Mohit Document
Mohit Document
Mohit Document
JAMIE APPELLANT
Vs.
OLIVER RESPONDENT
JUDICIAL DECISION
1. HUSSIAN VS. UNION OF INDIA
2. RAM AND ORS VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
3. MANEKA GANDHI VS. UNION OF INDIA
BOOKS REFERED
1) K.T. Thomas, M.A. Rashid (Rev.), Ratan Lal & Dhiraj Lal’s The Indian Penal Code, (35th
ed., 2017)
2) K.D. Gaur, Criminal Law : Cases and Materials, (8th ed., 2015)
3) R.C. Nigam, Law of Crimes in India (Vol. I) (1965)
4) V.B. Raju, Commentary on Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Vol. I & II) (4th ed., 1982)
5) K.N.C. Pillai & Shabistan Aquil (Rev.), Essays on the Indian Penal Code (The Indian Law
Institute, 2005)
6) K. I. Vibhute (Rev.), P.S.A. Pillai’s Criminal Law (13th ed., 2017)
7) Syed Shamsul Huda, The Principles of the Law of Crimes in British India(1902)
8) K.N. Chandrasekharan Pillai, General Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed., 2011)
STATUE REFERED
WEBSITE REFERED
1. https://www.scconline.com/
2. https://www.manupatrafast.com/
3. https://www.lexisnexis.com/
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
5. Art. Article
6. S. Section
SUMMARY OF FACT
The Democratic Republic of Jotunheim (also called Jatindham) gained independence from
British rule in 1947. The British had introduced a penal code, the Jotunheim Penal Code
(1860), along with the Criminal Procedure Code (1862) and Jotunheim Evidence Act
(1872). These colonial laws were revised post-independence, with the Criminal Procedure
Code updated in 1973 to align with the new constitution. In 2023, three new laws replaced
these colonial codes: the Jatindham Nyaya Sanhita (JNS), Jatindham Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita (JNSS), and Jatindham Sakshya Adhiniyam (JSA), effective from 1st July 2024.
Jamie, a 32-year-old entrepreneur, met Oliver, a 30-year-old banker, in May 2023 at a business
event and offered her a job. They grew close and entered into a romantic relationship. Jamie
expressed the intention to marry Oliver, and both began saving money for the wedding. Over
time, Oliver used Jamie’s accounts without permission, and they purchased a house together.
In November 2023, an argument occurred after Jamie confronted Oliver about her relationship
with a colleague. They reconciled, and Jamie proposed to Oliver in December, promising
marriage by 2025.
However, by May 2024, Jamie grew distant, avoiding discussions of marriage. Oliver became
suspicious and accessed Jamie’s social media accounts without his knowledge. Jamie withdrew
money saved for the wedding and deposited it into a joint account with another person, Alexa.
By August, Jamie broke off the relationship, explaining his family’s disapproval and their plans
for him to marry Alexa. He also sold the house they shared and transferred the proceeds.
Feeling betrayed, Oliver posted intimate images of them online and filed a police report against
Jamie, accusing him of exploitation. Jamie was arrested in September 2024 under Section 69
of JNS. Despite multiple extensions of police remand, Jamie was tortured but refused to
confess. He was granted default bail in December due to delays in filing the chargesheet. The
police later charged him under Sections 375 and 376 (rape) of the Jotunheimian Penal Code.
After Jamie failed to appear in court, he was declared a proclaimed offender in January 2025.
The trial proceeded in absentia, and Jamie was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment
under Section 376 in April 2025. Jamie’s lawyer filed an appeal, challenging the remand
proceedings and the conviction.
ISSUES
1. Whether the appeal in the present case is maintainable before the High Court?
2. Whether the trial in absentia adhered to the provisions and principles of due process?
3. Whether the lower court’s application of substantive and procedural laws in the given
factual context was correct?
