation to States which have
ratified the procedure for this. Syria has not ratified any of the individual complaints
procedures.
In terms of the periodic reporting system, all of these mechanisms allow civil society
organisations to submit parallel reports and most also allow civil society organisations to
make oral presentations during the consideration of the matter before the relevant body. Each
also has a similar approach to reporting, calling on States bodies to present their initial reports
within one or two years of the treaty coming into force for that State and thereafter
periodically, every two, four or five years. Specifically, under the CAT, reports should be
submitted after one year and thereafter every four years (Article 19(1)). For the CRC, the first
report needs to be submitted within two years and thereafter every five years (Article 44).
The CEDAW mandates a first report within one year and thereafter every four years or
whenever the CEDAW Committee so requests (Article 18(1)). Finally, under the CERD, a
first report should be provided within one year and thereafter every two years or, like the
CEDAW, whenever the CERD Committee so requests (Article 9(1)).
Each of these different treaties protect different rights which may be relevant to the question
of impunity for crimes and human rights abuse against journalists, other media workers and
media outlets in Syria. The focus of the CAT, as the name implies, is on torture, so this is
very relevant to the issue of impunity give how widespread torture is in Syria.
The CRC protects a number of rights of children, defined as those under 18 years of age,
unless a different age is stipulated in the relevant national legislation. These include the right
to freedom of expression which is guaranteed, in Article 13, in almost identical terms to
Article 19(2) and (3) of the ICCPR (see also Articles 12 and 15, the latter of which
guarantees children the right to access information from diverse sources, including the
media). The CRC also guarantees the rights of children to be free of discrimination (Article
2), to peaceful assembly (Article 15), not to be sexually abused (Article 34), to be free of
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 37), to respect
for the rules of international humanitarian law (Article 38) and to criminal due process rights
(Article 40).
The CEDAW protects a number of rights of women, with a strong focus, as the name of the
Convention suggests, on combatting discrimination. One specific area addressed by the
CEDAW which may be more relevant to the issue of impunity which is the subject of this
report is ending trafficking in and sexual exploitation of women (Article 6). The CERD is,
like the CEDAW, primarily focused on ending discrimination. However, given the strong
ethnic overtones of the various conflicts in Syria, it may well be relevant to the issue of
impunity for crimes and human rights abuses against journalists and other media workers.
The last full reporting cycle for Syria under the CAT, the second, was completed with the
adoption of Concluding Observations in June 2012.98 Syria was then supposed to provide a
98
See https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC
%2FSYR%2FCO%2F1%2FAdd.2&Lang=en.
- 25 -
State party report in May 2014 but this has not yet happened. 99 A couple of civil society
organisations provided parallel reports for the second cycle. In the 2012 Concluding
Observations, the CAT Committee expressed “grave concern” about “widespread use of
torture and cruel and inhuman treatment of detainees, individuals suspected of having
participated in demonstrations, journalists, web bloggers”, as well as “killings of journalists,
lawyers, human rights defenders and activists”.100 It then called on Syria to:
Immediately cease all attacks against journalists and human rights defenders and advocates, and
take all necessary steps to ensure that all persons, including those monitoring human rights, are
protected from any intimidation or violence as a result of their activities and exercise of human
rights guarantees, to ensure the prompt, impartial and effective investigation into such acts, and to
prosecute and punish perpetrators and provide redress including compensation to victims. 101
Given that Syria has effectively ceased to report under this mechanism, it is not clear when
the next cycle might take place. However, once it does, it is clearly important for civil society
organisations and others to provide relevant information to the CAT Committee about
relevant abuses against journalists and other media workers.
The last reporting cycle for Syria under the CRC, the fifth, concluded in 2019 with the
adoption of Concluding Observations by the CRC Committee on 6 March 2019, with the
previous cycle having been concluded in 2012. The next State report was due on 13 February
2024 but it appears that it has not yet been submitted. A few civil society organisations
provided parallel reports in the fifth cycle.102
The fifth cycle Concluding Observations included a couple of comments on freedom of

expression and access to information, calling generally on Syria to “ensure the full respect for
the child’s rights to freedom of expression and to freedom of association and peaceful
assembly” and to “ensure children’s access to information and material from a diversity of
national and international sources of all forms, including the Internet”. 103 The CRC
Committee made references to attacks on, sexual abuse of and other harms to children as a
result of the conflict.104 It also decried the presence of widespread torture and cruel and
inhuman punishment of children who had been detained and called on Syria to investigate all
allegations of these sorts of human rights abuses. 105 These are just some of the relevant
references in the Concluding Observations. None of these references specifically alluded to
the issue of child journalists or other media workers. However, if evidence of such atrocities
were presented to the CRC Committee, this might quite likely warrant a reference. Given that
the upcoming cycle for Syria under the CRC should be relatively soon, depending on when
Syria provides its State report, this might represent an interesting opportunity for civil society
engagement in this area.
99
100
Paras. 20(a) and (l).
101
Para. 22(f).
102
All of these documents are available at:
103
Paras. 25-26, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC
%2FC%2FSYR%2FCO%2F5&Lang=en.
104
Ibid., para. 19.
105
Ibid., paras. 27-28.
- 26 -
The last completed reporting cycle for Syria under the CEDAW, like the CAT just the
second, concluded with the adoption of Concluding Observations in July 2014. 106 It is not
clear from the UN records what happened after that as no date for a third cycle report appears
to have been established. A few civil society organisations provided parallel reports for the
second cycle. In the 2014 Concluding Observations, the CEDAW Committee did not refer
specifically to journalists but it did call on Syria to “guarantee the human rights of women
activists, in particular freedom of movement, expression, assembly and association,
nationality, liberty and integrity of the person and access to justice” 107 and to ensure “that
women are able to participate freely in political and public life, independent of the
Government, and in an enabling environment in full respect of their freedoms of expression,
association and assembly”.108
Syria regularly participated in the CERD periodic reporting process between 1971 and 1992,
providing ten reports and going through ten full cycles. However, the following State party
report, due in May 2000, was never provided and there has been no cooperation with the
mechanism since then.109
Arab Charter on Human Rights

