RA 9262 CASES

ESTEBAN DONATO REYES vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 232678;

FACTS:

Reyes is being charged with violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. At the time the complaint for violation of the
VAWC was filed against him, Reyes was employed as a pilot. Sometime in 2005, AAA (Reyes wife) learned that
Reyes got married to a certain Marilou Osias Ramboanga with whom he is living with up to the present.

AAA claimed that Reyes used to give her and their children monthly financial support, ranging from Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but he suddenly ceased giving the same
in July 2005.

Reyes assailed the validity of his marriage with AAA alleging that he never attended the marriage ceremony and
that his supposed signature appearing in the marriage certificate was forged. He alleged that he lived with AAA
in a common-law relationship, which produced three daughters and a son.

The RTC and the CA rendered a Decision finding Reyes guilty as charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding Reyes guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating section 5(i) of RA 9262?

RULING:

The CA did not err. The conviction of Reyes was affirmed.

Reyes committed psychological violence against AAA when he deprived her of financial support beginning July
2005 and onwards which caused her to experience mental and emotional suffering. Here the accused could
also be held criminally liable for violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 9262 which attaches when the accused
deprives the woman of financial support which she is legally entitled to.

Reyes argues that he cannot be held liable for violation of R.A No. 9262 because he has no obligation to financially
support AAA since he never contracted marriage with her. He is mistaken. The National Statistics Office certified
copy of a marriage certificate presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence of the existence of the
marriage between Reyes and AAA. Their marriage is deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. Hence, Reyes is obliged to support his wife, AAA, the amount of which shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the said petitioner and to the needs of the latter.

Reyes will not be exonerated even assuming that his marriage is declared void ab initio by the court. RA9262
defines and criminalizes violence against women and their children perpetrated by the woman's husband,
former husband or any person against whom the woman has or had a sexual or dating relationship with, or with
whom the woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse or psychological harm or
suffering. Thus, the offender need not be related or connected to the victim by marriage or former marriage, as he
could be someone who has or had a sexual or dating relationship only or has a common child with the victim. In the
case at bench, it is undisputed that AAA had borne Reyes four children out of their relationship.

According to Reyes, he stopped giving monetary support to AAA because she filed a Bigamy case against him.
The Court finds his excuse unacceptable and will not at all exculpate him from criminal liability under the
VAWC. It is noteworthy that AAA charged Reyes with Bigamy not merely to torment or harass him but to enforce her
right and protect her interest as Reyes’ legal wife considering that he contracted a second marriage with one Marilou
Osias Ramboanga during the subsistence of his marriage with AAA. Evidently, the denial of financial support is
designed to subjugate AAA's will and control her conduct, either to pressure her to withdraw said criminal case for
Bigamy or dissuade her from pursuing it, or at least, to discourage her from filing additional cases against him.
 JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, G.R. No. 179267;

Facts:

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a TPO against her husband, Jesus
C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. Rosalie claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of Jesus, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.

Said marital infidelity occurred when Jesus had an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City,
who is the godmother of one of their sons. Jesus admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him
about it in 2004, subsequently spawning a series of fights which left private respondent mentally and
emotionally wounded.

After Rosalie confronted him about the affair and intended to file charges against the bank manager, Jesus got
angry at Rosalie for jeopardizing the manager’s job and told her that he was leaving her for good. In addition, he
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the three corporations, all
of which Jesus is president, are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses.

The RTC of Bacolod City issued a TPO on March 24, 2006, effective for thirty (30) days in accordance with the
finding that there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur. The TPO was continuously renewed until September 26,
2006, by the filing of private respondent of an application for its extension as petitioner continued to deprive them
of financial support and committed acts of harassment against her and their children.

Meanwhile, during the proceedings before the RTC, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection
clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an
invalid law”.

Issue:

I. Whether R.A. 9262 violates the equal protection clause;

II. Whether R.A. 9262 violates the due process clause; and
III. Whether R.A. 9262 gives undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

Ruling:

R.A. 9262 does not violate theguaranty of equal protection of the law

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive:

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree
with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
- classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
- that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
- that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
- that it must apply equally to each member of the class.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law.

II. The classification is germane (relevant) to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane (relevant) to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children, [as] spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.

III. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members.

