Segment at I On and Informality in Vietnam
Segment at I On and Informality in Vietnam
Segment at I On and Informality in Vietnam
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Jean-Pierre Cling
Mireille Razafindrakoto
François Roubaud
Jean-Pierre Cling*
Mireille Razafindrakoto**
François Roubaud***
* Senior Research Fellow at the French Institute of Research for Development (IRD), Paris
** Research Director at IRD
*** Senior Research Fellow at IRD
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International Labour Office Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working Conditions Branch.
labour market segmentation / employment / informal economy / informal workers / social protection / Viet Nam
13.01.2
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The authors wish to thank the experts interviewed when preparing this
working paper: G. Sziracski (director of the ILO office in Hanoi); Yoon Y. (Chief
Technical Advisor, ILO Office, Hanoi); Nguyen T.H.Y (ILO Office, Hanoi);
Nguyen Thuong (ILO Office, Hanoi); and Paulette Castel (economist/consultant,
Washington D.C.). Usual caveats apply. This working paper was finalized in April
2013. The Employment law adopted by the National Assembly in November 2013
is therefore not discussed in this document. An interview of the Chairwoman of the
Committee for Social Affairs of the National Assembly concerning this law can be
found for reference as “New Law focuses on young workers, disadvantaged
groups,” 2013.
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
References ..................................................................................................................................... 35
Figure 1. T “ ” V .......................................................... 13
Figure 2. Unemployment rates and GDP growth in Vietnam (1996-2010) in percentage ........... 23
Labour market segmentation is usually defined as the division of the labour markets
into separate sub-markets or segments, distinguished by different characteristics and
behavioural rules (incomes, contracts, etc.). The economic debate on the segmentation
issue has been focusing in developed countries, and especially in Europe, on contractual
segmentation and dualism. However, in developing countries such as Vietnam which is
the focus of this study, wage work (even more so formal wage work) is marginal and the
approach to labour market segmentation is necessarily slightly different. Indeed, most
workers are engaged in the informal economy and many of them are self-employed in
their own household business.
Given the blurred contours of this concept in academic work, it is important to start
with giving it the precise definition of informality adopted in Vietnam and used in this
study. In keeping with international definitions (ILO 1993, 2003), the informal sector is
defined as the whole of non-agricultural individual enterprises which produce at least in
part for the market and are not registered (no business license), and this stands for
wherever the activity is carried out (on professional premises, in the street, or at home).
The non-registration of certain activities does in no way suppose that they are illegal, to
the extent that when operating within a certain level of activity, individual enterprises are
not obliged to be registered nor to pay taxes. Informal employment is, for its part,
defined as work without any social protection. On account of these definitions, 1
informal employment is comprised of two distinct principal components, namely
employment in the informal sector, as well as unprotected employment in the formal
sector. In conformity with the definitions of the ILO (2003), the informal sector and
employment together make up what is designated as the informal economy. According to
Cling et al. (2012a), the informal sector represents 24 per cent of total employment (that
is nearly half of non-agricultural employment) and informal employment 81 per cent of
total employment in Vietnam in 2009.
Following Fields (2007), the concept of income segmentation is used here to refer to
labour xp w ’ .
That is to say, income gaps associated with certain characteristics of the job. In
particular, the question addressed in this report is whether two workers with equal
personal attributes obtain different remunerations because one works in the formal sector
and the other in the informal sector. The same way of reasoning is applied to labour
income differentials between informal and formal employment (for the study of South
America, see Maurizio, 2012). Segmentation is also related to a lack of connection
between sectors, as indicated by low mobility from one segment to another.
1
These operational definitions have been adopted by the GSO and used in the Labour force surveys since 2007
(ILO, 2010, p. 16).
The labour market segmentation issue therefore raises the question of the
determinants of informality, knowing that two competing theories have traditionally been
p .T “ ” pp
dual labour market (Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970), where the informal sector is
considered as a subsistence economy which only exists because the formal economy is
p j (“ w ”). T
w p p “ ” pp w
sector is constituted of micro-entrepreneurs who prefer to operate informally in order to
escape from economic regulations (de Soto, 1989); this liberal approach contrasts sharply
with the two preceding ones in so much as the choice of informality is voluntary and
linked to the excessive costs of the legalization process associated with registering and
obtaining a formal status. Combining these two contrasting views leads to a multi-
segmented approach of the informal economy, composed of a competitive voluntary
upper-tier (« exit hypothesis ») coexisting with a lower-tier segment of individuals who
(“ x p ”) ( and Torm,
2012a).
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Starting with an analysis of the
main characteristics of the national labour market, this report presents a survey of the
literature on informality and labour market segmentation in Vietnam (section 2). Section
3 describes the institutional background related to firm registration and social protection
in Vietnam, and analyses the reasons for informality in relationship with the institutional
framework. Section 4 describes the reforms being put in place and employment strategies
related to the informal economy. Policy recommendations are proposed in section 5. Five
main messages come out from our study:
(1) The analysis of employment in Vietnam conducted in this report confirms that
the informal economy provides low earnings and precarious working conditions, without
any protection (contract, social protection, etc.) and with a low level of satisfaction.
Indicators and econometric estimates available evidence labour market segmentation
between the informal and formal economy: one can observe both significant income
gaps, especially to the detriment of women, and low mobility from one sector to another.
In spite of high economic growth in Vietnam, we do not foresee any decreasing trend of
the share of the informal sector in total employment.
(2) The rules for registration of household businesses in Vietnam are vague and not
p “ ”
those earning less than a certain amount set at district level are exempt; however, up to
(4) The good news is that employment policies are starting to acknowledge
informality in Vietnam, which is a substantial progress (see `New Law focuses on young
w p ’ 2013). However, public policy measures have still to be
defined and implemented. Moreover, they are confronted to the usual dilemma on this
subject: if they focus on high productivity sectors in order to speed up economic
development, they abandon the majority of the population which is still involved in
traditional low productivity activities; the alternative strategy might increase welfare in
the short term but to the detriment of long term development.
(5) Our own list of recommendations suggests to fully recognize the role of the
informal economy which is here to stay, encourage the formalisation of the informal
sector through increased rule transparency, and support the informal sector through
targeted policies and an extension of social protection discussed between enterprises and
employees. By reducing earning gaps and increasing mobility towards the formal sector,
these policies would reduce segmentation on the labour market.
Some selected key indicators drawn for the Vietnam Employment Trends report
report are presented in table 1 for 2007-2009. The labour force participation rate, defined
as the ratio of the labour force to the working-age population (aged 15 years and above)
stands at 76.5 per cent in 2009 (+2.1 percentage points compared to 2007), which is
considered to be high if considered from an international perspective, and among the
highest in South-East Asia (ILO, 2010; World Bank, 2008). As in other developing
countries, because there are almost no public transfers (pensions, unemployment
allocations, family allowances, etc.) participation in the labour market is essential to
survive. This is also the reason why the unemployment rate is marginal (2.6 per cent at
the national level in 2009). The share of wage and salaried employees is still very low
(33.9per cent in 2009) but increasing. This latter characteristic is due to the high share of
self-employment in agriculture and the informal sector (see below).
