VOL.

57, JUNE 28, 1974 663

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

*
No. L-32818. June 28, 1974.

CRISANTO CORNEJO, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
AUDITOR GENERAL, THE NATIONAL TREASURER,
THE CITY MAYOR OF PASAY, THE CITY COUNCIL OF
PASAY CITY, THE CITY AUDITOR OF PASAY CITY, THE
CITY TREASURER OF PASAY CITY, and SPECIAL
COUNSEL ADELINO A. SANCHEZ OF PASAY CITY,
respondents.

Civil Service; Decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service;

Motion for reconsideration of decision should be filed within thirty
days after receipt thereof.·Section 36 of Republic Act No. 2260
[Civil Service Act of 1959] and the Civil Service Rules provide
that a motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered by the
Commissioner of Civil Service may be filed within thirty (30) days

______________

* EN BANC.

664

664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

af ter receipt of the decision by the party adversely affected.

Same; Same; Same; Case at bar.·The petitioner filed his
motion for reconsideration on September 17, 1966. What is
debated is the date on which the petitioner received a copy of the
Commissioner's decision. Petitioner, on the one hand, contends
that he received it on August 18,1966, while the respondents, on
the other hand, allege that petitioner received it on June 8,1966.
This Court is inclined to uphold the respondents on this point.
Consequently, the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service
considering petitioner resigned from the service became final on
July 8, 1966. Hence, the proceedings on petitioner's case take
after said date, including those that relate to petitioner's motion
for reconsideration and the resolution of the Commissioner
setting aside his May 19, 1966 decision, are without legal effect.
Same; Mistake of public officials or officers cannot prejudice
the State; Case at bar.·The reinvestigation of the case conducted
by the Special Prosecutor was a mistake that cannot prejudice the
State since it is in violation of an express provision and policy of
the law.
Constitutional law; Due process; Lack of opportunity to be
heard, and not absence of previous notice, constitutes violation of
due process.·ln the application of the principle of due process,
what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but
the denial of opportunity to be heard.
Same; Same; Same; Case at bar.·The record does not show
that petitioner ever filed an answer to the complaint, much less
elected a formal investigation pursuant to Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 2260, in spite of the unequivocal language of the first and
third indorsements earlier quoted. Petitioner himself does not
claim that he did. Respondents' assertion that there was no such
answer and/or election, therefore, stands uncontradicted.
Consequently, the investigation could well proceed without notice
to petitioner before each hearing and the Constitutional
injunction on due process was not disregarded.
Evidence; Presumptions: Presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed; Case at bar.·There is in respondents'
favor the presumption that "official duty has been regularly
performed" [Rule 131, Section 5 (m)]. That presumption has not
been overcome; instead it has been strengthened by the fact
admitted by petitioner that he was present at one of the hearings,
i.e., on July 14,1964.
Quo warranto; Action should be brought within one year after
ouster from office; Case at bar.·Consequently, this is a petition
for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 6 of the Rules of Court,
as petitioner alleges that he is entitled to a public office which is

665

VOL. 57, JUNE 28, 1974 665

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

allegedly usurped or unlawfully held and exercised by another.
The action to recover the office of Special Counsel or Fourth
Assistant Fiscal of Pasay City should have been commenced
within one (1) year after the ouster of the petitioner from the
office and his failure to do so is fatal to his pretension.
Same; Same; Pendency of administrative remedies did not
suspend the running of the one-year prescriptive period.·The
pendency of the administrative remedies that petitioner sought to
exhaust did not operate to suspend the running of the one-year
period within which a petition to recover the office should be filed.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus

with preliminary injunction.

The f acts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

ESGUERRA, J.:

In this original action for mandamus, with prayer for a writ

of preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to compel the
respondents to order his reinstatement to the position of
Special Counsel of Pasay City, and/or Fourth Assistant
City Fiscal (the latter position, according to petitioner,
being now the equivalent rank of Special Counsel of Pasay
City), and for payment to him of back salaries. This Court
did not issue the preliminary writ prayed for.
The facts of this case are substantially as follows:
On April 4, 1960, Secretary of Justice Alejo Mabanag
appointed petitioner to the position of Special Counsel
created by the Municipal Board of Pasay City to assist the
City Attorney in the discharge of his duties, with an
annual compensation of P3,600.00, payable by said City.
Petitioner took his oath of office on April 6, 1960.
Subsequently, a promotional appointment was extended to
him increasing his salary to P6,000.00 per annum, effective
July 1,1960.
Sometime in December 1963, a certain Teofilo L.
Amante filed an administrative complaint for dishonesty
and willfull failure to pay debts against petitioner with the
Department of Justice. The complainant charged that on
November 21, 1962, petitioner executed in favor of the
complainant real estate and chattel mortgages to secure
the payment of a loan of P5,000.00; that one of the
mortgaged properties turned out to have been previously
mortgaged by petitioner to another person who

