IGNALINA RBMK-1500 Source book

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A Source Book
IGNALINA SAFETY ANALYSIS GROUP

LITHUANIAN ENERGY INSTITUTE
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The University of Maryland,

College Park Campus,
Department of Materials and Nuclear Engineering
College Park, MD 20742, USA
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Ignalina Safety Analysis Group,

Lithuanian Energy Institute,
3 Breslaujos, 3035 Kaunas, Lithuania
ISBN 9986-492-35-1  Ignalina Safety Analysis Group,

Lithuanian Energy Institute, 1998
Printed in LITHUANIA
ABSTRACT
This publication provides an overview of design and operational data regarding the
RBMK-1500 Nuclear Power Plants located at Ignalina, Lithuania. The content is
modeled on the data presentation scheme employed by U.S. FSAR reports with
modifications made as required by the unique RBMK design. Particular emphasis is
placed on safety related design data. Subjects covered include: description of the site
characteristics, design of structures and components, descriptions of the reactor, the fuel
channels, reactor shielding structures, control rod channels and refueling equipment plus
procedures. An extensive section deals with various aspects of the main circulation
system and systems for cooling control rods, instrumentation and shielding. In addition,
such systems as the Reactor Cavity Overpressure Protection System, Fuel Cladding
Integrity Monitoring System, Emergency Power Protection System, Electric Power
System, Steam and Power Conversion System, Service Water System, Intermediate
Circuits System as well as other auxiliary systems are described. Presented engineered
safety features include the accident confinement system, radiation protection features,
reactor power control systems, emergency core cooling and water purification systems
and safety management. System description includes also an overview of their evaluated
response during design basis accidents. The results of the In-Depth Safety Assessment of
the Ignalina NPP are discussed, this includes results of system and accident analyses,
safety improvements performed at the Ignalina plant after the Chernobyl accident and
during implementation of the first as well as the second Safety Improvement Program.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................................................................3
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................................................4
LIST OF FIGURES...................................................................................................................................................... 8
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................................................... 10
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 13
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................................................... 15
INTRODUCTION FOR THE EXTENDED AND UPDATED VERSION................................................................ 16
1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT ................................................................................... 17

1.1 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................. 18
1.1.1 Location of Plant..................................................................................................................................... 18
1.1.2 Plant Panorama....................................................................................................................................... 18
1.1.3 Plant Layout............................................................................................................................................ 20
1.1.4 Power Plant Parameters.......................................................................................................................... 22
1.2 COMPARISON WITH OTHER FACILITIES............................................................................................... 22
1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS AND CONTRACTORS ......................................... 22
1.4 OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IGNALINA NPP.............................................................. 24
2. SITE CHARACTERISTICS ............................................................................................................................. 28
2.1 GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................... 28
2.2 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION ................................................................................................................... 29
2.3 NEARBY INDUSTRIAL REGIONS.............................................................................................................. 29
2.4 METEOROLOGY .......................................................................................................................................... 29
2.5 HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING................................................................................................................... 31
2.6 GEOLOGICAL AND SEISMOLOGICAL EFFECTS .................................................................................. 33
3. DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS................................ 35
3.1 DESIGN LOADING ....................................................................................................................................... 35
3.1.1 External .................................................................................................................................................. 35
3.1.1.1 Air-Shock Wave ........................................................................................................................... 35
3.1.1.2 Water ............................................................................................................................................. 35
3.1.1.3 Missiles .......................................................................................................................................... 35
3.1.1.4 Seismic .......................................................................................................................................... 36
3.1.2 Internal.................................................................................................................................................... 38
3.1.2.1 Postulated Piping Ruptures............................................................................................................ 38
3.1.2.2 Assumed Missile Effects................................................................................................................ 41
3.2 DESIGN OF STEEL STRUCTURES............................................................................................................. 42
3.2.1 Standard Practices................................................................................................................................... 42
3.2.2 Material Properties.................................................................................................................................. 42
3.2.3 Failure Design Criteria .......................................................................................................................... 45
3.2.4 Qualification Tests of Reactor Components ........................................................................................... 46
3.3 DESIGN OF CONCRETE STRUCTURES.................................................................................................... 49
3.3.1 Standard Construction Practices............................................................................................................. 49
3.3.2 Material Properties Used.......................................................................................................................... 49
3.4 SELECTION OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT....................................................... 51
3.4.1 Compliance with Code Requirements .................................................................................................... 51
3.4.2 Qualification Tests and Analyses............................................................................................................ 52
4. REACTOR............................................................................................................................................................ 55
4.1 DESIGN BASIS .............................................................................................................................................. 55
4.2 DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM........................................................................................................................ 55
4.2.1 The Graphite Stack................................................................................................................................. 57
4.2.2 Reactor Metal Structures ........................................................................................................................ 59
4.2.3 Biological Shielding ............................................................................................................................... 60
4.2.4 Fuel Assembly and Fuel Channel ........................................................................................................... 62
4.2.4.1 Fuel Assembly................................................................................................................................ 62
4.2.4.2 Fuel Channel ................................................................................................................................. 63
4.2.4.3 Pressure Tube - Graphite Gap........................................................................................................ 65
4.3 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM ............................................................................................................ 66
4.3.1 Special Purpose Channels ...................................................................................................................... 67
4.3.2 Fuel Handling System ............................................................................................................................ 68
4.3.3 Control Rod Drive Characteristics.......................................................................................................... 70
4.4 REACTOR DRAINING SYSTEM .................................................................................................... 72
4.4.1 The Reactor Cavity Draining System......................................................................................... 72
4.4.2 Metal Structures and Peripheral Ionization Chambers Draining System ..................................... 73
4.5 OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES .................................................................................................................. 73
4.5.1. Startup.................................................................................................................................................... 73
4.5.2 Shutdown................................................................................................................................................ 76
4.5.3 Refueling Operation................................................................................................................................ 76
5. MAIN CIRCULATION CIRCUIT ....................................................................................................... 78
5.1 THE MCC THROUGH THE CORE ................................................................................................... 80
5.1.1 Group Distribution Header, Water Piping, Isolation and Control Valve................................................ 80
5.1.2 Fuel Channels: Operation Parameters ................................................................................................... 82
5.1.3 Steam-Water Piping................................................................................................................................ 82
5.2 SEPARATION OF STEAM .......................................................................................................................... 82
5.2.1 Separator Drums .................................................................................................................................... 82
5.2.2 Connections at the Liquid and Steam Level between Separator Drums................................................. 84
5.2.3 Downcomers........................................................................................................................................... 85
5.2.4 MCP Suction Headers ............................................................................................................................ 85
5.3 FORCED CIRCULATION ............................................................................................................................ 85
5.3.1 Main Circulation Pumps......................................................................................................................... 85
5.3.2 Suction and Pressure Piping of the MCPs ............................................................................................. 87
5.3.3 MCP Pressure Header............................................................................................................................. 88
5.3.4 Pipe Connections between Suction Headers and Pressure Headers ....................................................... 88
5.3.5 Pipe Connections between the Pressure Header and the Group Distribution Header ............................ 89
5.4 STEAM PIPING.............................................................................................................................................. 89
5.4.1 Protection of the MCC from Pressure Surges......................................................................................... 89
5.4.1.1 Fast-Acting Steam Discharge Valve SDV-C................................................................................. 90
5.4.1.2 High Pressure Steam Loop............................................................................................................. 91
5.5 THE WATER FEEDBACK SYSTEM........................................................................................................... 91
5.5.1 Operation ................................................................................................................................................ 91
5.5.2 Operation Parameters of the Water Feedback System ........................................................................... 92
5.5.3 Components of the System ..................................................................................................................... 93
5.5.3.1 Condensate Pumps......................................................................................................................... 93
5.5.3.2 Filtration of the Condensate.......................................................................................................... 93
5.5.3.3 Pre-Heating the Condensate........................................................................................................... 93
5.5.3.4 Deaerators...................................................................................................................................... 95
5.5.3.5 Main Feed Water Pumps ............................................................................................................... 95
5.5.3.6 Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps......................................................................................................... 96
5.5.3.7 Main Feeder .................................................................................................................................. 96
5.5.3.8 Auxiliary Feeder ........................................................................................................................... 97
5.5.3.9 Mixers............................................................................................................................................ 97
5.5.3.10 Valves in the Feedwater Piping ................................................................................................... 97
5.6 PURIFICATION AND COOLING SYSTEM................................................................................................ 98
5.7 CONTROL ROD COOLING CIRCUIT......................................................................................................... 101
5.7.1 Top Storage Tank .................................................................................................................................. 102
5.7.2 Distribution Piping ................................................................................................................................. 102
5.7.3 Connections between the Instrumentation Channels and the Heat Exchangers..................................... 103
5.7.4 Coolers.................................................................................................................................................... 103
5.7.5 Connections between the Coolers and the Circulation Pumps ............................................................... 103
5.7.6 Bottom Storage Tank.............................................................................................................................. 103
5.7.7 Circulation Pumps .................................................................................................................................. 103
5.7.8 Connections between the Pumps and the Top Tank................................................................................ 104
5.7.9 Other Piping and Auxiliaries.................................................................................................................. 104
5.8 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY MONITORING SYSTEM.............................................................. 104
5.9 MATERIALS ................................................................................................................................................. 105
6. ENGINEERED SAFETY FUTURES .............................................................................................................. 108
6.1 MEASUREMENT OF REACTOR PARAMETERS ..................................................................................... 108
6.2 PLANT RADIATION PROTECTION........................................................................................................... 109
6.2.1 Habitability Requirements ...................................................................................................................... 109
6.2.2 Examination Techniques and Procedures............................................................................................... 111
6.2.3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation................................................................................................... 111
6.2.4 Scheduling of Inspections....................................................................................................................... 111
6.3 ACCIDENT CONFINEMENT SYSTEM...................................................................................................... 112
6.3.1 Purpose and Applicability....................................................................................................................... 112
6.3.2 Design Characteristics of the ACS ......................................................................................................... 113
6.3.3 ACS Structural Characteristics............................................................................................................... 114
6.3.4 Condenser Tray Cooling System ................................................................................................ 116
6.3.5 Reactor Cavity Overpressure Protection System......................................................................... 118
6.3.6 Description of ACS Response................................................................................................................. 119
6.3.6.1 Accident in the Reinforced Leaktight Compartment..................................................................... 119
6.3.6.2 Rupture of the Group Distribution Header.................................................................................... 119
6.3.6.3 Rupture of a Fuel Channel............................................................................................................ 120
6.3.6.4 Inadvertent Opening of the MSV’s ............................................................................................... 120
6.3.6.5 Small Pipe Break Accident ............................................................................................................ 121
6.3.6.6 Hydrogen Release .......................................................................................................................... 121
6.3.7 ACS Leakage Testing............................................................................................................................. 121
6.4 REACTOR POWER CONTROL ................................................................................................................... 122
6.4.1 Reactivity Coefficients ............................................................................................................................ 122
6.4.2 Measurement and Control of Reactor Power.......................................................................................... 125
6.4.2.1 Reactor Neutron Flux Measurement.............................................................................................. 125
6.4.2.2 Power Density Distribution Monitoring System ............................................................................ 127
6.4.3 Control and Protection System ............................................................................................................... 130
6.4.3.1 Neutron Flux Control..................................................................................................................... 131
6.4.3.2 Control Rods.................................................................................................................................. 131
6.5 EMERGENCY PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM......................................................................... 133
6.6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ................................................................................................ 134
6.6.1 Purpose of the ECCS .............................................................................................................................. 134
6.6.2 System Description ................................................................................................................................. 135
6.6.3 Operation of the ECCS........................................................................................................................... 137
7. AUXILIARY SYSTEMS...................................................................................................................... 138
7.1 SYSTEM FOR COLLECTION AND PURIFICATION OF DEMINERALIZED WATER................. 138
7.1.1 The Pumping Station of Contaminated DW .............................................................................. 138
7.1.2 The DW Purification Facility .................................................................................................... 139
7.1.3 The Pumping Station of Purified DW........................................................................................ 139
7.1.4 System Operation...................................................................................................................... 140
7.2 AUXILIARY DEAERATOR MAKEUP SYSTEM............................................................................. 140
7.2.1 General Description .................................................................................................................. 140
7.2.2 Operational Procedures of the Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup System .......................................... 141
7.3 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ........................................................................................................... 142
7.3.1 General Description .................................................................................................................. 142
7.3.2 HEs of ACS Condenser Tray Cooling System............................................................................ 144
7.3.3 Diesel Generators Cooling System ............................................................................................ 144
7.4 INTERMEDIATE CIRCUITS........................................................................................................... 144
7.4.1 Intermediate Circuit of the PCS Water Final Coolers IC-1 ........................................................ 145
7.4.2 Intermediate Circuit for MCC Equipment IC-2 .......................................................................... 145
7.5 FISSION PRODUCT REMOVAL AND CONTROL SYSTEM ......................................................... 146
7.5.1 Reactor Gas Circuit and Vented Gas Cleaning System .............................................................. 146
7.5.2 Reactor Channel Integrity Monitoring system ........................................................................... 147
7.5.3 Venting System for the Reactor and the MCC Compartments ................................................... 148
8. ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM .......................................................................................... 149
8.1 OFF-SITE POWER SYSTEM ........................................................................................................... 149
8.2 ON-SITE POWER SYSTEM ............................................................................................................ 150
8.2.1 Normal Power Sources .............................................................................................................. 150
8.2.2 Auxiliary Power Supply ............................................................................................................ 150
8.2.2.1 6 kV Power Supply ........................................................................................................... 150
8.2.2.2 0.4 kV Power Supply ........................................................................................................ 151
8.2.2.3 DC 220 V Normal Power Supply ...................................................................................... 151
8.2.2.4 Cables............................................................................................................................... 151
8.2.3 Emergency Power Supply System.............................................................................................. 152
8.2.3.1 Reliable Power Supply System .......................................................................................... 152
8.2.3.2 Uninterruptible Power Supply System ............................................................................... 154
8.2.4 Power Supply to Instrumentation and Control Systems.............................................................. 156
9. STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM ........................................................................... 158
9.1 MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM................................................................................................... 158
9.2 TURBINE AND CONDENSER ........................................................................................................ 158
9.3 GENERATOR................................................................................................................................... 161
10. SYSTEM ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................... 163
10.1 REACTOR CONTROL AND PROTECTION SYSTEM ................................................................. 164
10.2 EMERGENCY PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM ................................................................................ 166
10.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM................................................................................... 169
10.4 ACCIDENT CONFINEMENT SYSTEM ........................................................................................ 170
10.5 FEEDWATER AND STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM........................................................................... 172
10.6 SUPPORT SYSTEMS ..................................................................................................................... 173
11. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................... 175
11.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 175
11.2 ACCIDENTS INITIATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES .............................................................. 178
11.3 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS ............................................................................................... 179
11.4 REACTIVITY INITIATED ACCIDENTS ...................................................................................... 180
11.5 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM ..................................................................... 181
11.6 POTENTIAL INITIATORS OF MULTIPLE PRESSURE TUBE RUPTURE................................... 182
11.7 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT................................................................................... 182
12. SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND PLANT OPERATION............................................................... 185
12.1 OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 185
12.2 ROLE OF OPERATOR ................................................................................................................... 186
12.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT............................................................................................................. 189
13. PLANT MODIFICATIONS ............................................................................................................... 191
13.1 POST-CHERNOBYL MODIFICATIONS ....................................................................................... 191
13.2 MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTED DURING THE SAFETY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.......... 192
13.3 NEW SAFETY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT.................................................................................. 193
REFERENCES.............................................................................................................................................. 196
LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 1.1 General panorama of the Ignalina NPP

Fig. 1.2 General units arrangements
Fig. 1.3 Panorama of auxiliary services
Fig. 1.4 Plan of the Ignalina NPP main buildings
Fig. 1.5 Cross-section A-A of one unit of the Ignalina NPP
Fig. 1.6 Cross-section B-B of one unit of the Ignalina NPP
Fig. 1.7 Heat cycle diagram
Fig. 1.8 Scope of responsibility for the Ignalina NPP project
Fig. 1.9 Relationship of the Ignalina NPP with the authorities of the Republic of Lithuania
Fig. 2.1 Location of the Ignalina NPP
Fig. 2.2 Configuration of lake DrkÖiai, location of the Ignalina NPP and permanent testing stations (1-6)
Fig. 2.3 Bathygraphic curves of lake DrkÖiai
Fig. 2.4 Glacial accretions of the ground-cover in the Ignalina NPP area
Fig. 3.1 The relation between seismic scales
Fig. 4.1 General view of the reactor
Fig. 4.2 General view of the graphite stack and the water-steam piping
Fig. 4.3 Segment of the graphite stack
Fig. 4.4 Cross-section of the reactor vault
Fig. 4.5 Top metal structures
Fig. 4.6 Segment of the top cover
Fig. 4.7 Fuel channel shielding plug
Fig. 4.8 Shielding sleeves in the top reflector
Fig. 4.9 Fuel assembly
Fig. 4.10 Fuel channel
Fig. 4.11 Graphite and zirconium interaction zone
Fig. 4.12 Fuel channel seal plug
Fig. 4.13 Change of hole diameter in graphite bricks and equivalent diameter of pressure tubes (pressure tube
& graphite rings) during operation of Ignalina NPP unit 1
Fig. 4.14 Reactor - control and protection system channel
Fig. 4.15 Reflector - cooling channel
Fig. 4.16 Refueling machine
Fig. 4.17 Grabber
Fig. 4.18 Control rod drive
Fig. 4.19 Block diagram of the reactor draining system
Fig. 4.20 Refueling machine operation
Fig. 5.1 Schematic representation of one loop of the main forced circulation circuit
Fig. 5.2 Elevations of the MCC
Fig. 5.3 Isolation and control valve
Fig. 5.5 Operation parameters of the isolation and control valve
Fig. 5.6 Vertical variation of coolant parameters along the maximum designed power 4.5 MW fuel channel
Fig. 5.7 Separator drum
Fig. 5.8 Connections at the liquid and steam level between separator drums
Fig. 5.9 The pump equipment of the RBMK type reactor
Fig. 5.10 Schematic of the RBMK-1500 pump
Fig. 5.11 A schematic representation of the throttling-regulating valve
Fig. 5.12 A schematic representation of the GDH check valve
Fig. 5.13 Steam piping
Fig. 5.14 Water feedback system
Fig. 5.15 A schematic representation of purification and cooling system
Fig. 5.16 Control rod cooling circuit
Fig. 5.17 Schematic of fuel cladding integrity monitoring system
Fig. 6.1 Section of RBMK-1500 measurement parameters
Fig. 6.2 Principal ACS schematic
Fig. 6.3 Condensing compartment and pool
Fig. 6.4 Sketch of steam distribution devices
Fig. 6.5 Fifth steam-condensing pool
Fig. 6.6 Gas-delay chamber
Fig. 6.7 Condenser tray cooling system
Fig. 6.8 Simplified schematic of the reactor pressure relief system
Fig. 6.9 GDH rupture after the check valve
Fig. 6.10 Void reactivity coefficient versus fuel burnup
Fig. 6.11 Neutron flux measurement location
Fig. 6.12 Cross-section of a suspension bracket of the fission chamber
Fig. 6.13 Suspension bracket section of the ionization chamber for reactor startup
Fig. 6.14 Cross-section of the suspension bracket ionization chamber for normal reactor operation
Fig. 6.15 Sensor for the radial power density monitoring PDMS-R
Fig. 6.16 The suspension bracket for in-core power density sensor of axial monitoring PDMS-A
Fig. 6.17 Tri-axial bi-sectional chamber used in the PDMS-A detector
Fig. 6.18 Reactor power density distribution monitoring system sensor distribution in the reactor cross-section
Fig. 6.19 Arrangement of control and protection system absorber rods in the core
Fig. 6.20 Control rod design
Fig. 6.21 Emergency core cooling system
Fig. 6.22 ECCS actuation logic
Fig. 7.1 Schematic representation of system for the recovery and purification of demineralized water
Fig. 7.2 Process scheme of auxiliary deaerator makeup system
Fig. 7.3 Flow diagram of the HEs of the ACS condenser tray cooling system SWS
Fig. 7.4 Reactor gas circuit with released gas cleaning system
Fig. 8.1 Circuit diagram of power supply at units 1 and 2
Fig. 8.2 Circuit diagram of emergency power supply system
Fig. 11.1 Damage and accident contributors in different initiating event classes
Fig. 11.2 Damage and accident contributors in short, intermediate and long term cooling
Fig. 12.1 The Ignalina NPP organizational chart
Fig. 12.2 The Ignalina NPP operating service organization chart
Fig. 13.1 The modernization of the RBMK-1500 manual control rods
Fig. 13.2 Fast-acting scram system test, at reactor power N = 0.4Nnom
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1 Specific status of the RBMK plants

Table 1.2 Fundamental parameters of the RBMK-1500 reactor
Table 1.3 Comparison of BWR and RBMK - 1500 reactor parameters
Table 2.1 Population distribution
Table 2.2 Main data of hydrologic and hydrothermic regime of water cooling reservoir of the Ignalina NPP
Table 2.3 Filtration properties of glacial accretions of the ground-cover in the Ignalina NPP area
Table 2.4 Engineering-geological properties of glacial accretions of the ground-cover in the Ignalina NPP area
Table 3.1 Seismic stability of the Ignalina NPP structures
Table 3.2 Chemical composition of steels, used for the main equipment of RBMK-1500 reactors
Table 3.3 Physical-mechanical properties of steels, used for the main equipment of RBMK-1500 reactors
Table 3.4 Thermo-physical properties of low-alloy steels
Table 3.5 Steel 08Ch18N10T properties at 20 oC after exposure to fast neutrons with different fluencies
Table 3.6 Physical-mechanical zirconium alloy properties
Table 3.7 Influence of fluency exposure on physical-mechanical properties of alloy Zr+2.5 % Nb
Table 3.8 Chemical compositions of different concretes
Table 3.9 Neutron and gamma quantum attenuation parameters of concrete
Table 3.10 Radiation influence to strength of concretes
Table 4.1 Composition and dimensions of principal biological shield components
Table 4.2 Biological shielding parameters of the office premises which are adjacent to the operating equipment
Table 4.3 List of non-service compartments
Table 4.4 Fuel assembly parameters
Table 4.5 Fuel channel inspection program for unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP
Table 4.6 The channels and their number
Table 4.7 Reactivity control system rods
Table 5.1 Water and steam volumes of one loop of the MCC
Table 5.2 Coolant operating conditions at 4200MW(th) power operation
Table 5.3 Parameters of the fuel channels
Table 5.4 Specifications of the separator drum
Table 5.5 Specifications of the suction header of the MCP
Table 5.6 Pump characteristic
Table 5.7 Electric motor characteristics
Table 5.8 Specifications of throttling-regulating valve
Table 5.9 Specifications of the pressure header of the MCP
Table 5.10 Operation parameters of the steam
Table 5.11 Parameters of the protective steam discharge valves
Table 5.12 Fast-acting steam discharge valve to turbine condenser
Table 5.13 Fast-acting steam discharge valve to fifth pool of the ACS tower
Table 5.14 Operation parameter of feedwater
Table 5.15 Specification of the condensate pump of first stage
Table 5.16 Specifications of the condensate pump of second stage
Table 5.17 Specifications of condensate filters
Table 5.18 Low pressure reheater PND-1
Table 5.23 Specifications of the deaerator
Table 5.24 Specifications of the main feed water pump
Table 5.25 Specifications of the auxiliary feed water pump
Table 5.26 Specifications of the filter
Table 5.27 Specifications of the control valve for main feeder
Table 5.28 Specification of the filter
Table 5.29 Specification of the control valve for auxiliary feeder
Table 5.30 Specification of the mixer
Table 5.31 Specification of the control valve
Table 5.32 Purification pump
Table 5.33 Specification of the regenerator
Table 5.34 Specifications of the additional cooler
Table 5.35 Specifications of water quality
Table 5.36 Specifications of the filter
Table 5.37 Specification of the ion exchanger
Table 5.38 Specification of the CRCC
Table 5.39 Specification of the top tank
Table 5.40 Specification of the coolers
Table 5.41 Specifications of the bottom storage tank
Table 5.42 Specifications of the pump
Table 5.43 Specification of the discharge pump
Table 5.44 Materials
Table 6.1 Main measured parameters
Table 6.2 Limits of safe operation of Ignalina NPP with RBMK-1500
Table 6.3 Main dose limits
Table 6.4 Allowable release of radioactive gases and aerosols from Ignalina NPP
Table 6.5 Principal ACS design characteristics
Table 6.6 ACS components
Table 6.7 ACS leakage test results of the Ignalina NPP unit 1
Table 6.8 ACS leakage test results of the Ignalina NPP unit 2
Table 6.9 The state of the reactor at the Ignalina NPP
Table 6.10 Measurements of steam reactivity coefficient and means of reducing it at the Ignalina NPP unit 1
Table 6.11 Measurements of steam reactivity coefficient and means of reducing it at the Ignalina NPP unit 2
Table 6.12 Neutron flux measurement
Table 6.13 Reactor power density distribution monitoring system sensors
Table 6.14 Structural types of control rods
Table 6.15 Thermal power of an RBMK-1500 reactor as a function of time, during emergency protection AZ-1
Table 6.16 Estimate of ECCS flow rate during a DB-LOCA
Table 6.17 Characteristics of the ECCS and Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup System Pumps
Table 6.18 Water Reservoir Capacities for the ECCS
Table 7.1 Specifications of reception tank for contaminated DW
Table 7.2 Specification of pumps
Table 7.3 Design specification of the DW purification facility
Table 7.4 Specifications of tank of purified DW
Table 7.5 Specification of pumps
Table 7.6 Required water quality
Table 7.7 Technical specification of the auxiliary deaerator makeup system pump
Table 7.8 Required water quality in the ADMS system
Table 7.9 Service water flow rates to main equipment at t cool = 28 0C
Table 7.10 Specification of the SWS pump
Table 7.11 The nominal SWS operating parameters
Table 7.12 IC-1 conditions
Table 7.13 Technical specification of heat exchangers of IC-1 and IC-2
Table 7.14 Technical specification of pumps of IC-1 and IC-2
Table 7.16 Main components connected to intermediate circuit IC-2
Table 7.17 Water quality in IC-1, IC-2
Table 7.18 Special venting system structure
Table 8.1 List of loads according to steps
Table 8.2 The characteristics of diesel generator of ASD-5600 type
Table 8.3 Main characteristics of rectifier of TPPS-800 type
Table 8.4 Main characteristics of inverter PTS-200 type
Table 8.5 Main characteristics of switching device TKEP-100 type
Table 8.6 Main characteristics of disconnecting device TKEO type
Table 9.1 Fast-acting steam discharge valve to deaerators
Table 9.2 Main Technical characteristics of turbine K-750-65/3000
Table 9.3 Technical specification of steam - separator reheater SPP-750
Table 9.4 Technical specification of turbine condenser K-16560
Table 9.5 Technical specification of main turbine ejector of EPO-3-220 type
Table 9.6 Main characteristics of turbine generator TVV-800-2UZ
Table 11.1 Temperatures of failure by cladding collapse at P=7 MPa
Table 11.2 Temperature of failure by cladding ballooning
Table 11.3 Meteorological parameters
Table 13.1 EBRD funded safety improvement projects at Ignalina NPP
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AC Automatic Control
ACR Automatic Control Rod
ACS Accident Confinement System
ADMS Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup System
AFWP Auxiliary Feed Water Pump
ATWS Anticipated Transients Without Scram
AZ-1 - AZ-6 Emergency Protection “AZ-1” - “AZ-6”
BS Baltic System
BSRC Bottom Steam Reception Chamber
BWCC Bottom Water Communication Compartments
BWPC Bottom Water Pipes Compartments
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CANDU Heavy Water Reactor with Pressure Tubes
CKBM Central Design Office of Mechanical Engineering
CNIITMASH Central Research Institute of Mechanical Engineering
CPS Control Protection System
CRCC Control Rod Cooling Circuit
CTCS Condenser Tray Cooling System
CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System
DAZ Supplementary Emergency Protection
DB-LOCA Design Basis LOCA
DBA Design Basis Accident
DC Direct Auxiliary Feed Water
DG Diesel-Generator
DS Drum Separator
DSA Permissible Contents of Radionuclide in Sensitive Organ
EBRD European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
EHCS Electric Hydraulic Control System
EPPS Emergency Process Protection System
FAS Fast Acting Scram
FASR Fast Acting Scram Rod
FASS Fast Acting Scram System
FC Fission Chamber
FCIM Fuel Claddings Integrity Monitoring
FSAR Format on Safety Analysis Report
GDH Group Distribution Header
HCC Hot Condensate Chamber
HCS Hydraulic Control System
HE Heat Exchanger
HPC High Pressure Cylinder
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IC Intermediate Circuits
ICS Information Computing System
ISAG Ignalina Safety Analysis Group
ISI In-Service Inspection
ISP Ignalina Safety Panel
KOM Emergency Protection With Special Key “KOM”
LAC Local Automatic Control
LACR Local Automatic Control Rod
LAP Local Automatic Protection
LEI Lithuanian Energy Institute
LEP Local Emergency Protection
LOCA Loss Of Coolant Accident
LPC Low Pressure Cylinder
LPR Low Pressure Reheater
LSR Local Scram Rod
MCC Main Circulation Circuit
MCP Main Circulation Pump
MCR Manual Control Rod
MFWP Main Feed Water Pump
MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve
MSK-64 Seismic Stability Scale
MSV Main Safety Valve
NAL Normal Affluent Level
NIKIET Russian Acronym for RDIPE
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NSA Nuclear Safety Account
PIE Postulated Initiating Events
PCS Purification and Cooling System
PDDMS Power Density Distribution Monitoring System
PDMS-A Power Density Monitoring Sensor - Axial
PDMS-R1 Power Density Monitoring Sensor - Radial (with hafnium oxide emitter)
PDMS-R2 Power Density Monitoring Sensor - Radial (with silver emitter)
PROMETEI Institute of Material Research
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment
QA Quality Assurance
RBMK Russian Acronym for ”Channelized Large Power Reactor”
RC Reactor Cavity
RCIM Reactor Channel Integrity Monitoring
RDIPE Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering
RLC Reinforced Leaktight Compartment
RRCC Radial Reflector Cooling Channels
RSR Review Safety Report
SA Supplementary Absorber
SACR Shorted Automatic Control Rod
SAR Safety Analysis Report, Shorted Absorber Rod
SDV-A Steam Discharge Valve to ACS Pool
SDV-C Steam Discharge Valve to Turbine Condenser
SDV-D Steam Discharge Valve to Deaerator
SFA Single Failure Analysis
SGAM Steam-Gas-Air Mixture
SIP Safety Improvement Project
SWP Service Water Pumps
SWS Service Water System
TIRV Turbine Isolation and Regulating Valve
VATESI Lithuanian State Atomic Energy Safety Inspection
VNIIAES Research and Development Institute for Nuclear Power Plants
VNIPIET Russian Acronym for “Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology”
VVER Russian Acronym for Soviet Design PWR
WPOPE Working Place for Operator Process Engineer
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The compilation of design and operational data for a nuclear power plant built by the highly
centralized Soviet Union turned out to be a sizable undertaking. It would not have been
possible without the cooperation and help a large number of people. We would like to
acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered in collecting the data by Dr. B. ¸esna. At the
plant valuable advise was offered by Director V. Shevaldin and Production Manager
G. Negrivoda, help was provided by Mr. A. Dvorecky, Mr. G. Zheltobriuch and his staff,
especially by B. Dizik. Safety related data was provided by Dr. P. VaiÖnys and Mr. A. Aleev
of the Lithuanian Safety Inspectorate (VATESI). The work on the initial source book was
supported by the director of the Lithuanian Energy Institute Prof. Dr. J. Vilemas and was
encouraged by Prof. Dr. L. Ašmantas former minister of the Lithuanian Energy Ministry.
Their support has been significant and is greatly appreciated.
Special thanks are due to Mr. V.Kulikauskas for the initial translation, to Dr. A. Marchertas
for editorial effort and to the U.S. Department of Energy for providing assistance which
made it possible to prepare the English language edition. The authors gratefully
acknowledge support provided by the United States Agency for International Development
and by the United States Department of Energy.
The revised version owes additional special thanks to Dr. R. Pabarqius, ISAG, whose
assistance in preparing this publication is significant and is deeply appreciated. At the
plant, valuable advice was provided by Mr. G. Zheltobriuch, Head of Engineering
Assessment Department and his staff, especially by Mr. A. Merezhnikov. The
preparation and publication of the revised edition is supported by the U.S. Department of
Energy, administrative services are provided by the Pacific Northwest Batelle Laboratories,
personal administrative responsibility was exercized by Mr. G. Smith. Their support and
efforts are gratefully acknowledged.
INTRODUCTION FOR THE EXTENDED
AND UPDATED VERSION
The first edition of the "Ignalina RBMK-1500. A Source Book" was issued in 1994. It has
received a broad distribution worldwide and has been recognized as one of the most
definitive data source available on the RBMK-1500 power plant.
There are several reasons why an updated version of this publication has been prepared. The
most important one is that the safety improvement process at the Ignalina Nuclear Power
Plant is both active and ongoing. The first significant Safety Improvement Program was
defined in 1993 and has implemented. It led to the signing of a Grant Agreement in 1994
between the Lithuanian Government, the Ignalina NPP and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development on behalf of the Nuclear Safety Account. A Safety
Improvement Program sponsored by NSA are not only safety upgrading projects at Ignalina
NPP. In addition several bilateral safety enhancement projects with USA, Sweden, Finland
and other Western countries completed or underway. These projects have led to
implementation of hardware and modification of operating procedures.
The second reason for updating the “Source Book” is that several extensive projects were
initiated and completed which analyzed safety issues of the Ignalina NPP and considerably
expanded the available information in this area. An In-Depth Safety Assessment of the
Ignalina NPP sponsored by EBRD has been completed and a Western-type plant-specific
Safety Analysis Report was produced in 1996. The results of the fourth phase of the
Barselina project - a probabilistic study of the Ignalina NPP - is also available. A thermal-
hydraulic evaluation of the RBMK-1500 Accident Confinement System has been performed
in 1995-96. This study was performed using state-of-the-art codes RELAP5 and CONTAIN
and includes analyses not only short-term, but also the long-term (up to 24 hours)
aspects of LOCA transients for primary system and the ACS.
On the base of the recommendation of the In-Depth Safety Assessment project a new Safety
Improvement Program of Ignalina NPP (SIP-2) has been prepared and was approved by the
Lithuanian authorities in April, 1997. The SIP-2 program includes a safety upgrades which
should be implemented at the plant by 2000.
Finally, this version of the "Ignalina RBMK-1500. A Source Book" is not only updated but
also considerably extended. In addition to the systems described in the first version, it
includes a description of such systems as the Reactor Cavity Overpressure Protection
System, Fuel Cladding Integrity Monitoring System, Emergency Power Protection System,
Electric Power System, Steam and Power Conversion System, Service Water System,
Intermediate Circuits System as well as other auxiliary systems. Results of the In-Depth
Safety Assessment of the Ignalina NPP, especially results of system analysis and accident
analyses, as well as Barselina project are discussed in Sections 10 and 11. Safety
management and plant operation are described in Section 12. Section 13 discusses safety
improvements performed at the Ignalina plant after the Chernobyl accident and during
implementation of the first Safety Improvement Program as well as the new Safety
Improvement Program.
1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Ignalina NPP is a product of the former Soviet went into service at the end of 1983, the second unit in
Union. This fact is relevant in understanding some of its August, 1987. Their design lifetime is projected out to
design and operational characteristics, it also explains 2010 - 2015. A total of four units were originally planned
why a number of safety studies which should have been on this site. Construction of the third unit was terminated
conducted during plant design, have been carried out only in 1989 because of political pressure.
recently. This up-dated source book provides a systematic
over view of the design data, summarises results from the Because of their online re-fuelling capability RBMK -
completed safety studies and provides a description of type reactors were not exported, and were built exclusively
completed and planned modifications. in the territory of the former Soviet Union. There are
presently plants at Saint Petersburg (Sosnovy Bor), Kursk,
The Ignalina NPP contains two RBMK-1500 reactors. Chernobyl and Smolensk (Table 1.1). A total of 17 such
This is the most advanced version of the RBMK reactor reactors have been built and 15 are currently in operation.
design series (actually the only two of this type that were
built). "RBMK" is a Russian acronym for "Channelized Lithuania declared its independence in March of 1990,
Large Power Reactor". Compared to the Chernobyl NPP, but the Ignalina NPP was guarded by Soviet troops and
the Ignalina NPP is more powerful (1500 MW versus KGB operatives and remained factually in the jurisdiction
1000 MW), and is provided with an improved ACS of the Soviet Union until August, 1991. Supervision was
(Accident Confinement System). In most other respects, carried out by that country's regulatory authority, the State
the plants are quite similar to their predecessors. They Atomic Supervision. After the political events of August,
have two cooling loops, a direct cycle, fuel clusters are 1991 (the formal collapse of the Soviet Union), Ignalina
loaded into individual channels rather than a single NPP finally came under the authority of the Lithuanian
pressure vessel, the neutron spectrum is thermalized by a Republic. It is now controlled administratively by the
massive graphite moderator block. The plant can be Lithuanian Ministry of Energy. Regulatory control is
refueled on line and uses slightly enriched nuclear fuel. exercised by the Lithuanian State Atomic Energy Safety
Inspection (VATESI). Most of the former technical,
The power plants were built not to meet Lithuania's operation and administrative personnel of the plant have
needs, but as part of the Soviet Union's North - West retained their jobs.
Unified Power System. The first unit of Ignalina NPP
Table 1.1 Specific status of the RBMK plants [1]
Generation * Status Number of Number of