4. Whether any offence in the instant case has been committed, if so, under which laws?
5. Whether the repeated authorisation of police remand by the lower court till 14th
December was in accordance with the provisions of criminal procedure and the
principles enshrined under the Constitution of Jotunheim?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1) Whether the appeal in the present case is maintainable before the High Court
It is humbly submitted in the Hon'ble Court that the appeal is not maintainable as the accused
is declared a proclaimed offender and has failed to appear before the court as required by
Section 356(7) of the BNSS, which states that no appeal can be filed unless the accused presents
himself. The accused’s absence, despite being summoned and having two warrants issued,
indicates a waiver of his right to appeal. This process ensures that justice is not delayed due to
the accused’s evasion. Allowing this appeal would violate the statutory provisions of the BNSS.
2) Whether the trial in absentia adhered to the provisions and principles of due process
It is humbly submitted in the Hon'ble Court that the Court of Session followed all procedural
requirements as per Section 356 of BNSS for a trial in absentia. The accused was declared a
proclaimed offender, and necessary warrants were issued, ensuring compliance with due
process. The law allows for trials in absentia to prevent delays in justice, especially when the
accused willfully absconds. Thus, the trial was valid and did not violate the principle of due
process, as the accused had the opportunity to defend himself but chose to abscond.
3) Whether the lower court’s application of substantive and procedural laws in the given
factual context was correct
It is humbly submitted in the Hon'ble Court that the lower court correctly applied both
substantive and procedural laws, as procedural laws are retrospective and substantive laws are
prospective. The FIR was filed under the IPC due to the offence occurring before the enactment
of BNSS, but the procedural laws followed BNSS. Therefore, the court’s application of law
was justified and in accordance with legal standards.
4) Whether any offence in the instant case has been committed, and if so, under which
law
It is humbly submitted in the Hon'ble Court that an offence of rape under Sections 375 and 376
of the IPC has been committed, as the accused’s actions indicated no intention to marry and
misled the victim into a sexual relationship. The lack of genuine consent due to deceit
constitutes rape, as the accused’s behavior demonstrates that he did not have the victim's true
consent.
5) Whether the repeated authorization of police remand by the lower court till 14th
December was in accordance with the provisions of criminal procedure and the principles
enshrined under the Constitution of Jotunheim
It is humbly submitted in the Hon'ble Court that the lower court's authorization of police
remand was lawful and followed the provisions of the BNSS. The Magistrate exercised the
authority to detain the accused beyond 15 days, adhering to the statutory framework for serious
offences. This removal of distinctions between police and judicial custody facilitates effective
investigations, ensuring that justice is served efficiently.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCE
1) Whether the appeal in the present case is maintainable before the High Court
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that, in the present factual matrix, the appeal
is not maintainable in law or on facts. The accused has been declared a proclaimed offender 1
and has filed this appeal through his advocate, which is barred by Section 356(7) of BNSS.
Section 356 of bnss- Inquiry, trial or judgment in absentia of proclaimed offender.
356(7)of bnss says that - "No appeal shall lie against the judgment under this section unless
the proclaimed offender presents himself before the Court of appeal"
The accused has voluntarily waived his right to appeal by failing to appear before the court
when summoned by the Judicial Magistrate. Furthermore, the court issued two subsequent
warrants, but the accused remained absconding. After following all procedural laws, the trial
and conviction of the accused stand justified. Allowing this appeal would amount to a violation
of statutory provisions under BNSS.
For an appeal to be maintainable, the accused must present himself before the court. Since he
has failed to do so, no appeal should lie before the High Court or Supreme Court. After the due
process under Sections 356(1) to 356(6) has been followed, the appeal should not be
entertained.
The accused was given ample opportunities to defend himself and was aware that he was
charged with the offence of rape. His failure to appear in court constitutes the will amount to
waiving off his right, and he cannot now claim that his absence was unintentional. By
absconding, he voluntarily waived his rights. Moreover, allowing the accused to file an appeal
through his advocate, without his physical presence, would waste the court's time and add to
its burden.
In Hussain v. Union of India2, the Supreme Court noted that trials were delayed due to the
absconding of accused persons and recommended amendments to the CrPC to address such
delays. The introduction of BNSS seeks to expedite trials and ensure swift justice.
Therefore, my submission to court is that appeal should not be allowed.
