Strategic control of agro-industrial cooperatives:

A strategic map proposal

Reginaldo Ferreira Barreiros

Universidade Estadual de Ponta Grossa - Brazil

Vilmar Rodrigues Moreira (vilmar.moreira@pucpr.br)

Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná – Brazil

Luiz Carlos Duclós

Pontifical Catholic University of Paraná – Brazil

Roberto Max Protil

Universidade Federal de Viçosa - Brazil

Abstract
Using the concepts of Balanced Scorecard and System Dynamics and considering the corporate
features of agro-industrial cooperatives, this article proposes a strategic map, which presents up
variables that represent critic processes in strategy management for agro-industrial cooperatives, as
well as identifying hypothesis of causal relations among the variables.

Keywords: Strategic management, agro-industrial cooperatives, Dynamic Scorecard

Introduction
Cooperative societies present several differences comparatively with mercantile societies or
investor owned firms – IOF, and so they demand the adaptation of specific management tools.
Being constituted as societies of people instead of societies of capital, the strategic administration
of cooperatives depends significantly on the relationship they maintain with their members. The
members view a cooperative as an intermediary organization between their individual ventures and
the market and are stimulated to maintain and strengthen their commercial relationships with the
cooperatives through economical advantages for their own individual enterprises. In this context, it
is important that strategic management of agro-industrial cooperatives is supported by models that
might consider conciliation and balance among the distinct goals of cooperatives and members.
Cooperative societies show peculiarities in their legal constitution and adopt principles and
doctrines that exert significant influence in their structuring and organizational governance,
delegation and use of power and, consequently, in how decision process happens. Cooperatives are
societies of people who unite themselves seeking for the satisfaction of common needs. In
opposition of an IOF, where the power is proportional to the invested capital, in cooperatives the
power is egalitarian, because of each member exerts the right of a single vote independently of the
owned capital. In a cooperative the financial result is not the only objective. The decisions about re-

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investment or distribution of the financial surpluses to members are taken in assembly formed by
the peers. The financial surpluses share returns to the members proportionally to their work with the
cooperative, instead of the amount of capital owned (Bialoskorski 2001).
In cooperative societies, an ambiguous relationship among the members happens. They are at
the same time customers, suppliers and owners of the society. Due to that, the emergence of
conflicting goals is verified, especially in the case of highly competitive markets. Among the causes
of these conflicting goals, one of the most important are the difficulties to balance the pressure for
decreasing the prices of final products, coming from market, with the pressure for increasing the
price paid for supplies, coming from members – who are the suppliers of the cooperative
(Bialoskorski 2001).
Cooperatives face different pressures influencing their decision process at a strategic level.
On one hand, the internal environment is composed by members who seek their satisfaction and
corporative goals that are barely convergent, due to the homogeneity of the social boards and the
kind of relationship between members and cooperatives. On the other hand, cooperatives work in
high competitive markets, including the more industrialized ones, demanding the need for
development of effective management practices that can provide the necessary competitiveness for
the business success. From the internal environment, corporative pressures, that may cause the
political behavior of the decision makers emerge and, from the external environment emerges
competitive pressures demanding a rational behavior of these decision makers (Barreiros 2005).
Hence, it is possible to imply that members of an agro-industrial cooperative, as independent
economic agents, not always have a convergent behavior with the collective goals of the
cooperative. In this sense, the development of a strategic management model for this type of
organization depends on adaptations that adequately consider the effect and influences of the
member’s behavior in relation to the decision process of cooperatives – such as commitment,
degree of capitalization acceptance and degree of technological innovations acceptance.
Based on the concepts of the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 2001) and System
Dynamics (Sterman 2000), the purpose of this paper is to present a strategic map that
provides conditions for future development of management strategy modeling in this type of
organization.
In this paper, core concepts of strategic management and particular characteristics of agro-
industrial cooperatives are discussed. A strategic map is proposed, based on the Balanced Scorecard
concept and associated to the vision and resources of the Dynamic Systems. These tools have been
applied aiming to improve the strategic analysis model proposed, considering the complexity
inherent to cooperative management.