A first version of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (ACHR) 110 was adopted on 15
September 1994 but no State ended up ratifying it. An updated version was then adopted in
2004, and came into force in 2008, following ratification by seven States. Syria is among the
States which have ratified the ACHR.111
The ACHR guarantees a number of rights, including freedom of expression, in Article 32, as
follows:
1. The present Charter guarantees the right to information and to freedom of opinion and
expression, as well as the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
medium, regardless of geographical boundaries.
2. Such rights and freedoms shall be exercised in conformity with the fundamental values of
society and shall be subject only to such limitations as are required to ensure respect for the rights
or reputation of others or the protection of national security, public order and public health or
morals.
This guarantee is positive inasmuch as it protects both the right to freedom of expression and
the right to information. However, it is limited by the condition that it be exercised in
conformity with the “fundamental values of society”, a vague formulation which is not
subject to any constraints. The test for restrictions also lacks a requirement for such
restrictions to be provided by law. The list of grounds for restricting freedom of expression is
the same as in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. Instead of the necessity test, the ACHR refers to
106
See https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC
%2FSYR%2FCO%2F1%2FAdd.2&Lang=en.
107
Para. 30(b). The report is available at
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FSYR
%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en.
108
Para. 36(c).
109
110
22 May 2004, entered into force 15 March 2008,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/IJudiciary/Arab-Charter-on-Human-Rights-
2005.pdf.
111
See https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2009/10/the-arab-charter-on-human-rights?lang=en.
- 27 -
the idea of being “required”, which, depending on interpretation, could amount to pretty
much the same thing.
Unlike all of the other regional systems for the protection of human rights – i.e. within
Europe, the Americas and Africa – the ACHR does not enable individual complaints. Instead,
like the various UN treaties, Article 48 simply provides for a reporting mechanism, initially
within one year of the Charter coming into force for a State Party and thereafter every three
years.
A separate Statute of the Arab Court of Human Rights 112 was adopted in 2014. However,
according to Article 19(1) of the Statute, only the State whose citizen claims to be a victim of
human rights abuse may bring a case before the Court, while States may also, pursuant to
Article 19(2), accept that accredited NGOs may bring cases on behalf of individuals. The
Court and the systems under the Statute have been strongly criticised by a range of human
rights actors.113 In any case, as of 29 May 2024, no State had yet ratified the Statute.114
3. 3 Specialised Mechanisms for Syria
The UN has provided for four specialised mechanisms for Syria, all of which are relevant to
the issue of combatting impunity for crimes and human rights abuses against journalists,
other media workers and media outlets. The first is the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI). 115 The COI was first created on
22 August 2011 by Human Rights Council Resolution S-17/1.116 The resolution tasked the
COI with investigating “all alleged violations of international human rights law since March
2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic” and with establishing “the facts and circumstances that
may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify
those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that
may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable”. 117 The mandate of the IIC has
continuously been extended since it was first created, most recently through
Resolution 55/22, adopted on 4 April 2024.118 The COI presents both written and oral reports
to the HRC. In addition to its general mandate, the COI has also been asked to look into
specific situations in Syria, such as the events in El-Houleh in 2012 119 and the events in
Aleppo in 2016.120
112
7 September 2014, https://acihl.org/texts.htm?article_id=44&lang=ar-SA.
113
See, for example, International Commission of Jurists, The Arab Court of Human Rights: A Flawed Statute
for an Ineffective Court, 2015, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MENA-Arab-Court-of-Human-
Rights-Publications-Report-2015-ENG.pdf
114
See University of Melbourne, Emerging Arab States Human Rights Mechanisms,
https://unimelb.libguides.com/c.php?g=928011&p=6704321.
115
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/independent-international-commission.
116
22 August 2011, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/
ResS17_1.pdf.
117
Ibid., para. 13.
118
See https://undocs.org/A/HRC/RES/55/22.
119
Resolution S/19-1, 4 June 2012, https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/g12/137/73/pdf/g1213773.pdf?
token=3hV9hghrAaoYj5KUF9&fe=true.
120
Resolution S-25/1, 25 October 2016, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g16/238/14/pdf/g1623814.pdf?
token=4bZXmKQJcxvOAIp2Zh&fe=true.
- 28 -
The most recent Report of the COI was issued on 9 February 2024. 121 The recent versions of
these reports are broken down into sections covering the different parts of the country
(focused on the main actors who are responsible for each area). They focus on the overall
military situation, breaches of international humanitarian law, and also breaches of
fundamental rights. In the February 2024 report, this latter section in the government-
controlled areas part of the report focused on a violent response to a protest, as well as on
attacks on freedom of expression, including via arbitrary detentions and arrests, including for
posts on social media.122
This, then, provides a fairly detailed and granular official report on attacks on journalists and
others. The COI welcomes submissions from individuals and civil society organisations and
even has a very specific and fixed schedule for the filing of such submissions, namely by 1
June for the September report (covering events from January-June) and 1 December for the
March report (covering events from July-December), along with contact details.123
Another specialised mechanism for Syria is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Syrian Arab Republic. As of November 2023, the HRC had established
46 thematic and 14 country mandates, of which the Special Rapporteur for Syria is one of the
latter. The UN describes these mandates as “independent human rights experts with mandates
to report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective”. 124 In
general, these mandates may undertake country visits to assess the situation (focusing on the
relevant thematic issue for thematic mandates), act on individual complaints by engaging in
dialogue with States about them and raise awareness about human rights situations.
The Special Rapporteur for Syria was originally provided for in HRC Resolution S-18/1 of 2
December 2011.125 The Resolution gives a mandate to the Special Rapporteur to:
[M]onitor the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic as well as the implementation
of the recommendations made by the commission of inquiry addressed to the authorities of the
Syrian Arab Republic and of the resolutions of the Human Rights Council on the situation of
human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.126
However, the mandate will only be created in practice “once the mandate of the commission
of inquiry ends”.127 Furthermore, the person tagged to be the mandate holder – Mr. Paulo
Sérgio Pinheiro (from Brazil) – is currently the Chair of the COI.128
Another important mechanism for current purposes is the International, Impartial and
Independent Mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible
for the most serious crimes under International Law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic
since March 2011 (IIIM), established by a 21 December 2016 United Nations General
121
A/HRC/55/64. All of the reports, which are issued semi-annually, can be found at
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/documentation#statements.
122
See paras. 52-55 of the report.
123
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/independent-international-commission.
124
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures-human-rights-council.
125
A/HRC/RES/S-18/1, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/
SpecialSession/Session18/A-HRC-RES-S-18-1_en.pdf.
126
Ibid., para. 10.
127
Ibid.
128
See https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures-human-rights-council/current-and-former-mandate-
holders-existing-mandates/
- 29 -
Assembly resolution.129 This was established after vetoes in the UN Security Council
