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Environmental Politics

ISSN: 0964-4016 (Print) 1743-8934 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fenp20

Non-state actors in global climate governance:


from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond

Karin Bäckstrand, Jonathan W. Kuyper, Björn-Ola Linnér & Eva Lövbrand

To cite this article: Karin Bäckstrand, Jonathan W. Kuyper, Björn-Ola Linnér & Eva Lövbrand
(2017) Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond,
Environmental Politics, 26:4, 561-579, DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1327485

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1327485

Published online: 26 May 2017.

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https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fenp20
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, 2017
VOL. 26, NO. 4, 561–579
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1327485

EDITORIAL

Non-state actors in global climate governance: from


Copenhagen to Paris and beyond

Introduction
‘Together now!’ was the slogan used in the invitation to the Marrakesh
Partnership for Global Climate Action (GCA), an initiative launched on
the second day of the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP 22) to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in
Marrakesh in November 2016. During this event, the two high-level cham-
pions nominated by COP as an outcome of the Paris Agreement – the
French Ambassador in charge of climate negotiations Laurence Tubiana
and the Moroccan Minister of Environment Hakima El Haité – called upon
businesses, regions, cities, industries and NGOs to showcase their climate
activities and partner with states in the transition to the low carbon society.
The champions’ effort to mobilize non-state climate action pre-2020 coin-
cides with the launch during the last week of COP 22 of the 2050 Pathway
Platform. Informed by the same cooperative spirit, this multi-stakeholder
initiative rests upon a broad coalition among 15 cities, 22 states and 200
companies seeking to devise long-term, net zero, climate-resilient and
sustainable development pathways.1
These efforts to accelerate climate action by facilitating dialogue, knowl-
edge exchange and cooperation among state and non-state actors intensify
a trend in global climate politics: rapprochement of the realms of multi-
lateral diplomacy and transnational climate action with the rationale to
enhance the pre-2020 ambition. Officially, this process was set in motion
during the ‘Action Day’ of COP 20 in Lima in 2014, when the Lima–Paris
Action Agenda (LPAA) and the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action
(NAZCA) were launched to ‘galvanize the groundswell of actions on cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation from cities, regions, businesses and
civil society organizations’ (Chan et al. 2015, p. 467). However, in practice,
this “widened frame” for climate diplomacy’ (Christoff 2016, p. 770) has a
much longer history and reflects the growth and impact of transnational
private actors, NGOs, social movement and transnational advocacy net-
works in world politics (Hoffmann 2011). Ever since the UNFCCC was
signed at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro in 1992, it has formed a veritable center of gravity for a multiplicity
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
562 EDITORIAL

of non-state actors and social networks. The numbers of participants at the


annual COPs have increased over the years, peaking in Paris with more
than 28,000 accredited participants, of whom 8000 were registered as non-
state observers (Lövbrand et al. 2017). With the adoption of the Paris
Agreement, the observer groups present at the annual COPs are now
invited to play a more integrated role in multilateral processes through,
for instance, monitoring of national action and experimentation with local,
regional and transnational mitigation and adaptation strategies.
Here, we advance the concept of ‘hybrid multilateralism’ as a heuristic to
capture this intensified interplay between state and non-state actors in the
new landscape of international climate cooperation. We take the term non-
state actor to include not only civil society and social movements, but also
economic actors (business and trade unions) and subnational or substate
actors (regional local governments, cities and municipalities).2 This defini-
tion is consistent with the United Nations Economic and Social Council
recognition of observers who have received consultative status. We suggest
that ‘hybrid multilateralism’ captures two major tendencies in global cli-
mate politics. First, it denotes a hybrid policy architecture that combines
voluntary climate pledges by states with an international transparency
framework for periodic review and ratcheting-up of ambition (Savaresi
2016, p. 5). Non-state actors are included in this hybrid arrangement, not
just as observers of multilateral diplomacy, but also as actors overseeing the
monitoring and implementation of states’ Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs). In fact, the informal review and monitoring has
already started outside the UNFCCC (see later).
Second, ‘hybrid multilateralism’ also denotes an intensified and increas-
ingly dynamic interplay between multilateral and transnational climate
action where the UNFCCC Secretariat has taken a role as facilitator (Hale
2016). The 2015 Paris Agreement refers to NAZCA, a platform established
and hosted by the UNFCCC that to date has registered more than 12,000
individual or cooperative climate commitments by companies, investors,
civil society and cities. The purpose of NAZCA is to mobilize the mitigation
potential of transnational climate action and thereby help close the global
emissions gap. While the Paris Agreement primarily rests upon national
climate plans submitted by states, its accompanying COP decision formally
recognizes that ‘non-Party stakeholders’ can contribute to the goal of limit-
ing global warming well below 2°C, or even 1.5°C. As such the agreement
spells out a new role for the UNFCCC as ‘orchestrator’ of transnational
climate experiments and calls for analyses of the democratic legitimacy and
reflexivity of this new role (Bäckstrand and Kuyper 2017, Dryzek 2017).
In the following, we trace the emergence and institutionalization of
hybrid multilateralism from the infamous 2009 Copenhagen summit to
the celebrated 2015 Paris conference. We explore the rapprochement of
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 563

multilateral and transnational climate action in terms of authority, legiti-


macy and effectiveness.