The LFS2009 is a survey carried out among households which follows the plan of a classical
survey stratified in two tiers (GSO, 2010). It is representative at the national level, as well as for
each of the 16 domains of stratification, by zone (rural and urban) and by region (the 6 official
regions, plus Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City). 66 185 individuals belonging to 17 884 households
were interviewed. Among them, 35 528 were aged 15 and over (the lower age limit to be part of
the labour force in Vietnam), and hold a job.
Outside the standard indicators on the labour market (activity, unemployment, under-employment,
work status, branch of activity, multi-activities, etc.) two sets of questions, essential for this study,
have been introduced into the questionnaire, at the instigation of a joint research project between
the GSO and the French Institute for Research and Development (IRD). [The author of this report
was a member of this project between 2007 and 2010].
First of all, the survey was especially conceived to measure employment in the informal sector and
more widely informal employment. A battery of questions put to each member of the working
population allows us to identify those working in the informal sector. These questions cover the
whole spectrum of internationally recommended criteria (ILO, 1993): the number of employees in
the enterprise, the type of administrative registering and accountancy. This information has been
collected not only for the principal job but also for secondary ones. It provides a great flexibility as
to the operational definition of the informal sector (for more details, see Cling et al., 2010a). In
accordance with the terminology in use in Vietnam, we shall call these production units:
The exclusion of agricultural activities is justified by their profound differences to non- agricultural
activities (in terms of their seasonal nature, of their organization of production, salary levels, etc.).
This definition of the informal sector has the advantage of falling within the larger context of
institutional sectors, which constitute the preferred point of departure for our analysis. The
LFS2009 also provides a measure of informal employment, defined in conformity with
international recommendations as the whole of jobs not covered by a system of social protection,
whatever the sector of activity (formal or informal sector).
Secondly, a specific question about job satisfaction has been introduced into the questionnaire. The
q w p xp j p “A
things considered, to what extent are yo w j ?” p
w p p “V ” “ ” “N ”
“ ” “V ”. T q w p w age
of 15 and refers to their principal job. A question formulated in such a way, the most general of the
existing possibilities, does not allow us to precisely identify the reasons which lead a worker to
prefer such or such a job. On the other hand, it presents three principal advantages: it has the merit
of remaining simple in a context where the size of the questionnaire was a major constraint; it can
be considered as a synthetic indicator of the different advantages and disadvantages linked to each
type of job, finally, it leads the way to analytical comparative perspectives.
Growth in
E p (‘000) Shares in Employment (%)
2009/97 (%)
1997 2009 1997 2009
Total 35 603 48 015 34,86 100 100
Agriculture 23 242 22850 -1,67 65,3 47,6
Industry 4 512 10 489 132 12,7 21,8
Mining 131 227 73 0,4 0,5
Manufacturing 3 460 6 950 100 9,7 14,5
Electricity, Gas & Water 74 274 270 0,2 0,5
Construction 847 3 038 259 2,4 6,3
Services 7 849 14 676 87 22,0 30,6
Trade 3 676 5 708 55 10,3 11,9
Hotels & Restaurants 601 1 979 229 1,7 4,1
Transport 935 1 721 84 2,6 3,6
Finance 118 229 94 0,3 0,5
Science & Technology 17 238 1 300 0 0,5
Real Estate 38 101 165 0,1 0,2
Public Administration 425 1 135 167 1,2 2,4
Education 828 1 663 94 2,3 3,5
Health 243 435 79 0,7 0,9
Culture Reports 107 290 171 0,3 0,6
Politics (Party) 94 186 98 0,3 0,4
Other Services 623 737 18 1,8 1,5
Household Employees 141 242 72 0,4 0,5
Other-Intern. Org. 3 5 66 0 0
Formal
Public Foreign Domest. Informal Agri-
house-hold TOTAL
sector enterrpr. enterpri. sector culture
business
Number of jobs
4,615 1,376 3,669 3,688 11,313 22,838 47,548
(1 000)
Structure (%) 9.7 2.9 7.7 7.8 23.8 48.0 100
Migrant (%) 10.4 32.1 16.0 8.4 5.6 2.4 6.3
Head of Household
43.6 25.4 33.0 37.6 42.9 39.7 39.7
(%)
Salaried workers (%) 99.7 99.9 93.6 36.4 26.7 9.6 33.6
Professional
96.4 97.6 86.4 33.8 7.8 1.1 23.8
premises (%)
Informal job (1) (%) 12.5 12.9 48.1 51.5 100 98.6 80.5
Rural (%) 42.8 63.4 48.1 46.4 63.2 91.7 72.6
Female (%) 47.1 64.7 39.1 46.0 48.0 51.1 49.1
Ethnic minorities (%) 8.9 5.1 5.8 7.2 5.7 27.2 16.5
Age (years) 37.6 26.8 31.6 36.4 38.4 39.8 38.0
Higher education (%) 48.0 8.0 15.3 3.6 1.0 0.6 6.8
Seniority (years) 10.5 3.5 4.4 7.1 7.7 15.8 11.4
Hours/week 44.0 53.0 51.8 51.8 45.9 37.0 42.6
Average income/m
1,964 1,735 2,093 1,805 1,273 703 1,185
(1 000 VND)
The informal sector is not an exclusively urban phenomenon: there are more
workers in the informal sector in rural and peri-urban zones (63 per cent). This
characteristic is in part an artefact due to the administrative definition of rural zones in
Vietnam, of which a high number would have been classed as urban in other countries.
Nevertheless, it is also largely linked to the diversification of revenues strategy
implemented by farmers.
Contrary to the theory of the compensating salary (for bad working conditions), the
disadvantages of jobs in the informal sector seem to be cumulative. Thus, in spite of long
working hours (46 hours a week compared to an average of 43), and long average length
of service (almost 8 years), remuneration is low. The average monthly salary is 1.7
million dong (about 75 Euros), the formal sector (private or public) pays salaries which
are 50 per cent higher. The informal sector thus occupies an intermediary position
between the non-agricultural formal sector (at the top of the distribution) and agriculture
(at the bottom).
Informal/formal workers
Informal self-
Self-employed
All Workers (1) Wage workers (3) employed / formal
workers (2)
wage workers (4)
OLS estimates:
Total -22% -30% -21% +6%
- Men -17% -30% -16% 13%
- Women -27% -30% -28% 0% (ns)
Fixed effect estimates:
Total -14% -17% -11% +16%
- Men -10% -15% 0% (ns) 22%
- Women -18% -20% -17% 16%
Their main conclusion is that informal workers earn less than formal workers, all
other things being equal (that is to say, for the same qualifications, experience, sex,
industry and other observable characteristics); on average (OLS estimates), the earning
gap is -22 per cent (column 1). Once unobserved individual characteristics (such as
entrepreneurial skills) are controlled for, the penalty for being informal is smaller (-14
per cent globally). The earnings gaps look more like those observed in emerging
countries, not characterized by considerable segmentation between formal and informal
jobs, compared to the standard dualistic Sub-Saharan labour markets (Dimova et al.,
2010; Bocquier et al., 2010).
