Armies of Deliverance: A New History of The Civil War Elizabeth R. Varon
Armies of Deliverance: A New History of The Civil War Elizabeth R. Varon
Armies of Deliverance: A New History of The Civil War Elizabeth R. Varon
com
https://textbookfull.com/product/armies-of-
deliverance-a-new-history-of-the-civil-war-
elizabeth-r-varon/
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-new-york-times-disunion-a-
history-of-the-civil-war-1st-edition-ted-widmer/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/france-and-the-american-civil-war-a-
diplomatic-history-civil-war-america-steve-sainlaude/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/a-history-of-the-greek-resistance-in-
the-second-world-war-the-people-s-armies-1st-edition-spyros-
tsoutsoumpis/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/best-of-john-legend-songbook-legend/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/who-should-die-the-ethics-of-killing-
in-war-r-jenkins/
textbookfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/great-salt-lake-biology-a-terminal-
lake-in-a-time-of-change-bonnie-k-baxter/
textbookfull.com
Armies of Deliverance
ii
iii
Armies
of Deliverance
A New History of the Civil War
zz
ELIZABETH R. VARON
1
iv
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Map x
vi Contents
Notes 435
Index 489
vi
Acknowledgments
viii Acknowledgments
My friend Matt Gallman read the entire manuscript and offered invalu-
able advice for improving it. I very much appreciated the chance to workshop
parts of this book at Yale’s Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study of Slavery,
Resistance, and Abolition, and I thank David Blight for the invitation to
speak at its annual conference in the fall of 2017; I am also grateful to have
received feedback at the Harvard University conference, that same fall, in
honor of my treasured graduate school mentor Nancy Cott.
Oxford University Press has been wonderful throughout this process, and
my thanks go to Susan Ferber and Charles Cavaliere for their editorial steward-
ship, and mapmaker George Chakvetadze for his expert work. The anonymous
readers who vetted the manuscript for Oxford made many helpful suggestions.
I am fortunate to live in a family of writers, and I rely on all of them for
inspiration: my husband, best friend, and all-time favorite historian, Will
Hitchcock; our kids, Ben and Emma, whose strong voices fill us with pride
and hope; my brother, Jeremy, with his fierce social conscience; my father,
Bension, whose productivity leaves us all in the dust; and my late mother,
Barbara, to whose standard we still aspire.
Nothing buoyed me more in the final stages of writing this book than the
experience of watching my nephew Arlo, a Brooklyn sixth-grader, become a
Civil War buff. Like I did at his age, he has become fascinated by the voices of
the war. But he has been exposed by his teachers to a far wider range of those
voices, and a more nuanced treatment of the war, than I was. His newfound
passion for the study of the Civil War makes me optimistic for the future of our
field, and serves as a reminder that we should never underestimate the capacity
of young people to handle the complexity of history. This book is for Arlo.
E.R.V.
Charlottesville, Virginia
ix
Visit https://textbookfull.com
now to explore a rich
collection of eBooks, textbook
and enjoy exciting offers!
x
xi
xi
xi
Armies of Deliverance
xvi
1
Introduction
“We Are Fighting for Them”
In July 1864, in the fourth summer of the Civil War, the popular Northern
journal Harper’s Weekly featured an article entitled “Fighting for Our Foes.”
The article invoked the “terrorism under which the people of the rebellious
States have long suffered”—the extortion, intimidation, and violence per-
petrated by elite slaveholders against the Southern masses in order to keep
“their white fellow-citizens ignorant and debased.” The Union army, Harper’s
pledged, would bring liberation to the South:
Many of these wretched victims are in arms against us. But we are
fighting for them. The war for the Union and the rights secured by
the Constitution is a war for their social and political salvation, and
our victory is their deliverance. . . . It is not against the people of those
States, it is against the leaders and the system which have deprived
them of their fair chances as American citizens, that this holy war is
waged. God send them and us a good deliverance!1
A modern reader might be tempted to ask: could Harper’s Weekly have been
sincere? Surely Northerners had learned, after so much blood had been shed
on so many battlefields, that the Southern masses were diehard Confederates,
not unwilling dupes of slaveholding aristocrats. Surely Northerners had given
up waiting for Southern Unionism to come to the fore. Surely Northerners
no longer cherished the naive hope of changing Southern hearts and minds.
