Specters of Marx Reading Group Meeting Agenda # 2

9 August 2024 6pm GMT

Preliminaries

Introduction of new participants

Suggestions or questions arising from last week's session

This week we will continue our discussion of the first half of Chapter 1 of Specters of Marx, using the
outstanding questions and quotations from last week's agenda. I have reworded the questions slightly,
added some new text boxes and provided the original French of all quotations.

Outstanding Questions relating to Chapter 1 (pages 1 – Etymological Wordplay – 'Coming and Going'
34)
Derrida uses many words that derive, in French and other
neo-Latin languages, from the Latin verb venire (come). Some
1. Visor effect On page 6, Derrida uses the term of the resulting wordplay is lost in English, since, although
English has borrowed some of these Latinate words, the verb
'visor effect' to refer to the ghost seeing us not come is Germanic, and the relation to the verb meaning come
seeing it. Derrida will use similar language later in in these words is not as immediately apparent as it is in neo-
Latin languages.
reference to animals. He also relates this here to
In French the relation between coming and the future is clear
the Marxian interpretation of commodity value. in the avenir. Other words derived from venir include:
(sensibilité insensible) And also, on page 7, to the provenir/provenance, revenir/revenant, devenir, souvenir,
inventer/invention, and, importantly, événement/event,
law ("Since we do not see the one who sees us, which derives from Latin evenire and originally had more of a
and who makes the law, who delivers the sense of 'consequence' or 'result' than it does in present-day
English.
injunction" ["Comme nous ne voyons pas qui nous voit, et qui
fait la loi, qui délivre l'injonction"]) See Quotation 8a. English come and Latin venire and Greek baino all, in fact,
have the same Proto-Indo-European root *gwa-, while go has
2. Mourning, Voice, and Work On page 9, Derrida a different unrelated origin, connected more with the idea of
'releasing', 'letting go'. The past tense went, meanwhile, is
makes three points about the ghost as thing. First related to '*wendh' turn.
it
is mourned—he adds that all ontologization
The relation between come and go is linguistically interesting.
involves a certain mourning. Second it requires Some linguists posit an 'andative' and a 'venitive' case in some
language, a voice. And third, it does some kind of languages, although there is really no need to multiply the
number of cases in this way. The distinction can be seen in
work. It has a certain power of 'transformation'. terms of deixis—position relative to the speaker (akin to
How do we understand these three points? adverbs such as here and now, the demonstrative pronouns
this and that, and personal pronouns). The distinction can
3. Following On page 10, Derrida asks "What does it confuse people even in their own language. (I recently heard
a young girl corrected by her mother in a public hospital for
mean to follow a ghost? And what if this came not using the 'venitive' correctly. The girl had said 'I didn't
down to being followed by it, always, persecuted want to go here." (In Portuguese the sentences in fact form a
minimal pair: Eu não queria vir pra cá/eu não queria ir pra cá)
perhaps by the very chase we are leading?" [Qu'est- ce
que suivre un fantôme ? Et si cela revenait à être suivi par lui, In French, it is possible to use the verb a(d)venir to mean
toujours, persécuté peut-être par la chasse même que nous lui arrive/come to pass. The word advent in English exists only as
faisons ?]
This again is echoed later by comments he a noun. It is sometimes used to refer to the period before
Christmas. Children used to have an advent calendar, on
will make concerning animals. which they counted down the days before they would receive
gifts. In this context, it is possible to see the event
4. Hauntology Derrida first introduces the term (deictically) either as something coming towards us or as
'hauntology' in relation to repetition and something we are approaching. The word advent is also
