Landmark Cases

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LANDMARK CASES

1. Bijoe Emmanuel v/s State of Kerala: The Appellants, Bijoe, Binu Mol and
Bindu Emmanuel are faithful of jehovah’s witness. In the school, they
refused to sing National Anthem in the morning assembly as they
honestly believe that their religion does not permit them to join any
rituals except it be in their prayers to God ‘Jehovah’. However they they
always stood up in respectful silence in the school assembly. They got
expelled from school as a result of this act.
The Supreme Court took a liberal approach and observed that not joining
the singing of the National Anthem neither prevents the singing of the
National Anthem nor causes any disturbance to any assembly engagaed
in such singing so as to contribute an offence under section 3 of the
Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act. The court concluded that
that it is evident that Jeovah’s Witnesses whenever they are, do hold
religious beliefs that may appear strange or even bizarre to us, but the
sincerity of their belief is beyond question. The Court very greatly
observed that Appellants were not engaged in any alleged religious
ceremonies which may be injurious to the moral tone of the school and
mere refraining from joining the singing do not injure the moral tone.
Therefore, the belief or practice of the Appellants was protected under
Article 25 (1) of the Constitution of India.

2. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal: DK Basu was the Executive Chairman
of Legal Aid Services, West Bengal, a non-political organization. He
addressed a letter to the Supreme Court of India drawing the courts
attention to a piece of news published in various newspapers about
deaths in police custody and lockups.
In the letter, it was mentioned that such crimes of custodial violence always
went unpunished despite the efforts made and urged the courts to look into
the matter so that the family members of the victims are given some form of
compensation. He requested that the letter be treated as a Writ Petition within
the “Public Interest Litigation” category.
The Supreme Court referred to the case of Neelabati Bahera v. State of Orissa
AIR 1993 SC 1960 and reiterated that prisoners and detainees should not be
deprived of their Fundamental Rights under Article 21 and only the restriction
permitted by law could be imposed on the enjoyment of their Fundamental
Rights. The apex court further laid down the following guidelines and said that
arrest and detention will be subject to the guidelines. The violation of these
guidelines would attract not only the departmental action but also the
contempt of court proceedings in a High court having the jurisdication over the
matter.
3. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India: Prior to this case decision, Article 21
guaranteed the Right to Life and Personel Liberty only against the
arbitrary action of the executive and not the legislature. This case turned
up pages and extended the protection against legislative actions.

The petitioner Maneka Gandhi's passport was issued on 1st June 1976 as
per the Passport Act of 1967. On 2nd July 1977, the Regional Passport
Office (New Delhi) ordered her to surrender her passport. The petitioner
was also not given any reason for this arbitrary and unilateral decision of
the External Affairs Ministry, citing public interest. The petitioner
approached the Supreme Court by invoking its writ jurisdiction and
contending that the State's act of impounding her passport was a direct
assault on her Right of Personal Liberty as guaranteed by Article 21. It is
pertinent to mention that the Supreme Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney
v. Ramarathnam[2] held that right to travel abroad is well within the
ambit of Article 21, although the extent to which the Passport Act
diluted this particular right was unclear. The authorities, however,
answered that the reasons are not to be specified in the "interest of the
general public". In response, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Art
32 for violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19
and 21 of the Constitution alleging that Section 10(3)(c) of the Act was
ultra vires the constitution.

The court said that section 10(3)(c) of passport act,1967 is void because
it violates Article 14 of Indian Constitution because it confers vague and
undefined power to the passport authority. It is violative of Article 14
since it doesn’t provide for an opportunity for the aggrieved party to be
heard. It was also held violative of Article 21 since it does not affirm to
the word procedure.

The Central Government never did disclose any reasons for impounding
the petitioner's passport rather she was told that the act was done in the
interests of the general public whereas it was found out that her
presence was felt required by the respondents for the proceedings
before a commission of inquiry. The reason was given explicit that it was
not really necessarily done in the public interests and no ordinary person
would understand the reasons for not disclosing this information or the
grounds of her passport confiscation.

