Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts provide for the limitation on the court to initiate any
proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, it means court can’t initate
any proceedings of contempt, which is alleged to have been committed.

S. No. Case Title Relevant Paras

1. Amrik Singh 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ansari, submitted that there is
Lyallpuri v. material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Controller
Ravi Dutt inasmuch as he declined to make a reference to the High Court for initiation of
Sharma, contempt proceedings against the respondents under the Contempt of Courts
1991 SCC Act, 1971. According to him, the alleged offence admittedly was committed on
OnLine Del 16th o 73 August, 1987 and notice of contempt petition was ordered to be
36 issued to the alleged contemner on 16th February, 1988 and this amounts to
application of mind by the Rent Controller and initiation of contempt
proceedings within one year under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 as Section 20 refers to initiation of contempt proceedings by any court,
including the High Court. It is difficult to accept the submission of Mr. Ansari.
Having regard to the scheme and intention of the various provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 it is clear that Section 20 refers to the initiation
of contempt proceedings by the High Court and not by the Subordinate Court
of which contempt is alleged to have been committed Simply because the
subordinate court is moved by the aggrieved party and the subordinate court
holds inquiry for the purpose of making a reference to the High Court, it
cannot be said that the subordinate court has initiated proceedings for
contempt. The proceedings for contempt can be said to be initiated only after
the High Court decides to take action against the contemner and initiates the
proceedings by issuing notice to the contemner to show cause why action
under the Contempt of Courts Act should not be taken against him. The
proceedings will be deemed to be initiated only when the High Court passes an
order calling upon the contemner to show cause and not till then. Since in the
present case, at the time when the matter came up for consideration before the
Additional Rent Controller the period of one year had already expired from the
date when the alleged contempt was committed, obviously the Additional Rent
Controller had no jurisdiction to make a reference to the High Court and was
justified in observing that it would be fruitless to make any further enquiry on
the contempt application as period of one year from the date of the alleged
contempt had already expired.

4. It was next contended by counsel for the petitioner that the contempt
petition was instituted on 11th February, 1988, i.e., well within one year from
the date of commission of the alleged contempt and the contempt proceedings,
therefore, can be very well initiated under Section 20 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 against the respondents. I am unable to accept this contention

Page | 1
 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well.

5. At the cost of repetition it may be re-stated that the alleged contempt

admittedly was committed on 16.8.1987 and on 2.9.1989 when the matter was
considered by the Additional Rent Controller whether or not reference should
be made to the High Court for initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 the period of one year had already expired long back from
the date of commission of the alleged contempt. The institution of proceedings
and initiation of proceedings are entirely on different tooting. It is only after
the institution of the proceedings when the High Court applies its mind and
passes some order within a period of one year from the date of the commission
of the alleged contempt, the proceedings can be considered to have been
initiated and not otherwise. In Kishan Singh v. Honourable Mr. T. Anjalah,
Chief Minister (1985 Crl. L.J. 1428) the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court has 073 observed:

“…that the word ‘initiation’ of contempt proceedings as stated in S. 20 of the

Contempt of Courts Act 1971 has a definite connotation and cannot be equated
with the mere presentation of the petitioner. It was observed:
‘initiation of the contempt proceeding is the time when the Court applies its
mind to the allegations in the petition and decides to direct, under S. 17 the
alleged contemner to show cause why he should not be punished.’

