TC 3-10 Commander's Tactical NBC Handbook: Preface Chapter I - Winning Under NBC Conditions
TC 3-10 Commander's Tactical NBC Handbook: Preface Chapter I - Winning Under NBC Conditions
TC 3-10 Commander's Tactical NBC Handbook: Preface Chapter I - Winning Under NBC Conditions
TC 3-10
TC 3-10
Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction
Concept
Training Responsibilities
Battle-Focused Training
Pre-Deployment
Chapter 3 - Survival
Concept
Chapter 5 - Sustainment
Concept
Concept
NBC Reconnaissance
NBC Decontamination
Maneuver
Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability (M/C/S)
Fire Support
Air Defense
Glossary
References
Authorization Letter
-----Original Message-----
From: Washington, Lawrence [mailto:washingl@monroe.army.mil]
Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2000 9:23 AM
To: Hauser, Ed
Ed
The attachment contains the Chemical Schools request for change to the
restriction statements in selected FMs and TCs. The Chemical School is the
proponent for these publications an have the authority to make the
appropriate changes based on their analysis.
Lawrence Washington
Joint and Army Doctrine
757-727-3454/DSN 680-3454
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
SUBJECT: Request to Change Chemical Proponent Field Manual Distribution Restriction Statements
1. Reference. Army Regulation 25-30, The Army Publication and Printing Program, July 99.
2. Request approval to change the distribution restriction for the manuals identified in Table 1 (Enclosure 1) from
Statement B (US Government agencies only) to Statement A (Approved for public release).
3. As proponent for these manuals, the U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS) has carefully considered the
provisions of AR 25-30, Section 2-14, paragraph c in preparing this request. Our belief is that although the
referenced regulation proscribes that manuals containing information on "chemical warfare" should not be approved
for public release, it is our interpretation that this provision was intended to deal with aspects of offensive chemical
warfare, an aspect no longer a part of any US Army doctrine.
4. The USACMLS believes that changing the distribution restriction for these manuals will increase NBC readiness
for Army forces and will contribute to U.S. counterproliferation efforts. By changing the distribution restriction, Army
personnel will have ready, unimpeded access to these critical documents through such means as the Reimer
Digital Library and the USACMLS web page. It will allow more open and productive dialogue during the
development of these manuals. We also believe that the open distribution of this doctrine under the provisions of
Statement A will permit potential adversaries to perceive the U.S.’s robust capabilities to operate in an NBC
environment which will deter the adversary’s use of NBC weapons and thus directly contribute to U.S. policy for
counterproliferation.
5. In accordance with AR 25-30, request the manuals in Table 2 (Enclosure 1) that are restricted distribution
statement B (US Government agencies only) be changed to restricted distribution statement C (US Government
agency’s and their contractors) to protect technical and operational information. It is our belief that these manuals
still reveal limitations on U.S. chemical and biological defenses that should not be available for public release,
however we do acknowledge that these documents should be made available to U.S. Government contractors who
are assisting in developing NBC defense capabilities.
6. The USACMLS points of contact for this project are LTC Flanagan and CPT Kemp, DSN 676-7363/7364,
commercial (573) 596-0131 ext 37363/37364, fax (573)563-8063, e-mail: flanagac@wood.army.mil and
kempc@wood.army.mil.
Original signed
Encl PATRICIA L. NILO
COL, CM
Commandant
Table 2. Manuals for Distribution Authorized to US Government Agencies and Their Contactors
INTRODUCTION
As you know, units at the Combat Training Centers (CTC) face realistic combat training against a well-
trained, aggressive opposing force (OPFOR). The OPFOR is skilled in the use of threat tactics, to
include the use of chemical weapons.
During a recent battle at a CTC the failure to recognize the impact of NBC conditions led directly to a
brigade failing to achieve its assigned mission.
The lead task force was an armor-heavy battalion task force (TF1) with three Ml tank companies and
one M2 mechanized infantry company.
The mission of TF1 was to attack to penetrate the enemy's first echelon defensive belt and seize a
terrain-oriented objective. Map 1 shows the commander's plan, which was to move along an axis in the
northern portion of the zone and assault Objective BULL (OBJ BULL). Once at the OPFOR's obstacle
belt, the plan called for TF1 to breach the obstacle, then continue the attack to seize OBJ MARY, OBJ
ANN, and OBJ JAN, in turn. After the TF secured all objectives, the commander planned to reform and
continue the attack to seize OBJ BULL.
In the intelligence annex to the TF1 operations order (OPORD), the intelligence officer (S2) stated that
opposing 1st Brigade are two motorized rifle battalions (MRBs) of the 76th motorized rifle regiment
(MRR), and that "persistent and nonpersistent chemical agents have been used. Expect persistent
chemicals to be used to close an avenue of approach (AA) and augment final protective fires (FPF).
Expect a major AA sealed off with persistent contamination."
In the NBC defense annex to the TF1 OPORD, the Chemical Officer (ChemO) listed five possible
locations that the OPFOR might contaminate with persistent chemical agents.
The OPFOR defended with two MRRs in the first defensive echelon and one MRR in the second
defensive echelon. The OPFOR commander planned to use chemical weapons as obstacles to shape
the battlefield, to assist in counterattacks, and to prevent consolidation by enemy forces. The OPFOR
planned to use persistent type agents to create two zones of contamination as obstacles: P1 to block
the southern avenue of approach into the sector (considered the most dangerous), and P2 along the
northern wall to push attacking units to the south into the "fire sack" and to protect the northern flank.
Nonpersistent agents, such as blood (AC), or nerve (GB), would be employed if the enemy penetrated
the first defensive echelon.
During the brigade rehearsal the brigade commander placed the NBC reconnaissance platoon under
control of TF1. The NBC reconnaissance platoon's mission was to locate and identify possible
contaminated areas along TF1's axis.
Even though the TF ChemO listed possible contaminated areas on the enemy situation template, they
were not designated as named areas of interest (NAI) and added into the TF's reconnaissance and
surveillance (R& S) plan. In fact, the TF S2 predicted (templated) a contaminated area near the axis of
advance for the TF, yet planned a route for a scout section through the area to emplace an observation
post (OP) team. The scout platoon was not assigned any chemical survey missions nor were they
instructed to confirm or deny any of the templated contaminated areas.
The OPFOR, based on intelligence from their OPs, decided to shoot persistent chemicals into target
P2. A little past midnight, a 2S3 artillery battalion from the regimental artillery group (RAG) initiated a
fire mission that contaminated approximately one square kilometer of ground with thickened nerve
agent. While the flashes from impacting artillery rounds were clearly visible past the line of departure,
nothing was reported.
In the early morning hours of the day of the attack, a scout vehicle moved along its designated route to
establish a deep OP. The section was in MOPP2, even though their route took them through a
templated contaminated area. The crew immediately began to suffer the initial effects of nerve agent
poisoning. The scouts then called the TF 1 S2 by radio and informed him of their situation. They were
able to identify the contamination by symptoms only, because the scout section was not equipped with
any chemical detection or identification equipment (e.g., M256A 1 detector kit, M8A1 chemical alarm, or
MS or M9 detector paper). The scouts also reported their location incorrectly -- approximately 1,000
meters to the southeast of the actual contamination.
TF1 reported the location of the chemical contamination to the brigade main command post using a
spot report (SPOTREP). The brigade chemical section disseminated a warning to all brigade units
informing them of the reported contaminated area.
After the scout report of contamination, the chemical recon platoon was deployed to conduct a survey.
It started near the LD and moved north using a zig-zag pattern, but missed the location reported by the
scouts by 1,000 meters (see Map 2 below).
The TF1 S2, in his intelligence update, reported the suspected contaminated area using the location
that the scouts provided. The TF1 S3 then directed one of the teams to avoid the contaminated area.
There was no change to the directed MOPP level (MOPP2).
The TF commander called the NBC reconnaissance platoon leader, but was unable to make contact
with him or his platoon. In addition, the TF chemical officer left the TOC to assist in positioning
elements of the smoke platoon along the LD. Meanwhile, the NBC reconnaissance platoon ended its
mission and later reported no chemical contamination found.
TF1 crossed the LD and began to move to the northwest. The lead team, by attempting to go north of
the reported contaminated area, ran directly into the actual contaminated area. The team reported this
to the TF commander, but by that time the entire team and the TF command group had moved into the
contaminated area. Fifteen vehicles were contaminated.
The forward momentum of TF1 was halted. A second team hit the contaminated area and reported to a
third team. Each team made a decision to move to the south to get around the contamination.
