ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY (UNIT 4 / PART 1)

TWO DOGMAS OF EMPIRICISM - W. V. Quine

This passage comes from W.V.O. Quine's essay "Two Dogmas of
Empiricism," in which he critiques two major assumptions that
underlie traditional empiricism:
1. Analytic vs. Synthetic Distinction: This is the belief that there is a
fundamental difference between statements that are true by virtue
of meaning alone (analytic) and those that are true based on facts
about the world (synthetic). For example, the statement "All
bachelors are unmarried" is considered analytic because it is true
solely due to the meanings of "bachelor" and "unmarried." On the
other hand, "It is raining outside" is synthetic, as its truth depends on
observable facts.
2. Reductionism: This is the idea that each meaningful statement can
be reduced to a combination of statements about immediate
experiences or observations. In other words, every statement should
ultimately connect to something we can observe or experience
directly.
Quine argues that both of these assumptions are flawed. The line
between analytic and synthetic statements is less clear-cut than
philosophers traditionally believed, and the concept of "analytic"
statements (those true by meaning alone) lacks a precise definition.
He also suggests that reductionism is problematic because not every
meaningful statement can be traced back to direct experience in a
straightforward way.
He gives examples, like "Evening Star" and "Morning Star," which
both refer to the planet Venus. The meaning of these terms is distinct
(since one describes Venus as it appears in the evening, and the
other as it appears in the morning), even though they refer to the
same object. This distinction implies that meaning is not just about
1
what a term names but also involves other aspects, such as context
or associations.
In essence, Quine is questioning the clarity and usefulness of analytic
truths and reductionism, arguing that doing away with these dogmas
brings us closer to a pragmatic approach to knowledge, where we do
not sharply divide speculative philosophy from empirical science.
In this passage, Quine continues to explore the difference between
meaning and naming (or reference) by using examples to show how
terms that refer to the same thing can have different meanings.
1. Singular Terms: Singular terms name specific things. For example,
"9" and "the number of planets" both refer to the same number (9),
but their meanings differ. We needed scientific observation (i.e., to
count the planets) to understand they referred to the same entity.
This shows that meaning is more than just what a term refers to.
2. General Terms and Extension: General terms describe categories or
groups rather than specific things. A general term like "creature with
a heart" applies to all creatures that have hearts. The extension of a
term is the set of things it applies to. So, while "creature with a
heart" and "creature with a kidney" both describe humans (and
many animals), they mean different things even though they have a
similar extension.
3. Intension vs. Extension: In philosophy, intension (or meaning)
refers to the concept or qualities a term represents, while extension
refers to the actual things it applies to. For example, "biped" refers to
creatures that walk on two legs, while "human" refers to humans
specifically. Even if the extensions overlap (since humans are bipeds),
the intensions differ.
4. Essence and Meaning: For Aristotle, "essence" referred to a thing’s
fundamental characteristics (like rationality in humans). Quine notes
that in modern philosophy, meaning replaces essence; meaning is

2
now linked to the words we use, not the object itself. So while
rationality might be essential in the meaning of "human," it’s not
essential in the meaning of "biped."
5. Problems with Defining Meaning: Quine highlights that meanings
are difficult to define concretely. Are they mental ideas, or abstract
concepts? It’s unclear. This raises challenges for determining when
two terms are truly synonymous or have the same meaning.
Quine’s main argument here is that meanings are not as clear or
stable as we might think, which complicates the idea of a strict,
scientific study of meaning.
Quine is arguing that the idea of "meaning" as a separate entity is
unnecessary and problematic. Instead, he suggests that we should
focus on understanding concepts like synonymy (when two terms
mean the same thing) and analyticity (statements true by meaning
alone), without relying on a mysterious, independent concept of
"meaning."
1. Separating Meaning and Reference: Quine believes that a lot of
confusion comes from failing to separate "meaning" from
"reference." Meaning is about the concept or idea behind words,
while reference is about the specific things words point to in the
world. By keeping these separate, we don’t need to think of
meanings as special "entities" that exist somewhere.
2. Two Types of Analytic Statements:
- Logically True Statements: These are statements that are true no
matter how you interpret the terms (except logical terms like "and"
or "not"). For example, "No unmarried man is married" remains true
regardless of how we interpret "man" or "married."
- Synonym-Based Analytic Statements: These are statements that
can be transformed into logical truths by substituting synonyms. For
example, "No bachelor is married" can be changed to "No unmarried