Of all the ongoing debates over the Civil War, perhaps none has proven
so difficult to resolve as the issue of Northern war aims. What was the
North fighting for? Some modern scholars emphasize Northerners’ bedrock
2
2 Introduction
commitment to saving the Union, seeing that as the central point of con-
sensus among the majority of Republicans and Democrats. Other scholars
emphasize the growing power and momentum of antislavery Republicans,
and their role in establishing emancipation as the defining purpose and
achievement of the war. Each of these interpretations focuses on only part of
the broad Northern political spectrum. This book takes a different approach,
by asking how disparate Northerners, who disagreed about the fate of slavery
and the future shape of the Union, managed to form a powerful Unionist
coalition and to defeat disunionism. The answer lies in the political theme of
deliverance.2
Northerners imagined the Civil War as a war of deliverance, waged to
deliver the South from the clutches of a conspiracy and to deliver to it the
blessings of free society and of modern civilization. Northerners did not
expect white Southerners to rise up en masse and overthrow secession. But
they did fervently believe that as the Union army advanced across the South,
Southerners, especially from the non-slaveholding majority, would increas-
ingly welcome liberation from Confederate falsehood and despotism.
This belief in deliverance was not a naive hope that faded, but instead a
deep commitment that grew stronger over the course of the war.3 That is be-
cause the idea resolved the tensions within the Union over war aims. A dis-
tinct politics of deliverance—a set of appeals that fused “soft war” incentives
and “hard war” punishments, and sought to reconcile the liberation of white
Southerners with the emancipation of enslaved blacks—unified a pro-war
coalition in the Union and sustained its morale. “As the guns of Grant and
Sherman shake down their idols and clear the air,” the Harper’s essay prophe-
sied, “these men, deluded fellow-citizens of ours, will see that in this country
whatever degrades labor injures every laboring man, and that equal rights be-
fore the law is the only foundation of permanent peace and union.” Grant and
Sherman, symbols of hard war, also stood at the head of powerful armies of
deliverance.4
Introduction 3
4 Introduction
citizenship. On the other end were conservative Democrats who rejected ab-
olition and black citizenship and were content for slavery to persist indefi-
nitely. Across the middle of the spectrum were moderates of various political
stripes who, like Lincoln himself, believed in the superiority of the free labor
system and resented the power of slaveholders but had a relatively patient atti-
tude toward slavery’s demise, wishing for its gradual extinction instead of im-
mediate abolition. From the start, antipathy to elite slaveholding secessionists
was a strong source of Northern unity. Republicans had long scorned Slave
Power oligarchs; Northern Democrats, bitter at the fracturing of their
party, felt betrayed by the leadership class of Southern Democrats. As his-
torian Martha Hodes notes, Northerners imagined a “simplistically divided
Confederacy” and did not carefully differentiate among the various strata of
non-elite whites. The ambiguous category of the “deceived masses” lumped
together the South’s landholding yeomen farmers and landless poor whites.7
Very quickly, in the first months of the Civil War, the Slave Power con-
spiracy idea took on a new cast and increased potency. Northerners began
to argue that the Confederacy was a “military despotism” that herded white
Southerners into its ranks, seized private property for the war machine, and
suppressed dissent. This was the theme of Lincoln’s first wartime message to
Congress, delivered on July 4, 1861, nearly three months after the Confederate
firing on Fort Sumter had initiated war. After “drugging the public mind of
their section for more than thirty years,” the leaders of the secession move-
ment had relied on “ingenious sophistry” (the false doctrine of state sover-
eignty) and on coercion (votes in which “the bayonets are all on one side
of the question”) to bring “many good men to a willingness to take up arms
against the government,” Lincoln insisted. A small band of conspirators had
seemingly cowed the South into submission. But how deep did support for
disunion really run? “It may well be questioned whether there is, to-day, a
majority of the legally qualified voters of any State, except perhaps South
Carolina, in favor of disunion,” Lincoln speculated. “There is much reason
to believe that the Union men are the majority in many, if not in every one,
of the so-called seceded States.” The Union fought to uphold the principle of
majority rule—that ballots, not bullets, should settle disputes—and did not
intend “any coercion, any conquest, or any subjugation, in any just sense of
those terms.”8
Claims that white Southerners were “ripe for their deliverance from the
most revolting despotism on the face of the earth,” as an influential newspaper,
the New York Herald, put it in May 1861, were standard fare in the Northern
press and among politicians in the early months of the war. Sometimes words
5
Introduction 5
6 Introduction
manpower (a population of 18.5 million in free labor states in 1861, and an-
other 3 million in the slaveholding border states, compared to a population of
9 million, 3.5 million of whom were enslaved, in Confederate states) and re-
sources (90 percent of American industrial capacity lay in the North). But the
vast size of Confederate territory—larger than all of Western Europe—made
the prospect of winning and holding territory daunting.