Unfortunately, the chemical officer had not yet returned to the TOC and was unable to advise the TF
commander against this move.
The OPFOR then began to attrite the stopped teams with close air support and artillery. One team
alone lost 10 combat vehicles while the TF was stopped. The TF1 command group moved through the
contaminated area in MOPP4.
One team used an M256 kit to determine if they were in the chemical hazard area. The result of the kit
was misread as "nonpersistent nerve" instead of "all clear." The results of the test were sent to the TF
commander on the command net, compounding the problem of identifying the exact NBC threat facing
the TF. Based on the knowledge that the NBC recon platoon found no contamination and the team had
identified the agent as nonpersistent nerve, the TF commander and S3 assumed that the first team had
been hit by a nonpersistent chemical attack. After hearing several units report all clear readings on the
command net, the commander ordered the TF to MOPP2. Within minutes after removing his mask, the
TF commander becomes a nerve agent casualty.
One team, now attrited to platoon size, continued to move west to occupy the designated support by
fire position. The team remained in MOPP4, even though two subsequent M256 tests indicated no
chemical agents present. Target identification was difficult and the team began to tier from accurate
long-range fires. It was not until most of the team was destroyed that the MOPP level was reduced.
The remainder of TF1 assaulted through a breach in the OPFOR obstacle system, but did not have
sufficient combat power to continue the attack. The brigade ordered TF1 to assume a hasty defense.
The brigade's MECH TF began to move forward with the mission to pass through TF1 and continue the
attack.
The MECH TF crossed the LD and moved toward the contaminated area. Although the MECH TF
received warnings of the contaminated area, the warning was not fully disseminated to the subordinate
units. As a result of the failure of the lead TF to report and mark the contamination, a significant number
of vehicles from the MECH TF entered the contaminated area.
• The protective mask is the most critical item of protective equipment (Chapter 3)
• Template all likely NBC targets and designate templated areas as NAI (Appendix A)
• Ensure your unit carries their basic load of NBC defense equipment (Chapter 5 and Appendix C)
• Report NBC attacks or contact with NBC contamination hazards (Chapter 3 and Appendix A)
• NBC information must be present and visible in TOC (Chapter 4)
• Identify the NBC threat and determine how the enemy will employ NBC agents (Chapter 1)
• If contamination in the NAI could affect the scheme of maneuver, attempt to recon the NAI (Chapter
2)
• Threat capability and intent to employ weapons of mass destruction should be a priority information
requirement PIR (Appendix A)
• The supporting chemical units must execute their assigned missions in support of your intent
(Chapter 8)
RDL Table of Document Download
Homepage Contents Information Instructions
Chapter 3
SURVIVAL
"My nightmare was that our units would reach the barriers in the very first hours of
the attack, be unable to get through, and then be hit with a chemical barrage. We'd
equipped our troops with protective gear and trained them to fight through a
chemical attack, but there was always the danger that they'd end up milling around
in confusion - or worse, that they'd panic. The United States had not fought in a gas
attack since World War I. The possibility of mass casualties from chemical weapons
was the main reason we had sixty-three hospitals, two hospital ships, and eighteen
thousand beds ready in the war zone."
CONCEPT
The actions of your unit when it encounters its first NBC attack are major factors in determining
success. If not properly prepared, the psychological impact of NBC can be devastating to your
unit's combat effectiveness. Your unit, if trained and confident, can survive an NBC attack and
minimize casualties.
Two basic actions are required for your unit to survive a CB attack. The first action is to mask
quickly and properly, and the second is to warn or alert all personnel of the attack. There are three
ways your unit may be warned or alerted to mask.
• Your unit may be notified through command or NBC channels that it is in a downwind
hazard zone. This method provides adequate time for all individuals to mask or obtain
overhead cover or collective protection. Your major concern is an effective notification
system
• The attacks may activate unit NBC alarms. You do not have as much time as above, but
there should be sufficient time to warn all personnel
• Your unit may encounter a direct attack, which triggers your automatic masking criteria.
This is the most dangerous situation, but a well trained unit can survive and minimize
casualties
The mask is the most critical item of protective equipment. Over 90% of chemical and biological
warfare casualties are caused by agent entering through the respiratory system or eyes;
therefore, a serviceable, properly fitted mask protects you against this threat. However, many
soldiers do not believe their NBC protective equipment provides adequate protection and do not
use proper procedures to mask and unmask. This equipment is excellent, and the individual soldier
must be made aware of its protective capability. Use your chemical battle staff to instill soldier
confidence in their NBC equipment.
Nuclear
• Use the best cover and concealment (e.g., fighting positions, covered/concealed
movement, and shelters)
• Disperse materiel and soldiers as much as the situation allows
• Keep exposed skin covered
These are critical survival actions in the face of any threat, not just nuclear capable opposition.
Maintaining good operations security/communications security (OPSEC/COMSEC) are
supplemental activities that further reduce vulnerability.
The mask is the most important item of protective equipment. Most chemical/biological
casualties are caused by agents entering the body through the eyes or the respiratory system.
Ensure all individual protective equipment is available, serviceable, and with soldiers.
Test fit of all masks using the M41 protective mask fit validation system (PMFVS).
Panic
This may be your biggest problem. WWI troops broke ranks, removed masks, and reported to
medical channels even when not gassed.
Panic can only be avoided by soldiers having confidence in their equipment and state of
NBC training. Leaders must discuss what to expect from an NBC attack and instill
confidence in their NBC system including their equipment. Leaders must become the
principal NBC trainers to have an effective program.
All Individuals (To include Senior Leaders) are Proficient in Common NBC Tasks
These tasks are found in the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks - Skill Level 1.
These tasks must be rehearsed and evaluated during the Skill Development Test. To
survive an NBC attack, soldiers must be proficient in masking and then first aid, buddy-
aid, and individual decon.
This system is used to rapidly report an NBC attack in order for troops to take protection, and to
report attacks to higher, subordinate, and adjacent headquarters
Rehearse warning and reporting system including the employment of NBC detectors, and
direct attack on your unit).
Units will aromatically increase there MOPP posture after being attacked. Units not in the
immediate attack area, but in the downwind hazard area may need to increase there MOPP level.
The goal is to remain in the minimum MOPP level as possible and reduced MOPP as quickly as
possible. If the attack was not directly on your unit, you may be able to reduce MOPP to just the
mask. A mask only posture can be assumed only if there is no liquid agent present and the agent is
not blister. Use your chemical battle staff and Table 3-1 below for recommendations.
Don't move from a contaminated area unless it is tactically sound. However, plan to move as soon
as possible to reduce risk of casualties from contamination or heat stress
• Perform decontamination
• Reduce MOPP
• Continue mission
Perform Decontamination
Reduce MOPP
Reduce MOPP levels based on chemical staff recommendations and when detection efforts
indicate higher MOPP is no longer required.
Continue Mission
One of the most important actions under NBC conditions is to continue to focus on your mission.
Do not over emphasize or concentrate on the NBC attack at the expense of your primary mission.
Determine type of agent and delivery systems, vulnerability of units, and automatic masking
procedures.
Perform MOPP analysis and provide MOPP level recommendations based on METT-T.
REFERENCES
SOURCES USED
Army Publications
FM 3-6. Field Behavior of NBC Agents (Including Smoke and Incendiaries). Nov 1986.
FM 3-100. NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations. May 1991.
FM 3-101. Chemical Staffs and Units. Apr 1987 and Feb 1994.
FM 8-10-7. Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Environment. Apr 1993.
STP 21-1-SMCT. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1. Oct 1990.
STP 21-II-MQS. Military Qualification Standards II, Manual of Common Tasks. Jan 1991.
STP 3-74-11-MQS. Military Qualification Standards II Chemical Branch (74) Company Grade
Officer's Manual. Mar 1991.
Nonmilitary Publications
Cheney, R., "Excerpts from the Unclassified Interim Report by the Secretary of Defense to
Congress on the Conflict in the Gulf," Congressional Testimony, circa. Jun 1991.
Harmeyer, Colonel G. and Antal, Major J., "Fire Discipline and Fratricide," Army, Volume 42, No. 3,
Army Magazine, Mar 1992.
Heller, Colonel C.E., "Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 1917-1918,"
Combat Studies Institute, Leavenworth Papers, Volume 10, Sep 1984.
Montgomery, J.R., ',Maintenance Operations in Mission-Oriented Protective Posture," Dugway
Proving Ground, (DTIC #ADB118294), Sep 1987.
Neumann, Major Robert C., "Dealing with a Contaminated Area," CML - Army Chemical Review,
Jul 1992.
