People v. Teehankee, Jr.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 111206-08. October 6, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v s . CLAUDIO

TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Lino M. Patajo for accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J : p
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee,
Jr. for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman.
Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN , and two
(2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course of
the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to
MURDER. 1
The Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
"That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill
and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun
Roland John Chapman who was hit in the chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds
which directly caused the death of said Roland John Chapman. cdll
"Contrary to law." 2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:
said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier , armed with a handgun, with intent to kill
and evident premeditation, and by means of treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting
mortal wounds which directly caused the death of the said Maureen Hultman.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4607
reads:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2024 cdasiaonline.com
above-named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery
and evident premeditation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head, thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Jussi
Olavi Leino, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of his will, that is, due to the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which
prevented his death.
"Contrary to law." 4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against accused, bail
was set at twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for
the murder of Roland John Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused.
Hearing was set on August 9, 1991, while his arraignment was scheduled on August 14,
1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution
manifested that it would present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing
of Chapman and on the circumstances resulting to the wounding of the witness himself
and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the
incident pending that day was hearing of the evidence on the petition for bail relative to
the murder charge for the killing of Chapman only. He opined that Leino's testimony on
the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding of Leino and Hultman would
be irrelevant. 5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be wasted if
the testimony of Leino would be limited to the killing of Chapman considering that the
crimes for which accused were charged involved only one continuing incident. He
pleaded that Leino should be allowed to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay
and the inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two (2) frustrated murder
charges. 6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution wanted
to present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after the
arraignment of accused on August 14, 1991. The defense pointed out that if accused
did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution would still have to wait until after accused
had been arraigned before it could present Leino. 7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail until
after arraignment of accused on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and,
at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. The defense counsel acceded. 8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges. The
prosecution then started to adduce evidence relative to all three (3) cases. No objection
was made by the defense. 9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited
Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at his house in
Forbes Park, Makati. The party started at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight.
They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where students of International School hang out.
10 After an hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where they stayed until
past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of
Maureen, then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they entered the village,
Maureen asked Leino to stop along Mahogany Street, about a block away from her house in
Campanilla Street. She wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create too
much noise in going back to her house. She did not want her parents to know that she was
going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and
listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany Street.
When they reached the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored
Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up
from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car,
approached them, and asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought
accused only wanted to check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his
plastic wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D. 14
Accused did not bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed it.
15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind Leino
and inquired what was going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused:
"Why are you bothering us?" Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a
gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked:
"Why did you shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside
Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone.
16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed the gun at him and asked: "Do
you want trouble?" Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The shooting initially
shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started
screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna
kill us. Will somebody help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen,
warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino
obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him.
He knew he could not run far without being shot by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the
side of accused's car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around
accused's car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a
minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to
shut up and sit down beside Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away and
directly in front of them stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from
the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards
on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen
fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his
car and drive away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three (3)
people looking on and standing outside their houses along Caballero Street. 20 The
three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to
secure his residence at #1357 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE
MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero Street, corner
Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village; 22 and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a private security
guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street, corner
Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of their
employer, while driver Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to return to his own
house. These three (3) eyewitnesses heard the first gunshot while at their respective
posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see what was
happening, while Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's
house and looked out to Caballero Street. Each saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on the
ground, another man (Leino) sitting on the sidewalk, a third man standing up and
holding a gun and a woman (Hultman). They saw the gunman shoot Leino and Hultman
and flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because of Florece's distance from the scene
of the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw the control
numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He described the getaway car as a box-type Lancer, its
color somewhat white ("medyo puti"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the
getaway car and gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver metallic gray. 26 Both
Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman's face. They had a good look at him. Cadenas was
then a mere four (4) meters away from the gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about
twenty (20) meters away from the scene of the crime. 28 The three confirmed that the corner
of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took place was adequately
illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house and
went near the scene of the crime. He noticed security guard Florece along Caballero
Street. A man on a bike passed by and Mangubat requested him to report the shooting
incident to the security officers of Dasmariñas Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to
his post and narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired
to the crime scene while Florece noted the incident in his logbook (Exhibit "B"). He also jotted
down the license plate control number of the gunman's car as 566. 31
The security guards of Dasmariñas Village came after a few minutes. They
rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES
BALDADO of the Makati police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ,
investigated the incident. 33 Their initial investigation disclosed that the gunman's car was a
box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number 566. They checked the list of vehicles
registered with the village Homeowners' Association and were able to track down two (2)
Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566. One was registered in the name of JOSE
MONTAÑO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmariñas Village, with plate number PKX 566, and
another was traced to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339 Caballero Street,
Dasmariñas Village, with plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI,
was also tasked by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to investigate the
shooting. Ranin's team immediately proceeded to the house of Jose Montaño 35 where they
found ahead of them the Makati police and operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol.
Ranin tried to verify from Mrs. Montaño whether the white Lancer car registered in the name
of Mr. Montaño and bearing plate number 566 was the gunman's car. Mrs. Montaño denied
and declared they had already sold the car to Saldaña Enterprises. She averred the car was
being used by one Ben Conti, a comptroller in said company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon
City. Mrs. Montaño called up her husband and informed him about the investigation. She
also called up Conti and asked him to bring the car to the house. 36
Jose Montaño came around noon. Conti followed with the white Lancer car.
Ranin brought them to the NBI office for investigation, together with the Lancer car. At
the NBI, Ranin inquired from Montaño the whereabouts of his car on July 12 and 13,
1991. Montaño informed him that the car was at the residence of his employee, Ben
Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street, Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July 12, 1991. In the
morning of July 13, 1991, Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaña Enterprises.
Conti confirmed this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2) NBI
agents who made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request, Montaño left
his car at the NBI parking lot pending identification by possible witnesses. 38
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot investigation
and neighborhood inquiry of the shooting incident. They interviewed Domingo Florece
and asked him to report to their office the next day for further investigation. 38 They also
interviewed Agripino Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any information and even denied
having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance, they returned to Cadenas' post at
Dasmariñas Village that night and served him a subpoena, inviting him to appear at the NBI
office for investigation the next day. 39 The NBI agents also talked with Armenia Asliami, an
Egyptian national residing at #1350 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, near the scene of
the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car was not white but light gray. A
foreign national, Asliami was afraid and refused to give a statement about the incident. The
agents exerted every effort to convince Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of their protection.
Ranin even asked a representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to cooperate.
They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as
summoned. Florece readily executed a sworn statement. 41 Cadenas, however,
continued to feign ignorance and bridled his knowledge of the incident. He was lengthily
interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas
was still withholding information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas
confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case. He was apprehensive that the gunman
would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin assured him of NBI protection, Cadenas
relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He
described the gunman's car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He was
brought to the NBI parking lot where Montaño's white Lancer car was parked to identify
the gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if Montaño's was the gunman's car. Cadenas
replied that its color was different. Ranin directed him to look around the cars in the
parking lot and to point the color that most resembled the color of the gunman's car. He
pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he pointed to was not
white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas replied in
the affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to his office and showed him ten (10) pictures of
different men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC-10") taken from the NBI files. One of the pictures
belonged to accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Cadenas studied the pictures, picked
accused's picture (Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote
his name and the date at the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the NBI then
took down Cadenas' statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial Court to
apply for a search warrant. After a searching examination of the witnesses, Judge
Rebecca Salvador issued a search warrant (Exhibit "RR"), authorizing the NBI to
search and seize the silver metallic gray, 1983 Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by
accused, bearing plate number PDW 566. Ranin and his agents drove to accused's
house at #1339 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, to implement the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee , mother of accused,
of their search warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from
Director Lim to invite accused to the NBI office for investigation. Mrs. Teehankee
informed them that accused was not in the house at that time. She excused herself,
went to the kitchen and called up someone on the phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and
secured accused's car. After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for
the car keys but she told him that the keys were with accused. Upon Ranin's request,
Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with accused on the phone. Ranin conversed with
accused and invited him to the NBI for investigation. Accused assured Ranin that he
would report to the NBI later that day. The agents then towed the car of accused to the
NBI office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the NBI
office and waited for accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3) Makati policemen,
after an hour. He informed them that he just came from the Makati police station where
he was also investigated. He told Lim that he has given a statement to the Makati police
and was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts of