International climate cooperation after Copenhagen


The 2009 UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen has often been described
as a turning point for global climate politics (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand
2015). Then, the top-down universal approach to global climate govern-
ance, epitomized by the Kyoto Protocol’s legally binding targets and time-
tables for emission reductions, was replaced by a much more decentralized
climate policy architecture (Victor 2011). Many analysts have suggested
that Copenhagen marked the decline of the EU’s global leadership, or even
the defeat of the EU model of liberal multilateralism (Bodansky 2012,
Parker et al. 2012). Instead of delivering a legally binding global climate
treaty for the post-2012 era, the meeting paved the way for multipolarity
and consolidated a new climate (dis)order defined by the fragmentation of
G77 and the concomitant rise of the BASIC countries.
While the failures of the Copenhagen summit have been well documen-
ted, it is important to recognize how the much-criticized Copenhagen
Accord also formed the ground for the ‘hybrid multilateralism’ now insti-
tutionalized through the 2015 Paris Agreement. Central elements of the
Copenhagen Accord include the 2°C temperature target as the long-term
goal for international climate cooperation; a review of the possibilities to
aspire for a 1.5°C target; the pledge and review system for NDCs; a target of
$100 billion annually by 2020 in climate finance; and recognition that
emission reductions are necessary from both developed and developing
states. While this climate policy architecture was the result of intense
bargaining between ‘major emitters’ and ‘major economies’ in the North
and South, it also paved the way for myriad non-state and substate climate
activities and novel forms of state/non-state interactions.
The Copenhagen summit gave birth to a climate regime that scholars
have depicted as complex, dispersed, fragmented and polycentric (Cole
2015, Jordan et al. 2015). Of course, climate governance has never solely
taken place in the hallways of interstate diplomacy or the formal rooms of
international negotiations. In tandem with domestic and local efforts to
develop mitigation and adaptation responses to climate change, alternative
international arenas emerged long before COP 15. After former US
President George W. Bush in 2001 declared that the United States would
not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, we saw the rise of a number of bilateral or
mini-lateral climate partnerships and clubs such as the Methane to Markets
Partnership, the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate and the Major Economies Forum. While the lifespans of these
initiatives varied, they have effectively challenged the UNFCCC as the
Private carbon reporting refers to the practice of organizations voluntarily disclosing information about their
carbon emissions and environmental impact. Unlike regulatory-mandated reporting, private carbon reporting
relies on organizations providing this information willingly. The idea behind this approach is that a free market
564 EDITORIAL will encourage participants to share relevant data without the need for regulatory intervention1. However, the
effectiveness of private carbon reporting depends on the willingness of organizations to participate and the
transparency they demonstrate in managing their climate change responsibilities.