Management of Cooperatives
Georg Drahein in 1951 introduced the concept of dual nature of cooperative organization (Hanel
1994). On the one hand, the cooperative is primarily an association or a group in the sociological
aspect, whose members are the owners and maintainers of the organization. On the other hand, the
cooperative is also a joint company of the members’ economic ventures and these members are the
cooperatives’ owners. To Staatz, until the 1960s the debate on cooperative organizations was
focused on the discussion whether cooperatives would represent a form of vertical organization of
farmers, being simply as an extension of individual members’ ventures, or cooperatives
could legitimately be analyzed as organizations with self-specific scope and with independent
decision-making process, regardless the goals of farmers in their individual ventures (Staatz
1989). In this sense, the debate was focused on the discussion whether the
cooperative administration might simply implement the wishes of members, guided by

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their individual goals, or if they might look for the achievement of the cooperatives’
objectives itself, as an independent organization, assuming the vision of collective goals, not always
convergent with the goals of individuals. Staatz also states that Stephen Enke started a different
discussion, but perfectly adherent to real conditions, when he said that on the day by day of a
cooperative, its administration is faced with situations in which decisions must be made, based on
alternative choices and often antagonistic of what should be maximized between the goals
of members and the needs of the cooperative itself. From this discussion emerged the approach
to study cooperatives as independent organizations, with their own objectives and as alternative
economic firms in face to the conventional IOF.
Enke's model emphasized that to maximize the outcome of members, the cooperative's
management had to balance the benefits received from two different sources. Initially, the benefits
received by members, derived from their operations with the cooperative, to the extent that it
can offer lower prices for purchased inputs and higher prices for products sold by the members. In
addition to these primary benefits, as wished by the members when forming the cooperative,
another type of benefit might be considered, derived from the cooperative’s industrial adding
value to the raw materials supplied by the members. That is, industrializing the products
delivered by the members and operating under market conditions, the cooperative would
offer financial returns derived from profitable business in different markets, that in medium and
long terms, could be shared among the members in proportion of their respective financial
movements with the cooperative (Staatz 1989).
Prioritizing benefits focusing only one of these sources on financial return would tend
to reduce the overall returns of members. That is, focusing only on the returns derived from
the operations of members with the cooperative, could limit the capitalization of the cooperative in
the long run, with consequences on the competitiveness and future returns of their
own members. On the other hand, focusing only on the strengthening of the cooperative, at the
expense of short-term economic benefits, could significantly compromise the return of
the individual members’ ventures (Staatz 1989).
Reynolds reports that farmers establish and maintain a cooperative when they can reach their
goals in a broader and more comprehensive way when compared to their alternative individual
actions as separate economic agents (Reynolds 1997). Cooperatives are voluntary organizations and
operate under democratic principles of corporate governance. This author considers that members
of cooperatives usually have divergent economic goals, given the differences in size, technological
level and type of individual businesses and that the maintenance of cohesion and the creation of
incentives for cooperation is much more complex the more different the productive and
technological processes are.
Machado Filho, in turn, argue that in the strategic field, the cooperative model is difficult to
manage, due to the need to tend to very diverse demands, leading to a natural increase of the
political weight in decision making (Machado Filho et al. 2003). Governance becomes very
complex, and much of the management effort is concentrated on it. Besides, they reinforce that in
Brazilian cooperatives, there usually is no separation between ownership and control, in that, in
many organizations, managers come from the body of members, which can lead to management
difficulties in that it increases the complexity and the competitive level of businesses. Lacking
management professionals, cooperatives move away from the market, focusing on the operational
aspect of production.
Emerging from these considerations is the problem of this research, embodied by the apparent
need for adaptation of the BSC methodology and consequently of the Dynamic Scorecard for use in
cooperative societies, thus possibly incorporating, beyond the four traditional perspectives

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(financial, customer, internal processes as well as learning and growth), other perspectives, which
are shown to be fundamental in this type of organization: the relationship of the cooperative with its
body of members, which depends on transparent policies of incentives for the practice of
cooperation, leading to fidelity of the members and strengthening of cooperative; and also the social
perspective.