CPS Channels Fuel Channels
Ignalina 1 2 operational 211 1661

Ignalina 2 2 operational 211 1661
Chernobyl 1 1 operational 179 1693
Chernobyl 2 1 shut down 179 1693
Chernobyl 3 2 operational 211 1661
Chernobyl 4 2 shut down 211 1661
Kursk 1 1 operational 179 1693
Kursk 5 3 under construction 223 -
St. Petersburg 1 1 operational 191 1693
St. Petersburg 2 1 operational 179 (191) 693
Smolensk 1 2 operational 211 1661
* The term "Generation" pertains to the initial design or an updated version of the initial design
17
1.1 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION common building D1 and D2 with control rooms, electric
instrumentation rooms and deaerator rooms. The last
1.1.1 Location of Plant building is adjacent to a common turbine hall. The main
buildings of the plant are situated about 400-500 m from
The Ignalina NPP is located in the north-eastern part of the banks of lake DrkÖiai.
Lithuania, near the borders of Latvia and Belarus. More
details on the location of the Ignalina NPP are provided in Both units have the following common facilities: low-
Section 2.1. activity waste storage, medium - and high-activity waste
storage, liquid - waste storage, an open distributive
1.1.2 Plant Panorama system, nitrogen and oxygen manufacturing facility and
other auxiliary systems. The building which houses the
The general Ignalina NPP panorama is shown in Fig. 1.1. 12 diesel- generators (six diesel- generators per each unit)
The site of the nuclear power plant covers an area of about for emergency power supply is physically separated from
0.75 km2. (In comparison: the Swedish Barsebeck nuclear other buildings. A separate water-pump service station is
power plant with two BWR reactors covers an area of also built for each unit, serving the needs of uninterrupted
about 0.24 km2). The buildings take up about 0.22 km2. supply of water.
The Ignalina NPP possesses two similar units of RBMK- A panorama of the auxiliary services for the Ignalina NPP
1500 reactors, as shown in Fig. 1.2. Each unit consists of is shown in Fig. 1.3. The general area of the Ignalina
five construction buildings; namely, buildings designated NPP, the city of Visaginas, the construction organisations
as A, B, V, G and D. There are also two separate reactor and the auxiliary services encompass an area of about
buildings A1 and A2 adjacent to a 26 km2.
Fig. 1.1 General panorama of the Ignalina NPP [2]

1,2 - service water pump stations, 3 - acetylene bottle depot, 4 - oil depot, 5 - oil system equipment room, 6
- transformers equipment tower, 7 - pump station for waste and liquid sewerage discharge, 8 - hydrogen- and oxygen-
receiving facility, low-activity waste storage, 9 - low-level radwaste repository, 10 - medium- and high-activity waste
storage, 11 - operational shower- water reservoir, 12 - drainage water tank, 13 - venting stack of the radwaste
reprocessing building, 14 - bitumen storage, 15 - liquid waste storage, 16 - chemical water treatment building, 17
- primary grade water tanks, 18,19 - recreational facilities, 20,21 - gas purification systems, 22 - heat power station ,
23,24 - building plant units 1 and 2, respectively, 25,26 - pressurised tank (accumulator) of the ECCS, 27,28 - purified
deminiralized water tanks, 29 - car-washing facility, 30 -bitumen depot, 31 - special laundry, 32 - chemical reagent
depot, 33 - equipment storehouse, 34 - noble-gas reservoir depot, 35 - reservoir facility with artificial evaporation, 36 -
repair building, 37,38 - administrative buildings, 39 - cafeteria, 40 - diesel - generator building, 41 - compressor and
refrigeration station, 42 - nitrogen and oxygen manufacture building, 43 - liquid nitrogen reservoir, 44 - 110/330 kV open
distributive system.
18
G1 G2
D0 D1 D2
V1 B1 V2 B2
A2
A1
Fig. 1.2 General units arrangements [2]

A1,A2 - reactor buildings, B1,B2 - demineralized water treatment facilities of the MCC, V1,V2 - reactor gas circuit and
special venting system, G1,G2 - turbine generators with auxiliary systems, feed facilities and heat supply facilities, D1,D2
- control, electrical and deaerator rooms, D0 -heat pipe service and fire fighting facilities
Fig. 1.3 Panorama of auxiliary services [2]

1 - NPP site, 2 - open distributive system, 3 - construction base, 4 - purification constructions, 5 - artisan well site, 6 -supply
base, 7 - motor transport department, 8 - car service station, 9 - industrial construction base, 10 - construction base, 11 -
military base, 12 - health clinic, 13 - city of Visaginas, 14 - railway station, 15 - the city transformer, 16 -the NPP
transformer, 17 - recreational area
19
1.1.3 Plant Layout system are located in building V. The building area for
the special water treatment has dimensions of 66m x 36m,
The structure and layout of the main buildings of the and the building for the reactor gas circuit measures 66
Ignalina NPP are subordinate to the peculiarity of the m x 25 m. Both of these buildings have a height of about
requirements of the RBMK-1500 reactor operation. Fig. 31 m.
1.4 shows the top view of the buildings of unit 2, which
indicates sections A-A and B-B through the building and Building D contains the main control room, the electrical
are displayed in Figs. 1.5 and 1.6, respectively. instrumentation and deaerator rooms. The main control
room, the batteries and the 6 kV switchyard are situated
Building A contains an RBMK-1500 reactor with a Main on the first floor and the deaerator room is situated on the
Forced Circulation Circuit (MCC), and the following second floor of this building. This common building for
main auxiliary systems of the reactor: Emergency Core both units has an area of 600 m x 25.5 m and a height of
Cooling System (ECCS), Accident Confinement System about 44 m.
(ACS) and Control and Protection System (CPS). The
hall above the reactor is a large open workspace housing Building G houses the turbine generators with auxiliary
the refueling machine. The spent-fuel storage pond is systems, the feed and heat supply facilities. The turbines
situated in an adjacent hall, but separated from the reactor are positioned parallel to the reactor. The turbine hall is
hall. The reactor compartment consists of a rectilinear common to both units and consequently, houses the four
structure, the horizontal cross-section of which is 90 m x 750 MW turbine generators on the second floor. The first
90 m and a height of about 53 m. floor of the turbine hall contains condensers, separator-
reheaters, evaporators, condensate pumps and
Building B contains demineralized water treatment components for heat extraction to the district-heating
facilities. The reactor gas circuit and the special venting system. The entire building measures 600 m x 51 m and
is about 28 m high.
Fig. 1.4 Plan of the Ignalina NPP main buildings [2]

1 - reactor, 2 - pressure and suction headers, 3 - main circulation pumps, 4 - accident confinement system, 5 - spent fuel
compartment, 6 - deaerators, 7 - turbine generators, 8 - condensate cleaning filters, 9 - first stage condensate pumps, 10
- separator - reheater
20
Fig. 1.5 Cross-section A-A of one unit of the Ignalina NPP [2]
1 - reactor, 2 - refueling machine, 3 - main circulation pump, 4 - separator drum, 5 - MCP pipelines
Fig. 1.6 Cross-section B-B of one unit of the Ignalina NPP [2]
1 - reactor, 2 - refueling machine, 3 - turbine, 4 - condenser, 5 - separator - reheater, 6 - evaporator, 7 - first stage of the
condensate pump, 8- deaerator
21
1.1.4 Power Plant Parameters use graphite to moderate (slow down) the fast fission
neutrons. This requires a large amount of graphite, so that
The Ignalina NPP belongs the category of "boiling water" the graphite stack of the reactor becomes its dominant
reactors, a simplified thermal diagram of which is component, at least by volume.
provided in Fig. 1.7. As it passes through the reactor core
the cooling water is brought to boiling and is partially The nuclear fuel assemblies of the Ignalina NPP are
evaporated. The steam - water mixture then continues to changed without shutting down the reactor. This is
the large separator drums (3), the elevation of which is possible only for a channel type reactors. Since there are
above the reactor. Here the water settles, while the steam many channels, it is possible to disconnect one of them at
proceeds to the turbines (4). The steam which remains a time from the reactor cooling system, change the fuel
uncondensed beyond the turbines is condensed in the assembly, and then reconnect the channel.
condenser (6), and the condensate is returned via the
deaerator (8) by the feed pump (9) to the water of the Further similarities and differences in comparison with
same separator drum (3). The coolant mixture is returned other types of generating stations are described in
by the main circulation pumps (10) to the core, where part subsequent sections of this document. Table 1.2 presents
of it is again converted to steam. several of the more important plant parameters [2].
This fundamental heat cycle is identical to the Boiling When analysing emergency conditions and
Water Reactor (BWR) cycle extensively used throughout establishing safety measures, the RBMK-1500 design
the world, and is analogous to the cycle of thermal is based on the following safety criteria [4]:
generating stations. However, compared to BWRs used in
Western power plants, the Ignalina NPP and other plants • with the reactor at nominal power, breaking of the
with the RBMK-type reactors have a number of unique maximum diameter pipe with discharge of coolant
features. The most important features are discussed in the from both ends is considered to be the Design
subsequent sections. Basis Accident (DBA),
• first design limit of fuel-element failure under
The Ignalina NPP uses an RBMK - type channelized normal operating condition:
reactor [3]. This means that each nuclear fuel assembly ∗ 1% of fuel elements with gas leakage-type
bank in this type of an RBMK - type reactor is located in a defects,
separately cooled fuel channel (pressure tube). There are a ∗ 0.1% of fuel elements having defects resulting in
total of 1661 of such channels and the cooling water must direct contact between coolant and fuel,
be equally divided among that number of feeder pipes. • second design limit on fuel failure:
Past the core, these pipes are brought together to feed the ∗ fuel cladding temperature less than 1200oC,
steam- water mixture to the above - mentioned separator ∗ local depth of fuel cladding oxidation less than
drums. 18% of initial clad thickness,
∗ fraction of zirconium oxidation less than 1% of
The RBMK reactors belong to the thermal neutron reactor fuel cladding weight in one group distribution
category. Due to the large number of metal piping in the header channels (about 40 of such channels).
core of this type of a reactor, the neutronic characteristics
of the reactor are degraded. To improve the neutronic 1.2 COMPARISON WITH OTHER FACILITIES
characteristics, the reactors of Ignalina NPP
A comparison of RBMK and BWR reactor parameters is
presented in Table 1.3. It is worth noting that these
reactor types [2] are quite similar in power per fuel
quantity or fuel rod length, but large differences appear
when comparing reactor power per core volume. The
power of the RBMK reactor is somewhat less in that
respect, and its heat capacity is correspondingly larger.
These parameters have a certain impact on the operation
of the reactor during an emergency.
1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS

AND CONTRACTORS
The Ignalina NPP belongs to the RBMK-type of reactors

Fig. 1.7 Heat cycle diagram as designed and constructed by the former USSR's
1 - reactor, 2 - fuel assembly, 3 - separator drum, 4 - Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry. A schematic
turbine, 5 - generator, 6 - condenser, 7 - condensate dependence of various institutes responsible for the design
pump, 8 - deaerator, 9 - feedwater pump, 10 - main and construction of the Ignalina NPP is provided in Fig.
circulating pump 1.8.
22
Table 1.2 Fundamental parameters of the RBMK-1500 reactor [38,36,62]
Coolant water (steam-water mixture)

Heat cycle configuration single circuit
Power, MW:
thermal (design) 4800
thermal (actual) 4200
electrical (design) 1500
Core dimensions, m:
height 7
diameter 11.8
Thickness of reactor's graphite reflector, m:
end 0.5
side 0.88
Lattice pitch, m 0.25 x 0.25
Number of channels:
fuel 1661
control and shutdown system 235
reflector-cooling 156
Fuel uranium dioxide
Initial fuel enrichment for 235U, % 2.0 *
Nuclear fuel burnup, MWdays/kg 21.6**
Number of main circulation pumps 8
Capacity of main circulation pumps, m3/s (m3/h) 1.805 - 2.22 (6500 - 8000)
Temperatures, oC:
maximum acceptable temperature at center of fuel pellet 2600
maximum acceptable graphite stack temperature 760
maximum acceptable fuel cladding temperature 700
maximum acceptable fuel channel temperature 650
coolant temperature at fuel channel inlet *** 260 - 266
feedwater temperature *** 177 - 190
Pressures, MPa (kgf/cm2):
at separator drum 6.86 (70)
at pressure header 8.5 (86.6)
Coolant flow rate through reactor, m3/s (m3/h)*** 10.83 - 13.33 (39000 - 48000)
Steam produced in reactor, kg/s (t/h)*** 2056 - 2125 (7400 - 7650)
Void fraction at reactor outlet, % 23 - 29
Maximum fuel channel parameters:
fuel channel power, kW 4250
coolant flow rate through fuel channel, m3/s (m3/h) 0.0111 (40)
void fraction at fuel channel outlet, % 36.1
* Now the fuel is being changed to 2.4 % enrichment fuel with erbium.
** At fuel enrichment for 235U 2%.
*** At 4200 MW (th).
Table 1.3 Comparison of BWR and RBMK-1500 reactor parameters [3]
Parameter BWR* RBMK
Thermal power, MW 3800 4800

Core diameter, m 5.01 11.80
Core height, m 3.81 7.0
Core volume, m3 75 824
Mean specific power per core volume, MW/m3 51 5.82
Mean specific power per fuel quantity, MW/t 24.6 25.4
Mean power per fuel element length, kW/m 19.0 15.0
* General electric design
23
USSR's Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry
Ignalina NPP Project

Development
Research and Research and
Nuclear Development Development
Regulatory Institute for Energy Institute for
Authority Technology Nuclear Power Plants
General Architect
NPP
Operation Institute
Research and
Atomic Energy
Development
Desi gn
Institute of Power
Organization
Engineering
General Designer of General Designer of

Nuclear Steam Supply Thermal Scheme
Fig. 1.8 Scope of responsibility for the Ignalina NPP project

The development of the Ignalina NPP project was carried Analysis Report was issued. The results of this study are
out by the Research and Development Institute for Energy discussed in Sections 10 and 11.
Technology (Russian abbreviation - VNIPIET), St.
Petersburg, (at that time Leningrad) Russia. This institute 1.4 OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
originated the design of the reactor internals and other THE IGNALINA NPP
radiation-related structural components. The development
of the Accident Confinement System was carried out by The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is a state owned
the Sverdlovsk branch, Ekaterinenburg, Russia, of the enterprise (a utility) founded by the Lithuanian
above mentioned institute. Metal structures of the main Ministry of Economy. A schematic outline of the
building were designed by the Main Design Office administrative and overview organizations responsible
"Leningrad Steel Design" (translation the Russian - for the Ignalina NPP is shown in Fig. 1.9. The
"Leningradstalkonstrukcija"), St. Petersburg, Russia. The Ministry of Economy is the owner of the plant and has
turbine hall, the open distributive system and the auxiliary the responsibility for:
facilities were developed by the Atomic Energy Design
Organisation (Russian abbreviation - • assignment of electricity generation goals,
"Atomenergoproekt"), Kiev, Ukraine. • determination of prices for the output,
• assignment of administrative positions which are
It was intended, that the Ignalina NPP would be the pilot filled subject to appointments made by the owner.
nuclear power plant for the RBMK-1500 reactor type.
The scientific supervisor of the RBMK-1500 project was As the owner, The Ministry of Economy is responsible
the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute (often referred to for a broad scale of activities, in addition to nuclear
as the Russian Research Center "Kurchatov Institute"), safety. These include economical issues such as tariffs,
Moscow, Russia. The principal designer of the nuclear pricing system, organization, and financial audits. The
steam supply system was the Research and Development Ignalina NPP is a corporate entity and has the
Institute of Power Engineering (Russian abbreviation - ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of the
NIKIET), Moscow, Russia. These two institutes prepared plant and development and implementation of a
and in 1987 published the Technical Safety Report of the quality assurance program. The plant is required to
RBMK-1500 reactor. In 1988 the mentioned institutes, submit the following documents to the Ministry of
together with the Research and Development Institute for Economy:
Energy Technology, prepared the Technical Safety Report • annual report on plant safety,
of the Ignalina NPP. Last safety report comes closer to the • report on abnormal operation events,
Western standard in comparison with the Technical • reports on faults and defects in equipment of safety
Safety Report of the RBMK-1500 reactor. Unfortunately, related systems (twice a year),
the Technical Safety Report of the Ignalina NPP was not • monthly and annual reports on environmental
officially approved. In 1996 in-depth safety assessment of impact (releases and discharges),
the Ignalina NPP was completed and Western style Safety • annual reports on radioactive wastes and harmful
chemical materials present on site.
24
Enviromental
Ministry of Economy VATESI
Protection Ministry
Governmental
Commission Operating Utility
Defence Ministry
for Emergency INPP
Situations
Labour and Welfare Ministry of Internal

Health Ministry
Ministry Affairs
Fig. 1.9 Relationship of the Ignalina NPP with the authorities of the Republic of Lithuania
In addition, the Ministry of Economy regularly VATESI regulates plant operation by an annual
receives information from the radiation survey system operating permit that is issued following submittal of
which maintains 4 monitoring locations in the vicinity specified documents by the Ignalina NPP. However, in
of the site. The owner checks financial activities of the accordance with and agreement with EBRD a License
plant by way of audits. Annual audits are mandatory. for continue operation of unit 1 should be issued in
1998.
State regulation in the area of nuclear and radiation
safety is exercised in Lithuania by the Lithuanian With respect to safe operation of the plant the role of
Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI). VATESI includes inspection, surveillance, review,
VATESI is vested with executive authority by the oversight, and in the case of some activities, issuance
Republic of Lithuania, and the Head of VATESI is of permits. VATESI has free access to all required
appointed by the Prime Minister. Although VATESI documents and information and the plant generally
reports to both the Lithuanian government and the gives assistance to VATESI in the performance of its
Ministry of Economy, it is not subordinated to the function. VATESI maintains a group of inspectors at
Ministry of Economy in matters of nuclear safety. the plant site. The group includes four inspectors and
VATESI would have direct recourse to the highest is headed by the State Inspector who reports to the
levels of government, if required to address safety Head of VATESI. Issues which can be handled by the
issues. The main functions of VATESI as: on-site inspection group are usually addressed by plant
management to this group. Despite these contacts at
• setting up principles and criteria for safe use of
lower levels of the plant organization, the formal
nuclear energy,
interface with the Regulator is by the Director General
• development, approval and enforcement of safety
or technical director.
standards in nuclear energy,
• licensing of the operating organization, To perform functions ascribed to them, inspectors of
• safety review and assessment for operating nuclear the supervisory group visit the plant every day and are
power plants, given access to operational documentation both in the
• annual report to the Lithuanian Government and main control room and other locations where work is
Ministry of Economy on the safety of nuclear carried out. It is customary for one VATESI inspector
installations, to attend routine meetings held every day to discuss
• inspection and review for adherence to national various operational and maintenance issues. The
standards on the safety of nuclear power. inspector can take part in the discussions held at these
meetings.
At the close of 1997 the Ignalina NPP did not have a
formal Operating License. In those conditions
25
A detailed list of significant events is maintained at • sets health requirements for radiation protection,
the plant which is used by plant personnel as the basis • defines time and requirements for medical
for reporting events to VATESI inspection. examination of people working with radiation
Emergency messages are conveyed by telephone. The sources and supervises their performance.
plant shift supervisor is responsible for reporting
abnormal events to the inspection group. Information The Ignalina NPP is required to submit to the Ministry
about abnormal operation events is reported to the of Health annual and quarterly reports on personnel
head of VATESI by the Director General and the exposure, reports on the cases for which the maximum
technical director. In addition, official information is permissible levels of radiation exposure were exceeded
passed to VATESI, the Ministry of Economy, mass and occupational diseases. The technical inspection
media and other interested organizations by facsimile service of the Ministry of Health performs surveillance
lines. The plant submits the following reports to of potentially dangerous equipment (cranes, pipelines,
VATESI: vessels) except for those subject to inspection by
VATESI.
• annual report on Ignalina safety,
• reports on abnormal events in plant operation, State labour inspection in the Ministry of Labour and
• reports on faults and defects in equipment of safety Welfare checks adherence to labour protection
related systems (twice a year), requirements set in laws regulating labour relations
• monthly and annual reports on environmental and other regulations. Ignalina NPP is expected to
impact (releases and discharges), report to the State Labour Inspection all cases of
• annual reports on radiation exposure of plant industrial accidents and send annual reports on
personnel, industrial safety.
• annual and quarterly reports on radiation exposure
of plant personnel, reports on the cases of The Interface of the Ignalina NPP with the Ministry of
exceeding maximum permissible radiation levels Internal Affairs is based on the Lithuanian Temporary
and occupational diseases. Law of Internal Service. The Visaginas Township and
the Ignalina NPP Militarized Fire Protection
Ignalina NPP relations with the Ministry of Department is responsible for operational fire fighting
Environment are defined by the Lithuanian Law on and rescue service at INPP. This department is a
Environmental Protection. In accordance with this structural sub-unit within the Fire Protection
law, the Ministry of Environment: Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and
consists of three fire brigades located outside the plant.
• defines, together with VATESI, procedures for As a contracted service to INPP this department also
receiving and shipping nuclear and radioactive provides a fire inspection team, located at the plant.
wastes, their transportation, use and disposal, The main functions of the team are:
• sets maximum permissible levels for radioactive
releases in the environment, • supervision of activities bearing the risk of fire,
• sets radiation safety standards, • fire prevention and provision of technical and
• gives authorizations for the use of natural administrative measures for fire fighting at the
resources, etc. Ignalina NPP,
• supervision of the state of automatic fire fighting
Ignalina NPP is expected to submit the following systems,
reports to the Ministry of Environment: • supervision of the execution of remedial measures
aimed at fire protection enhancement and analysis
• monthly and annual reports on environmental of the cases of fire.
impact (releases and discharges),
• monthly and annual reports on radwastes and The fire inspection function at INPP is arranged as a
harmful chemical materials present on site, 24-hour job performed by a team of 13 inspectors who
• reports on the cases of exceeding maximum conduct their activities based on relevant instructions
permissible environmental releases. and Fire Safety Rules for INPP. The fire inspection
team interfaces with the Safety and Quality Assurance
In addition, The Ministry of Environment regularly Department within the plant organization. In the event
receives data from the radiation monitoring of a fire at the plant the plant shift supervisor is in
instruments in the vicinity of the plant. charge of operation until the officer of the First
Brigade arrives at the plant. Ignalina NPP must also
The Ministry of Health: report to the fire protection team on cases of violations
of fire safety.
• develops and approves standards and rules for
looking after the health of people working at The Defence Ministry, in cooperation with the INPP
nuclear sites, and other local and national authorities, develops
26
plans for public protection in case of an accident at • informs interested organizations, mass media,
INPP. Together with VATESI and other state general public on accident mitigation measures and
authorities the Ministry organizes exercises for coping the risk of ionizing radiation.
with nuclear accidents.
The responsibility for the emergency plan for the
According to the National Law on Civil Defence, Republic of Lithuania, which is currently being
Department of Civil Defence performs the following prepared, rests with the Department of Civil Defence.
activities: According to the “Plan of Personnel Protection in Case
of an Accident at INPP”, the Ignalina NPP must notify
• organizes accident mitigation activities for INPP, the Department of Civil Defence and other state
• coordinates activities of all institutions involved in authorities on the accident and measures taken to cope
accident mitigation at Ignalina, with them. The Director is responsible for a timely
• periodically reports to the President, Seimas notification of the accident.
(Parliament) and Government on the progress in
accident mitigation,
• implements Governmental decisions and
instructions related to the accident,
• organizes public evacuation from the affected area,
27
2. SITE CHARACTERISTICS
2.1 GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY Visaginas is part of the Ignalina district. The construction
of the nuclear power plant has made a big impact on the
The Ignalina nuclear power plant is located in Lithuania, demography in this district. In 1979 the total population
close to the borders of Belorus and Latvia, as shown in of the Ignalina district was 37,800, then in 1989 it rose to
Fig. 2.1. The plant is built on the southern shores of lake 59,700, while the population in the country-side decreased
'UNÖLDL, 39 km from the town of Ignalina. Nearest cities from 21,600 to 18,200 [5].
to the plant are Vilnius at a distance of 130 km with over
600,000 inhabitants, and Daugavpils in Latvia 30 km In 1979 the natural population increase rate was 4.8
away with 126,000 inhabitants. Six kilometers from the people per 1000 (the birth and the death rate were 16.1
plant is the city of Visaginas, about 33,200 inhabitants, and 11.3 per 1000, respectively) and in 1989 it was 3.8
residence of the Ignalina nuclear power plant personnel. people per 1000 (the birth and death rate was 13.5 and
9.7 per 1000, respectively) [6]. The main cause of the
In the vicinity of the Ignalina NPP are the following lakes increase of population in the Ignalina district was
and rivers: migration to Visaginas. This also led to a significant shift
• lake Visaginas, in the nationality of the population of the Ignalina district.
• lake 'UNÖLDL, In 1979 the percentage of Russians and Russian speakers
• lake Apyvards, located 8 km and lake Alksnas, 13 km was about 26 % in 1989 it had increased to about 53 %.
to the south from the Ignalina NPP, This immigration was concentrated in the city of
• river Daugava passes 30 km to the north of the Visaginas which consisted of about 92 % Russians and
Ignalina NPP. Russian speakers.
/$79,$
.LORPHWUHV
0$Ù(,.,$,
Õ,$8/,$, '$8*$93,/6
3$1(9(Ù<6
./$,3·'$ =$5$6$,
87(1$ ,*1$/,1$
/,7+8$1,$ 133
,*1$/,1$
.$81$6
9 ,/1,8 6
),1/$1'
%(/$586
125:$<
6:('(1 (6721,$
5866,$
'$10$5. /$79,$
%DOWLF 8 1XFOHDU 3RZHU 3ODQW
6HD /,7+8$1,$
%(/$586
32/$1'
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8.5$,1(
Fig.2.1 Location of the Ignalina NPP
28
2.2 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 2.4 METEOROLOGY
The population distribution in the region of concern on The Ignalina NPP is situated in the temperate climate
the basis of location is presented in Table 2.1. zone. The region concerned, as well as all Lithuanian
territory, is located along the path dominated by western
The total population within a 30 km radius excluding the wind currents, therefore in the global sense its climate can
population of Daugavpils is about 85,000. Within a 15 km be considered as homogeneous. However, on the regional
radius the population density is 16.1 people/km2 without scale it is rather variable, because of the prevalent
taking the Visaginas inhabitants into account, and 63.1 intrusion of air flows from the adjacent geographical
people/ km2 including the Visaginas inhabitants. Within zones [8].
the 25 km radius the density of population is 18.7 and
35.6 people/km2, respectively. This does not exceed the The territory of the Lithuanian Republic is divided into
nominal density of population of 56.7 people/km2 in four climatic regions, depending on their proximity to the
Lithuania. Baltic see, the orography of relief and the diversity of the
underlying surface. The territory of concern belongs to the
2.3 NEARBY INDUSTRIAL REGIONS East climatic subarea [9]. In comparison with other
Lithuanian areas, this area is marked by a big variation of
The nearest highway passes 12 km to the west of the air temperature over the year, the colder and longer
Ignalina NPP. This highway joins the city of Ignalina winters with abundant snow cover, and warmer, but
with those of Zarasai, 'NÖWDV and has an exit to the shorter summers.
highway connecting Kaunas - St. Petersburg. The
entrance of the main road from the Ignalina NPP to the On the whole the local climate depends on the circulation
highway is near the town of 'NÖWDV. The extension of the of air mass from the Atlantic, but the influence of air mass
road from Ignalina NPP to 'NÖWDV is about 20 km. from the continents of Europe and Asia continent are
perceptible as well [10].
The main railroad line Vilnius - St. Petersburg passes
nine km to the west of the Ignalina NPP. A single track Wind Regime
extends from Visaginas to 'NÖWDV, the rest of the main
line connecting Vilnius - St. Petersburg is double-track. About 60 cyclones and 50 anticyclones are expected
The weight limit of the train is 3500 tons. The railway yearly due to the weather conditions of the territory
station 'NÖWDV is used for the cargo traffic as well as for concerned. Cyclones are influenced by the weather about
passenger transportation. 170 days and anticyclones about 130 days a year, because
they are moving faster. During the rest of the time baric
An installation for the treatment of sewerage is located formation are observed [8].
one km to the south from the Ignalina NPP. This is a
repository of chlorine, the capacity of which is 16,000kg. The entire territory of Lithuania has practically no
influence on the formation of new air masses or their
As a note, no chemical or oil process industries exist in considerable transformation. During the year about 170
the vicinity of the Ignalina NPP. atmospheric fronts pass over the Ignalina territory.
Table 2.1 Population distribution
Populated area Distance from Ignalina NPP, Direction with respect to Number of inhabitants
km Ignalina NPP
Villages and farmsteads within 15 radius - 11,400
Villages and farmsteads within 25 radius - 30,400
Visaginas 6 west 33,200
Turmantas 12 north-west 0,400
'NÖWDV 17 south-west 1,200
Zarasai 22 north-west 8,900
Daugavpils 30 north 126,000
Ignalina 39 south-west 6,800
Vilnius 130 south-west 600,000
29
During the cold season the warm fronts predominate over Sunshine and Cloudiness
the cold ones, while during the warm seasons they are
distributed equally. Colds fronts move faster than the Average annual duration of sunshine in the region is
warm ones. Western and southern winds predominate. about 1710 hours (42 % of the maximum possible
The strongest winds have western and south - east duration of the earth's surface irradiation by the sun). June
directions. The average annual wind speed is 3.5 m/s, and is the most sunny month: the amount of sunshine in June
maximal (gust) speeds can reach 28 m/s. No-wind is about 280 hours (58 % of the possible duration). The
conditions are observed on the average of 6 % of the time shortest period of sunshine because of cloudy weather is
and last no more than one day (24 hours) in the summer, observed in December, which is about 20 hours (12 %
and no more than two days in the winter [8]. of possible duration) [14].
The predominant wind direction changes depending on Average annual cloudiness in region is about a force 7,
the distance above the ground. Beginning from the 200 m and in December it increase to a force 8.5 and in May it
distance above ground the predominate direction is as decrease to a force 6.5. The average annual amount of
follows: in January from south to south-west, in April cloudy days (175) is considerably larger than the clear
from south-south-east to south-east, in October from west- ones.
north-west to north. Only during July is the predominate
direction west at elevated altitudes. Air Temperature
The wind velocity changes depending on the distance Average annual air temperature in the region is 5.5 oC.
from the ground surface. At a distance of 100 m from the January is the coldest month with an average monthly
ground the average wind velocity doubles in comparison temperature of - 6.5 oC, and June is the warmest one with
with wind velocities at the height of the wind vane. They 17.8 oC. Annual amplitude of average monthly
continue to grow within the half km layer. Then the temperatures is 24.1 degrees. Absolute maximum of
increase of the wind velocity as a function of height recorded temperature is 36 oC, and absolute minimum is -
decrease. On the whole the area atmospheric conditions 40 oC. The greatest oscillations of twenty-four-hour
are favorable for scattering substances from the plant amplitude of temperature are usually in May-June, and
ventilating stacks. the lowest - in December. The lowest temperature is
usually observed in winter during the northern and north-
Hurricanes and Spouts [12,13] east winds. In the summer the hot weather brings about
the east and south-east winds [8].
Spouts in the vicinity of the Ignalina NPP do not exceed
class F-2 according to Fujita classification [11]. The Atmospheric Precipitations and Snow
probability of a class F-2 spout for the plant platform with
one km2 area is one time in more than 61667 years. For a The atmospheric conditions are formed by circulation of
class F-1 spout such a probability is one time per 43023 air mass on the whole. Average annual amount of
years. As a calculated characteristic of a spout for the precipitation with correction for the moistening of the
Ignalina NPP platform with one km2 area is assumed to draught gauge is 638 mm. During the warm period of the
be the characteristic of a class F-0 spout, the probability year (April-October) about 70 % of all precipitation takes
of which is one time per more than 10000 years. place, and during the cold period (November-March) -
about 30 %. The coefficient of variation of multi-year
The season of spouts begins at the end of April and ends annual precipitation is 0.15. Minimum of precipitation
in the first half of September. The directions of spout occurs in March, and the maximum - in July-August.
motion is from south-west to north-east in 73 % of the There are about 170-180 days with precipitation (0.1 m
cases. The average length of spout shift trajectory is and more) per year [8]. The snow cover in the region is
20 km and the length varies from 1 to 50 km. Average about 100-110 days per year. Average height of snow
width of the spouts is 50 m, and it varies mostly from 10 cover is 30-40 cm [8].
to 300 m. Calculated maximal spout velocity with
frequency one time per 10000 years is about 39 m/s. Evaporation and Humidity
Data about the most destructive spouts are incomplete. Multi-year amount of annual evaporation from the dry
However, the following data in normally used for land is about 500 mm, evaporation from the water surface
calculations: during the warm period (April-November) is about 600
mm with the coefficient of variation 0.15 [8].
• maximal rotation speed of the spout wall is 105 m/s,
• pressure differential between center of the funnel and Average relative humidity of air reached 80 %, and about
the fringe region of the spout is 135 kPa. 90 % in winter. A minimum relative humidity (53-63 %)
is observed in June, and a maximum - in January [8].
30
Fog and Oscillation of Atmospheric Pollutants
In the Ignalina NPP area, fog is observed during the entire