epicenter of climate governance. So has ‘the Cambrian explosion’ of trans-


national climate initiatives and experiments following the Copenhagen
meeting (Abbott 2012, Abbott 2017, Zelli et al. 2017). Transnational climate
experimentation takes many forms, ranging from private carbon reporting,
labeling, offsetting and trading schemes to transnational city networks and
local grassroots mobilization for low carbon lifestyles (Hoffmann 2011,
Bulkeley et al. 2014). Rather than assuming that the innovative thrust of
climate governance will spring from the UN-led climate regime, many of
these voluntary pledges and initiatives have developed bottom-up and in
direct response to inadequate multilateral action (Jordan et al. 2015).
Second, and directly related to the emergence of climate action ‘beyond
the international regime’ (Okereke et al. 2009), we have seen an increasing
involvement of non-state and substate actors in the UNFCCC system.
Compared to policy areas of security, trade and finance, UN climate
diplomacy has been pioneering in enhancing access, inclusion and repre-
sentation of non-state actors through a range of deliberative and participa-
tory mechanisms (Bernstein 2012). Ever since UN negotiations on the
global climate were initiated in the early 1990s, NGOs, businesses and
local governments have been present as activists, experts and diplomats
(Newell 2000, Betsill and Corell 2001, Betsill 2015). Following Copenhagen,
the range of roles available to non-state observers expanded, along with
their ability to exercise authority in the international climate regime (Green
2014). However, different non-state actor groups play different roles in
multilateral climate diplomacy. Treating ‘non-state actors’ as a homoge-
neous category can be useful for heuristic purposes, but in practice hetero-
geneity prevails (Nasiritousi et al. 2016).
The non-state actors involved in the UNFCCC system include environ-
mental NGOs, activist groups, intergovernmental organizations, city net-
works, oil companies, consultancy and legal firms, carbon brokers,
indigenous communities, trade unions, women’s groups, youth organiza-
tions and religious communities. Many of these are internally divided.
While some businesses demand environment-friendly policies and technol-
ogies, others seek to greenwash their practices or roll back regulation
(Nasiritousi 2017). Some NGOs seek insider status while others demand
radical, systemic change. Through the rise of the climate justice movement,
climate activism has gained new energy and involved new social groups and
networks in global climate politics (Fisher 2010, Hadden 2015). The mobi-
lization for climate justice was prominent during the Copenhagen meeting,
and has since then resulted in numerous climate protests, demonstrations
and marches across the global North and South in the lead up to Paris.
A third feature of post-Copenhagen climate governance is the increas-
ingly close interplay between the UNFCCC system and non-state climate
action (Betsill et al. 2015, Chan et al. 2016, Hale 2016). The rise of non-state
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 565

climate experimentation did not occur in a vacuum; many initiatives were


explicitly galvanized by international organizations in the negotiation pro-
cess after Copenhagen. In time for COP 17 in Durban in 2011, the
UNFCCC Secretariat launched the Momentum for Change to highlight the
‘groundswell of climate action’ that can bring about low carbon transfor-
mative change not least in developing countries. This initiative was devel-
oped in tandem with the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform
for Enhanced Action (ADP). As outlined in the decision text from COP 17,
the aim of the ADP is to ‘develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all
Parties’ (UNFCCC 2011, para 2) to be concluded by 2015 to come into
effect and be implemented from 2020. In the 4 years leading up to Paris, the
ADP was broken into two work streams. Under work stream one, the ADP
invited states and observer organizations to provide input to the develop-
ment of a post-2020 climate agreement. Work stream two aimed at enhan-
cing the ambition before 2020 and hereby set out to close the ‘mitigation
gap’ between voluntary pledges submitted by states to the Copenhagen
Accord and the ultimate goal to limit global warming to 2°C.
At COP 18 in Doha in 2012, governments decided to explore a wide
range of actions that could help to limit the pre-2020 ambition gap. The
importance of civil society and private sector contributions were particu-
larly highlighted in relation to developing country activities, such as finance
and Loss and Damage. At the following COP in Warsaw in 2013, the
UNFCCC Secretariat launched a portal that presented information on
‘cooperative climate actions undertaken around the world at various levels
by governments, international organizations, civil society and business’.3
This portal would a year later in Lima prove to be a symbolically vital
instrument tightly coupled to the LPAA. The latter initiative was launched
at COP 20 by a quartet of actors – the Peruvian COP presidency, the
incoming French presidency of COP21, the UNFCCC Secretariat and
United Nations Secretary-General’s Executive Office – to boost non-state
action, increase pre-2020 ambition and harness the groundswell of climate
initiatives in the post-Paris period (Widerberg 2017).
While all these initiatives and events laid the foundations for the ‘hybrid
multilateralism’ now institutionalized through the Paris Agreement, inten-
sified non-state involvement in UN climate diplomacy has also been subject
to contestation and debate. Following the civic protest actions and organi-
zational failures to effectively accommodate the many accredited observers
in Copenhagen, many governments questioned the involvement of civil
society in the UNFCCC process (Fisher 2010, Nasiritousi and Linnér
2016). Directly after Copenhagen, the Subsidiary Body of Implementation
was therefore asked to review the future role of observer organizations at
the annual COPs. Although the review concluded that the chairs of the
566 EDITORIAL

COPs should ‘make greater use of observer input’ (UNFCCC 2010, para.
178(a)ii) and ‘invite, time permitting, observer organizations to make pre-
sentations’ (UNFCCC 2010, para. 176), the space for observer participation
has become more restricted after Copenhagen and all protest actions within
formal UN spaces are now subject to strict institutional control by the
UNFCCC Secretariat (Orr 2016).

