Economics 257 – MGTECON 630

Fall 2024

José Ignacio Cuesta jicuesta@stanford.edu

Liran Einav leinav@stanford.edu
Paulo Somaini soma@stanford.edu

Industrial Organization I: Reading List

I. Imperfect Competition: Background

Bresnahan, Tim “Empirical Studies with Market Power,” Handbook of Industrial Organization,
vol. II, chap. 17.
Einav, Liran and Jonathan Levin. “Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(2), 145-162 (2010).
Tirole, Jean. The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.

A. Test of Market Power

Ashenfelter, O., and D. Sullivan, “Nonparametric Tests of Market Structure: An Application to
the Cigarette Industry,” Journal of Industrial Economics 35, 483-498, (1989).
Baker, J., and T. Bresnahan, “Estimating the residual demand curve facing a single firm,”
International Journal of Industrial Organization 6(3), 283-300, (1988).
Corts, K., “Conduct Parameters and the Measurement of Market Power,” Journal of
Econometrics 88, 227-225, (1999).
Genesove, D. and W. Mullin, “Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar
Industry, 1890-1914,” Rand Journal of Economics 29(2), 355-377, (1989).
Stigler, G. “A Theory of Oligopoly,” The Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), 44-61, (1964)
Sumner, D., “Measurement of Monopoly Behavior: An Application to the Cigarette Industry,”
Journal of Political Economy 89, 1010-1019, (1981).
Wolfram, C., “Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market,” American
Economic Review 89($), 805-826, (1999).

B. Differentiated Products
Anderson, S. P., A. de Palma, and J. F. Thisse, Discrete Choice Theory of Product
Differentiation, Chapters 1-5, Cambridge: MIT Press, (1992).
Caplin, A., and B. Nalebuff, “Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of
Equilibrium,” Econometrica 59: 25-60, (1991).
Chaudhuri, Shubham, Pinelopi K. Goldberg, and Panle Jia, "Estimating the Effects of Global
Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India." American Economic
Review, 96 (5): 1477-1514, (2006).

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 Deaton, A., and J. Muellbauer, Economics and Consumer Behavior, New York: Cambridge
University Press, (1980).
Deaton, A., and J. Muellbauer, “An Almost Ideal Demand System,” American Economic Review
70: 312-326, (1980).
McFadden, D., “Econometric Analysis of Qualitative Response Models,” in Griliches and
Intilligator (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, Volume III, Amsterdam: North Holland. (1984).

C. Demand and Supply Estimation

Benkard, C. L., and Pat Bajari, “Demand Estimation with Heterogeneous Consumers and
Unobserved Product Characteristics: A Hedonic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy
113(6): 1239-1276, (2006).
Berry, Steven, “Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Product Differentiation,” Rand Journal of
Economics 25: 242-262, (1994).
Berry, Steven, M. Carnall, and P. T. Spiller, “Airline Hubs: Costs, Markups and The Implications
of Customer Heterogeneity,” in Advances in Airline Economics, Vol. 1: Competition Policy and
Anti-Trust, D. Lee, ed. Elsevier Press, 183–214 (2006).
Berry, Steven and Philip Haile, “Identification in Differentiated Products Markets Using Market
Level Data,” Econometrica 82: 1749–1798 (2014).
Berry, Steven, and Philip Haile, “Nonparametric Identification of Differentiated Products
Demand Using Micro Data,” Econometrica 92: 1135–1162 (2024).
Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes, “Automobile Price in Market Equilibrium,”
Econometrica vol. 63: 841-890, (1995).
Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes, “Differentiated Product Demand Systems from
a Combination of Micro and Macro Data: The New Car Market,” Journal of Political Economy
112: 68-105, (2004).
Berry, Steven, and A. Pakes, “The Pure Characteristics Discrete Choice Model of Differentiated
Products Demand,” International Economic Review 48(4)” 19923-1225, (2007).
Borenstein, Severin, “Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S. Airline
Industry,” Rand Journal of Economics vol. 2: 344-365, (1989).
Bresnahan, Tim, “Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Oligopoly: The 1955
Price War,” Journal of Industrial Economics vol. 35: 457-482, (1987).
Einav, Liran, “Seasonality in the U.S. Motion Picture Industry,” Rand Journal of Economics
37(1), (2007).
Goldberg, Pinelopi, “Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of
the U.S. Automobile Industry,” Econometrica vol. 63: 891-952, (1995).
Hausman, Jerry, Gregory Leonard, and J. Douglas Zona, “Competitive Analysis with
Differentiated Products,” Annales d’Economie et de Statistique vol. 34: 159-180, (1994).
Hendel, Igal, “Estimating Multiple Discrete Choice Models: An Application to Computerization
Returns,” Review of Economic Studies vol. 66: 423-446, (1999).
Nevo, Aviv, “Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry,” Econometrica vol.
69: 307-342, (2001).

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 Nevo, Aviv, “A Practitioner’s Guide to Estimation of Random Coefficients Logit Models of
Demand,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy vol. 9: 513-548, (2000).
Whinston, Michael, and Scott Collins, “Entry and Competitive Structure in Deregulated Airline
Markets: An Event Study Analysis of People Express,” Rand Journal of Economics vol. 23: 445-
462, (1992).

D. Welfare Analysis of New Goods

Gentzkow, Matthew, “Valuing New Goods in a Model with Complementarities: Online
Newspapers,” American Economic Review 97(3), (2007).
Hausman, Jerry, “Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition,” in
Bresnahan and Gordon (eds.), The Economics of New Goods, NBER Studies in Income and
Wealth vol. 58: 209-237 (see also a comment by Bresnahan in the same volume) (1997).
Petrin, Amil, “Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of The Minivan,” Journal of
Political Economy vol. 110: 705-729, (2002).
Trajtenberg, Manuel, “The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovation, with an Application to CT
Scanners,” Journal of Political Economy vol. 97: 444-479, (1989).

