THE CHINA-BANGLADESH RELATION

AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN

POLICY
Colonel Jeffrey P. Gottlieb, ndc

Introduction
The nature of the China-Bangladesh relation poses both challenges and
opportunities for the United States. The problem is to determine the nature
of the bilateral relation, how it serves the interests of both nations, and the
implications for the foreign policy of the United States. The relation would be
relatively straightforward were it not for three regional and international factors.
First, Bangladesh’s geo-economic and geopolitical position at the head of the Bay
of Bengal affects the interests of not only her neighbors but of all her trading
partners and even global powers. Second, Bangladesh is encircled by India and
must account for India in all her foreign relations. Third, the rise of China relative
to the United States means that relations of all states with China are perforce of
interest to the United States.

The Geostrategic Setting

Unlike the United States or the European Union - which cannot be encircled -
China, Bangladesh and India all face encirclement by potential adversaries and
their foreign relations must account for this. All are developing nations whose
major trade routes are seaborne making the economic foundation of their
national power and their independence of action particularly vulnerable to such
encirclement.

              

by the Altai Mountains, Mongolia and Russian Siberia; to the east is the Tien Shan
             
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communications through such terrain means only 9.5% of Chinese exports go
overland through her neighbors the rest does by sea.1 Chinese energy imports,
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country/bgd/, accessed 9 July 2017.

155
 The China-Bangladesh Relation and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

especially oil, depend on the sea. Approximately 90% of her oil imports come by
sea, with 82% passing through the Strait of Malacca.2 Thus, the land routes of the
One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR) are a strategic economic necessity, a
way to avoid encirclement by reducing China’s vulnerability to blockade. As long
as China remains reliant on the sea for trade she must ensure good relations with
the states on her borders, with the members of ASEAN and with the allies of
the United States that physically dominate the approaches to the East and South
China Seas – South Korea, Japan and the Philippines (see Map 1 below).

Map 1: OBOR – Escaping Encirclement

India has Bangladesh encircled by land and sea. Of greater potential danger than
its encirclement by land and sea, India controls Bangladesh’s two main sources of
river water, the Ganges and Brahmaputra and China controls the headwaters of
the Brahmaputra. This vulnerability makes good relations with India and China
imperative for Bangladesh. Bangladesh is not, however, completely helpless before
her much larger neighbor. Bangladesh’s relations with China are a counter to

2. Business Insider, “This Pentagon map shows what’s really driving China’s military and diplomatic
strategy” available at http://www.businessinsider.com/this-map-shows-chinas-global-energy-ties-2015-5,
accessed 15 September 2017.

156
overbearing behavior by India; India must have access to routes through Bangladesh
to improve connectivity and pursue the “Act East” policy; Bangladesh poses a
remote but potential military threat to the Siliguri Corridor; and Bangladesh can stir
up trouble in the Seven Sisters as some claim she has in the past.

India is better placed geographically than Bangladesh but worse placed

   " >      ?@       
her rival China, and to the east is China’s friend Myanmar. Poorer than China,
India must be a land power to deter China and Pakistan and a sea power to control
of the Indian Ocean. India does not have the option of developing connectivity
with a strategic hinterland of neighboring states, hence the necessity for the “Act
East“ policy, a logical way for India to build relations with countries that can help
her keep China away from the Indian Ocean.

In sum, China, Bangladesh and India all face potential encirclement. China is in
the stronger position against her Indian rival. India, while she cannot hope to
counter-encircle China, cannot herself be encircled so long as she controls the
Indian Ocean. Because Bangladesh poses no threat to the security of India or
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political action in a particular period of history depends on the political and
cultural context”3 is apt with respect to the three powers. The political and
cultural context of Sino-Indian relations, one of rivalry and competition, gives
Bangladesh an opportunity to exploit the “pattern of competition” and ensure
that the Sino-Indian rivalry functions “to preserve the independence” of the
weaker power4, Bangladesh.

China - Interests, Policies and Strategies

“In their endeavor to realize the Chinese Dream of great national rejuvenation,
the Chinese people aspire to join hands with the rest of the world to maintain
peace, pursue development and share prosperity.”5

China announced its core interests in a document from 2011, China’s Peaceful
Development. They are “state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity
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1993, p. 11.
4. Ibid., pp. 190-192.
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gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2014.htm, accessed 2 July 2017.