year. Average number of foggy days is 45 and a
maximum - 62 days. Fog absorbs different impurity
(noxious gases, smoke, dust) and, combined with high
humidity, increases corrosion intensity, aggravating
visibility and impeding transportation. Average duration
of fog in the course of a month is from 4 to 29 hours
and in the course of year is about 173 hours. During
the cold period total duration of fog oscillates between 92
to 106 hours, and during the warm period it is about twice
lower which is 49-68 hours.
Maximum dust intensity is observed in May, and

minimum-in December. Oscillations of total content of
sulphurous gas has the following annual distribution:
lower values are observed in the summer and autumn, and
highest ones-during the cold period of the year.
Fig. 2.2 Configuration of lake 'UNÖLDL, location of the
Ground Freezing Ignalina NPP and permanent testing stations (1-6)[15]
Total area of the lake, including nine islands, is
The ground usually begins to freeze in the first part of 49.32 km2. The area of the biggest island is 0.23 km2,
December and lasts to the middle of April. Average depth and the areas of other islands are smaller than 0.05 km2.
of the frost line reaches about 50 cm, with a maximum The surface of the islands varies from one to twelve
extending to 110 cm depending on the composition of the meters above the water level. All islands, except one, are
ground and its humidity. located in the south part of the lake.
2.5 HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING The biggest depth of the lake is 33.3 m, and average is 7.6
m, while the predominate depth is 12 m. The channel of
The lake 'UNÖLDL serves as a natural water reservoir and the lake was formed during the movement of the glaciers
supplies the plant with cooling water. Lake 'UNÖLDL is the by two perpendicular runways, which were extended from
biggest lake in Lithuania. The catchment basin of the lake the north to the south and from the west to the east.
is located near the foot of the east slope of the Baltic ridge, Maximum depth of the first runway was 29 m, and
which is bordered by the ÕYHQqLRQ\V upland from the second one - 33.3 m [8]. The largest depths are located in
south and by the Latgal upland from the north. Such a the middle of the lake. The most shallow water is on the
watershed location with predominating north and south south ridge of the lake, the depth of which does not
winds influences its hydrologic regime [10]. exceed 3-7 m.
The length of the lake is 14.3 km, the maximum width is

5.3 km, and the perimeter is 60.5 km. Drainage area of
the lake is small, only 613 km2 [15].
Total volume of water is about 369⋅106 m3. It should be

noted, that all data are given at the Normal Affluent Level
(NAL) of water reservoir 141.6 m for the Baltic System
(BS) elevation. During the exploitation of the water
reservoir by multi-year regulation of discharge, the water
level of the lake can decrease to an elevation of 140.7 m,
that is by 0.90 m from nominal. As a result, the surface
area of the lake decreases to 42 km2, and the volume of
water - to 326⋅106 m3. At the present the water regime of
the lake is regulated by a hydro-engineering complex of a
former hydroelectric power plant [10].
The hydrographic schematic of lake 'UNÖLDL is presented

in Fig. 2.2, and the bathygraphic curves of the lake in
Fig. 2.3. Main data of the water-cooling reservoir of the
Ignalina NPP are presented in Table 2.2.
31
145 The water regime of lake 'UNÖLDL is formed by
141.6
140 correlation of natural and anthropogenic factors. The
135
main natural factors are the climatic conditions of the
Marks in BS, m
130
125
region: precipitation onto the surface of the water
49.0
120
reservoir and natural evaporation from lake surface and
115 watershed. Anthropogenic factors, which have an
110 influence on the NPP operation, are the control of
D
105 discharge by the hydro-engineering complex and water
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
circulation in the lake because of the needs for cooling of
Ar e a, k m 2
the NPP equipment.
145
141.6
The Ignalina NPP operation has no perceptible influence
140
135
on the amount of atmospheric precipitation and on the
Marks in BS, m
130 water inflow into the lake. The NPP power has an
125 367.6 influence on the evaporation from the water surface.
120
Evaporation processes from the water surface of lake
'UNÖLDL is very important.
115
110
105
E
100
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Net losses of water from the lake depend on the amount of
V olum e , m 3
evaporation. In conditions of limited water resources this
amount can limit the power of the NPP. For this reason
Fig. 2.3 Bathygraphic curves of lake DrkÖiai [15] the natural and additional evaporation from the water
a - area, b - water volume surface are monitored carefully. During the years 1973-
1976 a total annual evaporation from the water surface of
lake 'UNÖLDL was determined to be 585 mm.
Table 2.2 Main data of hydrologic and hydrothermic
regime of water cooling reservoir of the Ignalina NPP
'UNÖLDL lake drainage area, km2 613

2
Water area of lake at NAL, km 49
Multiyear flow rate of water from lake, m3/s 3.19
Multiyear discharge from lake, m3/year 100.5⋅106
Multiyear quantity of atmospheric
638
precipitation, mm/year
Multiyear value of evaporation from water
600
surface, mm/year
Normal affluent level of lake, m 141.6
Minimum permissible lake level, m 140.7
Regulating volume of lake, m3 43⋅106
Permissible drop of lake level, m 0.90
A number of lakes are present in the area of the Ignalina

NPP. Their total water surface area is 48.4 km2 (without
lake 'UNÖLDL). Lakes occupy 15 %, swamps - 15 %,
farming land - 40 % and forests - about 30 % of the
surrounding area. Net density of rivers is 0.3 km/km2.
Nearly all surface discharge (74 %) flows to the south part

of lake 'UNÖLDL by way of two rivers Riqianka and
'UNÖs, the rest of the surface discharge goes to the west
ridge from the tributaries of the rivers Smalvs and
Gulbins. Discharge from the lake goes by way of the river
Prorva through the south ridge of the water reservoir.
Warm coolant water of the NPP is discharged into the
same place. So, the most intensive water exchange take
place in the south part of the lake.
32
The twenty-four-hour average evaporation during all this During the entire season of the year 1984 evaporation was
period was 3 mm. During the hottest months-June and 36⋅106 m3, in 1985 - 48⋅106 m3, in 1986 - 45.7⋅106 m3,
July-the evaporation was the largest - about 115 mm per in 1987 - 50.8⋅106 m3, and in 1988 - 52.2⋅106 m3. These
month. In general, during the May-October period the values exceeded the multi-year average values of
evaporation was 535 mm [8]. evaporation (600 mm) by 14 % in the year 1984 during
the operation of one turbine of Ignalina NPP with power
The slope of subsoil waters in the lake is sufficiently of 750 MW, and by 72 % when the power was increased
small: a depth of 5 m in about 150-200 m from the bank. to 2500 MW [10].
The flow is directed to the area of drainage of lake
'UNÖLDL. Subsoil discharge is about 3 % from all the Predictive calculations of the former Research and
multiyear water balance of lake 'UNÖLDL. Development Institute for Energy Technology,
St.Petersburg, Russia, together with LEI (at that time the
Ignalina NPP began operation in 1984. At the start only Institute for Physical and Engineering Problems of
the first turbine of the first unit was put in operation. At Energy Research, Kaunas, Lithuania), the additional
the end of the same summer the second turbine was evaporation was found to be 16.2⋅106 m3 or 55 % from
introduced, which reached full power in summer of 1985. the multi-year average value of the Ignalina NPP
Then the power of Ignalina NPP reached 1200 MW (e). operation at 1500 MW (e), and 32.4⋅106 m3 at 3000
During the years 1985-1987 Ignalina NPP operated at MW (e). During the years of 1985-1987 the measured
power of 1300-1500 MW on the whole with preventive evaporation corresponds to computed predictions.
maintenance during summer months. The first turbine of
the second unit reached full power in August, 1987. Employing the calculated estimates of water loss by
During the year of 1988 the two units with a total power evaporation from the lake's surface - a cooling discharge
not exceeding 2500 MW (e) operated with interruptions. equal to about 5.5 l/s km2 is obtained. This is equivalent
to a discharge of the Ignalina NPP operating at 3000
During the operation of one unit the heat load to the lake MW (e) [10].
is more than 0.06 kW/m3 (i. e. the amount of heat
transmitted to the lake per month is 8.7⋅1015 J), and
during the operation of two units - 0.11 kW/m3.
Since the time when the first turbine started operating, the
NPP coolant water began adding heat to the lake, this
intensified the evaporation from the water surface. With
the increase of power of the Ignalina NPP and gradually
rising water temperature of the lake, there were additional
losses of water by evaporation [10]. During the operation
of Ignalina NPP the intensity of evaporation from the
surface of lake 'UNÖLDL is sufficiently high and reaches a
monthly average of 5 mm/day. This corresponds to a total
evaporation of 158 mm/month during the operation of
one unit, and 198 mm/month during the operation of two
units.
From May to October in the 1984, the evaporation from

the lake surface was 627 mm, in 1985 - 720 mm, in 1986
- 712 mm, in 1987 - 684 mm and in 1988 - 788 mm.
During the May-October period, the evaporation norm is
540 mm, and during all the evaporation season (end of
April-November) - 600 mm. From May to October in
1984 the evaporation norm was exceed by 16 %, in 1985 -
by 33 %, in 1986 - by 32 %, in 1987 - by 27 %, and in
1988 - by 46 %, which shows the influence of the
operation of the NPP [10].
The other side of the effect of Ignalina NPP to the amount

of evaporation from the surface of lake 'UNÖLDL is the
lengthening of the active evaporation time because of the
extended period during which no ice forms on lake
'UNÖLDL. During the cold period the evaporation process
persists in the zone which is adjacent to the mouth of
discharge channel.
33
2.6 GEOLOGICAL AND SEISMOLOGICAL
EFFECTS [8]
The Ignalina NPP is located in the area of the East-

European platform, at the junction of two large structure
elements: the Baltic sineclize and the Mazur-Belorus
antiklize. Therefore, the crystal foundation and sediment
case are separated by a series of tectonic breaks. Some of
these were discovered by geophysical methods and
determined by data from drilling samples. Data of seismic
prospecting and test drilling 10 km to the north-west from
the Ignalina NPP show, that dimensions of tectonic blocks
can not be large, in the neighborhood of 2 x 2 km. From
the evidence of such tectonic disintegration of this area,
the probability of availability of tectonic disintegration
zones near the Ignalina NPP is sufficiently high.
The surface in the Ignalina NPP area is rough. Their

absolute elevation-marks change from 150 m to 180 m
and more. Glacial Quaternary sediments exist near the
surface within a depth from 60 to 200 m, they are
supported from below by Before-Quaternary, Devonian,
Silurian, Ordovician, Kembrician and Upper-Protozoan
sediment variety. At a depth of 700-750 m imbedded
methomorphic and Crystal sediments of Upper
Proterozoic and Archei are present.
Table 2.3 Filtration properties of glacial accretions of the ground-cover in the Ignalina NPP area [10]
Type of accretion Geological Distribution, Power, Filtration Depth of water Water yield
index % m coefficient, m/day bed level, m coefficient
Swampy bIV 5 2-6 0.04 - 6 0.2 - 0.4 0.001 - 0.05
Alluvial aIV+III 5 1 - 20 1 - 190 0.2 - 5 0.01 - 0.25
Limno-glacial lgIIInm3 5 4-6 0.2 - 8 0.5 - 2.5 0.0002 - 0.15
Fluvi-glacial fgIIInm3 5 10 - 15 5 - 20 2.5 - 5 0.05 - 0.35
t
Water-glacial ag IIInm3
agtIIInm1 30 5 - 10 10 - 20 2.5 - 5 0.05 - 0.35
Glucagon gtIIInm3
gtIIInm1 50 5 - 50 0.01 - 2 0.5 - 1.5 0.001 - 0.1
Table 2.4 Engineering-geological properties of glacial accretions of the ground-cover in the Ignalina NPP area [10]
Type of Particle Soil density, Humidity Porosity Fluidity Plasticity Angle of Adhesion, Young's
accretion density, g/cm2 coefficient limit limit friction, 0 MPa modules,
2
g/cm MPa
Swampy 1.57 0.89 6.76 13.3 - - - - 0.5
Alluvial 2.71 1.97 0.29 0.77 0.33 0.11 22 0.034 7
Limno-glacial 2.71 1.94 0.21 0.82 - - 14 0.011 5
Fluvi-glacial 2.64 1.69 0.09 0.72 0.33 0.22 33 0.001 27
Water-glacial 2.65 1.67 0.09 0.71 - - 32 0.001 6
Glucagon 2.70 2.24 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.14 23 0.028 30
Surface sediments in the area of Ignalina NPP are very glacial processes. Later on, alluvial, marsh and lake-
inhomogeneous. They were formed during the retreat of sediments were formed.
the last glacier as a result of different glacial and water-
34
The lithologycal structure, the filtration and engineering- All these factors have an influence to the settlement of
geological properties of separate genetic types of surface buildings and constructions. The deformation of the split
sediments are not equal (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Most slabs can be considerable - from 50 to 1000 mm - and can
prevalent are the permeable water-glacial sediments, be highly irregular.
which are located in direct proximity of lake 'UNÖLDL and
the Ignalina NPP, Fig. 2.4. All surface sediments contain The Ignalina NPP territory is located in the area of a
subsoil water, which range in depths from 0.2 to 7 m. Before - Kembrician platform. In spite of this, the earth's
Heterogenous supporting weight, the marsh, lake-marsh, crust is pulsating, even experiencing perceptible shocks.
lake-glacial and water-glacial sediments are located near The predicted intensity of neotectonic motion in the area
the surface and at the level of the building foundations of Ignalina NPP is 3.5 mm per year. The district was
and other constructions. According to lithologycal affected by the Karpat earthquake, which had a predicted
classification this is peat, sand, gravel, sandy soil, sandy intensity of 5 on the Richter scale.
loam and clay.
Construction and operation of the Ignalina NPP
The complexity of engineering-geological conditions of essentially widens the spectrum of technogenic influence
the platform in question is: on the geologic environment. The character and scales of
the consequences depends on the geological situation such
1. Heterogeneity of grounds, as power of the aeration zone and filtration, as well as
2. Availability of weak grounds, especially, peat, from drainage conditions of the subsoil aquifer. From this
3. Availability of numerous cradles, lenses and point of view the territory of Ignalina NPP is located in
interbeds in the sand - gravel sediments, unfavorable conditions. The depth of the aeration zone is
4. Availability of swamps. from 1-2 m to 5-8 m and is insufficient to protect subsoil
waters. It is composed of fine sands, the filtration
coefficient of which is 5-20 m/day, the water-yield
coefficient is 0.05-0.35, and for sandy loam, the filtration
coefficient of which is 0.01-2 m/day, the water-yield
coefficient is 0.001-0.1. Soils of the Ignalina NPP area
can not guarantee a reliable localization of radionuclides
during an accidental leak, and can not be a barrier, which
prevents the migration of such radionuclides as 90Sr and
137
Cs to the biosphere.
Fig. 2.4 Glacial accretions of the ground-cover in the Ignalina NPP area [10]
1 - swampy accretions (peat, slimy sand), 2 - alluvial accretions ( sand, gravel, pebble, sandy soil), 3 - limno-glacial accretions
(clay, alevrit, sand), 4 - fluvi-glacial accretions (sand, gravel, pebble), 5 - water - glacial accretions of local formations (sand,
gravel, pebble, sandy soil), 6 - glucagon accretions of local formations (sandy soil, sandy loam) of late (a) and early (b) stage
of last glacier
35
3. DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS,
EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS
This Section covers a number of subjects which can be The structural components under investigation were
classified under the ‘design’ specification. It starts by a similar for all three units of the Ignalina NPP. The
brief overview of the events which where used to define calculations show, that such a wave would destroy the
the range of loads imposed on structural components and following structures:
equipment. The material properties of the metal and
concrete used in construction of the structures and • the pre-fabricated ferro-concrete structures, the
components of the plant are summarized. Criteria for metallic framework of external and internal walls in
choosing equipment characteristics are presented. The the central hall of the equipment room of the main
Section is concluded by describing the testing of building (Fig.1.2, building A),
equipment and the testing program completed during • the building structures of the turbine hall (Fig.1.2,
initial startup and initial power operation. building G) and the deaerator room (building D) of
the main building,
Only a brief description of some of the events which result • the building structures of the ECCS pressurized tanks
in the imposition of loads (e.g. DB and SB-LOCA events) (accumulators) above the zero elevation (Fig. 1.2,
is given in this Section. A more complete description is building B),
provided in the Subsections that analyze the thermal- • the building structures of the service-water pump
hydraulic response of the plant and the design and station (Fig. 1.1, buildings 1 and 2),
performance of the safety related equipment. • the building structures of the redundant diesel power
station (Fig. 1.1, building 40).
3.1 DESIGN LOADING
The studies showed that in this event the loading on
The structural components of the plant are designed in equipment due to oscillations of the structures was below
accordance with the specification set forth in "Design the load due to, for example, an earthquake of magnitude
Safety Regulations of Nuclear Power Plants (OPB-88)" 6 on the scale MSK-64 (see Subsection 3.1.1.4).
[16]. The generic requirement of this document is that
safety-related systems and elements of nuclear power 3.1.1.2 Water
plants have to be able to fulfill their functions under all
conditions. This implies that they have to accommodate According to reference [18] an analysis of the "Rupture of
stresses imposed by natural phenomena as well as the dam (weir) of the cooling water pond" was not
mechanical, thermal, chemical and other impacts which necessary, because the source of cooling of the Ignalina
may arise during design basis accidents. NPP is the water from lake 'UNÖLDL. In order to
justify this, changes of the water level in lake 'UNÖLDL
3.1.1 External must be considered. According to available records a
maximum water level was 142.26 m in 1953, and the
The term "external events" (relative to a nuclear power minimum -140.76 m (above see level) in 1964 [10].
plant) covers such natural phenomena as a earthquakes,
flooding, strong winds, lightning, snow and ice, and such In normal operation of the Ignalina NPP and for
man-made events as aircraft crashes, industrial explosion, supporting calculation of water level in lake 'UNÖLDL,
sabotage and terrorist action. On site fire and flooding there is the addition of spring floods and rain-water, as
are usually also considered as external events. well as the effects of the hydro-engineering complex on
the river Prorva. In case of destruction of this structure
3.1.1.1 Air-Shock Wave and the dam of the hydroelectric power plant, the water
level in lake 'UNÖLDL would drop to the level of river
Buildings and other constructions unit 1 and unit 2 of the Prorva, which is 140.20 m.
Ignalina NPP were designed and built without taking into In case of destruction of the earthen dam on the river
account the influence of the air-shock wave, because 'UNÖs and return of the flow to the old river-bed, the
corresponding requirements were put into operation only influx of water into lake 'UNÖLDL would decrease by about
after the beginning of year 1987 [17]. 20 %. Temporary elimination of the dam on the river
'UNÖs would not lead to a sharp lowering of the water
Before construction started at the Ignalina NPP, the level in lake 'UNÖLDL.
Research and Development Institute for Energy
Technology, St. Petersburg (at that time Leningrad), 3.1.1.3 Missiles
Russia, performed a number of studies on the response of
structures subjected to a step air shock wave of 10 kPa Safety analysis of nuclear power plants, according to
with the duration of up to 1 s, as required in the code [17]. reference [18], requires the consideration of an "Aircraft
35
crash on the reactor hall". The consideration of this event protection system, control and measuring devices and
is proposed in a list of hypothetical accidents defined in others.
1990 by the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, Moscow,
Russia. This requirement was imposed after completion of
the Ignalina NPP.
The requirements for considering an aircraft crash

therefore were not imposed on any RBMK plant. This
was due mainly to three major considerations:
A) There were no such regulatory requirements at the

time when the plants were developed and no such
requirements were introduced by the regulatory
bodies,
B) Such events are sufficiently unlikely, besides, the
RBMK sites are situated reasonably far from airports,
C) Until recently, there were no reliable statistics on
flight incidents and fatal accidents involving both civil
and military aircraft, which could be used when
considering such events regarding nuclear power
plants.
Note, that the nearest air route Svir-Rokiškis is ten km to