II. Imperfect Competition: Policy

A. Mergers
Ashenfelter, Orley and Daniel Hosken, “The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence
from Five Selected Case Studies,” Journal of Law and Economics 53: 417-466 (2010).
Ashenfelter, Orley, Daniel Hosken, and Matthew Weinberg, “The Price Effects of a Large
Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool” American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, 5(1): 239-261, (2013).
Dafny, Leemore, “Estimation and Identification of Merger Effects: An Application to Hospital
Mergers” Journal of Law and Economics, 52(3): 523-550, (2009).
Farrell, Joseph and Carl Shapiro, “Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic
alternative to market definition” The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 10(1): 1-41, (2010).
Farrell, Joseph and Carl Shapiro, “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis.” American
Economic Review, Vol. 80: 107-26, (1990).
Hosken, Daniel and Orley Ashenfelter, “The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence
from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin” Journal of Law and Economics, 53(3): 417-466,
(2010).
Houde, Jean-François, “Spatial Differentiation and Vertical Mergers in Retail Markets for
Gasoline” The American Economic Review, 102(5): 2147-2182, (2012).
Nevo, Aviv, “Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry”
RAND Journal of Economics 31(3): 395-421, (2000).
Pesendorfer, Martin “Horizontal Mergers in the Paper Industry” The RAND Journal of Economics
34(3): 495-515, (2003).

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 Sweeting, Andrew, “The Effects of Mergers on Product Positioning: Evidence from the Music
Radio Industry” The RAND Journal of Economics 41(2): 372-397, (2010).
Whinston, Michael and Volker Nocke, “Merger Policy with Merger Choice” The American
Economic Review 103(2): 1006-1033, (2013).

B. Collusion
Albæk S., P. Møllgaard, and P. Overgaard, “Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A
Concrete Case,” The Journal of Industrial Economics 45(4), 429-443, (1997).
Asker, John, “A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel”. The American Economic
Review, 100(3): 723-62, (2010).
Athey, Susan, Kyle Bagwell, and C. Sanchirico, “Collusion and Price Rigidity,” Review of
Economic Studies, (2005).
Bagwell, Kyle and R. Staiger, “Collusion over the Business Cycle,” Rand Journal of Economics
28(1), 82-106, (1997).
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Erik Madsen, “Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect
Cartels,” American Economic Review 107: 387-424 (2017).
Borenstein, S. and A. Shepard, “Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets,” Rand Journal of
Economics 27(3), 429-451, (1996).
Carlton, Dennis, Gustavo Bamberger, and R. Epstein, “Antitrust and Higher Education: Was
There a Conspiracy to Restrict Financial Aid?” RAND Journal of Economics, 131-147 (1995).
Clark, Robert and Jean-François Houde, “Collusion with asymmetric retailers: Evidence from a
gasoline price-fixing case” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5(3): 97–123(2013).
Chen, Z. and P. Rey, “On the Design of Leniency Programs” Journal of Law and Economics,
56(4): 917-957, (2013).
Ellison, Glenn, “Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee,” Rand Journal
of Economics 25(1), 37-57, (1994).
Erutku, Can and Vincent A. Hildebrand, “Conspiracy at the Pump,” Journal of Law and
Economics 53(1), 223-237, (2010).
Genesove, D. and W. Mullin, “Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from
the Sugar Institute Case,” American Economic Review 91(3), 379-398, (2001).
Genesove, David; Mullin, Wallace P. “Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the
Sugar Industry, 1890-1914” RAND Journal of Economics 29(2): 355-77, (1998).
Green, E. and R. Porter, “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information,”
Econometrica 52(1), 87-100, (1984).
Harrington, Joe and Andy Skrzypacz, “Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels:
Explaining Recent Collusive Practices,” American Economic Review, 101(6): 2425-49 (2011).
Kaplow, Louis, Competition Policy and Price Fixing, Princeton University Press (2012).
Levenstein, M., “Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre World War I
Bromine Industry,” The Journal of Industrial Economic,45(2): 117-138, (1997).
Levenstein, Margaret and Valerie Suslow “What Determines Cartel Success?” Journal of
Economic Literature, 44(1): 43-95, (2006).

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 Marshall, Robert and Leslie Marx, The Economics of Collusion, MIT Press, (2012).
Miller, Amalia R., “Did the Airline Tariff Publishing Case Reduce Collusion?” Journal of Law and
Economics 53(3): 569-586, (2010).
Noel, M., “Edgeworth Price Cycles: Evidence from the Toronto Retail Gasoline Market”, Journal
of Industrial Economics 55(1): 69-92, (2007).
Porter, R., “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Economic Committee, 1880-1886,” Bell Journal
of Economics Vol. 14, 301-314, (1983).
Porter, Robert H. and J. Douglas Zona, “Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding,” The
RAND Journal of Economics 30(2): 263-288, (1999).
Rotenberg, J. and G. Saloner, “A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Prices Wars During Booms,”
American Economic Review 76(3): 390-407, (1986).

III. Imperfect Competition: Applications and Extensions

A. Two-Sided Markets, Platforms, and Network Effects

Armstrong, Mark. "Competition in Two-Sided Markets." RAND Journal of Economics 37, no. 3
(2006): 668–91.
Chandra, Ambarish, and Allan Collard-Wexler. "Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application
to the Canadian Newspaper Industry." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 18, no. 4
(2009): 1045–70.
Cullen Z, Farronato F. 2015. Outsourcing tasks online: matching demand and supply on peer-to-
peer Internet platforms. Work. Pap., Stanford Univ.
Einav, Liran, Chiara Farronato and Jonathan Levin, “Peer-to-Peer Markets,”Annual Review of
Economics, 8:1, 615-635, (2016).
Ellison, Glenn, Drew Fudenberg, et al. "Competing Auctions." (PDF) Journal of the European
Economic Association 2, no. 1 (2004): 30–66.
Ellison, Glenn, and Drew Fudenberg. "The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the
Software Industry." (PDF) RAND Journal of Economics 31, no. 2 (2000): 253–72.
Farrell, Joseph, and Garth Saloner. "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation." RAND
Journal of Economics 16, no. 1 (1985): 70–83.
Fradkin A. 2015. Search frictions and the design of online marketplaces. Working Paper, MIT
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. "Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by Sole Supplier of a
Network Good." Journal of Industrial Economics 48, no. 4 (2000): 373–90.
Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro. "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network
Externalities." Journal of Political Economy 94, no. 4 (1986): 822–41.
Jeziorski, Przemyslaw. "Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: Examination of U.S. Radio
Industry." University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business, 2012.
Lee, Robin S. "Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided
Markets." American Economic Review 103, no. 7 (2013): 2960–3000.
Lerner, Josh, and Jean Tirole. "A Model of Forum Shopping." American Economic Review 96,
no. 4 (2006): 1091–113.

