Judgement2024 02 01

FA/688/2023 UNITED INDIA INS. CO. LTD. VS. MR. VIPIN TANEJA & ANR. DOD: 01.02.
2024
IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL

COMMISSION
Date of Institution:29.12.2023
Date of hearing : 30.01.2024
Date of Decision : 01.02.2024
FIRST APPEAL NO. 688/2023
IN THE MATTER OF
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

THROUGH ITS BRANCH MANAGER
D-14, SECOND FLOOR, RANJIT NAGAR
COMMERCIAL COMPLEX, BEHIND SATYAM CINEMA
PATEL NAGAR, NEW DELHI-110008.
ALSO AT
DELHI REGIONAL OFFICE NO.1
18, BARAKHAMBA ROAD
8TH FLOOR, KANCHENJUNGA BUILDING
NEW DELHI-110001
(MR. TRIBINDH KUMAR, ADVOCATE

MOBILE NO. 9899283185 &
EMAIL: tribindh@gmail.com)
…APPLICANT/APPELLANT
VERSUS
1. MR. VIPIN TANEJA

S/O LATE MR. B.L. TANEJA
R/O 171-B, G-BLOCK, ANSAL’S
PALAM VIHAR, GURUGRAM
HARYANA-122001
2. M/S HERITAGE HEALTH SERVICES TPA PVT. LTD.

411, 4TH FLOOR, LAXMI DEEP BUILDING
LAXMI NAGAR, DISTRICT CENTRE
DELHI-110092
....NON-APPLICANTS/ RESPONDENTS
CORAM:
HON’BLE JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT)
HON’BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)
DISMISSED Page 1 of 12
FA/688/2023 UNITED INDIA INS. CO. LTD. VS. MR. VIPIN TANEJA & ANR. DOD: 01.02.2024
Present: Mr. Tribindh Kumar (MOBILE NO. 9899283185 &

Email: tribindh@gmail.com), counsel for the appellant.
None for the Respondent.
PER: HON’BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)
1. The present appeal has been filed on 29.12.2023 challenging the

impugned order dated 31.07.2023 passed in Complaint Case
No.358/2016 by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission- VIII (Central), Kashmere Gate, Delhi-110006
whereby the complaint was allowed.
2. This order will dispose off an application bearing IA No.98/2024
seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, filed along with the
appeal. Affidavit of Ms. Rebeca Chopra, Deputy
Manager/Constituted Attorney of the appellant has been filed along
with this application.
3. Record has been carefully and thoroughly perused.
4. The application has been moved without mentioning any provision of
law. However, it is being considered under Section 15 of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as it is arising out of Complaint Case
No.358/2016.
5. The bare perusal of the application reflects that it has been
preferred without mentioning any provision of law. However, the
entire proceedings of the present case took place according to the
Old Act. Hence, before delving into the merits of the present
application, it is imperative to ascertain whether the present
application bearing IA No.98/2024 filed along with the appeal on
29.12.2023 is maintainable under the New Act/Old Act.
6. The repeal of a law shall not affect the previous operation of any
enactment i.e. the proceedings under Consumer Protection Act,
1986 shall continue for cases which had been filed prior to the
implementation of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 on 20.07.2020.
The same can be gauged through the repeal and saving section
(Section 107) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which has been
reproduced below:
“107. (1) The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action
taken or purported to have been done or taken under the Act
hereby repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under
the corresponding provisions of this Act.
(3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not
be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6
of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of
repeal.”
7. We may also take the assistance of Section 6 (b) of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 to further this view. Section 6 (b) of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 has been reproduced below:
“6 Effect of repeal. : Where this Act, or any 1 [Central Act] or
Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any
enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a
different intention appears, the repeal shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which
the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or
anything duly done or suffered thereunder”
8. Moreover, unless the legislature explicitly provides that the
amendment is retrospective in nature, it will be considered
prospective. The aforesaid view has been taken by the Apex Court in
the case of CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. reported in (2015) 1
SCC 1 wherein the Court discussed the proviso to Section 113 of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 and held that it was prospective and not
retrospective. While deciding the case, the Constitution Bench laid
down certain general principles which have been reproduced as

under:
“28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be
interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary
intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be
intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind
the rule is that a current law should govern current
activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the
past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the
law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward
adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is
founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to
arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should
not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This
principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit: law
looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips v.
Eyre [Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) LR 6 QB 1] , a retrospective
legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation
by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when
introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not
to change the character of past transactions carried on upon
the faith of the then existing law.
29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity
is the principle of “fairness”, which must be the basis of every
legal rule as was observed in L'OfficeCherifien des
Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.
[L'OfficeCherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon
Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 AC 486 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 :
(1994) 1 All ER 20 (HL)] Thus, legislations which modified
accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new

duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as
prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the
enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for
purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former
legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not
note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject
because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the
various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the
counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few
judgments containing this dicta, a little later.”
(emphasis in original)
9. Similarly, the Apex Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs State of