666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the property

was sold by the sheriff at public auction; and that after the
mortgage in favor of the complainant had been executed,
petitioner, without the complainant's knowledge and
consent, executed in favor of another person a deed of sale
with right of repurchase over one of the mortgaged
properties, which property was, subsequently, again
mortgaged by petitioner to still another person.
An investigation was conducted by the Department of
Justice through State Prosecutor Alfredo Laya, who
recommended petitioner's dismissal. On May 19, 1966, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, concurring in the findings
and recommendation of the investigator, rendered a
decision f inding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and willful
f ailure to pay just debts and considering him resigned
from the service effective on his last day of duty with pay.
On July 1, 1966, respondent Adelino A. Sanchez was
appointed by the Secretary of Justice through
Undersecretary Claudio Teehankee to the position of
Special Counsel for Pasay City, deemed vacated on account
of petitioner's dismissal. The appointment was approved by
the Commissioner of Civil Service as provisional under
Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260, effective upon its
approval and Sanchez' assumption of office, but not earlier
than August 23, 1966.
On September 17, 1966, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Commissioner of
Civil Service on the grounds that he was denied due
process of law and that the decision was not supported by
evidence. On March 7, 1969, the Commissioner rendered a
resolution setting aside his decision of May 19, 1966, and
ordering a new investigation on the ground that in the
original investigation petitioner had been denied due
process. Pending reinvestigation, petitioner sought his
reinstatement.
The reinvestigation of the case was assigned by the
Department of Justice to State Prosecutor Leonardo B.
Cañares, who, in a memorandum to the Secretary of
Justice dated February 24, 1970, recommended "favorable
action on the petition for reinstatement to any of the
prosecution service under the Department pending
reinvestigation of the case," because petitioner had never
been preventively suspended from office, and the decision
considering him resigned had been set aisde by the
Commissioner of Civil Service.
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VOL. 57, JUNE 28, 1974 667

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

This was followed on March 11, 1970, by Cañares' "Report,

Findings and Recommendation," wherein he recommended
"the dismissal of the instant case for insufficiency of
evidence," and petitioner's exoneration. The said report,
copy of which was furnished the Civil Service
Commissioner, was transmitted to the Secretary of
Justice under a covering letter of even date. The report
was not, however, approved by the Secretary of Justice.
On April 22, 1970, the Commissioner of Civil Service, in
a second indorsement on State Prosecutor Cañarez'
Memorandum of February 24, 1970, recommending
petitioner's reinstatement, granted petitioner's request for
reinstatement. On May 4, 1970, Mayor Jovito O. Claudio of
Pasay City in a third indorsement, addressed to the City
Fiscal, referred the matter for implementation of the
Commissioner's reinstatement order.
In an indorsement to the City Auditor dated May 29,
1970, the City Fiscal stated that "as far as this office is
concerned, it is Mr. Adelino A. Sanchez who is officially and
actually holding the position [of Special Counsel] and who
renders service up to the present." And in what appears to
be a fourth indorsement on Cañarez' memorandum, the
said City Fiscal referred the matter to Secretary of
Justice Felix V. Makasiar, who, in a fifth indorsement
dated June 16, 1970, stated that "the case of Mr. Crisanto
Cornejo is already a closed matter," not only because his
motion for reconsideration of the Commissioner's decision
was filed beyond the thirty-day period prescribed in Section
36 of Republic Act No. 2260, but also because he must "be
deemed to have abandoned his office by his failure to
seasonably take the appropriate remedy to secure his
reinstatement, first, when his motion for reconsideration
[assuming that it was really filed on time] was not acted
upon for years and, second, when that Commission set
aside its May 19,1966, decision."
In the meantime, a voucher for P1,500.00 corresponding
to the back salaries of petitioner for three months from
April 1 to June 30, 1966, was approved by the City
Treasurer, the City Auditor and the City Fiscal, of Pasay
City, by virtue of which petitioner received the
aforementioned amount on June 10, 1970.
On July 3, 1970, the City Fiscal, in an indorsement to
the City Mayor, opined that the requested reinstatement of
petitioner "cannot be done and therefore ought to be denied
by that Office

668

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

on the basis of the 5th indorsement of Hon. Felix V.