his Lancer car at the time of the shooting. Accused claimed that his car was involved in
an accident a few weeks back and was no longer functioning. The car had been parked
in his mother's house at Dasmariñas Village since then. Due to the lateness of the
evening, the group decided to continue the investigation the following day. 49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed
accused on what really happened at Dasmariñas Village. Accused said he did not see
anything. Lim apprised accused that he would be confronted with some eyewitnesses.
Accused sank into silence. 50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was requested to
join the lineup composed of seven (7) men and he acceded. Cadenas was called from
an adjoining room 51 and Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from the lineup.
Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas.53
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2) other
agents brought accused to Forbes Park for further identification by the surviving victim,
Jussi Leino. Leino has just been discharged from the hospital the day before. Since
Leino's parents were worried about his safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the
identification of the gunman in Forbes Park where the Leinos also reside. The NBI
agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house and
escorted him and his father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue.
After a couple of minutes, Leino was brought out of the house and placed in a car with
slightly tinted windows. The car was parked about five (5) meters away from the house.
Inside the car with Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a driver.
Leino was instructed to look at the men who would be coming out of the house and
identify the gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the unoccupied
house, into the street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of them was wearing
sunglasses. Since Leino could not yet speak at that time due to the extensive injury on
his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of paper a request for one of the men in the
lineup to remove his sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father. The
men in the lineup were herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes, they
again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup, Leino identified
accused as the gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred the
cases of murder and double frustrated murder against accused to the Department of
Justice for appropriate action. At the inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio did not
recommend bail insofar as the murder charge was concerned. Hence, accused was
detained at the NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado
went to see security guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his
employer in Dasmariñas Village. Baldado interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the
Makati police station where his statement (Exhibit "D") was taken. 59
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat
from his house and brought him to the Makati police station. At the station, Baldado told
him to wait for a man who would be coming and see if the person was the gunman.
Mangubat was posted at the top of the stairs at the second floor of the station. 60
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete. He
ascended the stairs, passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the
second floor. While accused was going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired from
Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat initially declined to identify accused,
saying that he wanted to see the man again to be sure. He also confided to Pat.
Baldado that he was nervous and afraid for accused was accompanied by a police
Major. When accused came out from Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again asked
Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in response. 60
Accused, together with Major Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a Mercedes Benz and left.
Mangubat was brought back to his post at Dasmariñas Village by other Makati policemen. 61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house and
asked him again if accused was really the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in
the affirmative. Pat. Baldado told Mangubat that he would no longer ask him to sign a
statement which he (Baldado) earlier prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI
agents. Director Lim asked Mangubat if he could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said
he could. Mangubat was shown twelve (12) pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-11") of different
men and was asked to identify the gunman from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit
"E-10"), that of accused, and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat signed at the
back of said picture. Mangubat's statement was taken. He was asked to return to the
NBI the next day to make a personal identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the presence
of the media. At that time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the
office of then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco protesting to the submission of accused
to identification. They pointed out that since the cases against accused had already
been filed in court and they have secured a court order for the transfer of accused to the
Makati municipal jail, any identification of accused should be made in the courtroom.
Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their on-going
investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but requested that
identification be made without the presence of the media. Velasco turned them down
and explained that if accused is not identified in the lineup, the media coverage would
favor accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at
Lim's office and remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the SOG office the
men composing the lineup and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told
Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat pointed to accused as the gunman.
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its
investigation. 66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
"FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in diameter,
located at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial line, directed
backwards and downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone and
central and lateral incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then
lacerating the tongue with fragments of the bullet lodged in the right
palatine, tongue and tonsillar region.
SKULL
CHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322
July 13, 1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign
body (bullet fragments) along the superior alveolar border on the
right. No remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone fragments in the
right palatine, tongue and tonsillar regions with associated soft
tissue swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
xxx xxx xxx" 67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino. After
entering Leino's head, it fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth. Some of the bullet
fragments pierced his palette and tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions on the
temporal lobe and hemorrhage on the covering of the brain. Physical deformity resulted
as a consequence of the gunshot wound because of the fractured upper jaw and the
loss of the front teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper portion of his tongue.
Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him difficulty in speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman. He
opined that the muzzle of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must have been at a
higher level than the victim's head. He concluded that the gun must have been pointed
above Leino's head considering the acuteness and downward trajectory of the bullet. 69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center,
operated on MAUREEN HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw Maureen, she
was unconscious and her face was bloodied all over. Maureen had a bullet hole on the
left side of the forehead, above the eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her
nostrils and on the left side of the forehead where the bullet entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She was
also given a CT scan. The examination revealed that she suffered injuries on the skull
and brain. There were several splintered bullets in her brain and the major portion of the
bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged beneath her right jaw. 71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a team
who operated on her brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head, remove devitalized
brain tissues and retrieve the splintered bullets embedded in her brain. Due to the
extensive swelling of Maureen's brain and her very unstable condition, he failed to patch
the destroyed undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After the surgery, Maureen's vital
signs continued to function but she remained unconscious. She was wheeled to the ICU for
further observation. cdlex
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of Maureen's
nostrils due to the unpatched undersurface covering of her brain, leaving the swollen
portion of her brain exposed. A second surgery was made on July 30, 1991 to repair
Maureen's brain covering. He used the fascia lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace
the destroyed covering of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained unconscious. The
trickle of brain tissues through her nose was lessened but Maureen developed infection
as a result of the destruction of her brain covering. Maureen developed brain abscess
because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to remove brain abscess and
all possible focus of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis
explained that Maureen was shot at the left side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at
1.5 cm. above the eyebrow. Upon entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented into
pieces and went from the left to the right side of the temple, fracturing the frontal bone
of the skull. The bullet eventually settled behind the right jaw of Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital parts of
the body, the brain. When Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they discovered
hemorrhage in her brain. After the bullet hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic lesion on
the ventricles of the brain and the second covering of the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling underneath
the forehead brought about by edema in the area. Scanning also showed that
Maureen's right jaw was affected by the fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion of
her nose was also swollen. 76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the internal
bleeding and remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments and dead tissues. The
main bullet was recovered behind Maureen's right jaw. There was also an acute
downward trajectory of the bullet. Hence, it was opined that Maureen was shot while
she was seated. 77
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen
survived, she would have led a vegetating life and she would have needed assistance
in the execution of normal and ordinary routines. 78 She would have been completely
blind on the left eye and there was possibility she would have also lost her vision on the right
eye. All her senses would have been modified and the same would have affected her motor
functions There was practically no possibility for Maureen to return to normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of confinement
in the hospital, she ceased to be a breathing soul on October 17, 1991. LexLibris
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused
claimed that on said date and time, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime.
He alleged that he was then in his house at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He
slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991 and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m.
that same morning. Accused avowed his two (2) maids could attest to his presence in
his house that fateful day. 80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the
Dasmariñas shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. He denied knowing
prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas and Vicente Mangubat before they
identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer,
with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good
running condition after its involvement in an accident in February 1991. Since May 1991
until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his
mother's house in Dasmariñas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused,
however, conceded that although the car was not in good running condition, it could still
be used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at
around 5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete
who wanted to ask him about the ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother's
house. He readily gave a statement to the Makati police denying complicity in the crime.
He submitted himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied by the Makati police to the
Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. 83
After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany him to the NBI for he had earlier
committed to his mother that he would present himself to Director Lim. 84
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished Lim
with the statement he earlier gave to the Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at
the NBI against his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the Manila
Hotel for breakfast. When they returned to the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's
office. On his way, he saw a lineup formed inside Lim's office. The NBI agents forced
him to join the lineup and placed him in the number seven (7) slot. He observed that the
man who was to identify him was already in the room. As soon as he walked up to the
lineup, Cadenas identified him as the gunman. 86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes Park.
The NBI agents brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly
identified him as the gunman in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated at the
office of Ranin for he refused to join another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents
insisted on the conduct of the identification and ordered a group of men to line up
alongside him. While thus seated, he was identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He
complained that he was not assisted by counsel at any stage of said investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from May 1989 to February 1991, he had been using
his father's Lancer car bearing plate number PDW 566 in going to school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit a
bicycle driver and two (2) trucks parked at the side of the road. The accident resulted in
the death of the bicycle driver and damage to his father's car, 90 especially on its body.
The timing of the engine became a little off and the car was hard to start. They had the car
repaired at Reliable Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon City. After a month, he brought
the car to the residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati.
He personally started the car's engine and drove it to Makati from the shop in Quezon City.
He did not bring the car to their house in Pasig for it was still scheduled for further repairs
and they preferred to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed that
from that time on, he was prohibited by his father from using the car because of his careless
driving. He kept the keys to the car and since he was busy in school, no further repair on said
car had been made. 91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders Hultman,
adoptive father of deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He capitalized on a newspaper
report that the gunman may have been an overprotective father. This theory was
formed when an eyewitness allegedly overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman:
"Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The defense presented Anders Hultman as a hostile
witness. Llibris
ANDERS HULTMAN testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian

Hultman were married in the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two (2) children by her
previous marriage, one of whom was Maureen. He legally adopted Vivian's two (2)
daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had three (3) children of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the initial
stage of the investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading to the gunman:
"Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen could not have
uttered those words for Maureen never spoke Tagalog. He also said that all his children
call him "Papa," not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out but
instructed her to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first salary in her first
job and she wanted to celebrate with friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his
wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up at around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991
when a security guard came to their house and informed them about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to accused
at the Makati municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked on accused in jail and
discovered that accused was not in his cell. The jail guards even covered up accused's
whereabouts. His complaint was investigated by the Congressional Committee on
Crime Prevention, headed by Congressman Concepcion. 95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F.
BALDADO and SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned from Mr.
Jose Montaño that he sold his white Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to
Saldaña Lending Investors in February 1991. This car was assigned to Ben Conti,
Operations Manager of said company and was in the residence of Conti at the time of
the shooting. The other witnesses he interviewed confirmed that Montaño's white
Lancer car was not in the vicinity of Montaño's residence at the time of the incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente Mangubat.
Mangubat saw the gunman and the get-away car but could not give the control letters of
the car's license plate. Fernandez went to one of the houses at the corner of Mahogany
and Caballero Streets and asked the maid therein if he could use the phone. After
placing a call, the maid told him that he saw the gunman and heard one of the victims
say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get the maid's name but the
latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court nor asked the court to
subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged statement of the maid included in the
Progress Report (Exhibit "13") prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he and
Baldado fetched the latter at Dasmariñas Village for identification of the gunman at the
Makati police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the lobby. After
a few minutes, accused and company arrived. When accused passed by them, they
instructed Mangubat to look around and see if he could identify the gunman. Mangubat
failed to identify accused. Mangubat told Fernandez that the gunman was younger and
shorter than accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo Florece
(Exhibit "MM"). It was signed by Florece in his presence. In said statement, Florece
described the gunman's car as "medyo puti" (somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified
on the paraffin test she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both hands of accused. 100 As
per Chemistry Report No. C 274-91, 101 the test yielded a negative result of gunpowder
nitrates on accused's hands. In said Report, she noted that accused was subjected to
paraffin test more than seventy-two (72) hours after the shooting incident. She explained that
72 hours is the reasonable period within which nitrate residues may not be removed by
ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a person who has fired a gun. 102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also took the
stand for the defense. He testified that in the course of handling the cases, he was able
to confer with Ponferrada, Cadenas' supervisor at the Security agency where Cadenas
was employed. Ponferrada informed him that Cadenas confided to him that he was
tortured at the NBI and was compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada, allegedly,
refused to testify. Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did not compel the
attendance of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the
irregularities committed in the off-court identification of their client. When asked what he
did to remedy this perceived irregularity, Malvar said he objected to the conduct of the
lineup. When further pressed whether he filed a petition for review raising this issue with
the Department of Justice upon the filing of the cases therewith, he said he did not. He
offered the excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal counsel of accused at
that time. He also declared that although they knew that arraignment would mean
waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the investigation and preliminary
investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed accused to be arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the progress
in the investigation of the case. It presented seven (7) newspaper reporters as
witnesses, viz: Nestor Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave
Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer , Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and
Alex Allan of the People's Journal and Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of
defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the testimonies of the news
reporters, thus: cdasia

NESTOR BARRAMEDA , a news reporter of the Manila Times identified two (2)
news reports as having been partly written by him. One was a news item, entitled:
"JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"),
appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified
that a news report is usually the product of collaborative work among several reporters.
They follow the practice of pooling news reports where several reporters are tasked to
cover one subject matter. The news editor then compiles the different reports they file
and summarizes them into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in
evidence as follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
"Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the
investigation of the murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25, and
three members of a family — Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela, 19,
and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7."
Exhibit "1-B"
"Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when
Hultman, a 10th grader at the International School in Makati was escorted home
by Chapman after going to a disco."
Exhibit "1-C"
"The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman."

Exhibit "1-D"
"The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they tried
to escape."
Exhibit "1-E"
"Other angles
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly sensitive"
matter that might involve influential people." 106
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of
the news items marked as Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D." He just culled them from
previous news reports of other newspapers. He admitted that the only portion he
wrote based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director Velasco was Exhibit
"1-E."
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the
Manila Times, entitled: "NBI INSISTS IT HAS 'RIGHT' SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN
SLAY" which was marked as Exhibit "2." Certain portions thereof, which were not
written by Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the defense and offered in evidence,viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital

region, claims, however, that another security guard, Vic Mangubat, had testified
before the police that another man, not Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and
his companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on
Teehankee's hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS laboratory indicated
that he may not have fired the gun. 108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two (2)
newspaper clippings which were partly written by him.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, was entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3," thus:
Exhibit "3-a"
"Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called
"Daddy" shortly before Chapman's shooting."
Exhibit "3-b"
"But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was a
dancer before she was adopted by her foster parent."
Exhibit "3-c"
"Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street
inside the village after the shooting and was believed to have proceeded toward
Forbes Park using the Palm street gate."
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a" and "3-
c." He just reiterated previous reports in other newspapers. They were based on
speculations.
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON
HELD FOR DASMA SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
Exhibit "4-B"
"According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came when
the witness showed up and said that the gunman was on board a silver-metallic
Lancer."
Exhibit "4-C"
"The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the car
and was talking to Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several times."
110
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination, Marfil

admitted that the news reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were written based on
information available at that time. 111
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report, entitled:
"TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which appeared on the July 18,
1991 issue of Malaya. She testified that she wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit
"5-c," and the sources of her information were several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-
c" reads:
"Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee

was arrested at his house.
"They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate control
number 566 who had not been questioned, voluntarily went to police
headquarters upon invitation of Makati Police chief Superintendent Remy
Macaspac." 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged concerted effort
of the investigators to implicate accused as the lone gunman; (b) that there were other
suspects aside from accused and that someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy" was
the actual gunman; (c) that the initial police investigation showed that the gunman's car
was a white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after the NBI took over the
investigation, the white Lancer car of the gunman became a silver gray Lancer of
accused and thereafter, he became the gunman. LLjur
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the portions she
wrote in the news item, entitled: "I WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October
24, 1991 issue of People's Journal (Exhibit "6"). She identified the source of her
information as Mr. Anders Hultman himself. 114
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion," Hultman
said the day after his 17-year old daughter was cremated." 115
Exhibit "6-b"
"The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the Hultman
family's request for permission to visit Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of their
choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding behind the
curtain," Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can take the curtain down and
jail authorities will pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item marked
as Exhibit "6." Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was
quoted as telling Vergel de Dios."
Exhibit "6-e"
"BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-
Hultman, Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases because he belongs to a secret but
very influential multi-sectoral group monitoring graft and corruption and other
crimes in high levels of government and society." 118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given to him
by BIR insiders for the latter refused to be identified. 119
Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged blind and
consuming personal rage and bias of Anders Hultman against accused; and (b) the
unwarranted pressure, prejudice and prejudgment by some congressional leaders in
favor of the Hultmans in violation of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer , identified the news
account which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA
SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He wrote a portion of said article (Exhibit
"7-c) and the source of his information was Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
"Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer with
plate number '566.' The witnesses cannot tell the plate's control letters." 121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991 issue
of the Inquirer, entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS
TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The portions of said news item which he wrote were
marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
"At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who asked
not to be identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man. The NBI has taken
over the case from the CIS."
Exhibit "8-c"
"He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he described
as "resembling Teehankee but looks much younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
"The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as
Mangubat, saw everything that happened in the early morning of July 13. The
witness, however, failed to identify Teehankee as the gunman."122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP CHAPMAN
SLAY CASE," which appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
(Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire news account,124 portions of which were marked by
the defense in evidence, thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
"The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise
witness" picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup."
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to interview
Mangubat himself . 125
Exhibit "9-b"
"Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si
Bobby (Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon bigla
niyang ituturo," said a red-faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did not want
to be identified."
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article,
entitled: "US DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD," which appeared on the July 14, 1991
issue of the Manila Bulletin (Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof were marked as
evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
"The victims were on their way home in Olavi Leino's Mercedez Benz with
a diplomat's plate number when a white Lancer with plate number PKX-566
blocked its path."
Exhibit "10-a-2"
"US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a

communications specialist. He said the shooting could be the result of an
altercation on the street." 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the news
account he wrote which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: "4
MURDER SUSPECTS FALL" (Exhibit "22"). Portions of said news item were marked by
the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . "He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of
Mahogany and Caballero Sts. in Dasmariñas Village at past 4 a.m. Friday."
Exhibit "22-c"
"The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman who
was killed in front of his friends on his way home from a party. The armed men,
on board a white Lancer car, blocked the path of the victim's Mercedes Benz car
inside the village before the shooting."
Exhibit "22-a-1"
"The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered
Chapman to alight from the car. They shot Chapman several times in the body,
while his companions identified as Maureen Hultman, and Jussi Olavi Leino,
were seriously wounded when the gunmen sprayed the car with bullets. prLL
"The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce later
the names of the detained suspects after their initial investigation." 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit

"23"), which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced
by the defense in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
"The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked Chapman's
car on Mahogany St. in the subdivision."
Exhibit "23-a-2"
"Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two
companions, Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olavi Leino, a Finn, to get out of their
car." cdll
Exhibit "23-a-3"
"They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with
plate No. PDW 566. They added that they saw the same car in the garage of the
Teehankee family."129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (2) stories was
the NBI and they were based on information available to the NBI at that time. 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT as its
rebuttal witness. Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify accused when he saw
the latter at the Makati police station. He reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of
the Makati police went to his place of work in Dasmariñas Village and asked him if he
was sure about the identity of the gunman. He told Baldado he was positive. Baldado
then said him he would no longer require him to sign the statement he prepared for him
earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI,
was also presented as a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified that extensive
washing of hands or excessive perspiration can eliminate gunpowder nitrates lodged on
skin pores of the hands. Continued washing with hot water can induce perspiration and
remove nitrate residue embedded in the skin pores. Application of vinegar on the hand
can register the same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a suspect
within 72 hours from the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during which time, any
possible trace of nitrate may still be found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of the
paraffin test. She related that she once attended a training in Baguio City where they
tried to test the accuracy of a paraffin test. In said training, two (2) NBI agents fired a
.38 revolver. One of them washed his hands. They then subjected both agents to a
paraffin test using diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she
opined, the result of a paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative evidence
and evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992 for the
presentation by the defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a day before the
scheduled hearing, the defense filed a Constancia 135 manifesting that it shall waive its
right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the same being unnecessary. The defense, however,
declared that this is without prejudice to the presentation of its evidence in the trial proper
should the same be necessary. cdll
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear. The
prosecution moved in open court that the main cases and the petition for bail be
submitted for decision in view of the absence of defense counsels who had manifested
that they would no longer present their sur-rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted
and the parties were given ten (10) days from receipt of the Order within which to
submit their simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does not appear that the defense objected
to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a motion asking for additional
time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time, both parties submitted their respective
Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes charged. 138 The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:
"(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J.

Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Roland John Chapman, and
sentencing said accused to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to
pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus moderate or temperate and exemplary
damages in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Philippine
Currency;

Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the
heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00),
Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83),
Philippine Currency, as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of earning capacity of the said
deceased; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as
moral, moderate and exemplary damages;

Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Frustrated
Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay the said offended party the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos
(P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum equivalent in Philippine
Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of earning capacity of said offended
party; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages.
"(4) In all these three cases, ordering said accused to pay all the
offended parties the sum of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
"(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
"Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED." cdlex
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He
filed a Motion for New Trial , 139 alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in
considering as submitted for decision not only the petition for bail but also the case on the
merits. He claimed that accused's right to adduce further evidence was violated. His motion
for new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCU SED
HAD BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND
MANGUBAT AS THE ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND
MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT
WAS MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO
EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL
TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF
CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS
ATTENDED BY TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
OF THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON
THE MERITS AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME
TIME WITHOUT GIVING THE ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE ON THE
MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3)
eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. He vigorously assails his
out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone
surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an occupied house in Forbes Park
was highly irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he
identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to
the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have
been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction
over the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The shooting
lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed
only on the gunman's face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer
he imbibed that night. Llibris
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the

prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification
constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the
prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and
authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or
DNA testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness evidence as "inherently suspect."
141 The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a

crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event
actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event.
Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers
of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for
whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately,
they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.
(Emphasis Supplied). 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done

thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the
case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying
on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities
cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process.
There is nothing wrong in Leino's identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in
Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for
security reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and
escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the
house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification
at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. 145 Leino's fear
for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of
the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of
the Special Operations Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast rule
as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in
open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the
mind of the victim. 146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV
accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the records show
that on July 15, 1991, while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three (3)
pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified appellant as the gunman
from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot
identification, he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report relative to the
shooting incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification
was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain
about the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by Leino.
The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely
2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes .
Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify against appellant. His testimony at the trial was
straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense
counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked how sure he
was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: "I'm very sure.
It could not have been somebody else." 148
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to
a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It
was sufficiently established that Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his
tongue, limited his mobility. The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still
physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. 149
There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness
whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by appellant on the case
o f People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was
acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the finding
that the prosecution's evidence was, at best, circumstantial and "suspiciously short in
important details," there being no investigation whatsoever conducted by the police. cdll
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch
prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino. There is nothing on
the record to show that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could
warrant a presumption that the sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch
did not resemble appellant is not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino
to have remembered appellant's face when the incident happened within a span of five
(5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture
of appellant. Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality
committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can
remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. 151 We have ruled that
the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their
assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body
movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to
impute a serious crime to appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each
other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified appellant, it must be because
appellant was the real culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas
did not witness the crime. He stresses that when the Dasmariñas security force and the
Makati police conducted an on-the-spot investigation on the day of the incident, neither
came across Cadenas. The next day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent
interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied: "Nakita ko
pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he supposedly
witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He went to the
NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his
statement to the NBI. Cadenas allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI
tortured him.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the
authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related that
he feared for his and his family's safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his
own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant belonged
to an influential family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance of protection
from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the authorities. 153 The Court has
taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of
crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court
has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with
authorities as an indicium of incredulity. 154 It will not depart from this ruling.
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out by
the records. Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada,
information about his torture. The allegation is an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada
was not presented in the witness stand. Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation
of torture. The claim of torture is also belied by the fact that Cadenas' entire family was
allowed to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and likewise extended protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing the
testimony of defense witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado
testified that Mangubat failed to identify appellant as the gunman the first time he was
brought to the Makati police station. Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He
declared he positively identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati police station.
He averred that the day after he identified appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to his place
of work in Dasmariñas and asked him again whether appellant was the gunman. Again,
he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said he would no longer ask him to
sign a statement (Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement
previously prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant, whom he
saw at the Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give more weight to the
testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat would
perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous to Pat. Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr.
Hultman has proved that the Makati police, including some of its jail officials, gave appellant
favored treatment while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a
congressional investigation. LexLibris
II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court
erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in
previous shooting incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that evidence that one did or
omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do
the same or similar thing at another time. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination
to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered
from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunman's car
as white, but the trial court found it to be silver metallic gray. Fourth, appellant could not have
been the gunman for Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that he overheard
the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't shoot me and don't kill
me. I promise Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the
scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say:
"Daddy, don't shoot. Don't." Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car from Dasmariñas Village to
the NBI office which proved that the same was not in good running condition. Lastly, the
result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz: (a) ANDERS HULTMAN, since
one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen
plead to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b) JOSE MONTAÑO, another resident of
Dasmariñas Village, who had a white Lancer car, also bearing license plate control
number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge
violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he considered his involvement in previous
shooting incidents. This stance is a specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the English
Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a trial court's error as to the admission of evidence
was presumed to have caused prejudice and therefore, almost automatically required a
new trial." 158 The Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest for even English appellate
courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence "unless in its opinion, some
substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been occasioned." 159 American courts
adopted this approach especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required
a federal appellate court to "give judgment after an examination of the entire record before
the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties." 160 We have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our
jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging
quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly
admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. 161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the
troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin
of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As
aforestated, the appellant was convicted mainly because of his identification by three
(3) eyewitnesses with high credibility. Llibris
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with
the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate
appellant. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive
identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was not in
running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car
from Dasmariñas Village where it was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is
negated by the records which show that said car was towed because the NBI could not
get its ignition key which was then in the possession of appellant. Clearly, the car was
towed not because it was not in running condition. Even appellant's evidence show that
said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove it from
the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmariñas Village, in Makati, where it was
parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses'
description of the color of the gunman's car. Leino described the car as light-colored;
Florece said the car was somewhat white ("medyo puti"); 163 Mangubat declared the car
was white; 164 and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray. 165 These alleged
discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are not meaningful,
referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the
speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these
slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses
unworthy of credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive
father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper
item 166 where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman:"Huwag, Daddy.
Huwag, Daddy." The evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could
not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have uttered
said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed
Anders Hultman as "Papa," not "Daddy." 167 Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this
suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking
into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. 168 Leino
is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of
nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved
extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from
this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm.
The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person
who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these
substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco." 169 In numerous
rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands
after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong
wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. 170 In the case at bar, NBI Forensic
Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of
hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the
skin. She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two
(72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time,
the nitrates could have already been removed by washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report
172 on the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted
that when appellant was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already
lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.cdlex