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 Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets." Journal of
the European Economic Association 1, no. 4 (2003): 990–1029.
Rysman, Mark. "Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow
Pages." Review of Economic Studies 71, no. 2 (2004): 483–512.
Weyl, E. Glenn. “A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms.” American Economic Review,
September 2010, 100, 4, 1642-1672.

B. Consumer Search and Imperfect Information

Bakos, Yannis, and Eric Brynjolfsson, “Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and
Efficiency” Management Science 45(12): 1613-1630, (1999).
Bakos, Yannis, and Eric Brynjolfsson, “Bundling and Competition on the Internet: Aggregation
Strategies for Information Goods,” Marketing Science 19(1): 63-82, (2000).
Baye, Michael and John Morgan, “Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the
Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets,” American Economic Review, 91(3): 454-
474, (2003).
Baye, Michael and John Morgan, “Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and
Evidence” The RAND Journal of Economics 35(3): 449-466, (2004).
Brown, Jeffrey and Austan Goolsbee, “Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive?
Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry,” Journal of Political Economy 110(3): 481-507,
(2002).
Brynjolffson, Erik and Michael Smith, “Consumer Decision-making at an Internet Shopbot:
Brand Still Matters,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(4): 541-558, (2001).
Clay, Karen, Ramayya Krishnan, and Eric Wolff, “Price and Price Dispersion on the Web:
Evidence from the Online Book Industry,” The Journal of Industrial Economic 49(4): 521-539,
(2001).
Coey, D., Larsen, B., and B. C. Platt (2020). “Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search,”
American Economic Review, 110(12), 3748-3785.
De Los Santos, Babur, Ali Hortacsu, et al. "Testing Models of Consumer Search Using Data on
Web Browsing and Purchasing Behavior." American Economic Review 102, no. 6 (2012): 2955–
80.
Dinerstein, Michael, Liran Einav, et al. "Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet
Commerce." (PDF) 2013.
Ellison, Glenn, “A Model of Add-on Pricing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2): 585-637,
(2005).
Ellison, Glenn and Sara Ellison, “Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet,”
Econometrica, 77(2): 427-452, (2009).
Ellison, Glenn, and Sara Fisher Ellison. "Match Quality, Search, and the Internet Market for Used
Books." (PDF) 2013.
Genesove, David, “Search at Wholesale Auto Auctions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110
(1): 23-49, (1995).

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Gerardi, Kristopher and Adam Hale Shapiro, “Does Competition Reduce Price Dispersion? New
Evidence from the Airline Industry,” Journal of Political Economy 117(1): 1-37, (2009).
Hortacsu, Ali and Chad Syverson, “Product Differentiation, Search Costs, and the Welfare
Effects of Entry: A Case Study of the S&P 500,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2): 403-
456, (2004).
Klemperer, Paul, “Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with
Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade,” Review of
Economic Studies 62 (4): 515-39, (1995).
Morton, Scott, Fiona Zettelmeyer, and Jorge Silva-Risso,“Internet Car Retailing,” Journal of
Industrial Economics, 49(4): 501-519, (2001).
Sorenson, Alan, “Equilibrium Price Dispersion in Retail Markets for Prescription Drugs,” Journal
of Political Economy, 108(4), (2000).
Stahl, Dale, “Oligopolistic Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumer Search,” International Journal
of Industrial Organization, vol. 14: 243-268, (1996).
Varian, Hal, “A Model of Sales,” American Economic Review 70(4): 651-659, (1980).
Diamond, Peter A. "A Model of Price Adjustment." Journal of Economic Theory 3, no. 2 (1971):
156–68.
Varian, Hal R. "A Model of Sales." American Economic Review 70, no. 4 (1980): 651–9.
Anderson, Simon P., and Régis Renault. "Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs: A
Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model." RAND Journal of Economics 30, no. 4 (1999): 719–35.
McAfee, R. Preston. "Multiproduct Equilibrium Price Dispersion." Journal of Economic Theory
67, no. 1 (1995): 83–105.
Baye, Michael R., and John Morgan. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the
Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets." American Economic Review 91, no. 3
(2001): 454–74.
Genesove, David. "Search at Wholesale Auto Auctions." Quarterly Journal of Economics 110,
no. 1 (1995): 23–49.
Hong, Han, and Matthew Shum. "Using Price Distributions to Estimate Search Costs." RAND
Journal of Economics 37, no. 2 (2006): 257–75.
Ellison, Glenn, and Alexander Wolitzky. "A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation." RAND Journal
of Economics 43, no. 3 (2012): 417–41.
Wilson, Chris M. "Ordered Search and Equilibrium Obfuscation." International Journal of
Industrial Organization 28, no. 5 (2010): 496–506.

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C. Spatial Search Frictions
Brancaccio, G., Kalouptsidi, M. and Papageorgiou, T. (2020), “Geography, Transportation, and
Endogenous Trade Costs.” Econometrica, 88: 657-691.
Brancaccio, G., Kalouptsidi, M., Papageorgiou, T. and Rosaia, N. (2022) “Search Frictions and
Efficiency in Decentralized Transport Markets,” Quarterly Journal of Economic, forthcoming.
Buchholz, N. Spatial Equilibrium, Search Frictions and Dynamic Efficiency in the Taxi Industry.
Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
Fréchette, Guillaume, Alessandro Lizzeri, and Tobias Salz, “Frictions in a Competitive,
Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis,” American Economic Review, 109 (8): 2954-92, (2019).