6. In the present case, the matter has not even been referred to the High Court
and the Subordinate Court was holding an enquiry into the matter whether or
not reference should be made. In this process, period of one year had already
expired from the date on which the contempt was alleged to have been
committed and as such no reference could have been made by the Addl, Rent
Controller to the High Court. As such the reference would be barred by time
under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

2. Indra Chand 1. In the above captioned contempt petitions, violation of orders of 5th July,
Jain v. 1982 and 4th April, 1983 passed in RFA No. 188/1982 is alleged. Vide
Jaideep aforesaid orders of 5th July, 1982 and 4th April, 1983 in RFA No. 188/1982
Gupta, 2019 appellant-Sudhir Kumar Gupta, was restrained from alienating suit property
SCC OnLine and vide orders of 4th April, 1983 it was ordered that status quo in respect of
Del 9731 suit property be maintained by the parties. According to petitioner,
respondent/contemnor in violation of the aforesaid orders of 5th July, 1982 and
4th April, 1983 have alienated 1/12th share each of the suit property in favour
of one Ms. Simmi Berry vide two sale deeds of 29th July, 1994.

Page | 2
 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

2. The aforesaid is the contempt alleged against respondent/Jaideep Gupta in

the above captioned first petition, whereas in the above captioned second
petition, the contempt alleged against Pushpa Gupta, Sandeep Gupta, Jaideep
Gupta and Anupama Jagdi is of violating the aforesaid orders by executing
four release deeds for consideration in October, 2004 in favour of respondent
no. 5/Sh. Ramnik Gupta, brother of S.K. Gupta.

3. The stand taken by the respondents/contemnors in the reply to this contempt

petition is that they had come to know about the status quo order only on 24th
August, 2004 and they had no knowledge of the execution of the release deed
in pursuance to the decree passed by the trial court. In the reply, it is also stated
by the respondent nos. 1 to 4 that the release deeds have been executed by
them under duress and misrepresentation and that respondent nos. 1 to 4 had
no money to sustain themselves at the time of execution of the release deeds
and so they had received Rs. 20,000/- only, whereas in the release deeds
amount mentioned is Rs. 1,50,000/- each.

8. The submissions advanced by both the sides in these petitions and the
applications have been duly considered and on perusal of the record, this Court
finds that contempt proceedings ought not to be initiated unless a degree of
default or misconduct is quite evident. The contemnous act alleged done with a
“bad purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately or
perversely” needs to be punished in contempt proceedings. The wilful act has
to be distinguished from an act done thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.
A deliberate conduct of a person means that he knows what he is doing and
intends to do the same. Thus, there has to be a calculative violation with evil
motive, for initiating contempt proceedings. Even if there is disobedience of an
order but such disobedience is result of some compelling circumstances, then
the contemnor cannot be punished.

9. The pertinent observations of Supreme Court in ‘Ram Kishan v. Tarun

Bajaj’ (2014) 16 SCC 204 which are as under:—

“It is well-settled principle of law that if two interpretations are possible, and
if the action is not contumacious, a contempt proceeding would not be
maintainable. The effect and purport of the order is to be taken into
consideration and the same must be read in its entirety. Therefore, the element
of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within

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 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

the meaning of the Act”.

10. In the light of afore-referred legal position, the alleged contempt has been
examined and thereupon it becomes evident that the respondent/contemnors
had learnt about the status-quo order in August, 2004 and prior thereto, they
had no knowledge about status-quo orders passed by this Court on 5 th July,
1982 and 4th April, 1983. This aspect assumes importance in the light of the
fact that the original contemnor-S.K. Gupta had died in October, 1986 and
there is nothing on record to show that he was aware about the passing of the
aforesaid interim orders in the appeal.
11. Considering the fact that the legal heirs of original contemnor were ill
advised that execution of lease deeds would not violate the interim orders, I
find that the legal heirs of original contemnors had bona fidely executed the
release deeds in favour of Ramnik Gupta, who was not a party to the civil suit
nor was a party in the appeal. Since aforesaid Ramnik Gupta, cannot be hauled
up for contempt, therefore, the title of applicant-Evershine Pvt. Ltd. who had
purchased the subject property from aforesaid Ramnik Gupta, cannot be put
under cloud. It has come on record that due to financial stringencies the
alleged contemnors had executed the release deeds and since it was done under
compelling circumstances, therefore, the alleged contemnors cannot be
punished for disobeying the interim orders passed in the appeal, as this Court
finds that their conduct was neither wilful nor intentional or perverse.
12. Consequently, this Court is not inclined to proceed against the alleged
contemnors for violation of the interim orders passed in the appeal.
13. The contempt petitions and the applications are accordingly disposed of.
3. Santosh 4. Briefly stated the material facts are that M/s Apex Computers Pvt. Ltd.
Kapoor v. filed a suit against M/s Welcome Enterprises for recovery of Rs. 1,61,977/-
Apex along with pendent lite interest and future interest at the rate of 21% per
Computers annum. Since despite service defendant did not enter appearance, defendant
(P) Ltd., was proceeded ex parte and the suit was decreed for a sum of Rs. 1,61,977/-
2009 SCC together with interest thereon at the rate of 15 % per annum from the date of
OnLine Del filing of the suit till realization. It is pertinent to mention that admittedly Mr.
129 Rajiv Kapoor is the sole proprietor of M/s. Welcome Enterprises and that the
suit for recovery was based on dishonoured cheques.