The fundamental rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution are not
distinctive nor mutually exclusive." Any law depriving a person of his
personal liberty has to stand a test of one or more of the fundamental
rights conferred under Article 19. When referring to Article 14, ex-
hypothesi must be tested. The concept of reasonableness must be
projected in the procedure. The phrase used in Article 21 is "procedure
established by law" instead of due process of law which is said to have
procedures that are free from arbitrariness and irrationality. There is a
clear infringement of the basic ingredient of principles of natural justice
i.e., audi alteram partem and hence, it cannot be condemned as unfair
and unjust even when a statute is silent on it.

A.K Gopalan was overruled stating that there is a unique relationship


between the provisions of Article 14, 19 & 21 and every law must pass
the tests of the said provisions. Earlier in Gopalan, the majority held that
these provisions in itself are mutually exclusive. Therefore, to correct its
earlier mistake the court held that these provisions are not mutually
exclusive and are dependent on each other.

4. Mithu v. State of Punjab: In the landmark case of Mithu v State of


Punjab[1] (hereafter, Mithu), the 5-judge bench of the Supreme Court of
India struck down Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as being
unconstitutional. In this case, the petitioner challenged Section 303
which 'provides for punishment of mandatory death penalty to the
person who commits murder while undergoing life imprisonment'.[2] It
was held that Section 303 violates equality guaranteed under Article 14
and rights conferred under Article 21. The case involved challenges to
Section 303 which is applicable not only to murder convicts charged for
life imprisonment under Section 302[3] but also to convicts under 50
other offences that have life imprisonment as a form of punishment.
Section 303 was uniformly applicable to all the 51 offences under IPC
which also includes offences like sedition[4] and forgery[5]. The convicts
under these offences were subjected to the mandatory death penalty in
case they commit a murder while undergoing imprisonment for life.

