Govind Memorial

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SEC-C GROUP-18

MOOT COURT EXERCISE


CAMPUS LAW CENTRE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE PEACE PALACE


THE HAGUE,
NETHERLANDS

CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES IN TULIP

THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF TULIP


APPLICANT
V.
THE REPUBLIC OF DAFFODIL
RESPONDENT

WRITTEN REPLY for the RESPONDENT


Submitted by,

Name- GOVIND KUMAR


Exam Roll No -22309806290
Class Roll No.- 22290
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Contents

Index of Authorities 3

Statement of Facts 5

Statement of Jurisdiction 7

Statement of Issues 9

Summary of Arguments 10

Arguments Advanced 11

Prayer for Relief 20

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Index of Authorities

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS:

1. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally


Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10),

2. Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (1945)

3. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933)

4. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (1945)

5. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation


among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [‘Friendly Relations Declaration’]

Cases Cited:

1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua. (Nicaragua v. United States of
America). Merits,. Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986

2. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the v
Uganda, Judgment, Merits, ICJ GL No 116, [2005] ICJ Rep 168, ICGJ 31 (ICJ 2005), 19th
December 2005, International Court of Justice [ICJ]

3. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia, Order, Provisional Measures, [1993] ICJ Rep 3, ICGJ
67 (ICJ 1993), 8th April 1993, United Nations [UN]; International Court of Justice

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UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS:

1. Commentary ILC Draft ASR, Y.B.I.L.C., II, (1975)

2. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation


among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV),
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)

3. S/RES/678 of 1991(Iraq)

4. S/RES/686 of 1991 (Iraq)

5. S/RES/748 of 1992 (Libya)

6. S/RES/807 of 1993 (Croatia)

Books and Treatises:

1. Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 8) (2017)

2. Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 9)(2019)

3. Oppenheim's International Law(9th ed., 1992)

4. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction To International Law(Routledge 7)(1997)

5. James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge University Press) (2013)

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Statement of Facts

Background

1. The parties to this dispute are People's Republic of TULIP and Republic of DAFFODIL.
TULIP’s experience of its colonial history and ethnic demography has an influence upon its
internal and external policies.

2. Recurrent violence against the non-ethnic minority population of Tulip forced them to take up
arms under an organized group 'Armed Group V'.TULIP has always denied it as a peripheral
issue.The Republic of DAFFODIL was accused of assisting this armed group by TULIP.

Report of the International Commission of Inquiry

3. A UNSC mandated International Commission of Inquiry reported that murder, extermination,


torture, enslavement and sexual violence against members of the non-ethnic community is
rampant. In its report, it found that while the members of the ‘Armed Group V’ were trained,
funded and armed by the Republic of DAFFODIL, ‘Armed Group V’ did not act on the
‘instructions, direction or control’ of the Republic of DAFFODIL.

4. On 13 March 2011, the Foreign Minister of DAFFODIL rejected the findings of the report and
maintained that unless the official armed personnel of the Republic of DAFFODIL are directly
involved in any attack, the question of breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter does not arise.
On the other hand, the People’s Republic of TULIP noted that any attack by the ‘Armed Group

V’ would be attributable to the Republic of DAFFODIL as the members of the group are being

Trained, funded and were armed by it.

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The Attack

5. On 11 August 2011, an armed attack on a government building killed 200 people. The ‘Armed
Group V’ took responsibility for the attack. Subsequently, TULIP held DAFFODIL responsible
for the incident which "amounted to the use of force".

The Proceedings

6. Thereafter, the People's Republic of TULIP, initiated proceedings against the Republic of
DAFFODIL in the International Court of Justice seeking reparations.

7. Hence, the instant case.

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Statement of Jurisdiction

In accordance with Article 40 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice [“ICJ"] which
states as follows,

“Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special
agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the
dispute and the parties shall be indicated

the Parties hereby submit to this Court their dispute concerning the armed activities in TULIP . The
ICJ is hereby requested to adjudge the dispute in accordance with the rules and principles of
international law, including any applicable treaties.

The parties have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 36(1) of the
Statute of the [“ICJ"] which states as:

“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters
specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in
force.”

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Each party has made declarations Under Article 36(2) of Statute of the [“ICJ”] accepting the
jurisdiction on the condition of reciprocity over all international disputes which states as:

“The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting
the same
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:

a. the interpretation of a treaty;

b. any question of international law;

c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation;

d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.”

Each party shall accept the judgment of the Court as final and binding and shall execute it in good
faith.

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Statement of Issues

A.
Whether the Republic of DAFFODIL violated any substantive provision of The International Law?

B.
In the light of findings of the commission whether any state responsibility is imputed upon part of
DAFFODIL?

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Summary of Arguments
A.