the West of the Ignalina NPP. In 1990 a total number of
flights along the Lithuanian air routes was 65000. During
the last 30-year period there were no commercial aircraft Fig. 3.1 The relation between seismic scales
crash accidents in Lithuania MSK - Modvedev, Spanheuer, Karnik
MMIS - Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale
3.1.1.4 Seismic JMA - Japan Metrological Agency
Seismic stability is the ability of equipment and structures Seismic Stability Categorization for the NPPs with
to maintain integrity during seismic loading. This implies RBMK - type Reactors
the maintenance of strength, tightness, maintainability,
nuclear and radiological safety and the absence of residual Depending on the need for functionability during and
deformation, which encumber normal operation [19]. after the earthquake, all systems, equipment and
structures of NPPs with RBMK-type reactors, are
The standard of seismic stability in the former USSR was designed according the "Code for Designing of seismic-
the MSK-64 scale, which was established by the Earth resistant nuclear power plants" [20]. The structures are
Physic Institute, Moscow, Russia. Fig 3.1 provides a divided into three seismic stability categories.
comparison between the MSK-64 scale and two other
scales in common use. According to the MSK-64 scale, The first category is in turn divided into three groups.
forces correspond to the following acceleration ranges of The first group encompasses systems or elements for
soil for periods from 0.1 to 0.5 s [19]: which damage and loss of integrity could lead to releases
of radioactive products in such amounts that they would
forces 5 - 0.12-0.25 m/s2, result in radiation exposure to inhabitants above the
forces 6 - 0.25-0.50 m/s2, established codes for a maximum design basis accident.
forces 7 - 0.50-1.0 m/s2 and so on. The following systems of the NPP belong to this group:
For Soviet-designed NPPs two levels of seismic impact • reactor,
were taken into account: (a) the design earthquake, and • main circulation circuit,
(b) the maximum possible calculated earthquake. The first
• steam pipelines from the separator drums to the relief
is a maximum earthquake, which may happen during the
valves, and the valves themselves,
life-time operation of the NPP. The second is the
• feedwater supply system,
maximum possible earthquake in the area in question. As
• MCP hydrostatic sealing feeding system,
a rule, for design purposes the maximum calculated
• CPS cooling circuit,
earthquake employs an MSK-64 scale one force higher.
• refueling system equipment, refueling machine,
During construction it is necessary to guarantee the cranes of the central hall,
seismic stability not only for the building being • equipment of spent fuel system, cranes in the service
constructed, but also for equipment, reactor control and hall of the fuel cooling pond,
• radioactive safety control system,
36
• CPS equipment for combustion of explosive mixture. • pipelines located inside of the ACS.
The second group of the first seismic stability category The second group of the second seismic stability category
includes the safety systems which protect the reactor core, includes:
the emergency heat removal systems from the reactor, and
• ACS elements not mentioned above,
also the confinement system for radioactive products. The
• control systems of devices, which separate structures
following safety systems belongs to this group:
of the second seismic stability category from structures
of third category,
• control and protection system,
• turbine hall (building G),
• emergency core cooling system,
• supporting structures of the second seismic stability
• MCC overpressure protection system, except steam
category.
discharge valves to condensers (SDV-C),
• reactor-space overpressure protection system (part of
Systems, equipment and structures, which are not
the ACS, which removes the steam from the reactor
included in the first and second categories, belong to the
space to the fifth condensing pool),
third seismic stability category.
• reinforced leaktight compartment system, including
headings, hatches and doors,
Seismic Stability of Structures, Equipment and Pipelines
• ACS towers,
• ACS heat exchanger and pumps, Calculations of seismic stability criteria for the Ignalina
• cutoff and sealing devices, NPP structures, equipment and pipelines were conducted
• system for reception of waste water from reinforced by the Research and Development Institute for Energy
compartments, Technology, St. Petersburg (at that time Leningrad),
• emergency power supply system, Russia. These calculations were performed using a linear
• service water system, spectral theory of seismic stability. Calculation results of
• intermediate circuit system, the main and auxiliary facilities are shown in Table 3.1.
• ECCS makeup system, The seismic stability of buildings is given according to the
• venting system of the safety system compartments and above mentioned MSK-64 scale.
cable service,
• tanks of the CPS venting system, For the Ignalina NPP area the design earthquake
• control safety systems, including redundant control magnitude is 6 forces and the maximum possible
systems. calculated earthquake magnitude is force 7 according to
the MSK-64 scale. This requirement implies, that some
Third group of the first seismic stability category includes structures of the Ignalina NPP need to be strengthened.
those buildings, structures and equipment for which According to the above listed estimates, the following
damage would lead to failure of reactor operations. This structures are subject to alterations:
group consists of: A) Main building. The extent of reconstruction amounts
to about 35-40 % of the entire volume of the unit. The
• control room structures (building A) and deaerators deaerator building and reactor hall need to be replaced
(building D), completely.
• ECCS pressurized tanks (accumulator) building, B) The ECCS pressurized tank (accumulator) building.
• redundant diesel-generators building, Degree of reconstruction amounts to about 50 %.
• service water pump building, C) Building of service-water pumps should be replaced
• purified deminiralized water tank (V=1500 m3), completely.
• communication tunnels and support structures of the
first seismic stability category. Table 3.1 Seismic stability of the Ignalina NPP
structures
The second seismic stability category encompasses those
systems, equipment and structures (not included in the Building Seismic stability,
first category), for which failure can lead to radiation force
levels above the permissible annual level for normal
operations. This category is divided into two groups. Reactor building (A) 6
Deaerator building (D) and Turbine hall (G) <5
The first group of the second seismic stability category Building of the ECCS accumulators 5
includes systems, equipment and constructions, which are Redundant diesel-generator building 7
located inside of the accident confinement zone:
Building of service-water pumps:
• heat exchanger and pumps of the purification and - part below ground 7
cooling system, - building frame 6
• bypass cleaning system, Primary system grade water tank 7
• maintenance cool-down system of reactor, Trenches and tunnels for cables 7
37
The rupture of the fuel channel inside of the reactor block
A large part of the equipment within the first and second can be diagnosed by the following symptoms:
units of the Ignalina NPP do not comply with the seismic
requirements. Calculated results of pipeline seismic • pressure change in the reactor block,
stability show, that they correspond to standards [21]. • activation of "gas moisture increase" and "gas
temperature increase" signals in the system for
Thus systems, equipment and structures of the Ignalina monitoring fuel channel integrity,
NPP do not fully comply with seismic stability standards. • activation of the "water flow increase" signal in the
Measures aimed at reinforcing the existing building and emergency channel cell,
equipment components are expensive, and are considered • appearance of water in the drainage pipes from the
by plant experts as unfeasible. However, aftereffects of an reactor block,
earthquake will be diminished if the reactors are promptly • appearance of water in the drainage lines from the
shut down prior to the seismic wave approaching the plant. CPS channel siphon compensator,
The implementation of the seismic monitoring system is • a considerable local decrease of graphite temperature.
under progress in accordance with Safety Improvement
Program of Ignalina NPP [22]. When symptoms flagging a fuel channel failure are
detected, the reactor emergency shutdown and cool-down
3.1.2 Internal is initiated. Reactor shutdown is initiated by either:
The "internal" events which can impose loads on structures • a FASS signal generated automatically if the
and equipment are events anticipated or postulated to excess pressure in the reactor block increases to
occur as a result of plant failures, i. e. malfunction of the 7.5 kPa,
reactor's normal operating and control system. • or by the operator, using the AZ-1 button if emergency
symptoms are indicated by control room
3.1.2.1 Postulated Piping Ruptures instrumentation.
The safety analysis of the NPP with RBMK - type reactors Simultaneous with the cool-down of the reactor, the
considers the following ruptures of pipes and system damaged fuel assembly is removed from the fuel channel
components: using the refueling machine. The emergency plug is
utilized and the leakage is stopped by closing of the
• fuel channel, isolating and control valve of the damaged channel.
• water communication line,
• steam-water communication line, Rupture of the Water-Communication Line
• group distribution header,
• downcomer or the cofferdam of the separator drum, The symptoms of a full or partial rupture of the water-
• main steam line before the main steam gate valve, communication lines are:
• feedwater pipe,
• pipe or header of the MCP, • activation of the "water flow increase" signal in the
• service water pipeline, channel with the ruptured water-communication line,
• purification and cooling system pipeline, • increase of moisture and air activity in the water
• intermediate circuit pipeline. communication compartment,
• increase of pressure in the water communication
This Subsection discusses the initiating event itself, compartment,
symptoms of the accident, direct consequences and • noise in the water communication compartment,
measures to eliminate or limit the anticipated • level increase in the waste water tanks.
consequences. A quantitative analysis of the most
significant accidental transients are presented Section 11 An increase of excess pressure to 2 kPa in the water
of the Ignalina RBMK-1500 Source Book. communication compartments, activates the emergency
protection (FASS, AZ-1) signal and the reactor power is
Rupture of the Fuel Channel decreased to zero. Subsequently the reactor cool-down
process is initiated. If emergency symptoms are flagged,
The following potential break locations of the fuel the reactor can be shut down by the operator using the
channel were investigated: button AZ-1.
• rupture of the steam and water communications lines After cool-down of the reactor, the fuel assembly is
of the fuel channel removed from the damaged fuel channel and an
• full rupture of the fuel channel inside of the reactor emergency plug is installed. Leakage is stopped by closing
block, off the isolating and control valve.
• partial rupture of a fuel channel.
38
Rupture of the Steam-Water Communication Line complicating event is assumed. Simultaneous with the
activation of FASS, a loss of off-site power is assumed to
A rupture of the 75 mm exiting line which carries the occur. In this case, the main circulation pumps and main
two-phase coolant from the core to the DS results in feedwater pumps are not available. The ECCS is put into
increased coolant flow rates within the damaged operation by the simultaneous excess pressure signals and
channel. Coolant flow is increased roughly in proportion the decrease of the pressure differential (up to 0.6 MPa)
to the break flow, consequently ability of coolant to between the MCP pressure header and the separator
maintain adequate temperatures within the channel is drum. Water from the ECCS is taken to the affected
thus not impaired. During the pressurized phase of the damaged-half of the reactor. ECCS operation is discussed
transient critical flow conditions prevail for the break in more detail in Section 6.4.
flow.
Safeguards for confinement of this accident lead to the
In case of the mentioned rupture, a leakage of the coolant closure of gate valves in the head, suction and bypass lines
from the MCC is insufficient to cause a strong change of of the MCP headers. All channels of the damaged-half of
the circuit parameters. However, because of loosing a the reactor, which are not connected to the affected group
large amount of active coolant, it is necessary to shut distribution header, are cooled by direct ECCS flow under
down and cool-down the reactor. maximum possible flow conditions. After an increase of
the water level in the separator drum of the damaged-half
Accident symptoms: of the reactor the channels of the ruptured GDH are
cooled by backward flow.
• activation of the "water flow increase" signal in the
channel with the ruptured steam-water line, Water, which escapes through the rupture of the group
• increase of air moisture and activity, distribution header to the water-communication
• noise in the drum separator compartments, compartment, flows by way of the drainage lines to the
• pressure increase in the steam-water compartments. 350 m3 tank. From this tank water could be taken to the
ACS hot condensate chamber.
If any of the above symptoms appear, the operator must
shut-down the reactor. The reactor emergency protection Rupture of the Downcomer from the Separator Drum
AZ-1 is activated by a pressure increase signal when the
excess pressure reaches 2 kPa. An accident rupturing one of the 325 mm, 16 mm wall
thickness downcomers from the separator drum will have
Water, which is discharged due to the rupture of the a more severe impact on cooling conditions of the reactor
steam-water pipeline flows to the drainage lines of the core. This is due to a lower discharge rate of saturated
135m3 tank. From this tank water could be taken to the water from both sections of the ruptured piping. In this
ACS hot-condensate chamber, or after the elimination of event, before the ECCS pumps are initiated, the reactor
accident consequences, to contaminated demineralized core is cooled by coast-down inertia of the MCPs.
water tank, the capacity of which is 1500 m3.
To ensure most unfavorable accident conditions,
Rupture of a Group Distribution Header simultaneous with the activation of FASS, a loss of off-
site power is assumed. This leads to a shut-down of the
Rupture of the 300 mm diameter group distribution turbine generators, the main circulation pumps and the
header belongs to those accidents, which can cause main feedwater pumps. The reactor is cooled down by the
considerable changes of the MCC parameters. The supply ECCS pumps and the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
of coolant to the fuel channels connected to the ruptured Cladding failure does not occur, because coolant is
group distribution header, depends strongly on the rupture provided to the reactor block without interruption.
location. The most severe rupture of the group distribution
header is one which occurs beyond the check valve (taken Water, which escapes from the separator drum
in the flow direction). In this case all 43 fuel channels are compartment, flows by way of the drainage lines to the
cooled by backward flow of coolant from the drum 135 m3 tank, which are designed for maximum pressure
separators. In this case the leakage rate is maximized, possible in case of emergency in the separator drum
because the coolant flow, which is discharged through the compartment. From this tank water could be taken to the
restriction inserted in the MCP pressure header, is added ACS hot-condensate chamber.
to the leakage of the coolant from the emergency group
distribution header through the 43 fuel channels from the An accident rupturing one of the water cofferdam of the
separator drum and the ECCS headers. separator drum which have an outside diameter of
325 mm and a wall thickness of 16 mm will have a more
The FASS reactor emergency protection signal is severe impact on cooling conditions of the reactor core.
activated by an increase of excess pressure to 2 kPa in the This is due to a lower discharge of saturated water from
water communication compartment. In order to simulate both sections of the ruptured piping. Before putting into
most unfavorable accident conditions, a
39
operation the ECCS pumps, the reactor core is cooled Rupture of the MCP Header or Pipes Leading to the
while the MCP is costing down. Header
Rupture of the Main Steam Line Before the Main Steam
Gate Valve The largest diameter component of the primary system is
the 900 mm MCP pressure header. Loss of integrity of
Rupture of the 600 mm diameter main steam pipeline is this component cuts of the regular coolant supply to one
characterized by a significant pressure decrease in the half of the reactor. Therefore, the rupture of this
main circulation circuit, as well as by the release of a component is defined as the DB-LOCA for an RBMK
large amount of steam through the break. System plant.
operating parameters, such as pressure in the MCC,
pressure differential between the MCP pressure header Rupture of the MCP suction header starts a coast-down of
and the separator drum, liquid levels in the separator the MCP pumps in the affected half .The pumps have a
drum, etc., in both halves of the reactor change in a cavitation margin more than 1.5 MPa. Moreover, after
similar fashion, because of the 400 mm diameter steam stalling of the MCP’s, their inertia provides a brief
connection between the two MCC halves through operating margin. This means, that the coolant supply to
4 cofferdams and the 8 steam discharge valves of type the affected half of the reactor is not terminated
SDV-C. Simultaneously a loss of off-site power is immediately.
assumed.
The reactor emergency protection FASS or AZ-1 are The rupture of pressure or suction pipes to the MCP,
activated by one of the following signals: which have an internal diameter of 750 mm, leads to a
smaller loss rate of coolant and the initial failure of only
• pressure increase in the steam-water pipeline one MCP pump.
compartment,
• loss of off-site power supply, Therefore, the instantaneous full cross-section rupture of
• closure of the turbine emergency regulating valve, the MCP pressure header, which has an internal diameter
• decrease of feedwater flow. of 900 mm, with unimpeded discharge of coolant from
both ends of the pipe while the unit is in full power
In addition it is anticipated that the emergency protection operation is taken to be the maximum design basis
AZ-1 is activated by neutronic signals from the reactor: accident.
either by exceeding the power limit or by an increase of
the reactor power excursion period. The reactor emergency protection FASS is activated by a
pressure increase signal in the reinforced leaktight
Before the ECCS pumps are turned on, the reactor core is compartments. A simultaneous loss of off-site power is
cooled by the inertial coast-down of the MCP’s. assumed. The main circulation pumps and main
Subsequently the ECCS provides cooling water to both feedwater pumps are deactivated. Diesel-generators are
halves of the reactor. placed into operation.
Rupture of the Feedwater Pipeline The reactor emergency cooling system is switched on by
simultaneous signals generated by the pressure increase in
The largest impact of a break in this component occurs for the reinforced leaktight compartments and the pressure
a full rupture of the 500 mm diameter feedwater pipeline differential between the MCP pressure header and the
extending between the separator drum and the feed separator drum. The ECCS pumps and the auxiliary
control device. This regime is characterized by a feedwater pumps are activated and provide cooling water
significant dynamical variation of the main parameters of at a flow rate of at least 275 kg/s in each half of the MCC.
the MCC. Water expelled through the break flows along drainage
lines to a 150 m3 capacity tank. From this tank water can
In the analysis a simultaneous loss of off-site power is be taken to the ACS hot-condensate chamber.
assumed. In this case, turbine generators, main circulation
pumps and main feedwater pumps are switched off. Steam produced by flashing of the hot pressurized water
flows from the reinforced leaktight compartments through
The FASS and AZ-1 reactor emergency protections are the steam supply corridors and passes to the ACS steam
activated by an increase of the gauge pressure 2 kPa in the reception chamber. The response of the of the ACS is
separator drum compartment. The reactor is automatically described in more detail in Section 6.2.
shut down.
Rupture of the Service-Water Pipeline
Water, from the ruptured of feedwater pipeline flows
along drainage lines to the 135 m3 tank. From this tank At least three different emergency situations are possible:
water could be taken to the ACS hot-condensate chamber
or to the contaminated de-mineralized water tank. A) Rupture of the pressure pipeline of the service-water
pump before the check valve.
40
When the pressure decrease signal is received, the • reinforced leaktight compartments in case B,
reserve pump is automatically switched on and the • feed system compartment in case C,
devices are switched into reverse. If during the 24 • separator drum or reinforced leaktight compartments
hours it is impossible to repair the malfunction, the in case D,
unit must be shut down. • purification and cooling system compartment in case E.
B) Rupture of the service-water pipeline in the segment Fuel channels of the damaged-half of the reactor are
extending from the check valve of the service-water normally cooled by coolant flow from the MCP. During
pumps to the gate of the device-consumer pipeline. the loss of off-site power or by a signal of water level
decrease in the separator drum, water is taken to the
For the case of a partial rupture of pipelines, which damaged-half of the reactor by the ECCS pump.
does not lead to a pressure decrease in the water line,
the loss of coolant is eliminated without unit Rupture of the Intermediate Circuit Pipeline
shutdown.
Rupture of the intermediate circuit pipeline is a very-low-
A large loss of water can lead to a cessation of the probability event, because in this system pipelines are
service-water supply required for normal operation. used, which are designed for pressures of 1.6 MPa. This is
Interruption of cooling of engines and oil coolers of an about three times higher than the maximum possible
MCP requires their shut-down, subsequent to this the pressure in the system.
reactor would be shutdown by the AZ-1 button. In this
case a loss of off-site power is possible. It is the most Rupture of this pipe would lead to the shutting off of the
serious sequence of the rupture of a service water water supply to the MCP coolers and the heat exchanger.
pipeline. In this case to ensure a reliable supply of The reactor would be shut down by the operator and
service-, this pressure water line is closed off, and cooled down. Water level in the separator drums is
their pumps switched to the non-emergency water supplied by the auxiliary feedwater pumps.
line.
3.1.2.2 Assumed Missile Effects
C) Rupture of the service-water pipeline at segment which
connects this pipe to the system. According to the list of initial events [18], the following
events, related to internal missile effects, are examined.
Isolation of the damaged section is performed Accidental dropping of:
automatically by a preventive signal from flow meters.
It leads to the isolation of only one device-consumer • a fuel assembly during transportation to the spent-fuel
from the group. pool by the refueling machine,
• a casket with spent fuel during its unloading from the
Rupture of the Purification and Cooling System Pipeline hot cell to the spent-fuel pool or during transportation
from the spent-fuel pool to the container,
The character of the accident resulting from the rupture of • an irradiated fuel channel in transportation by crane
the purification and cooling system pipeline depends on during replacement,
the location of the rupture. For the Ignalina NPP design • a transport container during transportation from the
the following situations were examined: spent-fuel pool by car to the flushing chamber,
A) Rupture of the PCS 150 mm diameter pipeline near • a refueling machine, central hall crane or
the pressure header. constructions onto the top of the reactor.
B) Rupture of the PCS 200 mm diameter pipelines at the
section right after joining the 150 mm diameter A fuel assembly being transported by means of the
pipelines before the limiting insertion. refueling machine is lifted and lowered with the grabber.
C) Rupture of the PCS 300 mm diameter pipeline, which This ensures a reliable grip of the fuel assembly and
is used for water return to the mixers of the feed eliminates a possible release of the fuel assembly. To
system between check valve and mixer. increase the reliability and safety, the refueling machine is
D) Rupture of the 300 mm diameter water receipt inspected before each transporting cycle.
pipeline to the PCS from the water cofferdam of the
separator drum. The fall of the casket with spent fuel, fall of spent fuel
E) Rupture of a pipeline in the PCS compartments. assembly, irradiated fuel channel and transport container
during transporting from cranes are prevented by the
The maximum rate of coolant loss occurs in the first case. following measures:
Depending on the rupture location, the reactor emergency
protection FASS is activated by a pressure increase signal • using the grabber, which eliminates the spontaneous
in the corresponding locations: disconnection with transporting loads,
• reinforced leaktight compartments in case A,
41
• precautionary lock is placed on the hook, which • satisfactory mechanical properties (strength, plasticity,
prevents the dropping of the grabber loop from the creep) taking into account radiation, which can
hook, change these properties,
• cranes have a brake which is normally closed. This • high thermal conductivity,
ensures reliable locking of loads during loss of power • low cross-section for neutron capture,
and from automatically disconnecting by a switch on • technological effectiveness, such as machinability and
the drive of the lifting mechanism, and the end switch, weldability.
which ensures automatically stops of the hook-lifting
mechanism, when it reaches a set limit, Note that, compared to the VVER-type reactors, the
• regular inspection of the load lifting mechanisms. requirements for materials of metal structures of RBMK-
type reactors is less restrictive. It is possible to use simpler
The possibility of fall of a transport casket from the low-alloy steel because of the lower coolant pressure,
second tier to the bottom of the spent-fuel pool is neutron fluency and thickness of different construction
prevented, because the dimensions of the openings are elements.
smaller than the dimensions for the casket.
3.2.2 Material Properties
The consideration of the "Dropping of the refueling
machine, the central hall crane or crane construction The RBMK-1500 reactor is located in a cylindrical casing
components on the top of the reactor" is proposed in a list made from a sheet of heat-resistant low-alloy steel
of hypothetical accidents defined in 1990 by the 10ChN1M, the thickness of which is 16 mm. Reactor
Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, Moscow, Russia. casing, together with the top and bottom metal structures,
This requirement was imposed after completion of the the thickness of which is 40 mm and is manufactured
Ignalina NPP. from the same material, form the close reactor space.
Chemical composition, physical-mechanical and
3.2 DESIGN OF STEEL STRUCTURES thermophysical properties of the low-alloy steel are given
in Tables 3.2 through 3.4.
3.2.1 Standard Practices
Maximum permissible temperature for steel 10ChN1M is
Requirements for materials inside the core, where they are 400 oC [17]. This steel is not prone to thermal fracture by
subject to intensive neutron fluxes, and for materials of aging in the temperature range of 340-450 oC and
equipment and pipelines, which are not exposed in such a duration time up to 104 hours. Steel 10ChN1M is
way, are quite different. All metals, which are used for sufficiently effective to all metallurgical conversions. The
equipment and pipelines of the nuclear power plant, must statistical data of mechanical tests of specimens show that
have excellent mechanical properties, such as high the material is stable and has a high level of strength,
corrosion and erosion resistance, certain thermophysical plasticity and viscosity.
and good technological properties. It means, they must
have an ability to withstand deformation without cracking For welded structures, which are manufactured without a
under cold and hot conditions as well as good weldability thermal treatment, the ability of steel to relieve stresses
and machinability. during operation is very important. At a temperature of
400 oC and the duration time of 103 hours an initial stress
For materials inside the core, the cladding and pressure equal to 0.8 x sy is reduced about 10 % and at temperature
vessels present additional requirements such as low cross of 450 oC - by about 30 % [23].
neutron capture cross sections. This is needed for
supporting chain reactions, as well as for improved Steel 10ChN1M with a content of nickel up to 1.4 %
mechanical properties, especially for strength against ensures full hardenability of sheets and, hence,
cleavage fracture and resistance to plastic deformation uniform mechanical properties for thickness not more
upon intensive neutron exposure. than 50 mm. The critical fracture temperature for
steel 10ChN1M sheets for thickness of 30-40 mm is about
Neutron exposure can result in damage of metal and alloy 10 oC [23]. This steel has a high resistance for thermal
crystal lattice. Each metal structure transformation fracture, and maximum rise of critical fracture
involves a change of its mechanical and thermophysical temperature depends somewhat on aging temperature and
properties. Metals subjected to neutron exposure, become the critical fracture temperature 10-20 oC [23]. Steel
tougher and more brittle, their thermal conduction is 10ChN1M has good radioactive resistance to fluency up
decreased, and their creep rates are increased. to 6⋅1013 n/cm2 (E > 1 MeV) [21].
Thus, main requirements for construction materials are: Main circulation circuit of the RBMK-1500 reactor is
manufactured mainly from austenitic stainless steel
• corrosion and erosion resistance of coolants for 08Ch18N10T. Pressure and suction headers with
specified parameters, compatibility with fuel and corresponding pipelines, as well as the separator drum,
fission products, are manufactured mainly from carbonic steel 22K, and
42
the lining inside by austenitic stainless steel
08Ch18N10T. Chemical composition, physical-
mechanical and thermo-physical properties of mentioned
steels are given in Tables 3.2 through 3.4.
Table 3.2 Chemical composition of steels, used for the main equipment of RBMK-1500 reactors [23]
Steel type Chemical composition, %

C Si Mn Cr Ni Ti Mo S P Cu
10ChN1M 0.08-0.12 0.17-0.37 0.3-0.6 0.7-1 1.1-1.4 - 0.4-0.6 < 0.03 < 0.03 < 0.3
08Ch18N10T < 0.08 < 0.8 <2 17-19 9-11 < 0.7 - < 0.02 < 0.035 -
22K 0.19-0.26 0.2-0.4 0.75-1 < 0.4 < 0.3 - - < 0.025 < 0.025 < 0.3
Table 3.3 Physical-mechanical properties of steels, used for the main equipment of RBMK-1500 reactors [21]
Steel type Characteristic Temperature, oC
Specification
20 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550
10ChN1M Sheet σu, MPa 540 530 520 500 491 491 461 451 441
thickness σy, MPa 441 432 422 412 402 392 373 363 353
from 6 to 40 mm εu, % 16 16 16 13 13 13 13 13 14
A, % 50 50 50 50 45 45 40 40 40
Weld-less tubing σu, MPa 491 491 471 451 441 432 412 402 392
hot rolled with σy, MPa 343 333 323 314 304 294 294 294 275
outside diameter εu, % 20 20 20 15 15 15 15 15 15
60-168 mm and A, % 50 50 50 50 45 45 40 40 40
wall thickness from
6 to 32 mm
08Ch18N10T Rolled steel σu, MPa 491 480 461 436 417 397 377 353 328 314 289 270
and forging σy, MPa 196 191 189 186 181 176 172 167 162 157 152 150
with thickness or εu, % 38 37 36 33 31 28 26 25 22 20 20 20
diameter less than A, % 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
200 mm
Plates, forging σu, MPa 491 477 456 426 417 382 358 333 303 289 260 235
from ingot, sheet σy, MPa 196 193 186 181 176 167 162 157 152 144 137 132
bar and stamping eu, % 35 34 33 31 29 27 26 25 24 23 22 22
with diameter from A, % 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
40 to 200mm
The same, σu, MPa 491 475 446 421 392 368 343 314 289 260 235 206
with diameter σy, MPa 196 191 181 172 164 152 147 137 132 123 113 103
more than εu, % 35 34 33 31 29 27 26 25 24 23 22 22
200 mm A, % 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Piping σu, MPa 510 471 461 441 421 421 412 412 402 382 353 333
σy, MPa 216 206 206 196 187 187 177 177 167 157 147 147
εu, % 35 32 30 28 27 26 26 26 25 25 25 25
A, % 55 55 55 54 54 53 52 51 50 48 47 45
22K Sheets with σu, MPa 430 430 430 430 430 421 412 392
thickness from σy, MPa 215 206 196 186 186 186 186 177
70 to 170 mm εu, % 18 18 18 17 17 16 17 18
A, % 40 40 39 38 38 38 39 40
Forging with σu, MPa 390 390 390 383 373 363 353 353
diameter from σy, MPa 195 186 177 167 167 157 157 137
300 to 800 mm εu, % 18 15 13 13 13 13 13 13
A, % 38 38 38 36 36 35 34 34
Forging with σu, MPa 430 392 392 392 392 392 353 343
diameter from σy, MPa 215 206 196 186 186 186 186 177
100 to 800 mm εu, % 16 14 11 11 11 11 11 11
A, % 35 35 35 33 33 32 31 31
43
σu - ultimate strength, MPa,
σy - yield strength, MPa,
εu - ultimate strain, %,
A - area reduction, %.
Table 3.4 Thermo-physical properties of low-alloy steels [23,24]
Temperature, oC 10ChN1M 08Ch18N10T 22K

α, 10 /K
-6
E, GPa α, 10 /K E, GPa λ, W/(mK) a, 10 /K
-6 -6
E, GPa λ, W/(mK)
20 - 210 - 205 - - 200 -

50 11.5 207 16.4 202 - 11.5 197 -
100 11.9 205 16.6 200 16.3 11.9 195 49.5
150 12.2 202 16.8 195 - 12.2 192 -
200 12.5 200 17.0 190 17.5 12.5 190 47.7
250 12.8 197 17.2 185 - 12.8 185 -
300 13.1 195 17.4 180 18.8 13.1 180 45.5
350 13.4 190 17.6 175 - 13.4 175 -
400 13.6 185 17.5 170 21.4 13.6 170 43.5
450 13.8 180 18.0 167 - 13.8 165 -
500 14.0 175 18.2 165 23.0 14.0 160 41.5
550 14.2 170 18.4 162 - 14.2 - -
600 14.4 165 18.5 160 24.6 14.4 - 39.3
700 - - - - 26.8 - - -
α - coefficient of thermal expansion, 1/K,

λ - thermal conductivity, W/(mK),
E - Young's modules, GPa.
Table 3.5 Steel 08Ch18N10T properties at 20 oC after exposure to fast neutrons at different fluences [24]
Fluency, n/cm2 σu, MPa σy, MPa εu, %

o
At exposure temperature of 100 C
- 675 340 53
10E17 730 380 48
5x10E17 720 530 45.5
4.3x10E18 875 710 37
9x10E18 780 680 34.5
10E20 880 780 23
At exposure temperature of 300 oC
- 550 - 40
3x10E19 650 - 27
6x10E19 680 - 21
10E20 720 - 18
3x10E20 750 - 14
5x10E20 770 - 18
7x10E20 790 - 12
Maximum permissible temperatures for steels corrosion at temperatures 260-315 oC amount to 0.0003-
08Ch18N10T and 22K are 600 oC and 350 oC, 0.0018 mm/year [25].
respectively [22]. Austenitic stainless steel 08Ch18N10T
possesses high heat resistance right up to 550-600 oC Cross-section of heat neutron absorption for steel
[24]. This steel has high uniform corrosion resistance in 08Ch18N10t is (2.7-2.9)⋅10-28 m2. Neutron fluency
the water of main circulation circuit up to 360 oC, and in influence to physical-mechanical properties of austenitic
water-steam mixture - up to 650 oC. Losses due to stainless steel is shown in Table 3.5.
44
decrease by 4-6 times. Hydrides have little influence to
With an increase of neutron fluency the elongation of steel indexes of statistical strength and strain elongation.
08Ch18N10T decreases. By exposure to temperatures
higher than 350 oC partial annealing of the radioactive Cladding of fuel assemblies use iodide-zirconium alloy
effects and, hence, reestablishment of physical- with 1 % of niobium, and cladding of fuel channels use an
mechanical properties of steel 08Ch18N10T take place. alloy with 2.5 % of niobium. The physical-mechanical
The temperature of the annealing is about 0.5-0.55 of the properties of the mentioned alloys as well as the Zyrcaloy-
absolute melting temperature. Exposure of austenitic 2 properties, are shown in Table 3.6. Maximum
stainless steel to temperatures higher than 600 oC leads to permissible temperature for using zirconium alloys with 1
loss of fragility. and 2.5 % of niobium is 360 oC [21].
Neutronic exposure has practically no influence on the
corrosion of steel 08Ch18N10T. It can be subject to Influence of neutron exposure on zirconium and its alloys
corrosion cracking with simultaneous presence of chlorine is similar to the influence on steel: ultimate resistance and
and oxygen or other oxidizers and with the presence of especially yield strength increases, ductility decreases,
stretching of the metal. If the stressed metal is in the creep accelerates. Influence of neutronic exposure to
surroundings, of only 1 % of the mentioned agent, fracture of zirconium alloys with niobium is lower in
cracking is not observed [24]. Corrosion cracking of the comparison with that of Zyrcaloy-2. With rise of
steel 08Ch18N10T is observed with the concentration of temperature up to 350-400 oC bad influence of exposure
chlorides on the surface. It is observed that, if to creep decreases. Influence of exposure to physical-
concentration of the chlor-ion on the surface of steel is in mechanical properties of alloy Zr+2.5 % Nb is shown in
saturated steam which contain 0.3-0.4 g/kg oxygen, the Table 3.7.
corrosion is 10-6 g/kg.
Corrosion process are accelerated with increasing
Steel 22K is sensitive to thermal fracture of the operating amounts of oxygen in the reactor water and the
temperature of the NPP equipment. Maximum rise of the availability of exposure. Without exposure such a process
critical temperature of fracture depends very little on the was not observed. The influence of exposure to
temperature of aging. For heating under extended time of hydrogenation is less than that to oxidation. Hydrogen
104 hours it make up 10 oC at aging temperature of 340 absorption by zirconium alloys with niobium is less
o
C and 20 oC at aging temperature of 400 oC [23]. visible than that by Zyrcaloy-2.
As a construction material for manufacturing of cladding In the wall of the fuel channel of the zirconium alloy an
of fuel assemblies and fuel channels of the RBMK-type accumulation of plastic deformation is observed during its
reactors zirconium alloys with admixture of niobium are life-time. Zirconium alloy with 2.5 % of niobium has
used. Zirconium and its alloys have a small cross-section good ductility at initial conditions. However, due to aging,
of absorption of heat neutrons equal to (0.2-0.3)⋅10-29 m2. exposure, creep and cyclic change of temperature, the
Zirconium keeps satisfactory mechanical properties at ductility properties gets worse.
temperatures up to 390-400 oC. Zirconium practically
does not interact with nuclear fuel, does not undergo Fracture of fuel channels because of loss of long-term
plastic deformation either under hot or cold conditions, strength occurs at residual strain of 5-10 %. According to
and has good weldability. Zirconium and its alloys have the studies of the exposure limit on long term strength
good corrosion resistance to reactor water at temperatures increase [25]. Corrosion rate of alloy Zr+2.5 % Nb does
up to 370 oC. not exceed 0.01 g/(m2hour) during the 8000 hour testing,
and under reactor exposure conditions, rise by 5-10 %.
If water possesses both oxygen and ammonia, corrosion
resistance visibly decreases. This condition imposes Aluminum alloys are used for the CPS equipment. They
definite limitations on the choice of the water regime. have good corrosion resistance in the water at
temperatures 100-250 oC. Maximum permissible
At temperatures of 1200-1300 oC zirconium actively temperature for these alloys is 190 oC [21]. Ultimate
interacts with water. This process leads to the release of a strength of these alloys at 20 oC is 150 MPa, and the yield
large amount of heat. This condition is taken into account, strength is 40-50 MPa. At a temperature of 200 oC these
when analysis of accident situations are performed. indexes decrease to 90-100 and 30-40 MPa, respectively.
Niobium not only improves mechanical properties of the 3.2.3 Failure Design Criteria
alloy, but also neutralizes bad influences of admixtures to
the corrosion resistance. Similar to the design of other reactor types, the design of
RBMK-1500 reactors employs a ‘safety factor’ in the
Rise of hydrogen content in zirconium and its alloys determination of the strength of equipment and pipelines.
evoke a hydrogen-induced fracture, which is displayed Maximum stresses in structures must not exceed the
mainly by a decrease of impact strength - at 20 oC it can permissible stresses. Permissible stresses are determined
from the material characteristics at recommended
45
temperatures and include the safety factor. In the code for
strength calculations [21] the following recommended
temperatures were given:
• 20 oC for aluminum and titanium alloys,

• 250 oC for zirconium alloys,
• 350 oC for carbon, alloy, silicon-manganese and high-
chromium steels,
• 450 oC for corrosion-resistant austenitic and high-
temperature chrome-molybdenum-vanadium steels
and for ferrous-nickel alloys.
Table 3.6 Physical-mechanical zirconium alloy properties [24]

Alloy Characteristics Temperature, oC
20 200 300 400
Zr+1 % Nb σu, MPa 350 260 200 180
σy, MPa 200 160 120 90
δ, % 30 31 33 38
Zr+2.5 % Nb σu, MPa 450 320 300 270
σy, MPa 280 220 200 180
δ, % 25 24 23 22
Zyrcaloy-2 σu, MPa 480 250 200 170
σy, MPa 310 150 100 70
δ, % 22 34 35 36
δ - plasticity, %.
Table 3.7 Influence of fluency exposure on physical-mechanical properties of alloy Zr+2.5 % Nb [24]
Working Fluency, Test temperature, σu, σy, εu, δ, %

n/cm2 o
C MPa MPa %
Hardening - 20 870 780 63 13
with 880 oC 1020 20 1000 960 - 10
and aging 1021 20 1110 1080 45 8
with 500 oC - 300 580 530 75 14
during 1020 300 720 680 - 13
24 hours 1021 300 810 780 65 9
Hardening - 300 580 480 70 13

