Week 5
Week 5
Week 5
To cite this article: Karin Bäckstrand, Jonathan W. Kuyper, Björn-Ola Linnér & Eva Lövbrand
(2017) Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond,
Environmental Politics, 26:4, 561-579, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1327485
EDITORIAL
Introduction
‘Together now!’ was the slogan used in the invitation to the Marrakesh
Partnership for Global Climate Action (GCA), an initiative launched on
the second day of the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP 22) to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in
Marrakesh in November 2016. During this event, the two high-level cham-
pions nominated by COP as an outcome of the Paris Agreement – the
French Ambassador in charge of climate negotiations Laurence Tubiana
and the Moroccan Minister of Environment Hakima El Haité – called upon
businesses, regions, cities, industries and NGOs to showcase their climate
activities and partner with states in the transition to the low carbon society.
The champions’ effort to mobilize non-state climate action pre-2020 coin-
cides with the launch during the last week of COP 22 of the 2050 Pathway
Platform. Informed by the same cooperative spirit, this multi-stakeholder
initiative rests upon a broad coalition among 15 cities, 22 states and 200
companies seeking to devise long-term, net zero, climate-resilient and
sustainable development pathways.1
These efforts to accelerate climate action by facilitating dialogue, knowl-
edge exchange and cooperation among state and non-state actors intensify
a trend in global climate politics: rapprochement of the realms of multi-
lateral diplomacy and transnational climate action with the rationale to
enhance the pre-2020 ambition. Officially, this process was set in motion
during the ‘Action Day’ of COP 20 in Lima in 2014, when the Lima–Paris
Action Agenda (LPAA) and the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action
(NAZCA) were launched to ‘galvanize the groundswell of actions on cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation from cities, regions, businesses and
civil society organizations’ (Chan et al. 2015, p. 467). However, in practice,
this “widened frame” for climate diplomacy’ (Christoff 2016, p. 770) has a
much longer history and reflects the growth and impact of transnational
private actors, NGOs, social movement and transnational advocacy net-
works in world politics (Hoffmann 2011). Ever since the UNFCCC was
signed at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992, it has formed a veritable center of gravity for a multiplicity
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562 EDITORIAL
COPs should ‘make greater use of observer input’ (UNFCCC 2010, para.
178(a)ii) and ‘invite, time permitting, observer organizations to make pre-
sentations’ (UNFCCC 2010, para. 176), the space for observer participation
has become more restricted after Copenhagen and all protest actions within
formal UN spaces are now subject to strict institutional control by the
UNFCCC Secretariat (Orr 2016).
(Busby 2016, p. 9). Hence, the post-Paris period may bring renewed
scholarly attention to the prospect of the green, ecological or environmental
state as an engine of transformative change to low carbon societies in local,
national and comparative perspectives (Bäckstrand and Kronsell 2015).
Legitimacy
The legitimacy of non-state actors inside and outside the UNFCCCC has
received much attention in the time frame between Copenhagen and Paris
(Bäckstrand 2008, Fisher 2010). This section focuses on input and through-
put legitimacy offered to, and fostered by, non-state actors in the Paris
Agreement (Schmidt 2013). On the surface, Paris looks like a breakthrough
for input legitimacy in terms of both state and non-state participation and
inclusion. The French COP presidency was heralded for its leadership in
conference diplomacy and for shepherding an inclusive COP 21 entailing
extensive consultation with all major countries and negotiation groups
(Brun 2016).7 Input legitimacy was high compared to COP 15, where the
Copenhagen Accord was hammered out in a ‘Friends of the Chair’ group of
only 28 states. In Paris, by contrast, states came together and agreed – even
under consensus decision-making – on a binding periodic review process
for their voluntary NDCs. Small island states, though small in resources,
were able to overturn major power differentials and spur the successful
‘high ambition coalition’, a loose grouping of more than 100 high-, low-
and middle-income countries.
Input legitimacy was also high for non-state actors as the Paris
Agreement entails the formal recognition of the more than 12,000 commit-
ments tabled by businesses and other non-Party stakeholders which gave
momentum to the Agreement. Furthermore, from the thematic sessions of
LPAA to the participation of 6306 accredited non-state actors at le Bourget,
COP 21 was regarded by many as truly inclusive (UNFCCC 2015).