prevented the situation in Syria from being referred to the International Criminal Court.
The IIIM does not have the power to launch prosecutions of its own. Instead, it aims to
provide support to jurisdictions which have launched or may launch investigations and
prosecutions against suspected perpetrators of crimes in Syria. To do this, it collects evidence
from a wide range of sources, including civil society organisations. The evidence it collects is
stored in a Central Repository of Information and Evidence, which is governed by strict
confidentiality rules and which has in place rigorous information security measures. This
information is then shared with relevant official authorities (i.e. those with a formal mandate
to investigate and prosecute crimes) in target jurisdictions, either upon request or proactively
when the IIIM sees a need for its evidence. The IIIM does not report publicly on its work,
given the nature of that work, but it does submit an annual report to the UN General
Assembly on “its activities, priorities and funding requirements”.
The formal mandate of the IIIM is captured in paragraph 4 of Resolution 71/248, which
established it, as follows:
[T]o collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations of international humanitarian
law and human rights violations and abuses and to prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite
fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with international law standards, in
national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have
jurisdiction over these crimes, in accordance with international law.
The IIIM has a special note on its engagement with civil society organisations on its website,
which states:
The IIIM is mandated to establish two-way dialogue with Syrian civil society organisations
(CSOs) and engage with them via regular consultations, targeted outreach events, biannual
dialogue meetings along with distributing regular newsletters providing updates on its work. The
IIIM formalised its operational engagement with Syrian CSOs by signing a Protocol of
Cooperation in 2018 to provide a general framework for engaging with the IIIM. When
appropriate, the IIIM also enters into individual MoUs with specific CSOs setting out practical and
individualised details with those seeking to share material.130
Although the IIIM may be less high-profile than some of the other mechanisms which are
profiled in this report, in fact it is a very important one for groups which wish to see
accountability for crimes committed by different actors in Syria. Ultimately, there are very
few hard, legal avenues for such accountability, of which the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by national courts is proving to be the main avenue in practice (see below under
National Options for Redress). The IIIM can serve as a practical means to route valuable
information which has been collected by individuals or civil society organisations to those
jurisdictions which are in fact either engaged in or contemplating investigations or
prosecutions. Absent this facilitation, it would normally be very difficult for civil society
organisations holding such information to know how to get that information to criminal
justice actors in relevant jurisdictions. It is thus very important for civil society organisations
which do have such information to collaborate with the IIIM.131
129
Resolution A/71/248, https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/248.
130
See https://iiim.un.org/who-we-are/at-a-glance/.
131
It may be noted, as a separate matter, that it is important for civil society organisations which are collecting
such information to do so in a manner that preserves it properly such that it might ultimately be accepted by
courts as evidence, taking into account the strict rules for such evidence that apply in all legal system. This is a
- 30 -
The fourth, and most recent specialised UN mechanism for Syria is the Independent
Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP), established by the United
Nations General Assembly in a 29 June 2023 resolution. 132 The primary mandate of the IIMP
is “to clarify the fate and whereabouts of all missing persons in the Syrian Arab Republic and
to provide adequate support to victims, survivors and the families of those missing”. 133 Civil
society advocacy played a key role in getting the IIMP established. 134 In a briefing to the UN
General Assembly on 25 April 2024, Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, indicated that his Office had recruited staff for the IIMP. With the budget having been
approved just the day before, they were expecting a director for the IIMP to be recruited in
the coming months. As of the anniversary of the adoption of the resolution creating it, on 29
June 2024, however, no director had yet been appointed.135
3. 4 Other General UN Mechanisms
There are a number of thematic mandates which are relevant to the issue under consideration
in this report, namely impunity for crimes and human rights abuse against journalists and
other media workers. The first, and most important, is the Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, whose mandate
covers, as the title indicates, freedom of expression.
Like all special mandates, this Special Rapporteur can, among other things, issue
communications to Syria regarding specific human rights situations, including attacks on
freedom of expression. The Rapporteur has issued at least 26 such communications since
2011.136 The most recent, issued on 30 June 2023,137 jointly with the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights defenders, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, focused
on a physical attack against and intimidation of Mr. Jdea Abdullah Nawfal, Director of the
Centre for Democracy and Civil Rights in Syria, which appears to be related to his human
rights work. The previous one, issued on 17 March 2021, 138 jointly with the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
complex topic which is beyond the scope of this report but the Centre for Law and Democracy has produced a
Manual for Journalists on Collecting and Preserving Information About International Crimes which may be
useful reading for civil society organisations working in this area. Available at
https://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Manual.War-Crimes.Final_-1.pdf.
132
Resolution 77/301, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/190/47/pdf/n2319047.pdf?
token=JuKSwCuGped9C92nAa&fe=true.
133
Ibid., para. 2.
134
See, for example, Civil Society Organizations Urge UN Member States to Vote in Favor of Independent
Institution on Missing Persons in Syria, 23 June 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/23/civil-society-
organizations-urge-un-member-states-vote-favor-independent.
135
See Synergy Hevdestî, Statement on the First Anniversary of the Resolution to Establish the Independent
Institution on Missing Persons in Syria, 29 June 2024, https://hevdesti.org/en/statement-on-first-anniversary-of-
the-resolution-to-establish-the-independent-institution-on-missing-persons-in-syria/.
136
A wealth of information about UN human rights bodies and Syria can be found at:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/syrian-arab-republic. The dedicated webpage for the Special Rapporteur on
freedom of expression is at https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-freedom-of-opinion-and-expression.
137
See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28192.
138
See https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26164.
- 31 -
health, and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, focused on the
killing of journalist and human rights defender Mr. Hussain Khattab.
The aim with such communications is to enter into some sort of dialogue with the State
concerned, ideally so as to reach a resolution of the matter. But these communications, which
are made public in due course, also serve to provide official status to reports of human rights
abuse and also to publicise the actions involved. It is not clear whether Syria responds to such
communications.
The special mandates rely heavily on civil society actors for information about events on the
ground which may warrant the issuance of a communication. It is thus very important for
civil society organisations to provide relevant information to the mandates. As the two
communications mentioned above highlight, thematic mandates often join together with other
relevant mandate holders when issuing such communications. In the context of attacks and
human rights abuse directed at journalists, the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights defenders will almost always be engaged and then, depending on
the facts, so might other mandates.
The special thematic mandates also undertake country visits, as noted above. No country visit
by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression is currently envisaged for Syria (these
visits need to be distributed among all 193 UN Member States). 139 However, since 2011,