As for political considerations, although Lincoln’s Republican party won
a resounding victory in 1860, the Democratic party represented about 40 per-
cent of the Northern electorate, and about that same percentage of Union
soldiers. Democrats intended to hold Lincoln to his promise of fighting a lim-
ited war for Union, not a revolutionary war for black citizenship and racial
equality. At the start of the war only roughly one in ten Union soldiers was an
abolitionist, committed to black freedom as a war aim. The other 90 percent
shared an animus against the Slave Power conspiracy but not necessarily an
animus against slavery itself—or any deep sympathy for the enslaved.
Proslavery Unionism was especially dominant in the slaveholding border
states of Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Delaware; keeping them in
the fold was a major strategic priority for Lincoln. Very early on, the Union
resorted to hard war measures in Maryland and Missouri, where secessionist
minorities brazenly defied the will of Unionist majorities. The attack by a
secessionist mob on Massachusetts regiments passing through Baltimore to
Washington, D.C., on April 19, 1861, and the destruction by Confederate-
sympathizing saboteurs of railroad bridges and telegraph wires in Maryland
were met with stern measures on Lincoln’s part, including the military arrest
of rioters, saboteurs, and even several secessionist legislators, and the placing
of Baltimore under martial law. In Missouri that May, Union forces captured
a unit of secessionists who planned to attack the Federal arsenal in St. Louis;
secessionists in that city rioted in protest, resulting in the imposition of federal
martial law. Lincoln and his allies justified the suppression of dissent on the
grounds that the unscrupulous secessionist elite must not be permitted to ma-
nipulate the border state masses the way it had manipulated the Confederate
masses. Clashes in the border states gave rise to a “tandem strategy,” as his-
torian Christopher Phillips has put it, in which the president used political
means, particularly disavowals of antislavery radicalism, to reassure border
state Unionists, while selectively “allowing discretion to Federal commanders
to apply the hard hand of war against civilians” whose loyalty was in question.12
Diplomacy was also a factor. Lincoln’s administration was loath to grant
the Confederacy status as a sovereign belligerent, empowered to make treaties
or alliances and entitled to respect as a member of the family of nations, lest
7
Introduction 7
European powers such as Britain and France openly take the Confederate
side. Union officials thus characterized secession as a “domestic insurrection”
within a sovereign nation and routinely referred to the seceded states as the
“so-called Confederacy.” The deluded-masses theory and emphasis on military
despotism were essential parts of the Union’s effort to cast the Confederates,
for an international audience, as usurpers rather than nationalists seeking
self-determination.13
In nineteenth-century Judeo-Christian culture, the political meanings of
deliverance were inseparable from its religious meanings. The Old Testament
story of Israel’s exodus from Egyptian bondage was central to slave resist-
ance and to antislavery politics; so, too, were other biblical texts with deliv-
erance as their theme, such as the story of the year of jubilee from the Book
of Leviticus, in which slaves were proclaimed free. Antebellum abolitionists
such as Frederick Douglass and William Lloyd Garrison told the story of
the Israelites’ deliverance from Pharaoh as an “epic tale of liberation” and an
“ominous tale of divine judgment,” casting defenders of slavery such as John
C. Calhoun as modern Pharaohs. Once the war started, Northern preachers
applied biblical images to the redemption of the white South and of the na-
tion itself—they described the white Southern majority as “crushed down
and silenced by an armed minority” and yearning for liberation from such
traitors, as the Reverend Horace Carter Hovey, a Massachusetts Presbyterian,
declared in an April 1861 sermon. Northerners’ biblical references often lik-
ened secessionists to satanic demons whose evil spell over the beguiled masses
must be broken.14
Deliverance rhetoric filled emotional needs, too, as it reflected the convic-
tion, pervasive among antebellum Americans, that the Union was designed
by the Founders to be “affective” and consensual rather than coercive—“a po-
litical entity bound together not by force or interest, but by tender emotions
such as affection and love.” Americans associated the affective theory of
Union with Revolutionary forefathers such as George Washington and James
Madison and with antebellum heroes such as Andrew Jackson and Daniel
Webster, who in times of crisis had appealed to the strong emotional bonds
between American citizens. Bonds of affection were what made the Union
great, and beneficial, and indeed exceptional in the world: a shining beacon
of representative government, and of prosperity and progress. Secessionists
argued on the eve of war that political conflicts had broken the bonds of affec-
tion between South and North and that the Union could not persist without
such bonds. Unionists argued that they could reverse sectional alienation and
rekindle the mutual affection and respect of Northerners and Southerners.15
8
8 Introduction
Introduction 9
than Union on the Republicans’ terms. While this wing of the Democratic
party was in a decided minority in the early days of the war, its message—that
emancipation would endanger the economic security and racial supremacy of
Northern whites as well as Southern ones—served Lincoln notice that any
moves he took against slavery would meet with a fierce partisan backlash.17
10 Introduction
return of the Southern masses to the national fold. The most ardent and influ-
ential of these Unionists, such as Andrew Johnson and William G. “Parson”
Brownlow of Tennessee, called loudly for hard war measures against the
Confederates, even as they maintained that the war’s primary aim was white
Southern deliverance.