157
 The China-Bangladesh Relation and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

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and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable
economic and social development.”6 These interests fall into three areas – the
defense of the nation, the defense of the system, and the development of the
   '"        )   
in terms of power” and the “elements of national power” used to pursue them
with national power resting on the material means provided by the economy and
the decisive factors of “the quality of society and the government,”7 in Chinese
terms, the political system and social stability.

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analysts, including Chinese analysts, have noted the deep domestic political
roots of China’s foreign policy. As Jian Zhang of Peking University noted, “In
general, beyond issues such as food safety, environment pollution and rampant
corruption that are hurting the welfare of nearly everyone, all major social classes,
   #             +8 Zhang thought the
aggressive aspects of China’s foreign policy can be seen as attempting to distract
from domestic social and political pains. “Foreign policy ‘pills’ as a means of
addressing domestic pains have been a popular choice for politicians throughout
the ages.”9

The role China seeks to play in the world is ambiguous. In a recent speech, the
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world because …

A globalized world, where countries are more closely inter-connected than ever
before, needs not a single-handed hero but partners of cooperation who stick
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building partnerships as the new direction for state-to-state relations, a proposal
welcomed by most countries.10

Xi Jinping echoed this formulation during his speech at the CPC National
Congress, emphasizing the theme that “China will never seek hegemony or

6. State Council of the PRC, “China’s Peaceful Development” available at http://english.gov.cn/archive/

white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284646.htm, accessed online 7 July 2017.
7. Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 152-154.
8. Jian Zhang, “The domestic sources of China’s more assertive foreign policy”, International Politics, Vol.
51, No. 3, 2014, p. 393.
9. Ibid., p. 394.
10. |)| @"  * ?    ?  ?   € #  +# ' /00
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1448155.shtml, accessed 2 July 2017.

158
engage in expansion.”11 China is unready, or perhaps unwilling, to take a more
active role, and would prefer to focus on economic development in order to
mitigate “domestic pains” and avoid the expense of world leadership.

When considering Chinese policy toward Bangladesh, the only core interests
concerned are economic development and national security. Bangladesh can
directly contribute to China’s economic development through trade and can
indirectly contribute to China’s national security but has no realistic role to play
in helping China with other interests. From the Chinese point of view, economic
development indirectly affects social development and further social stability but
this is not something that is exclusive to Bangladesh, rather it applies to all of
China’s trading partners.

In terms of economic development, the Chinese see Bangladesh as a key part of

their strategy. The Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor
(BCIM-EC) is a key part of OBOR, an effort to develop South Asian connectivity
from Kunming to Kolkata. As Ding and Li describe it …

On the one hand, it will help China get access to the required resources (rather
       ‚   >    >
markets where it can transfer its excess infrastructure production - because the
domestic market for this is shrinking - and to exchange China’s portfolio of US
treasury bills into more productive investments in the new markets.12

Avia Nahreen sees China’s view of Bangladesh driven by “Bangladesh’s

strategically important geographic location, physical and political proximity to
India [and the Indian Ocean], availability of cheap labour, and proximity to the Bay
of Bengal” adding in addition that China will seek to relocate sunset industries to
Bangladesh.13 Thus, Bangladesh can become a supplier of inexpensive consumer
goods to China as China moves up the value chain.

After the October, 2016 summit between China’s President and Bangladesh’s
Prime Minister, the joint statement detailed areas of economic cooperation.
China and Bangladesh agreed to cooperate on the BCIM-EC and in “industrial

11. Xinhua, “Full text: Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative” available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/18/c_136688994.htm, accessed 20 October 2017.
12. '€ ‡)" ?  { Q ^  ( Z (/Z"  
Perspective”, Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2017, p. 54.
13. Avia Nahreen, “The growing strategic importance of Bangladesh to China” available at http://www.
thedailystar.net/op-ed/the-growing-strategic-importance-bangladesh-china-1393957, accessed 2 July
2017.

159
 The China-Bangladesh Relation and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

capacity building, power and energy, information and communication technology,

investment, maritime cooperation, disaster management and cultural and people-
to-people contacts.”14 Agreements on cultural and people-to-people contacts
show China’s use of the informational instrument of national power.

China has a requirement to gain alternate access to the Indian Ocean for both
economic and security reasons. One of the motivations behind OBOR, in its
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and BCIM-EC aspects, is to bypass
the Malacca Strait overland. There is also a potential threat of China using its
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any encirclement of China by India, Japan, South Korea and others. China’s
security relations with Bangladesh introduce a very small measure of uncertainty
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apparent than real. Chakravarty notes that with China providing “more than 80
per cent of the arms inventory of the Bangladesh defence forces” and “ droves
of Bangladeshi defence personnel travelling to China for training” there is
 ) ‰        ˆ         +15 China may
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relationship with Pakistan, but there is scant evidence of that at this time.