Females always financially suffer more (or benefit less) when they are informally
employed. At the aggregate level, the OLS gap is -17 per cent for male and -27 per cent
for female (respectively -10 per cent and -18 per cent with fixed effects); according to
the authors, this feature suggests that women might accept lower wages in the informal
sector because it provides other non-pecuniary advantages, relatively more valuable to
them; this result opens space for specific policies to align the functioning of labour
market for women with that of men (reduction in entry barriers to formal jobs,
improvement of access to physical capital, etc.).
However, this study also obtains some puzzling results. At odds with the
“ x ” p w w w w p
informal jobs are more rewarding (self-employment) or as rewarding (male wage
workers) as formal wage jobs. Once unobserved individual characteristics are controlled
for, the penalty for being informal is no longer significant for male wage workers: for
them working informally is at least financially as rewarding as having a formal wage job.
This feature is due to the relatively low wages of formal wage jobs. The reason for such a
specificity should be investigated further (international competition pressure? wage
repression policy?).
To sum it up, although they tend to globally nuance the segmentation of the labour
market in Vietnam, Nguyen et al. emphasize that it is especially strong for women, and
that there is also a multi-segmentation phenomenon within the informal sector, as already
10 Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 52
suggested by Cling et al. (2010) based on an principal component analysis: there is a
w w “ ”w
w p ( “ ”
) “p ” - ( “ pp ”
sector), which have often chosen to work there and are better off.
The results obtained by Rand and Torm (2012a) are consistent with those by
Nguyen et al. (ibid). Their study is based on (non-representative) survey data on 1,098
manufacturing small and medium firms (SMEs) collected in 2009. Using the traditional
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method, they show that average wages are about 10 to 20
per cent higher in formal firms compared with informal ones and that the gap remains
when standard earnings determinants are added. According to the results, most of the
wage gap is attributed to differences in characteristics between firms in the formal and
informal sectors (the survey does not provide information on individual worker
characteristics). The authors consider that the fact that the wage gap remains when firm
level workforce characteristics are included could be an indication that formal firms pay
higher wages so as to attract more productive workers (efficiency wages). Rand and
Torm (2012b) also show (based on the same survey data) that formal firms have higher
profits and investments and a lower share of casual workers, but find no evidence of a
higher share of wages in total value added.
Table 5. Transition matrix of employment status between 2002 and 2006 (per cent)
2006
Formal Informal
Not- Agricultural Formal Informal
2002 self- self- Total
working empl. wage wage
employed employed
Not-working 55.29 17.65 6.87 9.62 2.64 7.93 100 (19.9)
Agricultural empl. 7.32 76.44 2.76 6.44 1.12 5.92 100 (52.5)
Formal wage worker 4.29 5.81 74.49 11.87 0.76 2.78 100 (8.3)
Informal wage worker 5.35 17.06 4.35 55.18 3.68 14.38 100 (6.2)
Formal self-employed
worker 13.1 7.59 2.07 2.07 51.03 24.14 100 (3.2)
Informal self-employed
worker 10.34 20.46 2.95 7.38 9.7 49.16 100 (9.9)
Total 16.95 47.48 9.64 10.55 3.03 11.45 100 (100)
Source: Nguyen et al. (2011), based on VHLSS, 2002 and 2006 (GSO).
Some more recent results on mobility have been presented by Demenet et al. (2010)
who built the same kind of transition matrixes based on panel data for Hanoi and Ho Chi
Minh City covering the 2007-2009 period. The data was drawn from the Household
Business and Informal Sector surveys (HBand IS) conducted in these two hubs by GSO
in partnership with the French Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD/DIAL
team). According to their results, which are consistent with those of Nguyen et al.,
around one informal household business (IHB) out of ten got formalized between 2007
and 2009; respectively 31 per cent and 15 per cent got informal in Hanoi and HCMC
Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 52 11
during the same period (Table 6). This important informalisation process has probably a
lot to do with the economic crisis.
Table 6. Transition matrix of employment status between 2007 and 2009 Hanoi and HCMC
(per cent)
Source : HB&IS surveys, Hanoi and HCMC, 2007 ; 2009, OGS / IRD-DIAL.
Not surprisingly, the IHBs which became formal were on average bigger, more
productive and less precarious than their counterparts which remained in the informal
sector. Demenet et al. (2013) evaluate rigorously, using data matching techniques, the
impact of formalization on household businesses performances and mode of operation in
Hanoi and HCMC. The results are drawn from a panel of representative data (2007-
2009) which allows measuring the performance and intermediate incomes of household
businesses with great precision. They come to similar conclusions as Rand and Torm
(2012b) mentioned here above. According to the authors, leaving the informal sector
increases annual value added by 22 per cent on average. More importantly, this
improvement is made possible by associated changes in operating conditions, such as
better access to equipment, size, type of premises and type of accounts. Formalization
thus allows household businesses to have better equipment and increase their scale of
operation. As pointed o “T p q
concerning the types of businesses likely to formalize and the potential incentive policies
w ”( 5 w).
To sum it up, there is a double duality in the labour market between sectors and also
within the (multi-segmented) informal sector, as underlined by Fields (2007). Adapting
the typology proposed by Fields to the case of Vietnam, we build a “p ”
labour market, by analogy with population pyramids widely used in demographic studies.
T p 5 ( “ ”) 1 p
2/formal private sector (formally self-employed, excluding formal wage workers); 3/
wage workers employed in the private formal sector; 4/informal sector (broken down
w “ pp ” “ ”p ) 5 ( 1). T
the pyramid represents the biggest share (nearly half) of total employment and the share
of each segment tends to decrease (with some exceptions) going upward.
In this pyramid, the wage workers in formal enterprises and household businesses
are squeezed between the two categories of informal sector: their income is inferior to
“ pp ” (w W B
5. Agriculture (48 %)
Note: the numbers in brackets represent the share of each sector in total employment in 2009
Source: LFS2009.
First of all, the extreme values (very satisfied and very unsatisfied) only represent a
very marginal part of the distribution of replies. For the whole workforce only 2.4 per
cent declared that they were very satisfied with their job, while the proportion of those
who affirm that they are very unsatisfied is negligible (0.2 per cent). Regardless of
anything else, these results show that working conditions in Vietnam are more or less
satisfactory or they at least correspond globally to the expectations of Vietnamese
workers. But we may also evoke a cultural (or political) characteristic linked to the
Vietnamese context: citizens are not very willing to express attitudes or opinions which
are too clear-cut, either because they do wish to provoke feelings of envy or
2
The econometric estimates conducted by Nguyen et al. (2013) put informal household businesses above formal
wage workers (see the sign of the earning gap) and formal wage workers above informal wage workers. But we
w (“ ”) w w
workers. We also make the hypothesis that informal wage workers in the private formal sector are above the
same kind of workers employed in the informal sector.