Makasiar, Secretary of Justice, x x x."
Subsequently, on October 12, 1970, the Commissioner of
Civil Service wrote a letter to the Secretary of Justice,
explaining in the said letter that "the approval of Mr.
Sanchez' appointment x x x is subject to the conditions that
'x x x there is no pending protest against this appointment
nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely
affect the approval of this appointment;'" that the approval
of Mr. Sanchez appointment "was subject to the implied
condition that the position would ultimately be vacated by
Mr. Cornejo", and that the decision considering Mr.
Cornejo resigned had been set aside, so that he [Cornejo]
should now be reinstated to his position. The Commissioner
ruled that the approval of the appointment of Mr. Adelino
A. Sanchez is hereby revoked effective upon receipt hereof,"
and "Mr. Cornejo is reinstated as Special Counsel in Mr.
Sanchez' stead without prejudice to the outcome of the
reinvestigation of the case against Mr. Cornejo."
On October 29, 1970, petitioner addressed a letter to the
Secretary of Justice making a final bid for
reinstatement, otherwise he would be constrained to take
the matter to court. On November 23, 1970, Secretary of
Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in an indorsement of the
letter of the Commissioner of Civil Service of October 12,
1970, refused to reinstate petitioner, giving as reasons
therefor the finality of the decision dismissing petitioner
from the service; that the appointment of Sanchez had
already become irrevocable, and that petitioner's
reinstatement would involve the extension to him of
another appointment by the Commissioner of Civil Service
who is without power to appoint a Special Counsel in Pasay
City.
On November 23, 1970, petitioner filed the present
petition.
The outcome of this case hinges on the resolution of the
following issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner's motion to reconsider the

 decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service was
timely filed; and
2. Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process
of law in the original investigation of the
administrative complaint filed by Teofilo Amante
conducted by State Prosecutor Alfredo Laya;

669

VOL. 57, JUNE 28, 1974 669

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

3. Whether this action was timely filed by the petitioner. As

regards the first issue, Section 36 of Republic Act No. 2260
[Civil Service Act of 1959] and the Civil Service Rules
provide that a motion for reconsideration of the decision
rendered by the Commissioner of Civil Service may be filed
within thirty [30] days after receipt of the decision by the
party adversely affected.
It is undisputed that petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration on September 17, 1966. What is debated is
the date on which petitioner received a copy of the
Commissioner's decision. Petitioner, on the one hand,
contends that he received it on August 18, 1966, while
respondents on the other hand, allege that petitioner
received it on June 8,1966. This Court is inclined to uphold
the respondents on this point.
Annex "3" of the Answer filed by the respondent officials
of Pasay City is a certif ication by the Chief of Registry
Section of the Pasay City Post Off ice, to wit:

"Registered Letter No 3624 [containing the decision of the

Commissioner of Civil Service dated May 19, 1966], addressed to
FISCAL CORNEJO, 2415 Tramo St., Pasay City, was duly
delivered by our Mail Carrier Mr. BRAULIO RECILLO and
received by one ROSY CORNEJO, Fiscal CORNEJO'S
Household, on June 8,1966."

Annex "4" of the Memorandum filed by respondents with

this Court is a registry return receipt signed by Rosy
Cornejo showing that on June 8, 1966, she received a
letter from the Off ice of the City Fiscal of Pasay City
addressed to petitioner.
Annex "6" of the same Memorandum is a letter by the
Administrative Officer of the said fiscal's office addressed
to the City Fiscal in which it appears that on one occasion,
her registered letter addressed to petitioner asking for the
return of all pending criminal records in petitioner's
possession, was received by one Rosy Cornejo.
In their Memorandum, respondent officials insist that
the subject matter of the postal official's certification and
of the registry return receipt refer to the copy of the
Commissioner of Civil Service decision of May 19,1966.
Petitioner flatly denies that he ever received a copy of
the decision from any of respondents, or that a certain
Rosy Cornejo was ever a member of his household during
the last sixteen 16 years. He does not explain, however,
what, if any,