There is however, evidence that China would at least like Bangladesh’s tacit support
in disputes China has with third parties. Analyzing China’s recent White Paper
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unambiguous sentence, “Small and medium sized countries need not and should
not take sides among big countries.”16| )'  + >   
as China, the United States, Russia, India, and Japan, this implies that China, as a
condition of its economic relationship with Bangladesh, expects Bangladesh will
not to “take sides.”

In sum, China’s relations with Bangladesh are primarily concerned with the
Chinese core interests of sustainable economic development and national
security. In order to further these interests, Chinese policy emphasizes developing
trade, investment and connectivity with Bangladesh and defense cooperation.
14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement of The People’s Republic of China and The People’s
Republic of Bangladesh on Establishing Strategic Partnership of Cooperation 14 October 2016” available
at http://www.mofa.gov.bd/media/joint-statement-people’s-republic-china-and-people’s-republic-
bangladesh-establishing, accessed 3 May 2017.
15. Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, “Bangladesh-India Ties: Pragmatic Transformation”, Indian Foreign Affairs
Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2015, p. 215.
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160
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infrastructure, industrial capacity, energy and power, transportation, information
and communication technology, agriculture; the BCIM-EC to enhance regional
connectivity; and military equipment sales and training.

Bangladesh - Interests, Policies and Strategies

“Friendship to all and malice towards none.” (Bangabandhu)

“In the year 2041, Bangladesh will become a peaceful, prosperous and developed
place after crossing the status of a middle-income country.” (Prime Minister
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According to the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister wants Bangladesh “[t]o be
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democratic, secular and inclusive identity, contributing to global peace, progress
and prosperity” by 2041.17 This will enable Bangladesh to pursue its national
interests of “[p]reservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, economic
security, energy security, environmental preservation and internal peace and
cohesion.”18

Bangladesh has very serious ambitions to meet the Sustainable Development

goals and to become a high-income country as part of Vision 2041. To do so,
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to collaborate with wealthier and more technologically advanced neighbors to
sustain growth in the coming years.”19 Sarwar Jahan Chowdhury sees a need for
very close collaboration with the Chinese.

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discard India or the US, neither should we get tied in their disputes.20 (Chowdhury
2016)

17. Z   [  €      ‹Œ$‘ ' Z    Z  {     *   
“Bangladesh Foreign Policy” on 18 June 2017, National Defence College, Dhaka.
18. ”   ){ ? +# ' /00 '   0 • –{ —? 
accessed 7 July 2017.
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20. Sarwar Jahan Chowdhury, “The geo-politics of Bangladesh-China relations” available at http://opinion.
bdnews24.com/2016/10/13/the-geo-politics-of-bangladesh-china-relations/, accessed 3 April 2017.

161
 The China-Bangladesh Relation and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

"             *     

but not one leading to confrontation with India. It helps “Bangladesh to exploit
its strategically important location on the Bay of Bengal to extract concessions
and economic assistance from India, China and Japan.”21

As a variation on the “pill” metaphor, Bangladesh’s economic policies can be

seen as the “pill” to ease foreign policy pains. With Europe and the United States
the buyers of over three quarters of Bangladesh’s exports, Ayesha Kabir argues
that “Bangladesh’s major [economic] interests are wrapped up with the Western
world.”22 In contrast, China and India are the source of over half of Bangladesh’s
imports. This helps explain Chinese and Indian interest in the further economic
development of Bangladesh.

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opinion and domestic political tensions. During an interview, a distinguished
expert emphasized two points. First, that Bangladeshi public opinion is “basically
anti-Indian, Bengalis see them as a bully who make no concessions to their
neighbors.” Second, that “China needs Bangladesh and Bangladesh needs
China.”23 In other words, the interests of Bangladesh and China are congruent
and essentially economic.

There is in this a danger for Bangladesh. When the Chinese invest, they have
a reputation for employing Chinese workers, for the low quality of what they
build, for often building without considering the long-term economic prospects
for success, and for environmental despoliation as Carrie Gracie extensively
documented in a recent article for the British Broadcasting Corporation.24
Bloomberg News, in a generally favorable assessment of OBOR, reported on
other the failed projects.25 Bangladesh must ensure, in all her dealings with the
Chinese that there is actually a win for Bangladesh, not two wins for China.

