2024 SCC OnLine SC 260

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2024 SCC OnLine SC 260
In the Supreme Court of India

(BEFORE DIPANKAR DATTA, K.V. VISWANATHAN AND SANDEEP MEHTA, JJ.)
Nirmal Premkumar and Another … Appellants;

Versus
State Rep. by Inspector of Police … Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 1098 of 2024
Decided on March 11, 2024
Advocates who appeared in this case :
For Appellant(s) Ms. E. R. Sumathy, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. D. Kumanan, AOR
Mr. Sheikh F. Kalia, Adv.
Mrs. Deepa. S, Adv.
Mr. Veshal Tyagi, Adv
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.:—
THE APPEAL
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1. The correctness of the judgment and order dated 11 November,
2022 (“impugned judgment”, hereafter) passed by a learned Judge of
the High Court of Judicature at Madras (“High Court”, hereafter) is
questioned in this appeal. By the impugned judgment, the High Court
dismissed the criminal appeal1 [under section 374(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (“Cr.P.C.”, hereafter)] carried by the appellants from
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the judgment and order dated 22 November, 2021 of the Special
Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases (“Special Court”, hereafter) under the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (“POCSO Act”,
hereafter) in a sessions case2 registered against the two appellants (“A-
1” and “A-2”, respectively, hereafter). The Special Court having
convicted A-1 under section 12 of the POCSO Act sentenced him to
three (3) years' rigorous imprisonment together with a fine of Rs.
30,000/-, in default to suffer further six (6) months' rigorous
imprisonment. Insofar as A-2 is concerned, conviction under section
506 of the Penal Code, 1860 (“I.P.C.”, hereafter) was recorded and he
was sentenced to two (2) years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.
20,000/, in default to suffer further four (4) months' rigorous
imprisonment.
BRIEF RESUME OF FACTS
2. The facts, leading to the present appeal, are as follows:
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a) The prosecution's case unfolds in three distinct incidents. The

victim/P.W.2 (“victim”, hereafter), a minor girl aged about 13
years, was an eighth-grade student of a Higher Secondary School
(“school”, hereafter) during the academic year 2017-2018. A-1
and A-2 held positions as Tamil and Social Science teachers,
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respectively, in such school. The first incident occurred on 14
February, 2018, around 10 : 15 A.M. A-1 entered the classroom,
approached the victim, and forcefully presented her with roses,
jasmine flowers, and chocolate in the presence of fellow students.
Despite the victim's refusal to accept the offerings, A-1 resorted
to twisting her arm, coercing her into accepting the same. The
second incident took place later in the day on 14th February,
2018, when the victim was called by A-2 through a girl student
studying in the seventh grade. A-2 enquired from the victim why
was she refusing to talk to A-1 and that if she continues to not
talk to him, A-1 would die and she would be held responsible. The
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third incident transpired on 15 February, 2018, when another
teacher (“P.W.9”, hereafter) informed the victim that she had
been called to the physical education teacher's room by A-1. Upon
reaching the designated room, A-1 inquired why the victim was
not talking to him. In response, she expressed fear citing
potential trouble with her family if they were to discover the
situation. Allegedly dismissive of her concerns, A-1 purportedly
asserted that the victim's family members would be powerless to
address the situation even if they became aware of it. The victim's
parents learnt of her distress resulting from the aforesaid three
incidents through the victim's maternal aunt (“P.W.4”, hereafter)
upon her persistent questioning of the victim.
b) Following this, the victim's father (“P.W.1”, hereafter) approached
the Headmaster of the school (“P.W.10”, hereafter) appealing for
intervention. However, instead of addressing the issue, but upon
assuring appropriate action, P.W.10 advised P.W.1 to not disclose
it to anyone. Due to inaction on the part of P.W.10, P.W.1 lodged
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a formal complaint with the local police station on 18 February,
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2018 .
c) The aforementioned complaint led to the registration of the First
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Information Report (“F.I.R.”, hereafter) on 19 February, 2018
against three teachers, viz. A-1, A-2 and A-3, for the offences
under sections 11(i) and 12 of the POCSO Act.
d) Upon completion of investigation, a report was filed under section
173(2), Cr. P.C. While A-1 was charged under sections 11(i) read
with section 12 of the POCSO Act and A-2 under section 17 of the
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POCSO Act, the proceeding against A-3 was dropped.