670

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

was contained in the mail matter received for him on June

8, 1966. That he did receive a mail matter on said date,
cannot be denied in the face of the certification by the post
office and of the registry return receipt. The only logical
conclusion in the premises is that petitioner received a mail
matter from respondent City Fiscal on June 8,1966, and
that the same was, as declared by respondents, a copy of
the Commissioner's decision.
Petitioner claims that the first and only time he received
a copy of the decision was on August 18, 1966, "when he
personally dropped by the Civil Service Commission and
inquired about the Administrative Case No. R-29156, for
which he personally signed in the records of said case." In
his 6th indorsement of January 14, 1971, to the Secretary
of Justice, the Commissioner of Civil Service states that
Mr. Cornejo received notice of the decision only on August
18, 1966. That petitioner received notice of the decision in
question from the Civil Service Commission on August
18,1966, may be true, but this does not obliterate the fact
that he also received notice earlier by mail through the City
Fiscal, or on June 8, 1966, as asserted by respondents and
borne out by the post office certification and the registry
return receipt. It will be noticed that on July 1, 1966,
respondent Sanchez' appointment as Special Counsel "vice
Crisanto Cornejo, dismissed," to be effective not earlier
than August 23, 1966, was prepared by the Department of
Justice and signed by then Undersecretary Teehankee.
This shows that before July 1, 1966, the Department of
Justice had already received notice of the Commissioner's
decision separating the petitioner from office. As said
decision is dated May 19,1966, there is reason to believe
that the Department of Justice, either directly or through
respondent City Fiscal, received a copy thereof earlier than
June 8, 1966. Thus, respondent City Fiscal, petitioner's
superior, was in a position to send a copy of the decision to
petitioner who, as shown by the evidence, received it from
the post office on June 8,1966, through Rosy Cornejo, a
person who appears to be the one usually receiving mail
matters for petitioner.
Consequently, the decision of the Commissioner of Civil
Service considering petitioner resigned from the service
became final on July 8, 1966. Hence, the proceedings on
petitioner's case taken after said date, including those that

671

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Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

relate to petitioner's motion for reconsideration and the

resolution of the Commissioner of Civil Service setting
aside his May 19, 1966 decision, are without any legal
effect. The reinvestigation of the case conducted by Special
Prosecutor Cañarez was a mistake that cannot prejudice
the State since it is in violation of an express provision and
policy of the law. [See Chaves, Sr. v. Mathay, L-29311,
February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA, 775, 782.]

II

The resolution of the second issue whether or not due

process of law was observed in the original investigation
conducted by State Prosecutor Alfredo Laya is of course of
paramount importance, for if it is shown that petitioner
was denied due process of law, the decision of the
Commissioner of Civil Service considering petitioner
resigned, shall be nullified and set aside despite our
conclusion that petitioner's motion to reconsider was f filed
beyond the reglementary period. In the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner with the Civil Service
Commission, he alleged that on April 10, May 28,
November 6 and 16, 1964, State Prosecutor Alfredo Laya
conducted the investigation of the administrative case
against him in his absence and without prior notice.
However, he admitted that he was present at the hearing
of July 14, 1964. According to him he was not notified
thereof and it was only by accident that he came to know
about it. At the said hearing, petitioner signed a note
acknowledging an indebtedness of P5,000.00 to the
complainant and promising to pay the same on or about
August 15, 1964.
The respondents assert that the hearings was conducted
after due notice to petitioner, which was not even necessary
in view of petitioner's failure to elect a formal investigation
as provided in the Civil Service Laws and Rules. It is Our
opinion that petitioner was not denied due process of law
in the investigation conducted by State Prosecutor Laya.
He failed to elect a formal investigation of the sworn
complaint filed against him by Amante. In fact he did not
even file an answer to the complaint although he was duly
furnished with a copy thereof. He was required to file an
answer and in

672

672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

the letter to that effect he was asked to indicate whether he

wanted to have a formal investigation. Three [3] pertinent
annexes are attached to respondents' Memorandum to
show this fact. Annex "1" is the first indorsement, dated
December 23, 1963, of the Secretary of Justice signed by
Chief Prosecuting Attorney Emilio A. Gancayco, which
reads in part:

"Respectfully referred through the City Fiscal to Assistant City

Fiscal Crisanto Cornejo, Pasay City, requesting him to submit an
answer to the charge contained in the verified complaint with
documentary evidence of Teofilo L. Amante dated December 18,
1963. Respondent Cornejo should attached to his answer
whatever evidence he may have in support of his side, and should
indicate in said answer whether he wishes to be heard in a formal
investigation, should one be deemed necessary, or elects to stand
on his written explanation.
"Return hereof within ten [10] days from receipt through the
City Fiscal who was requested to give his comment thereon, will
be appreciated."