with 960 oC 1020 300 810 770 50 8
and aging 1021 300 860 860 5 4
with 500 oC
during 24 hours
According to the same design code [21], nominal For components of equipment and pipelines, which are
permissible stresses for equipment and pipeline loaded by internal pressure,
components, which are pressure loaded, take the
minimum of the following values: nu = 2.6, ny = 1.5, nut = 1.5.
σ = min {σu(T)/nu, σy(T)/ny, σut(T)/nut}, For components of equipment and pipelines, which are
loaded by external pressure, which is higher than the
where σu - ultimate strength, σy - yield strength, σut - internal pressure
minimum protracted strength during time period t.
nu = 2.6, ny = 2, nut = 2.
46
This calculation procedure for permissible stresses is used P is allowable pressure during tests at the
for static loading conditions. Structural components manufacture plant or working pressure during
subjected to variable, cyclic loading, as a rule, are tests after installation and operation, MPa,
damaged by lower stresses. Therefore, for the final design σ(Th) is the nominal allowable stress at
strength and stability conditions, final calculations are temperature of the hydraulic tests Th, MPa,
performed, which take into account all the expected σ(T) is the nominal allowable stress at
loading and all the operation regimes. During these final recommended temperature T, MPa.
calculations, the following characteristics are taken into
account: For components, which are subjected to loading by
external pressure, the following condition must be
• static strength, fulfilled Ph < 1.25P.
• stability,
• cyclic and long-term cyclic strength, For a pressure P up to 0.49 MPa, the value of Ph should be
• resistance to cleavage fracture, more than 1.5P, but not less than 0.2 MPa. For a pressure
• prolonged statistical strength, P above 0.49 MPa, the value of Ph should not be less than
• progressing deformation, (P+0.29) MPa.
• influence of seismic loading,
• resistance to vibration. Hydraulic tests of equipment would be performed at the
temperature of the tested medium, where the metal
The final calculation procedure is described in detail in temperature of the tested equipment is not lower than the
[21], pages 45-119. minimum allowable, as calculated by the code [21]. In all
cases the temperature of the test and the surrounding
3.2.4 Qualification Tests of Reactor Components medium can not be lower than 5 oC. It is also possible to
calculate the minimum permissible metal temperature Th
The materials of the equipment, including the materials during a hydraulic tests from the correlation’s:
used in the reactor core, must maintain during its
operational life-time high strength with a sufficient level Th > Tk0 - 260 + 73⋅10-6Sσ2y, if Sσ2y< 3.5⋅106,
of ductility and high corrosion resistance. In order to
avoid destructive failure the NPP, equipment is tested
Th > Tk0 - 17 + 3.1⋅10-6Sσ2y, if 3.5⋅106 < Sσ2y < 25⋅106,
before installation for expected conditions during its life-
time. The design, manufacturing, mounting and operation
Th < Tk0 + 48 + 0.47⋅10-6Sσ2y, if Sσ2y > 25⋅106,
of the main metal components and their welds would be
subjected to the requirements, which are regulated by the
where, T is the critical temperature of metal fracture at
references [23, 27, 28]. These requirements are extended
initial conditions, oC,
to vessels under pressure (including hydrostatic and
S is the maximum nominal wall thickness of the
vacuum), reactor vessels with their guard tanks and
equipment, mm,
casings, pump vessels, pipelines and devices of first and
σy is a limit of material yield stress at
second circuit of the NPP.
temperature 20oC, MPa.
Hydraulic Tests [23]
Pressures as well as temperatures of the hydraulic tests
conducted after manufacturing, are indicated by the
Hydraulic tests are performed to control the strength and
manufacturer in the equipment certificate.
leakage of equipment, which is loaded by pressure.
Hydraulic tests of this equipment are performed after the
The permissible metal temperature in the hydraulic tests
manufacturing and installation has been completed.
during equipment operation is determined by the owner of
the equipment on the basis of calculated strength, data
Pressure of the internal hydraulic tests (Ph) must not be
from the equipment certificate, number of load cycles
lower than those calculated by the formula:
(which is known from the operational process) neutron
fluency with energy E > 0.5 MeV and the surveillance-
Ph = Kh P σ(Th)/σ(T) (lower bound),
specimen test data.
and not higher than the pressure which would cause the
The exposure time for the equipment subjected to pressure
tested equipment a nominal membrane stress to 1.35 s
Ph during hydraulic tests must not be less than 10
(Th), and the sum of the nominal local membrane and the
minutes. After the exposure, the pressure is decreased to
nominal flexural stresses to 1.7 s (Th) (upper bound),
the value of 0.8⋅Ph and a visual inspection is performed
wherever possible.
where, K = 1.25 for equipment and pipelines, and K
= 1 for confinement and for guard tanks,
The measurement of pressure during the hydraulics tests
has to be performed by at least two independent
measuring channels. A measurement error can not exceed
47
5 % of the nominal value of the test pressure. specimens are made by the manufacturer of the
Temperature must be controlled by devices with the sum equipment.
error not higher than 3 % from the maximum value of the
measuring temperature. Technological Control of RBMK-1500 Reactor
Components
A test program is prepared before the hydraulic tests.
After the test the data are prepared and documented. In order to avoid reactor component damage it is
necessary to ensure an optimal thermal operation regime.
The equipment is considered having passed the test, if Technological control of reactor components is provided
during the test or visible inspection it does not reveal leaks by a system of temperature monitors of graphite cladding
or rupture of metal, pressure drop does not exceed a and reactor metal structures.
permissible limit, and if after the tests visible residual
strains are not discovered. Temperature of cylindrical casing of the reactor is
controlled along one generatrix at four elevation points.
Control of the State of Metallic Equipment During On top and bottom metal structures, which are under
Operation [23] considerable thermal stresses, 30 points are monitored
during stationary and transient regimes. Cable chromel-
Control of the state of the NPP metallic equipment is alumel thermocouple (type TChA-1449) placed inside
performed to uncover light structural defects, changes of protective case of corrosion-resistant steel with two
physical-mechanical properties, as well as to estimate the modification - for putting into another special case and
metal. Estimation of the metal state during the equipment one without that case - is used for temperature measuring
operation is performed using both indestructible and of metal structures. The use of special cases for
destructible methods. Metal testing by indestructible positioning the TChA-1449 thermocouple does make it
methods is performed using visual, capillary, supersonic possible to change thermocouples.
and radiography methods. Destructible methods are used
to test metal components and welds by means The temperature of metal structures is automatically
surveillance-specimens, namely: monitored by the information-computing system
"TITAN" and in the case of excess of an assigned value, a
• changes of mechanical properties (yield strength,
deviation is depicted on the screen and in print.
temporary resistance, change in elongation, change in
Information about temperatures of the metal structure is
cross-section),
available upon operator's request.
• characteristics of resistance of cleavage fracture
The error of the temperature measurement does not
(critical temperature of fracture, viscosity of
exceed 2 %, the time constant of the cable thermocouple
destruction or critical crack opening),
is less than 5 s, and the time constant of the thermocouples
• characteristics of solid and local corrosion (inter- in the protective case - no more than 60 s. The magnitude
granular stress corrosion), of cumulative errors are estimated for internal heat-
• changes in characteristics of cyclic strength (fatigue evolution in elements of thermometric devices and for
strength). heat exchange conditions using benchmarked objects. As
a rule, methodical errors have a positive sign. This means
Periodical inspection of metallic components by that thermal converters give an excessive reading in
indestructible methods is performed on the following time comparison with the actual temperature value. Thus, there
scale: is some reserve in the control parameters.
a) first - not later than after 20000 hours of operation, Primary converters of type D-2373 are used for control of
b) subsequent - not later than after 30000 hours from pressure differences between the cylindrical casing and
the previous test. the reactor space.
Tests of the surveillance-specimens, which are placed Quality Assurance of Welded Joints
inside the reactor vessel, are performed not less than 6
times per expected life-time of the component. First A large number of welds are present in an RBMK type
unloading and tests of surveillance-specimen are NPP. Welding is the main method for joining a
performed after one year from the start of the operation, considerable number of pipelines with elements of
and subsequently - every three years during the first 10 equipment, devices and metal structures, which were
years of operation on the condition, that during the first manufactured from carbon, austenitic and other special
unloading the neutron fluency at the reactor vessel is not steals. Pipelines at Ignalina NPP are of different outside
less than 1022 n/m2, but not more than 1023 n/m2 (E > diameters ranging from less than 0.1 to more than 1.0 m.
0.5 MeV). Surveillance-specimens for control of Total amount of welded joints reaches hundreds of
mechanical properties and its characteristics for thousands. Therefore, a continuous control of quality
redundancy to cleavage fracture are placed into the fuel assurance of welds by appropriate measuring equipment is
channels. Detectors for measuring of neutron fluency and necessary.
temperature are placed with the specimens. Surveillance-
48
Concrete is a composite material, which consists of a
For quality control of welded joints and surfacing the binder, fine and coarse aggregates. In most cases portland
following methods are used [28]: cement is used as binder, sand is used as fine aggregate.
For preparation of coarse aggregate used in protection
• visual inspection and measurement of main concretes, metamorphic rocks (serpentinite) are used, as
dimensions of welds, well as metallic ores (magnetite, chromite, hematite),and
• chromatic and luminescent detection (to reveal artificial materials (chamotte, boron carbide).
internal defects, which become apparent on the
surface), For radiological protection of the Ignalina NPP ordinary
• magnetic-particle inspection (for ferro-magnetic heavy concrete with a density of 2.2 t/m3 is used most
steals, it is possible to find defects at depths up to 8- widely, and to a smaller degree, particularly heavy
10 mm from the surface), concrete with a density of 4.0 t/m3 [2]. Special protective
• radiographic inspection, concretes or solutions with complex chemical composition
• ultrasonic detection, are used in very small amounts. At the Ignalina NPP
• hydraulic tests of strength and leakage, serpentinite solution is used as a filling of top metallic
• control of welded joint tightness by means of helium structures. Density of the serpentinite solution is about 1.7
and halogen leak detectors, t/m3 [2].
• laboratory testing methods (mechanical properties,
metallography investigations, tests of inter-granular Use of concrete for radiological protection of nuclear
corrosion, etc.). This inspection should be carried out reactors is possible provided the following conditions are
for the surveillance-specimens that are cut-out from met:
the welded joints made according to the same welding
technology using the same surfacing materials and • the concrete has properties which are resistant to the
heating facilities, welded using the same equipment effects of both neutron and γ-radiation and can
and subjected to the same monitoring method as the maintain satisfactory mechanical and thermo-physical
joint under inspection. characteristics,
• temperature stresses, which arise in the concrete and
The specimens are placed in a special container. A reinforcement, deformations and cracks do not exceed
complete set should include the following specimens: permissible values,
• specimens for determining the mechanical properties, 3.3.2 Material Properties Used
• specimens for determining the critical fracture
temperature. All initial concrete properties are determined at normal
Six containers each of which is a single set, represent a temperature (20 oC) and depend on concrete consistency.
suspension that is arranged in the reactor close to the Protective properties of concretes are determined by two
bottom and top metal structures of the reactor. The
suspension structure enables the removal of specimens
without difficulties and to separate each section for
handling and further testing of the specimens.
3.3 DESIGN OF CONCRETE STRUCTURES
3.3.1 Standard Construction Practices
The NPP concrete, which serves as a structural

component, is also used as a material for radiological
protection. For radiological protection of the NPP heavy
concrete is used with volumetric mass density from 1.8 to
2.5 t/m3 and particularly heavy concrete with density of
more than 2.5 t/m3.
Heavy concretes for radiological protection, which can be

employed at temperatures up to 50 oC, are called ordinary
heavy concretes. Concretes, which are used at
temperatures from 51 to 350 oC, are called concretes for
abnormally high temperatures. Concretes, which are used
at temperatures higher than 350 oC are called heat
resistance concretes.
49
main factors: chemical composition and nuclear density.
Composition and protective properties of ordinary and
particularly heavy as well as serpentinite concretes are
shown in Tables 3.8 and 3.9.
Variation of structural and material properties caused by

the influence of ionizing radiation, depends on two main
factors, namely, composition and the radiation load on the
material. After radiation all concretes (except chromite)
increase in volumetric dimensions, and the density
decreases. The influence of radiation on strength of
concrete is shown in Table 3.10.
Compression strength of ordinary heavy concrete depends

on the type of cement used and can reach 50 MPa.
Heat conductivity and the coefficient of thermal expansion
range up to 700 oC is 1.14 W/(mK) and 3.5⋅10-6 oC-1,
respectively. Limiting permissible temperature of ordinary
heavy concrete is 1200 oC [31]. Concrete exposure to
neutron flux leads to a storage of radiation defects in the
concrete, which can be a cause of variation of their
mechanical and thermo-physical properties. The exposure
of ordinary heavy concrete to a neutron fluence up to
5⋅1019 n/cm2 does not change properties significantly.
Increasing the fluence to 1.45⋅1020 n/cm2 leads to visible
variation of properties: decreasing of density to 7-11 %,
thermal conductivity to 30-35 %, coefficient of linear
thermal expansion by 5-10 times, compressive strength
and elastic properties to 10-20 % [32].
Compressive strength of particularly heavy (chromite)

concrete depends on the type of cement used and may
reach 40 MPa. Heat conductivity and coefficient of
thermal expansion at 700 oC is 1.57 W/(mK) and 3.4x10-
6 o -1
C , respectively. The permissible temperature operating
limit of particularly heavy (chromite) concrete is 1700 oC
[31].
Compressive strength of serpentinite concrete is 40 -

62.5 MPa Elastic modules of serpentinite concrete varies
from 18200 to 6800M at temperature variation from 20 to
500 oC, respectively. Serpentinite concrete is a heat
resistant material and has a coefficient of heat
conductivity, which linearly decreases from 0.91 to
0.74 W/(mK) with temperature increase from 20 to
450 oC. Coefficient of linear expansion is constant in
temperature interval 100-450 oC and equals 4.2⋅10-6 oC-1.
Limit of permissible temperature for serpentinite concrete
is 500 oC [31]. Maximum change of coefficient of linear
expansion of serpentinite concrete is 1.3-1.7 % and is
affected by exposure dose of (1.3-1.7)⋅1021 n/cm2.
Strength of serpentinite concrete with increase of
exposure dose (1.3-1.7)⋅1021 n/cm2 reduces to 40 % of the
original strength. Variation of the modules of elasticity is
nearly the same as the strength variation. Thermal
conduction coefficient decreases by 13 % upon exposure
of 1.7⋅1021 n/cm2. Coefficient of linear thermal
expansion at exposed and nonexposed serpentinite
concrete by repeated heating is the same (6-7)⋅10-6 oC-
1
[33].
50
Table 3.8 Chemical compositions of different concretes [30]
Concrete Chemical elements, kg/m3
H O B C Na Mg Al Si Ca Fe S F Cr
Ordinary heavy 8 1275 - - - - 110 774 137 46 - - -

Particularly heavy - 1200 - 2 29 194 175 145 119 263 2 21 1119
(chromite)
Particularly heavy 10 1150 - - - - 30 661 164 1245 - - -
(magnetite)
Serpentinite 25 1000 12 - - 332 42 309 132 86 9 - -
Table 3.9 Neutron and gamma quantum attenuation parameters of concrete [29,30]
Concrete Cross-section Storage coefficient Attenuation of gamma

radiation with
of extraction for X = 1.0 - 1.5 m
E = 3 MeV coefficient
Σr Ki Kh Kg µ, µ/ρ,
m-1 (W/m2)/(n/cm2) m-1 10-3m2/kg
Ordinary heavy 8.0 10.2 105 130 8.52 3.63

Particularly heavy (chromite) 10.02 1000 100 900 11.84 3.63
Particularly heavy (magnetite) 9.5 18.0 8 100 11.90 3.63
Serpentinite 6.5 20.0 82 93 7.01 3.64
Ki, Kh - storage coefficients of intermediate and heat neutron, respectively, (W/m2)/(n/cm2),

K - storage coefficients of gamma radiation capture, (W/m2)/(n/cm2),
Σr - macroscopic extraction of protection material, m-1,
µ - linear coefficient of attenuation of gamma quantum flux density, m-1,
µ/ρ - mass coefficient of attenuation of gamma radiation, m2/kg,
X - thickness of protection, m.
Table 3.10 Radiation influence to strength of concretes [29]
Concrete Neutron flux, n/cm2 Temperature, oC Compressive strength, MPa
Ordinary heavy 0 20 12.5

20
(0.4-0.6)⋅10 100 12.5
20
(1.2-1.4)⋅10 150 10.0
20
(3-4)⋅10 180 4.5
0 200 9.0
Particularly heavy (chromite) 0 20 12.0
20
(16-24)⋅10 550-650 4.8
0 550 7.9
Serpentinite 0 20 9.0
20
(1.3-1.9)⋅10 100-150 9.5
(5-6)⋅1020 200-250 7.0
20
(13-17)⋅10 250-300 4.0
0 300 11.0
51
3.4 SELECTION OF MECHANICAL AND Flow of the main feedwater pumps must correspond to the
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT steam generation rate of the nuclear reactor with a margin
of 10 %. In case of failure of one pump, the rest would
3.4.1 Compliance with Code Requirements provide the reactor operation by nominal capacity of all
steam generating equipment. Three main feedwater
The main components of an NPP with the RBMK-type pumps for each circulation loop are used at the Ignalina
reactors is: the nuclear reactor itself, equipment of the NPP based on the so-called 3 x 50 % principle.
MCC (including MCP, pipelines, devices), separator
drums, turbines, generators and transformers. Each unit of the Ignalina NPP is provided with six
AFWPs. The capacity of each pump is sufficient to
Principal Components of the Main Circulation Circuit provide removal of residual heat from the core.
Approximate flow of one AFWP is 2-4 % of the nominal
The design power of the Ignalina NPP the RBMK-1500 is feedwater requirement. Pipeline systems, as well as
1500 MW, though as noted previously after the Chernobyl electrical cables to auxiliary feedwater pumps, are laid
event it was reduced to 1370 MW. The steam generation independently from the corresponding lines of the main
capacity of the nuclear reactor is determined by the feedwater pumps.
nominal steam flow rate to the turbines, by a pre-set
temperature in the turbine condenser, and all thermal For reliable removal of thermal energy from the reactor
loads for the internal requirements of the NPP, and during startup and shutdown of the unit special steam-
requirements needs of the industrial site and the local relief valves are installed to the steam discharge to the
residential settlement. The final calculated value of turbine condensers (SDV-C), to the fifth pool of the
steam generation capacity is increased by a margin of at accident confinement system (SDV-A) and to the
least 3 %. deaerators (SDV-D). These steam discharge valves have a
safety margin of 100 %. Their capacity is determined to
The RBMK-1500 reactor has two independent main provide an appropriate cool-down rate for the reactor.
forced circulation circuits. Each MCC consists of four The removal of residual heat in the core as well as the
main circulation pumps, two separator drums and the heat, which is accumulated by equipment and coolant is
necessary pipes and associated equipment taken into account.
At the Ignalina NPP type CVN-8 main circulation pumps Feedwater, which is directed to the reactor, should be well
are used. The shaft of the pump has a flywheel to increase deaerated. To this end, the use of deaerators in thermal
the MCP slow-down period to 120-130 s by loss of power schematic was foreseen. All aerated water flows
of electrical motor. A moment of inertia of the CVN-8 is (drainage, overflows from drainage tanks, condensate
9400 kgm2, and the total moment of inertia of the pump overflows, etc.) are fed to the deaerators if they have a
complex is 13150 kgm2. temperature exceeding 50 oC. In the opposite case, they
are directed to the condensers of the turbines. Total
The MCPs provide the main circulation circuits with the capacity of the deaerators is selected based on the
required flow and the pressure head. As a rule, parameters maximum feedwater flow with a margin not less than
of the pump correspond to the characteristics of the off- 10 %. Two deaerators are provided for each turbine plant.
site network and have a head margin of 2-4 %. Feedwater margin in the tanks of main deaerators
provides for one unit operation with full power during a
Internal pipe diameters of the MCC of Ignalina NPP are time period not less than 180 s.
0.02-0.9 m, and the flow rates are 2-12 m3/s.
For water supply to the separator drum in case of
Selection of profile for the MCC pipelines and the emergency cool-down of the reactor a permanent margin
strength calculations is performed in accordance with of feedwater in special tanks is foreseen. Two such tanks
code rules for calculation of strength for the reactor are available, their capacity can provide sufficient coolant
equipment of the NPPs [21,23]. to sustain an NPP operation at full power of at least 300 s.
On the other, hand an operation at power equal to 2 %
Principal Equipment of the Turbine Plants from nominal (for removal of residual heat) should not be
less than 10 hours. Loss of feedwater is supplanted by de-
An RBMK-1500 plant is equipped with two type K-750- mineralized water.
65 turbines. Although the installation of two turbines in
the NPP is somewhat expensive, it nevertheless enables to Three condensate pumps are used for each turbine, each
utilize the capacity of the unit more effectively, because in pump providing 50 % of the nominal flow. The head of
the RBMK-type reactors it is possible to do the core the condensate pumps is designed to overcome the
loading without reactor shutdown. Moreover, the hydraulic resistance from the turbine condensers to the
availability of two turbines in one unit makes it easier to deaerators, including the water pressure in the
do general turbine repairs (during operation), which deaerators.
normally need a considerable amount of time.
52
3.4.2 Qualification Tests and Analyses • downcomers from the separator drum to discharge
header,
Operation of installed equipment and systems is permitted • charging and discharging pipelines of the MCC.
only after stringent control measures are taken and
equipment acceptance tests are completed. Acceptance During high velocity flushing of individual elements and
and pre-operational tests of installed equipment and pipelines it is necessary to ensure that the flushing
systems usually begin 8-12 months before start-up of the velocity is 1.5 time higher than nominal design values,
NPP. They are performed by the constructors in but not lower than 2.5 m3/s.
cooperation with the customer. For the installing of the
NPP equipment the following tests were performed: A criterion that the “cold” flushing has been performed
successfully is a water transparency of not less than 95 %.
• tests of individual equipment, tests of safety systems Hot flushing of the MCC is provided to ensure cleanliness
and of the automatic activation or deactivation of of the internal cavities of equipment and the pipelines.
equipment, Water is heated in the MCC by the operation of the
• circulation of "cold" and "hot" coolant, flushing of MCP. During hot circulation flushing each half of the
NPP equipment and systems, MCC is in turn connected to two MCP’s. The water
• test of reactor equipment and systems under ‘hot’ temperature is maintained at 250 oC at a flow rate of
conditions with coolant parameters near to design about 8 m3/s. The water is cleaned continuous by
values but without loading of nuclear fuel into the mechanical filters and special grid filters, which are
reactor core, temporarily used in the group distribution headers.
• startup of the reactor and testing of its nuclear-
physical characteristics, Effectiveness of hot flushing is controlled not only by
• start of energy generation and complex testing of all transparency, but also by monitoring the presence of
NPP equipment and systems at nominal power, corrosion products and chemical admixtures in the water.
• tests at design power. According to code, a transparency of the flushing water of
at least 95% is required, corrosion products must decrease
Individual Tests to o concentration of less than 10-3 g/kg, chloride - less
than 10-4 g/kg, and the total hardness of water must be
Tests of Individual NPP components and equipment less than 10-6 g(equiv.)/kg. Oil and mechanical
consist of the following: admixtures in that water are not permitted after hot
circulation flushing.
• hydraulic or pneumatic tests for strength and leak-
tightness of vessels, heat exchangers, shells of pumps, A characteristic of the NPP with RBMK - type reactors is
pipeline systems and other equipment, that the main quantity of metal corrosion products (up to
• tests at low speeds of rotating mechanisms (electric 90%) in the MCC are generated by reaction occurring
motors, pumps, ventilators, electric drives), with feedwater. Therefore, the condensate-feed circuit and
• testing of equipment (engines, mechanisms, pumps) other auxiliary systems of the turbine room are subjected
by operation at full load for the specified test time to careful cleaning from post-installation contamination
period. as well as from corrosion products. Mechanical cleaning,
high velocity flushing and chemical flushing of all the
Post-installation Flushing of the MCC and Turbine Hall main and auxiliary systems of the turbine room are used
Equipment for this purpose. For high velocity flushing of the main
pipelines of the condensate-feed circuit, the water
The equipment is flushed by "cold" and "hot" coolant to velocity has to beat least 3-4 m3/s. Effectiveness of the
ensure a thorough cleaning of the internal cavities of the cleaning procedures are controlled mainly by requiring
Ignalina NPP equipment and pipelines. Flushing by water transparencies of at least 90 %.
circulation of coolant in the MCC was performed in two
steps: first, high velocity water was used to flush separate Several equipment items and pipelines of the condensate-
sections, the flushed water being directed to waste feed section require a more extensive cleaning procedure.
disposal. Second, the MCC was flushed with cold water at Therefore, together with water flushing, a procedure using
temperatures up to 100 oC and with hot water at a chemically active (acidic) wash of selected pipes and
temperatures 250-270 oC. equipment is performed. For this purpose a flushing
solution at a flow rate of 0.2-0.3 m3/s is circulated by
A large portion of the NPP equipment, systems and special acid-resistant pumps. The procedure employs
pipelines are subjected to high velocity water flushing: tanks for storage of solutions of chemical reagents and
temporary pipelines. After the chemical flushing a special
• all fuel channels, flush using ammonia is performed to neutralize acidic
• top and bottom water communication lines, residues.
• pipelines of the purification and cooling system,
• cooling circuit of the CPS channels, Acclimatization of Equipment at Hot Conditions
53
The RBMK equipment is operated under hot conditions decrease of water in fuel channels with fuel assemblies
only after completion of the complex testing program and in channels with CPS rods,
assuring the quality of the installed and manufactured • the absolute measurement of neutron flux (neutron
components and systems. During the hot acclimatization power) using activation methods and an initial survey
of the reactor equipment and systems, the hydro- of the measurement generated by emission detectors
dynamical characteristics of the reactor and main and ionization instruments. The relation of these
circulation circuit, reliability of reactor control and measurement to the thermal power of the reactor.
protection systems, as well as other systems, which
provide safe and reliable operation of the reactor are The start-up phase of the RBMK-1500 reactor is
tested. Average duration of the warm-up of the NPP completed by transferring control of low-power level to
equipment is about 10-15 days. From the results of the the CPS. This is a power level at which automatic
warm-up period conclusions regarding the quality and controls can become effective and amounts to about 1 %
reliability of installation of the equipment and pipelines of the nominal thermal power. At this power level the
are made. This includes the assessment of the readiness temperature reactivity coefficients are determined by
of the reactor and all its service systems including the temperature variation in the range of 100-150 oC. Heat-up
loading of the nuclear fuel to the core of the reactor. of water in the MCC is accomplished by utilizing four
MCPs ( two by two at each half of the MCC).
Startup of the Reactor
Start of Power Generation and Testing of Reactor at
Startup procedures of the RBMK-1500 reactor include the Power
determination of flux and power distribution of the initial
core loading and the evaluation of the main neutronic and Testing of NPP equipment and systems for power
thermal characteristics of the reactor. In order to provide operation is accomplished at power levels from 1 to
reliable control and to ensure nuclear safety during the 10 % of the nominal reactor power. Initiation of power
loading of fuel assemblies into the core a highly sensitive generation for the RBMK-type reactors proceeds in
CPSs is used in addition to the regular control and several stages each of which encompasses a gradually
protection system. This CPS makes it possible to control widening range of tests.
the neutron flux and the reactor reactivity level, and
provides an emergency shutdown if necessary. Before completion of the first stage of energy startup, an
adjustment and trial of the fuel channel failure detection
Fuel assemblies are loaded in several stages. During the system is performed. During the first energy startup stage,
first stage criticality of the reactor is achieved. At room the main pipelines are cleaned by steam, which is
temperature this consists of 23-24 fuel assemblies, which generated in the reactor. To carry out the proper steam
have an initial enrichment of 2 %. In the second stage the blow-through steam flows of up to 95-100 kg/s must be
number of fuel assemblies is increased to 916 and generated at a pressure in the separator drums of about
154 additional absorbers and 56-60 CPS rods are inserted 1.2-1.4 MPa. Therefore, the MCC water is heated to 80-
into the core. In the subsequent stages the initial core is 100 oC by operation of the MCP, and subsequently fission
loading is completed. During the determination of the power is increased to up to 8-10 % of the nominal power.
neutron flux distribution of the initial core loading the The rate of temperature increase in the MCC must not
power is on the order of 10-5-10-4 % of the nominal value. exceed 10 oC/h.
At this low power the neutron-physical characteristics of
the reactor, the effectiveness of the CPS rods and the Blow-through of steam through the main pipelines is
reactivity margin are established. The composition of the performed in the following sequence: separator drum,
initial core loading of the RBMK-1500 reactor consists of main pipeline, main steam gate valve, pipeline from the
1445-1455 fuel assemblies and 230-240 additional main steam valve to the emergency regulating valve,
absorbers. temporary blowdown pipeline, discharge to atmosphere.
The blow-through of the main pipelines is maintained foe
During the first stage single fuel assemblies are loaded 15-20 minutes, and the total time for blowdown of all the
into the reactor. In the subsequent stages it is feasible to pipelines is 15-20 hours. To provide the necessary amount
load two assemblies. Total time for full scale core loading of steam, the deaerators, separator drums and tanks are
is about 20-25 days. filled with 3500-4000 m3 of de-mineralized water.
During startup of the reactor several measurement The second stage of the startup involves adjustment of the
programs are carried out. This includes measurement of main and auxiliary equipment of the reactor and turbine
the following parameters: hall at powers of up to 10 % of the nominal as well as an
adjustment of steam discharge valves, emergency steam
• integral and differential effectiveness of the CPS, reception systems, safety valves at the separator drum
• the reactivity variation generated by increase or and bubble condensers. At this stage the reactor power
is varied from 2 to 10 % from the nominal.
54
The third start-up stage involves a test startup of the The safety and reliability of reactor operation at a given
reactor accompanied by testing of individual turbine power level is checked. This includes the following tests
generators under a relatively small load (75-100 MW). and procedures:
A complete testing program of the NPP equipment and • optimization of power density distribution and
systems is carried out during 72 hours at specific power by determination of other thermal parameters,
means of nominal parameters in all circuits. • investigation of the degree of stress imposed on
individual structural components and the NPP
Approach to Design Power systems,
• analysis of transient characteristics of main
Testing of the NPP at design power is performed in equipment,
several stages, beginning from 10 % of the nominal • estimation and evaluation of the heat balance in the
power and subsequently in steps of 20-30, 40-45, 55-60, MCC and in the turbine room,
75, 85-90 and 100 % of the nominal thermal power. • debugging of codes employed for the calculation of
At each stage, acceptance tests of the thermal- neutronic and thermal core properties, as well as for
hydraulic components and electronic equipment are control of fuel channel parameters,
carried out. • adjustment of water purification units and provision of
water-chemical regime in the MCC and other NPP
circuits.
55
4. REACTOR
For the most part this Section describes the mechanical reactivity coefficient. The real fuel burnup is about 12-
aspects of plant features located in the core region or its 16 MWdays/kg for loading of fuel with 2% enrichment,
immediate vicinity. This encompasses the description of and not less 21 MWdays/kg for loading fuel with 2.4 %
the fuel channels, the core block itself, its surrounding enrichment. The fuel clusters are cooled by water which
structures and shields. Section 4.3 describes the various enters at the bottom at a subcooling of 30 oC and exits the
control and instrumentation channels, the control rod channels at an average steam volume fraction of about
drives and the fuel handling system, Section 4.4 presents 76%. Nominal coolant flow rate at design power is 10000
the core block draining system. Section 4.5 departs from kg/s.
mechanical aspects and outlines the major operational
procedures which directly involve the reactor core. 4.2 DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM
4.1 DESIGN BASIS The position of the reactor core and its main components
in a RBMK-1500 plant is shown in the schematic cross-
The RBMK-1500 is fueled by a graphite-moderated, section through the main reactor building provided in Fig.
water-cooled reactor core having a thermal power 4.1.
generation capacity of 4800 MW. It is designed to provide
saturated steam at a pressure of 7.0 MPa. The fuel is low The core of the reactor is housed in a 25 m deep,
enrichment UO2 which is loaded into the core in the 21x21 m cross-section concrete vault. The core volume is
form of zirconium clad, 13.6 mm diameter fuel rods. dominated by a large cylindrical graphite stack (1), an
Initial enrichment was 2%, since 1997 reload fuel is isometric drawing of this structure is shown in Fig. 4.2.
2.4%. Fuel clusters are made up of 18 such rods and each The graphite stack is constructed of closely packed
is positioned in an individual vertical fuel channel. There graphite blocks stacked into columns and provided with
are 1661 vertical fuel channels having an active fuel an axial opening. Most of the openings contain fuel
length of 7 m. Design fuel burnup is 21.6 MWdays/kg channels. A number of them also serve other purposes
though presently this can be lower because of safety- (e.g. instrumentation, reactivity regulation). Therefore,
imposed restrictions related to minimizing of the steam adapting the nomenclature of the designer, these will be
referred to as "special channels".
Fig. 4.1 General view of the reactor

1 - graphite stack, 2 - fuel channel feeder pipes, 3 - water pipes, 4 - distribution header, 5 - emergency core cooling pipes, 6
- pressure pipes, 7 - main circulation pump, 8 -suction pipes, 9 - pressure header, 10 - bypass pipes, 11 - suction header, 12 -
downcomers, 13 - steam and water pipes, 14 - steam pipes, 15 - refueling machine, 16 - separator drum
55
Fig. 4.2 General view of the graphite stack and the water-steam piping
The graphite stack is located in a hermetically sealed mixture [62]. In the radial direction as well as above and
cavity consisting of cylindrical walls and top and bottom below the reactor it is surrounded by the primary
metal plates. The entire reactor cavity is filled with a biological shield structures.
helium (about 40 % by mass) and nitrogen mixture which
prevents graphite oxidation and improves heat transfer The coolant channels penetrating the reactor core are
from the graphite to the fuel channels. In order to prevent divided into two essentially independent cooling loops:
loss of helium, the space surrounding the cylindrical one containing 830, the other 831 vertical channels with
graphite stack is filled with nitrogen at a pressure of about fuel assemblies. Each loop is provided with four main
0.29 - 0.98 kPa greater than that of the helium-nitrogen circulation pumps, one of which is kept in reserve during
56
normal operation. The circulation of the coolant in each x 0.25 m, and heights of 0.2, 0.3, 0.5 and 0.6 m of which
of the reactor cooling loops can be traced with the help of the 0.6 m blocks are most common. The short blocks are
Fig. 4.1. Water from the main pump pressure header (9) used only in the top and bottom end reflectors, as required
is distributed first to 20 group distribution headers (4) to provide a staggered fit to neighboring columns. The
from there to the feeder pipes (3), these then lead to the total mass of graphite is about 1700 tons. The material
individual fuel channels. The water rises past the fuel must meet stringent purity requirements and has a density
assemblies, attains its saturation temperature, partly of 1650 kg/m3.
vaporizes (average steam quality is 23 %) and, in the form
of a steam-water mixture, flows through the header pipes The outer edge of the graphite stack is covered by a metal
(13) to the separator drums (16). Here the two-phase liner. The four rows of columns at the outer edge make up
mixture is separated, and the steam continues to the the radial reflector, and a 0.5 m thick layer at the top and
turbines. The condensate passes through deaerators, bottom make up the end reflectors. The blocks possess a
returns to the separator drums where it mixes with the 0.114 m diameter bore opening through the vertical axis.
unvaporized water. From there the condensate flows via This provides a total of 2044 channels which are used for
standpipes to the pump suction header (11), and then to placing fuel clusters, reactivity regulating control rods and
the main circulation pumps (7), which return it to the fuel several types of instruments into the core. In the
channels. remaining 444 columns located within the radial reflector
the central holes are filled by graphite rods, increasing the
As noted in previously, one of the important density and neutron reflecting effectiveness of this part of
characteristics of RBMK reactors is their online refueling the graphite stack. As shown in Fig. 4.3, the graphite
capability. Refueling at full reactor power is accomplished columns rest on a steel support plate (5) which, in turn, is
by means of the fueling machine (15). Under normal supported by a steel bushing (4). The bushing is welded to
operation and nominal reactor power, it is feasible to the top plate of the bottom biological shield. At the top of
change up to two fuel assemblies per day (24-hours). the stack, the columns are fastened and centered with
The maximum capacity of this machine is 5 fuel respect to the guide pipes (9) welded into the top
assemblies per day. biological shield, by means of shield plates (7) and
junction sleeves (8).
The reactor is provided with instrumentation systems
monitoring the following parameter groups:
• axial and radial core flux distribution,

• fuel channel integrity,
• fuel cladding integrity in each fuel channel,
• coolant flow for each channel,
• metal structure and graphite temperature.
These systems provide integral information regarding the

operation of the entire reactor and information regarding
specified reactor core segments and individual fuel
channels. Because of the very large size of the core and
the resulting weak neutronic coupling of distant core
segments, reactor operation requires a detailed spatial
resolution of the main operational parameters.
4.2.1 The Graphite Stack
An isometric view of the graphite stack is presented in