Shrader, C.S., "Amicicide, The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modem War," Combat Studies Institute,
(DTIC #ADA211713), Dec 1982.
Smith, Captain J.M., "Facing a Chemical Threat," Infantry Magazine, Volume 8, No. 3, May-Jun
1991
Staff, "Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, Close Combat Light (CANE CCL) Test
Summary Evaluation Report (SER)," US Army Chemical School, May 1993.
Staff, "Impact of Toxic Chemical Agent Training on Combat Readiness," US Army Chemical
School, Mar 1992.
Staff, "NBC Lessons Learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM," US Army Chemical
School, Undated Draft.
Staff, Physiological and Psychological Effects of NBC and Extended Operations on Combined
Arms Crews (P2NBC2) Insights," US Army Chemical School, Mar 1991.
Staff, P2NBC2 Report, Extended Operations in Chemically Contaminated Areas (Formerly FC 50-
12)," US Army Combined Arms Command, 1990.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
RECOMMENDED READING
These are the recommended documents for further reading and study.
FM 3-100. NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations. May 1991.
FM 8-10-7. Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Environment. Apr 1993.
Neumann, Major Robert C., "Dealing with a Contaminated Area," CML -Army Chemical Review, Jul
1992.
Staff, "Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment, Close Combat Light (CANE CCL) Test
Summary Evaluation Report (SER)," US Army Chemical School, May 1993.
Television Tapes
Appendix A
Planning Phase
Preparation Phase
Execution Phase
Planning Phase
Preparation Phase
Execution Phase
•• NBC situation?
•• Smoke operations?
•• Chemical unit support?
• Since going into MOPP3 or 4 have I changed my way of doing business (i.e., Am I sleeping
less, managing more closely, or delegating less than before)?
MANEUVER
Planning Phase
• Does my tactical plan take into account the trade-offs and risk:
Preparation Phase
• Has my unit been able to maintain a high volume of fire or are very few weapon systems
engaging the enemy?
• Is the NBC condition imposing greater (or lesser) burdens on maneuver than I had planned?
Should I issue a FRAGO to adapt?
• Can I lower protection levels now and increase my unit's effectiveness?
MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY (M/C/S)
Planning Phase
Preparation Phase
Execution Phase
FIRE SUPPORT
Planning
Preparation Phase
Execution Phase
AIR DEFENSE
Planning Phase
Preparation Phase
• During rehearsals in MOPP4, did my unit adequately practice scanning and target acquisition?
• Under a high nuclear threat, are all weapon systems and communications cables buried?
• Have I adequately exercised/rehearsed the air defense system while crews were wearing
MOPP3 or 4?
Execution Phase
• In MOPP3/4, is air defense responsive, or should I:
• Displace them to clean areas?
Planning
• Does the chemical unit supporting my force require sustainment and security support?
• Does my plan consider distribution of NBC equipment?
• Does my plan include transportation to move CDE?
• Does my plan consider that maintenance and transportation operations under NBC conditions
are significantly slower?
• Does my plan consider that operations under NBC conditions significantly limit health service
support capability?
Preparation Phase
Execution Phase
• Since going into MOPP4, are my CSS assets able to keep pace with the battle?
• Will temporary relief from MOPP4 be sufficient or should I lower MOPP levels for a prolonged
period and risk casualties?
RDL Table of Document Download
Homepage Contents Information Instructions
Chapter 5
Sustainment
"It is worth noting that a great deal of time was available to accomplish logistic
objectives without the exacerbating pressures of combat, and there were no other
major crises competing for resources."
CONCEPT
In future combat, we probably will not have the amount of time that we had in the 1991 Persian Gulf
Conflict. The very meaning of the phrase "combat readiness" implies being prepared today to fight
tonight. To realize your unit's full potential, you must support your operations with robust, flexible,
self-sufficient sustainment systems.
Focus your efforts on premobilization acquisition, storage, maintenance, and reporting of adequate
stocks of chemical defense equipment (CDE). After training, this is the single most important action
to prepare for the NBC environment.
To survive, every one of your soldiers must have a protective mask that fits well and works
correctly, along with the rest of his authorized items of individual protective equipment (IPE)
(Appendix C). This IPE is also called MOPP gear -- the mask and hood plus overgarments,
overboots, and gloves. Deploy with these to any theater in the world, as these items give you the
basic protection from chemical and biological hazards, and the overgarments can also serve as a
sacrificial covering for fallout.
Besides MOPP gear, IPE also includes nerve agent pyridostigimine pretreatment (NAPP),
antidotes, personal dosimeters, chemical detection paper, and decontamination kits. Be prepared
to take everything when you deploy, but plan to operate with the equipment that fits the enemy's
capabilities. Ensure all personnel have all required immunizations, including those for suspected
biological agents. Your chemical battle staff must participate in the IPB process to determine the
probable NBC capabilities you may face. Base your sustainment plans for operations in theater on
this assessment.
The NBC environment provides unique challenges for leaders at all levels, but there are few
challenges as big as sustaining your force under NBC conditions. You must anticipate your support
needs, integrate support for every phase of your operation, preclude interruption of sustainment
functions, prepare sustainment systems for the surge that accompanies a crisis, all under the
degradation that accompanies the NBC environment.
Pre-Deployment
During Operation DESERT-SHEILD, some units found that the installation actually "owned" a
large portion of their deployment stocks. Failure to purchase stock-funded items (e.g.,
overgarments) resulted in many units having to "rob" them from nondeploying units.
Allocate resources to acquire, store, maintain, man, and protect the systems required for
NBC readiness. Plan to take all stocks of CDE and unit equipment during deployment.
CSS Survivability
Soldiers in MOPP4 often fail to keep up camouflage, concealment, and other passive defense
measures -- making the already vulnerable CSS activities a fat target of opportunity.
Ensure the brigade support area (BSA or trains) has effective command and control and
has established active and passive NBC defense measures. Plan to quickly identify and
control contaminated areas to minimize spread of hazards.
Supply
Take the guesswork out of CDE resupply. Organize CDE into LOGPACs that contain all
items needed for unit recovery. Simple supply and services work best -- NBC can foul up
the best plans, and complexity adds to the confusion. Rehearse NBC defense material
distribution and reissue plans. Rehearse LOGPAC operations in MOPP4.
Maintenance
Transportation
Because of disorientation and how the mask impacts on peripheral vision, land navigation under
NBC conditions is seriously degraded, particularly at night.
Plan for more transport time for materials, more fuel (because transportation
assets/LOGPACS tend to get lost), and movement controls to minimize the impact on
your operations. Rehearse movement in MOPP4 from your BSA or trains to the supported
unit.
People fatigue easier in MOPP4. Accidents are more frequent and fratricidal engagements
increase when troops are in MOPP4.
Manage risk -- plan and enforce work/rest cycles, water discipline, and unit sleep plans.
Situational awareness and fire control/identification friend-or-foe training is critical.
A high degree of physical fitness is a life and death matter if your soldiers must operate in
MOPP4. Soldiers have been found to be clinically dehydrated after wearing MOPP gear for
extended periods. Test have shown a direct correlation between high Army physical fitness test
scores and the ability to operate in MOPP4 for extended periods and with less degradation to
cognitive skills.
Support your surgeon in keeping immunizations and physicals up to date. Your surgeon
must plan to receive and handle contaminated casualties. Ensure your units are
conducting proper field sanitation and hygiene measures.
Enforce work/rest cycles, command drinking and unit sleep plans, and conduct frequent checks to
prevent accidents. Check to ensure soldiers maintain MOPP discipline, particularly in maintenance
work areas.
Decontamination requires large quantities of water and decontaminants -- you must decide to
commit transportation assets or preposition water sources. Check power driven decontamination
equipment (PDDE) crew operations -- focus on support to rapidly restore combat power.
• Check supplies
Establish an aggressive program to be ready for deployment. The program must cover preventive
medicine, physical fitness, command supply discipline, maintenance, and test, measurement and
diagnostic equipment (TMDE) programs. Plan immunizations and physicals on the long-range
training calendar. Budget and allocate funds to purchase stock-funded NBC defense materials; buy
and correctly store, maintain and package them for deployment.
Plan to quickly identify and control contaminated areas to minimize spread of hazards. Plan
alternate positions for CSS activities. Conduct NBC route reconnaissance along main supply routes
(MSR). Plan and rehearse NBC warnings in your trains/brigade support area (BSA).
Check Supplies
Plan to take all stocks of CDE and unit equipment during deployment. Check/report status of critical
items of NBC defense equipment according to SOP.