e) Upon committal, charges for the offences under section 12 of the
POCSO Act and section 506 of the I.P.C. were framed against A-1.
A-2 faced charges under section 12 and section 17 of the POCSO
Act and section 506 of the I.P.C. A-1 and A-2 entered pleas of not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
f) The prosecution examined twelve (12) witnesses. From the trend
of cross examination to which the prosecution witnesses were
subjected, it is clear that the defence sought to make out a case
of false implication of A-1 and A-2 arising out of a previous
incident, which we propose to refer at a later part of the
judgment. After the prosecution's evidence, examination of A-1
and A-2 under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. followed when both
denied the allegations, while asserting their falsehood. A-1 then
examined himself in defence.
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3. Vide judgment and order dated 22 November, 2021, the Special
Court convicted A-1 and A-2 and sentenced them as noted at the
beginning of this judgment.
4. Challenge to such judgment and order proved abortive. The High
Court was of the view that the findings recorded by the Special Court
did not warrant any interference and that the appeal was devoid of any
merit; hence, it was dismissed.
SUBMISSIONS
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants took
serious exception to the findings returned by the Special Court and the
High Court and advanced the following submissions:
a) The prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt
and the Court ought to have acquitted the appellants.
b) Several glaring inconsistencies and contradictions that manifest
on a bare reading of the oral evidence were brushed aside
because the Special Court and the High Court were too obsessed
with the thought that a teacher had indulged in sexual
harassment/assault of a girl student.
c) The prosecution could not prove the case beyond a reasonable
doubt, as none of the witnesses other than the victim testified to
witnessing A-1 giving flowers and chocolate to her. This crucial
fact was acknowledged by the Investigating Officer (“P.W.12”,
hereafter) in course of recording of his testimony. The evidence of
the victim was thoroughly unreliable and should not have been
given any credence.
d) The contradictions in the testimony of the victim cast serious
doubt as to whether the actions of A-1 and A-2, as framed by the
prosecution, could be said to carry ‘sexual intent’.
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6. Learned counsel, emphasizing the contradictions in the

depositions and highlighting the flaws in the impugned decisions,
urged this Court to accept the appeal and acquit A-1 and A-2.
7. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State, in contrast,
supported the judgment of conviction and order of sentence of the
Special Court and submitted that the High Court took pains to reassess
the evidence in arriving at its concurrence with the Special Court's
judgment and order. It was emphasised by him that teachers occupy a
position of immense trust and responsibility in the life of a student,
since they not only help shape the future of the student, but are also
guardians with whom parents entrust the care of their child. Thus, the
desecration of an educational institution by such acts of sexual
harassment not only grimly underlines the moral depravity of the
accused, but also violates the sanctity of the pursuit of education,
which has larger ramifications for society as a whole, inasmuch as such
incidents can act as a deterrent in the education of young girls. No case
having been set up by A-1 and A-2 for interference, he urged this Court
to dismiss the appeal.
ANALYSIS
8. We have heard the parties, considered the evidence led at the
trial and perused the judgment and order of the High Court as well as
the Special Court.
9. The issues that emerge for decision are:
(i) Whether the evidence on record is sufficient to record conviction
against A-1 and A-2?
(ii) Should the answer to the above be in the affirmative, what
should be the appropriate punishment to be imposed on A-1 and
A-2?
10. Before addressing the issues, we consider it appropriate to
revisit the law laid down by this Court regarding the weight to be
attached to the testimony of the victim in matters involving sexual
offences where the prosecution's case hinges on the victim's evidence—
a scenario central to the present case.
11. Law is well settled that generally speaking, oral testimony may
be classified into three categories, viz. : (i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly
unreliable; (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The first
two category of cases may not pose serious difficulty for the Court in
arriving at its conclusion(s). However, in the third category of cases,
the Court has to be circumspect and look for corroboration of any
material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, as a
requirement of the rule of prudence.
12. In Ganesan v. State4, this Court held that the sole testimony of
the victim, if found reliable and trustworthy, requires no corroboration
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and may be sufficient to invite conviction of the accused.