5. In proceedings filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881, Mr. Rajiv Kapoor on 7th December, 2002 undertook to pay Rs.
1,50,000/- by 3rd February, 2003 to M/s Apex Computers Pvt. Ltd. On such an
undertaking being given by Mr. Rajiv Kapoor, M/s Apex Computers Pvt. Ltd.
undertook not to execute the civil decree against him.

6. As Mr. Rajiv Kapoor failed to make payment by 3rd February, 2003, the

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 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Additional Sessions Judge (in short ‘ASJ’) forfeited his bail bond and issued
non-bailable warrants against him.

7. On Mr. Rajiv Kapoor furnishing a pay order of Rs. 30,000/-, the ASJ on
24th February, 2003 gave time to Mr. Rajiv Kapoor till 30th September, 2003
to settle the dispute with M/s Apex Computers Pvt. Ltd. in accordance with the
order dated 7th December, 2002. In the said order Mr. Rajiv Kapoor undertook
to pay interest at the rate of 8% on the outstanding amount of Rs. 1,20,000/-
from the said date.

8. This Court on 26th September, 2003 by an ex parte order allowed a

Criminal Misc. (M) Petition filed by Mr. Rajiv Kapoor and set aside the order
dated 3rd February, 2003 as well as the subsequent orders passed by the ASJ
for procuring the presence of accused Mr. Rajiv Kapoor.

9. However, in execution proceedings filed by M/s Apex Computers Pvt. Ltd.,

Mr. Rajiv Kapoor on 20th August, 2004 agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,70,000/-
in full and final settlement of the decree. Mr. Rajiv Kapoor further agreed
before the Civil Judge to give post-dated cheques totaling to Rs. 1,70,000/- on
the next date of hearing. On such a statement being made by Mr. Rajiv Kapoor,
M/s Apex Computers Pvt, Ltd. undertook not to press the criminal proceedings
filed by them against Mr. Rajiv Kapoor.

10. In accordance with the aforesaid undertaking, Mr. Rajiv Kapoor furnished
twelve post-dated cheques amounting to Rs. 1,70,000/-. In fact, on 3rd
September, 2004, Mr. Rajiv Kapoor undertook oil solemn oath before the Civil
Judge that all the twelve post-dated cheques given by him would be honoured
on the respective dates of their encashment and “that in case any of the
cheques given by me (Rajiv Kapoor) today in court gets dishonoured, I (Rajiv
Kapoor) shall be liable to make payment of entire decreetal amount along with
interest.”

11. Mr. Rajiv Kapoor vide his letter dated 29th September, 2004 requested M/s
Apex Computers Pvt. Ltd. to deposit the first post-dated cheque on 15th
October, 2004 instead of 30th September, 2004 on the ground that he had to
bear some unforeseen expense on account of his mother's ailment. M/s Apex
Computers Pvt. Ltd. accepted the request of Mr. Rajiv Kapoor and delayed the
deposit of the cheques.