However, Chan et al. (2016) demonstrate that there is a wide participation
gap for developing countries in climate action both in terms of inclusion
and leadership. The bulk of the climate action measured in LPAA and
NAZCA is not mobilized by or implemented for the poor and vulnerable.
Of the 52 actions adopted at the UN Climate summit in New York not led
by international organizations, 75% are coordinated by partners in North
America. Moreover, praise for input legitimacy at COP 21 and in the Paris
Agreement should be tempered by recognition that subsequent to
Copenhagen, the UNFCCC has gradually increased institutional control
of both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ climate movements. Just before the Paris
meeting, this development was further reinforced as a response to the terror
attacks in the city weeks before COP 21 (Orr 2016). For security reasons,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 571
civil society action was restricted, which diminished the possibilities for
civil society to hold UN and state parties accountable.
These matters of inclusion and participation will likely bring renewed
interest in the legitimacy of non-state actors as we move into the post-Paris
context where the LPAA, NAZCA and the GCA offer venues for interaction
between state and non-state actors. Some of this work will focus on socio-
logical legitimacy – what individual citizens and civil society groups think
about the Paris Agreement and their national policies (for some experi-
mental work in this vein, see Bernauer and McGrath 2016). But much
analysis will focus instead on the throughput legitimacy of non-state action:
that is to what extent non-state actors enhance the accountability, transpar-
ency and deliberative quality of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.
The Paris Agreement provides several avenues for non-state actors to
demand accountability of states and other non-state actors for their actions
and inactions. Article 15 of the Agreement calls for the establishment of a
‘mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance’ of the
Agreement (UNFCCC 2015a, article 15). This is supplemented by the
5-year global stocktake that will review the aggregate effect of NDCs in
reaching the goals on mitigation, finance and adaptation embedded in the
Agreement.
Both the compliance mechanism and the global stocktake have pro-
blems in terms of accountability. The former is a mechanism that will be
‘expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is
transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive’, thus lacking the teeth
necessary for curtailing free riding.8 Moreover, the global stocktake will
focus on the aggregate state contributions, and not on individual state
NDCs. This will also limit the ability of non-state actors and states to
hold each other to account for their failures. Nevertheless, it seems likely
that in a system of hybrid multilateralism, much of the accountability
and watchdog role of NDCs will fall to non-state actors both interna-
tionally and domestically. Non-state actors were invited to participate in
the designing process of the Green Climate Fund’s monitoring and
accountability framework, which is primarily a regular mandatory self-
reporting and participatory monitoring approach by the National
Designated Authority and local stakeholders.
Perhaps, the strongest element of the Paris Agreement is the transpar-
ency framework and Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency (article
13). While the measures for accountability (and mechanisms to achieve
them) are weak, NDCs, biennial reports, international assessments, finan-
cial contributions and the global stocktakes all need to be as transparent as
possible. In many ways, the transparency framework is key to generating
compliance with the Paris Agreement by driving accuracy, completeness,
comparability and consistency of efforts by states. But again, the role of
572 EDITORIAL
Effectiveness
The rise of transnational climate governance has spurred research on how
the UN can orchestrate, mobilize and catalyze public and non-state action
to curb climate change, limit global warming to 2°C or below and promote
climate resilience and decarbonization (Hsu et al. 2015, Widerberg and
Pattberg 2015). This research is closely tied to debates on the effectiveness
of the international climate regime. Effectiveness of an international agree-
ment is a function of the ambition and stringency of its commitments
combined with the levels of state participation and compliance (Bodansky
2012, Bang et al. 2016). More stringent commitments may increase effec-
tiveness only as long as they do not lower participation or compliance.
Conversely, participation does not necessarily enhance effectiveness if
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 573
ambitions are watered down. Non-state actors are often perceived to spur
implementation as well as monitoring and evaluating compliance. But they
also stimulate ambition and participation by defining problems, setting
agendas, shaping rules, principles, and norms provide information and
capacity building, mobilize public engagement, evaluating and monitoring
compliance (e.g. Börzel and Risse 2005, Nasiritousi 2016).