The court used the 'reasonable classification test' to check whether


section 303 is in consonance with Article 14. The questions it delves into
were: Whether there is an intelligible basis to differentiate between life
convicts and non-life convicts who commit murder? Whether this
differentiation warrant making the death penalty mandatory in the first
case and optional in the latter? Is there any rational nexus between such
classification and the object of law?
The Court talks about how Section 303 takes away judicial discretion
which is an important part of the Indian criminal system. Further, it
denies a person charged under Section 303 IPC the benefit under Section
235(2) to get heard on the question of sentence and Section 354(3)
which imposes an obligation on the court to state a special reason for
giving the death penality. The Court found the deprivation of these
rights and safeguards to be unjust and arbirary.
In Mithu, the Court acknowledges this proposition and states that
the gravity of an offence cannot be determined without looking at the
circumstances in which it was committed. The Court states that it found
no reason for making the death penalty mandatory for a life convict
committing murder and optional for a non-life convict.
5. Mohd. Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano Begum: In the case of Mohd. Ahmad
Khan V/S Shah Bano Begum, the Supreme Court specifically underlined
the that Triple Talaq cannot take away the maintenance right of a
divorced Muslim women who is not in a condition to maintain herself or
her children when she is disowned or divorced by her husband. The
period when the verdict of Shah Bano Case was delivered by the
Supreme Court it faced a lot of criticism. At that point of time Muslim
women weather married or unmarried were not given freedom even
they were debarred from there basic freedom, which is against humanity
and it basically violates the basic or fundamental rights of humans.
Muslim women were backward in there status as compared to other
women of the world. They were not educated and self-reliant as
compared to other women. They faced serious issues and problems
which led to the decrease in their level of self-confidence and their
knowledge in various sects. Along with these things they were not
allowed to study or educate themselves and they were also denied to
work either. Since they faced all these things from their very childhood it
was very natural that they in their difficult time cannot earn their living
and can maintain themselves so for them alimony or maintenance was
much needed.
6. Shayara Bano and others v. Union of India: Shayara Bano case led to the
ban of the Muslim practice of Triple Talaq. It is a process of divorce under
the "Sharia Law", where a Muslim man can instantly divorce his wife by
pronouncing the word "TALAQ" three times, without any state
intervention. The means of communication might be in any form i.e.
written, oral, or maybe electronic, which further enhanced a Muslim
woman's vulnerability during this sort of unilateral and arbitrary divorce.
For 15 years, Shayara Bano had been married to Rizwan Ahmed. In 2016,
through oral triple talaq (talaq -e biddat), Rizwan divorced her. A Writ
Petition was then filed by her in the Apex Court saying, "As a violation of
Articles 14,15,21 and 25 of the constitution, performance of the
practices of - talaq-e-biddat, polygamy, nikah-halala - should be held
unconstitutional."
The Supreme Court laid down its judgment on August 22, 2017 in a 3:2
majority, holding the practice of Triple Talaq unconstitutional. The 5-
judge bench that heard the controversial triple talaq case in 2017 was
made up of different faith members. The five judges were from five
different communities i.e., Chief Justice JS Khehar (a Sikh), Justices
Kurian Joseph (a Christian), RF Nariman (a Parsi), UU Lalit (a Hindu), and
Abdul Nazeer (a Muslim).
It is mentioned under Article 25 of the Constitution that the state cannot
take away any essential religious practice of a person. Hence, if a practice
is arbitrary and not an essential religious practice, it will be categorized
under the exception laid down under Article 25. On that account, the
whole issue was whether or not the practice of Talaq-e-biddat, is an
essential religious practice of Islam. the Apex Court has held the practice
of triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat), unconstitutional by a 3:2 majority.
7. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v/s Union Of India: The issue that arose in
the current case was whether or not this fundamental right includes the
right to die, or if it is possible for someone to have control over their own
demise and make the decision to end their life. The case separated
passive and active euthanasia.
Aruna Ramchandra, the victim, was a nurse at King Edward Memorial
Hospital of Mumbai. One of the sweepers of the hospital had attacked
her on 27th November 1973. He had choked and strangulated her and
restrain her movements. Subsequent to realizing that Ms. Aruna was
mensurating, he sodomized her. She was found unconscious by one of
the cleaners the next day. Consequent to such heinous strangulation via
the dog chain, the supply of oxygen to her brain had ceased entirely,
causing severe damage to the cortex of her brain. She had sustained a
brain stem contusion besides having a cervical cord injury. After 36 years
of this incident, a petition for the case was filed under Article 32 of the
Indian Constitution by a friend in 2009. For these many years Aruna has
been in a permanent vegetative state and has become highly feeble and
infirm.
The following issues were raised:
 Does Article 21 of the Constitution include the right to die
embedded within the right to life?
 What is the difference between passive euthanasia and active
euthanasia?
 Can individuals be allowed to give a “Living Will”, i.e. directives on
medical treatment, if they become incompetent or unable to
communicate in the future?
 Should the right to die and the right to die with dignity be studied
comparatively?
The court in Aruna Shanbaug V. Union of India case, distinguished
between active and passive euthanasia. Active euthanasia can be
seen as the positive and deliberate termination of one’s life by
injecting and administering lethal substances. It is considered to
be a crime worldwide except permitted by the legislation. In India,
active euthanasia is a straight infringement of Section 302 and
Section 304 of the IPC. The High court under article 226, was
entitled to make decisions regarding the withdrawal of the life
support system. The apex court enlisted a proper guidelines for
granting passive euthanasia in the “rarest of rare cases” while
rejecting the plea made by the petitioner. A bench was constituted
by the Chief Justice of the High Court when an application was
received, before which a committee of three reputed doctors
nominated was referred. A thorough examination of the patient,
state, and family members was conducted along with a notice issued
by the bench.
The court’s assessment of the medical report and the definition of
brain death provided in the Transplantation of Human Organs Act,
1994, clearly explains that Ms. Aruna’s brain was not dead. Despite
being in a Permanent Vegetative State, she had a stable state. She
had sensations and could breath without assistance. Therefore,
ending her life was not warranted.
In 2018, in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India, Supreme
Court stated that while considering the legality of passive
euthanasia, it has to be noted that the right to die with dignity is
included under Article 21 of the Constitution along with the right
to life. Therefore, it is very much relevant to withdraw the life
support system of patients suffering from a terminal illness who
are in a coma for a lifetime; so that they can die with dignity. The
notion of “living will” was also provided in the concerned case.
The concept of “living will” is a document that facilitates in taking
the consent of a patient in advance in the event if and when,
during the term of the treatment, the patient gets seriously ill or
paralysed in future or becomes the victim of a situation or medical
condition wherein he is unable to give consent or take any
decisions. The document then serves as the concerned patient’s
living will or living consent.

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