Looking ahead to Paris and beyond: toward a new era of hybrid


multilateralism
The UN Climate Conference in Paris in December 2015 was a carefully
managed event, designed to lower expectations but maximize chances of
success (Christoff 2016). It was preceded by intense diplomatic efforts to
build the momentum and capacity necessary to deliver what Copenhagen
could not: a new global climate treaty for the post-Kyoto period. Analyses
of the Paris Agreement often point to the reinforced role of domestic
climate action in the new climate regime (Bang et al. 2016, Falkner 2016).
The NDCs submitted by states in 2015 represent the principal instrument
of the Agreement and form the ground for international efforts to limit
global mean warming well below 2°C. While this bottom-up pledge-and-
review system formalizes and extends the bottom-up paradigm to which the
Copenhagen Accord gave birth (Bodansky 2015), it is also structured within
a legally binding transparency framework negotiated by states and coordi-
nated by the UNFCCC. In order to monitor the implementation of NDCs
and gradually increase states’ ambition, the Paris Agreement rests upon a
5-year cycle of global stocktaking and ratcheting up of ambition. As a
consequence, the new climate regime offers a hybrid mix of bottom-up
flexibility and top-down monitoring, reporting and review.
The other hybrid element of the Paris Agreement is the official linking of
multilateral and transnational climate action. While the Lima Conference’s
call for climate action omitted references to non-state and private actors
from the last rounds of negotiations (Hale 2016, p. 16), the Paris Agreement
officially recognizes ‘the importance of the engagements of all levels of
government, and various actors’ (UNFCCC 2015a). The accompanying
COP decision details the role of ‘non-Party stakeholders’, especially in
enhancing action prior to 2020 (UNFCCC 2015b) and calls for the ‘scaling-
up and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary efforts and initia-
tives’ (UNFCCC 2015b, para 122). Formally, the Paris Agreement opens up
for engagement of non-state actors in three processes: the 5-year cycles of
global stocktake of NDCs preceded by the ‘facilitative dialogue’ in 2018; the
transparency framework reviewing mitigation and adaptation actions; and
the implementation and compliance mechanism (van Asselt 2016, p. 7).
However, in practice, the input by non-state actors is uncertain given that
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 567

the procedures for these mechanisms will be negotiated. Also, non-state


actors are limited in their role as ‘technical experts’ as the review and
stocktake is to be based on ‘best available science’ (van Asselt 2016). The
role of non-state actors in the official review of the implementation by
individual states is also likely to be limited. However, input from non-state
actors at the national level is possible in the consultation and formulation of
national climate plans.
In negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement, in 2014, the parties
undertook a technical examination process (TEP) with the aim to increase
pre-2020 mitigation ambition and focus on ‘actionable policy options’
(Hermwille 2016). The TEP represents a venue for dialogues between
governments, international organizations and partnership to develop best
practice for decreasing the emission gap. However, the COP decision to the
Paris Agreement extended TEP to include non-state experts and non-Party
stakeholders and also launched TEPs on adaptation where the idea is that
non-state actors should provide ‘scalable and replicable solutions’ (Chan
et al. 2016, p. 242). In this respect, the COP decision provides a ‘rare and
crucial interface between transnational and multilateral spheres of action’
(Chan et al. 2016). In sum, TEP is an expression of hybrid multilateralism
as it deepens the interaction, or blurring between state and non-state actors
in the UNFCCC in post-Paris period. In their proposed Roadmap for GCA,
the High-Level Champions highlight TEMs as important mechanisms for
involving non-state actors in mitigation and adaptation action.
However, non-state actors also play a role in reviewing voluntary pledges
outside the UNFCCC. This is manifested in independent assessments by
civil society and research organizations of NDCs. One instance of a science-
based assessment that tracks, ranks and monitors individual pledges, com-
mitments and NDCs by states is the Climate Action Tracker run by a
consortium of research institutes including Ecofys and Climate Analytics.4
Similarly, a climate data explorer tool (CAIT) by the World Resource
Institute (WRI) provides independent assessment of the INDCs adopted
at Paris.5 These various tools will be an important complement to the state-
driven global stocktaking. Beyond the level of ambition, criteria such as
equity and fairness of NDCs are also calculated by the Climate Equity
Reference Project, which is a consortium of civil society organizations, as
well as Oil Change International.6 These tools for reviewing commitments
and pledges by states are expected to play a significant role in the post-Paris
landscape in holding states accountable for their (in)actions.
Overall, the Paris Agreement has led to a system that institutionalizes
hybrid multilateralism: it strikes a middle position between bottom-up
polycentricity and top-down targets-and-timetables by combining intergo-
vernmental and transnational action. The Paris Agreement accepts that
NDCs submitted by states are the backbone of mitigation, adaptation, and
568 EDITORIAL

finance, but also acknowledges that non-state actors are indispensable in


these pursuits as governors, implementers, experts and watchdogs.
Ultimately, this hybrid architecture cements the UNFCCC as the lynchpin
between state and non-state and states by both formalizing as well as
blurring (in some key regards) distinctions across several dimensions. In
the following, we will discuss potential consequences of the hybrid multi-
lateralism across three key issues for non-state involvement: authority,
legitimacy and effectiveness.