Place supplies and equipment indoors or cover with sacrificial covers -- especially critical with
ammunition, since it will be inside enclosed vehicles with soldiers.
Assign maintenance crews based on the buddy system -- no one works alone. Plan work/rest
cycles and frequent checks to prevent accidents. Rehearse vehicle recovery plans in MOPP4.
Rehearse NBC defense materiel movement plans. Rehearse LOGPAC movement to supported
units in MOPP4. Emplace road guides along MSRs -- ensure they have communications to the
BSA or trains.
The chemical battle staff must keep you current on the operational aspects of the NBC threat or
hazard.
Situational awareness is a key element in fratricide prevention: check to ensure combat units know
where their support elements are located and to ensure CSS elements know the location of combat
units.
Ensure your intelligence collection plan is executed, information is evaluated, and the chemical
battle staff provides you with an analysis and recommended courses of action.
Verify sizing and fit of MOPP gear. Conduct frequent serviceability checks of NBC defense
equipment.
The chemical staff has the responsibility to monitor NBC defense equipment supply, maintenance,
and transport. When not actively engaged in operations, the chemical staff should visit units and
inspect individual and unit NBC defense equipment.
Commanders of units that capture or will be responsible for enemy prisoners of war (EPW) must
consider IPE required to sustain the EPW.
RDL Table of Document Download
Homepage Contents Information Instructions
Appendix C
UNIT EQUIPMENT
Chapter 4
CONCEPT
After your unit has survived an NBC attack, it may have to operate under NBC conditions for an
extended period. Your goal should be to perform your combat tasks with minimum degradation and
suffer few or no NBC casualties. A well-trained unit can attain this goal. Well-trained troops can
perform most collective tasks in MOPP4 with minimum reduction in combat effectiveness. Try to
avoid changing normal procedures, because most routine tasks can be performed in MOPP4. Non-
routine or cognitive tasks cannot be performed as readily, and some degradation will occur. As
much as possible, keep operations simple and routine, and develop work-arounds where problems
exist.
Although you can perform most mission tasks with minimum reduction in effectiveness, the longer
your troops are in MOPP4, the more degradation will occur. Therefore, your priority should be to
avoid contamination to fight clean or, if that is not possible, find ways to reduce the MOPP level as
quickly as possible. This may require you to move from contaminated areas to clean areas or find
ways to periodically reduce to MOPP1/2. Avoid operating in contaminated areas for long periods.
Complete decontamination of vehicles and terrain is difficult, time consuming, and a logistical
burden. This should have a low priority. However, decontamination of personnel and personal
equipment should have top priority and be performed immediately. Operational decontamination of
crew-served weapons and vehicles should be accomplished when the situation permits.
Continue your mission because you can operate effectively in an NBC environment. Your unit is
NBC ready when it can accomplish its battle tasks in MOPP4.
What Are Your Major Operational Concerns?
Fear
You must instill confidence in soldiers through realistic training and information briefings.
Address fear or psychological factors by establishing confidence in equipment,
discussing what to expect during sustained operations in an NBC environment, and by
the unit being NBC ready. Ensure NBC equipment is available, properly fitted and
maintained, and in correct quantities. You must instill confidence in soldiers through
realistic training. Use your chemical battle staff.
Effectiveness
You should be able to perform your primary mission with minimum degradation in an NBC
environment.
Train your unit to operate in an NBC environment. Three things to emphasize are doing
primary tasks in MOPP4, care and fit of the protective masks, and physical fitness. The
Battle Command (BCTP) and other CTCs are excellent vehicles to train collective tasks
under NBC conditions.
Sustainment
Sustainment is more difficult under NBC conditions because CSS tasks are adversely affected
due to troops wearing individual protective equipment. There will also be a greater demand for
water, fuel, NBC equipment, and medical services.
Unique NBC requirements must be emphasized and addressed for all phases of your
operations. Use chemical battle staff -- for details see Chapter 5.
Fatigue
MOPP level should be lowered when possible to improve unit effectiveness and reduce
psychological impact. It is more difficult to decide when and to what level to reduce, than to
increase MOPP level.
As discussed in the survival chapter, there are specific guidelines on when to go into
MOPP4. The more difficult decision is when to reduce. It the attack is not directly on your
unit, you can probably reduce to MOPP3 (check with detector paper or downwind hazard
predictions.) Have chemical battle staff provide recommendations; your goal is to reduce
from MOPP4 as soon as possible.
Leaders
Leaders are usually the most adversely affected individuals on the battlefield. Recent tests have
shown that they tend to delegate less, get less sleep, and "burn out" faster in an NBC
environment.
They should be monitored to ensure they are properly pacing themselves, getting rest,
drinking water, and delegating tasks (this includes you!). Make sure your subordinate
leaders are aware of this problem.
Contamination Avoidance
By avoiding contamination, you eliminate or reduce the need for NBC protection and
decontamination.
Actions include conducting vulnerability analysis, locating and identifying NBC hazards,
using cover and concealment, preventing the spread of contamination, moving from
contaminated areas, and not moving through or into contaminated areas. Use the
chemical battle staff for recommendations.
Your goal is to reduce protection to MOPP1/2 as soon as possible. Use chemical battle staff for
recommendations.
If you have a choice, do not move through a contaminated area. However, if you must:, raise your
NBC protection level and do not stop -- you will probably receive very little contamination. Move out
of contaminated areas as soon as possible; over 40% of gas casualties in WWI were from units
staying unnecessarily in contaminated areas.
Use chemical battle staff for recommendation on MOPP levels, the NBC threat, NBCWRS,
movement through or out of contaminated areas, and decontamination. Ensure they are integrated
into all facets of staff operations.
• Avoid contamination
Continuing the mission must have top priority. NBC considerations must not become a dominant
factor in determining mission decisions. An NBC-ready unit can operate effectively in this
environment. Keep operations simple.
Conduct these tasks as required by the situation. Tasks include donning masks, performing first
aid, and conducting personal wipe down.
Report status of casualties and contamination. Mark contaminated areas. Perform surveys as time
and resources permit.
Avoid Contamination
Monitor with RADIAC instruments, chemical detectors and alarms, and chemical detector paper, as
appropriate, when not moving. Avoid or limit contamination by moving to clean areas as soon as
possible. To locate clean areas, use organic and available chemical units to perform NBC
reconnaissance.
Make MOPP Decisions
Use MOPP analysis to determine the applicable MOPP level. Operate with minimum amount of
NBC protection by reducing MOPP as quickly as possible. Seek recommendations from the
chemical battle staff.
Individual decontamination is usually done after a direct attack to allow soldiers to survive and
continue the mission. Contaminated equipment is decontaminated to allow the mission to continue.
Decontamination reduces the time your unit stays in MOPP4 and limits the spread of
contamination. Both operational and thorough decontamination are resource intensive operations.
Weathering can enhance decontamination and may under certain situations eliminate the need for
thorough decontamination.
This includes all aspects of the NBC situation; recommendations on MOPP levels,
decontamination, reconnaissance, smoke; and vulnerability/threat for future operations.
Conduct a vulnerability analysis and recommend if unit should move from contaminated area based
on METT-T.
RDL Table of Document Download
Homepage Contents Information Instructions
Chapter 1
Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons have had a profound impact on how our world is
shaped and how our forces will fight. Each technology change has altered doctrine, tactics, techniques,
and procedures. For decades, our leadership has struggled to prevent the proliferation of NBC
weapons. Nevertheless, the list of countries that possess NBC capabilities grows each year. As a
result, countries possessing these weapons could threaten the interests of the United States of America
in every possible theater of the world.
No enemy has used NBC weapons against the United States in over 75 years. This is a testament to
the fact that our forces:
The best means at your disposal to lessen these impacts are: knowledge of your soldiers; knowledge of
the threat; and stressful, realistic training under NBC conditions on a repetitive basis. The following will
first discuss what is required of you under NBC conditions, followed by a discussion of leadership the
threat, and Chapter 2, training.
To project power, your forces must be able to deploy with little notice. You may have to deploy against
a potential adversary who has both the capability and intent to use NBC weapons against your force,
perhaps even to deny/delay entry into the Theater of Operations.
• Our forces were not completely prepared to defend against Iraqi use of chemical or biological
weapons until just before commencing ground offensive operations
• Complacency and the absence of command emphasis prior to deployment were among the
root causes of this lack of preparedness
United States policy prohibits use of chemical or biological weapons. Treaty-based deterrence
mandates that you be prepared to deploy in a high state of NBC defense readiness or accept greater
risk of loss if the enemy uses NBC weapons against your forces. You may not have the grace period
enjoyed by previous commanders to adequately prepare for NBC defense the next time your forces are
called on to project power. To be fully trained and ready at all times, you must develop and maintain a
steady level of NBC awareness throughout your unit's training cycle.