country visits which are relevant to this report were conducted by the Special Rapporteur on
the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, in
2023 and also 2018, and by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally
displaced persons, in 2016. It may be noted that visits by mandates to countries other than
Syria may also be relevant to the situation in Syria. For example, a visit by the Working
Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the
exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination to Austria in 2019 looked at, among
other things, “the motivational factors that prompted individuals to travel [from Austria] to
conflict areas such as those in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic”.140
The Preliminary findings of the visit to the Syrian Arab Republic by the Special Rapporteur
on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights
Prof. Dr. Alena Douhan (2023 visit)141 do not refer directly to journalists but did include the
following statement: “I also request all interlocutors to ensure access of Syrian nationals to
information and to exercise freedom of expression online, and to withdraw limitations on
their use of online instruments.”142 The 2018 report did not include references to either
journalists or freedom of expression.143 However, all UN special rapporteurs are open to
receiving information and inputs from civil society organisations so it is possible that had
groups working on media freedom submitted information to this Special Rapporteur, that
information would have been reflected in the reports. The reason this mandate is important is
139
A list of all country visits to Syria, whether they took place or were just envisaged, since 1998 is available at
https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=SYR&Lang=en.
140
Available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4242add2-visit-austria-report-
working-group-use-mercenaries-means.
141
Available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5423add1-visit-syrian-arab-republic-
report-special-rapporteur.
142
Ibid., p. 16.
143
Available at https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC
%2F39%2F54%2FAdd.2&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
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that it has been able to visit Syria twice since 2011. The same applies to the 2016 report of
the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons 144 (i.e. it did not
include references to journalists or freedom of expression but it might have had relevant
information been provided to the Special Rapporteur).
Finally, it should not be overlooked that more regular UN actors also issue reports which may
be relevant to the issue of attacks or human rights abuse against journalists and other media
workers. For example, in August 2022, the UN Secretary General issued a report on Missing
people in the Syrian Arab Republic.145 In June 2022, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights issued a report on Civilian Deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic. 146 Such
reports are highly visible and attract a lot of attention. Civil society organisations focusing on
impunity for attacks and human rights abuse against journalists and other media workers
should, to the extent possible, also consider providing information to inform these processes.
4. National Options for Redress
This part of the report focuses on national options for redress, albeit looking at nations other
than Syria, i.e. options from outside of the country. Normally, States only prosecute crimes
which take place on their territory, which involve their citizens as perpetrators or victims, or
which involve important interests of the State, normally its security. The principle of
universal jurisdiction provides for States to prosecute crimes regardless of where they
occurred or who was involved. The core underlying notion behind this principle is that
certain crimes are so grave that they affect the international community as a whole. Put
differently, one might say that these crimes harm the international community as a whole, or
even international order. A supplementary rationale for such jurisdiction is to avoid impunity
for such crimes.
The idea of universal jurisdiction has reasonably ancient historical roots and can be traced,
for example, to the prosecution of the crime of piracy. 147 An early basis for such universal
jurisdiction was a common article found in each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, namely
Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146, respectively, provides, in relevant part:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of
the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance
with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High
Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie
case.
144
Available at https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC
%2F32%2F35%2FAdd.2&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
145
A/76/890, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/a76890-missing-people-syrian-arab-
republic-report-secretary-general.
146
A/HRC/50/68, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/reports/ahrc5068-civilian-deaths-syrian-
arab-republic-report-united-nations-high.
147
See, for example, Xavier Philippe, “The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do the
two principles intermesh?” (2006), 88(862) International Review of the Red Cross 375, p. 377.
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For its part, Article 50 of Convention I, spelling out the crimes which are subject to such
universal jurisdiction, states:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following
acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture
or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
This then requires States Parties to enact legislation so as to enable them to exercise
jurisdiction over individuals who have committed such crimes, to make an effort to locate
those individuals and to prosecute those individuals before their own courts or, if another
country has made out a prima facie case against those individuals, and if it prefers, to hand
those individuals over to that country.
The crimes listed in Article 50 represent a fairly limited list of very serious crimes. Article 85
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions extends the substantive basis for
universal jurisdiction to all grave breaches relating to the conduct of hostilities.
It is fairly clear from the language of Article 49 that the intention is that jurisdiction shall be
exercised only when the individual in question is subject to the physical jurisdiction of the
State Party (i.e. only when they have actual custody of the person). This is signalled, for
example, by the reference to searching for the person and handing them over to another State.
This is a binding commitment for every State which is a party to any of the Geneva
Conventions or to Additional Protocol I.
The CAT separately establishes a form of universal jurisdiction for the crimes it covers (i.e.
torture and related offences), with its Articles 5(2) and 7(1) stating, respectively:
5(2) Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under
its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in
paragraph I of this article.
7(1) The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed
any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does
not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
This is somewhat similar to the rule in the Geneva Conventions, albeit limited in scope to the
crime of torture. First, it requires States to establish jurisdiction over such offences for
individuals who are present in their territory. Then, it requires States either to extradite the
person or to prosecute him or her.
Paragraph 6 of the Preamble to the Rome Statute also refers to the idea of universal
jurisdiction although, as part of the preamble, it does not create legally binding obligations
for States. Paragraph 6 states:
Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those
responsible for international crimes.
This is the broadest statement of universal jurisdiction as a duty for States referring, as it
does, broadly to the idea of “exercising” criminal jurisdiction and in relation to all
- 34 -
international crimes, presumably meaning the ones defined by its own text. These include the
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.148
It may be noted that while the Geneva Conventions and CAT require States Parties to
exercise universal jurisdiction, there is a separate question as to the extent to which States
may establish such jurisdiction beyond what is provided for in the treaties without unduly
intruding into the sovereignty of other States. The Preamble to the Rome Statute suggests that
this extends at least as far as the scope of international crimes defined by that treaty.
As a practical matter, universal jurisdiction must be established through legislation at the