Strategic Control, Balanced Scorecard and Dynamic Scorecard

When studying performance assessment and control systems for implementation of business
strategies, Simons conceived a model of strategic control levers that involve four dimensions
(Simons 2000). These dimensions are partially related with the 5 P’s of strategy (Mintzberg et al.
2000): strategy as perspective, strategy as positioning, strategy as plan and strategy as pattern. Only
the fifth P of Mintzberg – strategy as ploy – is not considered in this model. The model of control
levers developed by Simons took advantage of some concepts and formulations of strategy
developed previously. The first one was the analysis of the Design’s School (Andrews 1996), which
establishes that the strategy formulation should be done according to the analytical study of threats
and opportunities of the external environment and of strengths and weaknesses of the internal
environment – SWOT analysis. In order to position the businesses in the external environment, the
dynamic of market competition is also used – 5 strengths model of Porter (Porter 1998). In order to
recognize and to develop resources and competences of the enterprise, the vision based on
resources of Barney and on essential competences of Prahalad and Hamel have been considered as
well (Barney 1991, Prahalad and Hamel 1998).
Strategy as perspective involves the consideration of values, beliefs and ideals as the
organization’s master guide. Strategy as positioning involves the consideration of boundaries that
must guide behaviors and management decisions, according to the risks that must be avoided. After
defining the mission and the strategic positioning, through the analysis of the competitive dynamics
of the market, resources, competences and internal capabilities, the dimension of the strategy as
plan emerges. In this phase, formally the goals are expressed, communicated and distributed for the
whole organization, and also the necessary resources are estimated and coordinated in order to
actually reach the goals.
The hierarchy “mission >> strategy >> goals >> measures of performance >> actions” defines
a concept in a cascade way that begins at a general inspiring mission towards a specific quantitative
measure of performance. This hierarchy is supported by strategic plans based on analytical
techniques, such as SWOT. Complementing this process, Mintzberg and Quinn studied the
emergent strategies that define the strategy as pattern and are the origin of the organizational
learning process (Mintzberg and Quinn 2001). This strategy considers that ideas emerge from
people, who are part of the organization, and those may become good strategies for the organization.
Simons considers that in the implementation of strategies, in order to reach the financial goals,
managers must deal with the following tensions that are inherent to organizations seeking high
performance: a) Tensions among profit, growing and control; b) Tensions among deliberate and
emerging strategies; c) Tensions among unlimited opportunities to limited attention; d) Tensions
among self-interest and the desire for contributing (Simons 2000). It is a managers’ duty to know
how to use the several techniques of measure of performance along with the four control levers,
shown in figure 1, in order to cope with these tensions.
The way of converting strategy into practical actions throughout the firm, detailing guidelines
and goals, creating tools for monitoring and for measurement of strategies’ results and creating a
favorable environment for strategic alignment and learning has been one of the greatest challenges
for the strategic management field. Seeking this goal, several methods have been developed, such

4  
 
as Tableaux of Board, Administration by Goals (developed by Peter Drucker), the Method of
Management by Guidelines and, recently, the Balanced Scorecard method, created by Kaplan and
Norton (2001). According to these authors, the BSC is structured as a set of indicators and is a
system of strategic management aiming at: a) Clarifying and obtaining consensus about the
strategy; b) Communicating the strategy throughout the firm; c) Aligning departmental and
personal goals with the strategy; d) Connecting strategic objectives with long-term goals and
budgets; e) Identifying and aligning initiatives, investment programs and strategic action; f)
Accomplishing periodic and systematic revisions; g) Getting feedback in order to increase the
knowledge about strategy, to improve it and to develop strategic learning.