Annex "2" is the second indorsement, dated January 14,

1964, of City Fiscal Gregorio G. Pineda, referring to
petitioner "for immediate action the instant basic
communication within the period so stated thereon." This
was received by petitioner on January 15, 1964, Annex "3"
is a letter dated January 17, 1964, of the Secretary of
Justice addressed to petitioner, signed by Chief
Prosecuting Attorney Gancayco, and received by petitioner
on January 30, 1964, which reads in part:

"This is in connection with our 1st indorsement dated December

23, 1963, a copy of which is attached hereto for ready reference,
requesting you to submit your answer to the charge contained in
the verified complaint of Teofilo L. Amante dated December 13,
1963, within 10 days from your receipt.
"In view thereof, you are hereby given another [5] days from
receipt hereof, to file your answer, and for [sic] failure to do so, we
will be constrained to take action on the basis of the complaint
and the evidence already submitted."

The record does not show that petitioner ever filed an

answer to the complaint, much less elected a formal
investigation

673

VOL. 57, JUNE 28, 1974 673

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 2260, in spite of

the unequivocal language of the first and third
indorsements quoted above. Petitioner himself does not
claim that he did. Respondents' assertion that there was no
such answer and/or election, therefore, stands
uncontradicted. Consequently, the investigation could well
proceed without notice to petitioner before each hearing
and the Constitutional injunction on due process was not
disregarded.

"x x x (I)n the application of the principle of due process, what is

sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the
denial of opportunity to be heard. x x x." [Bermejo v. Barrios, L-
23614; Camorin v. Barrios, L-23615, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA
764, 775776.]
"x x x Absence of previous notice is not of itself a substantial
defect; what the law abhors is the lack of opportunity to be heard.
x x x." [Manuel v. Villalena, et al., L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37
SCRA 745, 751.]
Such an opportunity was afforded the petitioner but by his
negligence or sheer indifference he forfeited it. In the language of
the Bermejo case, supra, "he has no one to blame but himself."

Assuming that it was the duty of Investigator Laya to

notify petitioner of the hearings, there is in respondents'
favor, the presumption that "official duty has been
regularly performed" [Rule 131, Section 5(m)]. That
presumption has not been overcome; instead it has been
strengthened by the fact admitted by petitioner that he was
present at one of the hearings, i.e., on July 14,1964.
Petitioner describes his presence at that hearing as
accidential, but this presence is belied not only by the
contrary assertion of respondents but also by petitioner's
own explanation of the incident. The explanation is
contained in the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner on September 17, 1966, with the Civil Service
Commission, pertinent portion of which reads:

"It is only by accident that he came to know it. Herein Respondent

arrived early and waited for one and a half-hours for Investigator
Laya to arrive. As Investigator Laya did not arrive during that
one and a half hours, herein Respondent left word to Investigator
Laya's secretary that he would go to Pasay City to postpone his
cases scheduled for investigation in his office and that he would
be back. As always, Investigator Laya once again

674

674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

proceeded with the investigation in the absence of herein

Respondent who arrived while said investigation was already in
progress only to be told to sign a certificate which said
Investigator Laya dictated to his Secretary. x x x."

The circumstances narrated by petitioner above, namely,

that he went to Investigator Laya's office on the hearing,
waited for Laya for one and one-half hours, then departed
after leaving word that he would come back, and he
actually return, warrant no other conclusion than that
petitioner was at the office of Investigation Laya for the
purpose of attending the hearing of which he had been
previously notif ied.