Hybrid multilateralism and non-state actors: authority,


legitimacy and effectiveness
Authority
Where does political authority reside in an era of hybrid multilateralism?
This question has preoccupied scholars of climate governance in recent
years. More than 12,000 contributions to the NAZCA database demonstrate
that non-state actors are now deeply involved in the governance of climate
change, indicating the rise of private authority (Hall and Biersteker 2002).
Whereas some contributions to the database are directly linked to the
regulatory activities of nation-states, many bear witness to the non-state
experimentation with climate action that has grown since COP 15.
For Hoffmann (2011), the Copenhagen conference marked a turning
point in global climate governance when cities, NGOs and corporations
began to take climate change into their own hands, with the rise of urban
engagement and transnational city networks in climate governance
(Johnson and Gordon 2017). Numerous studies have also mapped the
recent proliferation of private emission accounting standards, certification
schemes, transnational city networks and public–private partnerships
(Abbott 2012, Betsill et al. 2014). As cities, corporations and NGOs have
begun to develop their own rules and standards that others chose to follow,
they are no longer merely complying with the directives of nation-states or
intergovernmental treaties. They have become governors in their own right
and established ‘private spheres of authority’ dislodged from the sovereign
state (Betsill 2015). In the period following the Copenhagen conference,
some scholars interpreted this ‘downloading of responsibility’ from nation-
states to private actors as a sign that the competence and authority of states
in global climate governance is eroding (Hoffmann 2011, p. 67). The
demonstrated inability of nation-states to deliver an effective multilateral
response to climate change has reconfigured the political landscape in terms
of both the entities of authority and the modes of legitimation (Hoffmann
2011).
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 569

However, in light of the 2015 Paris agreement, we need to revisit this


conclusion. Rather than assuming that power and authority is drifting from
sovereign states to non-state actors in an increasingly complex climate
regime, the Paris Agreement institutionalizes an intricate interplay between
state and non-state, multilateral and transnational climate action. In line
with Green (2014), this volume suggests that public and private authority is
deeply intertwined in the new landscape of international climate coopera-
tion. States have delegated authority to private actors, for instance through
the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (Kuchler 2017).
However, private actors also generate their own rules and standards.
Green (2014) details how the expansion of carbon market governance was
made possible through enrollment of private firms as auditors and monitors
of carbon offsets, and scientists as experts of carbon removal methodolo-
gies. As Hale (2016, p. 14) argues, while transnational climate governance
and experimentation has long thrived, the scale and linkages to intergo-
vernmental regimes are unforeseen. Hence, rather than seeking to establish
the locus of authority in an era of hybrid multilateralism, we need to
explore in closer empirical detail how political authority is enacted in an
increasingly institutionally complex climate governance architecture (Zelli
et al. 2017).
This can be read as a return of the state, or the reassertion of state power,
which is manifest in the debate on the legal status of the Paris Agreement
(Bodansky 2016). Hickman (2016) argues that the effective operation of
transnational climate governance hinges on intergovernmental frameworks
developed by states. The basic architecture of the Paris Agreement com-
prises the states’ voluntary NDC pledges, which are neither multilaterally
negotiated nor legally binding. The agreement thus represents a new
domestication of global climate politics, where an international agreement
is aligned with domestic politics rather than the reverse (Falkner 2016).
This can be seen in several ways. First, the state reinforces sovereignty;
the Paris Agreement does not contain any legally binding provisions with
regard to domestic action (Clemenson 2016, p. 8). It is only the process of
tracking progress in NDCs that is legally binding. Second, the Paris
Agreement does not mandate any review of individual states, just the
collective efforts and synthesis of all NDCs. In this sense, the Paris
Agreement ‘aims to compensate this lack of legal compulsion by creating
reputational risk through the establishment of mandatory transparency
framework’ (Hermville 2016, p. 2). Third, while non-state actors are
detailed in the COP decision, in the Paris Agreement itself they are given
scant attention and have no explicit formal role in the periodic review.
Through the bottom-up voluntary pledging logic of the Paris Agreement,
authority has shifted to state power. ‘At best, climate negotiations serve as
focal points that allow countries to align their action for common purposes’
570 EDITORIAL

(Busby 2016, p. 9). Hence, the post-Paris period may bring renewed
scholarly attention to the prospect of the green, ecological or environmental
state as an engine of transformative change to low carbon societies in local,
national and comparative perspectives (Bäckstrand and Kronsell 2015).