Strategy  as  perspective   Strategy  as  positioning  

Obtaining  commitment  to  the  greater  purposes     Scouting  the  territory  

Belief  Systems   Boundary  Systems    

  Essential     Risks  to  be  

Values   avoided  

 
  Business  Strategy    

Strategic  
  Critical  performance  
Uncertaintie   variables  

   
Systems  of  interactive  control   Diagnosis  control  system  

Strategy  as  patterns   Strategy  as  a  plan  

Experimenting  and  learning   Acting    

  Figure 1 – Strategic Control Levers   (Source: Simons 2000)

The   BSC seeks to translate the vision and the strategy of a firm into a broad set of goals and
performance
  measures, having as structure a modeling based on four basic perspectives of a firm:
financial, customers, internal processes and also growth and learning. This modeling is expressed
through a map, known as strategic map, that must tell the history of the firm’s strategy.
Despite the improvement caused by BSC on the strategic management field, there are some
criticisms regarding BSC’s limitations: a) The relations of cause and effect are one way, or, in other
words, feedback among goals is not made explicit; b) The map is not operational, because it does
not consider delays among relations of cause and effect; c) The map cannot be experimented with,
in other words, it is impossible to use the map in a reliable simulation.
In order to solve these limitations, the use of System Dynamics in association with BSC has
been developed by some authors. To Richmond the deficiencies regarding the BSC’s strategic map
might be solved by using the language of flows and stocks provided by the System Dynamics
method (Richmond 1999). Due to this, the concept of Dynamic Scorecard was developed, where a
simulation of the relations of cause and effect is possible, creating strategic learning.
By studying the viability of conjugation of BSC with System Dynamics, Schoeneborn
showed that the relations of cause and effect of the various elements described in literature about
the BSC are not suitable enough for the identification of indicators that bring successful results in
the long run (Schoeneborn 2003). Being based on simple views that ignore the delays and possible
feedbacks, the strategic maps only show a part of the effects. Overcoming such limitations is
5  
 
possible through the conjugation of the BSC with System Dynamics, in a way that the delays and
feedbacks between variables start being considered and set into parameters, so that model
simulation and subsequent strategic learning are made possible.
The conjugation of System Dynamics with the BSC is interesting because it gives
possibilities for overcoming the limitations of the BSC method, as previously reported. By enabling
the consideration of delays and feedbacks between different variables of the BSC strategic map, the
model overcomes the initial limitations of unidirectionality and operational difficulties. The model
then enables more reliable simulations and consequent strategic learning (Schoeneborn 2003).
Fernandes has contributed for the combination of BSC with System Dynamics in his studies and
named the concept as Dynamic Scorecard (Fernandes 2003).

Methodology
The main purpose of this research is how to insert two particular perspectives (Social and
Relationship with members) in a new Balanced Scorecard model for agro-industrial cooperatives
that considers dynamic relations among its four traditional perspectives (financial, customers,
internal processes and growth). In this Dynamic Scorecard Model it is considered the need for
conciliating and balancing the members' goals - which seek for economic outcomes in their own
individual ventures - with the goals of the cooperative itself – which needs capitalization,
professionalization and investments to ensure its competitiveness.
Initially a model represented by a generic strategic map applicable to agro-industrial
cooperatives was developed. For the development of this model, which shows the hypothesis of
relations of cause and effect of the critical success factors in a qualitative and dynamic way, the
Vensim Software has been used. In order to evaluate the consistency of the hypothesis of causal
relationships among the variables of the generic strategic map some interviews and questionnaires
were conducted. The interviews were conducted with five experts of OCEPAR - Organization and
Trade Union of Cooperatives of the State of Parana, followed by content analysis of these
interviews (thematic analysis). Regarding the questionnaires, twenty-five agronomic engineers of
six cooperatives of Paraná State have answered them.
Besides, a case study was carried out in a large agro-industrial cooperative of Paraná. During
this phase it was possible to define control indicators, in the different perspectives of the Dynamic
Scorecard, that adequately express the critical strategic factors in agro-industrial cooperatives. For a
next phase it is intended to carry out a practical application of the proposed model in other agro-
industrial cooperatives, through the action-research method.
The strategic model was developed using the soft modeling language of Dynamic Systems.
This language considers variables (enclosed in polygons), relation between variables (arrows) and,
delays (double lines across arrows). The whole map is a set of sequential and progressive loops of
causal diagrams that represent reinforcement (loops type R) and equilibrium (loops type B) among
variables.