12. But when the cheques were presented on 15th October, 2004, they were

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 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

dishonoured by the Bank on the ground of insufficient funds. Upon dishonour

of the first two cheques, M/s Apex Computers Pvt. Ltd. once again revived the
execution proceedings and on 6th May, 2005, the Executing Court issued
warrants of attachment against the immovable property of Mr. Rajiv Kapoor.

13. On 5th July, 2005, Mr. Rajiv Kapoor's mother Smt. Santosh Kapoor filed
an objection application on the ground that Mr. Rajiv Kapoor had left her
house and she had disowned her son vide public notice dated 2nd July, 2005.
In the said application, it was prayed that the Executing Court should not issue
any warrants in respect of the premises being DDA flat which belonged to her.
However, the Executing Court vide its order dated 11th December, 2006
dismissed Smt. Santosh Kapoor's application on the ground that she had
nowhere stated that Mr. Rajiv Kapoor did not have any right, title or interest in
the immovable property at Shalimar Bagh. The Executing Court further held
that Smt. Santosh Kapoor had not filed any title deed showing her title in the
property despite the fact that M/s Apex Computers Pvt. Ltd. had taken the
stand that Mr. Rajiv Kapoor was the absolute owner of the DDA flat as the
said property stood in the name of his father.

4. V.L.S. 10. One incidental issue we may mention with regard to limitation for filing of
Finance Ltd. proceedings for initiating action for contempt. The period of limitation for
v. High Court initiating proceedings for contempt is a period of one year as per Section 20 of
of Delhi, the Act. An issue arose as to what happens if the consent is declined and
2010 SCC considerable time is spent till a writ petition is filed for
OnLine Del quashing the decision of the Law Officer and only whereafter a petition can be
2084 filed for initiating action for contempt, and by which time it is definitely
possible that the period of one year for initiating contempt under Section 20
may have expired. Once again this issue has been pronounced upon by the
Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC
549 and in which the Supreme Court has clearly held that once any
proceedings are initiated for contempt, which would include presenting of a
petition to the Law Officer seeking permission, the period of limitation would
stop running. The observations in paras 39 to 41 of the said judgment are
relevant and which reproduced herein below.
“39. In the case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High
Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate
court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or the Law Officer
of the Central Government in the case of a Union Territory. This
reference or motion can conceivably commence on an application
being filed by a person whereupon the subordinate court or the
Advocate-General if it is so satisfied may refer the matter to the High
Court. Proceedings for civil contempt normally commence with a
person aggrieved bringing to the notice of the court the wilful
disobedience of any judgment, decree, order etc. which could amount

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 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

to the commission of the offence. The attention of the court is drawn to

such a contempt being committed only by a person filing an application
in that behalf. In other words, unless a court was to take a suo motu
action, the proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would
normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the
attention of the court to the contempt having been committed. When
the judicial procedure requires an application being filed either before
the court or consent being sought by a person from the Advocate-
General or a Law Officer, it must logically follow that proceedings for
contempt are initiated when the applications are made.
40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for taking
cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating
the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action taken thereon
of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only
steps following or succeeding such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a
civil contempt, filing of an application drawing the attention of the
court is necessary for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.
41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a
litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this
background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of
the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to
the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the
inaction on the part of the court, a contemner cannot be made to suffer.
Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal
would mean that the court would be rendered powerless to punish even
though it maybe fully convinced of the blatant nature of the contempt
having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice
of the court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the
period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be
construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and
hardship both as regards the litigants as also by placing a pointless
fetter on the part of the court to punish for its contempt. An
interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant,
which would render the constitutional power of the courts nugatory in
taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt,
successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the
contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in
conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation
must therefore be avoided.”
11. We therefore, dismiss the petition and hold that once consent of the Law
Officer is refused as required under Section 15 of the Act, then, it is necessary
that an independent petition be filed for setting aside the decision of the Law
Officer and it is not permissible to file a contempt petition straight away
including seeking therein the relief of quashing of the administrative order