national level. This is true even if national constitutions provide for the direct applicability of
international law, given that the provisions described above are not “self-executing” (i.e. they
cannot function directly as operative legal rules). This is explicitly recognised in the treaty
provisions, with them calling on States to enact legislation or take the necessary measures to
provide for jurisdiction.
Broadly speaking, national legislation must establish three conditions for exercising universal
jurisdiction: the existence of a ground for universal jurisdiction (or the circumstances in
which it will be asserted); a clear definition of the offences covered and their constituent
elements; and a national means of enforcement (or the grant of power to a court or courts to
try these cases and impose punishments). As a matter of practice, the precise nature of these
rules varies from country to country, such that despite the existence of minimum international
obligations, one cannot talk of a uniform global system of universal jurisdiction.
One important issue is the question of whether jurisdiction should be asserted only when the
individual in question is present in the territory of a State. The international rules, described
above, are generally limited to this. However, in practice, many States have adopted laws
which give them the power to prosecute even when the individual concerned is not present in
their territory.149
Two other key and related principles must govern universal jurisdiction. The first is the
principle of non bis in idem, according to which a person cannot be tried twice for the same
crime. This means that if another court has already exercised or is already exercising
jurisdiction over a certain crime, another national court should not assert jurisdiction.
The second is the principle of complementarity, which is a functional principle which asserts
that the main or more appropriate system should assert jurisdiction over a crime. This takes
concrete form in Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, which precludes the International
Criminal Court from admitting a case where it is being dealt with by a State which has
jurisdiction over it, unless that State “is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution”. Thus, the ICC allows States, normally the State with regular
jurisdiction over the offence, to proceed, subject to them being willing and able to do so. At
the national level, complementarity, like primary jurisdiction, varies, such that there is no
uniform global system for this.
148
See Article 5 of the Rome Statute.
149
See, for example, section 8(1)(c) of New Zealand’s International Crimes and International Criminal Court
Act 2000, http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2000/0026/28.0/DLM63091.html and section 9(1) of
Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000, http://canlii.ca/t/j0th.
- 35 -
In a 2012 study, Amnesty International found that 147 States exercise universal jurisdiction
over international crimes and another 16 exercised universal jurisdiction over what amounted
to international crimes but which were defined only as domestic (national) crimes, so that 166
of the 193 UN Member States had legal rules providing for some sort of universal
jurisdiction.150 At the same time, the rate of prosecutions for these crimes, while it continues
to grow, remains small, with only 13 countries opening 36 new investigations (not all of
which will necessarily proceed to prosecutions) in 2023, according to one study.151
Part of the low rate of prosecutions can be explained by the fact that there are a number of
problems with prosecuting crimes which took place outside of your jurisdiction, especially
where the accused and victims also lack any connection to your jurisdiction. The first is
securing evidence, including the presence of witnesses to testify. Both the primary evidence
and the witnesses who can attest to it are likely to be present mainly in the country in which
the crime actually took place. Where this is a repressive country, which is probable in the
circumstances in which universal jurisdiction is likely to be exercised (including Syria), there
are additional risks, such as securing the protection of witnesses and even victims. It is also
essential that robust protection be provided for the rights of the accused, including the
presumption of innocence and respect for the due process rights of criminal defendants.
Despite the challenges, national prosecution of Syrians for crimes under universal jurisdiction
remains an important potential route for accountability. According to a 2024 report by Trial
International, investigations into several cases against Syrians were opened in 2023,
including:
● Austria: an investigation opened into Khaled H. and other Syrian intelligence officers;
● France: a case sent to trial against Ali Mamluk, Jamil Hassan and Abdel Salam
Mahmoud for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes in Syria; arrest
warrants issued against Bashar al-Assad, Maher al-Assad, Ghassan Abbas and
Bassam al-Hassan for war crimes and crimes against humanity through chemical
attacks; arrest warrants issued against Fahed Jassem al-Fraij, Ali Abdallah Ayoub,
Ahmad Balloul and Ali Safetli for complicity in war crimes; a case against Majdi
Nema (alias Islam Alloush) sent to trial;
● Germany: ongoing trial against Syrian doctor Alaa M. for crimes against humanity;
arrest of alleged former Hezbollah member Ammar A. on suspicion of crimes against
humanity and war crimes in Syria; arrest of alleged member of Syrian regime-
affiliated militia Ahmad H. on suspicion of crimes against humanity and war crimes;
and life sentence imposed on Syrian Moafak D., member of the Free Palestine armed
group, for an indiscriminate grenade attack on civilians in Damascus;
● Netherlands: conviction of a Syrian pro-regime fighter, Mustafa A.; war crimes
conviction for Dutch former member of ISIS, Yousra Lemouesset; sexual violence
charges brought against a Syrian former member of the NDF paramilitary group;
● Switzerland: arrest warrant issued against former Syrian vice-president Rifaat al-
Assad for war crimes; and
150
Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the World – 2012 Update, p. 2,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior53/019/2012/en/.
151
Trial International, Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2024, p. 16, https://trialinternational.org/wp-
content/uploads/2024/04/UJAR-2024_digital.pdf.
- 36 -
● United Kingdom: Syrian national arrested over torture allegedly committed in 2011. 152
Civil society organisations can play an important role in promoting these sorts of
prosecutions. The Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, for example, has
been active in promoting these sorts of prosecutions in a number of countries.153
Continuing and expanding these initiatives represents one of the only practical ways to
promote individual legal accountability for crimes against journalists in Syria.
5. Civil Society Initiatives