The Republic of DAFFODIL has not violated any substantive provisions of the International Law.
The submission herein rests upon two grounds : -

Firstly, the actions of the Republic of DAFFODIL do not amount to ‘use of force' under
International Law. It is because the findings of the commission are impeachable as such the
findings are not subject to the adversarial process thus the credibility is highly dubious and without
giving a chance to DAFFODIL to verify the findings also contravene nature justice.

Even if the findings of the commission were taken to be true the actions are no were imputable to
’intervention’ in the internal affairs of the People’s Republic of TULIP as there was no direct
involvement of DAFFODIL at any instance.

In addition, the Republic of DAFFODIL exercises does not exercise ‘effective control’ of over

the actions of the "Armed Group V”. The report of the commission no where states that Armed

Group V was action on the direction and control of DAFFODIL.

B.

Only an Internationally Wrongful act results in ‘state responsibility’ and as no substantive


provision of law stands violated thus question of state responsibility does not arise. As state
responsibility does not arise the question of reparation has no basis.

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Arguments Advanced

A. There has been no violation of International Law by The Republic of DAFFODIL.

This submission rests on two grounds that 1]there has been no interventionism and use of
force on part of DAFFODIL and 2]intervention if any is in the nature of Humanitarian
intervention.

1] There is no interventionism and thus no use of force on part of DAFFODIL

1. “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purpose of the United Nations.”1

2. An intervention is deemed prohibited only if it pertains to issues where each State has the right to
make its own decisions based on the principle of State sovereignty. This includes the selection of
political, economic, social, and cultural systems, as well as the development of foreign policy.
Intervention becomes wrongful when it employs coercive methods regarding these choices, which
should remain free. The element of coercion—central to defining what constitutes prohibited
intervention—is particularly evident in cases where force is used, whether through direct military
action or indirectly by supporting subversive or terrorist activities within another State.

3. Thus, not all interventions are illegal, however. In the Nicaragua case the International Court of
Justice clarified that to be wrongful the intervention must use methods of coercion. These are
‘particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force’ and ‘these forms of actions
are therefore wrongful in the light of both the principle of non-use of force, and that of non-
intervention’.Thus, a clear link can be identified between the prohibition of intervention and the

1 U.N. Charter art. 2, para.4


2Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at p. 106, para. 202.

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prohibition of the use of force.2If a state uses force illegally, it violates both prohibitions.4Every use
of force therefore also constitutes an intervention under international law, but not every intervention
constitutes a use of force (only those interventions that use force do).3The question then remains what
kind of force is covered by the term ‘use of force’.

4. A proposal to include economic measures into the notion of force under Article 2(4) UN Charter
was rejected during its drafting process.4 It is generally accepted that the term only refers to armed
force.5

5. As Oppenheim's International Law puts it, "the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or
otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter in
question. Interference pure and simple is not intervention”6

6. The prohibition of the use of force is typically recognized as a peremptory norm, specifically
concerning the prohibition of aggressive or unlawful force. This principle is reflected in various
documents, including the ILC Commentary on the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, the ILC
Commentary on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
(ARSIWA), the ILC Report on Fragmentation, which cites the works of Brownlie and Aust, as well
as a Commentary on the UN Charter..

3 Jamnejad and Wood (2009), pp. 348–349; touched upon by Kritsiotis (2015), p. 1000

4 Kohen (2012), p. 161.


5 supra n.3

6 Randelzhofer and Dörr (2012), p. 209; see also Shaw (2017), p. 855; Ruys (2014), p. 163; Henderson (2018),
p. 53.

7 Ruys (2014), p. 163; Dinstein (2017), p. 90; Henderson (2018), pp. 53, 55.
8 Oppenheim's International Law Vol. I, 9th ed., 1992, p. 432

9 Orakhelashvili (2015), p. 165; De Hoogh (2015), p. 1164; Henderson (2018), pp. 24–25.
10 ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, Art. 50, p. 247, para. 1, and p. 248, para. 3.
11 ARSIWA Commentary, p. 112.
12 ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law, as submitted to the General Assembly, A/CN.4/L.682, 2006,
p. 189, para. 374 and fn. 522; see also Cassese (2005), p. 202.

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7. The International Court of Justice threw light upon the scope of indirect force “as arming and
training of rebels amount to use of force, while funding the rebels will not amount the indirect
force.7

Thus in the light of the authorities mentioned above, it can be stated that Non -
interventionism and use of force is the fundamental principles on which International Law
rests. It is recognized by the states as jus cogens. Article 2(4) of UN Charter contemplates
direct intervention rather than an indirect intervention. The following arguments
substantiate this further:-

1. Use of force can be contemplated as : -Direct force : Which are in the nature of cross border
shooting or military incursions; and Indirect force: In which States are prohibited from
organizing, assisting, instigating or participating in civil strife or terrorist acts against another
State or acquiescing in organized activities when these activities are threaten or use of force
against another State.