13. This Court was tasked to adjudicate a matter involving gang
rape allegations under section 376(2)(g), I.P.C in Rai Sandeep v. State
5
(NCT of Delhi) . The Court found totally conflicting versions of the
prosecutrix, from what was stated in the complaint and what was
deposed before Court, resulting in material inconsistencies. Reversing
the conviction and holding that the prosecutrix cannot be held to be a
‘sterling witness’, the Court opined as under:
“22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’ should be of
a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be
unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness
should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the
witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the
truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would
be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right
from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the
witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court.
It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution
qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the
version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to
withstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever
strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for
any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved,
as well as the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation
with each and every one of other supporting material such as the
recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence
committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said
version should consistently match with the version of every other
witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test
applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not
be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the
accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version
of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other such
similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can be
called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be accepted by the
court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can
be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on
the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other
attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects
should match the said version in material particulars in order to
enable the court trying the offence to rely on the core version to
sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of
the charge alleged.”
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(underlining ours, for emphasis)

14. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana6, this Court laid
down that although the victim's solitary evidence in matters related to
sexual offences is generally deemed sufficient to hold an accused
guilty, the conviction cannot be sustained if the prosecutrix's testimony
is found unreliable and insufficient due to identified flaws and lacunae.
It was held thus:
“31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty for
commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the
prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same inspires confidence and
appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of
sterling quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the
prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, which have already been
projected hereinabove, would go to show that her evidence does not
fall in that category and cannot be relied upon to hold the appellant
guilty of the said offences.
32. Indeed there are several significant variations in material facts
in her Section 164 statement, Section 161 statement (CrPC), FIR
and deposition in court. Thus, it was necessary to get her evidence
corroborated independently, which they could have done either by
examination of Ritu, her sister or Bimla Devi, who were present in
the house at the time of her alleged abduction. The record shows
that Bimla Devi though cited as a witness was not examined and
later given up by the public prosecutor on the ground that she has
been won over by the appellant.”
15. What flows from the aforesaid decisions is that in cases where
witnesses are neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, the Court
should strive to find out the true genesis of the incident. The Court can
rely on the victim as a “sterling witness” without further corroboration,
but the quality and credibility must be exceptionally high. The
statement of the prosecutrix ought to be consistent from the beginning
to the end (minor inconsistences excepted), from the initial statement
to the oral testimony, without creating any doubt qua the prosecution's
case. While a victim's testimony is usually enough for sexual offence
cases, an unreliable or insufficient account from the prosecutrix,
marked by identified flaws and gaps, could make it difficult for a
conviction to be recorded.
16. Guided by the law as aforesaid and, in our pursuit, to answer the
first issue, we record having examined the evidence threadbare and
noticed manifest contradictions and discrepancies in the oral evidence
of the prosecution witnesses. To our mind, these have the effect of
casting a serious doubt with regard to the veracity of the prosecution
version. They are summarized hereunder:
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a) The prosecution's narrative attempts to establish that the victim