Maharashtra reported in 1994 (4) SCC 602, the court has culled
out the ambit and scope of an amending Act and its retrospective
operation and has held the following:
“26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment

would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending
cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on
which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had
not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by
this Court in various cases the illustrative though not
exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit
and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation
may be culled out as follows:
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is

presumed to be prospective in operation unless made
retrospective, either expressly or by necessary
intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects
procedure, unless such a construction is textually

impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its
application, should not be given an extended
meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly
defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural
in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and
right of appeal even though remedial is substantive
in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive
law but no such right exists in procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally
speaking be applied retrospectively where the result
would be to create new disabilities or obligations or
to impose new duties in respect of transactions
already accomplished.
(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure
but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be
construed to be prospective in operation, unless
otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary
implication."
10. Taking into account the aforesaid discussion, we conclude that the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is prospective in nature. Thus, the
cases pending or adjudicated and rights/obligations created before
the coming into effect of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 will
continue to be adjudicated under the Old Act i.e. Consumer
Protection Act, 1986. Hence, the Applicant cannot resort to the
provisions as inculcated in the New Act so far as the present case is
concerned this case will be governed by the provisions of the Old
Act.
11. Application for condonation of delay has been filed on various
grounds. Para No. 3 to 6 of the application read as under:
“3.The Applicant had to filed the present Appeal after
delay of 22 days on account of the fact that the Certified
Copy of the impugned order was received at the office of
appellant/insurance company on 04.09.2023 There-after,
dealing Advocate submitted the file alongwith opinion with

the concerned department on 20.10.2023.
4.That, after going through the opinion and the complete
records, file alongwith office note was put up before the
competent authority for the approval of filing the appeal in
the present matter.
5.That, after obtaining the approval of the competent

authority, undersigned counsel was deputed to file the
present appeal on 23.11.2023.
6.That upon the receipt of the file, the undersigned counsel
had to visit his native village due to some personal family
issues but upon coming back to Delhi present appeal is
being filed without any further delay.”
12. To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section

15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under:-
“Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District
Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the
State Commission within a period of thirty days
from the date of the order in such form and manner
as may be prescribed.
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an
appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if
it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing
it within that period:
[Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is
required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the
District Forum, shall be entertained by the State
Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the
prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees
twenty-five thousand, whichever is less]”
13. A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal
against an order should be preferred within a period of thirty days
from the date of impugned judgment. On perusal of record before us,
it is clear that the impugned order was pronounced on 31.07.2023
and the present appeal was filed on 29.12.2023 i.e. after a delay of
121 days.
14. In order to condone the delay, the Appellants have to satisfy this
Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal
after the stipulated period. The term ‘sufficient cause’ has been
explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl.
Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The
relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant
could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the
word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as
may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.
Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than
that which provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts
and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from
the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious
man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the
party should not have acted in a negligent manner or
there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the
facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained
inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each
case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court
concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that
whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be
exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the
Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely
a device to cover an ulterior purpose.”
15. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs.
United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Reported in
IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon’ble NCDRC held as under:-
“12. ………we are not satisfied with the cause shown to
justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not
been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment
of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while
deciding the application filed for condonation of
delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special
period of limitation has been prescribed under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and