D. Price Discrimination
Adams, William and Janet Yellen, “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(3): 475-498, (1976).
Borenstein, Severin and Nancy Rose, “Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline
Industry,” Journal of Political Economy, 102(4): 653-683, (1994).
Busse, Meghan and Marc Rysman, “Competition and Price Discrimination in Yellow Pages
Advertising,” Rand Journal of Economics 36(2): 378-390, (2005).
Crawford, Gregory, “The Discriminatory Incentives to Bundle in the Cable Television Industry,”
Quantitative Marketing and Economics 6(1): 41-78, (2007).
DellaVigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier, “Paying Not to Go to the Gym,” American
Economic Review, 96(3): 694-719, (2006).
Ivaldi, Marc and David Martimort, “Competition under Nonlinear Pricing,” Annales d'Economie
et de Statistique vol. 34: 71-114, (1994).
Kehoe, Patrick, Bradley Larsen, and Elena Pastorino, “Dynamic Competition in the Era of Big
Data” (2018). Working paper, Stanford University.
Leslie, Philip, “Price Discrimination in Broadway Theatre,” Rand Journal of Economics, 35(3):
520-540, (2004).
Luo, Yao, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong, “Structural Analysis of Nonlinear Pricing,”
Journal of Political Economy 126, 2523-2568 (2018).
McAfee, Preston and Raymond Deneckere, “Damaged Goods,” Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 5(2): 149-74, (1996).
McAfee, Preston, John McMillan, and Michael Whinston, “Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity
Bundling, and Correlation of Values,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 104: 371-83, (1989).
McManus, Brian, “Nonlinear Pricing in an Oligopoly Market: the Case of Specialty Coffee,”
Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 38: 512-532, (2007).
Miravete, Eugenio, “Choosing the Wrong Calling Plan? Ignorance, Learning, and Risk
Aversion,” American Economic Review, 93(1): 297-310, (2002).
Miravete, Eugenio and Lars-Hendrik Roeller, “Competitive Nonlinear Pricing in Duopoly
Equilibrium: The Early US Cellular Telephone Industry,” Journal of European Economic
Association, 2(2): 526-535, (2004).

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 Miravete, Eugenio and Lars-Hendrik Roeller, “Estimating Markups under Nonlinear Pricing
Competition,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2): 526-535 (2004).
Morton, Fiona Scott, Florian Zettlmeyer, and Jorge Silva-Risso, “Consumer Information and
Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities,”
Quantiative Marketing and Economics, 1(1): 65-92, (2003).
Oster, Sharon, and Fiona Scott Morton, “Behavioral Biases Meet the Market: The Case of
Magazine Subscription Prices,” The B.E. Journals in Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy,
5(1), (2005).
Ratchford, Brian, Myung-Soo Lee, and Debabrata Talukdar, “The Impact of the Internet on
Information Search for Automobiles,” Journal of Marketing Research 40(2): 193-209, (2003).
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Lars Stole, “Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation Constraints,”
Review of Economic Studies, 69(1): 277-311, (2002).
Rutherford, Brian, Debabrata Talukdar, and Myung-Soo Lee, “The Impact of the Internet on
Consumers’ Use of Information Sources for Automobiles,” Journal of Consumer Research 34(1):
111-119, (2007).
Shepard, Andrea, “Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration,” Journal of Political Economy,
99(1): 30-53, (1991).
Sibley, David and Padmanabhan Srinagesh, “Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing with Multiple Taste
Characteristics,” RAND Journal of Economics, 28(4): 684-707, (1997).
Stole, Lars, “Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
4(4): 529-562 (2005).
Varian, Hal, “Price Discrimination and Social Welfare,” American Economic Review, 75(4): 870-
5, (1985).

E. Product Quality
Armstrong, Mark, John Vickers, and Jidong Zhou, “Prominence and Consumer Search,” The
RAND Journal of Economics 40(2): 209-233, (2009).
Bond, Eric, “A Direct Test of the ‘Lemons’ Model: The Market for Used Pickup Trucks,” The
American Economic Review 72(4): 836-840, (1982).
Bronnenberg, Bart, Sanjay Dhar, and Jean-Pierre Dubé, “Brand History, Geography, and the
Persistence of Brand Shares,” Journal of Political Economy 117(1): 87-115, (2009).
Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu, “Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from eBay,” Journal of
Industrial Economics 58(1): 54-78, (2010).
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre and Bernard Salanie, “Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some
Recent Work,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, 8th Ed.
Vol.1. Edited by Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Peter Hansen, Stephen J. Turnovsky. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. (2001).
Cohen, Alma and Liran Einav, “Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice,” The
American Economic Review 97(3): 745-788, (2007).
Dafny, Leemore and David Dranove, “Do Report Cards Tell Consumers Anything They Don’t
Already Know? The Case of Medicare HMOs,” The RAND Journal of Economics 39(3): 790-
821, (2008).