3
man is married" by replacing "bachelor" with "unmarried man." But
this relies on knowing that "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are
synonyms, and Quine points out that we still lack a clear definition of
what makes two terms synonyms.
3. Carnap’s Approach to Analyticity: Philosopher Rudolf Carnap tried
to explain analyticity by using "state-descriptions." A state-
description assigns truth or falsehood to every possible simple
statement in a language. Under this method, a statement is analytic if
it’s true in every possible state-description (similar to saying it’s true
in all possible worlds). However, this works only if we don’t have
synonyms like "bachelor" and "unmarried man," which complicate
the model.
4. The Problem of Synonymy: Quine suggests that the real challenge
in defining analyticity lies with the second type of analytic
statements, which depend on the idea of synonymy. Without a clear
understanding of synonymy, it’s difficult to confidently define what
makes these statements true by meaning alone.
In summary, Quine is skeptical of the idea that meanings are real
"entities." Instead, he thinks we should focus on understanding
relationships between words, like synonymy, to clarify the concept of
analyticity without relying on an abstract notion of meaning.
II. DEFINITION
Quine here explores the idea of definition and synonymy—how
words come to mean the same thing and how definitions establish or
report this sameness.
1. Synonymy and Definitions: Some people think that analytic
statements (statements true by meaning, like "All bachelors are
unmarried") are simply true because we define one term in terms of
another (e.g., defining "bachelor" as "unmarried man"). But Quine
asks, how did this definition come to be? If we just check a dictionary,

4
that’s not enough—the dictionary reflects how words are used by
people, not a fixed law about their meanings. So, definitions don’t
cause synonymy; they just record it based on actual usage.
2. Types of Definitions:
- Lexicographical Definitions: These are definitions like those found
in dictionaries, which record words as they’re commonly understood.
Lexicographers (dictionary makers) are just describing how people
already use words, not creating new meanings.
- Explicative Definitions: In philosophy and science, sometimes
definitions aim to clarify a term by refining its meaning. This process,
called explication, doesn’t just repeat an existing synonym but tries
to make the term clearer or more precise. For example, in physics,
defining "force" might require more detail than in everyday use.
3. Explication and Context: When we explicate a term, we aim to
keep its meaning in some common situations but sharpen it for
specific contexts. For instance, scientists may define "energy" in a
precise way that works for physics, even if it doesn’t match the
everyday use of the word.
4. Creating New Synonymy: Through explication, a term might be
paired with a new, precise definition. This creates a new synonymy
between the original term and its refined definition. However, this
new relationship relies on older uses of the word that already have
some shared meaning.
In summary, Quine argues that definitions don’t create synonymy;
they either report existing usage (like in dictionaries) or refine terms
for clarity (like in science), both of which rely on how language is
already used.
Quine here discusses the limitations of definition in explaining
synonymy (when words mean the same thing) and analyticity
(statements that are true just by virtue of meaning).

5
1. New Notations and Synonymy: Sometimes definitions create
purely conventional synonyms—new terms designed explicitly to
mean the same thing as existing terms. For instance, if we define "A"
as "B" simply to shorten sentences, then "A" and "B" are synonymous
purely because we made it that way, without any prior meaning. This
is a clear-cut case of synonymy through definition, but it’s rare
outside these formal contexts.
2. Definition’s Role in Formal Systems: In fields like math and logic,
definitions help balance economy of language (keeping expressions
short) and economy of symbols (using minimal, fundamental terms).
To combine these two, mathematicians and logicians often create
two layers of language:
- Primitive Notation: This core language has minimal vocabulary and
grammar, ideal for theoretical simplicity.
- Redundant Language: This larger language uses shorthand to
make communication more practical and concise. Definitions then
serve as translations between the two.
3. Types of Definitions in Formal Work: Definitions can have different
purposes:
- Synonymous Definitions: When a term is rephrased with an
existing synonym.
- Explicative Definitions: When a definition refines or clarifies a
term, even if it doesn’t capture its full original meaning.
- New Notations: When entirely new symbols are created with
specific meanings for convenience.
4. Limits of Definition for Understanding Synonymy: In most cases,
definitions rely on existing meanings rather than creating new ones.
Quine concludes that definitions alone can’t explain why words are
synonymous or why some statements are true by meaning (analytic);