Results
The proposed strategic map in looping format is illustrated in Figure 2. The
reinforcing loop R1 designed refers to the hypothesis of positive effect of technical assistance over
the member’s capacity, efficiency, production, gross margin and profits. And as a reinforcement
loop, the higher the member’s profits, the greater the feedback of spending resources in more
technical assistance, closing the loop R1. This feedback is a result of members’ awareness in
relation to the benefits brought by technical assistance.

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 +
social benefits

members' +
satisfaction

+
cooperative's
internal R2
processes members'
efficiency R3 +
fidelity + members' profits
members' gross
+ + margin

+ +
+
external
customers' delivered
satisfaction production members'
in the production
B3 + cooperative cooperative's
organizational +
culture
+ R1
+
cooperatives' members'
turnover efficiency
+ B4 cooperativism
agroindustrial education +
efficiency
cooperative's -
+ + B2 financial members'
B5
surpluses financial + capacitation
surpluses technical +
distribuction +
- - + assistance
new -
investments
+
cooperative's investments in
capitalization experimentation
B1 and innovation

employees'
training
 
Figure 2 – Proposed Strategic Map in Looping Format

The reinforcing loop R2 designed refers to the hypothesis of the positive effect that the
commitment of the members with the cooperative - expressed by the indicator fidelity, influenced
by their profits, exert over the financial surpluses of the cooperative, which in turn, increase the
profits of the members through the possibility of surpluses distribution. The hypotheses are that
member's profits increases their satisfaction, and so their fidelity, the production delivered to the
cooperative and the financial surpluses of the cooperative, which can be distributed back, increasing
as a feedback the profit for members, closing the reinforcement loop R2.
The balance loop B1 is the first loop of the model. It refers to the hypothesis of the positive
effect that investment in innovation and experimentation exerts over the member's capacity and
consequently over their efficiency, production, gross margin and profits, but at the cost of reducing
the financial surpluses of the cooperative itself. Instead of reversing all the potential surpluses to the
members, the cooperative can alternatively invest a part in agricultural innovation and
experimentation, improving the technology employed by the members in their farms, with positive
effects in the medium and long term, over the capacity and consequently over the member's profits.
The balance loop B2 is also designed as a balancing one. It considers the hypothesis of the
positive effect that the capitalization of the cooperative exerts over its ability to make new
investments, required to preserve its competitiveness in the agribusiness markets, with consequent

7  
 
increase of the cooperative's financial surpluses in the medium and long term. The cooperative
operates in competitive markets and needs equity for new investments that preserve or expand its
competitiveness, with positive effects over agro-industrial efficiency, consequently over the
satisfaction of external customers, sales and revenues, providing the increase in the financial
surpluses of the cooperative. These investments, however, compete in the short term with the same
surpluses that could alternatively be reversed to the members, closing the balancing loop B2.
The balance loop B3 is also designed as a balancing one. It considers the hypothesis of the
positive effect that new investments may also exerts over the efficiency of internal processes of the
cooperative and consequently over the member’s satisfaction, and then with positive effect over
their fidelity, yet with sacrifice, in the short term, of the cooperative’s surpluses distribution.
The balance loop B4 considers the hypothesis of the positive effect that
cooperative education exerts over the commitment and fidelity of members, and consequently, in
the medium and long terms, over the financial surpluses of the
cooperative. The cooperative education increases member’s awareness about the benefits of
cooperativism, with positive effects on the organizational climate of the cooperative. The member’s
awareness about the collective objectives of the cooperative associated with the belonging
perception to the organization, leads to increased commitment and consequently the increase of the
cooperative surpluses in the medium and long term. In the short term, however, there is a
cost decreasing the financial surpluses of the cooperative.
The balance loop B5 considers the hypothesis of the positive effect that employee
training exerts over the efficiency of internal processes of the cooperative, both the agro-
industrial efficiency, with positive effects in the external environment (customers), and
the efficiency of internal processes, with positive effects in the internal environment
(members). The staff better trained, aware and able to perform their tasks better, with positive
consequences both internally and externally, lead to economic benefits in the medium and long
terms, but decreasing the financial surpluses in the short term, in proportion to the cost of training.
The last reinforce loop R3 considers the hypothesis of positive effect that profits of member’s
ventures exerts over social benefits, which in turn feeds the system positively, improving, in the
medium and long terms, the organizational culture, the member’s commitment and fidelity and
also the cooperative’s financial surpluses, closing the reinforcement loop R3. This last loop
integrated to the other ones result in the proposed strategic map, adapted to agro-industrial
cooperatives.
In the perception of the experts interviewed, this strategic map presents a very high degree of
adherence with the reality of agro-industrial cooperatives in Province of Paraná – Brazil. The same
strategic map developed is illustrated in Figure 3, but now in the frame of the BSC and considering
six basic perspectives. In other words, in addition to the traditional four BSC perspectives of
Growth and Learning, Internal Processes, Customers and Financial, are also considered the
perspective of Relationship with Members and the Social perspective. These six perspectives
include two distinct structures. The first one represented by cooperative and the second by the
individual venture of members, each one with its own goal of economic income. In the case of
cooperative structure, the strategic map considers the relations within the internal environment,
composed by the members and employees, and also relations with the external environment,
composed by the customers. The essence of the map lies in the systemic balance between goals and
objectives of the members and the cooperative itself.
In the perspective Relationship with Members of the proposed strategic map it is considered
key variables for the balance of goals of cooperative and its members. These variables are
represented by hexagons in the axis of the map, such as members’ fidelity, delivered production in