This part of the report focuses on one important and legally-focused initiative by civil society
to hold States responsible for their failure to respect the rights of journalists. A key aim of
this particular initiative is to highlight the fact that justice is not being done. It is also
important to mention the many other civil society initiatives that seek to raise awareness
about the crimes and human rights abuses suffered by journalists working in Syria, whether
local or international. There are many of these but, as an example of this, we point to the
example of Freedom Forum’s Journalists Memorial, to which the names of Syrian journalists
Saad Ahmad (a reporter for the Kurdish Hawar News Agency (ANHA)) and Mohamed
Hussein Rasho (a reporter for Çira TV) were added on 4 May 2020. The two were killed
when Turkish forces bombed a convoy of civilians accompanied by Kurdish soldiers and
journalists in North Eastern Syria on 13 October 2019. 154 The Memorial lists the names of
2,355 reporters, editors, photographers and broadcasters who died covering the news between
1837 and 2019.155
Work by civil society can also contribute to more formal statements about attacks on
journalists. For example, advocacy by the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of
Expression, as part of its response to the detention of members of its team, contributed to the
adoption, by the UN General Assembly, of a Resolution on The situation in the Syrian Arab
Republic, which included a call to “release all persons arbitrarily detained, including the
members of the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression”.156
In terms of the main focus on this part of the report, civil society actors do not have the power
to establish binding legal bodies to hear cases against States or individuals, whether for
human rights abuse or international crimes. However, there are a number of initiatives by
civil society to establish informal tribunals, which to all extents and purposes look and act
like formally binding bodies, to hear cases about human rights and breaches of the laws of
war.
152
Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2024.
153
See, for example, the page on their website about this: https://scm.bz/en/accountability-and-transitional-
justice/.
154
See https://www.freedomforum.org/journalists-memorial/2020-keynote-remarks/.
155
See https://www.freedomforum.org/journalists-memorial/.
156
Resolution 67/262, 4 June 2013, para. 5, https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FRES
%2F67%2F262&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
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One of the more important such initiatives is the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT), 157
established in 1979, based in Rome and currently operating under its 2018 Statute. 158 The
PPT describes its aim as being to establish tribunals,
to shed light on unheard cases of human rights violations and are activated at the request of social
forces who, in the absence of national, regional, or international tribunal initiatives, promote the
establishment of entities considered to be more accessible forms of justice. 159
The Preamble to the Statute of the PPT describes it as:
[A] tribune of visibility, of the right to speak, of the affirmation of the rights of peoples exposed to
severe and systematic violations by public and private actors, at national and international levels,
who have no possibility of referring and having access to competent organs of the organised
international community.
In November 2020, the PTT accepted a request by the press freedom organisations Free Press
Unlimited, Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Without Borders, in cooperation
with the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression and the Center for Justice and
Accountability, to create a special tribunal to investigate murders of journalists in relation to
their work, namely the People’s Tribunal on the Murder of Journalists (Tribunal). The
Tribunal ultimately agreed to focus on specific murders which took place in Mexico, Sri
Lanka and Syria. In the case of Syria, the murder in question was that of Nabil Walid Al-
Sharbaji, who was killed on 25 May 2015. These cases were “selected as representative of the
global scenario of human rights violations and impunity in which many journalists around the
world operate”.160
An opening hearing, held on 2 November 2021 in the Hague, provided an opportunity to set
the scene, establishing the nature of the problem of impunity for crimes and human rights
abuses against journalists globally and the impact of the problem. Focused hearings for the
Sri Lankan and Syrian cases were then held on 12-13 May 2022 and 16-17 May 2022 in The
Hague. In accordance with its Statute, the General Secretariat of the PPT invited the three
States to present their defence although, in practice, none of the States participated in this
way with the Tribunal. The Tribunal assembled an impressive panel of nine judges from
around the world with backgrounds mainly in law and journalism, including some who had
specific experience sitting as judges.161
The Tribunal appears to have operated functionally somewhere between a criminal trial and a
human rights hearing, with a prosecutor, judges and witnesses but with findings based on a
breach of human rights obligations (which bind States and are not criminal in nature). Article
1 of the Statute of the PPT lists the “crimes” falling within its competence, but the Tribunal
ultimately found Syria guilty instead of human rights breaches.
The Judgement of the Tribunal sets out clearly why press freedom is important, the obligation
on States to protect the safety and freedom of journalists and other media workers, and why
this is important for everyone.162 The part of the Judgement focusing specifically on Syria
157
See https://permanentpeoplestribunal.org/?lang=en.
158
The Statute is available at https://permanentpeoplestribunal.org/statute/?lang=en.
159
See https://permanentpeoplestribunal.org/the-tribunal/?lang=en.
160
Judgment Session on the murder of Journalists: November 2021 to September 2022, p. 4.
161
Ibid., p. 5.
162
Ibid., pp. 9-12.
- 38 -
encompasses pages 73 to 92. It describes the historical context of Syria and the rise of
repression against freedom of expression and other rights under the regimes of the al-Assads,
as well as the specific story of the victim, Nabil Walid Al-Sharbaji.
The section on Syria is followed by a section titled Analysis of the situation in the light of the
opening session and the three cases, which provides an analysis of the structures of violence
across the three countries, as well as specific comments on each country. In respect of Syria,
the Judgement notes:
In Syria, there has been a tragic continuity between the repression of fundamental freedoms and
human rights in the period before the outbreak of the Arab Springs and the violent and criminal
methods with which the Syrian people have been viciously repressed during the civil war. 163
The following section, Insufficiency of existing framework of international and regional