6
we must explore these concepts further without relying solely on
definition.
In short, definitions depend on prior meanings rather than creating
them, except in cases of purely conventional symbols. Therefore,
definitions can’t fully explain synonymy or analyticity.
III. INTERCHANGEABILITY
Quine is exploring whether synonymy—the idea of words meaning
the same thing—can be defined by the notion of interchangeability in
all contexts without changing the truth (or "salva veritate").
1. Interchangeability and Synonymy: He suggests that if two terms
can be swapped everywhere without changing whether statements
are true or false, they might be synonymous. For example, if
"bachelor" and "unmarried man" can be used interchangeably
without changing any truth, they might be synonyms.
2. Counterexamples: But this doesn’t always work perfectly. For
instance:
- Special Uses: Phrases like "bachelor of arts" or "bachelor's
buttons" mean specific things unrelated to "unmarried men." Here,
swapping "bachelor" with "unmarried man" would lead to false
statements.
- Quotations: In phrases like "‘Bachelor’ has less than ten letters,"
changing "bachelor" to "unmarried man" changes the meaning
completely, as we're referring to the word itself.
3. Limiting the Scope: To handle these exceptions, Quine suggests
treating some phrases ("bachelor of arts") as indivisible units or
"single words," where interchangeability doesn’t apply. This way, we
can focus on contexts where “bachelor” and “unmarried man” are
truly interchangeable.

7
4. Cognitive Synonymy: Quine introduces the idea of cognitive
synonymy, focusing on meaning rather than all the associations or
emotional qualities of words. He defines it by saying that "bachelor"
and "unmarried man" are cognitively synonymous if the statement
"All bachelors are unmarried men" is analytic (true by virtue of
meaning alone).
In short, Quine is questioning whether synonymy can be defined by
interchangeability without changing truth. He ultimately suggests
that true synonymy (cognitive synonymy) might require an analytic
truth, like "All bachelors are unmarried men," to confirm that two
terms mean the same thing.
Quine is exploring whether cognitive synonymy (meaning sameness)
can be defined without relying on the concept of analyticity—
meaning statements that are true just because of meanings alone.
1. Interchangeability as Synonymy: Quine examines if
interchangeability salva veritate (interchangeable without changing
truth value) could define cognitive synonymy. If “bachelor” and
“unmarried man” are interchangeable everywhere and don’t affect
truth, they might be synonyms.
2. Problem with Necessity: To test this, Quine uses statements with
the word "necessarily". For example:
- "Necessarily, all bachelors are bachelors" is analytically true, and if
"bachelor" and "unmarried man" are truly synonymous, then
"Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried men" should also be true.
- This suggests “bachelor” and “unmarried man” could be
cognitively synonymous if they work this way.
3. Circularity Issue: Quine points out a circular problem here. To use
"necessarily," we’re already assuming we understand what analytic
statements are—which is the very thing he’s trying to explain! So this

8
approach may not help fully clarify cognitive synonymy without
implicitly relying on analyticity.
4. Alternative Language Model: Quine suggests using an extensional
language—a simpler one with basic logical tools but no terms like
"necessarily." In this language, two terms are interchangeable if they
refer to the same things in all cases.
In summary, Quine questions if interchangeability can define
cognitive synonymy without needing analyticity. He shows how using
“necessarily” leads to circular reasoning, and proposes that a simpler
language may offer a cleaner way to explore this problem.
Quine is questioning whether interchangeability of words
(substituting one word for another without changing truth value) can
fully capture what we mean by cognitive synonymy (true sameness in
meaning). In an extensional language, where only external references
(not meanings) are considered, substituting terms like "bachelor" and
"unmarried man" gives no guarantee that their sameness is due to
meaning rather than coincidence.
1. Extensional vs. Cognitive Synonymy: Even if two terms agree in all
cases (like "bachelor" and "unmarried man" do), this agreement
could be accidental—like "creature with a heart" and "creature with
a kidney" usually referring to the same thing but not due to
synonymy.
2. Need for Analyticity: For cognitive synonymy that explains
analyticity, words must be equivalent in meaning, not just in external
reference. However, explaining this kind of synonymy (which
connects "bachelor" with "unmarried man" meaningfully) seems
circular if we already need analyticity to understand it.
3. Alternative Approach: Quine suggests it may be better to first
explain analyticity (truth based on meaning alone) directly, without