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Dewan, Sanjeev and Vernon Hsu, “Adverse Selection in Electronic Markets: Evidence from
Online Stamp Auctions,” The Journal of Industrial Economics 52(4): 497-516, (2004).
Einav, Liran, Amy Finklestein, and Mark Cullen, “Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets
using Variation in Prices,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(3): 877-921(2010).
Einav, Liran, Amy Finkelstein and Jonathan Levin, “Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of
Insurance Markets” Annual Review of Economics, vol. 2: 311-336, (2010).
Ellison, Glenn and Sara Ellison, “Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet”
Econometrica, 77(2): 427-452, (2009).
Genesove, David, “Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market,” Journal of Political
Economy 101(4): 644-665, (1993).
Gilligan, Thomas, “Lemons and Leases in the Used Business Aircraft Market” Journal of
Political Economy 112(5): 1157-1180. (2004).
Hendel, Igal and Alessandro Lizzeri, “Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets,” American
Economic Review, 89(5): 1097-1115, (1999).
Hendricks, Kenneth, and Robert Porter, “An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric
Information,” The American Economic Review, 78(5): 865-883, (1988).
Hendricks, Kenneth and Alan Sorensen, “Information and the Skewness of Music Sales,” Journal
of Political Economy, 117(2): 324-369, (2009).
Hubbard, Thomas, “How Do Consumers Motivate Experts? Reputational Incentives in an Auto
Repair Market,” Journal of Law and Economics, 45(2): 437-468, (2002).
Jin, Ginger Zhe, “Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs,” The
RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1): 93-112, (2005).
Jin, Ginger Zhe and Andrew Kato, “Price, Quality, and Reputation: Evidence from an Online
Field Experiment” The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(4): 983-1004(2006).
Jin, Ginger Zhe and Andrew Kato, “Dividing Online and Offline: A Case Study,” The Review of
Economic Studies, 74(3): 981-1004, (2007).
Jin, Ginger Zhe and Phillip Leslie, “The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2): 409-451, (2003).
Jin, Ginger Zhe and Phillip Leslie, “Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene,” American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1): 237-267, (2009).
Johnson, Justin and Michael Waldman, “Leasing, Lemons, and Moral Hazard,” Journal of Law
and Economics, 53(2): 307-328, (2010).
Lewis, Gregory, “Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case
of eBay Motors,” American Economic Review, 101(4): 1535-1546, (2011).
McDevitt, Ryan, “Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis” American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 3(3): 193-209, (2011).
Mocan, Naci, “Can Consumers Detect Lemons? An Empirical Analysis of Information
Asymmetry in the Market for Child Care,” Journal of Population Economics, 20(4): 743-780,
(2007).

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IV. Organization of Production

A. Theory of the Firm and Vertical Integration

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and Todd Mitton, “Determinants of Vertical Integration:
Financial Development and Contracting Costs,” Journal of Finance 64: 1251-1290 (2009).
Anderson, Eric and David Schmittlein, “Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical
Examination,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15(3): 385-395, (1984).
Anton, James and Dennis Yao, “Start-Ups, Spin-Offs and Internal Projects,” Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 11(2): 362–378, (1995).
Antras, Pol and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, “Organizations and Trade,” Annual Review of
Economics, 1: 43–64, (2009).
Arora, Ashish, Andrea Fosfuri, and Alfonso Gambardella. 2001. Markets for Technology: The
Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Asker, John and Alexander Ljungqvist, “Competition and the Structure of Vertical Relationships
in Capital Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 118(3): 599-647, (2010).
Atalay, Enghin, Ali Hortaçsu, and Chad Syverson, “Vertical Integration and Input Flows,”
American Economic Review, 104(4): 1120-48, (2014)
Azoulay, Pierre, “Capturing Knowledge within and across Firm Boundaries: Evidence from
Clinical Development.” American Economic Review, 94(5): 1591–1612, (2004).
Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard, “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job
Design and Information.” American Economic Review, 93(3): 551–572, (2003).
Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard, “Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board
Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(4): 1443–
1479, (2004).
Bloom, Nicholas and John van Reenen, “Measuring and Explaining Management Practices across
Firms and Countries.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1351–1408, (2007).
Bresnahan, Timothy and Jonathan Levin, “Vertical Integration and Market Structure,” in
Handbook of Organizational Economics, Robert Gibbons and John Roberts eds., Princeton
University Press, Ch. 21, (2012).
Chipty, Tasneem, “Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable
Television Industry,” American Economic Review, 91(3): 428-453, (June 2001).
Ciliberto, Federico, “Does Organizational Form Affect Investment Decisions?” The Journal of
Industrial Economics, 54(1): 63-93, (2006).
Cuellar, Alison Evans, and Paul Gertler, “Strategic Integration of Hospitals and Physicians.”
Journal of Health Economics, 25(1): 1–28, (2006).
Forbes, Silke and Mara Lederman, “Control Rights, Network Structure and Vertical Integration:
Evidence from Regional Airlines,” UCSD Working Paper, (2006).
Forbes, Silke and Mara Lederman, “Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry.”
American Economic Review 99(5): 1831–1849, (2009).
Forbes, Silke and Mara Lederman, “Does Vertical Integration Affect Firm Performance?
Evidence from the Airline Industry.” Rand Journal of Economics, 41(4): 765-90, (2010).

11
 Hastings, Justine, “Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical
Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California,” American Economic Review, 94(1):
317-328, (January 2004).
Hortacsu, Ali and Chad Syverson, “Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure,
Productivity and Prices,” Journal of Political Economy, 115(2): 250-301, (2007).
Hubbard, Thomas, “Information, Decisions, and Productivity: On-Board Computers and Capacity
Utilization in Trucking.” American Economic Review, 93(4): 1328-53, (2003).
Joskow, Paul, “Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence
from Coal Markets,” American Economic Review, 77(1): 168-185, (1987).
Joskow, Paul, “Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric
Generating Plants.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1(1): 33–80, (1985).
Joskow, Paul, “Price Adjustment in Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal.” Journal of Law
and Economics, 31(1): 47–83, (1988).
Joskow, Paul, “Vertical Integration,” Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Kluwer, (2005).
Lee, Robin S. “Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets.”
American Economic Review, 103(7): 2960-3000, (2013)
Masten, Scott, “The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry,” Journal
of Law and Economics, 27(2): 403-417, (1984).
Monteverde, Kirk and David Teece, “Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the
Automobile Industry,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13(1): 206-213, (1982).
Mortimer, Julie, “Vertical Contracts in the Video Rental Industry” Review of Economic Studies
75(1): 165-199, (2008).
Shepard, Andrea, “Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline
Retailing.” RAND Journal of Economics, 24(1): 58–77, (1993).
Tadelis, Steven, “Complexity, Flexibility, and the Make-or-Buy Decision” The American
Economic Review, 92(2): 433-437, (2002).
Whinston, Michael, “On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration,” Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization, 19(1): 1-23, (2003).