2. While the wording of the prohibition against the use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
appears clear at first glance, its scope and content remain ambiguous in both state practice and
academic discourse. This ambiguity arises primarily from the fact that the prohibition is part
of a broader framework addressing peacemaking and peacekeeping, which includes Articles
39, 51, and 53 of the U.N. Charter that use different terminology, such as "threat to the peace,"
"act of aggression," and "armed attack." Additionally, this framework imposes restrictions on
the right to self-defense, leading to debates not only over the extent of that right but also
regarding the definition of "force." Interpretations may draw upon the rulings of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and binding resolutions from the Security Council,
including S/RES/678 and S/RES/686 of 1991 (related to Iraq), S/RES/748 of 1992
(concerning Libya), and S/RES/807 of 1993 (pertaining to Croatia).

3. Developing countries and the former socialist countries especially have tried to extend the
notion of force even to political and economical coercion, arguing that its effects may be equal
to military force. Although the wording of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter is open to such an

13 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the v Uganda, Judgment,
Merits, ICJ GL No 116, [2005] ICJ Rep 168, ICGJ 31 (ICJ 2005), 19th December 2005, International Court of
Justice [ICJ] ,paras 60 – 165, supra n.2

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interpretation, it must clearly be rejected. In other provisions the Charter uses the word “force”
only in connection with military force. Moreover, at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 a
proposal of Brazil to extend the scope of the International Law and the Use of Force prohibition
to economic coercion was explicitly rejected. In accordance with this opinion, while
interpreting the fundamental Charter principles the Friendly Relations Declaration deals solely
with military force in respect to Article 2(4) while submitting political and economic coercion
to the principle of non-intervention. Under the latter, nonmilitary coercion is not generally
banned but has to be proportionate. Thus, the ICJ was correct in not applying the
prohibition of use of force to economic measures taken by the United States against
Nicaragua in its decision of 1986.

4. It is uncontested that the wording of Article 2(4) comprises the indirect use of force regardless
whether the direct force is actually applied by regular troops of another state or by unofficial
bands organized in a military manner (e.g. mercenaries or insurgents). While it is common
ground that the acts carried out directly towards the other state have to amount to the use or
threat of force (i.e. incursions into foreign territory or cross-border shooting), it remains
controversial which activities may qualify for an indirect use of such force. In this respect, the
Friendly Relations Declaration8 mentions the organizing of irregular forces or armed bands,
encouraging their organization, instigating, assisting, or participating in acts of civil strife or
terrorist acts or acquiescing in such organized activities. In the Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ
stated that not every act of assistance might qualify for an indirect use of force, holding
the arming and training of “contras” by the United States to be a violation of the
prohibition but rejecting the mere supply of funds to them.

5. In terms of the level of proof required to meet that standard, the Court rejected Bosnia’s
suggestion that it merely had to prove its case on the “balance of probabilities.” Instead, the
Court relied on its earlier jurisprudence to conclude that “claims against a State involving
charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive.”9
14Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [‘Friendly
Relations Declaration’]

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Thus under the prevailing view, clearly all non-military effects on another state, such as
environmental pollution, remain outside the scope of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
1. The findings of Commission of Inquiry are not conclusive and would not suffice to impute any
interventionism and thus use of force on part of DAFFODIL.A much higher degree of
imputation is needed which should be directly and fully conclusive.The mere finding that
DAFFODIL was involved in supply of material to Armed Group V are not sufficient to impute
State responsibility on part of DAFFODIL.

2. Without prejudice to the earlier argument even if there is any interventionism on part of
Republic of DAFFODIL it would be still not conclusive because it has not been put on trial
and subjected to adversarial process. Thus, the findings of the commission is highly doubtful.
Therefore the report of finding of the Commission is disapproved by Republic of DAFFODIL
since ‘Armed group V’ was not acting either directly or indirectly under the ‘direction or
control’ of DAFFODIL and as such Republic of DAFFODIL cannot be held responsible for
the acts of ‘Armed Group V’ under International Law.

3. The armed attack on the government building on 11 August, 2011 by Armed Group V should
not in any way be attributable upon DAFFODIL as no official armed personnel of the Republic
of DAFFODIL is directly involved in any attack. The Republic of DAFFODIL exercises no
effective control over the actions of the "Armed group V".

Therefore Republic of DAFFODIL categorically rejects all the allegations put forth by People’s
Republic of TULIP as they being without firm ground and frivolous.

2] Intervention if any was on humanitarian grounds.

In addition to arguments made earlier :-

15 Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at ¶ 209.

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1. Any intervention would be imputable upon TULIP itself as it stands in violation the principles
of International Humanitarian Law. And thus an intervention of any, it is in the nature of support
to the ethnic minorities of TULIP in the nature of humanitarian aid against the State sponsored
activities of People’s Republic of Tulip.