LEADERSHIP
Knowing your soldiers' abilities has always been a key component of successful leadership. Under NBC
conditions, knowing your soldiers becomes even more important. Some soldiers have difficulty
operating in MOPP. Leaders must identify these soldiers. Operationally stressful NBC training
situations provides an indication of soldier performance. Once identified, direct your subordinate
leaders and medical staff to closely monitor these soldiers.
You must have confidence in your soldiers, your equipment, and your own ability to lead under NBC
conditions.
Because of the mystery surrounding the effects of NBC weapons, some common misperceptions have
grown over time. This section is designed to dispel those myths and help you instill the necessary
confidence in your soldiers.
MYTH: All individual and ARTEP tasks are seriously degraded when performed in full NBC protection.
TRUTH: Many tasks can be performed effectively in MOPP4, especially routine tasks that have been
performed regularly. Difficult, complex tasks are performed more slowly in MOPP4. Some tasks, such
as those requiring fine manual dexterity or unimpaired vision or hearing, if not critical, maybe delayed
until a clean area is found or an area with collective protection is available.
TRUTH: While all soldiers will be degraded to some degree, leaders are more adversely affected on
the NBC battlefield. Leaders tend to be more physically active, sleepless, delegate less, manage more
closely, and therefore become the first casualties in full protection.
MYTH: Troops cannot effectively fire their weapons (individual or crew served) in full NBC protection.
TRUTH: Target acquisition difficulties due to a reduced field of view (caused by the mask) and reduced
hearing (caused by the hood) contribute to soldiers firing fewer rounds; once a target is acquired,
accuracy is about the same in MOPP4 as in MOPP Zero.
MYTH: It is more likely that troops will be killed by direct friendly fire when in M0PP4.
TRUTH: This is no myth, it is true, especially by individual weapon systems. The root causes are
recognition problems (incorrect combat ID) and disorientation (no situational awareness).
MYTH: You cannot effectively communicate on the radio or person-to-person in full NBC protection.
TRUTH: Receiving (hearing) is the primary problem; however, radio, telephone, and face-to-face
communications can be effective in MOPP4 after only a few hours of training. Identification and
recognition of individuals are more difficult, but training in your local ID system reduces the impact.
MYTH: Water requirements are the same in hot climates whether you are in MOPP4 or not.
TRUTH: Troops require more water when in MOPP4, and all must drink large quantities of water.
Leaders are the worst offenders of water discipline and are among the first to become dehydrated.
MYTH: Troops cannot operate for long periods of time in an NBC environment.
TRUTH: It is true that unit effectiveness will be reduced in an NBC environment, but well-trained,
disciplined units are able to operate at reduced efficiency for days if MOPP levels can be reduced
periodically to MOPP Zero/1/2, allowing recovery to take place.
MYTH: An excellent way to prepare or NBC conditions is to have troops wear MOPP4 when jogging, or
playing volleyball, basketball, or other sports.
TRUTH: This training may improve physical conditioning but fails to prepare troops to perform their
primary mission under NBC conditions. Physical conditioning is critical to minimizing the degradation
from MOPP gear, but METL training under NBC conditions provides the biggest payoffs.
MYTH: Plans for operating in a conventional environment are the same in an NBC environment.
The threat of NBC weapons being used against US forces is as great now as anytime in history. There
are significant indications that the spread of weapons of mass destruction is accelerating, as illustrated
by Figure 1-1 below.
Any nation with the will and resources can turn its legitimate nuclear, medical, and chemical facilities to
the development of NBC weapons. Regional conflicts can quickly escalate to international concern and
efforts at resolution may be complicated by the use of, or the threat to use, NBC weapons.
When employed properly and without warning, weapons of mass destruction can:
Nuclear Capabilities
Despite existing nonproliferation agreements, at least four Third World states are technologically
capable of producing nuclear weapons. The list could soon expand to include seven or eight others; for
example: North Korea and Pakistan have a nuclear weapons program, and Iraq was on the verge of
developing a nuclear weapon. Also to be considered is the possibility of a breakdown of accountability
in the states of the former Soviet Union which have nuclear weapons. Weapons or nuclear material
could find their way to potential trouble spots or terrorist organizations. A summary of nuclear weapons
effects is shown in Table 1-2.
Biological Capabilities
Biological warfare is the employment of biological agents or agents of biological origin (toxins) to
produce casualties in man or animal and damage to crops or material. Medical and pharmaceutical
facilities, widely established in the Third World, can produce BW agents as well as medicines.
Biological weapons systems can provide the widest area coverage per pound of payload of any
weapon system. Live pathogens, such as anthrax and plague, and botulinum toxin formed the basis of
the biological threat two decades ago and have reemerged as the principal threat today.
Naturally or artificially produced toxins are faster acting and more stable than live pathogens. A
summary of biological agents is shown in Table 1-3.
Chemical Capabilities
Today, twenty-four or more countries maybe developing chemical weapons. Iraq successfully used
chemical weapons in its war with Iran, and Iran used them as well. Libya and Syria produce and
weaponize chemical warfare agents. In the Far East, North Korea has followed Russia and China in
acquiring chemical weapons.
The hazards from a chemical strike may last for less than an hour or for several weeks. The effects on
personnel maybe immediate. For soldiers forced into the higher levels of protection (M0PP3/4), tasks
are more difficult and can take longer to perform. A summary of chemical weapons effects is shown in
Table 1-4.
NBC DEFENSE PRINCIPLES
The three fundamentals of NBC defense in priority order are contamination avoidance, protection, and
decontamination.
Contamination Avoidance
Contamination avoidance forms the cornerstone of NBC defense. If you can avoid NBC effects through
active or passive defensive measures, casualties can be reduced and operations facilitated. The
burdens of protection and decontamination are avoided, eliminating significant time and resource
requirements and operational degradation. Avoidance measures include:
Protection
If operations in a contaminated area are necessary or unavoidable, you must protect your personnel,
equipment, and supplies. Protection includes:
Decontamination
Once personnel and material are contaminated, they must be decontaminated to reduce protection and
restore full combat power. The major goal of decontamination is to reduce protection levels. How much
decontamination you do and when you do it depends on your mission, the enemy, the terrain, and the
troops and time available (METT-T).
Levels of Decontamination
Immediate
Operational
Thorough
You have access to a variety of NBC battle staff and chemical unit support. Figure 1-2 shows the
chemical battle staff available in the maneuver elements of a corps.
These personnel can provide valuable assistance to you and the rest of your battle staff. Each has
been trained under real chemical agent conditions at the Chemical Defense Training Facility at the
Chemical School. They can attest to the effectiveness of NBC protective and detection equipment
through personal experience. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM validated that they were able to
pass on their confidence in NBC defensive material to all soldiers.
Corps Support Commands, Division Support Commands, and other corps and divisional units (e.g.,
artillery battalions; air defense brigades) also have chemical troops in their infrastructure. The staffing
levels are similar to the structure shown in Figure 1-2.
Since chemical staff resources within your units are limited, you must provide nonchemical personnel
for specific NBC tasks to organize teams for detection and equipment decontamination and to assist in
NBC defense training.
Most companies, batteries, or troops have a chemical NCO (MOS 54B) authorized. A trained NBC
defense officer (ASI 3R) and an enlisted alternate (SQI C) will also be appointed from unit assets
(nonchemical personnel receive the ASI/SQI through completion of a two-week NBC defense course).
These three individuals constitute the company-level commander's principal trainers and advisers on
NBC defense operations and NBC equipment operation and maintenance.
In combat:
• Integrate enemy NBC, smoke, and flame, incendiaries and nonlethal (FINL) weapons into the
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process
• Collect, coordinate, and distribute all NBC reports from subordinate, adjacent, and higher
organizations
• Plan NBC reconnaissance for the R & S plan
• Coordinate closely with the intelligence and fire support sections
• Provide chemical hazard area and current smoke operations information
• Assist on NBC logistics matters
• Develop chemical support plan to OPLAN/OPORD
• Advise the commander on employment of supporting chemical units
• Develop a smoke operations plan to support battalion/brigade operations
• Develop an integrated smoke plan to support scheme of maneuver
In garrison:
Smoke Platoons
Decontamination Platoons
Smoke/Decontamination Platoons
Chapter 2
Power Projection
" ... we could all be dying right now because we were not prepared to do our mission
(under NBC conditions)."