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to
future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by
violence and abuse.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a
writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same
way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.

It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.

There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the Barangay Protection Order issued by the Punong Barangay
or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of its duty under
the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."
 GONZALO A. ARANETA vs. INES BOLOS SANTIAGO, G.R. No. 174205

Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 when
the petitioner forcibly embraced and threatened to kill the victim if she would not accept his love for her.

At around 10:00 o’clock in the morning of 10 April 1998, while AAA and her two younger sisters, BBB and EEE were
sitting on a bench at the waiting shed located near her boarding house, petitioner approached her. Petitioner,
who had been incessantly courting AAA from the time she was still 13 years old, again expressed his feelings for
her and asked her to accept his love and even insisted that she must accept him because he had a job.

She did not like what she heard from petitioner and tried to hit him with a broom but the latter was able to dodge
the strike. She and her two sisters dashed to the boarding house which was five meters away and went inside
the room. When they were about to close the door, the petitioner, who was following them, forced himself
inside. The three tried to bar petitioner from entering the room by pushing the door to his direction. Their efforts,
however, proved futile (useless) as petitioner was able to enter.

There petitioner embraced AAA, who struggled to extricate (free) herself from his hold. AAA then shouted for
help. Meanwhile, petitioner continued hugging her and tried to threaten her with these words: "Ug dili ko nimo
sugton, patyon tika. Akong ipakita nimo unsa ko ka buang" (If you will not accept my love I will kill you. I will show
you how bad I can be). BBB, tried to pull petitioner away from her sister AAA, but to no avail. Andrew Tubilag, who
was also residing in the same house, arrived and pulled petitioner away from AAA. AAA closed the door of the
room and there she cried. She then went to the police station to report the incident.

The petitioner, on the other hand, denied the charge.

Issue:

Whether the RTC gravely erred in convicting the Petitioner of Child Abuse.

Ruling:

No, the Republic Act No. 7610 is geared towards the implementation of a national comprehensive program for
the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the Filipino children, in keeping with the
Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3, paragraph2, that "The State shall defend the right of the
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.

Under Article VI of the statute enumerates the "other acts of abuse." Paragraph (a) of Section 10 thereof states: SEC.
10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s
Development. –(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article Article
59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article5922 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e.,
- (a) child abuse,
- (b) child cruelty,
- (c) child exploitation and
- (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of
the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse,
cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial
to the child’s development.

The evidence of the prosecution proved that petitioner, despite the victim’s protestation, relentlessly followed
the latter from the waiting shed to her boarding house and even to the room where she stayed. He forcibly
embraced her and threatened to kill her if she would not accept his love for her. Indeed, such devious act must
have shattered her self-esteem and womanhood and virtually debased, degraded or demeaned her intrinsic
worth and dignity. As a young and helpless lass at that time, being away from her parents, the victim must have felt
desecrated and sexually transgressed, especially considering the fact that the incident took place before the very
eyes of her two younger, innocent sisters. Petitioner who was old enough to be the victim’s grandfather, did not
only traumatize and gravely threaten the normal development of such innocent girl; he was also betraying the
trust that young girls place in the adult members of the community who are expected to guide and nurture
the well-being of these fragile members of the society. Undoubtedly, such insensible act of petitioner
constitutes child abuse.
 RICKY DINAMLING, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 199522; *****

Facts:

Dinamling, the petitioner, was charged of two criminal information for violating RA 9262 for inflicting
psychological violence upon AAA whom he had an on-going relationship for five years with two common
children. Dinamling evicted AAA including their children in their home, accusing her of using the place as whore
house wherein she “brought her partners”.

Another incident of physical abuse happened after several days where Dimanlang shouted and punched AAA at
her left ear, which subsequently bled and caused her miscarriage. Dinamling visited AAA but showed no remorse
over his acts. Dimanlang pleaded not guilty to both charges.

RTC found Dinamling guilty of both charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification on the penalty due to
the application of Indeterminate Sentence Law. Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of RA No. 9262

Ruling:

Yes. There is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim’s evidence. In particular, AAA's
testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to the charges was clear, categorical and
straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence.