In short, Bangladesh’s relations with China are primarily concerned with her
interest of economic security. Bangladesh is using her geographic position and
projects like BCIM-EC to develop her connectivity and various sub-sectors of
21. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘”Country Report, Bangladesh” available at http://www.eiu.com/home.
aspx, accessed 13 April 2017.
22. Ayesha Kabir, “Bangladesh and the New Cold War”, Defence Journal Pakistan, Vol. 17, No. 9, 2014, p. 11.
23. D # >'    ^ Z š‹Œ$‘[ €     €@
24. Carrie Gracie, “Tales from the New Silk Road” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-
sh/new_silk_road, accessed 15 July 2017.
25. Bloomberg News, “Chinese Spending Lures Countries to Its Belt and Road Initiative” available at https://
www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-china-belt-and-road-initiative/, accessed 11 September 2017.

162
the economy. Bangladesh policy emphasizes increasing trade and investment.
"                Š  Š    # 
infrastructure, industrial capacity, energy and power, transportation, information
and communication technology, agriculture, and BCIM-EC to enhance regional
connectivity. In its relations with China, Bangladesh primarily employs the
diplomatic and economic instruments of national power and exploits its location
at the head of the Bay of Bengal and as India’s neighbor.

      

“We have no dispute with China and hence Bangladesh-China relations can grow
     > #     *      'D 
from three sides.”26

No consideration of the China-Bangladesh relation makes complete sense without

considering the role of India. Many Bangladeshis see India as a bully characterize
India as an overbearing, big brother. This attitude affects both relations between
India and Bangladesh and between China and Bangladesh. As a distinguished
speaker explained, there is a “domestic requirement not to show subservience
to India.”27 *   D     #     
territorial integrity and national security as well as to ensure their security and to
 #        ˆ  

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Intelligence Unit recently noted …

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its international relations. Within South Asia, it will seek to establish itself as the
leading power and build closer economic and political ties (except with Pakistan).28

What this means for Bangladesh is the resolution of old disputes as well as
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India remains justly worried about the intentions of Pakistan and China. At the
National Defence College, a speaker noted that “relations with China are the
26. Chowdhury, op. cit.
27. D # >'    ^ Z š‹Œ$‘[ €     €@
28. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Report, India” available at http://www.eiu.com/home.aspx,
accessed 13 April 2017.

163
 The China-Bangladesh Relation and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy” and asserted that “a Russia-China-

Pakistan axis is emerging that will bring stability and counter other alignments in
  + # *  Š   ) ’ 
the Bangladesh Armed Forces will add to regional stability if close relations are
developed between Pakistan, China and Bangladesh.”29 These declarations will
not assuage Indian concerns.

Even with its suspicion of the Chinese, India knows where the future lies. Even
sources that, like Chakravarty, are hostile to the Chinese and sometimes dismissive
of the Bangladeshis, understand this.30 “Act East” is a sort of BCIM-EC without
China and is advantageous to Bangladesh. Even if it takes decades to create real
connectivity from Kolkata to Kunming, all of the connectivity improvements
' *  > '      > '  *   
the moment they are completed.

It appears that India is beginning to wake up to the fact that Bangladesh can no
longer be treated like a little brother.31 That this is so is clear from the results
of the April 2017 state visit. In the Joint Statement, India committed to billions
               
as poor as India. While the details of these commitments are not yet publicly
known the mere fact that they have been made indicates that India understands
the necessity for development and trade with its smaller neighbor.

The China-Bangladesh Relation in the Regional Context

“When you’re the only girl in the village, all of the boys are interested in you.”

Bangladesh is one of the most vital countries for China in expanding its sphere
 ˆ  \ \  Z ›D > *  
leverage from China’s checkbook diplomacy while maintaining the delicate
balance of regional geopolitics.32

With a steadily growing economy and having just reached the status of a
lower-middle-income country, Bangladesh is an attractive partner for trade and
investment, not just for its South Asian neighbors but also for China. Map 2
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Defence College, Dhaka.
30. Chakravarty, op. cit., p. 212.
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32. Nahreen, op. cit.

164
terms of total bilateral trade with the United States and India close behind.
The United States has contributed by far the greatest stock of foreign direct
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funding for projects to develop Bangladesh’s power supplies, connectivity and
information technology.