Fig. 4.2. The graphite stack of the RBMK-1500 reactors
serves several functions. The primary one is neutron
moderation and reflection, but it also provides structural
integrity and in the event of a temporary cooling
malfunction, a relatively large heat capacity.
The graphite blocks are assembled within the inner cavity

of the reactor on a supporting metal structure. The stack Fig. 4.3 Segment of the graphite stack
can be visualized as a vertical cylinder, made up of 1 - top ring, 2 - diaphragm, 3 - bottom ring, 4 -
2488 graphite columns, constructed from various types of bushing, 5 - steel support plates, 6 - graphite rods, 7 -
graphite blocks. Fig. 4.3 illustrates how these blocks fit shield plates, 8 - standpipe, 9 - guide pipe, 10 -
together in the lower and upper regions of the stack. The reinforcing tube (reflector cooling channel), 11 - outer
blocks are rectangular parallelepipeds, with a base of 0.25 steel shell, 12 - ring plate
57
The shield and support plates have a similar purpose: The corners of the rectangular cross-sections of the
namely, they consist of steel and, in addition to their graphite columns in the stack are hollow and incorporate
fundamental function of joining the intermediate elements 17 vertical 45 mm diameter instrumentation channels
of the graphite stack, also ensure thermal insulation of the used for measuring the temperatures of the graphite stack
top and bottom metal structures, and in part serve as itself as well as the support and the shielding plates.
biological shielding. A diaphragm, indicated as (2) in Fig. Thirteen of these channels are positioned within the
4.3 is fastened to the support bushings by means of a boundaries of the core, while four are in the radial
special rings (1), (3). Its primary purpose is to channel the reflector. Within each channel the temperature is
helium-nitrogen flow coming through the bottom measured at 5 vertical positions.
biological shield into the spaces between the channels
and the graphite blocks. Secondly, it is intended to reduce The graphite stack, including its hermetically sealed
the radioactive heat transfer between the support plates cavity, is called the sealed reactor space. This space is
and the top plate of the bottom biological shield. The filled with a circulating helium-nitrogen mixture at a
diaphragm is a 5 mm thick stainless steel sheet. The pressure of 0.49 - 1.96 kPa. During normal operation, the
radial span between the diaphragm and the inside of the gas is supplied by means of 0.3 m inside diameter tubes,
stack shell (11) is covered by a ring (12). and removed through the fuel channel integrity
monitoring system. Four drainage tubes (inside diameter
Radial creep of the graphite stack is restrained by of 0.15 m) are provided in order to guard against
156 hollow reinforcing bars (10). These bars are positioned accidental releases.
in the peripheral columns of the radial reflector. At the
bottom, the reinforcing bars are welded to the support When the reactor is in operation, all the components
plate, while at the top they fit loosely into the guide tubes listed above are subjected to conditions of high
welded to the bottom plate of the top biological shield. temperature and intense neutron/gamma radiation. For
This connection at the top allows freedom for thermal example, the temperature of the support structures in the
expansion. Since the reinforcing bars are hollow, they top part of the bottom biological shield reaches 350oC.
also serve as reflector cooling channels. Cooling water to The temperature of the bottom support plates reaches
these channels is supplied from above. The reinforcing 440oC, while the maximum calculated graphite
bars are made from stainless steel tubes, with outside temperature is 750oC.
diameters of 0.110 m and wall thickness of 5 mm.
21000
17000
Fig. 4.4 Cross-section of the reactor vault

1 - top cover, removable floor of the central hall, 2 - top metal structure filled with serpentinite, 3 - concrete vault, 4 - sand
cylinder, 5 - annular water tank, 6 - graphite stack, 7 - reactor vessel, 8 - bottom metal structure, 9 - reactor support plates, 10
- steel blocks, 11 - roller supports
58
4.2.2 Reactor Metal Structures
Fig. 4.4 provides a schematic overview of the principal

metal components surrounding and supporting the reactor
core. They consist of welded metal structures which
transmit the weight of the reactor core and its components
to the concrete foundations, and ensure the leaktightness
of the inner reactor cavity. These structures also
contribute to biological shielding.
The graphite stack is surrounded by a water-filled

biological shield tank, where the water is contained in an
annular metal tank (5). It has an outside diameter of 19 m,
an inside diameter of 16.6 m, the plate wall thickness is
30 mm. Internally this reservoir is divided into 16 water-
filled sealed vertical sections. Water is supplied to these
reservoirs from the bottom, and is removed from the top.
This shield component also contains the startup and
operating range ion chamber channels, and
instrumentation piping for thermocouples assigned to
monitor shield water temperature. The space between the
wall of the concrete vault and the shield tank (4) is filled Fig. 4.5 Top metal structures
with sand.
The bottom metal core support (9) shown in Fig.4.4
The most complicated heavy components are the top (2)
supports the weight of the entire graphite stack, the
and bottom (8) metal structures. The top cover is a
bottom biological shield, and the coolant water feeder
17.65m diameter cylinder, 3 m high, an isometric
pipes. The design of this support structure is rather
representation of which is shown in Fig. 4.5. The top and
simple: it consists of two heavy plates, which intersect at
bottom of this cylindrical structure is made from a 40mm
right angles along the center-line of the reactor and are in
thick steel plate. Along the outside periphery these plates
turn reinforced by 5.0 m high fins. These plates are
are hermetically welded and internally they are joined
welded to the bottom of the biological shield plate (8).
together by means of rigid vertical plates. Axial holes
through this structure are positioned to match the
The cylindrical shell (7) of the reactor core (Fig 4.4) is
openings in the graphite stack. Tubes are welded into
constructed from a 16 mm thick plate, it has an outside
these holes, to serve as guides for the fuel channels and
diameter of 14.52 m and a height of 9.75 m. To
other components of the control and instrumentation
compensate for axial thermal expansion, the shell is
system. The inside cavities of this metal structure are
provided with a bellows compensator. The shell, together
filled with serpentinite (a mineral containing bound
with the top and bottom metal structures, forms the sealed
crystalline water). The quality of the welds must be
reactor core compartment.
adequate to meet helium leak-tightness requirements. The
entire metal structure rests on 16 rollers, which in turn
The topmost structure, located above the coolant channel
rest on the top of the reinforced structure of the radial
banks which pass through the core vertically and exit
biological shield tank (see Fig. 4.4). This structural
horizontally, is the upper shield cover. This structure is
component supports the weight of the loaded fuel and
shown as item (1) in Fig. 4.4 and can also be identified
control channels, that of the floor segment extending to
readily in the isometric drawing of Fig. 4.2. The cover
the central refueling hall, and the weight of the water
serves several purposes: it is a component of the biological
pipes.
shield, provides thermal insulation and controls the access
to the fuel channels. The top surface of this cover is the
The construction of bottom metal structure (8) is very
floor of the refueling hall, its central part consists of
similar to top metal structure. The diameter of this
individual plugs which can be removed for accessing the
structure is 14.5 m, its height - 2 m. This structure
fuel channels and the special purpose channels. A
supports the weight of the graphite stack and the feeder
schematic cross-section of this structure is shown in Fig.
pipes supplying coolant water to the fuel channels. The
4.6. It shows the block segments which bear against the
number and distribution of the openings is the same as
tops of the vertical extensions (guide pipes) of the fuel
those of the top biological shield. The leak-tightness of the
channel tubes. The blocks are made of iron-barium-
structure is tested with an air-helium mixture at a pressure
serpentinite concrete having a density of 4000 kg/m3.
of about 0.125 MPa. The remaining internal spaces of the
They are constructed of two parts: the top segment is
structure are filled with serpentinite and are pressurized
removable to provide accessibility to the upper
with nitrogen.
59
Fig. 4.6 Segment of the top cover
1 - removable blocks, 2 - top cover of the control rod channel, 3 - bottom block, 4 - top cover of the fuel channel, 5 - top cover
of the temperature instrumentation channel, 6 - top cover of the reflector cooling channel, 7 - peripheral part of the cover
segment of the channel during refueling, the bottom layer into three parts: top shield (in the direction of the
segments are larger - one of these blocks covers three refueling hall), bottom shield (in the direction of the lower
channels. All of the blocks are supported by the guide coolant channel banks), and radial shielding.
pipes of the fuel channels and the reflector cooling
channels. The top and bottom block are staggered so that Biological shielding in the direction of the refueling hall
the gaps between blocks are covered, and the amount of encompasses the 0.5 m thick upper graphite reflector,
direct radiation is reduced. The peripheral sections of the 0.25 m high steel shielding blocks, the upper metal
top shield cover consist of 0.70 m high metal containers, structure which is filled with a mixture of serpentinite
filled with a mixture of cast iron fragments (86 %) and chips and gallium (weight ratio of 3:2), and the top shield
serpentinite. cover. The density of the fill material is 1700 kg/m3, its
height is 2.8 m, and the thickness of the steel foundation
Air is continuously drawn from the refueling hall down plates of the structure is 40 mm.
through the gaps of the cover plates, and out into the
ventilation system. This provides cooling for the cover A number of special design features are incorporated into
and impedes the transport of radioactive material from the these structures in order to reduce direct streaming of
steam-water pipes to the refueling hall. radiation along the gas-filled channels (temperature,
neutron flux instrumentation and ion chamber channels)
The gaps between the top and bottom plates and the and the fuel channels which in the upper region of the
blocks are used for positioning the wiring for the control core are filled with a steam-water mixture. The fuel
system servomotors, the flux distribution instrumentation, channels are capped with special steel-graphite plugs
and the temperature-monitoring instrumentation (Fig. 4.7) which incorporate spiral passages for the flow
(thermocouples). All of the reactor metal structures, of the two-phase coolant. The ring-shaped gaps between
which are in a gas and steam environment, are covered by the channels and the guide tubes are covered with
an anti-corrosive material. shielding sleeves (Fig. 4.8). Graphite followers are
employed in the control channels to reduce direct neutron
4.2.3 Biological Shielding and gamma streaming into the spaces underneath the
reactor. Whenever possible, the gas and coolant pipes
All of the structures surrounding the core region which penetrate the shielding structures are bent so that
contribute to some extent to biological shielding. The direct streaming is reduced.
principal structural components have been described in
the previous Section, they are complemented where The radial shield (Fig. 4.4) consists of the radial graphite
required by additional material. The principal structures reflector (average thickness 0.88 m), the shell of the core,
serving the shielding function include - the graphite the annular water-filled steel tank, sand filling between
reflectors, the internal spaces of the metal structures, the the tank and the walls of the reactor vault, and the 2 m
gap between the concrete vault and the outer surface of thick concrete walls of the vault. The walls of the vault are
the core support metal structures. With respect to the made from ordinary construction concrete with a density
center of the core, the biological shields can be divided of 2200 kg/m3.
60
Fig. 4.7 Fuel channel shielding plug Fig. 4.8 Shielding sleeves in the top reflector
1 - steel sleeve, 2 - steel helical plug, 3 - channel pressure 1 - graphite sleeves, 2 - steel shielding block, 3 - graphite
tube, 4. serpentinite filling reflector
A summary of the compositions and dimensions of the example, the average equivalent dose rate in the central
components used for biological shielding is presented in refueling hall was found to be (11 - 18) x 10-6 Sv/h, while
Table 4.1 [35]. in the access chamber to the coolant flow control valves it
did not exceed 4 Sv/h, with the reactor operating at
During reactor operation the biological shielding limits thermal power 3850 MW. These tests were performed by
the radiation dose rate in the refueling hall and in the the Moscow Research and Development Institute of
areas adjacent to the reactor to levels not exceeding Power Engineering (RDIPE - Russian abbreviation of
2.8 10-5 Sv/h. During refueling operations the gamma NIKIET) [38].
dose in selected locations close to the refueling machine
can range up to 1.0 10-3 Sv/h. The walls of the compartments of the main coolant circuit
equipment are made from ordinary concrete (density of
It is reported that the tests of the biological shielding 2200 kg/m3 ). Measurements of the effectiveness of
effectiveness, conducted in the first unit of the Ignalina biological shielding were performed on the second unit of
NPP with the RBMK-1500 reactor operating at nominal Ignalina NPP in December, 1992. The measured dose
power, confirmed that the radiation field in the reactor rates are shown in column 3 of Table 4.2, and the
service areas meets health standard requirements. For calculated dose rates - in column 2 [3].
Table 4.1 Composition and dimensions (in meters) of principal biological shield components [35]
Material Shielding Direction
Top Bottom Radial
Graphite (reflector) 0.5 0.5 0.88

Steel (shielding plates and metal structures) 0.29 0.24 0.045
Serpentinite filling (1700 kg/m3) 2.8 1.8 -
Water (annular tank) - - 1.140
Steel (metal structure) 0.04 0.04 0.03
Sand (1300 kg/m3) - - 1.3
Heavy concrete (4000 kg/m3) 0.89 - -
Construction concrete (2200 kg/m3) - - 2.0
61
Table 4.2 Biological shielding parameters of the office premises which are adjacent to the operating equipment
Thickness of concrete Calculated* dose rate, Measured** dose rate,

Source - equipment
shielding, m mR/h mR/h
Water-steam separators:
side walls and bottom covering 1.4 1.4 2.5
end walls 1.0 - 0.9
top covering 0.9 - 0.26
Pipes between separators and main 0.9 1.4 1.2
circulation pumps
Main circulation pump premises:
wall adjacent to suction header 0.9 0.4 0.6
top covering 0.8 - 0.9
walls between compartments 0.6 - 1.6
Lower water pipes 0.5 0.7 3.0
Pipes from separator to turbine 0.7 1.4 0.4
Low pressure re-heaters 0.6 1.4 0.6
Deaerators 0.24 0.8 0.15
* Data compiled from [3]
** Measurements taken at the Ignalina NPP, December 1992
By the project, the compartments, which are part of the compartment

accident localization system of the Ignalina NPP unit 2, 4.2.4 Fuel Assembly and Fuel Channel
were reinforced with 5 mm thick stainless steel liners on
the floors and 4 mm thick liners on the walls. One of the principal distinguishing characteristics of the
RBMK-type reactor is that each core fuel assembly is
During nuclear fission 95 % of the generated energy is housed in an individual pressure tube. As was noted
released in the fuel element and an additional 5 % is previously, the RBMK-1500 core contains 1661 fueled
released in the graphite during neutron moderation and channels separated from its nearest neighbors by the walls
gamma absorption. A helium-nitrogen mixture circulates of the pressure tubes and graphite blocks. Each pressure
around the fuel channels and between the graphite blocks. tube has considerable autonomy. For example, the coolant
This gas retards the oxidation process, and the humidity flow rate to the tube is controlled online by an individual
and temperature readings of the gas are monitored to isolation and control valve. This valve make it possible to
indicate leaks of the fuel channels. de-couple it from the primary cooling system while the
reactor is operation. This makes it possible to change fuel
Under normal reactor operating conditions the biological clusters online and also has a significant impact on the
shielding makes it possible to perform certain repair and potential consequences of loss-of-coolant accidents.
maintenance tasks. This applies to piping, which serves
the various channels and is located below the bottom and 4.2.4.1 Fuel Assembly
above the top biological shields. The non-service
compartments are accessible only during the reactor The nuclear fuel used in the Ignalina NPP is slightly
shutdown. The list of these compartments is given in enriched uranium (2% initially, converted to 2.4%) in the
Table 4.3 [36]. form of uranium dioxide. This is a chemically-stable and
heat-resistant ceramic material. It is prepared in powdered
Table 4.3 List of non-service compartments [36] form, pressed into small, 11.5 mm diameter and 15 mm
long pellets and sintered in the presence of a binder. The
Compartment Description pellet shape is adapted to an intensive, high-temperature
operating mode. For example, the pellets have
125 Compartment below reactor hemispherical indentations, in order to reduce the fuel
208/1-2 ECCS compartments column's thermal expansion and thermo-mechanical
210 Reactor vault interaction with the cladding. The 2 mm diameter hole
215 Connecting corridor between ACS through the axis of the pellet reduces the temperature at
tower the center of the pellet, and helps release the gases formed
408/1-2 Corridors during operation.
409/1-2 Compartments of downcomers,
pressure and suction headers The pellets are placed into a tube with an outside diameter
506/1-2 Separator drum and ACS tower of 1.3 cm, a wall thickness of 0.9 mm and an active
length of 3.6 m. Tube material is an alloy of zirconium
62
with one percent niobium. This alloy has good anti- upper or lower segments takes place in the direction
corrosive properties and a low neutron absorption towards the center of the core.
coefficient. The initial clearance between the UO2 pellets
and the wall of the tube varies from about 0.22 to 0.38mm.
The tubes are pressurized with helium at 0.5 MPa and

sealed. In the radial direction the fuel clad is augmented
by retaining rings which help to withstand the pressure of
the fuel channel and improve the heat transfer from the
pellet to the zirconium tube. In the axial direction, the fuel
pellets are held in place by a spring.
The design of the RBMK reactor fuel described so far

differs little from fuel elements manufactured for standard
BWR-type reactors. For example, a typical BWR fuel tube
in the United States is also manufactured from a
zirconium-niobium alloy, has a similar wall thickness and
an outside diameter ranging from 12 to 13.5 mm. The
uranium enrichment is also similar: namely, 2 % to 2.4%
in the case of Ignalina NPP, 2.2% to 3% in the case of the
BWR. More significant design differences are present in
the manner in which the fuel elements are mounted into a
structurally integral fuel assembly (or fuel cluster). The
shape of the assembly is determined by the geometric
characteristics of the core fuel channel. In the case of a
BWR this results in a square-shaped (usually 8x8) fuel
cluster which fits into the square core spaces between the Fig. 4.9 Fuel assembly
control rod blades. For an RBMK reactor, the fuel 1 - suspension bracket, 2 - top plug, 3 - adapter, 4 -
assembly must fit into a circular channel having an inside connecting rod, 5 - fuel element, 6 - carrier rod, 7 - end
diameter of 80 mm and an active core height of 7 m. In sleeve, 8 - end cap, 9 - retaining nut
order to achieve the required height, two fuel elements
must be joined end-to-end. The radial special restriction For ease of manipulation, the fuel assembly is provided
determines the arrangement and the number of the fuel with appropriate fittings at both ends. The principal
rods which can fit into a fuel assembly. technical parameters of the fuel assemblies are
summarized in Table 4.4 [2,35].
A schematic representation of the principal features of a
fuel assembly is shown in Fig. 4.9. The assembly contains The fuel assemblies described in this Section can be of
18 fuel elements arranged within two concentric rings in two types: regular fuel assemblies and instrumented fuel
a central carrier rod. The carrier rod is a 15 mm diameter assemblies which contain a neutron flux detector. In an
tube with a 1.25 mm wall thickness and is made of a instrumented fuel assembly the detector is contained
zirconium (2.5 % Nb) alloy. The complete fuel assembly within a tube which replaces the main carrier rod. This
is made up of two segments which are joined by means of tube has an outside diameter of 15 mm and a wall
a sleeve (7) at the central plane. Thus, along the axis of thickness of 2.75 mm.
the core there is a region in which fission does not take
place. This generates a flattening of the fast neutron flux 4.2.4.2 Fuel Channel
and a dip of the thermal neutron flux at this location and
influences the neutron kinetic characteristics of the core. The top, center, and bottom segments of a typical reactor
fuel channel are shown schematically in Fig. 4.10. The
The lower segment of the fuel assembly is provided with main component of the channel is the coolant-carrying
an end grid and ten spacing grids. The central tube and tube constructed from separate end and center segments.
the end spacer are also made from the zirconium (2.5% The center segment (9) is an 88 mm outside diameter
niobium) alloy. The remaining spacers are made from (4 mm thick wall) tube, made from a zirconium-niobium
stainless steel and are rigidly fixed (welded) to the central alloy (Zr + 2.5 % Nb). The top (3) and bottom (11)
tube and are positioned 360 mm apart. The top segment segments are made from a stainless steel tube. The choice
has 10 spacing grids placed 360 mm apart, and in of zirconium-niobium for the center part was made
addition, at every 120 mm this segment is provided with because of the relatively low thermal neutron absorption
specifically designed spacers which act as turbulence cross-section (σ = (0.2 - 0.3) ⋅ 10-29 m2) of the material
enhancers to improve the heat transfer characteristics. and its adequate mechanical and anti-corrosive
The fuel tubes are mounted so that axial expansion of the properties at high temperatures (up to 350 oC). The center
63
and end pieces are joined by special intermediate Authorized fuel assembly capacity,
2500
couplings, made from a steel-zirconium alloy. MWdays/assembly
Authorized lifetime of fuel assembly, year 6
Table 4.4 Fuel assembly parameters [2,35,36]
Fuel pellet
Fuel Uranium
dioxide
Fuel enrichment in 235U, % 2 & 2.4
Edge pellet enrichment, % 0.4
Fuel pellet density, kg/m3 10400
Fuel pellet diameter, mm 11.5
Fuel pellet length, mm 15
Pellet central orifice diameter, mm 2
Maximum temperature at the center of the
2100
fuel pellet, 0C
Fuel element
Fuel element cladding material Zr+1 % Nb

Outside diameter of fuel element, mm 13.6
Length of fuel element, m 3.64
Active length of fuel element (height of 3.4
fuel pallet column in cold state), m
Cladding wall thickness, mm 0.825
Clearance between fuel pellet and tube, 0.22-0.38
mm Fig. 4.10 Fuel channel
Mass of fuel within fuel element, kg 3.5 1 - steel biological shield plug, 2,10 - top and bottom
metal structures, respectively, 3 - top part of the fuel
Helium pressure in the cladding, MPa 0.5 channel, 4 - welding-support ledge, 5 - fuel assembly
Maximum permissible temperature of fuel 700 support bracket, 6 - encasement cylinder, 7 - seal plug, 8
element, 0C - graphite cylinder, 9 - central part of the channel, 11 -
Average linear thermal flux, W/cm 218 bottom part of the channel, 12 - thermal expansion
bellows compensator, 13 - stuffing box
Maximum linear thermal flux, W/cm 485
Fuel assembly The fuel channel tubes are set into the circular passages
Number of segments per fuel assembly 2 which consist of the aligned central openings of the
graphite blocks and the stainless steel guide tubes of the
Number of fuel elements per segment 18
top and bottom core plate structures described in
Total length of fuel assembly, m 10.015 Subsection 4.2.2. The channel tubes are welded to the top
Active length of fuel assembly, m 6.862 (2) and bottom (10) metal-structure plates to maintain the
Fuel assembly diameter (in the core), mm 79 core region hermetically sealed. The tube is welded to a
support ledge (4) at the top, and at the bottom to the guide
Mass of fuel assembly without bracket, kg 185 tube of the metal structure (11). A bellows (12) is used to
Total mass of fuel assembly with the compensate for the differences in thermal expansion
280
bracket, kg between the reactor metal core plates and the fuel
Total steel mass of fuel assembly, kg 2.34 channel. In case of failure of the bellows, additional
Total mass of zirconium alloy within sealing is provided by a pressure seal (13). The design life
40 of the channel tube is about 20-25 years. If necessary, the
assembly, kg
channel tube can be replaced by removing the top and
Mass of uranium within fuel pellet, kg 111.2 bottom welds.
Mass of uranium within edge fuel pellet,
1.016
kg As noted in Subsection 4.2.1, the fuel coolant tubes also
Maximum permissible power of fuel provide cooling for the energy deposited in the graphite
4.25 moderator of the core region. In order to improve heat
channel, MW
64
transfer from the graphite stack, the central segment of
the fuel channel is surrounded by the 20 mm high split d 79.5+0.80
graphite rings (8). These rings are arranged next to one pressure tube
d 88.0+0.70
another in such a manner that one is in contact with the -0.10
channel, and the other with the graphite stack block. The d 88+0.23
minimum clearance between the fuel channel and the d 111.0+0.23
graphite ring is 1.15 mm, and between ring and graphite graphite rings
d 91.0+0.23
stack 1.385 mm (Fig. 4.11). These clearances prevent
d 114.3-0.23
compression of the fuel channel tube due to radiation
and/or thermal expansion of the graphite stack. Due to graphite hole d 114.0+0.23
graphite shrinkage and the expansion of the pressure tube,
the thickness of this gap is gradually reduced during -1.0
d 250-0.6
plant operation. This phenomenon has a potential impact
on plant operability and is therefore discussed in more
detail in Subsection 4.2.4.3. Fig. 4.11 Graphite and zirconium interaction zone
4.2.4.3 Pressure Tube - Graphite Gap
The fuel assembly is suspended in the center of the
channel by means of a bracket (5, Fig. 4.10). The bracket The interaction of fast neutrons can lead to
is provided with a seal plug (7), which hermetically seals dimensional changes in various materials. For
the fuel channel tube after the fuel assembly is installed. example, in graphite moderated reactors, initial
Since all work related to sealing, unsealing and fuel accumulation of the fast neutron dose produces a
changing is complished by remote control via the gradual shrinkage of the graphite blocks. For the
refueling machine, the seal plug must have an RBMK reactors this results in a decrease of the bore
appropriately simple design which is shown in Fig 4.12. diameter through which the fuel channel passes. For
The main parts of this plug are the bolt (4) and ring (9). the pressure tube made of a Zr + 2.5 % Nb alloy,
When the bolt (4) is fully loosened, the fuel assembly, the effect is opposite, due to thermal and irradiation
which is supported by the bracket (13) together with the effects the tube diameter increases. As a result, the gap
seal plug, is lowered into the fuel channel tube by the between the pressure tube and the graphite, which has
refueling machine. The ball bearings (8) then drop into a nominal thickness of 1.5 mm (Fig. 4.11) is gradually
the groves of the expansion bushing (10), and are diminished leading to an eventual closure of the gap.
confined by the outside diameter of the retaining ring (9). The measured and the
The bolt (4) is then tightened with a special key of the
refueling machine to seal the channel. As the bolt
tightens, the expansion bushing pushes the bearing balls
into a ring-shaped groove in the body of the plug. As the
bolt moves further, the now enclosed bearings are
tightened within the groove thus preventing upward
motion of the bracket, and the compression bushing (11)
compresses the sealing gasket (12).
The seal plugs described in the previous paragraphs

pertain to the plugs used in unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP.
The seal plugs used in unit 2 have a somewhat different
construction. They have a spiral shape and the hanger of
the fuel assembly is fixed not by bearing balls, but by
special retaining nuts.
Fuel channels described in this Section may also contain

supplementary absorbers. They may also be devoid of
structural elements and just filled with cooling water.
65
• impaired sensitivity of the fuel channel integrity
monitoring system,
• difficulty or impossibility of replacing fuel
channels using standard pressure tube extraction
techniques,
• possible bending of fuel channels during power
operation.
In order to preempt the listed problems the RBMK

designers recommend the replacement of pressure
tubes before a large fraction of the gas gaps have
closed. This has been carried out in Leningrad units 1
and 2. It should be noted that after re-tubing a
renewed gap closure is not expected to occur [96].
For the Ignalina NPP the gap-closure issue has

received considerable attention. It was considered in
some detail in the SAR [62] and was the subject of a
1997 workshop conducted at Encinitas, California
[97]. An important on-going contribution to the
resolution of this issue is the expanded measurement
program initiated at the Ignalina NPP in 1997.
Two types of measurements are made. In one series of

measurements ultra-sound techniques are employed to
measure the dimensions of the metal pressure tube.
The instrument used is developed by ABB TRC AB,
Sweden [98]. It is designed for fast measurement
of
115
114
Diameter, mm
Graphite Bricks
113
Fig. 4.12 Fuel channel seal plug (for unit 1) 112

1- support handle, 2- flange, 3- retaining ring, 4- bolt, 5- Pressure tubes
support ring, 6- plug encasement tube, 7- brazing, 8-
bearing ball, 9- retainer ring, 10- expansion bushing, 11- 111
compression bushing, 12- sealing gasket, 13- support 0 4000 8000 12000
Energy production per fuel assembly, MWdays
bracket of fuel assembly.
A - operating position (channel sealed),
Fig. 4.13 Change of hole diameter in graphite
B - position of the plug before sealing the channel
bricks and equivalent diameter of pressure tubes
projected rate of gap closure for unit 1 of the Ignalina
(pressure tube channel & graphite rings) during
NPP as a function of the integral power per channel is
operation of Ignalina NPP unit 1 [62]
shown in Fig. 4.13. For the high power channels in
the Ignalina NPP this translates to a net operating time inner diameter and wall thickness, and is capable of
before the first gaps close of about 16 years. inspecting 30 fuel channels per day. The measurement
of the inside bore diameter of the graphite is more
The consequences of gap closure have not been laborious. It requires the removal of the metal tube and
thoroughly analyzed. However, it is in general agreed an insertion of specially calibrated instruments. Both
that operation after the gaps are closed may cause one sets of measurements are performed during regularly
or more of the following: scheduled maintenance shutdowns. The proposed
measurement program is outlined in Table 4.5. As the
• accelerated graphite brick cracking, table shows, it is expected that by 2001 a total of 1200
• appearance of additional uncontrolled loads pressure tubes will have been measured. This
causing a possible loss of fuel channel integrity, constitutes the entire population of high to medium
66
power channels present in the core. The number of are all identical. A schematic of their structure and the
projected measurement of graphite bore diameters is guide tubes is shown in Fig. 4.14. The upper segment of
smaller, and should reach a statistically significant the guide tube incorporates a compensator bellows (2) to
total of 130 measurements by 2001. These field accommodate the significant thermal expansion of the
measurements will make it possible to achieve a channels due to the large temperature difference between
considerably more accurate depiction of the true state the top biological shield and the cold guide tubes. The
of the graphite-pressure tube gap in unit 1 of the lower section of the channel guide tube, unlike that in the
Ignalina NPP. fuel channel, also contains a thermal expansion
compensator (6). The top and bottom sections are made of
4.3 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM stainless steel, while the middle section is of a zirconium -
niobium alloy.
The RBMK-1500 reactivity control systems reflect the
general complexity of this reactor type. For example, to The channels with control rods (Fig. 4.14) are provided
meet the various neutron flux and fission power control with a metal cover (4) which is employed for mounting
needs, seven different types of control rods are used. They
differ in their structure, insertion speed, insertion Table 4.6 The channels and their number [35]
direction or the control mode (automatic or manual). The
individual rod types and their control systems are Type of channel Number of
described in Section 6. This Section 4.3 deals with several channels
complementary control-related aspects:
Channels inside graphite columns
• Subsection 4.3.1 describes the control rod and Fuel channels 1661
instrumentation cooling system, Channels with control rods 211
• Subsection 4.3.2 describes the fuel handling system, Channels with in-core sensor of axial
• Subsection 4.3.3 gives the characteristics of the power density monitoring 20
servomotors. Channels with fission chambers 4
Total number of the reactor Control
In order to identify the mentioned control rod types and Protection System (CPS) channels 235
reference should be made to the tables and graphs
Radial reflector cooling channels 156
presented in Subsection 6.4.3.2.
Total number of channels inside 2052
graphite columns
Table 4.5 Fuel channel inspection program for
unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP Channels at the intersections of graphite columns
No. of fuel channels No. of fuel channels Graphite temperature instrumentation

Year for which the for which inside channels in the core 13
diameter of the diameter of the Graphite temperature instrumentation
pressure tube graphite bore hole channels in the radial reflector 4
is measured is measured Gas sampling channel 1
Total number of channels at the
1 1997 150 - intersections of graphite columns 18
2 1998 150 20
Channels in radial biological shielding
3 1999 300 30
Ionization chamber channels:
4 2000 300 30 for normal reactor operation 20
5 2001 300 50 for reactor start-up 4
Total number of channels in radial
biological shielding 24
4.3.1 Special Purpose Channels the control rod drive mechanisms (5) and for providing
access to cooling water. The lower ends of the ionization
Of the 2052 channels which penetrate the reactor graphite chamber and flux detector channels are sealed by metal
stack, 1661 of them are purposed for fuel loading, and the caps. The ionization chamber channel caps are made of
remainder, including additional channels in the radial stainless steel, and also serves in supporting the ionization
reflector, are termed "special purpose channels" and chambers. The caps of the other channels are made of an
contain control rods or various types of instrumentation. aluminum alloy. At the bottom of this type of a channel is
A list of the number of various channel types and their a throttling device (7), which provides some resistance to
purpose is presented in Table 4.6 [35]. The channels with water flow, and helps to ensure reliable filling of the
control rods, the channels carrying vertical traverse flux channel.
distribution instruments and the fission chamber channels
67
The CPS channels are cooled by an independent water internally supplied nitrogen. Therefore, the top cover
circuit provided with its own pumps and heat exchangers. includes both access to the liquid and the gas coolants and
The cooling water is supplied to the channels from above, a distributor which creates the falling liquid film. The
and flows over the exterior and interior casings of the bottom cap is provided with a liquid collector.
absorber rods. In this process, the water is heated from 40
o
C to a temperature of 70 oC. During reactor operation, Cooling channels also provide cooling to the radial
regardless of the position of the control rod, the inside of reflector (4) of the graphite stack shown in Fig. 4.15.
the channel is filled with water. When the absorber rod is These channels also cool the radial reflector reinforcing
withdrawn from the core, and if no special provisions are tube (5), and reduce the heat flow toward the shell of the
taken, its volume would be replaced by water. Because graphite stack and its compensator. The channel is made
water is a moderately strong neutron absorber, most of stainless steel. The cooling water is supplied to this
control rods have not only a boron carbide absorber, but channel from above through a central tube, it flows down
also a graphite follower which displaces water and to the bottom biological shield, then rises again to the top
improves the reactor's neutron balance. in the annular space between the two tubes, and finally
leaves the channel.
Radial reflector cooling channels, CPS channels and fuel

channels are inside the central part of the graphite columns,
the openings of which are 114 mm diameter. Total number
of channels inside the graphite columns is 2052.
The corners of the rectangular cross-sections of the

graphite columns in the stack are hollow and incorporate
17 vertical 45 mm diameter instrumentation channels
used for measuring the support and the shielding plates.
Thirteen of these channels are positioned within the
boundaries of the core, while four are in the reflector.
Within each channel the temperature is measured at
5 vertical positions. One channel of the same type is
placed in the core and is used for gas sampling.
Consequently, there are 18 channels in the graphite stack
of the reactor which are outside the graphite columns.
In the radial biological shielding of the reactor there are a

total of 24 channels into which radial ionization chambers
are positioned. Reactor startup channels are made of shell
inside of which there is as suspension bracket and a
convex lead shield (it mass is 1220 kg) which protects
startup ionization chambers from the gamma radiation.
The normal reactor operation ionization chamber
channels are quite analogous to the channels mentioned
above except that are no lead shields. This is because at
normal reactor operation the measured neutron flux
significantly exceeds the gamma radiation.
Fig. 4.14 Reactor-control and protection system
channel 4.3.2 Fuel Handling System
1 - channel opening, 2 - thermal-expansion bellows
compensator, 3 - welding-support ledge, 4 - channel One of the distinguishing features of the RBMK - type
cover, 5 - operating mechanism, 6 - bottom bellows reactor is its on-line refueling capability. This complicated
compensator, 7 - throttling device operation is accomplished by an especially
The above described channels are always filled with either
control rod or a graphite control rod follower and cooled
with water. Post-Chernobyl modifications included the
addition of 24 fast acting scram-type rods. To achieve
higher insertion speeds this rod type must drop into a gas-
filled channel without having to displace water. As
described in Section 6, this led to a different rod design
and required also some changes in the top and bottom
fittings of the special purpose coolant channels. These
channels are cooled by a lowing film of water and
68
The refueling machine is moved through the reactor hall
by means of the transport mechanism. A bridge-type
crane (2), consisting of 21 m long beams, moves on
transverse tracks located in the upper section of the
reactor hall with 39.6 m of travel distance. On the bridge,
11 m above the hall floor, a carriage (1) transports the
refueling machine equipment along the other axis. The
travel distance of the carriage is 12.5 m. The bridge and
the carriage can be moved at two speeds, 9.75 and
1.2 m/min. The slow speed is used for final, accurate
positioning. During this operating phase the bridge and
the carriage move in 1 mm increments.
The container (3) in Fig. 4.16 is a steel cylinder,

assembled from six sections. Its inside diameter is 0.77 m
and the wall thickness is 0.5 m. The lower part of the
container incorporates a movable biological shield (7)
used to screen the gap which appears between the bottom
of the container and the hall floor during refueling
operations. The operator's booth and access platforms are
located on the outside of the container, the inside provides
space for the movable fuel casket (4).
Fig. 4.15 Reflector - cooling channel