The elements have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that the victim is a woman, in a five-year
ongoing relationship with Dinamling and had two common children. Neither the physical injuries suffered by the
victim nor the actual physical violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements
of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. In this instance, the physical violence was means of causing
mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence
translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or emotional well-being.
For his crime, pregnancy of AAA is one of aggravating circumstances which increase the imposable penalty, thus,
they must be alleged and proven with competent evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed.

Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such testimony of Dr. Diaz, which expresses an uncertainty as to whether the
mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates (shows that he is not guilty) him from the crime.

The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also alleged to have led to
her mental or emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in the information in the case at bar. Thus, proof of
physical injuries is not needed for conviction. Likewise, proof of the absence thereof or lack of proof of such
injuries would not lead to an acquittal. Physical violence or physical injuries, in isolation, are not elements of
this particular crime.

As for Criminal Case No. 1701, section 5(i) no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance attends the
crime. Although it was stated during trial that the offense was committed in the presence of AAA's children, such
fact was not alleged in the information and therefore will not be taken into consideration. Nighttime, though alleged,
is not considered aggravating because it neither facilitated the commission of the offense nor was it shown to have
been purposely sought by the offender.53 The fact of AAA's pregnancy during the crime's commission, however, has
been alleged and established.

As for Criminal Case No. 1702, there is likewise no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance. Again, the
single circumstance of pregnancy aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises his penalty to the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed,

Additional Notes:

In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that her daughter was "like a corpse" because of
Dinamling's maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of maltreatment of her daughter, including the times that
she saw her with "bluish spots" and when AAA had a miscarriage from all the boxing and kicking that she had
received from Dinamling.

She knew that Dinamling was a married man when he had his relationship with AAA and she knew for a fact that
Dinamling did not live with AAA and the children because he always went home to his own wife.

Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove that not only was heat some
other place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not have been physically present at the place of
the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its commission. Using such standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no water.
Not only was his alleged location at the time of commission, that is, the XXX Police Station where he was on duty, in
the same municipality as the crimes' place of commission, Dinamling himself also admitted that this police station
is just "two to three minutes" away from AAA's boarding house.
 JAIME ARAZA Y JARUPAY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 247429;

Facts:

Complainant (AAA) testified that She and Accused (Araza) were married on October 5, 1989 at Malate Catholic
Church. She had no marital issues with Accused until he went to Zamboanga City for their networking business.
Accused was formerly working as an Overseas Filipino Worker but decided to stop in 1993 to join complainant
in her business.

One day, she received a text message informing her that her accused-husband is having an affair with their best
friend. At first, she did not believe them. However, that information brought complainant to Zamboanga to see
for her herself whether it was true. Indeed she was able to confirm that her husband was living with another
woman.

She instituted a complaint against the accused and his alleged mistress for Concubinage at the Philippine
National Police. The case was subsequently amicably settled after the parties executed an Agreement whereby
accused and mistress committed themselves never to see each other again.

After the case was settled accused lived with complainant. However, it was only for a short time. Without saying
a word, accused left complainant. She was looking for the accused and out of desperation, she sought the help
of the NBI to search for him. To her surprise, the accused had returned to live with his mistress again.

The complainant went emotionally depressed and anxious She was suffering from insomnia and asthma.
Allegedly, she is still hurting and crying. She took anti-depressant and sleeping pills to cope with her severe
emotional and psychological turmoil brought about by the accused marital infidelity and having children with
his mistress.

A case was filed against the accused for Violence Against Women and their Children on Psychological Violence
caused by his infidelity. RTC found accused guilty of the said offense. Accused appeal the case to the CA to which
it affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife AAA by committing
marital infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and mental suffering.

Ruling:

Yes, Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally
essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering
are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party.

The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done
by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish
emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be
presented in court, as such experiences are personal to this party.

In order to establish psychological violence, proof of the commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section
5(i) or similar of such acts, is necessary.

The prosecution has established Araza’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he committed
psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA’s testimony was strong and credible.
She was able to confirm that Araza was living with another woman. Marital infidelity, which is a form of
psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA’s emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point
that even her health condition was adversely affected.