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had revealed the incident to P.W.4 only on Thursday, 15
February, 2018, which led P.W.1 to approach P.W.10 on Friday,
16th February, 2018. P.W.10 had assured an enquiry, but failed to
follow through on such promise, which is what led P.W.1 to make
a complaint to the police. A deeper scrutiny of the evidence
reveals that though P.W.10 had assured that an enquiry would be
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conducted on Monday, 19 February, 2018, the complaint to the
police had already been filed on Sunday, 18th February, 2018. It
is also on record that the victim's maternal uncle, and husband of
P.W.4 (“P.W.5”, hereafter) had deposed that he and P.W.1 had
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been to P.W.10 on Monday, i.e., 19 February, 2018. Even
discounting the version of P.W.5, despite he being more educated
than the other witnesses (he happened to be the Headmaster of
another school), it is evident that the complaint was filed in a
tearing hurry, with absolutely no time being given to P.W.10 to
conduct any enquiry at all. Though not much would turn on the
reluctance of P.W.10 to take action against A-1 and A-2, what is
important, if the version of P.W.5 is to be believed, is that P.W.10
was approached after the complaint was lodged. Having regard to
the defence case that there was animosity between A-1 and
P.W.1, it is difficult to believe what P.W.1 said in the concluding
paragraph of the complaint as true. Also, nowhere in his
deposition does P.W.1 say of having approached P.W.10 for his
intervention. The water is further muddied by the numerous
contradictions in depositions which makes one question whether
P.W.10 was approached at all. The victim in her statement
recorded under section 164, Cr. P.C. states that it was P.W.5, who
went to P.W.10, but in her deposition on oath she states that it
was P.W.4 who did so. However, the deposition of P.W.10 makes
no reference to any such complaint being received by him.
b) In a strange turn of events, P.W.1 deposes in his cross-
examination that he made an oral complaint to the ‘Head Mistress’
of the school, accompanied by his daughter, the victim, and
P.W.12. There is no reference to the existence of a Head Mistress
by any witness. However, even if we take this to be a reference to
P.W.10, the evidence belies the prosecution's own narrative since
it has throughout been the case of the prosecution that it is only
after the reluctance of P.W.10 to take action on the oral complaint
that the police had been approached.
c) On the factum of the complaint being made to the local police
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station on 18 February, 2018, there is no clarity whatsoever as
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to who actually approached the police. While the victim deposes

that she went to the police station along with P.W.1 and P.W.5,
the depositions of the latter two persons reveals something else
entirely. According to P.W.1, he was accompanied to the police
station by his co-brother (which could be P.W.5). Significantly,
P.W.5 made no mention of going to the police station. The
victim's mother (“P.W.3”, hereafter), on the other hand, deposes
that it was she who went to the police station along with the
victim and P.W.1. A perusal of the deposition of the Sub Inspector
of Police (“P.W.11”, hereafter) reveals that it was only P.W.1 who
had come to the police station.
d) The dark grey clouds of suspicion, thus, begin to form from the
very inception, i.e., the contents of the complaint and the mode
and manner of the same being lodged.
e) Besides, there are manifest discrepancies between the statement
of the victim recorded under section 164, Cr. P.C. and her
deposition recorded in Court. In the former, it was mentioned that
A-1 “twisted her arm” when she declined to accept the rose,
jasmine flowers, and chocolate. Conversely, in the latter, the
victim simply stated that A-1 attempted to give her a flower, and
upon her refusal, he forcibly placed it in her hand. While this
alone may not prompt us to reach any immediate conclusion, it
has a material bearing while we proceed to consider the other
attending circumstances.
f) It is alleged by the prosecution that on 14th February 2018, during
the second period, A-1 singled out the victim and forcibly gave
her flowers and chocolates. However, while the victim mentions
both chocolate and flowers being offered in her statement under
section 164, Cr. P.C., as noted above, she omits the mention of
the chocolate in her deposition before Court. This could or could
not be seen as a mere omission. But, importantly, the only other
classmate who comes forward to depose on the incident is P.W.6,
but she turns hostile and denies having ever given the police a
narrative of events. Meanwhile, an examination of the victim's
confidante, i.e., P.W.4's deposition reveals a much more dramatic
turn of events. According to her, A-1 not only tortured the victim
into wearing the flowers, but also that he pinched her hand. She
also deposes that A-1 had allegedly given the victim flowers
often, whereas the victim nowhere refers to the occurrence of any
prior incident. These are no doubt embellishments which we
discard from our consideration.
g) The crucial question of whether the incident actually transpired
comes under scrutiny when considering the role of P.W.10 who, in
addition to being the head of the institution, held the significant
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position of a priest. It is in the evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.4 that it