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 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

declining taking of action for initiating criminal contempt proceedings and

seek its listing on the judicial side for hearing. The procedure adopted by the
respondent is correct that such petition can only be treated as an information to
the court which is to be dealt with by the Chief Justice on the administrative
side or to any Judge who is required to give the necessary opinion which is
acted upon by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice.
12. The petition is therefore dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own
costs.
5. Mohinder Smt. Iqbal Kaur, landlady, filed a petition for eviction of the appellant wherein
Singh v. an order of eviction was passed by the Controller on 7th November, 1973.
Iqbal Sing, Mohinder Singh, tenant, filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal and
1981 SCC on 18th April, 1975 he made a statement withdrawing his appeal and sought
OnLine Del time to vacate the premises up to 30th April, 1977. He also undertook to hand
122 over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in dispute to the
respondents on or before 1st May, 1977. The landlady alleges that the tenant
did not deliver possession according to his undertaking. She therefore made an
application on 15th March, 1979 before the Rent Control Tribunal to take
proceedings against the tenant under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The
Tribunal served the tenant by publication and referred the matter to this Court
vide order dated 25th September. 1979. The tenant-contemner filed his reply.
His contention is that the contempt proceedings initiated by the landlady are
barred by time under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. His
second contention is that he vacated and surrendered the possession of the
premises in question on 30th September, 1976 and that he has not been in
occupation of the same since then.
After hearing the parties, I find that the main question for decision is whether
the contempt proceedings are within time within the meaning of Section 20 of
the Contempt of Courts Act. This section reads as under:
“Section 20 : No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its
own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date
of which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”
A bare reading of the section shows that it operates as an absolute bar to
initiation of contempt proceedings whether suo motu or at the instance of
complaint after expirty of one year. It also appears that the starting point of the
limitation is the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. In
the instant case the tenant had undertaken to vacate the premises up to 30th
April, 1977. Thus he is deemed to have committed contempt on 1st May, 1977,
up to which date he failed to fulfil his undertaking by delivery of possession to
the landlady. The application admittedly
was filed by the landlady for taking proceedings under the Contempt of Courts
Act for the alleged violation of his undertaking on 15th March, 1979. The
application having been filed after the expiry of one year from the date of the
alleged contempt must therefore be held to be barred by time within the
meaning of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Learned counsel

Page | 8
 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

for the landlady submits that under Section 22 of the Act the provisions of the
said Act are in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other
law relating to the contempt of courts. He submits that under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India there is no limitation for taking proceedings for
contempt. That Article, it appears,, applies to the contempt of the High Court
itself. In the instant case before me the alleged contempt is of the Rent Control
Tribunal before whom the tenant gave the undertaking. Moreover it seems to
me that Section 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act does not control Section 20
of the said Act. In Dr. P.L Jauhar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 Rajasthan
61, N. Venkataramanappa v. D.K. Naikar, AIR 1978 Karnataka 57
and Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel,
Ahmedabad, AIR 1980 Gujarat 194, it has been held that Section 20 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is a complete bar for initiating contempt
proceedings after the expirty of one year.
I, therefore, hold that the present proceedings initiated by the landlady on 15th
March 1979 are barred under Section 20 of the said Act. In view of this
preliminary objection, I do not deem fit and proper to express any view on the
merits of the case. Notice is discharged. No order as to costs.