Next, the results highlight a very clear hierarchy depending on institutional sector,
which can be broken down into three big categories.
The public sector is found at the top of the ladder: nearly three quarters (72 per cent)
of employees in the public sector (civil servants or salaried workers in public or
para-public enterprises) declare themselves to be satisfied or very satisfied with their
job (70 per cent for the balance of opinion).
Then come workers from the private formal sector, of which a little more than half
show themselves to be at least satisfied, without any significant difference between
those who work in foreign, domestic or individual enterprises (with a balance of
opinion of respectively 49 per cent, 45 per cent and 47 per cent).
Finally, workers in the informal sector and in agriculture are the most critical, the
proportion of those declaring themselves satisfied being around one third, with an
advantage to the former (38 per cent and 29 per cent respectively, and a balance of
opinion of 30 per cent and 19 per cent in agriculture, the lowest of all sectors).
Less trivial is the far from favourable position of informal sector workers, the
principal centre of interest of this study, at least with regards to supporters of the theory
that workers freely choose the informal sector. It can be supposed that vulnerability and
precariousness of everyday life exercises some pressure on the fall in the level of
satisfaction. Finally, the stylized facts taken from this first descriptive analysis of job
satisfaction seem to validate the hypothesis of the queue before the gates leading to the
formal sector, based on the inferior status of jobs in the informal sector. Overall, it is
quite w “p ”p 1 .
W ’ p 2015 w p -
before the arrival of the crisis - show that employment in the informal sector and its
relative weight in total employment are going to continue growing over the next few
years (Cling et al., 2012a). As far as workforce supply is concerned, firstly Vietnam has
p “ p ” w
young people arriving on the labour market (more than one million per year) and the
situation is going to remain so until 2015. At the same time, the growth of the formal
private sector (if it continues), which is nevertheless rapid, is not high enough to absorb
all the new arrivals on the labour market given that agricultural employment (which
represents nearly half of total employment) is following a falling trend. Even if a return
to strong growth scenario is envisaged for the Vietnamese economy, once the effects of
the crisis are in the past, these forecasts suggest that the informal sector will continue to
represent a considerable share of employment in the years to come.
3
This conclusion is not shared by McCaig and Pavcnik (2011) who, on the contrary, conclude there was a fall
in the number of jobs in the informal sector at the beginning of the 2000s, which they attributed to an increased
opening up to international markets.
T ( ) ’ x .T
kinds of taxes are collected: the registration tax, the VAT and the income tax. From our
w w ’ xp pp p HB x p cial
p p . T q w w HB . ’
interlocutors are quite confident tax evasion is not an issue in Vietnam. Concretely in the
field, the exhaustive list of HBs (whether registered or not) is established at the local
x w p ’ . HB’
heads are supposed to self-declare their activity (industry, turn-over, income for
x p ) HB’ .T -checked by the
local administration, which decides who should pay and for which amount. Furthermore,
the list of tax payers and the nominative tax amount is publicly posted to the scrutiny of
the neighbourhood.
This process of peer review is supposed to equalize the tax burden, as each HB can
claim for unfair treatment, if it considers it is paying more than it should compared to
others operating with the same conditions. Nevertheless, we are less sure whether these
procedures really ensure horizontal equity among the HBs. The empirical evidence
suggests that the correlation between taxation and the true level of activity is quite fuzzy,
the most visible ones being taxed more often, whatever their income. The huge
discrepancy between the number of HBs controlled for tax purposes (around 1.2 million)
and the total number of HBs captured through the statistical surveys (8.4 million) is
compatible with a substantial phenomenon of tax evasion.
T ’ pp w
progressively, with an increased interest towards them. In June 2009, the government
adopted Decree N°56/2009/ND-CP on Support to Development of Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises, (SMEs). SMEs are defined according to different thresholds. The
employment threshold is of 300 employees in general and 100 employees in trade and
services. SMEs employing less than ten employees are considered no longer as
household businesses, but as micro-enterprises. This could mean that in the future micro-
enterprises will fall under the Law of Enterprise and not be considered apart anymore.
4
This presentation of registration of business households is based on Cling et al. (2011).
Source: Decree N°88 on Business Registration, Article 36, dated 29 August 2006.
Decree N°56 considers three main kinds of support policies towards SMEs,
especially for micro-enterprises: financial support (legitimate credits), training and
technical assistance. As it is the case for policies conducted by MoLISA, the informal
p I’ p .O s
excluded from them, as all SMEs are supposed to be registered according to this decree,
(which is not the case for household businesses). Indeed, whereas micro-enterprises
(FHBs) have largely benefitted from legitimate credits granted within the Stimulus
Package launched by the Vietnamese government in 2009, IHBs have not benefitted at
all from this assistance according to our surveys.
Below a certain level of business done, household businesses are not required to get
a business licence and can operate freely. Household businesses are exempt from
business tax (and now from personal income tax) if their turnover is too small. The
empirical evidence suggests that the informal sector as a whole is unknown to the State
registration services. Nevertheless, the absence of registration (business licence) does not
mean that the informal sector is not taxed; more than one-third of IHBs pay one sort of
tax in Hanoi (mostly local taxes), although this proportion is much lower in HCMC.
The Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) is in charge of fixing the rules for
registration of household businesses. Provincial MPI directorates are in charge of
registration, which is conducted in practice by the districts. The problem is that the
conditions are vague: there are numerous criteria, exceptions and different thresholds.
Almost no IHBs (less than 1 per cent) know the threshold above which HBs have to
register. Even among the formal HBs, only a minority claim that they know the
registration legislation (10 per cent of FHBs in Hanoi and 20 per cent in HCMC), and
their knowledge appears to be limited since the magnitude of the registration threshold
that they put forward varies substantially (from 2 million to 15 million per month).
Our calculations have been undertaken using the HB&IS surveys conducted in
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (see here above). The selected income variable is the
operating surplus taken from the HB&IS Surveys (we prefer not to use earnings as the
declarations are notoriously underestimated). We consider three legislative hypothesises:
a) all HBs should have a business licence when they earn more than the minimum wage
(450,000 VND/month; b) this income criterion does not apply to mobile HBs or HBs
with improvised street pitches (it applies only to businesses working at home or with
p p ) ) pp “ ” HB (w
professional premises).
Under the first hypothesis, 95 per cent of IHBs should be registered in both cities
(Table 7). If we relax the hypothesis by considering that only those with fixed premises
‘ ’ p IHB
drops significantly to around 70 per cent ‘p ’
(including homes), and dramatically to 10 per cent-15 per cent in the more restrictive
case (considering only HBs with professional premises). These results merely reflect the
IHB p p .‘ ’ IHB
in this respect ( w ‘ ’ ‘ ’ p ). T
are extremely close in the two cities. The only clear-cut conclusion to be drawn from this
exercise is that HB registration legislation is unclear and all the more confusing for HB
heads. This lack of transparency forms a breeding ground for discretionary decisions and
for potential harassment and corruption by public officials.