Legitimacy
The legitimacy of non-state actors inside and outside the UNFCCCC has
received much attention in the time frame between Copenhagen and Paris
(Bäckstrand 2008, Fisher 2010). This section focuses on input and through-
put legitimacy offered to, and fostered by, non-state actors in the Paris
Agreement (Schmidt 2013). On the surface, Paris looks like a breakthrough
for input legitimacy in terms of both state and non-state participation and
inclusion. The French COP presidency was heralded for its leadership in
conference diplomacy and for shepherding an inclusive COP 21 entailing
extensive consultation with all major countries and negotiation groups
(Brun 2016).7 Input legitimacy was high compared to COP 15, where the
Copenhagen Accord was hammered out in a ‘Friends of the Chair’ group of
only 28 states. In Paris, by contrast, states came together and agreed – even
under consensus decision-making – on a binding periodic review process
for their voluntary NDCs. Small island states, though small in resources,
were able to overturn major power differentials and spur the successful
‘high ambition coalition’, a loose grouping of more than 100 high-, low-
and middle-income countries.
Input legitimacy was also high for non-state actors as the Paris
Agreement entails the formal recognition of the more than 12,000 commit-
ments tabled by businesses and other non-Party stakeholders which gave
momentum to the Agreement. Furthermore, from the thematic sessions of
LPAA to the participation of 6306 accredited non-state actors at le Bourget,
COP 21 was regarded by many as truly inclusive (UNFCCC 2015).
However, Chan et al. (2016) demonstrate that there is a wide participation
gap for developing countries in climate action both in terms of inclusion
and leadership. The bulk of the climate action measured in LPAA and
NAZCA is not mobilized by or implemented for the poor and vulnerable.
Of the 52 actions adopted at the UN Climate summit in New York not led
by international organizations, 75% are coordinated by partners in North
America. Moreover, praise for input legitimacy at COP 21 and in the Paris
Agreement should be tempered by recognition that subsequent to
Copenhagen, the UNFCCC has gradually increased institutional control
of both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ climate movements. Just before the Paris
meeting, this development was further reinforced as a response to the terror
attacks in the city weeks before COP 21 (Orr 2016). For security reasons,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 571

civil society action was restricted, which diminished the possibilities for
civil society to hold UN and state parties accountable.
These matters of inclusion and participation will likely bring renewed
interest in the legitimacy of non-state actors as we move into the post-Paris
context where the LPAA, NAZCA and the GCA offer venues for interaction
between state and non-state actors. Some of this work will focus on socio-
logical legitimacy – what individual citizens and civil society groups think
about the Paris Agreement and their national policies (for some experi-
mental work in this vein, see Bernauer and McGrath 2016). But much
analysis will focus instead on the throughput legitimacy of non-state action:
that is to what extent non-state actors enhance the accountability, transpar-
ency and deliberative quality of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.
The Paris Agreement provides several avenues for non-state actors to
demand accountability of states and other non-state actors for their actions
and inactions. Article 15 of the Agreement calls for the establishment of a
‘mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance’ of the
Agreement (UNFCCC 2015a, article 15). This is supplemented by the
5-year global stocktake that will review the aggregate effect of NDCs in
reaching the goals on mitigation, finance and adaptation embedded in the
Agreement.
Both the compliance mechanism and the global stocktake have pro-
blems in terms of accountability. The former is a mechanism that will be
‘expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is
transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive’, thus lacking the teeth
necessary for curtailing free riding.8 Moreover, the global stocktake will
focus on the aggregate state contributions, and not on individual state
NDCs. This will also limit the ability of non-state actors and states to
hold each other to account for their failures. Nevertheless, it seems likely
that in a system of hybrid multilateralism, much of the accountability
and watchdog role of NDCs will fall to non-state actors both interna-
tionally and domestically. Non-state actors were invited to participate in
the designing process of the Green Climate Fund’s monitoring and
accountability framework, which is primarily a regular mandatory self-
reporting and participatory monitoring approach by the National
Designated Authority and local stakeholders.
Perhaps, the strongest element of the Paris Agreement is the transpar-
ency framework and Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency (article
13). While the measures for accountability (and mechanisms to achieve
them) are weak, NDCs, biennial reports, international assessments, finan-
cial contributions and the global stocktakes all need to be as transparent as
possible. In many ways, the transparency framework is key to generating
compliance with the Paris Agreement by driving accuracy, completeness,
comparability and consistency of efforts by states. But again, the role of
572 EDITORIAL