In Dimamling v. People the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 are enumerated:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child
or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial
of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar acts or omissions.
 CHRISTIAN PANTONIAL ACHARON, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

Facts:

• Christian Pantonial Acharon (Christian) was charged with violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No.
9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act).
• The charge was for allegedly causing mental or emotional anguish to his wife, AAA, by denying her
financial support.
• The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 270, under Criminal
Case No. 34-V-13.
• Christian and AAA were married on September 30, 2011.
• Christian left for Brunei to work as a delivery rider on October 6, 2011.
• They borrowed Php85,000.00 for his placement fee, which Christian was supposed to repay by sending
Php9,633.00 monthly.
• Christian only sent a total of Php71,500.00, leaving a balance of Php13,500.00.
• AAA testified that Christian's failure to send money regularly and his alleged infidelity caused her
emotional distress.
• Christian denied the accusations, citing financial difficulties due to a fire and a vehicular accident in
Brunei.
• The RTC convicted Christian, sentencing him to imprisonment and a fine, and ordered him to undergo
psychological counseling.
• The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision.
• Christian filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Did the CA err in finding Christian guilty of causing psychological or emotional anguish by allegedly
failing to provide financial support to AAA?
2. Did the CA err in finding Christian guilty of failing to keep communication lines open with AAA?

Ruling:

• The Supreme Court granted the appeal and ACQUITTED Christian of the charge.
• The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the necessary elements of the crime under
Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, specifically the willful intent to cause mental or emotional anguish through the
denial of financial support.
Ratio:
• The Court emphasized that for a conviction under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused willfully denied financial support with the intent to cause
mental or emotional anguish.
• The Court clarified that mere failure or inability to provide financial support does not constitute a
violation of the law.

The act punished by the Court stresses that Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 uses the phrase "denial of financial support" in
defining the criminal act. The word "denial" is defined as "refusal to satisfy a request or desire" or "the act of not
allowing someone to do or have something." The foregoing definitions connote willfulness, or an active exertion
of effort so that one would not be able to have or do something. This may be contrasted with the word "failure,"
defined as "the fact of not doing something [one] should have done," which in turn connotes passivity. From the
plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature - there must be a
concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence,25 in order to consummate the crime.

In this connection, the Court deems it proper to clarify, as Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Mario V.
Lopez pointed out in their respective Opinions that the crimes penalized under Sections 5(i) and 5(e) of R.A. 9262
are mala in se, not mala prohibita (offenses, which are actions that are considered wrong because they violate
the law, not because they are morally wrong), even though R.A. 9262 is a special penal law.

The acts punished therein are inherently wrong or depraved, and the language used under the said penal law
requires a mental element. Being a crime mala in se, there must thus be a concurrence of both actus reus and
mens rea to constitute the crime. "Actus reus pertains to the external or overt acts or omissions included in a
crime's definition while mens rea refers to the accused's guilty state of mind or criminal intent accompanying
the actus reus."

It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish, or for her partner to deny
financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262,
insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the
accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting
mental or emotional anguish upon her.

In other words, the actus reus of the offense under Section 5(i) is the willful denial of financial support, while
the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman. Both must thus exist and
be proven in court before a person may be convicted of violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.

"It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims
who are women and children."30 In prosecutions under Section 5(i), therefore, "[p]sychological violence is the
means employed by the perpetrator"31 with denial of financial support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to
be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting
mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful
denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose.

This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of
criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words,
even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused
merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to
the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.

From the above discussions, the Court clarifies that it now hereby abandons Melgar and Reyes insofar as they hold
that a person charged with a violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 may be convicted of violating Section 5(e) by
applying the variance doctrine. Based on the discussions in this Decision, the portions of Sections 5(e) and 5(i) that
deal with denial or deprivation of financial support punish different things. Section 5(e) punishes the deprivation
of financial support for the purpose of controlling the woman or to make her and/or her child or children lose
their agency. Section 5(i), on the other hand, punishes the willful infliction of mental or emotional anguish, or
public ridicule or humiliation upon the woman and/or her child or children by denying her and/or her child or
children financial support that is legally due her and/or her child or children. Thus, while the portions of
Sections 5(e) and 5(i) that deal with denial or deprivation of financial support may seem similar at first glance,
they, in reality, deal with different matters and penalize distinct acts. As the Court comes to the realization that
the said sections punish different things, the Court, therefore, abandons Melgar and Reyes to the extent that they
hold that the variance doctrine may be applied for Sections 5(e) and 5(i) of R.A. 9262.