revisions in consumer matters and the object of
expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes,
will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which
are highly belated are entertained.”
16. We further deem it appropriate to refer to Lingeswaran Etc. Versus
Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054-
2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as under: -
“5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by
the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned
trial Court that delay has not been properly explained
and even there are no merits in the application for
condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should
rest there and the condonation of delay application
was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted
by the learned trial Court that, even after finding
that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be
said that the delay has been explained and that there
are no merits in the application, still to condone the
delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails
to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and
laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case
of PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer,
reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to.
In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
17. From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble
National Commission, it is clear that ‘sufficient cause’ means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was
a want of bona fide on its part and the applicant must satisfy the
Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from
prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay.
18. Reverting to the material available before us, we find that the
impugned order was passed on 31.07.2023 and the period of
limitation starts from the date of order which had expired on
30.08.2023. However, the reasons stated for the delay that upon
receipt of impugned order on 04.09.2023, dealing advocate
submitted the file along with opinion with the concerned
department on 20.10.2023; after perusal of opinion as well as
complete record, file along with office note was put up before the
competent authority for approval of filing the appeal; after
obtaining the approval of the competent authority, the present
counsel namely Mr. Tribindh Kumar was deputed on 23.11.2023
to file the appeal; thereafter upon the receipt of the file, the
present counsel namely Mr. Tribindh Kumar had to visit his
native village due to some personal family issues and upon
coming back to Delhi present appeal was filed without any further
delay, seem fictitious.
19. It is note worthy that even if we consider that the appellant has
received the certified copy of the impugned order on 04.09.2023
(as averred in para no. 3 of the application), in this circumstance,
the appellant was expected to file the appeal within the limitation
period i.e. by 04.10.2023. Still there is unexplained delay of 86
days in filing the appeal.
20. Further, the impugned order dated 31.07.2023 was uploaded on the
website i.e. Confonet (https://confonet.nic.in) on 09.08.2023 (copy
placed on record).
21. The appellant has preferred not mention the name of dealing
advocate who submitted the file along with opinion on 20.10.2023
with the concerned department of the appellant, the date when
the file along with office note was put up before the competent
authority for approval and the date when approval was obtained.
Further, the appellant has not mentioned the date when the
present advocate had to visit his native village and the date when
he came to Delhi back.
22. No cogent reasons have been given by the Appellant to explain as to
why it did not take immediate steps even after receiving the copy of
the impugned order. Further, no document and no specific dates
have been furnished by the Appellant to prove the contention as
averred in the application. The Appellant has failed to explain the
day-to-day delay caused after the pronouncement of the impugned
order.
23. Furthermore, even if we assumed that the said delay was on behalf
of red tape in the bureaucratic machinery, the reasons submitted
by the appellant cannot be justification for condoning such delay.
Our view is further fortified by decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Office of the Chief Post Master General and Ors. Vs.
Living Media India Ltd. and Ors. reported in AIR 2012 SC 1506,
wherein the apex court has held as under:
“12. …….The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be
accepted in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the
Government.
13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and
there was bonafide effort, there is no need to
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept
pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the
process. The government departments are under a
special obligation to ensure that they perform their
duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should
not be used as an anticipated benefit for

government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be
swirled for the benefit of a few.”
24. Relying on the above settled law and considering the fact that there
was no proper explanation offered by the appellant for the delay
except inculpating the government lengthy approval procedures.
According to us, the appellant has miserably failed to give any
acceptable and cogent sufficient reasons to condone such delay. As
a result, it is abundantly clear from the above that the appellant
was moving at its own pace unmindful that the prescribed period to
file an appeal is 30 days from the date of impugned judgment.
25. Therefore, the application (IA/98/2024) filed by the appellant
seeking condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly,
the same is dismissed on the above grounds.
26. Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period
also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall
be no order as to cost.
27. File be consigned to record room.
JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL

(PRESIDENT)
PINKI
MEMBER (JUDICIAL)
Pronounced on 01.02.2024.

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FA/688/2023 UNITED INDIA INS. CO. LTD. VS. MR. VIPIN TANEJA & ANR. DOD: 01.02.

IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL

FIRST APPEAL NO. 688/2023

UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

(MR. TRIBINDH KUMAR, ADVOCATE

1. MR. VIPIN TANEJA

2. M/S HERITAGE HEALTH SERVICES TPA PVT. LTD.

Present: Mr. Tribindh Kumar (MOBILE NO. 9899283185 &

PER: HON’BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

1. The present appeal has been filed on 29.12.2023 challenging the

down certain general principles which have been reproduced as

accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new

9. Similarly, the Apex Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs State of

“26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment

(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is

procedure, unless such a construction is textually

dealing Advocate submitted the file alongwith opinion with

5.That, after obtaining the approval of the competent

12. To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section

Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and

not be used as an anticipated benefit for

JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL

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