B. Vertical Contracts and Relationships

Bernheim, Doug and Michael Whinston, “Exclusive Dealing,” Journal of Political Economy,
106(1): 64-103, (1998).
Bolton, Patrick and Michael Whinston, “Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply
Assurance,” Review of Economic Studies, 60(1): 121-148, (1993).
Coase, R.H., “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, 16(4): 386-405, (1937).
Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical
and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, 94(4): 691-719, (1986).
Hart, Oliver and John Moore, "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political
Economy, 98(6): 1119-1158, (1990).
Hart, Oliver and Jean Tirole, “Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 205-276 (1990).

12
 Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom, “The Firm as an Incentive System,” American Economic
Review, 84(4): pp. 972-991, (1994).
Lee, Robin S., “Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets,”
American Economic Review, 103(7): 2960-3000.
Williamson, Oliver, “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations,”
American Economic Review, 61(2): 112-123, (1971).
Williamson, O. Markets and Hierarchies, Free Press, 1975.

C. Procurement, Auctions and other Mechanisms

Athey, Susan and Phil Haile, “Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions,” Handbook of
Econometrics, 6(A): 3847-3965, (2007).
Athey, Susan and Phil Haile, “Identification of Standard Auction Models,” Econometrica, 70(6):
2107-2140 (2002).
Milgrom, P. and R. Weber, “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica,
50(5): 1089-1122, (1982).
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Hervé Ossard and Quang Vuong, “Econometrics of First-Price Auctions,”
Econometrica, 63(4): 953-980, (1995).
Guerre, Emmanuel, Isabelle Perrigne and Quang Vuong, “Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of
First-Price Auctions,” Econometrica, 68(3): 525-574, (2000).
Campo, Sandra, Isabelle M. Perrigne, and Quang H. Vuong, "Asymmetry in First-Price Auctions
With Affiliated Private Values," Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18(2): 179-207, (2003).
Li, Tong, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong, “Structural Estimation of the Affiliated Private
Value Auction Model,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 33(2): 171-193, (2002).
Krasnokutskaya, E., “Identification and Estimation in Procurement Auctions under Unobserved
Auction Heterogeneity,” Review of Economic Studies, 78(1): 293-327, (2011).
Roberts, James W., “Unobserved Heterogeneity and Reserve Prices in Auctions,” RAND Journal
of Economics, 44(4): 712-732, (2013).
Porter, Robert H. and J. Douglas Zona, “Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions,”
Journal of Political Economy, 101(3): 518-538, (1993).
Athey, Susan, Jonathan Levin, and Enrique Seira, “Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions:
Evidence from Timber Auctions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1): 207-257, (2011).
Kastl, Jakub, “Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions,” Review of
Economic Studies, 78(3): 974-1014, (2011).
Cassola, Nuno, J. Kastl, and Ali Hortacsu, “The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens
of European Central Bank Auctions for Short-Term Funds,” Econometrica, 81(4): 1309-1345,
(2013).
Jofre-Bonet, M. and M. Pesendorfer, “Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game,” Econometrica,
71(5): 1443-1489, (2003).
Somaini, Paulo “Identification in Auction Models with Interdependent Costs”, Journal of
Political Economy, 128 (10), 3820–3871 (2020)

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 Agarwal, N. “An Empirical Model of the Medical Match”, American Economic Review, July
2015, 105(7), 1939-1978
Agarwal, N. and P. Somaini, “Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An application to a
school choice mechanism,” Econometrica, March 2018, 86 (2), 391-444

V. Productivity

A. Measuring Productivity
Ackerberg, Daniel, Kevin Caves, Garth Frazer, “Structural Identification of Production Function
Estimators,” Econometrica 83(6): 2411–2451, (Nov 2015).
Aw, Bee Yan, Mark J. Roberts, and Daniel Yi Xu, “R&D Investments, Exporting, and the
Evolution of Firm Productivity,” American Economic Review, 98(2): 451-56, (2008).
Bartel, Ann, Casey Ichniowski, and Kathryn Shaw, “How Does Information Technology Affect
Productivity? Plant-Level Comparisons of Product Innovation, Process Improvement, and
Worker Skills,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1721-58, (2007).
Bloom, Nicholas, and John Van Reenen, “Measuring and Explaining Management Practices
across Firms and Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1351-1408, (2007).
Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen, “Americans Do I.T. Better: US
Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle,” American Economic Review. 102(1): 167-201,
(2012).
De Loecker, “Product differentiation, multiproduct firms, and estimating the impact of trade
liberalization on productivity,” Econometrica 79(5): 1407–1451, (Jan 2011).
Doraszelski, Ulrich and Jordi Jaumandreu, 2013, “R&D and Productivity: Estimating
Endogenous Productivity.” Review of Economic Studies 80 (4):1338-1383
Dunne, Timothy, Mark J. Roberts, and Larry Samuelson, “The Growth and Failure of U. S.
Manufacturing Plants,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(4): 671–698, (1989).
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger, and C. Syverson, “Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and Efficiency:
Selection on Productivity or Profitability?” American Economic Review, 98(1): 394-425 (2008).
Gandhi, Amit, Salvador Navarro, and David Rivers “On the Identification of Gross Output
Production Functions”, Journal of Political Economy, 128 (08), 2973–3016 (2020)
Griliches, Zvi and Jacques Mairesse, “Production Functions: The Search for Identification,” In:
Econometrics and Economic Theory in the 20th Century: The Ragnar Frisch Centennial
Symposium, 31. Cambridge University Press, p. 169, (1998).
Hall, Bronwyn and Nathan Rosenberg, Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Vol 1, Vol 2.
Melitz, Marc J. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry
Productivity,” Econometrica, 71(6): 1695–1725, (2003).
Syverson, Chad, “Market Structure and Productivity: A Concrete Example,” Journal of Political
Economy, 112(6): 1181–1222, (2004).
Syverson, Chad, “What Determines Productivity?” Journal of Economic Literature, 49(2): 326-
365, (2011).