9
needing cognitive synonymy. Once analyticity is clear, cognitive
synonymy can be understood from it.
In short, Quine is challenging whether synonymy alone is enough to
define analyticity and suggests focusing directly on analyticity to
avoid circular reasoning.
IV. SEMANTICAL RULES
In this passage, Quine critiques the traditional attempts to define
analyticity (truths that are based on meanings alone) by exploring
why these approaches fail.
1. Initial Assumptions: People have often tried to define analyticity by
referring to meanings, but that led to more ambiguity. Moving to
concepts like synonymy (words having the same meaning) or
definition didn’t resolve it either, as each concept seems to rely on
the very idea of analyticity we’re trying to explain.
2. Example Problem: Quine uses the example "Everything green is
extended" to show that it’s hard to decide if it’s analytic or not. This
difficulty, he argues, isn’t because we don’t understand words like
"green" or "extended"; it’s because we don’t fully understand what
"analytic" really means.
3. Artificial Languages: Some think that using a more precise, artificial
language with clear rules could make analyticity clearer. But Quine
argues that even in an artificial language, defining "analytic" is still
challenging. In other words, just saying certain statements are
analytic in a formal system doesn’t actually clarify what it means for a
statement to be analytic.
4. Truth vs. Analyticity: Quine suggests that we can define some
statements as true by setting rules for truth in a language. This is
straightforward, and from this rule of truth, we might later classify
some statements as analytic if they are true specifically due to these
rules.

10
In short, Quine finds it problematic to define analyticity directly, even
in precise languages. Instead, he suggests defining some truths first
and later seeing if we can derive analyticity from this.
In this passage, Quine argues that attempts to define analyticity
(statements that are true by meaning alone) through artificial
language rules do not solve the core problem, and he questions
whether the distinction between analytic and synthetic (statements
true due to facts) is even valid.
1. Issue with Semantical Rules: Quine points out that defining a
statement as "analytic" through semantical rules—rules that
supposedly mark certain statements as true based only on
language—just shifts the problem. We still don’t understand what
makes these rules "semantical" rather than just ordinary rules, and
calling them "semantical" doesn’t explain analyticity.
2. Artificial Languages and Analyticity: He criticizes the idea that we
can explain analyticity by creating artificial languages. In such cases,
the "analytic statements" are simply defined as a set within the
language, but that doesn’t clarify what analyticity itself means.
Essentially, the explanation becomes circular: we assume analyticity
to define it.
3. The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction: Quine explores the common
idea that truth depends on two parts: language (how words are
defined) and fact (how the world is). For example, "Brutus killed
Caesar" depends both on the meaning of "killed" and on an actual
event. This leads to the thought that analytic statements are ones
where the "fact" part is irrelevant—true by meaning alone. But Quine
argues there’s no clear way to draw this line in a non-arbitrary way.
4. Quine’s Conclusion: He ultimately suggests that the analytic-
synthetic distinction might not actually exist. It’s something many
empiricists (those who believe knowledge comes from experience)
assume is real without proof, which he calls an "article of faith."
11
In summary, Quine argues that defining analyticity through rules or
artificial languages doesn’t explain it and that the distinction
between analytic and synthetic truths may not even be a valid
concept.
V. THE VERIFICATION THEORY AND REDUCTIONISM
Quine here considers whether the verification theory of meaning
could help explain analyticity, the idea that some statements are true
by meaning alone. The verification theory suggests that a statement's
meaning lies in how we would confirm or disprove it with experience.
1. Verification Theory of Meaning: This theory, popular in empiricism,
says that the meaning of a statement is the way we would verify it
through observation or experience. An analytic statement, according
to this theory, is one that is always true, regardless of any
observation.
2. Relating Verification to Synonymy: Quine suggests that if two
statements can be confirmed or disproved in the same way, they
could be seen as having the same meaning, or being cognitively
synonymous. For example, if the statement "All bachelors are
unmarried men" could be confirmed or disproven in the same way as
"All bachelors are unmarried males," then they could be considered
synonymous.
3. Using Synonymy to Define Analyticity: If we can define synonymy
of statements based on verification, then we can use that to define
analyticity. A statement would be analytic if it is synonymous with a
logically true statement (one that is true no matter what).
4. Problem with Verification Theory: Quine questions how we
actually determine this "method of empirical confirmation." How do
we precisely link a statement with the experiences that confirm or
disprove it? This link between statements and experiences is still
unclear.