1 - external bushing, 2 - top biological shield, 3 -
thermal - expansion bellows compensator, 4 - radial
reflector, 5 - reinforcing tube, 6 - an annual double -
wall tube arrangement for central flow in one direction
to the end of the tube, then reversing to annual flow in
opposite direction, 7 - support sleeve, 8 - bottom
biological shield.
designed fuel loading and unloading machine. Besides

changing fuel bundles without shutting down the reactor,
the refueling machine can also be used to inspect a fuel
channel by a special fuel-assembly-shaped calibration
instrument, seal off a fuel channel with a standard or an
emergency sealing plug, and to correct certain emergency
conditions.
On line reloading operations at nominal power must

ensure that the coolant flow to the fuel assembly being
changed is not interrupted. The refueling machine is
capable of changing up to five fuel assemblies per day
when the reactor is in operation, and up to 20 when the
reactor is shut down.
Fig. 4.16 Refueling machine
The principal components of the refueling machine 1 - carriage of refueling machine, 2 - refueling machine
(shown schematically in Fig. 4.16) are: the refueling bridge, 3 - container, 4 - fuel casket, 5 - closing
machine transport mechanism (1), a container (3) which mechanism, 6 - standpipe, 7 - bottom movable biological
serves as a biological shield, two replaceable caskets (4) shield, 8 - refueling machine positioning systems, 9 -
(one mounted in the machine, the other kept in the repair metal frame, 10 - fuel assembly receptacle, 11 - grabber,
area), a metal frame (9), the positioning mechanisms (8), 12 - grabber control mechanism
and control equipment.
69
The fuel casket (4) is the principal component of the This mechanism consists of a cylindrical body holding a
refueling machine. It consists of a cylindrical pressure pinion gear on opposite sides of which ride two movable
vessel together with its internal operating mechanisms. racks (1) connected to the controlling mechanism. The
These mechanisms can perform the following functions: top ends of the racks are welded to the chains used to lift
the grabber. The bottom end of one of the racks is welded
• hermetically connects the cavity of the casket to the to an extender (2), which works the jaws (3) of the
top of the fuel channel, grabber. If both of the chains which control the grabber
• unseal and reseal the fuel channel, move in the same direction, the jaws stay closed and the
• remove a spent fuel assembly, fuel assembly is raised or lowered. If they move in
• measure the inside dimensions of the fuel channel, opposite directions, a cam opens the jaws, and the fuel
• load a fresh fuel assembly, assembly is released. The high pressure segment of the
• install an emergency plug into a fuel channel. casket contains only the grabber, the chains and their
gears, all of the control mechanisms are external to the
The metal frame (9) above the carriage houses the fuel casket.
equipment supplying the refueling machine with process
water, feedwater, pressurized air, inspection and The central part of the casket contains a three-section,
measurement instruments, and control-related equipment. 16.5 m long fuel assembly receptacle (10) shown in
Fig. 4.16. Each section of the receptacle has four slots,
The mechanisms (12) for raising and lowering the fuel which can store new fuel assemblies, the fuel channel
assembly are mounted on the top part of the casket shown gauge, and the emergency plug. One slot is left empty to
in Fig. 4.16. The assemblies are lifted by means of a receive the spent fuel assembly.
mechanical grabber mechanism shown in Fig. 4.17.
The bottom part of the fuel casket contains a closing
mechanism (5) and a standpipe (6). The closing
mechanism serves to lock and unlock the casket to the
fuel channel. It also acts as a biological shield during
removal of the spent fuel. This mechanism consists of two
dampers, with parallel disks installed in series within one
frame.
The standpipe is used in performing the connection to the

fuel channel. When the refueling machine is positioned
over the required fuel channel, the standpipe is lowered so
that it encloses the top part of the fuel channel. The joint
is sealed by means of an inflatable rubber gasket. A
special key located inside the standpipe is used for
activating the fuel channel seal plug when sealing or
unsealing the channel.
Two methods are used for positioning the refueling

machine so that it coincides with the fuel channel
coordinates:
a) Positioning from the operator's room. In this case the

operation is monitored by closed-circuit television.
b) Positioning from the machine booth on top of the fuel
casket bridge. In this case optical instruments are
employed.
In case steam escapes from the fuel channel, and it is

impossible to use either the optical or the television
system to position the machine accurately over the fuel
channel, a contact positioning system is utilized.
Fig. 4.17 Grabber
4.3.3 Control Rod Drive Characteristics
1 - movable racks, 2 - extender, 3 - jaws,
4 - shock absorber
The RBMK-1500 power plant employs several types of
control rods. In terms of travel direction and response
time they can be divided into three categories. The
"standard" control rods are inserted from the top, and
70
drop into a water-cooled channel, the fast-acting "scram" In the neutral position the induction coil of a servodrive
rods drop from the top into a gas filled channel, and and the anchor of its motor are disconnected, while the
finally, control rods used for vertical power shaping are DC clutch is turned on. Consequently the brakes of the
inserted from the bottom of the core. Section 6 lists motor-rotor are activated. As soon as the logic control
additional control rod classification categories, but these circuit issues an order for the removal of a rod, the
depend on function or control mode. These three types of induction coil of the motor is activated and the clutch is
control rods are powered by appropriate servodrives [1,5]. disconnected. Voltage is supplied to the anchor in about
0.2 s, the motor starts to extract the rod and continues
The isometric view of a servodrive used for the until the limit microswitch turns off the power supply
predominant (Type 1) control rod is presented in Fig. 4.18. from the motor to the clutch. Each rod can be inserted
The control rod is withdrawn from the core by means of a either manually or automatically. In manual operation the
metal tape which is wound on a drum (4). The housing is gravitational fall of the rod is damped. Simultaneously as
constructed of an aluminum alloy. The drive is powered the rod is released, voltage is supplied to the induction
by a DC motor (type D500MF) and is provided with a coil, this operation is referred to as dynamic breaking. In
direct electromagnetic clutch for braking. Magnitude of this mode the electric motor serves as a generator. In case
the load is indicated by a temperature sensor. The position of an automatic scram the rod is in free fall for 5 s, the
of the control rod is indicated on a dial for manual induction coil is reactivated in 5 s and dynamic braking is
inspection or a selsyn indicator (5) (type BM-404NA), established to cushion the final segment of rod travel. If
which is connected to the rod via a reducer. It has top and the electric current supply to the CPS rods fails, the rods
bottom position switches and a delayed dynamic-braking are automatically released to fall into the reactor core.
switch. Positions of the rods are replicated on the main
control panel and the completion of either insertion or The shortened absorber rods (Type 2) are drawn upwards
extraction of the rod is indicated by a specific sound into the core from the bottom. This requires the
signal. modification of three specific features of the servodrives.
Firstly, the direct electromagnetic clutches are replaced by
In the earlier RBMK-1000 reactor plants the control rods clutches acting in the inverse direction, secondly, an
were suspended by steel cables, while in the advanced inverse calibration is provided on the dial located on the
RBMK-1500 pants a steel tape is used, which has similar selsyn beam, and third, the length of the suspension tapes
strength characteristics but a significantly longer life. The is increased to 8.035 m.
tapes are fastened via eccentric cams to the drums, and
the rods are suspended at their ends via locks and Dynamic breaking is provided during removal of the rods
dampers. The 40 mm wide, 20 mm thick, and 7.9 m long in the downward direction. In case of electric current
tapes are made from specific steel (type 12Ch18N9).
Fig. 4.18 Control rod drive

1 - housing shell, 2 - DC motor, 3 - gear-train reducer, 4
- drum, 5 - selsyn indicator with switches, 6 - manual
mechanism, 7 - electrical connection
71
failure, the clutches lock and the rods are maintained in
their positions.
The fast-acting scram rods (Type 3) drop into a gas-filled,

water-film-cooled channel. This design feature requires
several specific design modifications. Thus, the servodrive
mechanism is provided with a valve which admits the gas
coolant and includes a float-operated lever which closes
the entrance in the event if the channel should become
flooded by coolant water. Because the drop height into an
RBMK reactor core is about 8 m, a completely free drop
could generate excessive speeds and lead to damage. To
mitigate this situation the drive is equipped with a
tachometric generator which provides breaking when the
rod achieves excessive speeds. To allow higher speeds the
gear train of the drive is modified so that the inertial
resistance is reduced.
Most of the Type 1 rods are directly controlled by the

operator and used to flatten the radial power distribution.
Some are controlled by Local Automatic Control (LAC)
or Local Emergency Protection (LEP) zone signals, i.e.
they are controlled by the Power Density Distribution
Monitoring System (PDDMS). Four other Type 1 rods are
controlled by the lateral ion chambers of the automatic
control system. Four Type 2 rods (shortened absorber
rods) are also part of the automatic control system,
controlled by the lateral ionization chambers. The rods
can be divided into seven groups according to their
function. The breakdown is provided in Table 4.7 [37].
Table 4.7 Reactivity control system rods [37]
Rods Number Time to fully insert rod Rod insertion speed shutdown
(automatic shutdown),
s automatic, m/s manual, m/s
Type 1 rods
1 - Manual Control Rods (MCR) 107 12-14 0.4±0.1 0.4±0.1
2 - Local Automatic Control Rods (LACR) 12 12-14 0.2±0.05 0.2±0.05
3 - Local Scram Rods (LSR) 24 12-14 0.4±0.1 0.4±0.1
4 - Automatic Control Rods (ACR) 4 12-14 0.2±0.05 0.2±0.05
Total type 1 rods: 147
Type 2 rods
5 - Shortened Automatic Control Rods (SACR) 4 12-14 0.4±0.1 0.4±0.1
6 - Shortened Absorbers Rods (SAR) 36 12-14 0.4±0.1 0.4±0.1
Total type 2 rods: 40
Type 3 rods
7 - Fast - Acting Scram rods (FASR) 24 2.0-2.5* - -
5.0-7.0** - 1.15±0.2**
Total number of control rods 211
* Fast-acting scram
** AZ-1 scram
72
4.4 REACTOR DRAINING SYSTEM
Excess coolant inventory in the various circuits which

serve to cool the core and the surroundings structures
is controlled by the Reactor Draining System. The
draining system is designed to perform the following
functions:
• draining and monitoring of coolant leaks in the

reactor cavity from damaged fuel channels, control
rod channels and radial reflector cooling channels,
• draining of condensate from the reactor cavity
auxiliary pipelines (upper and lower steam-gas
release circuit,
• centralized permanent monitoring and recording of
total water leak rates into the reactor cavity,
• draining of condensate from gas cavities of reactor
metal structures adjacent to the biological
shielding-annular water tanks (upper and lower
interbellow cavities and reactor interface cavity)
and from peripheral ionization chamber.
The reactor draining system consists of three following

components: Fig. 4.19 Block diagram of the reactor draining
system
1. Components draining the reactor cavity, 1 - upper steam-gas release circuit pipelines, 2 - upper
2. Components draining the regions around the metal interbellow cavity, 3 - reactor interface cavity, 4 -
structures, reactor gas cavity, 5 - upper interbellow cavity, 6 -
3. Components draining the peripheral ionization bottom metal structure, 7 - control rod channel bellow,
chambers. 8 - temperature detector, 9 - upper steam-gas release
circuit pipelines, 10 - drainage visual indicators, 11 -
4.4.1 The Reactor Cavity Draining System 8-meter hydrolock, 12 - heat exchanger, 13 - drainage
measuring tank, 14 - valves for visual drainage
A block diagram of the reactor draining system is monitoring, 15 - tank-hydrolock, 16 - draining tank,
shown in Fig. 4.19. 17 - "dirty" demineralized water tank, 18 - floor drain
water reception tank 19 - peripheral ionization chambers
The upper plate of bottom metal structure (6) is a
bottom boundary of the reactor cavity (4), where The control rod channel bellow (7) draining pipelines
moisture is accumulated in case of leaking control rod are located at the lower housing of a control rod
channels, radial reflector cooling channels and fuel channel. The upper part of the housing shows up
channels during reactor operation. The 150 mm above the upper plate of bottom metal structure (6).
diameter pipes are welded into each of the bottom Moisture may appear in control rod channel bellows
metal structure quadrants. Outside the reactor the from the reactor cavity by condensing on colder walls
pipelines merge in pairs into a pipeline, which is of a control rod channel and flowing downwards.
welded downstream into an 8 m - high hydrolock (11). Condensate from every bellow is drained through
The merged pipelines from both reactor halves are 10mm diameter pipelines into a 50mm diameter
equipped with valves (14) for visual drainage header. Each of the reactor quadrants has a header of
monitoring. its own. Nitrogen or a nitrogen - helium mixture from
the reactor gas circuit is pumped through all the
The four 50 mm diameter draining pipelines of the draining pipelines. Each control rod channel bellow
upper steam-gas release circuit (1) merging into the draining pipeline is equipped with a temperature
150 mm diameter pipeline of drainage removal from detector (8), which indicates the appearance of leaks.
the bottom metal structures into the 8 - meter The signals go to MCR at drainage temperature drop
hydrolock (11). There is a measuring tank (13) with to 160°C. Leaks from each of the reactor quadrant
water level indicator in the 8 m hydrolock outlet draining headers are drained through drainage visual
piping, which allows to monitor the leak rate of water indicators (10) into a heat exchanger (12) and after
drained from the bottom metal structure and upper cooling are collected in a control rod channel bellow
steam-gas release circuit pipelines. From the 8 m drainage measuring tank (13). In the tank moisture is
hydrolock water is further directed to a "dirty" separated from gas (nitrogen or a nitrogen - helium
demineralized water tank (17). mixture), the gas being returned
73
into the reactor gas circuit, and the condensate being 4.5 OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
drained via a hydrolock into the draining tank (16).
During a scheduled shutdown the reactor must be allowed
The draining pipelines of the lower steam-gas release to cool completely. This implies that the critical state of
circuit (9) consist of two outlet 50mm diameter pipes the reactor is reached with temperatures below 80 oC in
merging into a discharge pipeline of the control rod the MCC and 100 oC in the graphite stack, respectively.
channel bellow drainage measuring tank into the
draining tank (16). This Section presents a brief description of the procedures
employed during the standard power plant operations as
The total value of leakage at the bottom of the reactor startup, shutdown and refueling [36]. Note that the
is measured by registering of the leakage into the both descriptions must refer repeatedly to various plant systems
measuring tanks (13) Bottom metal structure (6), which for the RBMK reactors can have different
upper steam-gas release circuit pipelines (1) and connotations than those for the more familiar PWR or
control rod channel bellow (7) drainage measuring BWR plant types.
tanks (13) have level meters and motor-driven
discharge valves. The system operates in an automatic 4.5.1. Startup
mode. Signals from level indicators are processed in a
summator and self-recorded in terms of cumulative the Reactor startup proceeds in two main steps. During step
reactor cavity water leak rate. one reactor power is increased until the minimum
controllable power level is established, in step two it is
An enunciator sends a warning signal in the Gas taken to full power. The minimum controllable power
Circuit Control Room when the leak rate increases to level is reached when the full power instrumentation train
7 l/h, an emergency alarm is sent to MCR (Main is able to register and control the neutron flux levels, it
Control Room) when the leak increases to 10 kg/h. constitutes about 0.3 % of the nominal thermal power and
Upon receipt of the alarm, standard plant operating never exceeds 240 MW or 5 % of the design thermal
procedures require the operator to terminate reactor power.
power by activating the AZ-1 signal. No signals are
transferred to the Control Protection System. Step 1:
4.4.2 Metal Structures and Peripheral Ionization ⇒ Preparing for startup after a planned maintenance
Chambers Draining System shutdown.
⇒ Reaching the minimum controlled power.
By design some metal structures gas cavities (upper
(2) and lower (5) interbellow cavities and reactor A) Before starting the reactor, the following operations
interface cavity (3)) have an interface with biological must be performed:
shielding - annular water tanks. The metal structures
• the seals of the MCC must be tested,
draining system is designed to monitor status of
biological shielding - annular water tanks and drain • control instrumentation must be checked and made
potential leaks and condensate from these metal ready for operation. Special attention must be paid to
structures gas cavity. The leaks are drained through a the flow-rate meters of the fuel channel coolant,
special 40 mm diameter pipeline from all lowest • heating the MCC,
points of the gas cavity compensating bellows. Each • separator drums must be filled to a liquid height from
draining pipeline has a valve (14) for visual 1000 to 1400 mm from the bottom. The fill-water,
monitoring of condensate presence. Leak number must meet the following criteria:
control was not envisaged by the design. In order to
a) Water pH at 25oC 5.5-7.2
avoid connection between reactor metal structures gas
b) Relative electric conductivity at 25oC, ≤ 1.5
cavities and the atmosphere, the draining pipelines are
µS/cm
welded into a tank-hydrolock (15). The content of
the tank-hydrolock is drained into a floor drain water c) Calcium hardness, µg(equiv.)/kg ≤ 3*
reception tank (18). d) Bulk iron concentration, µg/kg ≤ 20
e) Bulk chloride ion concentration, µg/kg ≤ 10
The peripheral ionization chambers (19) are located in f) Bulk mineral oil concentration, µg/kg ≤ 100
the reactor biological shielding - annular water tanks. * water hardness of one µg/kg is equivalent to that
A special draining system is provided to monitor the hardness, which would be present in one kg of water with
leak-tightness of ionization chambers casings and 20.04 µg of Ca ions or with 12.16 µg of Mg ions.
timely drain potential leaks and condensate. Separate
drainage pipes (40 mm diameter) from each chamber • the reactor nitrogen blowers must be in operation,
are connected to tank-hydrolock (15). The each • emergency controls of the MCC must be checked,
pipeline from ionization chambers casing is equipped • fuel channel flow-rate meters must be activated and
with valves (14) for visual drainage monitoring. their readings recorded.
74
B) At least two main coolant pumps (MCP) must be a) level in the hot condenser chamber pools 2.5 m
turned on, their flow rates must reach 1.805 to 1.944 m3/s b) level in the condenser basins 1.05 m
(6500-7000 m3/h) with throttle-control on each pump. c) level in the water storage chambers 2.8 m
C) The purification system of the cooling water must be d) There must be no water in the water-exhaust pipes.
turned on, its flow rate adjusted to meet the requirements
H) Before initiation of control rod withdrawal, the
of the water purity criteria.
following operations must be performed:
D) The no-access areas must be cleared of personnel.
• the power supply system of the CPS must be checked,
Ignitable materials must be isolated.
• neutron flux instrumentation verified,
E) The following parameter limits must never be • emergency blocks and the emergency protection
exceeded: system AZ-1 prepared for operation,
• servo-drives of control rods checked by raising them
• water temperature heating rate in the MCC 10 oC/h, manually,
• temperature difference between the top and bottom • at least two MCPs in each pumping station turned on,
metal walls of the separator drum 40 oC, • coolant flow rate of at least 2.77⋅103 m3/s (10 m3/h)
• temperature difference between the top metal wall of maintained in the fuel channels,
the separator drum and the supply water 150 oC, • fuel channel control valve operation checked,
• temperature differences between the top metal plate of • the PDDMS set in operation,
the reactor and the fuel channel 50 oC in the central • the adequacy of the reactor nitrogen pressurization
sections, and 120 oC in the periphery. system verified,
• proper sealing of the fuel channels ensured,
F) Excess water must be discharged into the clean-water • the ACS and CPS set in "ready" mode,
storage tanks. • the ECCS set in “ready” mode.
G) Before heating the main circulation loop above 100oC, I) A representative of the Lithuanian Regulatory Body
the following operations must be performed: (VATESI) must be present, when the reactor is brought
up to the minimum controlled power level.
• all safety valves checked,
• the accident confinement system (ACS) set in J) The procedure for reaching the minimum controlled
operation, power is as follows:
• the necessary amount of water stored and its supply
piping checked, • CPS rods are lifted, beginning with the LEP rods and
• deaerators filled with water at least 1 m from the proceeding to the automatic control and manual
bottom, control rods,
• the diesel electric power generator set in “ready” • the startup procedure must be stopped if any
mode, discrepancy in the instrumentation readings is noted,
• electric power supply circuits of 6 kV and 0.4 kV • up to four rods may be lifted simultaneously at 60 s
checked., intervals before criticality is achieved,
• water quality must meet the following criteria: • if in 10 minutes time after the withdrawal of control
rods is initiated the reactor does not achieve criticality,
the reactor is shut down by re-inserting the control
MCC CPS rods,
a) The pH value at 25oC 5.5-8.5 4.5-6.2 • the automated control system is initiated after a power
level of about 30 MW(th) is reached,
o
b) Relative electric conduction at 25 C, ≤2 - • the power level of the reactor must not exceed 240
µS/cm MW(th) during the warm-up of its main circulation
c) Calcium hardness, µg(equiv.)/kg ≤ 50 - circuit.
d) Bulk silicium acid concentration, µg/kg ≤ 2000 -
K) Warm-up of the MCC:
e) Bulk iron concentration, µg/kg ≤ 500 ≤ 100
f) Bulk cooper concentration, µg/kg ≤ 50 - • when the absolute pressure within the separator drum
reaches 0.1962 to 0.392 MPa (overall 1-3 kgf/cm2),
g) Bulk chloride ion concentration, µg/kg < 100 ≤ 50
the steam discharge valves and the deaerators must be
h) Bulk mineral oil concentration, µg/kg ≤ 200 ≤ 100 initiated,
i) Bulk aluminum concentration, µg/kg - ≤ 100 • when the separator drum absolute pressure reaches
0.3-0.7 MPa, hermetic seals of the fuel channels must
be checked visually,
• water in the ACS compartments must conform as • water quality must now meet the following criteria:
follows:
75
Condensed water 1 2 3 4 5 6
Feedwater
after filtering b) Minimum time
to reach the next
a) The pH value at 25oC 5.5-7.8 6.5-7.5 stage, h 0.5 0.5 1.5 2.17 7.0 11.0
b) Relative electric
c) Minimum time
conduction at 25oC, µS/cm ≤ 1.5 ≤ 0.5 spent at given
c) Calcium hardness, power, h - 2.0 2.0 3.0 1.0 -
µg(equiv.)/kg ≤5 ≤1
d) Bulk silicium acid E) After the operation at stage 2 is stabilized:
concentration, µg/kg ≤ 100 ≤ 50
e) Bulk iron • increase the flow of the MCP by opening the throttling
concentration, µg/kg ≤ 50 ≤ 20 regulating valves,
f) Bulk copper • establish proper flow rate of the feedwater by MFWP:
concentration, µg/kg ≤5 ≤5
g) Bulk chloride Maximum flow rate of Supply rate of feedwater to
concentration, µg/kg each MCP, each side of MCC,
≤ 10 ≤ 10
h) Bulk mineral oil m3/s (m3/h) kg/s (t/h)
concentration, µg/kg ≤ 200 - 3 MCP in 2 MCP in
operation operation
Step 2:
1.94 (7000) below 180 below 125
(450) (650)
⇒ Raising the reactor power above the minimal
controlled power level. 2.5 (9000) 180 to 350 125 to 250
⇒ Initiating reactor operation. (450-900) (650-1250)
A) Before reactor power can be increased, the following 2.78 (10000) over 350 (900) over 250
operations must be performed: (1250)
• final adjustment of the fuel channel coolant flow-rate

F) After the operation at stage 3 is stabilized:
control made,
• operation of the gaseous coolant loop checked,
• start the third MCP in each pumping station (if only
• operational water levels in the separator drum and in
two are in operation),
the deaerator attained,
• initiate helium-nitrogen cooling of the reactor.
• proper water levels in the ACS and in the water
supply systems assured,
G) The transition from stage 3 to stage 4 must occur in 50
• measurement and recording of operational parameters
MW(e) (150 MW(th)) steps, maintained for 10 min. The
verified,
operation in each step should not be less then 20 min.
• coolant channel flow rates checked and recorded.
B) Water quality parameters must be rechecked. H) The transition from stage 4 to stage 5 must occur in 50
MW(e) (150 MW(th)) steps, maintained for 20 min. The
C) A representative of VATESI must be present, when operation in each step should be continued not less then 1
the reactor is brought above minimum controlled power hour.
level.
I) Further power increases must occur in 50 MW(e)
D) The procedure for increasing reactor power is as (150 MW(th)) steps. Each power increase step is
follows: maintained for 30 min. The duration of operation in each
steps should be not less 3 hour.
• the increase is accomplished in several stages:
J) If an emergency signal is generated by an energy
Parameter Number of stage distribution detector, the procedure must be stopped, the
1 2 3 4 5 6 failure must be analyzed and eliminated. If two
emergency signals are generated, the power must be
a) Reactor power, reduced until both signals cease. Only then can corrective
MW(th) 240 1000 2600 3300 4200 4800 procedures be initiated.
MW(e) - 250 750 1000 1300 1500
% - 17 50 67 87 100 K) The turbogenerators can be started after the drum
pressure reaches 7 MPa.
76
4.5.2 Shutdown temperature decreases below 180 oC, the purification and
cooling system is switched on.
A) Normal shutdown of power units must adhere to the E) The main circulation circuit must be cooled down to 70
following procedures: or 80 oC and the graphite stack down to about 100 oC.
• the power is decreased while maintaining a constant
pressure in the separator drum by reducing the reactor 4.5.3 Refueling Operation
power and the load of one turbine at a time, this is
followed by a similar reduction at the next turbine, The following refueling machine service areas are located
• while reactor power is reduced to 1000 MW(th), two in the main refueling hall:
or three MCPs are in operation in each pumping A) The refueling machine storage area.
station and their flow rate is reduced to 1.8 m3/s (6500 B) A practice and a calibration area. This area is used for
m3/h) using throttling regulating valves, adjustment and testing of the refueling machine.
• the turbine is fed from the auxiliary transformer, Practice operations include: filling the fuel casket with
• power is decreased continuously by pushing of AZ-1 condensate, refueling operations, loading of new fuel
button. into the fuel casket, decontamination of the interior of
B) Normal cooling of the reactor and the MCP: the fuel casket, and replacement of the inflatable
rubber gasket surrounding the standpipe.
• reduce steam pressure in the separators by discharging C) The spent fuel reception area.
steam via steam discharge valves (SDV-C), then with D) A repair area for replacement of damaged fuel caskets.
the aid of coolers and regenerators of the cooling A completely prepared reserve fuel casket is kept in
system. If necessary, discharge through steam this area.
discharge valves which directs excess steam to the The refueling machine operates in the following modes:
turbine condens (SDV-A) into the ACS condensing checkouts and preparation, loading of new fuel, online
pools, refueling, and refueling of a shut down, cool reactor.
• after the chain reaction has ceased, at least two MCPs
must be in operation in each pumping station, Checkout and Preparation of the Refueling Machine
• after the MCC has been cooled to 180 oC, at least one
When the power is turned on, the coolant tank is
MCP must in operation in each loop,
automatically filled with reactor feedwater. Subsequently
• after the MCC has been cooled to 100 oC, the main
the machine is moved to the practice stand area, where it
circulation pumps may be stopped,
loads the channel gauge and the channel plug into
• observe the inertia in the MCP, to note any reverse
appropriate receptacles of the fuel casket. After this is
flow or failure of a check valve to close,
accomplished the fuel casket is filled with water from the
• the Purification and Cooling System (PCS) must be in
coolant tank. Then the dampers of the closing mechanism
operation until the reactor is completely cool.
are shut, the condensate from the standpipe is drained,
C) During normal cooldown of the reactor observe the and the machine is disconnected from the loading socket.
following criteria:
Loading of New Fuel
• the minimum cooling rate is 10 oC/h,
• the temperature difference between the top and the The refueling machine, with the casket filled with
bottom of the separator drums must not exceed 135oC, feedwater at a temperature of 30 oC, is positioned over the
• the temperature difference between the metal of the practice socket, into which a new fuel assembly has
upper sections of the separator drums and the water previously been loaded. The machine is joined to the
supply must not exceed 150 oC, upper section of the socket by means of the standpipe, and
• the temperature difference between the metal wall of the joint is sealed. The socket and the standpipe are filled
the reactor and the fuel channel must not exceed 50oC with water. The dampers of the closing mechanism are
in the central region and 120 oC in the periphery. opened, the new fuel assembly is pulled into the receptacle
D) Emergency cooling of the reactor and the main of the fuel casket and locked in. The dampers of the
circulation circuit, which is initiated under the following closing mechanism are shut, water is drained from the
circumstances: standpipe and the practice socket, and the refueling
• a reactivity-related shutdown of the reactor, machine is disconnected from the socket and is moved to
• a failure in the MCC, in the main steam line or in the the reactor channel to be reloaded.
feedwater supply line,
• the failure of a fuel channel or of CPS, Fuel Assembly Replacement
• a fire in the control room.
The operator issues directions to prepare the fuel channel
Emergency cooling rates must not exceed 30 oC/h. for refueling. The block covering the fuel channel is
Steam pressure in separator drums is reduced by removed and if a flux detector cable is present, it is
discharging part of the steam by SDV-C. When the water disconnected. This is accomplished manually in the
refueling hall.
77
Two stages of the operations performed by the refueling displace the cooling water back into the supply tank. After
machine are illustrated schematically in Fig. 4.20. After this operation, the standpipe seal is released, the refueling
the refueling machine is positioned over the fuel channel, machine is disengaged from the fuel channel and moved
the standpipe control mechanism (1) lowers the standpipe towards the spent fuel reception area.
(3), which encloses the upper portion of the fuel channel As the spent fuel reception unit is already prepared to
(10). The joint is sealed by the inflatable rubber gaskets receive the spent fuel assembly into the storage pool
(5), and the standpipe is filled with water from the tank. casing, the spent fuel is loaded into one of the reception
Subsequently, the closing mechanism dampers are unit's sockets. The machine with the spent fuel is moved
opened, and the fuel casket is pressurized by the to the water-filled casing, is connected to it, and the
machine's feed pump until it matches the pressure in the standpipe cavity is filled with water from the supply tank.
fuel channel. The grabber (7) is then lowered, and clamps The closing mechanism dampers are opened, and the
on to the handle of the fuel channel seal plug. The sealing spent fuel assembly is transferred from the fuel casket to
mechanism (2), using a special key (4) to turn the fuel the casing. The dampers are closed, the water from the
channel seal plug (9), unseals the channel. Water is standpipe is forced back into the tank, the machine is
pumped in small quantities from the casque to the fuel disengaged from the casing, and is then ready to perform
channel. The cold water prevents steam and hot water the next fuel-changing cycle.
from entering the refueling machine from the fuel
channel. The coolant water is being pumped during the Refueling a Cool (Shut Down) Reactor
time when the new fuel assembly is being loaded. The
grabber is used to lift the spent fuel assembly to a height Two options are available: changing two fuel assemblies
of 7.5 m into the cooling zone, where it is kept for about at once and replacing the removed spent fuel with new
10 minutes. Afterwards, the fuel assembly is pulled into ones, or, removing four spent fuel assemblies and loading
the casque receptacle. new ones without the use of the refueling machine.
To ascertain that the coolant channel is free of In either case, the operations performed by the refueling
obstructions, it is inspected by means of a movable gauge, machine are greatly simplified, since the water pressure in
and then the new fuel assembly is lowered into the the reactor is reduced (down to 0.2-0.5 MPa). Using the
reactor. The fuel channel is then resealed. The coolant first option, the fuel-assembly-changing cycle takes 350
feed pump is disconnected, and the pressure in the fuel minutes, so the refueling machine can change 8 fuel
casket falls to atmospheric levels. The closing mechanism assemblies per day in this mode. If the refueling machine
dampers are closed, the standpipe space is connected to a is used only to remove the spent fuel from the fuel
special ventilation system, and the leak-tightness of the channels, the transfer cycle takes 267 minutes. In this
fuel channel seal is verified. Before disconnecting from case, up to 20 fuel channels per day can be refueled.
the channel, pressurized air is forced into the standpipe to
a) b)
Fig. 4.20 Refueling machine operation