CONCEPT
Power projection is the capability to project military power from CONUS and other locations in
response to regional crises to achieve national security objectives. Your unit must be prepared to
deploy on short notice for contingency operations. These may range from relatively small actions to
protect or evacuate US citizens, to much larger engagements against heavy forces with weapons
of mass destruction. Even low-level conflicts could include NBC weapons because of the
proliferation of such weapons.
Consequently, you must place greater emphasis on NBC training for contingency operations.
Training must be demanding and to standard and must include stresses such as could be expected
under NBC conditions. The power projection Army must be prepared to survive and operate under
NBC conditions.
A unit is NBC trained and ready when it can effectively employ its battlefield operating systems
under NBC conditions. To achieve NBC readiness, you must ensure that:
READINESS KEY:
Units must be able to perform their mission under NBC conditions
The Combined Arms in a Nuclear/Chemical Environment (CANE) series of tests showed the value
added by training under NBC conditions. These force-on-force field trials, conducted over 3 to 4
days for each trial, use real-time-casualty-assessment to measure losses. Each test unit would
conduct an entire trial in the baseline (no NBC threat), and then repeat the same scenario with
soldiers in MOPP4 for significant periods (the order was reversed for some of the trials - MOPP4
first, then baseline).
In the most recent test, the scenario consisted of an attack on each of the first two nights, followed
by a daylight defense and then another night attack. During this test, soldiers reported that they had
very little NBC-related training prior to the test (e.g., 78% of the soldiers had never worn MOPP4 for
more than three hours consecutively, and 42% had never fired their individual weapon in MOPP4 at
their unit).
Figure 2-1 compares how effective the unit was in destroying OPFOR targets in the baseline
versus unit effectiveness when the NBC situation forced them to fight in MOPP4. Figure 2-1
illustrates that while the units averaged about one-fifth as many targets destroyed per battle on the
first day of testing, by the third day of intensive experience in MOPP gear, the ratio improved to
nearly three-fourths as many targets destroyed per battle.
TRAINING RESPONSIBILITIES
Training requirements and responsibilities to achieve and sustain NBC readiness are shown at
Table 2-1.
You should review your METL and identify those tasks that are most degraded by MOPP gear and
therefore must be trained in MOPP3/4. NBC events become conditions, like night, under which
battlefield tasks are performed. A review of your METL should result in tasks being sorted into four
categories for training program development:
• Tasks which can be done in MOPP3/4 with little or no change in performance (normally
routine and practiced tasks); most tasks will probably fall into this category
• Tasks that cannot be delayed but which are severely degraded in MOPP4; these require
the most training and the developing of work-arounds which should be reduced to SOP
• Tasks which, through training, you find cannot be done effectively in MOPP4, and can be
delayed until the unit can reduce protection to MOPP2 or lower (e.g., skilled maintenance
tasks where the mask or gloves prohibit correct performance)
• Tasks that cannot be delayed, are severely degraded in MOPP3/4, and cannot be
effectively improved through training or work-arounds; identify as a battlefield deficiency
and forward through chain of command to the battlefield operating system (BOS) proponent
for solution (e.g., organizational, doctrinal, or materiel solution required)
BATTLE-FOCUSED TRAINING
Battle-focused training requires you to train as you fight. The unit officers should do the unit NBC
collective training, and the NCOs the individual NBC skills training. The chemical battle staff and
unit NBC officer and NCO assist in the training. NBC training should not be turned over to the
chemical battle staff except in a train-the-trainer or train-the-operator role. Focus of training should
be on performing vital METL tasks to standard under NBC conditions. The following areas have
been shown through field testing and experience to be key training needs requiring practice,
innovation, adaptation, and command emphasis:
Soldiers of all ranks must become acclimated to all components of their MOPP gear. This does not
happen by performing some task in MOPP gear over a few hours, a few times a year. Field tests
have shown that degradation caused by MOPP gear decreases with training. Soldiers become
more confident in their own abilities to perform their mission in MOPP gear. Problems with fitting,
especially the mask, can be readily identified and corrected.
MOPP Relief
The longer soldiers are in MOPP4, the more they worry about survival and less about task
performance. Field tests have shown that even short periods of relief from wearing the mask and
hood (MOPP4) add to soldier endurance and effectiveness. Locating clean areas, decontamination,
and/or the use of collective protection can provide this relief.
Units in MOPP4 tend to take greater risks, especially light and dismounted infantry (e.g., using
easier routes and closer formations, not always sterilizing kill zones before crossing). All leaders
must enforce tactical discipline, especially light and noise.
Target Acquisition
Target acquisition in MOPP4 is more difficult because of a reduced field of view and restricted
hearing. Target acquisition can be improved by practicing scanning techniques, reducing assigned
fields of observation, and rolling the hood on the mask.
Land Navigation
Disorientation and bunching-up of armored, mechanized and dismounted soldiers occur under NBC
conditions. Rehearsals, reconnaissance, and leadership are needed to overcome these problems.
Recognition
Recognition and identification of soldiers and leaders in MOPP3/4 are problems as the usual visual
cues are masked. This can also lead to communications problems (radio and face-to-face) and
fratricide from direct-fire weapons. Fire discipline, marking systems, practice, and adaptation are
needed.
Fire Support
Indirect fire support is less responsive as artillery and mortar units sacrifice time for accuracy.
There is also a tendency for decreased use of direct-fire weapons and more calls for indirect fire,
which has Class V supply implications. Plans must account for these phenomena, and active
measures taken to reduce the MOPP level requirements for indirect fire support units.
Movement, maneuver, and fire support are harder to synchronize, and many tasks take longer to
perform under NBC conditions (e.g., rates of march can decrease significantly and lead to
increased fuel usage). Planning needs to account for this time increase, and simplicity in plans and
operations practiced to improve synchronization.
These are generic Army training problems which are worse under NBC conditions (e.g., more
reliance on radio than arm and hand signals) and which require command emphasis down to the
squad level.
Leaders
Leaders tend to supervise more closely, delegate authority less, and rest less. Mental fatigue is a
larger factor of degradation than physical fatigue. The hours between 0100 and 0700 are the most
critical time because of reduced clarity of thought and mental concentration. Leaders must develop
more self-discipline and enforce sleep plans (leaders must sleep, too) to reduce these problems.
Synchronization and coordination of CS and CSS operations are more difficult under NBC
conditions. Include appropriate support elements in your mission training program on a regular
basis.
Water Intake
Enforced water intake is required when in MOPP4, especially in warm climates. This is understood
by most leaders, but is not always properly supervised at the individual soldier level. Over hydration
can reduce body temperatures and lessen heat stress.
Physical Conditioning
Long periods in MOPP4 sap soldier energy. Endurance training is more beneficial than speed or
strength training.
Although imposing NBC conditions on your METL training adds complexity and difficulty to mission
performance, it supports battle focused training, and trains your soldiers and leaders to cope with
complex, stressful, and lethal situations. Extended field tests conducted under NBC conditions
have shown that soldiers and leaders emerge with a sense of pride, accomplishment, and the
realization that, with practice, they can survive and win.
PRE-DEPLOYMENT
In a power projection role, the unit must be prepared to deploy on short notice with:
• All individual protective gear of the proper type, size, and fit
• All unit NBC equipment (including training equipment and material) in operating condition
with spare parts and supplies (e.g., batteries, kits)
• Deployment training packages to rapidly refresh and sustain key training areas
• A preliminary IPB analysis of the threat
You should use all opportunities to assess the proficiency of your soldiers, subordinate leaders and
units to perform their METL under NBC conditions. In addition to the usual training and equipment
assessment tools, periodically sample the individual NBC survival skills of your soldiers and staff
personnel, and the collective NBC skills of subordinate leaders. The standards for these skills can
be provided by your chemical battle staff from Soldier Training Publications (STP), Military
Qualification Standards (MQS) manuals, and ARTEP mission training plans (AMTP). Although the
chemical battle staff can perform a major portion of the overall assessment of the unit's NBC skills,
only you can adequately assess the unit's ability to perform its mission tasks under NBC conditions,
plus provide the command emphasis to ensure the unit is clear on the intent of your training
objectives. Your assessment should:
Ask three key questions about your unit when assessing or evaluating your subordinates' feedback:
The following job aid will assist you in answering these questions:
Survival
• Is there an efficient and effective local alarm system for NBC at each of my units'
positions?
• Do my soldiers properly don, clear, and seal their protective masks (9 seconds) and place
the hood over the head and secure the hood (untimed)?