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VI. Entry and Market Structure
A. Market Structure and Strategic Entry
Anderson, Simon, Andre de Palma, and Yurii Nesterov, “Oligopolistic Competition and the
Optimal Provision of Products,” Econometrica, 63(6): 1281-1302, (1995).
Berry, Steve, “Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry,” Econometrica, 60(4): 889-
918, (1992).
Berry, Steve and Elie Tamer, “Identification in Models of Oligopoly Entry,” in Advances in
Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Volume II,
edited by Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey, and Torsten Persson, Cambridge University
Press, Chapter 2, (November 2006).
Berry, Steve and Joel Waldfogel, “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting,”
Rand Journal of Economics, 30(3): 397-420, (1999).
Baumol, W.K., J.C. Panzar, and R.D. Willig, “On the Theory of Perfectly Contestable Markets,”
in J.E. Stiglitz and G.F. Mathewson (Eds.), New Developments in the Analysis of Market
Structure, MIT Press, (1986).
Bresnahan, Timothy, “Sutton's Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising,
and the Evolution of Concentration: Review Article,” Rand Journal of Economics, 23(1): 137-52,
(1992).
Bresnahan, Timothy and P. Reiss, “Entry in Monopoly Markets,” Review of Economic Studies,
vol. 57: 531-53, (1990).
Bresnahan, Timothy and P. Reiss, “Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets,” Journal of
Political Economy, 99(5): 977-1009, (1991).
Ciliberto, Frederico and Elie Tamer, “Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline
Markets,” Econometrica, 77(6): 1791-1828, (2009).
Comments on Bresnahan and Reiss, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Special Issue on
Microeconomics 3: 872-882, (1987).
Einav, Liran, “Not All Rivals Look Alike: Estimating an Equilibrium Model of The Release Date
Timing Game”, Economic Inquiry, 48(2): 369-390, (2010).
Ellickson, Paul, “Does Sutton Apply to Supermarkets?” Rand Journal of Economics, 37(1): 43-
59, (2007).
Mankiw, Gregory, and Michael Whinston, “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 17(1): 48-58, (1986).
Mazzeo, Michael, “Product Choice and Oligopoly Market Structure,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 33(2): 221-42, (2002).
Seim, Katja, “An Empirical Model of Firm Entry with Endogenous Product-Type Choices,” Rand
Journal of Economics, 36(3): 619-640, (2006).
Sutton, J. Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press, 1991, Chapters 1-2.
Toivanen, Otto and Michael Waterson, “Market Structure and Entry: Where's the Beef?” Rand
Journal of Economics, 36(3): 680-699, (2005).

15
B. Product Design and Positioning
Blonigen, Bruce, Christopher Knittel and Anson Soderbery, “Keeping it fresh: Strategic product
redesigns and welfare,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 53, 170-214, (2017).
Fan, Ying, "Ownership Consolidation and Product Characteristics: A Study of the US Daily
Newspaper Market," American Economic Review, 103(5), 1598-1628, (2013).
Eizenberg, Alon, “Upstream Innovation and Product Variety in the U.S. Home PC Market,” The
Review of Economic Studies, 81(3), 1003–1045, (2014).
Sweeting, Andrew, “Dynamic Product Positioning in Differentiated Product Markets: The Effect
of Fees for Musical Performance Rights on the Commercial Radio Industry,” Econometrica, 81
(5): 1763–1803, (2013).
Wollmann, Thomas, “Trucks without Bailouts: Equilibrium Product Characteristics for
Commercial Vehicles,” American Economic Review, 108(6): 1364–1406, (2018).

C. Strategic Entry Deterrence and Predation

Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton, “Contracts as Barriers to Entry,” American Economic
Review, 77(3): 388-401, (1987).
Bulow, Jeremy, John Geanakoplos, and Paul Klemperer, “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic
Substitutes and Complements,” Journal of Political Economy, 93(3): 488-511, (1985).
Chevalier, Judith, “Capital Structure and Product Market Competition: Empirical Evidence from
the Supermarket Industry,” American Economic Review, 85(3): 415-435, (1995).
Ciliberto, Federico and Jonathan Williams, “Limited Access to Airport Facilities and Market
Power in the Airline Industry” Journal of Law and Economics, 53(3): 467-495, (2010).
Dafny, Leemore, “Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets,”
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,14(3): 513-542, (2005).
Ellison, Glenn and Sara Ellison, “Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical
Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(1): 1-
36, (2011).
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, “The Fat Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy and the Lean and
Hungry Look,” American Economic Review, 74(2): 361-366, (1984).
Ghemawat, Pankaj, “Capacity Expansion in the Titanium Dioxide Industry,” Journal of Industrial
Economics, 33(2): 145-63, (1984).
Gilbert, Richard and Marvin Lieberman, “Investment and Coordination in Oligopolistic
Industries,” Rand Journal of Economics, 18(1): 17-3, (1987).
Goolsbee, Austan and Chad Syverson, “How do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry?:
Evidence from Major Airlines,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(4): 1611-1633, (2008).
Klepper, Steven and Kenneth Simons, “Dominance by Birthright: Entry of Prior Radio Producers
and Competitive Ramifications in the U.S. Television Receiver Industry,” Strategic Management
Journal, 21(10/11): 997-1016, (2000).
Lieberman, Marvin, “Post Entry Investment and Market Structure in the Chemical Processing
Industry,” Rand Journal of Economics, 18(4): 533-549, (1987).