Map 2: Economic Instrument of Power – Competing for Bangladesh

Source: Internet

165
 The China-Bangladesh Relation and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

China must remain careful as she engages Bangladesh. The effects on her relations
with India must be taken into consideration as well as the effects on BCIM-EC
and OBOR as a whole. Despite its suspicions, India clearly sees the need for
greater connectivity if not for greater integration in other areas. For Bangladesh,
the Rohingya crisis, discussed in more detail below, has shown that the head of
the Bay of Bengal might not be the only village.

These other interests of China and India explain their reaction to the current
crisis. They wish to offend neither Bangladesh nor Myanmar but both have
decided that Myanmar has much to offer them and they are willing to trade a
little diplomatic tension with Bangladesh to continue their economic engagement
>  >   >  >    )  
terms of power”33 and Bangladesh in a position evoking Thucydides’ dismissal
of morality in international relations, “the strong do what they can and the weak
suffer what they must.”34

It is unlikely that Bangladesh will follow the suggestions of Pakistan and join
  ^ HH?@  "  '        
too much depends on its relations with India, particularly water sharing but
also energy supplies and trade. Bangladesh is, however, beginning to seek more
opportunities within South Asia despite a moribund SAARC.35 In the regional
context, Bangladesh appears as quite aggressive in seeking bilateral agreements
with her neighbors, China and other partners all of whom appear interested.

There is only one country at the head of the Bay of Bengal. There is only one
country with steady, high growth and a potential demographic dividend. There
is only one country critical to the success of both China’s BCIM-EC and India’s
drive to increase connectivity to the East. That country is Bangladesh. In the
regional context, Bangladesh is the only girl in the village and all the boys will
have to pay attention to her.

Bangladesh, China, India and the Rohingya Crisis

For Bangladesh, the Rohingya crisis shows the limits of diplomacy and the
primacy of the economic interests. It is clear that Bangladesh does not want war.
Assuming Myanmar could be forced to accept repatriation of the refugees, such
33. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 5.
34. "      '^  > )   ?  | +# ' /00
classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.html, accessed 18 September 2017.
35. Dhaka Unb, “FTA with Sri Lanka this yr” available at http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/fta-sri-
lanka-yr-1433335, accessed 15 July 2017.

166
would not solve the problem. Neither are denunciations from western and Muslim
countries likely to force Myanmar to accept the Rohingya. For the time being, and
it may be a long time, Bangladesh has little choice but to continue to receive and
support the refugees while continuing to mobilize diplomatic, informational and
economic support from other states, international organizations and NGOs.

China and India support Myanmar because both states have big infrastructure
projects in Myanmar. India’s Kaladan project is designed to provide a links to the
northeast through Sittwe port. China’s Kyaukphyu port is the start of a pipeline
     @36 For China, the reason to support Myanmar is the
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Strait bypass to complement Gwadar in Pakistan. India, like China, sees Myanmar
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in Naypyidaw is less than China’s. If China bests her in Myanmar and forges a
relationship as close as the Sino-Pakistani relationship, India will be completely
encircled on land.

Implications for United States Foreign Policy

“Bangladesh is a country of great strategic importance to the United States and

America has a very strong interest in a peaceful, secure, prosperous, healthy and
democratic Bangladesh.”37

It may seem a gross exaggeration to assert that China, India and the United states
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The United States objective is a peaceful, stable, secure and democratic

Bangladesh. In the security context of counter-terrorism, Bangladesh stands out
as a moderate, secular, tolerant, and pluralistic rebuke to the nihilism of violent
  *         #    
and the promotion of regional peace and stability.

36. \ ? )|€D *@ #  ^   •+# ' 
at http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2115839/why-do-china-india-back-myanmar-
over-rohingya-crisis, accessed 18 October 2017.
37. Address to National Defence Course 2017 by Marcia Bernicat, U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh, on
“United States Policy in Bangladesh - Partners in Security and Development” on 25 June 2017, National
Defence College, Dhaka.

167
 The China-Bangladesh Relation and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

Bangladesh is important to United States interests not just in terms of

Bangladesh’s security but also regionally and globally. Bangladesh fosters stability
in the region and as one of the largest contributors of forces to international
peacekeeping operations Bangladesh promotes global peace. In the economic
  *  Q   #   '    ' *    
America. Bangladesh’s huge ready-made garments sector, the second largest in
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increasingly see Bangladesh as a future market and investment opportunity.
The United States has an interest in the social and political development that
underpins Bangladesh’s security. Pluralistic, democratic systems enable the healthy
release of political tension leading to greater stability. Stability counters violent
extremism and boosts economic development by creating a favorable business
climate that helps attract foreign investment.
In this light, how does the United States view China-Bangladesh relations and what
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States, the focus in South Asia was India.38 From these comments, it is obvious
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despite the focus of the United States on counter-terrorism and Bangladesh’s
economic, social and political development there are some implications for
American foreign policy.
The United States wants Bangladesh to succeed economically. A fruitful
Bangladesh-China relation can only help. Both the BBC and Bloomberg News
#    #                     
projects. To prevent the negative features of Chinese economic engagement from
affecting Bangladesh, the United States has an interest in government capacity
building in Bangladesh, to ensure capabilities in contracting and project oversight.