8  
 
 the cooperative, cooperative’s capitalization and distribution of the cooperative’s financial
surpluses.

C   COOPERATIVE   RELATIONSHIP  WITH   MEMBERS  

MEMBERS  
SOCIAL  

social +
 

benefits

+ -
FINANCIAL  

new cooperative's cooperative's

capitalization member's profits
investments financial
surpluses
+
+
+
- -
-
cooperatives' + financial member's gross
turnover
surpluses margin
distribution
CUSTOMERS  

+
external member's
customer's +
satisfaction satisfaction member's
production
+
delivered +
+ + production
in the
cooperative's cooperative member's
agroindustrial internal
PROCESSES  

efficiency
INTERNAL  

efficiency processes
efficiency +
+
+ +

+ member's
capacitation
+ +
member's + +
cooperative's fidelity
organizational employee's + technical
culture training assistance
+
GROWTH  

investments in
cooperativism experimentation
education and innovation
 
Figure 3 – Proposed Strategic Map in BSC Format

The strategic map also provides one important issue: how the capitalization of cooperative
may aid the generation of resources for new investment in agribusiness. The agro-industrial
cooperatives act in competitive markets, including large competitors with high economic power. To
maintain their competitiveness in these markets, agro-industrial cooperatives depend on
investments in new industries, distribution structures, and selling and marketing channels. Another
important aspect of the proposed strategic map is its potential for explanation of an important core
competence of agro-industrial cooperatives: the ability to develop strong structure of suppliers of
raw materials for agro-industrialization.

Final considerations
In this article a strategic map adapted for agro-industrial cooperatives and based on the concepts of
BSC and System Dynamics is proposed. This is a generic map, which considers critical processes in
this type of organization, such as the balance of goals between cooperatives and its members –

9  
 
which are not always convergent. Besides, it is also critic the fact that members who operate with
the cooperatives usually attempt to increase the economic result of their individual ventures while
cooperatives depend on the accumulation of surpluses for their capitalization, aiming to make
further investments that will provide the maintenance of their competitiveness in the markets where
they operate. This relationship is complex and ambiguous because if members worry only about the
success of their ventures, the cooperative will suffer from lack of resources, since it will have to
distribute more surpluses.
These considerations among others are well regarded in the strategic map proposed specially
because in the map dynamic interactions are deeply regarded. A better understanding of the causal
relationships between the variables proposed in the strategic map becomes crucial, and its
application as a strategy management tool in the agro-industrial cooperatives may prove to be an
important management tool, as it makes use of important and well-regarded concepts of strategy
management provided by the BSC jointly with System Dynamics.
The possibility of applying the proposed strategic map depends on the deepening of more
studies, further development and evaluation of indicators to properly assess each variable
envisioned in the proposed strategic map, as well as the adaptation and application to other real
cases of agro-industrial cooperatives using, for example, the action-research method.

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