Turning to the FHBs, we ask why some HBs get a business licence when they do
not have to. Based on the first hypothesis, less than 3 per cent of FHBs earn less than the
minimum wage, which means that they are complying with the legislation. However, if
we consider that the income condition applies only to HBs with premises (or, in
particular, industries), the diagnosis is quite different. For instance, under Hypothesis 3,
more than 40 per cent in both cities are registered when they need not be. In this case,
one interpretation could be that the cost/benefit analysis of registering leads HB heads to
register in order to benefit from the expected advantages of operating in the formal
sector.
L w “ ” p
procedures should be clarified to eradicate the grey area between formality/informality
and legality/illegality. Indeed, this is a source of both economic inefficiencies and
inequities, and therefore of increased segmentation on the labour market through reduced
efficiency and then earnings in the informal sector.
In terms of business registration, there are two distinct situations that are, by
definition, opposite: the situation of the IHBs, which are not registered, and the situation
of the FHBs, which are registered. The vast majority of IHBs (72 per cent in Hanoi and
79 per cent in HCMC) believe that registration is not compulsory (Table 8). In addition
to this huge proportion, 18 per cent do not know whether they need to register in the
capital city (7 per cent in HCMC). All in all, regardless of the type of register considered
(business, tax and social security registration), from 85 per cent to 90 per cent of IHBs
are not aware of the regulations. It is therefore essentially ignorance of their legal
obligations that leads the heads of IHBs to fail to register.
Neither the complexity nor the cost of the registration procedures appears to be a
problem and there is no overt reluctance to cooperate with the public services. Only a
Prepared
Reasons why not registered
to register
D ’ D ’
Registr. know want to
Too Too Not (business
in if have cooperate Other Total
complicated expensive compulsory licence)
progress to with
register State
Hanoi
Manufacturing 1.0 0.8 0.5 66.5 25.5 2.1 3.6 100 18.9
Trade 2.8 0.6 2.0 69.3 18.2 2.7 4.4 100 17.6
Services 1.0 0.6 0.2 76.5 14.1 2.0 5.7 100 14.1
Total IHB 1.7 0.6 0.9 72.0 17.7 2.3 4.8 100 16.3
Ho Chi Minh City
Manufacturing 1.3 0.3 0.6 83.0 4.9 0.0 9.8 100 19.2
Trade 0.9 2.0 1.7 75.1 9.3 0.0 11.1 100 21.0
Services 0.4 1.7 1.2 80.1 7.1 0.2 9.4 100 18.4
Total IHB 0.8 1.5 1.2 79.1 7.3 0.1 10.0 100 19.4
Source: Cling et al. (2012c) based on HB&IS Survey, Hanoi (2007), Ho Chi Minh City (2008), GSO-ISS/IRD-DIAL;
’ .
The qualitative survey conducted by Razafindrakoto and Nguyen (2010) with HBs
in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city assesses and illustrates the findings of the quantitative
HB&IS survey (see Box 1). The analysis made before showed that, if legislation were
strictly enforced, almost all the interviewed HBs would have to register. However, most
of the informal HBs argue that their business is too small, claim that registration is not
compulsory for them, and assert that nobody has asked them to register. Most of the
informal HBs put forward the case of the small scale of their activity. The heads of HBs
j ‘ ’. S
them, registration is not compulsory, though they acknowledge their limited knowledge
of the legislation, which is clearly illustrated by their declaration.
The case of street vendors and service providers conducting their business in a
public place like pavements and small lanes in the middle of a crowded neighbourhood
merits special attention. Normally, they are not obliged to be registered, but they are
banned in some streets. Due to both their personal circumstances and business
conditions, those micro-entrepreneurs are not in a position to learn about and familiarize
themselves with the laws concerning business registration. Not surprisingly, their limited
knowledge of the regulations puts them in a difficult situation and is more problematic.
On the whole, IHBs stress the fact that they have never been controlled by the
authorities: they have had no contact with public officials or no one has asked them to
register. They have a small business located in a small street (mostly at home), so the
authorities simply ignore them.
The social security system in Vietnam has been established under its present form
by the Social Security Law of 2006 and has two components: a mandatory system
covering all enterprises with 10 employees or more; a voluntary system created with the
Social Security Law of 2006, covers all the other workers. It consists only of a pension
system with survivorship benefits. Both systems require a minimum contribution
calculated on the minimum wage.
The mandatory system covers only the wage employed with labour contracts of 3
months and above. It includes a large range of programs: short-term benefits,
compensation for work accident and professional disease, old-age pension and
survivorship; cross-checking the data of the Census of Enterprises with the figures of
Vietnam Social Security, Castel and To (2012) consider that 24 per cent of the
employees in the enterprise sector (totalling 1.1 million) are employed under short-term
contracts and are therefore excluded from any social security ; this proportion even
amounts to 32 per cent in domestic private enterprises. The World Bank (IFC, 2011)
even comes to a higher estimate (based on enterprise surveys) of 36 per cent of
employees in the private enterprise sector (domestic and foreign enterprises), compared
with only 8 per cent in lower-middle-income countries.
Because of the massive share of temporary work in the private sector in Vietnam, it
is a priority to analyse the legal framework on this subject; it is very easy to employ
workers on a short term contract, knowing that a significant part of these contracts are
signed through subletting (labour subcontracting), which has just been recognized legally
(see box 3 below); however, no precise statistical information is available on this subject,
even in the building industry where subletting seems to be the norm. The New Labour
Code passed by the National Assembly in June 2012 (which will come into force in June
2013) recognizes officially this activity. This represents a significant progress, which
could help extending social protection (and reducing informal employment) for the sublet
workers. Although the finalised Labour Code that was enacted by the National Assembly
5
In Vietnam, health insurance is free and universal for the poor, children under 6 and the elderly (over 80 years
old). The rest of the population often contributes to voluntary schemes. The health insurance law (2008) plans to
achieve universal coverage by 2015. According to Castel (2012), approximately a quarter of the population,
corresponding to farmers and people working in the informal sector who are not considered as being poor,
would still remain uncovered.
The question of law enforcement only concerns then employees with a permanent
labour contract, but who do not benefit from social protection. No precise estimate is
available for the size of this group. Using the World Bank estimate of the share of short
term contracts and the share of informal employment in private enterprises drawn from
the LFS2009, we estimate that around 600,000 workers fall into this group. Estimates
from Castel and To (2012) are a bit higher (around 1 million) but still relatively marginal
(the formal private enterprises employ more than 5 million workers).6 The whole
discussion of this section 4 on law enforcement suggests focusing on the question of
registration of household businesses and short term contracts, in order to reduce
segmentation.