frequently used in academic and journalistic (but not
singularity and compares a haunting to any event everyday) discourse to refer to the appearance of some new
and to the end of history, in particular. On page invention, trend, or development. The emphasis is on
newness but there is also a subtle suggestion of expectation.
11 he says " A question of repetition: a specter is It is always used 'after the fact.' Advent here lacks the
always a revenant. One cannot control its comings neutrality of arrival, suggesting some grand narrative. It has a
soteriological flavor, signaling a kairos—a point at which 'the
and goings because it begins by coming back." time has come', as the English idiom puts it.
["Question de répétition : un spectre est toujours un revenant. On ne
saurait en contrôler les allées et venues parce qu'il commence par revenir.]
5. Marcellus Complex On page 12, Derrida speaks of a Marcellus complex. Marcellus is the watchman
in Hamlet who assumes that Horatio can speak to the ghost because he is an educated man (a
'scholar'). This is akin to Lacan's notion of the 'supposé savoir'. Derrida suggests that it is precisely
such a scholar (as spectator/observer) who is incapable of addressing ghosts. Scholars make too
 sharp a distinction between 'real' and 'unreal'. For this reason, they are also incapable of talking
about Marxism. [Quotation 9]
6. The End of History For Derrida, Fukuyama's idea of the end of history, and this kind of
apocalypticism in general, is nothing new. He argues that such discourse was already widespread in
the 1950s, an era when scholars were talking of the 'end of ideology', 'the end of art,' 'the end of
philosophy,' 'the death of the author,' and so forth. We have observed this tendency before in our
discussion of 'catastrophe' in Of Grammatology. Here, Derrida describes Fukuyama wittily as
'arriving late to the end of history' ["en retard sur la fin de l'histoire"] and asks what an event would be after
the end of history. This obliges one "to wonder if the end of history is but the end of a certain
concept of history" ["à se demander si la fin de l'histoire n'est pas seulement la fin d'un certain concept de l'histoire"]
7. Justice, Injustice and the Possibility of the Other A law without vengeance is something messianic
that belongs to the time after the end of history [Quotation 12 and injustice would however seem
to be necessary for justice to exist. "Is not this disjuncture, this dis-adjustment of the “it’s going
badly” necessary for the good, or at least the just, to be announced? Is not disjuncture the very
possibility of the other?" "Mais avec l'autre, ne faut-il pas cette disjointure, ce désajustement du «
ça va mal » pour que le bien s'annonce, ou du moins le juste ? La disjointure, n'est-ce pas la
possibilité même de l'autre?"
8. The Anaximander Fragment "Heidegger [on a fragment of
Anaximander
Anaximander] interprets Dikē (the Ancient Greek word often
translated as 'justice' or 'order') as joining, adjoining, Anaximander is credited with being the
first pre-Socratic Ancient Greek
adjustment, articulation of accord or harmony" [p. 27], using philosopher to have argued that
the German word Fug. There have been many attempts to everything is composed of some indefinite
translate this notoriously obscure Presocratic fragment. Kirk substance, rather than a specific element
and Raven suggest "And the source of coming to be for (water, air, fire and so forth). This is
described as 'to apeiron' (the
existing things is that into which destruction too happens limitless or boundless). Anaximander
(according to necessity); for they pay penalty and retribution appears to have believed in multiple
to each other for their injustice according to the assessment universes, which come in and out of
1
of time." Derrida draws some conclusions regarding the existence.
jointed-ness of the present. [Quotation 13] Justice/jointure is
thus a gift, without debt, of something that is not possessed of the present. Derrida relates this to
the 'supplement'. [Quotation 14 and Quotation 15], to the work of deconstruction [Quotation 16],
and to the legacy of Marx [Quotation 17].