Recommendations for Bangladesh

In her foreign relations, Bangladesh must be “the only girl in the village,”
attractive to but committing neither to her Chinese suitor nor to her Indian
one. Bangladesh must ensure that both her close friend and her far friend have
incentives to continue their suits.
38. Z [ €    ‹Œ$‘  ^ 'Z Y‹Œ$‘[ 
Defence College, Dhaka.

168
Bangladesh should maintain and even increase her focus on connectivity in order
to take advantage of India’s need for connectivity with the Northeast and of
China’s desire for connectivity with Kolkata.

Bangladesh must also increase its capacity to execute projects. It will do little
good to sign trade and development agreements with China if the Bangladeshi
side cannot execute them.

Bangladesh should pursue the movement of sunset industries from China. While
such industries are becoming less important to the Chinese, they represent for
Bangladesh an opportunity to begin moving up the value chain and might also
enable greater Bangladeshi penetration of the Chinese market.

Bangladesh must continue to diversify arms sources in order to prevent

dependence on any one supplier. Bangladesh should also consider further
developing indigenous arms industries, especially those that result in technology
transfer.

Bangladesh must avoid too much debt. Every debt, even concessional debt, must
be carefully studied to ensure that the returns are worth the price.

Finally, Bangladesh must understand and remain wary of Chinese and Indian
#   *        >    
China and India and these interests do not always coincide.

Recommendations for the United States

"           ”  \             
or strategy due to the China-Bangladesh relation. Instead, it should continue
its activities with a particular emphasis on the informational and economic
instruments of power as it pursues its national interests.

The United States should continue its efforts to develop the Armed Forces of
Bangladesh with a focus on professionalization and respect for human rights as
well as to peacekeeping training and equipment.

The United States should intensify government capacity-building efforts to enable

improvements to Bangladesh’s ability to contract and manage the execution of
projects and help prevent waste, corruption and economically unsound projects.

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 The China-Bangladesh Relation and its Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

The United States should publicize the business opportunities in Bangladesh to

the American business community. An information campaign should emphasize
both the export market but also the growing domestic market.
The United States should encourage other nations to take advantage of Bangladeshi
best practice in disaster preparedness, to develop their own capabilities.
The United States should expand opportunities for Bangladeshis to study in the
United States to reinforce human resource development.

Conclusion
Bangladesh is not a powerful country in the realist sense. It has neither great
natural resources nor a great industrial base. It is not wealthy and its infrastructure
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geography, her population and her national character. The geographic location
of Bangladesh ensures its importance to its neighbors, its population means that
there are not just the hands but also the brains needed to develop the country,
and its national character – the people’s and leaders’ insistence on maintaining
sovereignty and independence – means that powerful nations like China and
India cannot simply dictate their relations with Bangladesh. The national power
generated by the combination of geography, population and national character
of Bangladesh means that Bangladesh is in a strong position in its relations with
China and India and the rest of the world. The realization of Vision 2041 and of
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shared interest in the success of the other.

The United States wants Bangladesh to be a model for other developing

nations, to “be a prosperous, successful, democratic country that demonstrates
unequivocally that democracy is the best path to sustainable development.” The
United States does not have an interest in a closer political relationship between
Bangladesh and China. Therefore, while continuing and improving its current
relations with Bangladesh, the United States must monitor the China-Bangladesh
relation. The American interest is served by seeing this relation transcend the
strictures of realist international relations theory and become a true win-win
proposition. Such a result does not require China to change but it does require
Bangladesh to guard its sovereignty and independence and to remember that the
Chinese are not helping Bangladesh out of generosity but out of interest. Only
then can the interests of all three states be protected and their dreams realized.

170
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tactical assignment was as the Commander of the 4th Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry.
Colonel Gottlieb’s current assignment is as a member of National Defence
Course 2017 at the Bangladesh National Defence College.

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Army Achievement, Iraq and Afghanistan Campaign, NATO and United Nations
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