10%
9% GDP growth rate
8%
7%
6%
5%
Unemployment rate (urban)
4%
3%
2%
1% Unemployment rate (total)
0%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Between 2007 and 2009, almost 2 million jobs were created and job structure by
sector remained relatively stable in spite of the crisis. The number of agricultural jobs
continued to fall both in actual number and in share of the labour market (from 50.4 to
48.1 per cent). The informal sector saw the creation of 639 000 jobs (+6 per cent), which
was a slight rise in its share of total employment (from 23.4 to 23.8 per cent). However,
it was the private formal sector in particular which was the most dynamic: more than 1
million new jobs (+41 per cent) in domestic enterprises and 480 000 jobs (+53 per cent)
in foreign investment enterprises (the respective share of these sectors in employment
rising from 5.7 per cent to 7.7 per cent and from 2 to 2.9 per cent). Employment in
individual informal enterprises has for its part varied little (+183 000 jobs, its share of
this sector rising from 7.7 to 7.8 per cent). These evolutions resulted in a continuation in
the rise of the number of salaried workers (29.8 to 33.6 per cent) as well as in the share
of the working population covered by social protection. Consequently, the share of
informal employment fell slightly (from 81.9 to 80.5 per cent).
In fact, the adjustment on the labour market essentially passed through other
channels than by the reduction of the number of full-time working hours: the economic
slowdown thus resulted in a drop in the average number of hours worked (from 43.9 to
42.6 hours per week between 2007 and 2009) and by a rise in part-time employment (less
than 35 hours per week): 13.2 per cent of workers were concerned by this in 2007 and
26.7 in 2009. Paradoxically, this average evolution also went hand in hand with a
lengthening of working hours for the most vulnerable part of the population: the
percentage of the labour force working more than 60 hours per week rose from 5.6 per
cent to 9.3 per cent in two years. Finally, a very high rise in the number of workers with
more than one job was observed: having more than one job constituted a strategy to
compensate for the reduction in working hours by seeking an alternative source of
The impact of the crisis on income can a priori pass through several channels:
through a fall in salaries or the moderating of salaries in the formal sector, or through
adjustments in price or quantities (employment) in the informal sector. In this latter
sector, several mechanisms can play a role. On the labour supply side, additional
employment in the informal sector might have sharpened competition between individual
enterprises and put downward pressure on turnover and income. On the demand side,
there may have been have been a structural change in household consumption to the
detriment of formal products and to the benefit of supposedly cheaper informal products
this having the opposite effect; but as the informal sector already satisfies the essential of
household consumption, this effect was only a modest one so that one was expecting a
reduction of demand in the informal sector and thus incomes. Owing to the great
flexibility of this sector, the recessive impact on incomes should have been logically
greater than on formal salaries.
In fact, the evolution of income observed between 2007 and 2009 was positive in all
job sectors, except agriculture. The average monthly salary (for principal jobs) thus rose
from 1.06 million VND to 1.60 million VND, that is to say a rise of 52 per cent in two
years. This result is robust on a scale of used income since the rise in median income is
very close (+50.5 per cent). When the rise in nominal incomes is reduced by subtracting
the rate of inflation (+30.9 per cent between the two surveys) we arrive at an average rise
of 15.3 per cent for real income and 13.6 per cent for the real median income8. Quite
surprisingly, this dynamic is not only positive but also relatively close to the previous
trends for average income. In periods of high inflation, measurements of the evolution of
real income must nevertheless be interpreted with precaution: between 2007 and 2009,
the rise in the price of rice and cereal (+54 per cent) which constitute staples for the poor
in Vietnam, was almost twice the average rise of consumer prices. Consequently, the
application of a common deflator tends to overestimate the rise in real income for the
poorest categories of the population who constitute the base of the informal sector.
With the help of the statistical reserves above, it can be remarked that the informal
sector does not seem to have been the sector most badly affected by the crisis as far as
income is concerned, given that there is no observable divergence between the formal
and informal sectors. In volume, both average and median income growth in the informal
sector are higher than that of incomes in the whole of the economy.
The globally positive image of the impact of the crisis on the Vietnamese labour
market presented in part one needs to be balanced if we look at things from a more
precise geographical level. In order to do this, we shall concentrate our analysis on the
’ p p (H H ). A p
informal sector (HB&IS) was carried out in the two cities in 2007 and 2009, concurrently
with the employment survey. Compared to the latter, the HB&IS survey has three strong
points: firstly, it broadens the perspective as it is not limited to questions concerning
employment but also includes questions to informal enterprises about supply (production,
finances, difficulties, requests for help, etc.); secondly, it provides a more reliable
measure of income than the employment survey which tends to systematically
underestimate it ; finally, the sample group is composed of a panel dimension which
allows us to evaluate the economic and demographic dynamic of individual enterprises ,
which the employment survey does not allow.
8
To calculate real income growth, we have elaborated a price deflator which takes into account special
differences in price levels, as well as their variation over a given period.
Firstly, it is interesting to note that the informal sector remains a terra incognita for
economic policies, totally ignored by the authorities. None of the temporary measures
included in the aid plan aiming to provide compensation for the negative effects of the
crisis from an economic and social point of view has included the informal sector. This is
all the more regrettable as poverty is progressively changing face and is increasingly
affecting the marginal populations of the big rapidly developing urban hubs which are
the hard core for the urban informal sector. The lack of real policy for the informal sector
goes beyond the framework of the crisis and really appears to constitute a permanent
concern for economic policy. Thus, the socio-economic development plan (SEDP) for
the 2011-2015 period does not once mention the informal sector and makes do with the
standard targets of lowering urban unemployment, providing support to small and
medium-sized enterprises (credits and training for example) and, more daringly, the
implementation of social protection in employment (MPI, 2010).
This section is dedicated to three key issues concerning employment public policies
and the informal sector and employment in Vietnam: first of all, the challenges of
implementing an employment strategy addressing informality; second, the (marginal)
inclusion of employment in the Socio-economic development strategy (SEDS) 2011-
2020, which defines the main lines of economic policy by 2020 ; last of all, as in other
Asian emerging countries (China especially), there is an important current debate around
universal protection (pensions, health, etc.), which will lead to significantly reduce
informal employment.
9
Complementary information added in April 2014: The Vietnam employment strategy for 2011-2020 has
eventually not been adopted. This means that the principle of defining a specific ten-year strategy for
employment has eventually been abandoned by the government.
The author starts by pointing out the fact that defining and conducting direct policies
aiming at reducing informality would be rather unrealistic in Vietnam, because informal
agents are by definition difficult to detect and to observe. Moreover, in a country like
Viet Nam, with informality endemic in the system, and with approximately one labour
inspector out of 350,000 people, one cannot expect that enforcement of labour standards
can play a major role in formalization strategies. We are left with two alternative
strategies towards informality.
This model raises the well-known dilemma of public economic policy (not only in
developing countries), when there is a structural disequilibrium on the labour market:
should we speed up employment restructuring in order to promote economic growth
through productivity gains, knowing that employment demand will be insufficient to
absorb the labour surplus? Or should we rather define targeted policies towards
disadvantaged zones and low-productivity sectors, which will slow down economic
restructuring but will support the poor?