initiatives, describes the global and regional framework of rules and standards in this area,
concludes: “Despite all of the above, the safety of journalists is far from secure.”164
The findings, in respect of Syria, are stated as follows:
That “The Prosecutor … holds the Syrian Arab Republic responsible for grave violations of the
international human rights of journalist Nabil Walid Al-Sharbaji, specifically the right to freedom
from torture [Art. 7 ICCPR], the right to life [Art. 6 ICCPR], the right to freedom of expression
[Art. 19 ICCPR], and the right to an effective remedy [Art. 2 ICCPR].
Further, that the government violated Nabil Walid Al-Sharbaji’s right to freedom from
discrimination based on political opinion [Art. 26 ICCPR] and his right to a fair trial [Art. 14
ICCPR].165
It is not entirely clear why these findings are presented as a conclusion of the prosecutor
rather than of the judges who presided over the case.166
These civil society initiatives provide a very important opportunity to highlight the key types
of human rights, humanitarian law and international criminal law abuses that are being
perpetrated on journalists. The evidence and conclusions of the Tribunal, as set out in the
final Judgement, are an invaluable contribution to the body of knowledge on these heinous
acts. And these initiatives also provide an important means of drawing public attention to the
abuses and, in that way, to providing an indirect means of accountability, even if they do not
directly combat impunity. This is especially the case if the civil society organisations who are
involved with the operation make sure to disseminate it widely.
The more formal, including in the sense of adhering to legal standards, these tribunals can be,
the more powerful their findings and conclusions will be. Ideally, it would be positive to have
the States involved represented somehow, even if they themselves cannot be persuaded to
participate (for example via tribunal appointed defence lawyers). It would also have been
preferable for the findings to have followed the judicial format of the Tribunal and to have
been presented in the form of a decision reached by the judges.
163
Ibid., p. 96.
164
Ibid., p. 106.
165
Ibid., p. 107.
166
The findings for Mexico and Sri Lanka were also presented as holdings of the prosecutor.
- 39 -
Such initiatives take an enormous amount of time, effort and money. It is not clear whether
another such initiative focusing on attacks on journalists and other media workers will take
place. It if does, it will, in a similar way to this initiative, represent a powerful way of
highlighting the nature and scale of abuse against journalists, media workers and media
outlets. Consideration might also be given to conducting more modest initiatives along these
lines, perhaps focusing just on key cases from Syria, and involving less grand sets of hearings
and collections of witnesses, but still extracting key facts about the cases and allowing for
clear findings to be adopted and then disseminated widely.
Conclusion
The crimes and other attacks against journalists, other media workers and media outlets
which have and are taking place in Syria are attacks not only on those individuals and
entities. They represent attacks on all Syrians, since they have the effect of denying everyone
the right to access information, often information which is crucial for key personal and public
interests such as safety, health and indeed democracy itself. The broader impact of what have
been termed “crimes against freedom of expression” has been well documented by human
rights actors in relation to both Syria and other contexts.167
The primary obligation to prevent these sorts of attacks and human rights abuses falls on the
State where these acts take place. But where that State is not only failing to address the
problem but is indeed a major instigator of those crimes, as is the case in Syria, the
international community has a responsibility to step in and do what it can to remedy the
situation. There has been a lot of debate about whether the international community has done
enough in the context of Syria and the basic facts relating to the situation there on their own
somehow bear testimony to the fact that it has not. Despite that, there are at least a number of
mechanisms that can be used to combat impunity for these attacks, understood in the broader
sense of that term.
There are ultimately very few direct means for asserting legal responsibility of either the
Syrian State or individual Syrian officials for the crimes and human rights abuses they have
perpetrated. A key one is prosecutions in the national courts of other countries, via the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction. While such prosecutions are relatively rare, the pace of
them is increasing internationally. And it is helpful that the UN has established the IIIM to
support criminal investigations and then prosecutions relating to the situation in Syria, and
which can provide an invaluable link between sources of information about crimes, including
civil society organisations, and criminal processes that are taking place or being considered in
countries around the world.
There are a lot more mechanisms which serve to highlight and somehow hold Syria and
individual Syrians morally and socially accountable for especially human rights abuses.
These include treaty mechanisms, the COI which has been established for Syria, other formal
UN processes like the UPR and the reporting systems of the special mandates. The more civil
society organisations engage with all of these mechanisms in terms of feeding them
information about crimes and human rights abuses against journalists and other media
workers, the more impact all of these systems will have. Further supplementing this with civil
167
This term featured, for example, in the title of the 2012 Joint Declaration on Crimes Against Freedom of
Expression of the special international mandates on freedom of expression, which also set out clearly the harms
such crimes cause. 25 June 2012, https://www.law-democracy.org/live/legal-work/standard-setting/.
- 40 -
society initiatives, like the People’s Tribunal on the Murder of Journalists, will also increase
the impact.
The situation in Syria is not only complex but it is also firmly entrenched and presents an
intractable challenge for the international community. It would be naïve to suggest that we
have solutions to the grave abuses that are taking place in Syria or that we can hope to bring
them to an end. At the same time, it is incumbent upon us to do what we can to at least
mitigate the situation. This report aims to provide especially civil society organisations but
also others with some options for engaging to that end.
- 41 -