was usual for them to go to the priest (read P.W.10), should there
be any issue with regard to the Christian community. The
evidence does not reflect that they ever approached P.W.10 once
they learnt of the incident from the victim. We have, at an earlier
part expressed our doubt as to whether P.W.10 was at all
approached prior to lodging of the complaint. Moving further,
what is apparent is that coupled with his solemn duty as a priest,
responsibilities of P.W.10 as the master of the entire institution
included overseeing of daily activities involving both students and
teachers. In the context of the present case, P.W.10 who was
brought in as a prosecution witness, should logically have been
questioned about the alleged incident. However, the absence of
any query to have the truth elucidated severely dents the
prosecution's case. It is unbelievable that P.W.10 could either not
be aware of the incident, if at all the same happened, or even if
aware, would maintain stoic silence. That would not be in
consonance with what people like P.W.3 and P.W.4, having faith in
a priest, would expect.
h) We must notice another hurdle in the purportedly completed
sequence of events as asserted by the prosecution. It is a given
fact that there were other students present in the classroom who
were eyewitnesses to the incident, as described in the complaint
and as deposed by the victim. In what could have been a
determinative factor, none of the students present in the
classroom was examined except one, i.e., P.W.6 who turned
hostile to the case set up by the prosecution right from the word
‘go’. It is quite understandable that the other students may not
have, for varied reasons, been examined as witnesses for the
prosecution. However, the victim's elder brother, a student of
Class XII in the same school, was also not adduced as a witness.
Again, there could be multiple reasons for the prosecution not to
have him lead evidence, but what stands out is that even P.W.6
deposed that she did not remember as to what happened with the
victim and it is only through her friends that she became aware of
the incident. In such a scenario of hearsay evidence, failure of the
prosecution to elicit the truth from P.W.10 and lack of support
from him weakens the prosecution case to a significant extent.
i) The Special Court has laid repeated emphasis on the first incident
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being objectionable, especially in view of the fact that 14
February, 2018 was Valentine's Day. True it is, the Court could
take judicial notice of 14th February being celebrated as
Valentine's Day. However, an examination of the evidence reveals
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that the day was significant for the parties involved, all of whom
are Christians, not owing to Valentine's Day but because of Ash
Wednesday which is a day of mourning for Christians. This, we
find from the evidence of the victim, P.W.4 and P.W.10. The
complaint makes no mention of the day being Valentine's Day,
which is reaffirmed by the depositions of P.W.11 and P.W.12. The
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only hint of 14 February being Valentine's Day is found from the
deposition of P.W.5, who said so in the passing and not to
emphasise the role of A-1 in expressing his love for the victim on
that day. Drawing of conclusion by the Special Court with
reference to the date 14th February to indict A-1 does not,
therefore, seem to be logical and rational.
j) On its part, the High Court from the very beginning laboured
under a misconception that A-1 had perpetrated a physical attack
on the victim by pinching her. Nowhere in the deposition has the
victim said that she was pinched by A-1. It, therefore, defies
reason as to how the High Court could perceive, more than once,
and conclude that A-1 pinched the victim. The High Court
proceeded to decide the appeal with a coloured vision of the
victim having been sexually assaulted, which unfortunately led to
deflection of justice. Quite apart, the obvious conclusion that
necessarily follows is that the High Court found it difficult to nail A
-1 based on the insufficient materials on record for which it
sought to draw support by turning to the statement under section
164, Cr. P.C. and relying on the same.
k) The second incident does not involve A-1. According to the victim,
A-2 called her through another student, but this student was not
examined. His/her identity, therefore, is unknown. Even as per
the version of the victim, A-2 conveyed to her that if she did not
talk to A-1, he would die and for A-1's death, she would be held
responsible. While there is an assertion by the victim of having
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met A-2 in the evening of 14 February and a denial thereof by A