These policies are included in the SEDS. In a wise and considerate way, the SEDS
“ -intensive production will continue to play a role in the next ten
V N ”. p w p
to re-orient policies to support economic activities which are currently labour-intensive,
mostly informal and localized in poor areas of Viet Nam.10
10
The SEDS calls upon the Government to find ways to promote endogenous economic development of
communities through domestic savings and investment, implemented in tandem with policies aimed to urbanize,
“ ” V economy. On the other hand, even if one country misses the goal
of providing decent job opportunities for all, those left out by poorly inclusive growth usually lack the
possibility to express their dissent, as these workers and enterprises tend to be less well organized than those of
urban and large-scale enterprises.
The extension of social protection is actually confronted to a general trade off put in
evidence by many studies on the subject (World Bank, 2008; VASS, 2010; Castel, 2012):
except to a certain extent for voluntary measures (which still need incentives provided by
the Government and therefore also implies increased receipts), this extension requires an
increase of taxation on wages or global incomes (income tax), which goes against the
formalization of the informal economy.
The last category corresponds to workers having a permanent labour contract, but
for whom their employer (an enterprise or a formal household business) does not
pay any social contribution. As aforementioned, this is probably relatively marginal
(less than one million employees), although there are not any precise estimates of
the number of workers concerned. It is only for this last category of workers that law
enforcement should be increased.
5. Policy recommendations
In this section, we draw some conclusions from the analysis made in this report
concerning the issue of labour market segmentation and informality. Most of our
comments (drawn from Cling et al., 2012a) focus on the informal sector, which
corresponds also to a major share of informal employment; proposals on social
protection are directly linked to informal employment on the whole.
the first type of measure aims at having the existence of the informal sector
legally recognized, having it precisely defined and assuring that it is
continuously measured in official statistics; this is an imperative requirement
for defining adapted policies;
the second type of policy seeks to clarify and render transparent and intelligible
by everyone the criteria for registering individual enterprises, and at the same
time simplifying the bureaucracy required to do so; as it has been shown in this
report, promoting the formalization of informal household businesses is a way
to increase flows from the informal to the formal sector and thus to reduce
segmentation on the labour market;
the third type of measure concerns proposals for policies aimed at the informal
sector (tax measures and subsidies); as increasing mobility from one sector to
another can only be a partial solution (in the absence of enough formal jobs),
this is another requirement for fighting segmentation by reducing the earning
gap between formal and informal employment (especially for women);
the fourth and last type of measures concerns social protection. This is part of a
strategy to reduce vulnerability in employment, and especially to reduce
segmentation for wage workers through a unification of the wage market
(currently approximately divided in two between formal and informal wage
workers).
5.2. Registration: Suppressing the grey zone where rights are not respected
In fact, if the State does not really understand the informal sector, the reverse is also
true. Nobody really knows who should be registered and pay taxes. This blurred frontier
between formal and informal individual enterprises and the lack of transparency lead to
the creation of a grey zone favourable to informal arrangements, negotiations and even to
corruption. As a street seller declared, “I don’t know anything about regulations but I
apply one rule: when the police arrive I run off” (Razafindrakoto and Nguyen Huu Chi,
2010). Establishing clear, known rules would thus contribute to the reduction in the
arbitrariness of decisions and harassment by civil servants, while at the same time
allowing the authorities to rigorously enforce laws.
Outlining in a precise manner the informal sector and the rules for registering
enterprises should facilitate the implementation of an incentive fiscal policy adapted to
the specificities of this sector. These two processes are complementary: on the one hand,
the acceptance of taxation by individual entrepreneurs goes with the implementation of
support policies for their benefit and these policies thus constitute to a certain extent the
necessary and logical counterpart to this taxation, on the other hand, the taxes collected
p ( p “ ” p )
should naturally contribute to the partial funding of these policies.
The fiscal potential of the informal sector is far from negligible: out of the 8.4
million individual enterprises (=household businesses) in Vietnam, only 1.2 million are
registered with the fiscal authorities. In reality, the number of enterprises which
effectively contribute is higher owing to the multiplicity of local taxes. Thus, in Hanoi
and HCMC, about a quarter of informal businesses already pay taxes in one form or
another, whereas almost all formal ones do so. But the correlation between the rate and
level of taxation on the one hand and the level of economic activity on the other is low as
“ ” p x w
performance. Furthermore, a large part of the heads of informal enterprises declare that
they are ready to pay taxes, a part which might increase even more if they received
assurance that at least a part of the money collected went towards lifting the constraints
which weigh heavily on them.
Three principles should guide the informal sector taxation policy. On the one hand,
q p p ’ .O
hand, the amount of tax should be sufficiently low so as not to stifle an already limited
economic profitability and push enterprises out of the legal sphere. Finally, it should be
“ w ” w S
latter is not only (or does not have the impression of being) taxed but also receives
tangible benefits from its contributory efforts. A synthetic tax which would be both easy
to calculate and collect, as near as possible to the zone of activity (on a local level) seems
to be, from this point of view, the best idea.
Armed with this empirical data and the existing research in this domain, it is
possible to outline the guiding lines for a package of measures that it would be advisable
to prioritize. The latter may be organized according to the two principal functions to be
developed: on the one hand increasing the productivity of the informal sector (at the
same time maintaining its flexibility) and on the other hand, protecting its workers. On
the first front, and among the required support policies aimed at (formal and informal)
individual enterprises, three types of action should be favoured.
I p p p ’
associations. The informal sector is only marginally integrated into the rest of the
economy, whether it is in terms of subcontracting or of access to large orders.
Coherently, one of the principal requests for help expressed by the informal sector
concerns access to big orders. Policies aiming to improve access to markets, particularly
via an improved dissemination of information, would therefore be recommended.
Evidently, excessive competition and a lack of clients – considered to be among the
principal problems facing informal operators –cannot be resolved only by sectional
policies, as they indicate a problem of insufficient aggregate demand. Nevertheless, an
improved articulation accompanied by the potential (and dynamic) demand of the formal
sector would be likely to reduce market constraints. Thus, the informal sector should be
given preferential access to certain public markets (both State ones and local ones), from
which it is currently excluded. Likewise, the reinforcement of subcontracting links with
large enterprises (on the domestic market or for export) is likely to supply valuable
outlets for the informal sector, such as the relationships in force in the craft villages
(Fanchette, 2012). However, in order to do this, contracts cannot be individually
negotiated as informal operators are too small in size. In order to reduce transaction costs
the latter should group themselves together into associations of producers which are
currently almost inexistent (1 per cent of informal enterprises). International experience
shows that these associations play an essential role in the setting up of professional
networks and social capital, a factor which determines entrepreneurial success. Other
than the direct economic interest of policies aiming to favour the emergence of groups of
operators, these networks would be a means of giving a voice to workers in the informal
sector and defending their interests before the other organized forces they must face
(p p w p ’ NGO .).