III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as he
contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He
postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials
avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than Vice-President Joseph
Estrada and then Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended some of the
hearings and, President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman while
she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect
him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the prosecution
of the cases. He claims there were placards displayed during the hearing of the cases,
spectators inside the courtroom clapped their hands and converted the proceedings into
a carnival. In another instance, he was allegedly given the "finger sign" by several
young people while he was leaving the courtroom on his way back to his cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial
due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at
bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and
now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for,
as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden
of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . .. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny
and criticism." 173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial
judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of
members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen
straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they
lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's
wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: "When a
gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given
under the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports based
upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own
ignorance and stupidity . . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of
brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" 174 Our judges are
learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances
of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial
judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the
case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al ., 175 we rejected this standard of possibility
of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of
his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change
even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do not
disclose that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he
consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct
inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at bar. The transcripts reveal the
following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the
attention of the court to the visible display of a placard inside the courtroom.
Acting on the manifestation, the trial judge immediately directed that the placard
be hidden. Only then did he order the start of the arraignment of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of the
media after they had enough opportunity to take pictures. The court granted
defense's request, noting that the courtroom was also too crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued
between the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the audience clapped
their hands, the defense counsel invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court and moved for the exclusion of the public. Assistant Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio objected on the ground that the public was not unruly. The trial judge
noted that there were yet no guidelines drafted by the Supreme Court regarding
media coverage of trial proceedings. 178 Collaborating defense counsel, Atty.
Malvar, complained that the outpouring of sympathy by spectators inside the
courtroom has turned the proceedings into a carnival. He also manifested that he
personally saw that when accused was being brought back to his cell from the
courtroom, a group of young people were pointing dirty fingers at accused in full
view of policemen. Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he could not be
dissuaded by public sentiments. He noted that the clapping of hands by the
public was just a reaction at the spur of the moment. He then admonished the
audience not to repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the
coverage of the trial by the press. The defense alleged that the media coverage
will constitute mistrial and deny accused's constitutional right to due process. It
invoked the provision in the Rules of Court which allows the accused to exclude
everybody in the courtroom, except the organic personnel. The prosecutor,
however, argued that exclusion of the public can be ordered only in prosecution
of private offenses and does not apply to murder cases. He added that the public
is entitled to observe and witness trial of public offenses. He quoted the U.S case
o f Sheppard v. Maxwell 180 where it was held: "A responsible press is always
regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration especially in the
criminal field. The press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the
prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
What transpires in the courtroom is public property." The trial judge then ruled
that the media should be given a chance to cover the proceedings before the trial
proper but, thereafter, he prohibited them from taking pictures during the trial.
They were allowed to remain inside the courtroom but were ordered to desist
from taking live coverage of the proceedings. 181
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial
judge gave the media two (2) minutes to take video coverage and no more. Trial
then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the
media two (2) minutes to take pictures before the trial proper. Afterwards, the
reporters were duly admonished to remain silent, to quietly observe the
proceedings and just take down notes. 183
6. On September 10, 1992, before the start of the afternoon session,

the judge admonished the media people present in the courtroom to stop taking
pictures. 184
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press
for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less
than seven (7) newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their
reports for his defense. The defense's documentary evidence consists mostly of
newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared
to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same
time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge
voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's
suspicion of bias and partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of the trial judge's voluntary
Order of Inhibition to this Court, we directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed
up the administration of justice. 186 We found nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to
stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge. LLjur
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not present in the
killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that
the gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms
in the execution of the crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does
not prove treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the crimes at
bar with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled
out by the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual
encounter or a chance meeting on the street since the victims were unknown to
appellant and vice-versa. It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman .
Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting.
He testified that for no apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and
accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him
his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on.
Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was
wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt,
and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all
Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no
chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that
appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that
appellant acted on the spur of the moment . Their meeting was by chance. They were
strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was
short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We have
consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself,
constitute treachery. 187 Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should
only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold
that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that
after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement .
Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When
appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance
between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit
beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two
were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a
completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse
of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman — a
period which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated
by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of
Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant posits that
the awards of moral and exemplary damages and for loss of earning capacity of
Maureen Hultman, Roland Chapman and Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He likewise
claims that the trial court's award of attorney's fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino and the heirs of victims
Hultman and Chapman the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced
to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as indemnity for death and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) as moderate or temperate and exemplary damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was

sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as
actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning
capacity of deceased; and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to

pay: Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury; One
Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four
Centavos (P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.
$55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine pesos of
U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of earning capacity of Jussi Leino; and, One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the
offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (or a total of three million pesos)
for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
5. Costs of litigation. 188
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail the
matter of damages recoverable in case of death arising from a felony, thus:
"When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations
arising therefrom are governed by penal laws, '. . . subject to the provisions of
Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on
Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages.'
(Art. 1161, Civil Code)
"Thus, 'every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Art.
100, Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death,
includes indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id. ) and said
consequential damages in turn include '. . . those suffered by his family or by a
third person by reason of the crime.' (Art. 107, id. ) Since these provisions are
subject, however, as above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, (w)e
will now turn to said provisions.
"The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
"In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably foseseen by the defendant." (Art.
2202)
"When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206
which provides thus:
"The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict shall be at least three thousand pesos even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
"(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of
the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability
not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his
death;

"(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to
the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
descendant's inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not
exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
"(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."
"The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been
increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426,
and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 18793,
promulgated October 11, 1968, 190 and it must be stressed that this amount, as
well as the amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of
pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages being 'left to the discretion
of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.' (Art. 2216)
"Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability

when the crime has been committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, such damages being 'separate and distinct from fines and shall
be paid to the offended party.' (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however
be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should
be given. (Art. 2233)
"In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity
for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases wherein exemplary
damages are awarded precisely because of the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, (Art. 2230) '. . . damages to be adjudicated may be respectively
increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances,'
(Art. 2204) 'but the party suffering the loss or injury must exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or
omission in question.' (Art. 2203) 'Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a
proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the Court.' (Art. 2211) As to
attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered only when
exemplary damages have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or . . . when there is a
separate civil action."
"Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of
the deceased are entitled to the following items of damages:
"1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense —

P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00), without the need of any evidence or proof
of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances attending the commission of the offense.
"2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased —

an amount to be fixed by the court according to the circumstances of the
deceased related to his actual income at the time of death and his
probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and awarded
by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning
capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not caused by the
accused. If the deceased was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil
Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the
accused for not more than five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court.
"3. As moral damages for mental anguish, — an amount to be

fixed by the court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
"4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one

or more aggravating circumstances, — an amount to be fixed in the
discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from fines.
"5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, — the actual
amount thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover civil
liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
"6. Interests in the proper cases.
"7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable
separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 (now
P50,000.00) corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and
that these damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened
according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1
and 4 above, for obvious reasons." 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN
CHAPMAN in light of the law and the case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos
as moderate or temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of Roland John
Chapman was baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped together
the awards for moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), without specifying the particular amount which
corresponds to each, as they are of a different kind. We shall, however, consider their
propriety and reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be given as
temperate or moderate damages for the records do not show any basis for sustaining
the award. Nor can it be given as exemplary damages. The killing of Chapman was not
attended by either evident premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can
be considered as one for moral damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code.
192 It states:
"Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . .
shall be at least (fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence) . . . In
addition: LexLibris
xxx xxx xxx