III

Petitioner seeks to compel the respondent Secretary of

Justice as the appointing power, and the mayor and the
Council of Pasay City as well as the City Fiscal thereof to
reinstate him in office and pay his back salaries. To
reinstate petitioner would necessarily call for the outer of
respondent Adelino Sanchez. Consequently, this is a
petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court, as petitioner alleges that he is entitled to a
public office which is allegedly usurped or unlawfully held
and exercised by another. The action to recover the office of
Special Counsel or Fourth Assistant Fiscal of Pasay City
should have been commenced within one (1) year after the
ouster of the petitioner from the office and his failure to do
so is fatal to his pretension [Section 16 Rule 66; Tumulak v.
Egay, 82 Phil. 828; Abeto v. Rodas, 82 Phil. 59].
Respondent Adelino A. Sanchez was appointed by the
Secretary of Justice, through Undersecretary of Justice
Claudio Teehankee, to the position in question on July 1,
1966. On September 17, 1986, petitioner filed his motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the Commissioner of
Civil Service dated May 19,1966, considering him resigned
from the service. The Commissioner of Civil Service set
aside his decision on March 7, 1969, and ordered a
reinvestigation of the case. Petitioner sought his
reinstatement pending reinvestigation and the investigator
recommended favorable action thereon on February 24,
1970. However, the Secretary of Justice refused to
reinstate him on the ground that his motion for
reconsideration was filed when the decision of the
Commissioner of Civil Service had become final and
petitioner is "deemed to have abandoned his office by his
failure to

675

VOL. 57, JUNE 28, 1974 675

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

seasonably take the appropriate remedy to secure his

reinstatement, first, when his Motion for Reconsideration
(assuming that it was really filed on time) was not acted
upon for years and, second, when the Commissioner set
aside his May 19,1966 decision."
As this action was filed on November 23, 1970, it is clear
that petitioner had lost his right to recover the office
involved, which he should have done within one year from
March 7, 1969, when the decision separating him from
office was set aside by the Commissioner of Civil Service
who thereby ordered his reinstatement without prejudice to
the outcome of the reinvestigation. The pendency of the
administrative remedies that petitioner sought to exhaust
did not operate to suspend the running of the one-year
period within which a petition to recover the office should
be filed (Torres v. Quintos, G. R. No. L3304, April 5, 1951,
88 Phil. 436). Accordingly, petitioner has lost his right to
recover the office in question (Abeto v. Rodas, supra;
Unabia v. City Mayor of Cebu, et al., 99 Phil. 253, 258).
 When this case was first deliberated on and submitted
to a vote five (5) members of the Court, namely, Associate
Justices Fred Ruiz Castro, Enrique M. Fernando, Salvador
V. Esguerra, Cecilia Muñoz Palma and Ramon C. Aquino,
voted to dismiss the petition, with Justice Esguerra
writing the opinion and the four others concurring therein,
and Justice Fernando specifically concurring only in part
III thereof. Associate Justice Estanislao Fernandez
dissented in a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice
Zaldivar, and voted to grant the same. Associate Justices
Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Felix V. Makasiar
and Felix Antonio did not take part. The Chief Justice did
not cast his vote. Consequently, there is no majority of
eight justices to either grant or dismiss the petition.
Pursuant to Section 11, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court,
the case was set for rehearing, which was held on May 14,
1974. The petitioner personally appeared and argued in his
own behalf, while Solicitor Felix de Guzman, in
representation of the Solicitor General, appeared and
argued for the respondents. After the rehearing the
petitioner was granted by the Court a period of ten (10)
days within which to file his memorandum in amplication
of his oral argument and to submit such additional
documents as he might deem pertinent to support his case.
The Solicitor General was granted a like period from
receipt of petitioner's memorandum within which

676

676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

to answer. Petitioner's memorandum and additional

evidence, as well as the Solicitor General's memorandum,
having been both submitted, the case was, for the second
time, submitted to a vote.
The second voting stood as before, except that the Chief
Justice voted with Associate Justices Calixto Zaldivar and
Estanislao A. Fernandez to grant the petition.
Considering that five (5) Justices are for dismissal of the
petition, three (3) are for granting the same, and four (4)
did not take part, and consequently, a majority of eight (8)
votes required to grant the petition being lacking, the
petition is hereby dismissed in accordance with Section 11,
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.

Castro, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the opinion of Justice
Fernandez.
Zaldivar, J., concurs with Justice Fernandez to
grant petition.
Fernando, J., concurs specifically on the Basis of
part III of the opinion.
Teehankee, J., did not take part.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Makasiar, J., did not take part.
Antonio, J., did not take part.
Fernandez, J., I dissent in a separate opinion.

FERNANDEZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Although the petitioner, as Special Counsel of

Pasay City was considered resigned from the service in the
decision of the Civil Service Commissioner on May 19,
1966, the fact remains that said Commissioner, upon
motion of the petitioner, reconsidered his aforesaid decision
in a Resolution dated March 7, 1969, and ordered a
reinvestigation. In the reinvestigation conducted, the
investigator of the Department of Justice, in a Report
dated March 11, 1970, recommended dismissal of the case
against the petitioner for "insufficiency of evidence," and
his exoneration. And the Commissioner of Civil Service, in
a Second Indorsement dated April 22, 1970, granted the
petitioner's request for reinstatement. In the meantime, a
voucher for P1,500.00 corresponding to the back salaries of
the

677

VOL. 57, JUNE 28, 1974 677

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

petitioner for three months from April 1 to June 30, 1966

was approved by the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, and
the City Fiscal, of Pasay City, by virtue of which the
petitioner received the said amount on June 10, 1970.
These facts clearly show the innocence of the petitioner.
They have not been challenged before Us. Should this
exoneration of the petitioner be now ignored by Us in view
of the technicalities involved?
In the first place, the replacement in the meantime of
the petitioner by Adelino A. Sanchez, has been made
subject, in effect, to the final result of the case against the
herein petitioner. If ordered reinstated, Mr. Sanchez should
vacate the position.
And in the second place, the doubt on whether or not the
petitioner received the first decision of the Commissioner
of Civil Service of May 19,1966 considering him resigned
from the service, on August 18, 1966 as contended by him,
or June 8, 1966 as contended by the respondents, should be
resolved in favor of the herein petitioner; and as a
consequence, his motion for reconsideration filed on
September 17, 1966 should be considered as having been
filed within the thirty-day period provided for in Section 36
of Republic Act 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959).
Petitioner's claim that he received a copy of the decision
only on August 18, 1966 is corroborated by his signature in
the records of the case showing that he received a copy of
the decision only on said date, and by the Sixth
Indorsement of January 14, 1971 to the Secretary of
Justice of the Civil Service Commissioner stating that
petitioner received the notice of the decision only on
August 18,1966.
In view of these conclusions that I have arrived at, it
becomes unnecessary for me to discuss further the question
of whether or not petitioner was accorded due process of
law in the original investigation of the administrative
complaint filed against him.
WHEREFORE, I believe the petition in this case for the
reinstatement of the herein petitioner to the position as
Special Counsel of Pasay City should have been granted.
Petition dismissed.

Notes.·a) Civil service in general.·If anyone is entitled

to the protection of the civil service provisions of the
Constitution, particularly those against removals without
lawful cause, it must be the officers who entered the civil

678

678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice

service in their youth, bent on making a career out of it,

gave it the best years of their lives, and grew gray hair
therein in the hope and expectation that they would
eventually attain the upper reaches and levels of the
official hierarchy, not through political patronage, but
through loyalty, merit, and faithful and unremitting toil
(Jorge vs. Mayor, L-21776, February 28, 1964). Integrity in
public service, as a goal yet to be achieved, demands that
government employees must not become parasitic pawns of
a whimsical bureaucracy. To tolerate these tendencies is to
sanction further demoralization of the public service and to
 encourage practices that would undermine faith in popular
government (Gesolgon vs. Lacson, L-16507, May 31, 1961).
b) Period within which to seek judicial remedy.·It has
come to be the accepted rule, in view of the one-year
limitation on such special proceedings as quo warranto and
mandamus under the Rules of Court, that delay beyond
this time in instituting judicial proceedings to require
reinstatement to a public office or position,
notwithstanding illegality of removal or discharge, is
sufficient reason for denying the relief, either on the
ground of the limitation mentioned, or on the basis of
laches and implied acquiescence (Quingco vs. Rodriguez,
L12144, September 17, 1958). Any person claiming a right
to a position in the civil service should be required to file
his petition for reinstatement within one year from his
separation from service; otherwise, he is thereby
considered having abandoned his office (De la Cerna vs.
Osmena, Jr., L-12492, May 23, 1959).

LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE

See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume one, page 14 on

Actions; page 291 on Civil Service; page 375 Constitutional
Law; and page 718 Due Process.
See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume two, page
1804 on Public Officers; and page 1841 Quo Warranto.
UPLC, Administrative Practice and Procedure, 1967
Edition.
UPLC, Institute on Administrative Investigation, 1967
Edition
Fernando, E.M., The Bill of Rights, 1972 Edition with
1973 Supplement.

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