Favouring credit access. Informal enterprises suffer from the serious problem of
financial exclusion: only 2 per cent have been able to obtain bank loans in order to create
their own enterprise (essentially financed by their own capital); less than 10 per cent (7
per cent in Hanoi and 4 per cent in HCMC) obtained credit in 2009, as was the case in
2007; finally, a negligible proportion (between 2 per cent and 3 per cent) obtained a loan
from microfinance institutions. Better access to credit would allow them to improve
equipment and productivity, in full knowledge that credit constraints hinder the
development of activities in the formal sector and that access to credit constitutes one of
the principal constraints and requests for help of informal entrepreneurs. In so far as they
cannot provide the (collateral) guarantees necessary to obtain credit from banks, informal
enterprises largely benefit from the implementation of loans from microfinance
organizations. The experience of other developing countries where these organizations
play a significant role might provide a useful example to follow.
Developing training. Along with access to credit, the lack of competences to manage
individual enterprises constitutes a second major barrier to the development of the
The problem of lack of social protection for workers in formal enterprises, and
therefore the solution for extending social protection, is slightly different. According to
Castel and To (2012), enterprises that partly (or even totally) evade social security
Four additional policy recommendations, that we fully endorse, have also been
made by the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences in its policy report on Employment
and social protection in Vietnam already mentioned (VASS, 2011):12
Introducing a single social security system number (SSN), issued at birth; this
w “ p ” w w
province or region to another (whereas migrants lose benefits with the
existing system); this would then help broaden the coverage of the social
security system;
11
This result does not contradict the earning gap which benefits formal wage workers compared to informal
w w ( 3). T “ w w ” category in the estimates
by Nguyen et al. (2013) includes informal wage workers both in the formal and the informal sector (the latter
being the lowest paid of all sectors).
12
VASS also recommends m “p -as-you- ” w ed system. We do not
endorse this recommendation which is still being strongly debated.
No. 3 Statistics on working time arrangements based on time-use survey data (2003), by A. S.
Harvey, J. Gershuny, K. Fisher & A. Akbari
No. 4 The definition, classification and measurement of working time arrangements (2003), by D.
Bell & P. Elias
No. 5 Reconciling work and family: Issues and policies in Japan (2003), by M. Abe, C. Hamamoto
& S. Tanaka
No. 6 Reconciling work and family: Issues and policies in the Republic of Korea (2004), by T.H.
Kim & K.K. Kim
No. 7 Domestic work, conditions of work and employment: A legal perspective (2003), by J.M.
Ramirez-Machado
No. 8 Reconciling work and family: Issues and policies in Brazil (2004), by B. Sorj
No. 9 Employment conditions in an ageing world: Meeting the working time challenge (2004), by
A. Jolivet & S. Lee
No. 10 Designing programmes to improve working and employment conditions in the informal
economy: A literature review (2004), by Dr. R.D. Rinehart
No. 11 Working time in transition: The dual task of standardization and flexibilization in China
(2005), by X. Zeng, L. Lu & S.U. Idris
No. 13 É p ’ L Sé é .A
juridique et enquête auprès des entreprises (2006), by A. Ndiaye
No. 14 Reconciling work and family: Issues and policies in Thailand (2006), by K. Kusakabe
No. 15 Conditions of work and employment for older workers in industrialized countries:
Understanding the issues (2006), by N.S. Ghosheh Jr., S. Lee & D. McCann
No. 16 Wage fixing in the informal economy: Evidence from Brazil, India, Indonesia and South
Africa (2006) by C. Saget
No. 18 Reconciling work and family: Issues and policies in Trinidad and Tobago (2008), by R.
Reddock & Y. Bobb-Smith
No. 19 Minding the gaps: Non-regular employment and labour market segmentation in the Republic
of Korea (2007) by B.H. Lee & S. Lee
No. 22 Reconciling work and family: Issues and policies in China (2009), by Liu Bohong, Zhang
Yongying & Li Yani
No. 23 Domestic work and domestic workers in Ghana: An overview of the legal regime and
practice (2009), by D. Tsikata
No. 24 A comparison of public and private sector earnings in Jordan (2010), by C. Dougherty
No. 25 The German work-sharing scheme: An instrument for the crisis (2010), by A. Crimmann, F.
Weissner & L. Bellmann
No. 26 Extending the coverage of minimum wages in India: Simulations from household data
(2010), by P. Belser & U. Rani
No. 27 The legal regulation of working time in domestic work (2010), by Deirdre Mc Cann & Jill
Murray
No. 28 What do we know about low-wage work and low-wage workers (2011), by Damian
Grimshaw
No. 30 Measuring the economic and social value of domestic work: conceptual and methodological
framework (2011), by Debbie Budlender
No. 31 Working Time, Health, and Safety: a Research Synthesis Paper (2012), prepared by Philip
Tucker and Simon Folkard, on behalf of Simon Folkard Associates Ltd
No. 33 The Effects of Working Time on Productivity and Firm Performance: a research synthesis
paper (2012), by Lonnie Golden
No. 34 Estudio sobre trabajo doméstico en Uruguay (2012), by Dra. Karina Batthyány
No. 35 Why have wage shares fallen? A panel analysis of the determinants of functional income
distribution (2012), by Engelbert Stockhammer
No. 36 Wage-led or Profit-led Supply: Wages, Productivity and Investment (2012), by Servaas
Storm & C.W.M. Naastepad
No. 37 Financialisation and the requirements and potentials for wage-led recovery – a review
focussing on the G20 (2012), by Eckhard Hein and Matthias Mundt
No. 40 Is aggregate demand wage-led or profit-led? National and global effects (2012), by Özlem
Onaran & Giorgos Galanis
No. 41 Wage-led growth: Concept, theories and policies (2012), by Marc Lavoie & Engelbert
Stockhammer
No. 42 T W ’ w T ey (2013), by
S E ğ & Gülay Toksöz
No. 43 In search of good quality part-time employment (2013), by Colette Fagan, Helen Norman,
Mark Smith & María C. González Menéndez
No. 44 The use of working time-related crisis response measures during the Great Recession
(2013), by Angelika Kümmerling & Steffen Lehndorff
No. 45 Analysis of employment, real wage, and productivity trends in South Africa since 1994
(2014), by Martin Wittenberg
No. 46 Poverty, inequality and employment in Chile (2014), by Sarah Gammage, Tomás
Alburquerque & Gonzálo Durán
No. 47 Deregulating labour markets: How robust is the analysis of recent IMF working papers?
(2014), by Mariya Aleksynska
No. 48 Growth with equity in Singapore: Challenges and prospects (2014), by Hui Weng Tat &
Ruby Toh
No. 49 Informality and employment quality in Argentina, Country case study on labour market
segmentation (2014), by Fabio Bertranou, Luis Casanova, Maribel Jiménez & Mónica
Jiménez
No. 50 Comparing indicators of labour market regulations across databases: A post scriptum to the
employing workers debate (2014), by Mariya Aleksynska & Sandrine Cazes
No. 51 The largest drop in income inequality in the European Union during the Great Recession:
’ p (2014) p D