In the post-Paris era, effectiveness also revolves around how to align
non-state and intergovernmental action in a comprehensive framework that
can help achieve low carbon futures (Abbott 2017). Effectiveness and
performance of non-state contributions concerns bolstering climate action
outside the UNFCCC to close the emission gap (Chan 2015a, Hale 2016). In
essence, how can the aggregate sum of voluntary non-state and substate
commitments and actions complement NDCs in reducing greenhouse
gases, furthering mitigation and adaptation goals, and spurring decarboni-
zation? However, the UNFCCC is not only about climate change mitigation
and adaptation. The Paris Agreement aims to ‘strengthen the global
response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable
development and efforts to eradicate poverty’ (UNFCCC 2015a, article 2).
In addition to the goal of limiting global temperature increase to below 2°C
and increasing ability to adapt to unwanted impacts of climate change, it
shall foster ‘low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that
does not threaten food production’ and make ‘finance flows consistent with
these goals’ (UNFCCC 2015, article 2). Most likely, different non-state
actors will contribute to different parts of the agreement and these efforts
may very well be in conflict with one another. For example, cities’ adapta-
tion can exacerbate poverty for marginalized groups (Sovacool et al. 2015),
and bioenergy companies’ pursuits can threaten food security (Fuss et al.
2014).
Moreover, debates on the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement have
focused on its weak legal status. The Paris Agreement is not legally binding
with regard to states’ voluntary pledges, in contrast to the Kyoto protocol’s
emissions reduction obligations. However, the reporting commitments in
the Paris Agreement are binding, including mandatory commitments that
each ‘Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive’ NDCs.
While states ‘shall pursue domestic mitigation measures’, they do so with
‘the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions’ (UNFCCC 2015a,
article 4.2). The Paris Agreement nonetheless contains provisions that raise
strong expectations of commitment and compliance and is not without
consequences for failure. The many NDCs that are conditional on interna-
tional support are to different extents subject to compliance mechanisms.
For example, more than 50 of the NDCs are fully or partly conditional on
international support (Day et al. 2016).
574 EDITORIAL
Conclusions
Non-state involvement has been a distinct feature of global climate govern-
ance during the past three decades. Compared to policy areas of security,
trade and finance, UN climate diplomacy has in many ways been pioneer-
ing in continuously seeking to facilitate access and inclusion of a growing
range of non-state actors. In the period following COP 15 in Copenhagen,
the interplay between state and non-state actors was intensified. We have
here advanced the concept of ‘hybrid multilateralism’ to capture the new
landscape of international climate cooperation that gained ground after
Copenhagen and that now is institutionalized through the Paris
Agreement. First, hybrid multilateralism denotes a bottom-up climate pol-
icy architecture that combines voluntary pledging by states with an inter-
national transparency framework for periodic review and ratcheting-up of
ambition, in which non-state actors play important roles as implementers,
experts and watchdogs. Second, hybrid multilateralism refers to an increas-
ingly dynamic interplay between multilateral and transnational climate
action, where the UNFCCC Secretariat has taken a role as facilitator, or
orchestrator, of a multitude of non-state climate initiatives and actions.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 575
Notes
1. Announcement available at http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom
/high-level-climate-champions-launch-2050-pathways-platform/
2. It is noteworthy that this definition also includes governmental actors such as
local authorities. Climate commitments by local authorities (cities, municipa-
lities, regional governments) dominate NAZCA with over 6000 actors.
3. http://unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7785.php
4. http://climateactiontracker.org/
5. http://cait.wri.org/indc/
6. http://climateequityreference.org/. See also Oil Change International, ‘The
Sky’s the Limit’, http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_
limit_2016_FINAL_2.pdf.
7. A different account of COP 21 is provided by Dimitrov (2016) who argues that
COP 21 was highly secretive, but as the summit delivered, it has generated
praise from virtually all parties.
8. Interestingly, this mechanism shall be composed of expert-based members that
will likely include non-state actors.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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