12
In summary, while the verification theory could provide a path to
defining analyticity through empirical methods, Quine doubts that it
fully clarifies how meanings are connected to experiences.
Quine here explains radical reductionism—an idea about how
meaningful statements connect to direct experiences. The most basic
form of this view is that each statement can be directly translated
into terms about immediate sensory experiences, such as sights or
sounds. Radical reductionism, however, existed long before the
verification theory of meaning.
1. Historical Background: Thinkers like Locke and Hume believed that
every idea comes from sensory experience or is built from simpler
ideas that come from such experience. They believed a term could
only be meaningful if it referred to a sensory experience (like a
feeling or color) or was a combination of such terms.
2. Evolving the Idea: Quine points out that focusing only on individual
terms is too strict. Instead, whole statements could be the basic
meaningful units. This means that while individual words don’t
always directly reference a sensory experience, entire sentences
should still translate to descriptions of experiences.
3. Carnap’s Effort: Philosopher Rudolf Carnap tried to carry out this
reductionist idea in his work. He designed a starting point language
that used sensory concepts, mathematical logic, and set theory.
Carnap aimed to build a system that could define many scientific
concepts using just a few basic sensory ideas and logical rules. He
began to show how we might reduce complex ideas in science to
simpler sensory terms, but his work covered only a part of what
would be needed to fully translate all scientific ideas into terms of
experience.
In essence, radical reductionism suggests that to understand
meaning, we need to connect statements back to direct experiences,
but this approach remains difficult to apply fully in practice.
13
In this passage, Quine critiques radical reductionism—the idea that
statements about physical objects can be broken down into simpler
statements about sensory experiences.
1. Carnap's Attempt: Philosopher Rudolf Carnap tried to show that
statements about physical objects (like “Quality q is at a certain place
and time”) could be reduced to simpler, sensory-based language.
Carnap wanted science to rely only on direct sensory experiences,
and he even used certain guidelines to determine whether these
statements are true. However, Quine argues that Carnap's work
didn’t fully achieve this goal because the phrase "is at" (showing
something’s location) couldn’t be reduced to just sensory data and
logic.
2. Changing Views on Reductionism: Over time, Carnap moved away
from this strict reductionism, realizing that it wasn’t possible to
explain statements about the physical world solely in terms of
immediate experiences.
3. Reductionism’s Persistent Influence: Although this strict form of
reductionism faded, Quine says that a softer version of it still
influences many thinkers. This softer form suggests that each
statement has a specific set of possible sensory experiences that
would either support or challenge its truth.
4. Statements as a Collective: Quine proposes a different view:
instead of evaluating each statement in isolation, we should consider
statements collectively, as a whole system. Individual statements are
too connected to others to be understood on their own in terms of
verification by sensory experience. Science, as a whole, depends on
both language and experience, but we can’t split this dependence
into separate parts for individual statements.
5. Science as the Unit of Empirical Meaning: Quine concludes that
the entire system of science should be seen as the fundamental unit
for evaluating empirical meaning. This is a departure from the idea
14
that individual statements (or even terms) can be separately verified
or confirmed by experience.
In essence, Quine argues that our understanding of meaning and
truth shouldn’t be based on individual statements but rather on the
interconnected system of all scientific knowledge.
VI. EMPIRICISM WITHOUT THE DOGMAS
Quine here presents a view of knowledge as an interconnected
system that changes in response to experience but does not rely on
the absolute truth of any single statement. He argues:
1. Knowledge as a Fabric or Field: All of our knowledge—from basic
facts to complex scientific theories—forms a system that is
influenced by experience only at the "edges." Think of science as a
force field, where experience affects it at the boundaries. When new
experiences challenge the system (like new scientific evidence),
adjustments must be made in various areas, but not necessarily in
the same specific parts every time.
2. Interconnected Statements: In this system, statements are
connected logically. If one statement is revised, other related
statements may need to change too. Even statements about
fundamental logic are part of this system, so they too could
theoretically be adjusted if necessary to accommodate new findings.
3. No Fixed Boundaries: Quine argues that it doesn’t make sense to
separate statements into “analytic” (true no matter what) and
“synthetic” (dependent on experience) categories. He believes that
any statement can be held true if we’re willing to adjust enough
elsewhere in our system of knowledge. Conversely, no statement is
immune to revision—even core scientific or logical principles might
be revised, as seen in the development of quantum mechanics.
4. Statements Near the “Periphery”: Some statements, like those
about familiar physical objects, are closer to our direct experiences