Finally, the Court clarifies that in either case, whether the accused is prosecuted under Section 5(e) or Section 5(i),
the mere failure to provide financial support is not enough. In other words, neither Section 5(e) nor 5(i) can be
construed to mean that mere failure or inability to provide support is sufficient for a conviction. Those entitled to
support and are not given any have the remedy of filing a civil case for support against the delinquent person,
consistent with the provisions of the Civil Code and the Family Code. In order to be liable under the penal provisions
of R.A. 9262, therefore, it is necessary to allege and prove the existence of the facts that qualify the act of denial or
deprivation of financial support from one in which mere civil liability may arise to one where a person may be
criminally liable.

The Court sees the need for this clarification, as R.A. 9262 was not meant to make the partners of women criminals
just because they fail or are unable to financially provide for them. Certainly, courts cannot send individuals to jail
because of their mere inability - without malice or evil intention - to provide for their respective families. In a
developing country like ours, where poverty and unemployment are especially rampant, courts would inevitably find
themselves incarcerating countless people, mostly fathers, should the interpretation be that mere failure or inability
to provide financial support is enough to convict under Sections 5(e) and 5(i). As Associate Justice Rodil V.
Zalameda put it simply during the deliberations of this case, "poverty is not a crime x x x [and] the failure or
inability to provide support, without more, should not be the cause of a man's incarceration."

Also, while R.A. 9262 was indeed enacted to protect women, it was not meant to discount women's ability to
provide for themselves, especially when they are able-bodied.
 AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448;

Facts:

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two children: CCC
and DDD. In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident
status in September of 2008.

AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, and only sporadically (irregularly). There were also
allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence.
To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok
with whom he allegedly has been living in Singapore.

Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore
during her visit with their kids.

The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional anguish
through his alleged marital infidelity. Accordingly, an Information was filed against BBB for violation of Section 5(i)
of R.A. No. 9262.

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-
Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was archived
On November 6, 2013, counsel of accused filed on behalf of BBB an Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash
Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest.

The RTC granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissed the case. The
RTC ruled that since BBB’s acts complained of had occurred in Singapore, said Court enjoys no jurisdiction over
the offense charged, it having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may be filed within the Philippines if
the illicit relationship is conducted abroad.

Ruling:

YES. In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by AAA,
Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant. While the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is
certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional
anguish which is personal to the complainant.

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against
women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; x x x Thus, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed.

We say that even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is
committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of
Philippine courts.

Additional Notes:

RA No. 9262 criminalizes not the marital infidelity per se, out the psychological violence causing mental or
emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under said circumstances that is
outlawed. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence
may be committed.
 SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, G.R. No. 168852

Facts:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan were married. Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)
against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC.
She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic
abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h) (5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the "AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner Go-Tan contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily
(supplementary) applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose
in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from
the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.

Respondent’s Contention: Spouses Tan’s were contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons
since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. They submit that they are not
covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the
victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy
of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review.

RTC - Granted respondent spouses Motion To Dismiss and issued a resolution dismissing the case as to
respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as
respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expression unius est exclusio alterius ("to
express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative."

Issue:

Whether or not respondents-spouses perfecto & juanita, parents-in-law of sharica, may be included in the
petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with republic act no. 9262, otherwise known as the
"anti-violence against women and their children act of 2004".

Ruling:

YES.

The ratio of the SC is anchored on the 4 points below:

(1) Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as

"any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude (rule out) the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws,
shall have suppletory application.
(2) Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children
may be committed by an offender through another.

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman
or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(3) In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some
or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x

Additional Notes:

Section 47 of RA No. 9262 provides that the Revised Penal Code shall have suppletory application.
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides that this Code shall be supplementary to special
laws. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws, such as RA No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, the provisions on subsidiary penalty, on the service of sentences, and on subsidiary imprisonment under the
Revised Penal Code were applied to offenses under special laws.

The respondents, parents-in-law of the petitioner, submit that they are not covered by RA No. 9262 since Section 3
thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a
dating or Sexual relationship. It was held that: “While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Indeed, Section 47 of RA No. 9262
expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as RA No. 9262, in which
the special law is silent on a particular matter.