-2, the student who was the vital link not having been examined,
it is extremely doubtful whether the victim at all met A-2.
l) With regard to the third incident of the victim being summoned to
the P.E.T room and being threatened by A-1 and A-2, the victim's
own version of events is incongruous. The victim states in her
statement under section 164, Cr. P.C. that A-1 had called P.W.9
on phone and asked him to send both the victim and P.W.6 to the
P.E.T. room. However, the deposition of P.W.9 reveals that P.W.9's
phone was never even examined by the police to find out whether
A-1 had called him, thus, revealing yet another lacuna in the
investigation. Further, in her deposition, the victim states that it
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was P.W.6 who had come to the classroom and informed the
victim that A-2 had summoned her, and not A-1. It is only in her
cross-examination that she made an attempt to correct her
statement by saying that it was A-1 who had actually summoned
her. Perusal of P.W.6's deposition reveals that she denied ever
asking the victim to go to the P.E.T room, and also being in the
P.E.T room when the threats were allegedly made to the victim.
The cracks in the prosecution version are further deepened by the
deposition of P.W.4, who states that no incident happened on 15th
February, 2018 at all, and it is only A-2 who made the alleged
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threats to the victim on 14 February, 2018.
17. When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual
offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate
account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on allowing the victim
to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent
reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such
evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on
corroboration of that version.
18. However, an alleged offence of sexual harassment in a public
place, as opposed to one committed within the confines of a room or a
house, or even in a public place but away from the view of the public,
stands on somewhat different premise. If any doubt arises in the
Court's mind regarding the veracity of the victim's version, the Court
may, at its discretion, seek corroboration from other witnesse s who
directly observed the incident or from other attending circumstances to
unearth the truth.
19. In the present case, the alleged sexual harassment transpired in
a classroom. For corroboration of the victim's version, P.W.6 was
brought in as a witness. Although declared hostile, a part of her
testimony supports the allegation levelled by the victim, indicating that
the act of giving a flower became a topic of conversation among other
students in the class. However, the other part of the prosecution's
narrative, specifically that A-1 gave flowers and chocolate to the victim,
lacked support in her testimony. Rather strangely, the prosecution
made little effort or no effort to have the truth spoken to by P.W.10.
Notwithstanding that appropriate questions were not put to P.W.10, we
are inclined to form an opinion that if any untoward incident relating to
a girl student of his school had taken place, it was P.W.10 who as the
head of the institution would have been aware and as a priest would
have disclosed.
20. A-1 and A-2, in support of their defence, sought to make out
that there was an alleged pre-existing animosity between the parties.
What we can gather from the questions put in course of cross-
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examination of the witnesses and the deposition of A-1 are that there
was an incident of sexual harassment in the school in 2012 involving a
relative of the victim's parents. He was a teacher in the same school
and had been accused of sexually harassing a female teacher employed
by the school. Disturbed by such incident, both A-1 and A-2 had
initiated action against such relative/teacher. There is another
dimension to this animosity which has been elucidated by both A-1 and
A-2 through the evidence of P.W.9, and that is of promotional politics in
the faculty of the school. It is in the evidence of P.W.9 that P.W.1 had
another relative, who was a teacher at the school, and if A-1 and A-2
were removed from their posts, such relative would be the beneficiary
of a promotion. The victim herein is thus alleged to be a mere pawn in
an act of revenge orchestrated by P.W.1 to falsely implicate the
accused. While we do not believe it to be likely that an innocent child
would be so cruelly used by her parents, we also cannot deem it to be
entirely outside the realm of possibility.
21. Taking a close look at the overall picture, the inference which