16
 Nalebuff, Barry, “Bundling as an Entry Barrier,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,119(1): 159-
187, (2004).
Schmalensee, Richard, “Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry,” Bell
Journal of Economics, 9(2): 305-327, (1978).
Schmalensee, Richard, “Economies of Scale and Barriers to Entry,” Journal of Political
Economy, 89(6): 1228-1238, (1981).
Smiley, Robert, “Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence,” International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 6(2): 167-180, (1988).
Weiman, David and Richard Levin, “Preying for Monopoly: The Case of the Southern Bell
Telephone Company, 1894-1912,” Journal of Political Economy, 102(1): 103-126, (1994).
Zanarone, Giorgio, “Vertical Restraints and the Law: Evidence from Automobile Franchising,”
Journal of Law and Economics, 52(4): 691-700, (2009).

IX. Dynamic Models

A. Industry Dynamics: Theory and Evidence

Aw, Bee, Xiaomen Chen, and Mark Roberts, “Firm-Level Evidence on Productivity Differentials
and Turnover in Taiwanese Manufacturing,” Journal of Development Economics, 66(1): 51-86,
(2001).
Dunne, Timothy, Mark Roberts, and Larry Samuelson, “Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S.
Manufacturing,” Rand Journal of Economics, 19(4): 495-515, (1988).
Hopenhayn, Hugo, “Entry, Exit and Firm Dynamics in Long-run Equilibrium,” Econometrica,
60(5): 1127-1150, (1992).
Jovanovic, Boyan, “Selection and the Evolution of Industry,” Econometrica, 50(3): 649-670,
(1982).
Melitz, Marc, “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry
Productivity,” Econometrica, 71(6): 1695-1725, (2003).
Olley, Steven, and Ariel Pakes, “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications
Equipment Industry,” Econometrica, 64(6): 1263-1297, (1996).
Sutton, John, “Gibrat’s Legacy,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35(1): 40-59, (1997).
Sutton, John, Technology and Market Structure, MIT Press, (1998).

B. Single Agent Dynamic Models

Ackerberg, Daniel, “Advertising, Learning, and Consumer Choice in Experience Good Markets:
A Structural Empirical Examination,” International Economic Review, 44: 1007-1040, (2003).
Aghion, Philippe, Patrick Bolton, Christopher Harris, and Bruno Jullien, “Optimal Learning by
Experimentation,” Review of Economic Studies 58: 621-54, (1991).
Aguirregabiria, Victor, “The Dynamics of Markups and Inventories in Retailing Firms,” Review
of Economic Studies 66(2): 275-308, (1999).

17
 Benkard, C. Lanier, “Learning and Forgetting: The Dynamics of Aircraft Production,” American
Economic Review, 90(4): 1034-1054, (2000).
Dixit, Avinash, “Entry and Exit Decisions Under Uncertainty,” Journal of Political Economy,
97(3): 620-638, (1989).
Hitsch, Gunter, “An Empirical Model of Optimal Dynamic Product Launch and Exit Under
Demand Uncertainty,” Marketing Science, 25(1): 25-50, (2006).
Holmes, Thomas, “The Diffusion of Wal-Mart and Economies of Density,”Econometrica, 79(1):
253-301, (2011).
Hotz, Joseph and Robert Miller, “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of
Dynamic Models,” Review of Economic Studies 60(3): 497-530, (1993).
Hotz, Joseph, Robert Miller, Seth Sanders and Jeffrey Smith “A Simulation Estimator for
Dynamic Models of Discrete Choice,” Review of Economic Studies, 61: 256-289, (1994).
Pakes, Ariel, “Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent
Stocks,” Econometrica, 54(4): 755-784, (1986).
Rust, John, “Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold
Zurcher,” Econometrica, 55(5): 999-1033, (1987).
Stokey, N., R. E. Lucas, and E. C. Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, chapter 5,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.

C. Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition (in Winter Quarter)

Ackerberg, Daniel, Steven Berry, Lanier Benkard, and Ariel Pakes, “Econometric Tools for
Analyzing Market Outcomes,” in Handbook of Econometrics. J.J. Heckman and E.E. Leamer
(ed.), Elsevier. Edition 1, volume 6, (2007).
Bajari, Patrick, Lanier Benkard, and Jonathan Levin, “Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect
Competition,”Econometrica, 75(5): 1331-1370, (2007).
Benkard, Lanier, “Dynamic Analysis of the Market for Wide-Bodied Commercial Aircraft,”
Review of Economic Studies, 71(3): 581-611, (2004).
Caruana, Guillermo and Liran Einav, “Production Targets,” Rand Journal of Economics, 38(4):
990-1017, (2008).
Collard-Wexler, Allan, “Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix concrete Industry,”
Econometrica 81: 1003–1037 (2013).
Ericson, Richard and Ariel Pakes, “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for
Empirical Work,” Review of Economic Studies, 62(1): 53-82, (1995).
Gowrisankaran, Guatam and Robert Town, “Dynamic Equilibrium in The Hospital Industry,”
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6(1): 45-74, (1997).
Markovich, Sarit, “Snowball: The Evolution of Dynamic Oligopolies with Network
Externalities,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 33(3): 909-938, (2007).
Maskin, Eric and Jean Tirole, “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I,” and “A Theory of Dynamic
Oligopoly, II,” Econometrica, 56(3): 549-570 and 571-599, (1988).
Maskin, Eric and Jean Tirole, “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III: Cournot Competition,”
European Economic Review 31(4): 947-968, (1987).

18
Pakes, Ariel and Paul McGuire, “Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical
Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model,” Rand Journal of Economic, 25(4):
555-589, (1994).
Pakes, Ariel and Richard Ericson, “Empirical Implications of Alternative Models of Firm
Dynamics,” Journal of Economic Theory, 79(1): 1-45, (1998).
Pakes, Ariel, Michael Ostrovsky, and Steven Berry, “Simple Estimators for the Parameters of
Dynamic Discrete Games (with Entry/Exit Examples),” Rand Journal of Economics, 38(2): 373-
399, (2007).
Pakes Ariel and U. Doraszelski, “A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in IO”. In:
Armstrong M, Porter R, The Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol. 3. New York: Elsevier;
pp. Chapter 33 2183-2162 (2007).
Ryan, Stephen, “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry,”
Econometrica, 80(3): 1019-1061, (2012).

19