6. Bacchu 4. It is the petitioner's submission that, despite passage of more than three
Singh v. years and nine months, the respondents have not examined the issue, in
Santosh relation to the re-commencement of similar businesses.
Kumar, 2018
5. It is an admitted position that, the present petition has been instituted, after a
SCC OnLine
passage of over three years and nine months, from the date on which, the W.P.
Del 12035
(C) No. 192/2015, was disposed of, vide the said order dated 9th January, 2015.
11. In this behalf, it is trite to state that, there can be no negative equality. In
the event, the petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of proving his claim
to be just and legal, the judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the
illegalities. Therefore, neither is there any violation of this Court's order dated
9th January, 2015, on the part of the respondents nor can the same be
characterized as wilful or deliberate. Resultantly, the present contempt petition
is dehors any merit.
12. Even otherwise, the present petition is barred by limitation, in view of the
mandate of the provisions of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
13. The petition is, therefore, devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.
7. Rajni Rani Admit. On 18th May, 1994 in an appeal filed by the petitioner, this Court
Gupta v. passed an order of injunction restraining the defendants/respondents 1 & 2
Babu Ram, from selling, transferring or parting with possession of the properties in
2001 SCC question or from creating any encumbrance thereof. By an agreement dated
OnLine Del 16th April, 1992 respondents 1 and 2 agreed to sell the said properties to
77 respondent No. 3 for a sale consideration of Rs. 20 lacs. Since the sale deed
was not being executed by respondents 1 & 2 in favour of respondent No. 3,
the said respondent filed a suit being S. No. 1018/95 for specific performance
Page | 9
 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

of the agreement to sell dated 16th April, 1992. In this suit statement was made
by the respondents on 14th May, 1996 that balance sale consideration of Rs.
15,50,000/- has been paid by respondent No. 3 to respondents 1 and 2 on 15th
February, 1996 and the sale deed has also been executed and registered before
the Sub-Registrar. The petitioner on coming to know of the fact that the
respondents 1 and 2 had sold the property in favour of respondent No. 3 in
1996, filed the present petition under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of
Court Act for initiating contempt against the respondents for their having
allegedly violated the orders of this Court dated 18th May, 1994. On the
petition being filed, the Court on 14th February, 1997 issued notice to the
respondents to show cause as to why the contempt proceedings be not initiated
against them. The petition is continuing till date and no final orders have been
passed on that except that on 24th May, 1999 the Court directed respondent
No. 3 to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,000/- per month in Court as charges for use and
occupation of the premises without prejudice to the rights and contentions of
the parties.
Under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, no Court shall initiate any
proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the
expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged
to have been committed. In the present case, according to the petitioner, the
contempt was allegedly committed in early 1994 when the property was sold
by respondents 1 & 2 to respondent No. 3. The Supreme Court in a recent
judgment in Om Parkash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal, (2000) 3 SCC 171 has held
that proceedings in accordance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Act can
be said to have O been initiated only when the Court forms an opinion by an
application of mind that & prima facie case of initiation of proceedings is
made out and accordingly issues notice to the alleged contemner to show cause
why he be not punished for contempt. It was further held by the Court that
mere issuance of notice calling upon the alleged contemner to show cause why
contempt proceedings be not initiated would not amount to initiation of
proceedings for contempt for the purpose of Section 20. Since in the present
case only a notice calling upon the alleged contemner to show cause why
contempt proceedings be not initiated has been issued, this case is fully
covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court. A period of more than one
year has already passed from the date of alleged commission of contempt and
this petition in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court is clearly barred by
Section 20 of the Act and the same is accordingly dismissed.

8. Maya Ram 12. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent has wilfully disobeyed
Semwal v. the directions of this Court passed in writ petition bearing no. W.P (C)
Hotel Corpn. 4363/2007, wherein, vide order dated 6th May, 2008 where the respondent was
of India, directed to pay the arrears of salary every month till the disposal of the above
2024 SCC stated writ petition, and therefore the contempt proceedings may be initiated
OnLine Del against them.
2924
13. In rival submissions, the respondent refuted the contentions advanced by
the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner has not made out any grounds
to show the wilful disobedience on part of the respondent.

14. This Court has perused the records including the order dated 6 th May, 2008

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 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

as well as the reminder dated 26th February, 2019 sent by the petitioner.