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Combating Impunity for Crimes

and Human Rights Abuse

on behalf of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression

ACHR African Charter on Human Rights

CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

CERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

COI Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab

CPJ Committee to Protect Journalists

CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child

CSO Civil Society Organisation

HRC Human Rights Council

HRCttee Human Rights Committee

ICC International Criminal Court

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ILA International Legislation Atlas

IIIM Independent Mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution

IIMP Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

PPT Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal

RSF Reporters Without Borders

RTI Right to Information

SNHR Syrian Network for Human Rights

SYP Syrian Pound

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UPR Universal Periodic Review

USD United States Dollar

YPG People's Protection Units

1. The Situation in Syria

Similarly, according to the International Legislation Atlas (ILA):

Confirmed Motive Journalists and Media Workers Killed in Syria67

Journalists and Media Workers Imprisoned in Syria68

2. Bases for Syrian Responsibility

3. International Options for Redress

3. 1 Universal Periodic Review

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

CAT, CRC, CEDAW and CERD

The fifth cycle Concluding Observations included a couple of comments on freedom of

Arab Charter on Human Rights

3. 3 Specialised Mechanisms for Syria

3. 4 Other General UN Mechanisms

4. National Options for Redress

As a practical matter, universal jurisdiction must be established through legislation at the

5. Civil Society Initiatives

The Preamble to the Statute of the PPT describes it as:

The following section, Insufficiency of existing framework of international and regional

The findings, in respect of Syria, are stated as follows:

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