Deliverance politics also proved essential to establishing broad support
for emancipation. Rather than conceding to Confederates or Copperheads
that the advent of emancipation signaled a shift to war without mercy,
Lincoln and his allies worked to harmonize the case for black freedom with
the case for white Southern liberation. Each of the acts and proclamations
that implemented emancipation contained inducements— grace periods,
incentives, and exemptions—intended to encourage voluntary compliance by
slaveholders and to reassure nervous whites that the demise of slavery was a
military necessity and served the overarching aim of reunion. Over the course
of the war supporters of emancipation would assiduously build the case that
slavery, as the source of Southern terrorism and despotism, was the obstacle to
national reunion, and that emancipation and black enlistment would benefit
Northern and Southern whites alike, morally, politically, and economically.
“We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country,” Lincoln
asserted in his December 1862 Annual Message to Congress, connecting
emancipation to the survival of democracy. “In giving freedom to the slave,
we assure freedom to the free—honorable alike in what we give, and what we
preserve.”18
Black abolitionists such as Frederick Douglass and Frances Ellen Watkins
Harper made their own distinct contributions to deliverance discourse. They
were less inclined than whites to portray the Confederate masses as victims
or to imagine that Union victory in the war would bring swift sectional rec-
onciliation. Instead they emphasized the broad complicity of whites in the
system of racial oppression, and the depths of the hatred and mistrust that
system had sowed. On the eve of the war, blacks made up less than 2 percent
of the population in the free states and were relegated there to a second-class
citizenship. The vast majority of African Americans lived in the South and
were enslaved, deprived altogether of citizenship and basic rights. In order
to imagine an interracial democracy, black abolitionists had to work on two
fronts: to reform the North and transform the South. They protested the
persistent inequity in the North even as they acclaimed the achievements of
free black communities—the infrastructure of churches, schools, businesses,
and reform societies Northern blacks had built in the face of adversity.
Highlighting the crucial role of slave resistance and black enlistment in
Random documents with unrelated
content Scribd suggests to you:
— Sinä vaivaat päätäsi turhilla murheilla. Eihän kaikkea
mahdollista sovi peläten odottaa, sanoi Kerttu. — Kaipa meidän
yhteiset ponnistuksemme tulla paremmiksi ihmisiksi jotakin
merkitsevät tulevaankin polveen.
Sinun pitää keksiä meille muuta hauskaa, kun kerran uhkaat viinat
lopettaa.
— Jo toki laitetaankin.
— Joo.
Kyllä se taisi todellakin olla niin, että naisista riippui hyvin paljon,
maistelivatko miehet vai ei.
— Niin pitää.
12.
*****
13.
— Ei siitä nyt tule mitään, kun tuo akka ei anna avainta. Ovat
tehneet liiton. Ei taida saada Kaiterestakaan jauhoja.
— No kun ei, niin ei. Piruakos tänne kutsuit. Maksat kai
käymäpalkan?
Vieras saa siinä istua ja aikailla, eikä kuulu koko miestä takaisin..
*****
*****
— Ja se oli vahinko.
*****
— Mitäs tuota sinä… minä vain sitä samaa, monet kerrat jo ennen
mietittyä, että tulipas meistäkin ihmisiä.
— Vai jo sieltäkin.
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also
govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most
countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside the
United States, check the laws of your country in addition to the
terms of this agreement before downloading, copying, displaying,
performing, distributing or creating derivative works based on this
work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes
no representations concerning the copyright status of any work in
any country other than the United States.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form,
including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you
provide access to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work
in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in
the official version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or
expense to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or
a means of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original
“Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must
include the full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in
paragraph 1.E.1.
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive
from the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the
method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The
fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty
payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on
which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your
periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked
as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information
about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation.”
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.F.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.