1
https://bprd.nic.in/uploads/pdf/202402240432162657784ProclaimedOffender.pdf
2
In Hussain v. Union of India AIR 2017 S.C 1362
2) Whether the trial in absentia adhered to the provisions and principles of due process
It is humbly submitted that the Court of Session has strictly adhered to the provisions and
principles of due process. In the instant case, all the essential requirements under Section 356
of BNSS were fulfilled, and the conviction was in accordance with the law after following all
procedural requirements.
2.1) Whether there should be a de-novo trial due to the trial in absentia or conviction can
be done in this.
If the FIR was registered before the bnss came into force, then there must be de-novo trial as it
is the basic right of the accused. But the Fir was registered on 29th august and from then the
investigation has started and it has to be followed according to the bnss.
Section 356(1) -(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Sanhita or in any other law for
the time being in force, when a person declared as a proclaimed offender, whether or not
charged jointly, has absconded to evade trial and there is no immediate prospect of arresting
him, it shall be deemed to operate as a waiver of the right of such person to be present and tried
in person, and the Court shall, after recording reasons in writing, in the interest of justice,
proceed with the trial in the like manner and with like effect as if he was present, under this
Sanhita and pronounce the judgment
The legislature has enacted this section, because in the past many accused flee the country after
committing the offence, and trial could not be initiated only the property could be seized.
Therefore, this section provides a relief that the process will not be halted waiting for the
proclaimed
offender to join the process. The victim and society need not wait for the justice. There will be
an imaginary presumption that the accused was present in the trial.
In the case atma Ram and others vs state of rajasthan, the supreme Court while deciding the
trial absentia, held that It is certainly in the societal interest that the guilty must be punished
and at the same time the procedural requirements which ensure fairness in trial must be adhered
to. But the legislature has now removed this procedural requirement for the trial absentia.
For a trial in absentia under BNSS to proceed, the following conditions must be satisfied:
Firstly, The accused must be declared a proclaimed offender.
Secondly, Two consecutive warrants must have been issued within a 30-day period.
Thirdly, The trial cannot commence until 90 days have elapsed from the date of framing the
charges.
Fourthly, The court must notify a relative or friend of the accused about the trial’s
commencement.
Fifthly, A notice must be published in a national or local newspaper circulating in the area of
the accused’s last known address, informing him that the trial will commence if he fails to
appear.
Lastly, The notice must be affixed conspicuously at the accused's last known residence and
displayed at the local police station.
In the present case, all these steps were duly followed. The police filed the chargesheet in
December, summons and two consecutive warrants were issued, and the trial commenced after
the statutory 90-day period had passed. Therefore, the trial in absentia fully adhered to legal
provisions.
2.2) Whether the trial in absentia violates the principle of due process of law
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1970), the Supreme Court interpreted "procedure
established by law" as equivalent to "due process of law."
It is respectfully submitted that the trial in absentia does not violate the principle of due process.
The law relating to trials in absentia is not applied arbitrarily; it specifically applies only to
those accused who have willfully absconded after the court has ordered of summons and
warrants. If the accused had been innocent, he would not have fled but would have appeared
in court to defend himself. His absconding indicates guilt in him.
Moreover, the law includes safeguards to ensure fairness. Even after conviction, the accused
can move to set aside the conviction under Section 356(7) BNSS by presenting himself before
the court. However, in this case, the accused has chosen to have his advocate file an appeal on
his behalf, without personally appearing. Such an action would undermine the justice system
and invite misuse, where accused persons of heinous crimes could abscond and frustrate the
trial process, as has been seen in the past.
Considering the victim-centric approach, trials in absentia allow for faster conclusions where
the accused evades the law. Delaying justice solely because the accused is not present
constitutes justice denied, as famously expressed: "Justice delayed is justice denied."
Therefore, the trial in absentia in this case does not violate the principle of due process, as all
procedural requirements were fulfilled, and the accused has legal recourse to challenge the
conviction.
3) Whether the lower court’s application of substantive and procedural laws in the given
factual context was correct
It is humbly submitted that the lower court correctly applied both substantive and procedural
laws. Because substantive law is prospective in nature while procedural law is retrospective in
nature.
Section “531. Repeal and savings.