15. As per Section 20 of the Act, limitation period to initiate proceedings for
contempt of Courts is one year and a Court cannot initiate the proceedings for
the contempt of Court after the lapse of one year when the cause of action
arose. The relevant portion of the said provision is as under:
“20. Limitation for actions for contempt.—No court shall initiate any
proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the
expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged
to have been committed.”

16. With regard to the issue of limitation, this Court is of the view that the
provisions of Section 20 of the Act places a bar on initiation of any proceeding
of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period
of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed, i.e., the alleged cause of action. Similar observations have been
made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7
SCC 549, relevant paragraphs of which are as under:
“..19. In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram [1989 Supp (2) SCC 418 :
1989 Supp (1) SCR 223] where an order of this Court ordering delivering of
premises had not been complied with, an application was filed for initiation of
contempt proceedings. A contention was raised on behalf of the alleged
contemner based on Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Dealing
with this contention, this Court observed as follows : (SCC p. 423, para 7)
“7. Another point was taken about limitation of this application under Section
20 of the Act. Section 20 states that no court shall initiate any proceedings for
contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of
one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 3-11-
1988 as appears from the affidavit in support of the application. The contempt
consisted, inter alia, of the act of not giving the possession by force of the
order of the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Narnaul dated 12-2-1988. Therefore,
the application was well within the period of one year. Failure to give
possession, if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature is a
continuing wrong. There was no scope for application of Section 20 of the
Act.”..”

17. Upon perusal of the above judgment, it is observed that the Court should
not deal with a petition for contempt after expiry of one year from the date the
contempt is alleged to have been committed. In view of Section 20 of the Act,
the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance beyond one year of the act or
omission committing or constituting contempt of the Court.

9. Sandeep In the light of what has been observed aforementioned, it will be seen that
Chandra v. there is no limit to the exercise of power of the Court of Record to punish for
Vice-Admiral its contempt, either suo motu or on a reference from subordinate Court or on
Subhash C. the application of a party. The question of limitation was left open in the case.
Chopra
(Rtd.), 1998 The only limit on the period within which the proceedings for contempt may
SCC OnLine be initiated, is provided in Section 20 of the Act. The proceedings can be

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 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Del 593 initiated only when the Court applies its mind. In Baradkanta Mishra's case
(supra), the Apex Court held that it is only when the Court initiates a
proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. This
exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation
of proceedings and not before. The terminous-a-quo for the period of
limitation is the date of initiation of proceedings for contempt by the Court. As
such, in the case of a party, when it brings the contemptuous conduct of the
contemner to the notice of the Court, mind can be said to have been applied by
the Court only on the date when it decides to take action and issues any notice
to the contemner that why action be not taken or proceedings be not initiated
for contempt and not merely on the date of institution of the proceedings. The
power to punish under the Constitution being in addition to and not in
derogation of the inherent powers, there can not be any bar on such power, but
the period of limitation having specifically been incorporated in the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971, in so far as the High Court is concerned, when it may
assume jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the same will have to be adhered
to. Bar of limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act will apply
in the case when show cause notice is issued under the Contempt of Courts Act
for initiation of proceedings for contempt.

In the instant case, the Court had not decided within a period of one year to
initiate any proceedings. Because of this, we are of the view that the petition
on that ground is liable to be dismissed. Otherwise also we do not consider it
to be a fit case for initiating any proceedings, in exercise of our powers under
Article 215 of the Constitution. The petition is accordingly dismissed with no
order as to costs.
10. Ajay Kumar 24. Therefore, it is an established fact that the disobedience as required for
Bhagat v. initiation of contempt proceedings should be wilful disobedience. Before
B.L. analyzing the instant case on the said parameter, it is pertinent to look whether
Sherwal, the contempt proceedings are barred by limitation or not. Section 20 of
2023 SCC the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for limitation on initiation of
OnLine Del proceedings in following manner:
4636
“20. Limitation for actions for contempt.—No court shall initiate any
proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the
expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged
to have been committed.”