non-state actors in the hybrid architecture of the Paris Agreement is


blurred. On the one hand, non-state actors are asked to cooperate with
states to ensure best practice on monitoring emission reductions; on the
other, non-state actors are themselves asked to reduce their emissions
through voluntary commitments framed as complementary to state action
and supportive of NDCs (UNFCCC 2016). Some non-state actors will play
a watchdog function, while others need to be transparent themselves. While
these different roles reflect diversity between non-state actors as a group, it
also highlights the expanded roles of the international and the transnational
(non-state actors) in the UNFCCC.
Finally, how decisions are made will also impact the throughput legiti-
macy of the Paris Agreement. At its core, deliberative quality is about
decision-makers’ justifications of their activities in terms acceptable to
other parties. While states have not yet had to justify their NDCs in great
depth, the more than 170 national pledges were sufficient to reach agree-
ment in Paris. In 2018, states will go through a facilitative dialogue to
defend their pledges in relation to the long-term goals of the Paris
Agreement. Non-state actors, specifically through the TEP and TEM pro-
cess, will be central in this. At the other intersection of hybrid multi-
lateralism, the UNFCCC and non-state actors are increasingly engaging in
dialogue surrounding non-state contributions in LPAA, NAZCA and the
emergent GCA. These orchestration efforts have elements of a multi-
stakeholder design as they invite states and non-state actors into the same
process by creating space for showcasing and dialogue (see Bäckstrand and
Kuyper 2017). However, it has become clear that the contributions by non-
state actors in NAZCA and LPAA are often weak in terms of their justifica-
tion (i.e. how they relate to the broader efforts of the Paris Agreement) and
the UNFCCC Secretariat has not justified its decision to engage in orches-
tration in any substantial manner.

Effectiveness
The rise of transnational climate governance has spurred research on how
the UN can orchestrate, mobilize and catalyze public and non-state action
to curb climate change, limit global warming to 2°C or below and promote
climate resilience and decarbonization (Hsu et al. 2015, Widerberg and
Pattberg 2015). This research is closely tied to debates on the effectiveness
of the international climate regime. Effectiveness of an international agree-
ment is a function of the ambition and stringency of its commitments
combined with the levels of state participation and compliance (Bodansky
2012, Bang et al. 2016). More stringent commitments may increase effec-
tiveness only as long as they do not lower participation or compliance.
Conversely, participation does not necessarily enhance effectiveness if
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 573

ambitions are watered down. Non-state actors are often perceived to spur
implementation as well as monitoring and evaluating compliance. But they
also stimulate ambition and participation by defining problems, setting
agendas, shaping rules, principles, and norms provide information and
capacity building, mobilize public engagement, evaluating and monitoring
compliance (e.g. Börzel and Risse 2005, Nasiritousi 2016).
In the post-Paris era, effectiveness also revolves around how to align
non-state and intergovernmental action in a comprehensive framework that
can help achieve low carbon futures (Abbott 2017). Effectiveness and
performance of non-state contributions concerns bolstering climate action
outside the UNFCCC to close the emission gap (Chan 2015a, Hale 2016). In
essence, how can the aggregate sum of voluntary non-state and substate
commitments and actions complement NDCs in reducing greenhouse
gases, furthering mitigation and adaptation goals, and spurring decarboni-
zation? However, the UNFCCC is not only about climate change mitigation
and adaptation. The Paris Agreement aims to ‘strengthen the global
response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable
development and efforts to eradicate poverty’ (UNFCCC 2015a, article 2).
In addition to the goal of limiting global temperature increase to below 2°C
and increasing ability to adapt to unwanted impacts of climate change, it
shall foster ‘low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that
does not threaten food production’ and make ‘finance flows consistent with
these goals’ (UNFCCC 2015, article 2). Most likely, different non-state
actors will contribute to different parts of the agreement and these efforts
may very well be in conflict with one another. For example, cities’ adapta-
tion can exacerbate poverty for marginalized groups (Sovacool et al. 2015),
and bioenergy companies’ pursuits can threaten food security (Fuss et al.
2014).
Moreover, debates on the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement have
focused on its weak legal status. The Paris Agreement is not legally binding
with regard to states’ voluntary pledges, in contrast to the Kyoto protocol’s
emissions reduction obligations. However, the reporting commitments in
the Paris Agreement are binding, including mandatory commitments that
each ‘Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive’ NDCs.
While states ‘shall pursue domestic mitigation measures’, they do so with
‘the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions’ (UNFCCC 2015a,
article 4.2). The Paris Agreement nonetheless contains provisions that raise
strong expectations of commitment and compliance and is not without
consequences for failure. The many NDCs that are conditional on interna-
tional support are to different extents subject to compliance mechanisms.
For example, more than 50 of the NDCs are fully or partly conditional on
international support (Day et al. 2016).
574 EDITORIAL