15
and are more likely to be changed if experience contradicts them.
Others, like abstract scientific or logical statements, are “deeper” in
the system and aren’t tied to specific sensory experiences, making
them less likely to change immediately.
5. Physical Objects as Useful Myths: Quine sees concepts like physical
objects as useful inventions (or “posits”) to help us make sense of
experience. He doesn’t mean that they’re untrue but that they
function similarly to cultural stories. The concept of physical objects
is "superior" as a tool because it helps us predict and navigate
experiences effectively.
Quine’s perspective suggests that our knowledge, including beliefs
about objects and scientific theories, is a flexible, evolving structure
shaped by cultural and experiential factors rather than an absolute
reflection of reality.
Quine here uses an analogy with numbers to explain how we think
about physical objects and abstract concepts.
1. Analogy of Rational and Irrational Numbers: Imagine we only have
rational numbers (like fractions), and we create an algebraic system
to work with them. But this system becomes complex because
certain operations, like finding square roots, don’t work for all
numbers. To make calculations simpler, we introduce irrational
numbers (like √2) even though they aren’t directly representable by
rational numbers. Including them helps us solve problems with
rational numbers faster and more easily.
2. Experience as Rational Numbers and Physical Objects as Irrational
Numbers: In this analogy, our direct experiences are like rational
numbers. Physical objects—things we can’t directly experience in a
simple way—are like irrational numbers. By “positing” (imagining or
assuming) physical objects, we simplify the way we organize and
understand our experiences. Even though we can’t reduce physical

16
objects to pure experiences, they help us connect different
experiences in a more organized way.
3. Physical Objects as Useful Assumptions: According to Quine, just as
irrational numbers simplify our work with rational numbers, physical
objects help simplify our understanding of experiences. For example,
by assuming that physical objects exist consistently (even when we’re
not directly perceiving them), we make it easier to predict and
organize experiences over time.
4. Science as Extended Positing: This idea of making useful
assumptions goes beyond just everyday physical objects. Science
introduces atoms, forces, energy, and even abstract mathematical
concepts as “posits” that help us explain experiences more easily.
Quine suggests that all these concepts, from physical objects to
abstract mathematical entities, are like useful myths that help us
understand and organize our experiences better.
Ultimately, Quine’s point is that while physical objects, forces, and
mathematical entities might seem real, they’re fundamentally tools
we use to organize and make sense of the world. They help us
simplify our theories and predict what we’ll experience, much like
introducing irrational numbers helps us simplify calculations with
rational numbers.
In this passage, Quine is discussing how we build and adjust scientific
theories, and how questions about what exists (ontology) are tied to
the choices we make in creating those theories.
1. Rational and Irrational Numbers Analogy: Earlier, Quine used the
example of rational and irrational numbers. He says that while the
system of rational numbers alone isn't enough to explain everything
(for example, it doesn't cover square roots), when we add irrational
numbers, the system becomes smoother and easier to use. Similarly,
scientific theories are not entirely determined by experience (just like
rational numbers aren't determined by the rational number system
17
alone). However, adding "myths" or extra concepts (like physical
objects, forces, or abstract numbers) makes the system more
convenient and easier to apply.
2. Underdetermined by Experience: Quine argues that science is not
directly determined by what we experience. While our experiences
(what we observe) help us keep our scientific theories grounded, the
rest of science (like theories about atoms or forces) is more like a
helpful fiction or simplification. These theories help make sense of
the world, even though they aren’t directly observable in the same
way we observe physical objects.
3. Ontology and Conceptual Schemes: Quine discusses ontology,
which is the study of what exists. He mentions that the question of
whether something should be counted as "real" (like classes, or
groups of things) is not just about facts; it’s about choosing a useful
way to organize our thinking or theories (a conceptual scheme). This
view is similar to the ideas of philosopher Rudolf Carnap, who saw
ontological questions as about picking a convenient framework for
understanding the world.
4. Pragmatic View: Quine agrees with Carnap that some aspects of
science are about choosing frameworks that are useful, but he goes
further by rejecting the distinction between analytic (things that are
true by definition) and synthetic (things that are true based on
experience) knowledge. Quine believes that all scientific questions,
whether about classes or mythical creatures like centaurs, are guided
by practical considerations. When scientists encounter new
experiences that challenge their theories, they adjust their theories,
but they do so pragmatically. They aim to make the system as simple
and useful as possible.
5. Incorporating New Experiences: Finally, Quine suggests that
scientists, based on their experience, often adjust their theories or
conceptual frameworks not in strict response to facts, but in ways

18
that seem to make the most sense or that make the system easier to
use. The way they revise their beliefs is guided by practicality—what
works best in explaining and predicting experiences.
In summary, Quine argues that scientific theories are not strictly
determined by facts alone, but involve pragmatic choices about how
to organize and simplify complex ideas. This flexibility in theory-
building makes science useful, even though some aspects, like the
existence of physical objects or abstract entities, are not directly
verifiable.

19