25. The said provision has been analyzed by Allahabad High Court
in Islamuddin v. Umesh Chandrara Tiwari, 2009 SCC OnLine All 690 and it
was held that the Court should not deal with the petition after expiry of one
year from the date the contempt is alleged to have been committed. The
relevant part of the judgment is reproduced herein:

“66. There is another reason for taking the above view. Section 29(2) of Act,
1963 provides that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as
and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or
local law. From the very reading of Section 20 of Act, 1971, we are of the view
that it expressly excludes the power of the Court to condone delay in giving to
itself jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for contempt after expiry of one year

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 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

from the date the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Applicability of
Section 5 of Act, 1963 to the bar contained in section 20 of Act, 1971 would
make the mandate contained therein illusory for all purposes. Where the
language of the statute is clear, it is not for the Court to interpret the provision
of statute in a manner which would completely destroy the express provision of
the statute. Reading Section 20 of Act, 1971 in consonance with Section 29(2)
and 17 of Act, 1963, it can be said that it excludes the period taken beyond one
year by a person in moving application, due to lack of information on account
of the fraud played by the alleged contemnor and the benefit of Section 17 may
be stretched to what extent as there is nothing contrary in Section 20 to
exclude section 17 from its application but it does not mean that Section 5 can
also be placed on the same pedestal since the purpose and object of Section 5
is totally different.”

26. In the case of Yogesh P. Sukhanandi v. State of Gujarat, 1995 SCC OnLine
Guj 251, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court dismissed the petition on
grounds of limitation and held as follows:

“6. Another aspect of the matter on which the applications are liable to be
dismissed is that this Court while passing the order on 21-11-1991 has
directed the authority to decide the application preferably on or before
December 31, 1991. Both these applications are filed in the year 1993.
Application No. 200/93 is filed on 20-12-1993 and rule came to be issued on
21-3-1994. Misc. C.A. No. 914/93 was filed on 18-1-1993 and rule came to be
issued on 21-3-1994. In views of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971, the court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance beyond one year of the
act or omission committing or constituting contempt of the court. In view of
these facts, both these applications are filed beyond the stipulated time. Hence
this Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same.”

27. In the instant case, the petitioners have placed on record the directions
given by this Court in the interim order dated 30 th November 2018. In the said
order, the Court had provided relief to the petitioners and the other terminated
employees by directing the respondent No. 5 to not disturb their services.

28. Aggrieved by the non-compliance, some of the terminated employees had

filed contempt which was allowed reinstating those employees who had
approached this Court.

29. The petitioners in the instant case chose not to file the contempt petition
within time limitation, rather filed a representation before the respondent,
which was dismissed on the ground of alleged non-conformity with the
procedural requirement of submitting the documents.
30. Despite not getting relief from the respondents, the petitioners chose to
approach the Labour Commissioner and not this Court and ultimately
withdrew the petition from there as well.

31. After waiting for three years, the petitioners chose to file the present
contempt petition. One major difference between both the petitions is that the

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 Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

earlier contempt petition filed by the other employees was well within the
limitation time as prescribed under Section 20 of the Act i.e. one year.
Whereas, the present petition has been filed after a delay of more than three
years.

32. One of the underlying principles behind insertion of limitation is to make

the petitioners/aggrieved persons vigil about their rights so that they can act
diligently and not sleep over their rights. In the instant case, the other
aggrieved employees approached this Court immediately after non-compliance
with the interim order, but the petitioners chose not to do so rather they kept on
meddling between the respondent and the other authorities. Therefore, the
petitioners in the instant case can be only termed as parties who did not
exercise their right within the time as provided under Section 20.

33. In view of the above discussion, it is clearly established that the situation
of the petitioners cannot be termed as an exceptional situation and is certainly
barred by limitation of one year as provided under the Act.

34. Hence, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of

limitation as barred by Section 20 of the Act.

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