Selected Quotations

Quotation 8a [p. 6-7]" Another suggestion: This spectral someone other looks at us [concerns us], we feel ourselves
being looked at by it, outside of any synchrony, even before and beyond any look on our part, according to an
absolute anteriority (which may be on the order of generation, of more than one generation) and asymmetry,
according to an absolutely unmasterable disproportion. Here anach[r]ony makes the law. To feel ourselves seen by a
look which it will always be impossible to cross, that is the visor effect on the basis of which we inherit from the law.
Since we do not see the one who sees us, and who makes the law, who delivers the injunction (which is, moreover, a
contradictory injunction), since we do not see the one who orders “swear”, we cannot identify it in all certainty, we
must fall back on its voice. The one who says “I am thy Fathers Spirit” can only be taken at his word. An essentially
blind submission to his secret, to the secret of his origin: this is a first obedience to the injunction. It will condition all
the others.""Autre suggestion : ce quelqu'un d'autre spectral nous regarde, nous nous sentons regardés par lui, hors de toute synchronie, avant
même et au-delà de tout regard de notre part, selon une antériorité (qui peut être de l'ordre de la génération, de plus d'une génération) et une
dissymétrie absolues, selon une disproportion absolument immaîtrisable. L'anachronie fait ici la loi. Que nous nous sentions vus par un regard qu'il
sera toujours impossible de croiser, voilà l'effet de visière depuis lequel nous héritons de la loi. Comme nous ne voyons pas qui nous voit, et qui fait
la loi, qui délivre l'injonction, une injonction d'ailleurs contradictoire, comme nous ne voyons pas qui ordonne « jure » (swear), nous ne pouvons
pas l'identifier en toute certitude, nous sommes livrés à sa voix. Celui qui dit « Je suis le spectre de ton père » (« I am thy Fathers Spirit »), on ne
peut que le croire sur parole. Soumission essentiellement aveugle à son secret, au secret de son origine, voilà une première obéissance à
l'injonction. Elle conditionnera toutes les autres. "

Quotation 9 [p. 12] "the last one to whom a specter can appear, address itself, or pay attention is a spectator as such.
At the theater or at school... As theoreticians or witnesses, spectators, observers, and intellectuals, scholars believe
that looking is sufficient. Therefore, they are not always in the most competent position to do what is necessary:

1
The original Greek, as quoted by Simplicius, runs as follows:
speak to the specter." [le dernier à qui un spectre peut apparaître, adresser la parole ou prêter attention, c'est, en tant que tel, un spectateur.
Au théâtre ou à l'école. Il y a des raisons essentielles à cela. Théoriciens ou témoins, spectateurs, observateurs, savants et intellectuels, les scholars
croient qu'il suffit de regarder. Dès lors, ils ne sont pas toujours dans la position la plus compétente pour faire ce qu'il faut, parler au spectre : voilà
peut-être, entre tant d'autres, une leçon ineffaçable du marxisme.]

Quotation 12 " If right or law stems from vengeance, as Hamlet seems to complain that it does—before Nietzsche,
before Heidegger, before Benjamin—can one not yearn for a justice that one day, a day belonging no longer to
history, a quasi-messianic day, would finally be removed from the fatality of vengeance?" [p.25] "Si le droit tient à la
vengeance, comme semble s'en plaindre Hamlet - avant Nietzsche, avant Heidegger, avant Benjamin -, ne peut-on soupirer après une justice qui un
jour, un jour qui n'appartiendrait plus à l'histoire, un jour quasiment messianique, serait enfin soustraite à la fatalité de la vengeance?"

Quotation 13 "The present is what passes, the present comes to pass [se passe], it lingers in this transitory passage
(Weile), in the coming-and-going, between what goes and what comes, in the middle of what leaves and what arrives,
at the articulation between what absents itself and what presents itself. This in-between articulates conjointly the
double articulation (die Fuge) according to which the two movements are adjoined (gefügt). Presence (Anwesen) is
enjoined (verfugt), ordered, distributed in the two directions of absence, at the articulation of what is no longer and
what is not yet. To join and enjoin. This thinking of the jointure is also a thinking of injunction." [p.29] "Le présent
est ce qui passe, le présent se passe, il séjourne dans ce passage transitoire (Weile), dans le va-et-vient, entre ce qui va et ce qui vient, au milieu de
ce qui part et de ce qui arrive, à l'articulation entre ce qui s'absente et ce qui se présente. Cet entre-deux articule conjointement la double
articulation (die Fuge) selon laquelle ces deux mouvements sont ajointés (gefügt). La présence (Anwesen) est enjointe (verfugt), ordonnée,
disposée dans les deux directions de l'absence, à l'articulation de ce qui n'est plus et de ce qui n'est pas encore. Joindre et enjoindre. Cette pensée
de la jointure est aussi une pensée de l'injonction."