could reasonably be drawn is that the prosecution's case has been
marked by lacklustre efforts, revealing a poorly executed endeavour
that gives rise to substantial doubts regarding the integrity of the case.
The material contradictions apparent in the depositions of prosecution
witnesses, including the victim, significantly undermine the credibility
of the prosecution version. These inconsistencies in the prosecution's
narrative, render it considerably doubtful. On the face of such evident
discrepancies, recording conviction becomes untenable, as the
foundation of the case crumbles under the weight of doubt. While we
might have chosen to overlook other contradictions and solely relied on
the victim's account, considering her as a ‘sterling witness’, her version
appears muddled and prevaricated, much less coherent. It is precisely
these inconsistencies and contradictions, which are material, that
compel us to reject the case set up by the prosecution before the
Special Court with which the High Court concurred adopting a flawed
approach.
22. Conviction undoubtedly can be recorded on the sole evidence of
a victim of crime; however, it must undergo a strict scrutiny through
the well-settled legal principles as established by this Court in a catena
of decisions. While the actions attributed to A-1, as sought to be
demonstrated by the prosecution, may fall within the purview of ‘sexual
harassment’ under section 11 of the POCSO Act, the evidence in this
case has been marred by inadequacies from the outset, evident in
contradictions within statements and testimonies. The evidence led
leaves reasonable suspicion as to whether A-1 was actually involved in
any criminal act.
23. We are left with A-2's conviction under section 506, I.P.C. In the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
light of the above discussions and the nature of the overt act attributed
to A-2, the case against him does not justify a conviction under section
506 I.P.C.
24. The first issue is, thus, answered in the negative. Having regard
thereto, the second question does not call for any answer.
CONCLUSION
25. Upon reviewing the record, we have no other choice but to hold
that the circumstances on which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
was not fully established.
26. We quite agree with the submissions of learned senior counsel
for the State that an act of sexual harassment of a girl student (who is
also a minor) by any teacher would figure quite high in the list of
offences of grave nature since it has far-reaching consequences, which
impact more than just the parties to the proceeding. At the same time,
it is axiomatic that reputation is earned by a teacher upon rendering
service over the years and an accusation like the present would remain
as an indelible mark marring his entire future life. Care has, therefore,
to be taken so that his right to live a life of dignity and personal liberty
are not put to jeopardy on the basis of half-baked evidence.
27. We are, thus, inclined to deem this case unsuitable for securing
a conviction under section 11 read with section 12 of the POCSO Act, as
there are enough missing links in the present case to extend the
benefit of doubt to A-1. As regards A-2, we do not consider that the
prosecution was successful in proving that the conduct of A-2 was a
case of criminal intimidation punishable under section 506 of I.P.C.; his
conviction, too, is also liable to be set aside.
RELIEF
28. For all the foregoing reasons, the conviction of A-1 and A-2, as
recorded by the Special Court and the sentence imposed upon them,
since affirmed by the High Court, stand set aside. The appeal,
accordingly, is allowed. The appellants are acquitted and set free.
29. A-1 and A-2 are still behind bars. They shall be immediately
released from custody, if not wanted in any other case.
———
1
Criminal Appeal No. 697 of 2021
2
Special Sessions Case No. 13 of 2020
3
CSR No. 90 of 2018
4
(2020) 10 SCC 573
5
(2012) 8 SCC 21
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6
(2011) 7 SCC 130
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Page 1 Saturday, July 06, 2024

2024 SCC OnLine SC 260

In the Supreme Court of India

Nirmal Premkumar and Another … Appellants;

a) The prosecution's case unfolds in three distinct incidents. The

POCSO Act, the proceeding against A-3 was dropped.

6. Learned counsel, emphasizing the contradictions in the

and may be sufficient to invite conviction of the accused.

(underlining ours, for emphasis)

a) The prosecution's narrative attempts to establish that the victim

to who actually approached the police. While the victim deposes

position of a priest. It is in the evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.4 that it

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