• Can my soldiers put on and wear MOPP gear?
• Are my officers and NCOs proficient in individual NBC survival tasks?
• Are my officers and NCOs proficient in preparing for attacks by NBC weapons (e.g.,
disperse vehicles, check alarms, cover supplies, monitor)?
• Are my officers and NCOs proficient in responding to attacks by NBC weapons (e.g.,
correctly using shelters for work/rest cycles, planning decontamination, identifying and
avoiding hazards, adjusting protection)?
•• In each FTX, develop/use an NBC threat scenario consistent with our deployment
mission(s)
•• Conduct at least two STXs with threat or NBC events that drive protection to
MOPP3 or 4
•• During weapons qualification, ensure all soldiers fire their individual weapons
while wearing MOPP4
• Do my units conduct training of a task in MOPP Zero, then repeat the training in MOPP4?
• Have my subordinate leaders identified tasks they must delay or defer (in MOPP4)?
• Do my subordinate leaders use chemical battle staff as observer/controllers (O/C) on
FTXs, or "borrow" experts from sister units to conduct after action reviews (AAR)?
• Does my training guidance encourage acclimatization in MOPP gear?
Mission Tasks
• Does my unit perform its METL tasks to standard in MOPP4 (or with a high nuclear threat
scenario)?
• Does contamination seriously disrupt my operations?
• Do training exercise casualties increase such that we have unacceptable losses under
NBC conditions?
In addition to your own assessments, you must have an active feedback program from your
chemical battle staff and subordinate commanders on the NBC training and equipment status of
your unit.
The intelligence BOS includes functions that generate knowledge about the enemy, weather, and
terrain. If the operation involves a potential NBC threat, information about enemy NBC capabilities,
dispositions, and intent should be among your top priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
Upon receiving actual missions, the chemical battle staff needs the following type of guidance to
execute the IPB:
• Recommends NAI for this mission based on templated areas of expected contamination
• Recommends PIR to solve any uncertainties
• Recommends unit taskings for the R&S plan for NBC reconnaissance tasks
• Conducts a vulnerability assessment and integrates this into the decision support template
• Based on the vulnerability assessment, the chemical battle staff recommends:
• NBC warning and reporting systems (NBCWRS) are not standard throughout services or
armies. Use liaison personnel to coordinate NBCWRS SOP
• Communications equipment may not interface with supported and supporting units and
may require alternate means of communications
• Differences may exist in detection equipment and capabilities; if so, this must be
understood • NBC terminology, MOPP levels, and MOPP concepts may not be standard
• Logistics capabilities of supporting allied forces may be inadequate in types and amounts
of NBC supplies
• Doctrinal literature and TTP are not standard throughout services/nations
• In many cases, joint doctrine does not exist (e.g., smoke operations)
RDL Table of Document Download
Homepage Contents Information Instructions
Appendix B
Chapter 8
Chemical units do not come with a significant slice of CSS assets. Table 8-1 displays the "care and
feeding" responsibilities inherent with the command or support relationship that you have with the
chemical unit.
NBC RECONNAISSANCE
NBC reconnaissance aids in maneuver. For NBC reconnaissance to do this, you must develop an R &
S plan that is synchronized with your tactical plan.
Command and staff supervision is essential to ensure NBC reconnaissance elements report timely and
accurate information. Give planning guidance to the staff that answers the following questions.
• What do I want NBC reconnaissance to accomplish? (Locate clean routes? Collect samples?
Conduct a survey?)
• Where and for how long am I willing to delay movement to conduct NBC reconnaissance? (Do
I mark clean route markers and move faster? Do I emplace road guides?)
• How much restriction in my own mobility can I accept? (Do I cross large contaminated areas?
Do I bypass them and move into possible kill zones?)
• How will counter-reconnaissance (CR) help me? (If I use the NBC reconnaissance unit in the
CR plan, what are the costs?)
The extreme impact of NBC hazards on tactical operations mandates close coordination, control, and
planning for contingencies. You must control NBC reconnaissance in your AO. Designate NAI and
include them in the R & S plan. Task units to observe the NAI and conduct physical reconnaissance of
NAI that are in the scheme of maneuver. NBC reconnaissance unit leaders must monitor your
communications nets as well as their internal nets.
Commander's Considerations
Coordinate with all units participating in or influenced by the effects of NBC weapons use in your AO.
Define support requirements to include:
• Intent
• Location of the potential (templated) target
• Security of NBC reconnaissance assets
• Immediate support available for the mission
When the plan calls for support from an NBC reconnaissance unit, the commander of that unit is
responsible for the planning, coordinating, and execution of his assigned NBC reconnaissance
missions. Based upon information from the maneuver commander, the NBC reconnaissance unit
commander:
The chemical staff officer plans and monitors the execution of the R&S plan, in coordination with the S2
and NBC reconnaissance unit commander. The procedures for NBC reconnaissance planning have
been discussed. The procedures for monitoring execution are:
NBC DECONTAMINATION
NBC decontamination aids in protecting the force and restoring combat power.
Give planning guidance to the staff that answers the following questions.
The extreme impact of NBC hazards on tactical operations mandates close coordination, control, and
planning for contingencies. Command and staff supervision is essential to ensure the decontamination
assets are set up in the right place at the right time.
You must control NBC decontamination in your area of operations. Designate a reconstitution officer
and include this in the plan (e.g., battalion executive officer is a logical choice). Task units to perform
specific portions of the plan -- for example, the support platoon would be tasked to supply water and
bring replacement overgarments and other items to the decontamination point.
NBC decontamination unit leaders must monitor your communications nets as well as their internal
nets.
Commander's Considerations
Coordinate with all units participating in or influenced by the effects of NBC weapons use in your AO.
Define support requirements to include:
• Intent
• Security of decontamination assets
• Immediate support available for the mission
Based upon your situation, you may be able to decontaminate with your existing assets. However, the
decontamination work load may exceed your capabilities or you may require complete relief from
MOPP gear. Based on information from you, the NBC decontamination unit commander:
The chemical staff officer plans and monitors the execution of the decontamination plan, in coordination
with the XO, S4, and decontamination unit commander. Procedures include:
Chapter 6
Special Conditions
There are special considerations associated with operating in unique environments and climatic
regions. Each geographic area, terrain type, unique terrain feature, climatic condition, and NBC
defense posture has unique considerations that must be evaluated where NBC weapons may be
employed.