Quotation 14 "If one still translates Dikē with this word “justice,” and if, as Heidegger does, Dikē is thought on the
basis of Being as presence, then it would turn out that “justice” is first of all, and finally, and especially properly,
the jointure of the accord: the proper jointure to the other given by one who does not have it." [p.31] "Si de ce mot, «
justice », l'on traduit encore ainsi Dikè, et si, comme le fait Heidegger, on pense Dikè à partir de l'être comme présence, il se confirmerait que la «
justice » est avant tout, et finalement, et surtout proprement, l'ajointement de l'accord : l'ajointement propre à l'autre donné par qui ne l'a pas.
Injustice serait la disjointure ou le disjointement (citons encore : « Dikè, aus dem Sein als Anwesen gedacht, ist der fugend fügende Fug. Adikia, die
Un-Fuge, ist der Un-Fug ».

Quotation 15 " Beyond right, and still more beyond juridicism, beyond morality, and still more beyond moralism, does
not justice as relation to the other suppose on the contrary the irreducible excess of a disjointure or an anachrony,
some Un-Fuge, some “out of joint” dislocation in Being and in time itself, a disjointure that, in always risking the evil,
expropriation, and injustice (adikia) against which there is no calculable insurance, would alone be able to do justice
or to render justice to the other as other? A doing that would not amount only to action and a rendering that would
not come down just to restitution?" [p.32] ["Au-delà du droit, et plus encore du juridisme, au-delà de la
morale, et plus encore du moralisme, la justice comme rapport à l'autre ne suppose-t-elle pas au contraire l'irréductible excès d'une disjointure ou
d'une anachronie, quelque Un-Fuge, quelque dislocation « out of joint » dans l'être et dans le temps même, une disjointure qui, pour risquer
toujours le mal, l'expropriation et l'injustice (adikia) contre lesquels il n'est pas d'assurance calculable, pourrait seule faire justice ou rendre justice à
l'autre comme autre ? Un faire qui ne s'épuiserait pas dans l'action et un rendre qui ne reviendrait pas à restituer?"]

Quotation 16 "This is where deconstruction would always begin to take shape as the thinking of the gift and of
undeconstructible justice, the undeconstructible condition of any deconstruction, to be sure, but a condition that is
itself in deconstruction and remains, and must remain (that is the injunction) in the disjointure of the Un-Fug." [p.33]
["Ici s'annoncerait toujours la déconstruction comme pensée du don et de l'indéconstructible justice, la condition indéconstructible de toute
déconstruction, certes, mais une condition qui est elle-même en déconstruction et reste, et doitrester, c'est l'injonction, dans la disjointure de l' Un-
Fug."]

Question 17 "We believe that this messianic remains an ineffaceable mark—a mark one neither can nor should efface
—of Marx’s legacy, and doubtless of inheriting, of the experience of inheritance in general. Otherwise, one would
reduce the event-ness of the event, the singularity and the alterity of the other." [p.33] ["Ce messianique, nous croyons qu'il
reste une marque ineffaçable - qu'on ne peut ni ne doit effacer- de l'héritage de Marx, et sans doute de l'hériter, de l'expérience de l'héritage en
général. Faute de quoi on réduirait l'événementialité de l'événement, la singularité et l'altérité de l'autre."]

Extra Quotation
Jean Cocteau -- Le poète se souvient de l'avenir. [The poet remembers the future] – note the impossibility
of translating the play on 'venir'. 'The poet recollects what is to come' [?]
Bibliography

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Derrida, Jacques (1993) Spectres de Marx. L'État de la dette, le travail du deuil

Derrida, Jacques (1994) Specters of Marx. The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International.
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Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. Macmillan.

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Translated by David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi.
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Shakespeare, William (1982) Hamlet. Methuen.

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