Effectiveness could be enhanced through coordination of activities that


facilitates compliance and future willingness to ratchet up ambitions or
participation from state actors and non-state actors alike. A key question is
whether transparency, global stocktaking and finance will be effective. Most
crucially, what role will non-state actors play in monitoring the effective-
ness of NDCs? The Paris Agreement incorporates a mechanism for increas-
ing Parties’ ambition over time. Every 5 years, from 2020, the NDCs will be
reviewed and open for new and upscaled contributions. The adoption of the
Paris Agreement initiated a process for identifying ways to enhance the
ambition of mitigation efforts, starting with a facilitative dialogue at COP in
2018, which shall explore opportunities to enhance the provision of support
in terms of finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-
building support, where non-state actors are expected to have important
roles (UNFCCC 2015a).
Ultimately, effectiveness will hinge upon the transparency framework
and review outside the UNFCCC with the different voluntary mechanisms
for naming and shaming or the opposite, as it will be equally important to
showcase best practices. Several of the submitted NDCs emphasize aspira-
tions to show regional leadership. This can be supported by rankings by
non-state actors’ efforts to monitor the details of states’ NDCs (such as
Climate Action Tracker, the WRI’s CAIT Paris Contributions Map and the
INDC Content Explorer).

Conclusions
Non-state involvement has been a distinct feature of global climate govern-
ance during the past three decades. Compared to policy areas of security,
trade and finance, UN climate diplomacy has in many ways been pioneer-
ing in continuously seeking to facilitate access and inclusion of a growing
range of non-state actors. In the period following COP 15 in Copenhagen,
the interplay between state and non-state actors was intensified. We have
here advanced the concept of ‘hybrid multilateralism’ to capture the new
landscape of international climate cooperation that gained ground after
Copenhagen and that now is institutionalized through the Paris
Agreement. First, hybrid multilateralism denotes a bottom-up climate pol-
icy architecture that combines voluntary pledging by states with an inter-
national transparency framework for periodic review and ratcheting-up of
ambition, in which non-state actors play important roles as implementers,
experts and watchdogs. Second, hybrid multilateralism refers to an increas-
ingly dynamic interplay between multilateral and transnational climate
action, where the UNFCCC Secretariat has taken a role as facilitator, or
orchestrator, of a multitude of non-state climate initiatives and actions.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 575

While hybrid multilateralism remains a heuristic, it leaves us with a


gamut of questions of importance for the continued study of global climate
governance. Will the hybrid policy architecture institutionalized through
the Paris Agreement spur the ambition and participation necessary to limit
global mean warming well below 2°C? Which powers will be held accoun-
table for failure to comply with this global goal? Although the Paris
Agreement accepts the NDCs submitted by states as the backbone of
climate mitigation, adaptation and finance, this new climate treaty also
acknowledges that non-state actors are indispensable in these pursuits.
This hybrid arrangement raises questions about the critical capacity of non-
state actors to hold states and intergovernmental actors to account for their
(in)actions. Is global civil society being co-opted when asked to provide
voluntary climate targets in the service of governments? What is the place
of ideological critique and political dissent when NGOs take on the roles as
intermediaries of international goals? As the roles of state and non-state
actors continue to blur, these questions all warrant further critical scrutiny.

Notes
1. Announcement available at http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom
/high-level-climate-champions-launch-2050-pathways-platform/
2. It is noteworthy that this definition also includes governmental actors such as
local authorities. Climate commitments by local authorities (cities, municipa-
lities, regional governments) dominate NAZCA with over 6000 actors.
3. http://unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7785.php
4. http://climateactiontracker.org/
5. http://cait.wri.org/indc/
6. http://climateequityreference.org/. See also Oil Change International, ‘The
Sky’s the Limit’, http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_
limit_2016_FINAL_2.pdf.
7. A different account of COP 21 is provided by Dimitrov (2016) who argues that
COP 21 was highly secretive, but as the summit delivered, it has generated
praise from virtually all parties.
8. Interestingly, this mechanism shall be composed of expert-based members that
will likely include non-state actors.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

References
Abbott, K.W., 2012. The transnational regime complex for climate change.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 30 (4), 571–590.
doi:10.1068/c11127

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