2. The basis of intervention on humanitarian grounds is that it is no state’s prerogative to allow


the wanton disregard and violation of human rights, and therefore, if such wanton disregard
and violations take place, another state, or other states may intervene to put an end to them.10

3. The theory of intervention on the ground of humanity (...) recognizes the right of one State to
exercise international control over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when
contrary to the laws of humanity11

4. The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua v. USA threw light in the scope of
humanitarian assistance by stating that “there can be no doubt that the provision of strictly
humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliations or
objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to
international law”.12

B.] There is no State Responsibility which can be imputed upon DAFFODIL.

1. The matter of the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts is primarily
governed by the International Law Commission (ILA)’s Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). 13

16 Fernando Teson, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality” 5 (1988)
17Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, Kluwer Law
International, 1999, p. 31.
18Military and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua. (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits,.
Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.14
19 International
Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November
2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1

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2. Oppenheim, renowned jurist and former Whewell Professor of International Law at
University of Cambridge, had stated that “every neglect of an international legal duty
constitutes an international delinquency.”14
3. There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or
omission: is attributable to the State under international law; and constitutes a breach of an
international obligation of the State. 15

4. Attribution is how international law figures out if the actions of a person or an intermediary
can be considered an "act of state," which could make the state responsible for those actions.
Here, the key point we're looking at is the idea of "control.
5. Conduct will be attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled the specific operation
and the conduct complained of was an integral part of that operation.16
6. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ has identified three requirements of strict control :- (1) the
secessionist entity must be completely dependent on the outside power (2) this complete
dependence must extend to all fields of activity of the secessionist entity (3) the outside power
must actually have made use of the potential for control inherent in that complete
dependence, i.e. it must have actually exercised a particularly high degree of control.17

20 Oppenheim's International Law Vol. I, 9th ed.


21 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II (Part Two)
22 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge University Press) (2013)
23 ARSIWA Art.8 para 3
24 Nicaragua v USA supra
25 Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9: ICJ Reports 1949, p.4.

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7. In the Corfu Channel case, Albania didn’t warn British ships about mines in its waters, even
though those mines were placed by other countries. Because of this, Albania was still ordered
to pay reparations to the United Kingdom. This situation shows that international law holds a
country responsible for all the consequences of its wrongful actions unless it can clearly show
that part of the harm is separate from what it's being blamed for.
Thus in the light of law stated the following arguments are advanced.

1. The constituent element of State Responsibility depends upon the existence of certain
characteristic factors:-
1) The existence of an International legal obligation in force as between two

particular States,
2) There has occurred an act / omissions which violates that obligation,

3) That loss or damage has resulted from the unlawful act or omissions.

2. Thus, the second criteria that is occurrence of an act / omissions which violates that obligation
is not satisfied. As two establish delinquency two criteria have to be satisfied as held in
Nicaragua which are:-

1) General control and


2) Specific Control only then an effective control on part of DAFFODIL can be established.

3. Even if we were to accept the findings of the Commission of Inquiry, a definitive connection
between DAFFODIL and Armed Group V has not been established. The control attributed to
DAFFODIL is only general in nature and lacks substantial evidence.

4. The report does not indicate that Armed Group V was acting under the direction or effective
control of DAFFODIL. Therefore, no clear evidence of control has been established, and as a
result, DAFFODIL cannot be held accountable for the attack.

26 As established in their codification by the International Law Commission, known as the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility (hereinafter “Draft Articles”), UN doc A/56/10. See Text with commentaries by the special rapporteur
John Crawford (hereinafter “Commentaries”), adopted by the ILC at its 53rd session, 2001, (Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two), on art. 28, para. 3. The UN General Assembly (UNGA), in its
resolution 56/83 of 2001, commended the draft to the attention of governments “without prejudice to the question of
their future adoption or other appropriate action”,art. 31, paras. 12-13.

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5. Reparation in international law is founded on the idea of correcting a wrong through the
principles of restitution, compensation, and declaration. However, in this instance, there is no
case for reparation, as no wrong was committed.

6. The People's Republic of TULIP has made baseless and silly allegations that have unfairly
damaged the reputation of the Republic of DAFFODIL and its people. TULIP should apologize
for these careless statements, which have no real basis.

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Prayer for Relief

In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
People’s Republic of DAFFODIL respectfully requests this Honorable Court to
adjudge and declare that:

A. The actions of the Republic of DAFFODIL do not breach the principle of non-
intervention, nor do they contravene the United Nations Charter or any
provisions of international law.

B. The Republic of DAFFODIL is not required to provide any reparation to the


People's Republic of TULIP

Respectfully Submitted,

Agent For Respondent

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