(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants
of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased."
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by

appellant, we increase the amount of moral damages to One Million (P1,000,000 .00)
pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of MAUREEN
NAVARRO HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded
to her mother, Vivian Hultman, and her natural father. He contends that under Article
352 of the New Civil Code, Anders Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is not
entitled to said award. Only the parents by nature of Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in effect at
the time of Maureen's death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled to the
award made by the trial court. Article 190 of the Family Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
"(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
descendants of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire
estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half,
by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire
estate;"
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her natural
father. During the trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their
claim of damages. Hence, we find that the award of damages in their favor has
sufficient factual and legal basis.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the
very least, exorbitant and should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply justified by
the circumstances. The records reveal that Maureen hovered between life and death for
ninety-seven (97) days. Her family experienced the peaks and valleys of unspeakable
suffering. During that time, she underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition
was never stable and remained critical. It was always touch and go with death. She
could not be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to be perpetually by her side at
least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings had to be sent
back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended, her family's business took a downspin.
Soon, her family's assets were depleted, then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23)
doctors attended to her and their bills ballooned without abatement. They were forced
to rely on the goodness of the gracious. Her family started receiving contributions from
other people to defray the medical expenses and hospital bills. 193 Maureen never
regained consciousness until her demise on October 17, 1991, at the tender age of
seventeen. Under the foregoing circumstances, we thus find the award of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the
circumstances of the case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code , 194 in addition to the
award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be adjudged in order to
deter the commission of similar acts in the future. The award for exemplary damages is
designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences.
Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen
Hultman, a girl in the prime of her youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned
down by appellant in cold-blood, for no apparent reason. Appellant's vicious criminality
led to the suffering of his victims and their families. Considering our soaring crime rate,
the imposition of exemplary damages against appellant to deter others from taking the
lives of people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover, since the killing of Hultman
was attended by treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 195 we
impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages against
appellant for the death of Maureen Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive
injuries as a result of the shooting. His upper jaw bone was shattered. He would need a
bone transplant operation to restore it. His tongue was also injured. He partially lost his
sense of taste for his taste buds were also affected. When he was discharged from the
hospital, he had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed through a tube running down his
nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off and the raw nerves
were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries and suffering. More
devastating was the emotional strain that distressed Leino. His parents were in Europe
for a vacation at the time of the shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at the
hospital. It took two (2) days for his father to come and comfort by his bedside. Leino
had trouble sleeping in peace at night. The traumatic event woke him up in the middle
of the night. Black memories of the incident kept coming back to mind. 196
Understandably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family. Seppo Leino, Jussi's
father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had to relocate his entire family to Europe
where he felt they would be safe. 197 Under the foregoing circumstances, we find that an
award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral damages
is justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with
treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 198 appellant is additionally
adjudged liable for the payment to Leino of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary
damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS OF
EARNING CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the
victim, at the time of injury or death, is gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature
is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v.
Laguna Tayabas Bus Company , 199 we awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum
representing loss of his earning capacity although he was still a medical student at the time
of injury. However, the award was not without basis for Cariaga was then a fourth year
medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic record, which was presented at the trial,
justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish his course and pass the board
in due time; and a doctor, presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of
income Cariaga would have earned had he finished his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in Philippine
pesos, of Forty Thousand Dollars (U.S. $40,000.00) for the loss of earning capacity of
JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly speculative and
should be denied considering that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the
International School, Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the military and
has just arrived in Manila in February 1991 to pursue his ambition to become a pilot. At
the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991, he has just enrolled at the Manila Aero Club
to become a professional pilot. He was thus only on his first year, first semester, in said
school and was practically, a mere high school graduate. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial evidence to justify a
reasonable assumption that Leino would have been able to finish his studies at the
Manila Aero Club and ultimately become a professional pilot. cdll
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We
find that the award is not supported by the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial court
incorrectly used the monthly salary of a secretary working in Sweden, computed at two
thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a month, as per the estimate given by Anders Hultman.
Nowhere in the records does it appear that, at the time of her death, Maureen had
acquired the skills needed for a secretarial job or that she intended to take a secretarial
course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman himself testified that
there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path, thus:
"ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot and she continued her
studies, what professional career would she would (sic) like to pursue
considering her interests and inclinations?
"WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17 and our projection is
that, certainly she would have been an artist in the creative side. She
would have become an actress or a movie producer or probably she would
have been a college graduate.
"ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the salary of a secretary in Sweden,
how much would she have earned?
A Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month." 200
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million
(P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maureen for loss of earning capacity as a
probable secretary in Sweden. LLjur
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high
school, Maureen took up a short personality development course at the John Roberts
Powers. Maureen was employed at the John Roberts Powers at the time of her death . It
was her first job. In fact, she had just received her first salary, for which reason she
went out with her friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However, neither the nature of
her work nor her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to compute the
award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use the minimum
wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17, 1991), i.e., one hundred
eighteen pesos (P118.00). 201 Allowing for reasonable and necessary expenses in the
amount of P19,800.00, her net income per annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202 Hence,
using the formula repeatedly adopted by this Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 — age of victim at time of
death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would have been received by the
heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of earning capacity of deceased Maureen
Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos
(P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored in.
The rule is well-settled that the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of
the life expectancy of the deceased, and not the beneficiary. 205
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the amount
of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the
ACCRA law firm, with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the
amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos each as attorney's fees and for litigation
expenses. The three criminal cases were consolidated. A continuous trial was
conducted, with some hearings having both morning and afternoon sessions. The trial
lasted for almost one and half years. More than forty (40) witnesses testified during the
hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight (68)
documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents related to the trial of
the cases came up to this Court for review at least twice during the pendency of the
trial. 206 Given these circumstances and the evident effort exerted by the private
prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial court's award of a total of Three Million
(P3,000,000.00) pesos as attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears just and
reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on the
cases, where no less than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by the parties, 207
were merely hearings on the petition for bail concerning the murder charge for the
killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant
insists that after the termination of the hearing, he still had the right to adduce evidence
at the trial proper. He claims he was denied due process when the trial court considered
all the cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present its sur-
rebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first hearing
of the cases on August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was appellant's petition for
bail for the murder of Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, there was only one
murder charge against appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during
the course of the proceedings on October 17, 1991. prLL
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution was
appellant's petition for bail. The prosecution sought to present the surviving victim, Jussi
Leino, to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and inconvenience since all
three (3) charges involved one continuing incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected
to the testimony of Leino insofar as the two (2) frustrated murder charges (with respect
to the wounding of Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He argued that since the
pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the killing of Chapman, any
testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail were recommended was
irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would present
Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after accused's arraignment
on August 14, 1991. 208 The prosecution agreed on the condition that there shall be trial on
the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed.
209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented Jussi
Leino as its first witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the
defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the
hearings conducted by the trial court were limited to the petition for bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary
evidence relative to the shooting incident, including evidence in support of the
claim for damages. These witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the
defense counsels. The defense never objected that evidence on damages would
be unnecessary if its intention was really to limit presentation of evidence to
appellant's petition for bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases,the trial
court issued an Order 211directing the parties to submit their Memorandum, after
which "the main case as well as the petition for bail are respectively submitted for
Decision and Resolution." After receipt of this Order, the defense counsel filed
two (2) motions for extension of time to file the defense Memorandum. In both
Motions, the defense did not object to the trial court's Order submitting for
decision the main case and the petition for bail. Neither did it move for a
reconsideration of this Order and notify the court that it still had witnesses to
present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo
Jimenez, filed a Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum praying for
accused's acquittal. This is inconsistent with the defense's position that the
hearing conducted was only on the petition for bail. If the defense insist that what
was submitted for decision was only his petition for bail, he would have only
prayed that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the trial
court, the defense did not interpose any objection to the intended promulgation.
In fact, the defense attended the promulgation of the Decision and manifested
that they were ready therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail were
heard simultaneously and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to
present additional evidence was not abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the
records disclose that the trial court afforded the defense fair opportunity to adduce its
evidence. It took the defense almost one and a half years to submit its evidence. The
defense presented more than twenty (20) witnesses and several documentary
evidence. It was only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that he
filed a motion for new trial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first
time, he alleged that the joint decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition for
bail, was irregular for he was not given a chance to present further evidence to corroborate
his alibi. We note that in his motion for new trial, 213 appellant did not even identify his
alleged additional witnesses and the substance of their testimonies. Nor was it shown that he
could not have produced these evidence at the trial with reasonable diligence. Appellant's
motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on his cases. His motion was properly denied
by the trial court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision
of the trial court, dated December 22, 1992, thus:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J.

Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the
shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased
the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the
victim's death; and, One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages.

Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified
by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him
to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said
deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
indemnity for her death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four
Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual
damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.

Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision
mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months ofreclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following amounts:
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred
Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos
(P118,369.84) and the equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as
actual damages; One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and,
Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages. LexLibris
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three
(3) offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of
Three Million [P3,000,000.00] pesos) for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
1. The Court received the Appellant's Brief on March 21, 1994, the Appellee's Brief on
November 10, 1994 and Appellant's Reply Brief on March 6, 1995. With the filing of the
Reply Brief, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
2. Original Records, p. 1.
3. Ibid., p. 220.
4. Ibid., p. 41.
5. TSN, August 9, 1991, pp. 35–36.
6. Ibid., pp. 38 & 66.
7. Ibid., pp. 68, 71–72.
8. Ibid., 76–82.
9. TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 5–8.

10. Jussi Leino and Maureen Hultman were former schoolmates at the International
School.
11. TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 15–20.
12. Ibid., pp. 21–22.
13. Ibid., pp. 22–24, 29–30, 80.

14. Seppo Leino, Jussi's father, was a Finnish national and a communications specialist at
ADB; TSN, October 4, 1991, pp. 64–65.
15. TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 31–32, 104.
16. Ibid., pp. 33–40, 105–109.
17. Ibid., pp. 37–39.
18. Ibid., pp. 97–98.
19. Ibid., pp. 40–42, 53.
20. Ibid., pp. 43 & 111.
21. Roxas' residence was only about three (3) houses away from the scene of the crime;
TSN, August 27, 1991, pp. 10–11.
22. TSN, September 3, 1991, pp. 11 & 14.
23. TSN, September 23, 1991, pp. 43–45.
24. Florece was about 85 steps away from the scene of the crime; TSN, August 27, 1991,
p. 22.

25. TSN, August 27, 1991, pp. 30, 34–35; see also Exhibit "C", Sworn Statement of
Florece, Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, at p. 119.
26. See Sworn Statement of Cadenas, dated July 16, 1991, Exhibit "BB", Folder of
Prosecution Exhibits, at p. 154.
27. TSN, September 23, 1991, p. 64.

28. TSN, September 3, 1991, pp. 31–32.
29. TSN, August 27, 1991, p. 21; TSN, September 3, 1991, p. 32; TSN, September 23,
1991, p. 62.
30. TSN, September 11, 1991, pp. 30 & 32.
31. TSN, August 27, 1991, pp. 35–37, 46–47.
32. Ibid., p. 44.

33. TSN, August 14, 1992, pp. 18–19.
34. Before 9 a.m. of July 13, 1991, NBI Director Lim received a call from U.S. embassy
officials, informing him about a shooting incident at Dasmariñas Village, which resulted
in the death of an American citizen (Chapman) and the wounding of two (2) others;
TSN, October 4, 1991, p. 10.
35. TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 184–187.
36. Ibid., pp. 188–189, 192.
37. Ibid., pp. 190–196.

38. TSN, August 27, 1991, pp. 192–193, 206, 213–218, 224; TSN, October 2, 1991, pp.
190–191.
39. TSN, September 23, 1991, pp. 92–102; TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 201–204.
40. TSN, October 4, 1991, pp. 35–47.

41. TSN, August 27, 1991, pp. 221–224, 233–236.
42. TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 205–208.
43. Ibid., pp. 208–211.
44. Exhibit "BB", supra.
45. TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 218–222.
46. Ibid., pp. 223–228.
47. Ibid., pp. 229–231, 248–249.
48. Ibid., pp. 252–254.
49. Ibid., pp. 255–257.
50. Ibid., pp. 259–260.

51. At the time, Cadenas was staying at the NBI compound for security purposes, together
with witnesses in other cases who were also placed under NBI protection; TSN, October
2, 1991, pp. 268–269.
52. Exhibit "DD", Photo of the identification, Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 161.
53. TSN, October 2, 1991, p. 260.

54. TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 116 & 126.
55. Ibid., pp. 120–122, 128–137.
56. Ibid., pp. 132–148.

57. TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 283–284.
58. TSN, September 3, 1991, p. 34; TSN, September 11, 1991, p. 60.
59. Ibid., pp. 37–38; ibid., pp. 72–73.
60. Ibid., pp. 37–42; ibid., pp. 68–75.

61. TSN, September 3, 1991, pp. 41–44.
63. TSN, September 3, 1991, pp. 44–45; TSN, October 19, 1992, pp. 18–19.
64. TSN, September 3, 1991, pp. 45–50.
65. TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 285–294.
66. Ibid., pp. 295–299.
67. As per the medico-legal report of Dr. Pedro P. Solis, Exhibit "K", Folder of Prosecution
Exhibits, p. 138.
68. TSN, September 18, 1991, pp. 85–92.
69. Ibid., p. 94.

70. TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 26, 28.
71. Ibid., pp. 29–30.
72. Ibid., pp. 31–32.
73. Ibid., pp. 33–43.

74. TSN, September 18, 1991, pp. 27–39.
75. Ibid., pp. 41–46, 55.
76. Ibid., pp. 48–51.
77. Ibid., pp. 57, 68–69.
78. Ibid., pp. 66 & 73.
79. Ibid., pp. 76 & 82.

80. TSN, October 9, 1992, pp. 75–76, 132, 136, 186–187.
81. Ibid., pp. 77, 151–157.
82. Ibid., pp. 77–81, 183.
83. Ibid., pp. 81–87.
84. Ibid., pp. 87–89.
85. Ibid., pp. 92–93.
86. Ibid., pp. 94–107.
87. Ibid., pp. 114–117.
88. Ibid., pp. 112–114.
89. TSN, October 9, 1992, pp. 10–11, 24.

90. As a result of this accident, a criminal charge for reckless imprudence was filed against
him. However, in view of the desistance of the victim's parents, the case against him
was dismissed; id., pp. 11–14; See also Resolution, dated May 16, 1991, Exhibit "30",
Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 60.
91. Ibid., pp. 20–41, 63–64.
92. TSN, July 14, 1992, pp. 49–60, 72.
93. Ibid., pp. 79–80, 90.

94. TSN, July 22, 1992, pp. 28, 35, 43 and 109.
95. Ibid., pp. 74–75.
96. TSN, August 10, 1992, pp. 77–78, 86–88.

97. TSN, August 14, 1992, pp. 16–30, 51–52.
98. Ibid., pp. 31–35.

99. TSN, August 18, 1992, pp. 22, 24, 33.
100. As per request of Captain Roberto Reyes, Chief of the Special Investigation Division,
Makati Police Station Exhibit "20", Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 50.
101. Exhibit "21", Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 51.
102. TSN, August 25, 1992, pp. 12, 14, 20–25, 83–87.
103. TSN, September 1, 1992, pp. 89–105.
104. Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 16.
105. TSN, July 29, 1992, pp. 14–19.
107. TSN, July 29, 1992, pp. 32, 39–40.

109. Ibid., p. 18.
110. Ibid., p. 19.

111. TSN, July 29, 1992, pp. 56–61.
112. Ibid., pp. 69–71, 76.

113. Folder of Defense Exhibits, at p. 21.
114. TSN, August 4, 1992, pp. 12–19.
116. Ibid., at p. 23.

117. TSN, August 7, 1992, pp. 30–34.
119. TSN, August 7, 1992, p. 36.
120. Ibid., pp. 40 & 49.

122. Ibid., p. 25.
123. Ibid., p. 26.

124. TSN, August 7, 1992, p. 59.
125. Ibid., p. 63.
126. Ibid., pp. 77–78.

128. Ibid., pp. 63–64.
129. Ibid., p. 64.
130. TSN, August 12, 1992, pp. 68, 72 and 74.

131. TSN, October 19, 1992, pp 18–19; There was a statement in the unsigned sworn
statement prepared by Baldado (Exhibit "HHH") to the effect that Mangubat saw
accused at the Makati police station but categorically stated that accused was not the
gunman.
132. Ibid., pp. 110–116.
133. Ibid., pp. 116–117.
134. Ibid., pp. 118–121.

136. Order, dated October 29, 1992, Original Records, p. 743.
137. See Motion for Additional Time, dated November 6, 1992, p. 744.
138. Decision, penned by Judge Job B. Madayag, presiding judge, Makati Regional Trial
Court, Branch 145; Rollo, pp. 50–78.
139. Original Records, pp. 989–1001.

140. Atty. Lino M. Patajo, Former Associate Justice of this Court, represented accused in
the present appeal.
141. LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, Hornbook Series, 1992 ed., p. 353.
142. Ibid.
143. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188 [1973]; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 [1977]; Del
Carmen, Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, 3rd Edition, p. 346.
144. TSN, August 14, 1991, p. 126.
145. Ibid., pp. 116, 120–122.

146. TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 276–277.
147. TSN, August 17, 1991, p. 117.
148. Ibid.
149. TSN, August 14, 1991, p. 117.
150. Supra.
151. People v. Campa, G.R. No. 105391, February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 431.
152. People v. Apawan, G.R. No. 85329, August 16, 1994, 235 SCRA 355.
153. TSN, September 23, 1991, pp. 96, 107–109.
154. People v. Bongadillo, G.R. No. 96687, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 233;People v.
Israel, G.R. No. 97027, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 155;People v. Fuertes, G.R. No.
104067, January 17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289.
155. TSN, September 23, 1991, pp. 90–97.

157. Section 48, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
158. LaFave and Israel, op cit, p. 1160.
159. Ibid. Rulings were based on the so-called Harmless Error legislation included in the
English Judicature Act of 1873.
160. Ibid., p. 1161.
161. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 105805, August 16, 1994, 235 SCRA 371; People v.
Chatto, G.R. No. 102704, 219 SCRA 785; People v. Peran, G.R. No. 95259, October
26, 1992, 215 SCRA 152; People v. Pizarro, G.R. No. 49282, July 6, 1992, 211 SCRA
325, 336; People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 100813, January 31, 1992, 205 SCRA 666.
162. TSN, October 9, 1992, pp. 37–39.
163. TSN, August 27, 1991, pp. 3, 34–35.
164. TSN, September 3, 1991, pp. 28–29.
165. TSN, September 23, 1991, p. 62.

166. Exhibit "4-c", Folder of Defense Exhibits, at p. 19.
167. TSN, October 4, 1991, p. 49; TSN, July 14, 1992, pp. 79–84.
168. TSN, October 4, 1991, p. 80.
169. Turner, Criminalities, Bancroft Whitney Co., 1915 ed., p. 141; See also Richardson,
Modern Scientific Evidence, Anderson Co., p. 495.
170. People v. Ducay, G.R. No. 86939, August 2, 1993, 225 SCRA l;People v. Hubilo,
G.R. No. 101741, 220 SCRA 389; People v. Pasiliao, G.R. No. 98152-53, October 26,
1992, 215 SCRA 163; People v. Clamor, G.R. No. 82708, July 1, 1991, 198 SCRA 642;
People v. Talingdan, G.R. No. 94339, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA 333.
171. TSN, October 19, 1992, 110, 114–117.
172. Exhibit "21", Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 51.
173. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US 333, 350, 86 S Ct. 1507, 1515, 16 L ed. 600 [1966].
174. Mark Twain, Sketches, New and Old, New York, Harper and Bros. 1899.
175. L-30894, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 108.
176. TSN, August 14, 1991, p. 5.
177. Ibid., pp. 51–52.

178. Indeed, it was only on October 22, 1991 that this Court issued a Resolution regarding
live television and radio coverage of hearing of cases. This en banc Resolution was
brought about the live coverage of the hearing of the libel case filed by then President
Aquino against newspaper columnist Luis Beltran. The testimony of Pres. Aquino as
complainant was fully carried on air by the media. Then Congressman Art Borjal called
the attention of this Court to the possible excessiveness and impropriety of such
coverage. Forthwith, the Court issued the October 22, 1991 Resolution proscribing the
live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of hearings for
news purposes was to be taken prior to the commencement of the trial proper.
179. TSN, August 27, 1991, pp. 95–104.
180. Supra.
181. TSN, July 14, 1992, pp. 5–11, 16–17.
182. TSN, August 14, 1992, pp. 13.
183. TSN, September 8, 1992, p. 11.
184. TSN, September 10, 1992, p. 8.
185. Order dated May 29, 1992, Original Records, pp. 560–563.
186. En Banc Resolution, dated June 16, 1992, A.M. No. 91-6-508-RTC, Original Records,
p. 564.
187. People v. Supremo, G.R. No. 100915, May 31, 1995, citing People v. Ramirez, G.R.
Nos. 80747-48, October 17, 1991, 203 SCRA 25, 36; People v. Tugbo, Jr., G.R. No.
75894, April 22, 1991, 196 SCRA 133; People v. Tumaob, No. L-2300, May 27, 1949,
83 Phil. 738.
188. Decision, Rollo, at pp. 77–78.

189. G.R. No. L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327.
190. As per the policy adopted by the Court en banc on August 30, 1990, the amount of
civil indemnity for death caused by a crime has been increased to P50,000.00; People
v. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, September 18, 1990, 189 SCRA 700, 714.
191. Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos, supra,at pp. 332–335.

192. Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . . shall be at least
(fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence) . . . In addition:
xxx xxx xxx

(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased."
193. TSN, October 4, 1991, pp. 21–25; TSN, July 22, 1992, p. 69.
194. "Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages."
195. Supra.
196. TSN, October 4, 1991, pp. 68–70, 76 & 78; TSN, August 14, 1991, p. 46.
197. TSN, October 4, 1991, p. 79.
198. Supra.
199. No. L-11037, December 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 346.
200. TSN, October 4, 1991, pp. 36–38.

201. As per Wage Order Nos. NCR-02 and 02-A, effective January 8, 1991.
202. Using the equation: Equivalent Monthly Rate = Applicable Daily Rate x 365 divided by
12; See Annex "A" Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A,
January 8, 1991. Thus:
Equivalent Monthly Rate = P118.00 x 365
12
= P3,589.17
With allowance for the requirement of at least one (1) month salary as 13th month pay,
the gross income per annum would amount to P46,659.17.
203. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 54470, May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA
110; Monzon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72828, January 31, 1989, 169
SCRA 760; Davila v. Philippine Airlines, No. L-28512, February 28, 1973, 49 SCRA 497;
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,No. L-25499, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA
511.
204. People v. Alvero, Jr., G.R. No. 72319, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 16.
205. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 54470, May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA
110, 121, citing Davila v. Philippine Airlines, No. L-28512, February 28, 1973, 49 SCRA
497.
206. Motion to Inhibit Presiding Judge and Order of Inhibition, Adm. Matter No. 91-6-508-
RTC, Original Records, at p. 564; and, Petition for Certiorari relative to the conduct of
another preliminary investigation for the Amended Information for Murder for the
supervening death of Maureen Hultman, G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA
134, Original Records, pp. 329–336.
207. Appellant himself presented more that twenty (20) witnesses.
208. TSN, August 9, 1991, pp. 35–36.
209. Ibid., pp. 76–82.

210. TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 5–8.
211. Original Records, at p. 743.
212. Ibid., pp. 989–1000.

213. Original Records, pp. 989–1001.

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 111206-08. October 6, 1995.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v s . CLAUDIO

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

ANDERS HULTMAN testiﬁed that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2024 cdasiaonline.com

"The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman."

Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital

Marﬁl's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination, Marﬁl

"Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee

"US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a

Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:

"(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, ﬁnding accused Claudio J.

"(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, ﬁnding accused Claudio J.

"(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, ﬁnding accused Claudio J.

"(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.

It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identiﬁcation by the

Identiﬁcation testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a

Out-of-court identiﬁcation is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done

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6. On September 10, 1992, before the start of the afternoon session,

2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was

3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to

"The general rule in the Civil Code is that:

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"Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability

"1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the oﬀense —

"2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased —

"3. As moral damages for mental anguish, — an amount to be

"4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by

(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, ﬁnding accused Claudio J.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, ﬁnding accused Claudio J.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, ﬁnding accused Claudio J.

6. Ibid., pp. 38 & 66.

7. Ibid., pp. 68, 71–72.

9. TSN, August 14, 1991, pp. 5–8.

12. Ibid., pp. 21–22.

13. Ibid., pp. 22–24, 29–30, 80.

16. Ibid., pp. 33–40, 105–109.

17. Ibid., pp. 37–39.

18. Ibid., pp. 97–98.

19. Ibid., pp. 40–42, 53.

20. Ibid., pp. 43 & 111.

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27. TSN, September 23, 1991, p. 64.

31. TSN, August 27, 1991, pp. 35–37, 46–47.

32. Ibid., p. 44.

35. TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 184–187.

36. Ibid., pp. 188–189, 192.

37. Ibid., pp. 190–196.

40. TSN, October 4, 1991, pp. 35–47.

43. Ibid., pp. 208–211.

44. Exhibit "BB", supra.

45. TSN, October 2, 1991, pp. 218–222.

46. Ibid., pp. 223–228.

47. Ibid., pp. 229–231, 248–249.

48. Ibid., pp. 252–254.