• Defenders may use weapons of mass destruction to cause panic among the unprotected
population, to impede movement of attacking forces, and to impose increased MOPP
requirements against attacking elements
• Soldiers may be less inclined to fight in the presence of civilian NBC casualties, particularly in
confined spaces and partially destroyed buildings
• NBC detection equipment value may be limited due to the speed and constant movement of
forces
• Naturally occurring endemic diseases and vectors, which mimic biological agent use, increase
as sanitation decreases
• Security is difficult. Defenders may not be readily identifiable from noncombatants
Commander's Considerations
• Soldiers must be psychologically prepared for large numbers of civilian casualties which will
include women and children; prepare soldiers to carry out orders/missions when civilian
population is used to impede movement; practice mission requirements while wearing MOPP
gear
• Prepare soldiers to continue the mission while working in confined spaces and to recognize
hazards associated with damaged buildings and utilities
• Train soldiers in use of detection equipment, use of M8/M9 paper, and to recognize NBC
employment in the absence of detection equipment
• Maintain current immunizations. Train soldiers in field sanitation and vector control
• Light and heat will be reflected by the snow causing dazzle, snow blindness, and burn
casualties long distances from ground zero
• Avalanches may be created as far as 30 kilometers from ground zero
• Heat from the initial effects will create quick thaws, which may affect vehicle and foot
movement over roads, frozen streams and lakes, and marshy areas; refreezing may lock
vehicles and equipment in place
• Blast effects will create projectiles from frozen material and snow storms picked up by the
advancing shock wave
• Agents picked up by individual clothing may not be detected and may not become an
immediate hazard due to multi-layer clothing
• Wearing contaminated clothing into a heated shelter will volatize the agent and create
casualties
• In extreme cold temperatures, chemical agent effects are limited to on-target; there is minimal
downwind hazard
• Frost will restrict the airflow through the air inlet valves of the protective mask
• Frostbite of the face may occur if the protective mask head harness is secured too tightly
• Water-based decontaminants are less effective at temperatures near freezing
Smoke Impacts
• White phosphorous (WP) cartridges get buried in deep snow, and WP often burns undetected
in the snow
• WP smoke tends to pillar rather than disperse
Commander's Considerations
Commander's Considerations
• Organize bulk of mission requirements for cooler periods of night to extend capabilities
• Plan for light work and numerous work/rest cycles even in light work; make maximum use of
shade and collective protection
• Increase NBC awareness during night hours when the threat of NBC employment is greatest;
security personnel in sleep and work areas should sound alarm in event of employment
• Ensure soldiers cover their skin when not in MOPP gear and when wearing mask only; plan for
increased casualties and medical treatment, increase medical screening to limit prolonged
casualties
• Enforce hydration while in MOPP gear
• Drink and eat from approved sources; desert water sources that have been tainted with NBC
hazards may have local insect and animal life forms dead or dying nearby
• Encourage reporting of even minor cuts, abrasions, or illness to medical personnel for
immediate treatment
• Plan how to provide water for decontamination, including dedicating transportation assets
• Land navigation by foot is slow; foot travel is further degraded when wearing MOPP gear
• When in MOPP gear, peripheral vision is reduced and forward vision may be limited to a few
feet
• The jungle canopy creates good overhead cover from aircraft spray; however, if the dense
jungle foliage is contaminated, soldiers can easily pick up the contamination as they move
through the area
• Biological hazards maybe more difficult to identify
• Minor sickness or injury may become serious
• Thick vegetation prevents effective downwind travel of smoke
Commander's Considerations
• Plan for extra time when moving by foot when in MOPP gear
• Heat stress is increased due to the high humidity; plan for relief from MOPP gear
• Train soldiers to minimize physical contact with potentially contaminated vegetation
• Medical personnel must provide immediate treatment for any sickness, illness, or small cuts or
abrasions of the skin
• Avoid taking positions near stagnant or slow-moving water and near decaying plant/animal
matter
• The concentration of units along narrow roads where no egress is possible may make them
more vulnerable to NBC hazards. This is particularly true in narrow canyons or valleys where
movement may be restricted and in staging areas at the base of mountains
• Chemical agent vapors are heavier than air and will settle in valleys and depressions
• MOPP gear reduces foot soldiers' ability to traverse mountain terrain off roads and off normal
foot trails
• Smoke tends to follow valleys, roads, and ravines and is effective in denying the enemy use of
these narrow passages
• Swirling winds make smoke difficult to adjust and maintain
Commander's Considerations
• Disperse if tactically possible; movement by several means and routes limits concentration of
forces
• Limit movement through valleys and depressions; move through rapidly when cleared
• Limit off-road movement when in MOPP gear. Soldiers are less effective and the rugged
mountain terrain is very hard on MOPP clothing and equipment
• Enemy forces may use weapons of mass destruction to panic populations, to impede
movement of attacking forces, and to impose increased MOPP requirements on attacking
forces
• Reduced sanitary conditions will increase the available growth medium for biological
organisms and resultant probability that naturally occurring biological agents and vectors will
increase the health risks to soldiers and noncombatants
• Buildings may break up smoke streamers, reducing downwind coverage of smoke
• Smoke tends to rise over water (e.g., ponds, lakes), garden plots, parks, and open expanses
of concrete
• Smoke is very effective to protect from snipers, except burning rubble degrades screening
efficiency
Commander's Considerations
• Use smoke to obscure build-up areas before you attempt to secure them
• Pay particular attention to personal hygiene and field sanitation in cities; be alert to covert
dissemination of NBC hazards through water or sanitary systems
RDL Table of Document Download
Homepage Contents Information Instructions
Chapter 7
CONCEPT
Obscurants are man-made or naturally occurring particles suspended in the air that block or weaken
(attenuate) the transmission of a particular part or parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as
visible light, infrared (IR), or microwaves. Fog, mist, dust, smoke, and chaff are examples of
obscurants.
Smoke is an artificially created obscurant normally produced by burning or vaporizing some product. An
example is the vaporization of fog oil to produce smoke from a mechanical smoke generator.
Uses
We can render some electro-optical (EO) target acquisition and sighting devices ineffective; others we
can degrade significantly; some we cannot affect at all. As a result of the development of IR and radar
devices during World War II and subsequent technological advances, EO devices have supplemented
visual methods of target acquisition and aiming weapons. Precision-guided munitions and sophisticated
sensors provide the ultimate in lethality: What can be seen can be hit and killed.
We use visual obscurants to defeat the enemy's battlefield viewers and weapon guidance systems,
such as command line-of-sight or terminal homing systems on antitank and air defense missiles. When
fielded, we will use multispectral obscurants to defeat the enemy's battlefield viewers, weapon guidance
systems, radar systems, and high-energy, and microwave-directed energy weapons. Smoke and
obscurants change the previous truism: what can be seen may not necessarily be hit and killed.
Appendix A has a tactical decision aid for selecting the type smoke to defeat a particular EO system.
Smoke and obscurants themselves are not lethal. However, when synchronized throughout the depth
of the battlefield they enhance your unit's ability to maneuver. They help to concentrate combat power
against enemy vulnerabilities at the critical time and place. They help to reduce your own vulnerability
to enemy intelligence and target acquisition. Smoke and obscurants provide another means to meet the
imperatives of battlefield operations by:
WARNING
Smoke aids in deceiving the enemy, conceals maneuver, and increases your potential force-on-force
ratio when your target acquisition systems can see through the smoke and the threat's cannot. For
smoke to help, develop a plan to use smoke synchronized with your tactical plan.
Give planning guidance to the staff that answers the following questions:
• What do I want smoke and obscurants to accomplish? (Degrade target acquisition? Conceal
the movement of my main attack? Aid in deception?)
• Where and for how long am I willing to sustain this smoke cloud? (Over my own position?
Between my unit and the enemy? On the enemy?)
• How much restriction in my own mobility can I accept? (Visibility 50 meters or less? More?)
• How much restriction in my own target acquisition and engagement capabilities can I accept?
(If I deny the enemy use of laser designators, I also deny mine; but my thermal sights are
unaffected)
• When might on-call hasty or deliberate smoke benefit? (Where does my decision support
matrix indicate I may be exposed and need immediate smoke to obscure the enemy?)
• How will countersmoke help? (If the enemy uses smoke, where and how should I retaliate with
smoke to interfere with their synchronization?)
The extreme impact of smoke on tactical operations mandates close coordination, control, and planning
for contingencies. Command and staff supervision is essential to ensure the use of smoke enhances,
rather than degrades, mission success.
Control smoke in your area of operations. Use decision points based on IPB and human feedback to
control when you start and stop smoke. Smoke unit leaders monitor the communications nets for the
supported unit as well as internal nets. This ensures you have an immediate response to start or stop
smoke at a particular point or time.
Plan to minimize friendly force degradation from our own use of smoke. Rehearse those contingencies.
An antitank position with a clear field of fire may be useless in dense smoke unless the gunner or
section leader has rehearsed movement to previously prepared alternate positions (limited visibility
positions).
Commander's Considerations
Coordinate with all units participating in or influenced by the smoke operation. Define smoke support
requirements to include:
• Intent
• Location and size of the smoke target area (designate as a TAI)
• Time for effective smoke to be on the target
• Duration of effective smoke on the target
• Security of smoke assets
• Delivery options
• Preparation of a smoke annex for the operation
When the smoke plan calls for support from a smoke generator unit, the commander of the smoke unit
is responsible for establishing and maintaining smoke on the designated target. Based upon
information from the maneuver commander, the smoke unit commander:
The chemical staff officer plans and monitors the execution of the smoke plan, in coordination with the
FSO and smoke unit commander. The procedures for smoke planning have been discussed. The
procedures for monitoring execution are:
Appendix D
LOOK-UP TABLE
RDL Table of Document Download
Homepage Contents Information Instructions
GLOSSARY
AAR After-Action Review
AI Area of Interest
AO Area of Operations
Aslt Assault
Bde Brigade
BW Biological Warfare
CB Chemical/Biological
Co Company
CS Combat Support
CW Chemical Warfare
Def Defense
Div Division
DS Direct Support
FA Field Artillery
FM Field Manual
Freq Frequency
GP Group
GS General Support
HQ Headquarters
IET Initial Entry Training
IR Infrared
LC Line of Contact
LD Line of Departure
LOG Logistics
MED Medical
OB Order of Battle
OBJ Objective
OC Observer/Controller
PB Persistent Blister
Plt Platoon
PN Persistent Nerve
POS Position
QC Quality Control
RP Red Phosphorous
SB Supply Bulletin
S/O Smoke/Obscurants
TB Technical Bulletin
TC Training Circular
TF Task Force
US United States
WO Warning Order
WP White Phosphorus