(1) The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal—
(a) if, immediately before the date on which this Sanhita comes into force, there is any appeal,
application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending,then, such appeal, application, trial, inquiry
or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as in force immediately before
such commencement (hereinafter referred to as the said Code), as if this Sanhita had not come
into force. The issue of investigation procedure when an FIR is registered after the
commencement of new criminal laws for an offence committed before their enforcement is not
addressed by Section 531(2)(a) of BNSS. To resolve this, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1897, is relevant, as it outlines the effect of repealing a Central Act or Regulation.
Section 6. Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the
commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then,
unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any
enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed
against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege,
obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation,
legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted,
In Deepu & Ors. v. State of U.P., the Court held that if an FIR is registered on or after 1st July
2024 for an offence committed before that date, the FIR would be registered under the IPC, but
the investigation would proceed under BNSS.
The sexual intercourse was done in the December 2023, on the false belief of marriage by the
Jamie that is to say under misconception of fact that is not a consent. Means the offence will
be governed by the ipc not by the bnss And f.i.r was registered on 29th August 2024 that means
after the bnss came into existence and that is a procedural law which is retrospective in nature.
Means the procedural law will be governed by the bnss. Therefore my submission to the court
is lower court application to substantive and procedural was justified.
4) Whether any offence in the instant case has been committed, if so, under which law
It is humbly submitted that the offence of rape under Section 375 read with Section 376 of the
IPC has been committed in this case.Offence is done by an act and act does not mean by doing
something it also include omission.
It is clear that Jamie never had the intention to marry Oliver. His actions show that from the
beginning, he restricted her from announcing their relationship publicly, which raises serious
doubts about his commitment. Jamie falsely promised marriage to gain Oliver's trust, and based
on this belief, she entered into a sexual relationship with him. However, within five months,
his behavior drastically changed he began avoiding her, maintaining distance, and consistently
deflecting any discussions about marriage. This pattern of behavior makes it evident that
Jamie’s sole intention was to engage in a sexual relationship, not to marry Oliver.
Even if we accept the contention of petitioner that it was because of professionalism that the
relationship should not be announced in public and they were both saving money for their
marriage. Still,Jamie clearly did not intend to marry Oliver. He asked his parents to find a
suitable partner, indicating he was not committed to her. Additionally, on June 2, 2024, he
withdrew their wedding savings without informing Oliver, falsely claiming it was to cover
startup losses when the business was actually profitable.
During their business trip to Nagaur on July 10, 2024, they had multiple sexual encounters. If
Jamie truly had concerns about Oliver’s trustworthiness, he should have communicated that
instead of continuing the relationship. His silence while engaging in sexual activity, knowing
he did not intend to marry her, misled Oliver into believing in a future together. This deception
means Oliver’s consent was not genuine, which constitutes rape.
5) Whether the repeated authorisation of police remand by the lower court till 14th
December was in accordance with the provisions of criminal procedure and the principles
enshrined under the Constitution of Jotunheim
It is humbly submitted that the authorisation of police remand was in full accordance with both
the criminal procedure and the Constitution.
Under Section 187(3) BNSS, the Magistrate has the authority to authorise detention beyond 15
days, up to a maximum of 90 days in heinous offences, such as rape.
Section 187(3) -The Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, beyond the
period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no
Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this sub-section
for a total period exceeding
(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the
said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be
released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail
under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXV
for the purposes of that Chapter.
Jamie was arrested on 16th September, and the Magistrate authorised his detention for 90 days,
which is valid under Section 187 of BNSS. Prior to BNSS, police custody was limited to 15
days, with the remaining detention in judicial custody. However, BNSS has removed the
distinction between police and judicial custody, granting the Magistrate discretion to determine
custody type based on investigative needs.
The legislature removed the term "judicial custody" to make investigations easier for the police.
Once someone is in judicial custody, it can be hard to return them to police custody, which
limits the police's ability to gather important information. To properly investigate a case, the
police need direct access to the accused so they can ask questions and gather necessary details.
This change helps ensure that investigations are thorough and efficient.
PRAYER
In light of the aforementioned arguments, it is most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court
that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:
_____________________________