a) refueling machine positioning over the fuel channel, b) unsealing of the fuel channel
1 - standpipe control mechanism, 2 - special sealing key control mechanism, 3 - standpipe, 4 - special key, 5 - inflatable
rubber sealing gaskets, 6 - bottom biological shield, 7 - grabber, 8 - enclosing clock, 9 - fuel channel seal plug, 10 - fuel
channel body
78
5. MAIN CIRCULATION CIRCUIT
This Section describes the characteristics of the Main drum, a feedwater header is mounted, which through
Circulation Circuit (MCC) and the associated thermal- special mixers provides feedwater to the downcomer
hydraulic systems. This includes the steam pipes pipes. The separated water mixed with the returning
delivering steam to the turbine, the feedwater system, the feedwater, reaches the suction header (3) through 24
control rod cooling system and the associated water downcomer pipes on each loop (2). From the suction
purification systems. header it flows through four pipes (4) to the four Main
Circulation Pump (MCP). During normal reactor
A simplified overview of one of the coolant loops is operation, only three pumps are operating in each loop,
provided in Fig. 5.1, volumetric data for the various the fourth pump is a reserve. The MCPs are of a vertical,
components is listed in Table 5.1. Starting at the inlet to centrifugal, single-stage configuration. The MCP
the core (11) the coolant is forced upwards through the assembly consists of a tank, a removable pump section,
reactor core block in a large number of individual fuel and an electric motor. The steel pump tank (5) is covered
channels. Flowing through the core it acquires about 95% on the inside with an anti-corrosive mixture. The nominal
of the energy emitted by the fuel elements. The coolant capacity of the pump is 2.22 m3/s at a head of 1.962 MPa,
reaches saturation temperatures in the lower part of the speed - 1000 rpm, electric motor power - 5600 kW.
channel, starts boiling and exits as a from 23 to 29.1%
quality steam-water mixture (mass-fraction). From the MCP, water flows through pressure header pipes
(6) to the pressure header (8). The suction and pressure
The MCC consists of two loops, whose components are headers are connected by six bypass lines (7), each of
arranged symmetrically with respect to the vertical axis of which is provided with a gate and a check valve. The
the reactor. Each loop has two separator drums (1), which bypass (7) ensures that natural circulation of the coolant
separate the steam from the steam-water mixture exiting takes place in case the main circulation pumps are shut-off.
from the core block. The separator drums are horizontal
cylindrical steel vessels 2.6 m inside diameter and 33.76 From the pressure header (8), water continues through
m long with elliptical ends. Wall thickness of the shell is twenty pipes to twenty group distribution headers (9). The
115 mm. The drums are interconnected both at the lower, outside diameter of a group distribution header is 325
liquid filled, and the upper, steam filled elevations. In the mm, wall thickness is 15 mm, and the length is ~6 m.
water-filled zone the drums in the original design were Mechanical filters are provided inside the pressure
connected by six pipes, each with a 325 mm outside header, while, at the upstream end of the group
diameter and a wall thickness of 16 mm (325 x 16) mm distribution header, there is a flow limiter, a check valve,
and in the steam zone the drums are joined by five (325 x and a mixer for water from the reactor emergency core
19) mm pipes. In the bottom section of each separator cooling system.
1
13
15
+30.0
+23.37
2
14
+15.9
3 7
8
12
+15.5
From
5 +12.6 ECCS
+8.5 +8.9
4
+6.6 6 9 11
10
+2.645
+0.0
Fig. 5.1 Schematic representation of one loop of the main forced circulation circuit
1 - separator drum, 2 - downcomers, 3 - suction header, 4 - suction piping of the MCP, 5 - MCP, 6 - pressure piping of the
MCP, 7 - bypass between headers, 8 - pressure header, 9 - group distribution header with flow limiter, check valve and
mixer, 10 - bottom water piping, 11 - fuel channel before the core, 12 - fuel channel within the core, 13 - fuel channel above
the core, 14 - steam-water pipes, 15 - steam pipelines
78
Each group distribution header is connected to 40- flows down through filters, heaters and deaerators to the
43 bottom water pipes (10) leading to fuel channels. The main feed water pump and is finally returned to the
flow in each pipe, and therefore in each fuel channel (12), separator drums. This condensate retrieval system is
is set by isolation and control valves and is measured by a known as the water feedback system.
ball flow-meter. The steam-water mixture generated in
the fuel channel flows through the steam-water pipes (14) The purification and cooling of the water is performed by
to the separator drums (1). the Purification and Cooling System (PCS) which is an
equivalent of Chemical and Volume Control System
The elevations for the most important components of the (CVCS) in Western LWRs. Part of the water is taken
MCC are presented schematically in Fig. 5.2. The Figure from the MCC, cooled down and filtered by a mechanical
shows that the total, top-to-bottom elevation of the filter and an ion-exchanger in the purification bypass. The
primary system is over 30 m. The elevation driving the treated water then joins the feedwater flow.
natural circulation loop, that is from the bottom of the
core to the bottom of the separator drums is ~21m. These The reactor also contains a number of channels for control
large elevation heads determine the flow parameters of rods and metering devices. These are cooled by a separate
the system under natural circulation conditions. circulation system, which is called the Control Rod
Cooling Circuit (CRCC). More detailed information
From the separator drums the generated steam is directed regarding the various components and systems which
to the turbines. Discharge steam from the turbines is make up the MCC is provided in the subsequent sections
accumulated in condensers, from there the condensate of this chapter.
Table 5.1 Water and steam volumes of one loop of the MCC [39]
Component* Outside diameter x Number Volume, m3 Total volume,

wall thickness, mm per loop Water Steam m3
(1) Separator drum 2830 x 115 2 162.0 173.6 335.6

(2) Downcomers 325 x 16 24 61.5 - 61.5
(3) Suction header 1020 x 60 1 13.4 - 13.4
(4) MCP suction pipes 828 x 38 4 61.5 - 61.5
(5) MCP tanks - 4 - 8.0 8.0
(6) MCP pressure pipes 828 x 38 4 72.9 - 72.9
(7) Bypass between headers 325 x 15 6 4.2 - 4.2
(8) Pressure header 1040 x 70 1 11.8 - 11.8
(9) Group distribution headers and inlet pipes 325 x 15 20 32.6 - 32.6
(10) Bottom water pipes
57 x 3.5 1 0.0412 - 0.0412
-each fuel channel
-total for 830 channels 57 x 3.5 830 34.2 - 34.2
(11) Fuel channel, before the core
- 1 0.0189 - 0.0189
-each fuel channel
-total for 830 channels - 830 15.7 - 15.7
12) Fuel channel within the core
- 1 0.0089 0.0070 0.0159
-each fuel channel
-total for 830 channels - 830 7.5 5.8 13.3
(13) Fuel channel above the core
- 1 0.0067 0.0371 0.0438
-each fuel channel
-total for 830 channels - 830 5.6 30.7 36.3
(14) Steam-water pipes
76 x 4 1 0.0152 0.0844 0.0996
-each fuel channel
-total for 830 channels 76 x 4 830 12.7 70.0 82.7
(15) Pipes from separator drums to turbine - - - 404.7 404.7
Total volume of one circulation loop (830 channels) - - 503.6 684.8 1188.4
Total volume of primary circuit (1661 channels) - - 1007.3 985.4 1992.7
* Component numbers below correspond to the component numbers in Figs. 5.1 and 5.2
79
Fig. 5.2 Elevations of the MCC
1 - separator drum, 2 - downcomers, 3 - suction header, 4 - suction piping of the MCP, 5 - MCP, 6 - pressure piping of the
MCP, 7 - bypass between headers, 8 - pressure header, 9 - group distribution header with flow limiter, check valve and
mixer, 10 - bottom water piping, 11 - fuel channel before the core, 12 - fuel channel within the core, 13 - fuel channel above
the core, 14 - steam-water pipes, 15 - steam pipelines (all dimensions in meters)
5.1 THE MCC THROUGH THE CORE The coolant is supplied to the 1661 fuel channels from
40 group distribution headers. It exits the core as a
The MCC provides the following types of coolant flow for steam-water mixture and is directed to four drums
the proper operation of the core: separators by means of individual steam-water pipes.
• forced-flow cooling under normal operating 5.1.1 Group Distribution Header, Water Piping,
conditions as specified in Table 5.2 [2,35], Isolation and Control Valve
• cooling during transient operation and natural
circulation in the event the MCP are shut off, The coolant is supplied to the individual fuel channels via
• emergency cooling in combination with the group distribution headers (Fig. 5.3), which are horizontal
emergency core cooling system. cylinders with 325 mm outside diameter and 15 mm thick
walls. The Group Distribution Header (GDH) are securely
Table 5.2 Coolant operating conditions at fastened to support structures to prevent any sliding in
4200MW(th) power operation [2,35] case of failure. Each header distributes coolant to 40-43
bottom water pipes (57 x 3.5) mm. These pipes are
Discharge steam flow rate of the separator 2055-2125 provided with isolation and control valves between the
drum * , kg/s (t/h) (7400-7650) GDH outlet and the entrance to the fuel channel.
Feedwater flow rate *, kg/s (t/h) 2055-2125 Isolation and control valves are used to adjust channel
(7400-7650) flow on the basis of channel power. Flow rates can be
Flow rate in the core *, m3/s (m3/h) 10.83-13.33 controlled by varying the flow-area of the valves. This is
(39000-48000) achieved by manual operation from a separate room in the
vicinity of the reactor block. The operating life of the
Saturated steam pressure in separator 6.47-6.96
isolation and control valves is estimated as 50000 hours.
drums (absolute pressure), MPa (kgf/cm2) (66-71)
Ball type flow rate meters are mounted downstream of the
Fluid temperature entrance of the core, oC 260 - 266 valves, their indications are transmitted to the Main
Steam content in the steam-water mixture (23.0 - 29.0) Control Room (MCR). Construction of a isolation and
at core exit (mass fraction), % control valve is represented in Fig. 5.4 and its operation
Water content in the separated steam about 0.1 parameters are presented in Fig. 5.5.
(mass fraction), %
* Data applies to a reactor
80
Fig. 5.3 Group distribution header Fig. 5.4 Isolation and control valve
1 - isolation and control valve, 2 - ball type flow-rate meter, 3 1 - upper housing, 2 - pressurized ring, 3 - copper seal,
- coolant water pipe leading to the fuel channel, 4 - group 4 - bushing, 5 - lower housing, 6 - group distribution header
distribution header
800
Curve Valve steam Flow cross-
1
number position, section area,
2 mm mm2
600
Pressure drop, kPa
1 2 54
3 2 4 102
4 3 6 153
400
4 8 206
5 6
7 5 10 263
200 6 12 319
8
7 16 437
8 24 691
0
0 10 20 30 40 50
3
Flow rates, m /h
Fig. 5.5 Operation parameters of the isolation and control valve [94,95]
81
5.1.2 Fuel Channels: Operation Parameters 5.1.3 Steam-Water Piping
A detailed description of the mechanical characteristics of The steam-water flow from the top of the fuel channels is
an individual fuel channel is provided in Subsection 4.2.4.2. conducted by way of individual steam - water pipes (76x4)
The design thermal-hydraulic parameters of a channel are mm to the separator drums. The bottom water pipes
given in Table 5.3. The Table provides two sets of values, leading into the reactor block and the exiting steam-water
the first column represents the original design parameters pipes include several bends, this aids in reducing gamma
[35], the second, best estimate values determined for the radiation streaming.
current (1997) operating conditions [89].
5.2 SEPARATION OF STEAM
The axial distribution of thermal-hydraulic parameters
along a fuel channel at the maximum power 4.5 MW [35] Fuel channels heat the coolant water to boiling
are shown in Fig. 5.6. Flow rates in the individual fuel temperature and discharge a steam-water mixture. The
channels are based on predictions of fluid and thermal steam quality (steam content in mass fraction) of the
dynamics of the core, and include the variations in local steam-water mixture at core exit varies from 23 to 29%.
power generation rates. The gradual reduction of power The mixture arrives via the steam-water mixture flow
because of nuclear fuel burn-up requires periodic re- pipes at the separator drums, where the steam and water
adjustment of the flow rate in each channel. Standard are separated. The steam (included a water content of up
adjustments are performed at 30% and 60% burn-up. to 0.1% by mass) is directed to the turbines, and the liquid
fraction flows by means of the downcomer pipes to the
Table 5.3 Parameters of the fuel channels MCP suction headers.
Parameter Design Best 5.2.1 Separator Drums

parameter estimate
[35] values [89] Separation of steam in the RBMK plant occurs in large
Channel power, MW 4.5 2.53 horizontal separator drums which contain submerged
Coolant flow rate, kg/s (t/h) 6.67 (24) 5.51 (19.8) perforated sheets and upper liquid de-entrainment
structures. Industrial-scale tests performed on the RBMK-
Maximum quality at channel 1000 design drum separator suggested that an increase in
36.1 23
exit, % efficiency by a factor of 1.5 is possible with relatively
Coolant inlet temperature in minor modifications. These modifications were
260 263
the channel, oC implemented at Ignalina NPP. The modifications resulted
Steam-water temperature at in an almost 3 m longer drum with hardly any change in
288 283 the diameter. The effect was a cheaper construction, a
channel exit, oC
saving of transportation and material cost and the
Pressure drop in the channel, MPa 1.18 0.5
extension of equipment life.
t, oC P, MPa i, kJ/kg x; y w, m/s q,

MW/m2
q
1
300 9.0 1680 1.0 20 1 t y
P
i
0,5
275 8.0 1260 0.5 10 0,5
w x
7.0 840 0 0 0
250
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
H, m
Fig. 5.6 Vertical variation of coolant parameters along the maximum designed power 4.5 MW fuel channel [35]
p - pressure, i - enthalpy, w - velocity, q - heat flux density, y - steam content in the steam-water mixture (volume fraction),
t - temperature, x - steam quality
82
Fig. 5.7 Separator drum
1 - vessel, 2 - cover, 3 - impact plates for steam-water flow, 4 - submerged perforated sheet, 5 - top perforated shield, 6-
feed water distribution header, 7 - jet spray nozzle, 8 - nozzle of steam-pipe, 9 - nozzle of steam-water piping, 10 -
nozzle of feed water, 11 - nozzle of connection in the steam zone, 12 - nozzle of connection in the water zone, 13 -
nozzle of the downcomers
Each of the reactors at the Ignalina NPP is provided with steam goes through the perforations of the upper shields
four separator drums. They perform the following (5) into the steam-flow piping, the separated liquid flows
functions: downward from pipes at the bottom (13). The feed water
line has a nominal diameter of 500 mm (10). It enters the
• separation of steam from the steam-water mixture separator drum at a 45 degree angle, and extends to
flowing from the fuel channels, a distribution header in the lower part of the drum. The
• mixing of the separated water with feedwater, feed water pipe includes a peronite insulation chamber.
• storing of coolant for the MCC. From the header (6) the feed water is injected at (7) into
the downcomer flow (13) to facilitate cooling of the water
Construction parameters of the separator drum are to be supplied to the MCP. As has been noted, both the
represented in Fig. 5.7. This is a horizontal 33.76 m long steam and liquid containing regions of the two separator
cylindrical vessel with a 2.6 m inside diameter. It rests on drum are connected by a number of pipes.
two supports which are located close to the ends, and a
mid-level support which prevents longitudinal Thermocouples are installed in both the upper and the
displacement. lower part of the separator drums. Additional
thermocouples are placed in the feed water pipe. Samples
The steam-water mixture arrives at the separator drum, of materials used in the piping are stored in a special
through inlet pipes (9), and a part of the steam becomes receptables, so that the degree of corrosion can be
separated in the distribution compartments because the checked. The design specifications of the separator drums
flow looses its kinetic energy on impact of the special are listed in Table 5.4 [39,40].
plates (3). This steam then penetrates the submerged
perforated sheet (4) and the barbotage layer above it. Final
separation occurs because of gravity force. The separated
83
The non-uniform generation of power in fuel channels downflow passages functions as a hydraulic lock against
can lead to an in homogeneous steam-water distribution in any penetration of steam at the sides of the perforated
the steam drum. This requires design features which serve sheet. The sink is covered by safety plates spaced at 75
Table 5.4 Specifications* of the separator drum [39,40] mm from the frame.
(type - SP-2100) Traverse and circumferential variations of pressure at the
entrance of the steam pipes are reduced by a similar
Number per reactor 4 perforated shield in the upper part of the drum (5) and by
Steam generation, kg/s 513.9-531.2 190 mm inside diameter bushing installed in the steam
Steam-water flow rate, m3/s 2.71-3.33 outlet pipes. The liquid accumulates in the lower part of
Average steam content in the steam-water the drum to be mixed with feed water and directed to the
23-29
mixture (mass fraction), % downcomers.
Operational pressure, MPa 6.47-6.96
Design pressure, MPa 7.5 In 1988 an extensive performance-study was carried out
Outlet water content in the steam flow (mass in cooperation with RDIPE on unit 1 of the Ignalina NPP
>0.1
fraction), % [40]. Fluid-dynamic and steam separation parameters of
o the separator drums were measured for a range of
Feedwater temperature, C 177-190
Feedwater flowrate, kg/s 513.9-531.2 operational modes of the unit. Electric power was varied
Operational level above the perforated sheet, from 1050 to 1500 MW, this corresponds to an average
200 ± 50 steam flow rate from 423.6 to 583.3 kg/s, the level of
mm
Stored operational water volume for nominal water above the submerged perforated sheet as recorded
63 by the level meters, varied from -50 to +300 mm. The
steam generation and water level, m3
study determined that optimum operating conditions at a
Reduced steam flow velocity per evaporation
0.23 1500 MW(e) nominal power require that the water
cross-section, m/s
content in steam flow (mass fraction) is kept well below
Velocity of steam in perforations of
3.1 the 0.1% limit. In the range of power generation covered,
submerged sheet, m/s
the lowest water content in the exiting steam was observed
Velocity of steam in perforations of upper to occur when the water level is maintained 150 to 250
20.5
shield, m/s mm above the perforated sheet.
Outlet steam velocity, m/s 18.62
Size of separator drum: There is an incentive to keep the water level in the steam
33.76
- total length, m drums as high as practical, because this water provides a
- inside diameter, m 2.6 coolant reserve in the event of a Loss Of Coolant Accident
- distance between submerged sheet and (LOCA). On the other hand, excessive liquid levels
0.95
upper shield, m reduce the degree of de-entrainment. The tests have
Dry mass of separator drum, kg 292000 shown that a liquid layer 200 ±50 mm above the
Number of outlets: perforated sheet represents a workable compromise.
424
- steam-water piping (nominal diameter dn=90mm)
- steam piping (dn = 300 mm ) 16 5.2.2 Connections at the Liquid and Steam Level
- water downcomer (dn = 300 mm ) 12 between Separator Drums
- connecting pipes at the water level (dn=300mm) 6
The two separator drums within each loop are inter-
- connecting pipes at the steam level (dn=300mm) 5
connected both in the liquid and steam region. There are
- pressure metering outlets (dn = 10 mm) 4 five connecting (325 x 16) mm pipes in the steam zone,
- level meterings (dn = 50 mm ) 32 and in the original design there were six pipes
Submerged perforated sheet: (325 x 19) mm in the water zone. The length of pipes is
6
- thickness, mm 19.8 m in the water zone and 16.2 m in the steam zone.
- diameter of perforations, mm 10 Presently this number has been reduced to two water
- number of perforations 70280 region pipes. The connections ensure that equal water
Upper perforated shield: levels and steam pressures are maintained in both drums.
5 One of the connection pipes has a branch pipe
- thickness, mm
- diameter of perforations, mm 10 (325 x 15) mm to supply water to the PCS.
- number of perforations 10620
A schematic of steam and water inter-connections
* Thermal parameters at 4200 MW(th) power
between the separator drums is presented in Fig. 5.8.
to reduce both transverse and longitudinal variations of The number of the inter-connecting pipes at the
the steam content. This is accomplished by a submerged water level has been reduced because operational
perforated sheet (4) with a 150 mm thick downward experience demonstrated that these pipes present
frame. A downflow passages is provided between the maintenance problems. There are two main causes
frame and the drum wall for that part of water, which for this:
penetrates the perforations together with steam. The
84
• The pipes are subjected to substantial thermal Length, m 21.074
loads and resulting thermal stresses. This is Outside diameter, mm 1020
especially true during the shut-down and start-up Wall thickness, mm 60
periods of the plants.
• For most of the operating time fluid velocities in
3 +34.1m these pipes is very low. As a result particulates
settle in these pipes and corrosion processes are
accelerated.
A study was conducted [90] which led to the
4 conclusion that liquid level equilibrium could be
200m
+30.0m
maintained adequately with two pipes. As a result four
300m
of the pipes were removed during the 1996
maintenance outage.
1 5.2.3 Downcomers
2 +21.6m
The downcomer pipes direct the water from the separator
drums to the suction header of the MCP. Each of the
Fig. 5.8 Connections at the liquid and steam level separator drums is connected to the suction header by 12
between separator drums downcomer pipes (325 x 16) mm. Thus each of the two
1 - separator drums, 2 - connecting pipes at the water circulation loops contains 24 downcomers.
level, 3 - connecting pipes at the steam level, 4 -
submerged perforated sheet 5.2.4 MCP Suction Headers
The function of the suction headers is to:

• mix the water coming via 24 downcomers from the
separator drums,
• distribute water among the four main pumps.
The suction header is a cylinder with specifications shown

in Table 5.5 [39]. The inlet pipes from the downcomers
enter the cylinder from above. Its elliptic end covers have
circular nozzles of 400 mm diameters. The header rests
on two side rails and a fixed mid-level support.
5.3 FORCED CIRCULATION
The suction header supplies coolant to four suction pipes

and to four pumps. In the normal power-operation mode,
three pumps are used and one is kept in reserve in each
loop. Two pumps per loop are employed for operation
below 2400 MW(th) power. The exiting water is pumped
through the pressure pipes to the pressure header.
5.3.1 Main Circulation Pumps
For the forced circulation of cooling water through the

RBMK-1500 reactor at the Ignalina NPP type CVN-8
MCP are employed. These pumps belong to the “wet”
stator pump group. The CVN-8 type is a centrifugal,
vertical, single-stage pump with a sealed shaft. A
schematic of the pump is shown in Fig. 5.9, its
Fig. 5.9 The pump equipment of the RBMK type reactor characteristics are listed in Table 5.6 [42]. The pump is
1 - service platform, 2 - electric motor, 3 - flywheel, 4
powered by a vertical type VDA-173/99-6-2 AUChL4
-junction coupling, 5 - support of electric motor, 6-
electric motor, which is a three-phase asynchronous motor
foundation frame, 7 - tank of the pump, 8 - water outlet, 9 -
with a close - connected rotor (2). Motor characteristics
water inlet
are given in the Table 5.7. Rotary moment of inertia from
the electric motor to the pump is transferred by means of
Table 5.5 Specifications of the suction header of the
an elastic coupling mechanism (4) which is provided
MCP [39] (manufacturer - Izhora Plant, Russia)
with rubber packing (coupling type 65 GSP).
Number per reactor 2
85
Table 5.6 Pump characteristics [42] ( type- CVN-8, Table 5.7 Electric motor characteristics
manufacturer- OKBM (Special Designer Bureau of
Engineering), Niznij Novgorod, Russia) Power, kW 5600
Voltage, V 6000
Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) 2.22± 0.05 Current of stator, A 620
(8000±200) cos φ 0.9
Head, MPa (m of water column) 1.962 ± 0.20 Rotating speed, rpm 1000
(200±20) Frequency of mains, Hz 50
o
Temperature, C 270 Efficiency, % 96
Absolute suction pressure , MPa (kgf/cm2) 7.06 (72)
Minimum pressure margin before cooler A flywheel (3) is mounted on the motor shaft, which
boiling in the suction branch pipe of the 0.226 (23) increases the rotary inertia in order to prolong the rotation
pump, MPa (m of water column) of the shaft in the event the electric motor fails. The
Shaft power, kW 4300 ± 300 flywheel is of type 64 GSP, which has a massive 0.2 m
Rotational speed, rpm 1000 outside diameter and 0.195 m thick steel (type ST 25)
2
Water seal pressure range, MPa (kgf/cm ) 7.85 - 9.81 disk. An annular groove is provided in this disk for
(80-100) inserting balancing weights.
Water seal flow rate, kg/s (dm3/h) 0.0138 (50)
Seal leakage ( from shaft-sealing device to The MCPs are joined in groups of four pumps each (three
< 0.0069 (25) for normal operation and one on standby). Because the
the atmosphere), kg/s (dm3/h)
Sealing water temperature, C o MCPs are enclosed in the confinement structure, they are
- at inlet < 50 readily accessible for maintenance of the mechanical
parts. The pumps are mounted in such a manner, that the
- at outlet < 65
elevation of the intake suction and pressure is lower than
Cooling water flow rate though the cooler 2.22 ± 0.28
the branch pipe overlap. The MCP rests on the foundation
of sealing system, kg/s (m3/h) (8±1)
frame (6) and is attached to it by locking rings. The pump
Cooling water excess pressure, MPa
≤ 0.981 (10) is centered on the foundation frame by a locating pin, and
(kgf/cm2) the foundation is centered on the overlap. Verticality of
Cooling water pressure drop at cooler, when
≤ 0.1962 (2) the pump is obtained by concentric discs and jacks. For
flow rate is 2.22 kg/s, MPa (kgf/cm2) ease of maintenance the main zone of the pump and its
Cooling water temperature, oC supports is protected from overheating by thermal
- at inlet of cooler < 40 isolation. The annular gap between the overlap and the
- at outlet of cooler < 60 outer cylindrical surface of the pump is enclosed within a
Lubricant flow rate through radial-axial special steel plate, which is calculated to support a
bearing, m3/s 8 ± 0.3 pressure difference of 0.4 MPa. This prevents coolant
Lubricant pressure drop at the inlet of 0.147 -0.343 entry into the service compartments of the pump, in the
bearing, MPa (kgf/cm2) (1.5-3.5) event that the MCC pipelines were to rupture.
Lubricant temperature at the inlet of 40 - 50
bearing, oC The pump shown in Fig. 5.10, consists of a shell (1) part
Lubricant pressure at radial bearing, MPa 8.83 (90) of which can be removed. The removable part is packed
(kgf/cm2) with a cooper seal of trapezoidal cross-section (4), which
is needed to assure leak-tightness. The shell is a welded
Top (radial-axial) bearing temperature,oC 70
tank fitted with intake (suction) and pressure branch pipes
Water flow rate through the hydrostatic 11.1 - 16.7
connected to the MCC. The inner cavity of the shell is
bearing, kg/s (m3/h) (40-60)
lined with a corrosion-resistant stainless steel sheet. The
Maximum peak - to-peak amplitude of tank rests on supporting legs, which are attached to the
vibration in bearings, m < 0.0001 foundation frame. The removable part consists of a cover
Maximum admissible heating/cooling with jaws (5), an axial - radial upper bearing and shaft
velocity, oC/min 2 (14), pump rotor (3), pump stator (2), pole (6) and a lower
Time to full rotor acceleration, s 16 radial hydrostatic bearing.
Time to full rotor deceleration, s 120 - 300
Total moment of inertia 3741 The upper combined axial - radial sliding bearing consists
(pump&motor&flywheel), kg⋅m2 of a radial bearing and a heel (13) (axial part of bearing)
Overall dimensions with top and bottom footstep bearings. The shaft (14) is
- height, m 9.85 forged steel. The pump rotor (3) (having a specific speed
- length, m 3.07 coefficient of 102) is enclosed by double-curved blades. It
is welded of two parts: one disc with blades and a covered
- width, m 2.75
disc. The wheel and the pump stator are
Mass of pump equipment, kg 106000
86
manufactured from stainless steel. The inner surface of which time it is necessary to examine the removable part)
the cover (5) is also lined with stainless steel. The upper is about 20000 hours.
bearing and the support of the electric motor are attached 5.3.2 Suction and Pressure Piping of the MCPs
to the outlet housing (6), which is manufactured from
steel casting. These construction features make the These pipes direct the coolant from the suction header to
maintenance of the removable part easier. the pump and down-stream from the pump to the
pressure header. They have 282 mm outside diameters
A double - acting mechanical (contact) shaft bearing (10) and 38 mm thick walls. Each individual pipe includes a
is used to prevent the coolant flow from entering the gate valve and a branch between the gate valve and the
service compartment of the pumps. Clean sealing water pump for the following pipes:
is fed to the bearing the pressure of which is higher than
• piping system for countering the axial forces of the
the pressure of the MCC coolant. The distinguishing
pump rotor, (89 x 5) mm,
feature of this bearing is a very small (on the order of
• inlet-outlet cooling heating pipes, (89 x 5) mm,
about 10-6 m) gap between the two bearing surfaces. It
reduces the leakage of water to not more than 25 • outlet pipe for the pressure water of the hydrostatic
liters/hour. bearing, (57 x 4) mm,
• draining pipe for the suction side of the main pump,
The rotor of the pump moves clock-wise (from intake or external (57 x 4) mm,
suction side). To avoid the rotation of the shaft in the • supply pipe for the hydraulic system of the pump and
opposite direction (which is possible when a check valve to the forced circulation system, (25 x 3) mm.
is stuck in the open position), a special anti -rotational
device is used. It consists of a ratchet, which is mounted
in a recess of the flywheel. The reasons for installing the
ratchet are:
• radial-axial oil bearing of electric motor is not adapted

to work in case when the rotor turns in the opposite
direction,
• because the electric motor would be overloaded, it
does not permit the pump to be switched on, when the
rotor rotates in the opposite direction.
The following auxiliary systems are necessary for assuring

proper MCP operation :
• Lubrication system with an oil filter and cooler which

is part of the main circulation system. It is specifically
designed for each pump.
• A system, which supplies water to the shaft-sealing
device. This is common for all eight MCPs. A valve at
the sealing-water supply in the branch pipe is used to
prevent the MCC coolant flow from entering this
system. In the event that the system fails, and the
pressure of the sealing-water decreases, the shaft is
sealed by MCC water.
• A system, which supplies water to the hydrostatic
bearing and is specifically adapted for each pump. The
water to this system is supplied from the pressure
branch pipe of the pump. Water is filtered by a multi
hydrocyclone filter before being supplied to the
bearings. When the system fails, water is supplied to Fig. 5.10 Schematic of the RBMK-1500 pump
the bearings from the sealing-system. 1 - outlet case, 2 - pump stator, 3 - pump rotor, 4 - seal,
• A system for countering the axial forces of the pump 5 - cover of bearing seat, 6 - outlet housing, 7 - water
rotor, which is also designed specifically for each overflow from behind the pump rotor (from system for
pump. countering the axial forces), 8 - water to hydrostatic
bearing, 9 - lubricant from block and radial bearing,
10 - shaft sealing device, 11 - lubricant supply to radial
The tank of the pump is designed to last 25 years. The
bearing and block, 12 - lubricant from block, 13 - pillow
time of operation of the pump to the first inspection (at
block, 14 - shaft, 15 - water from cooler, 16 - outlet of
water, which is penetrates through the seal, 17 - water
87
supply to shaft sealing, 18 - venting, 19 - removal of water • supply the coolant to the twenty pipes and the twenty
- lubricant emulsion, 20 - water to cooler group distribution headers (325 x 15) mm,
Each individual pipe on the pressure side of the pump • supply the water to the PCS along two pipes connected
contains a check valve, a throttling-regulating valve, a to the stagnation region of the header (159 x 9) mm.
gate valve and a throttle disc flow rate meter. A branch
pipe is connected between the check valve and the pump The construction of a pressure header is similar to that of
to supply water to the hydrostatic bearing, (108 x 7) mm. a suction header, except for its wall thickness, as shown in
The gate valves are used to disconnect the pump during Table 5.9 [39]. The outlets to the group distribution
maintenance from its pressure pipes and pressure headers. header contain filters for solid particles and flow rate
The gate valve is open in the stand-by position of the controls which are 120 mm long Laval diffusers of
pump, and its proper temperature is maintained by a cylindrical diameter of 151.1mm.
small amount of water arriving to the suction header
through four openings of the 10 mm diameter in the 5.3.4 Pipe Connections between Suction Headers and
check valve. The type MA11112-800-05 gate valves, used Pressure Headers
here, are commonly used in other industrial applications.
The check valves used are of type PT4409-800-01. Each suction header in a separate circulation loop is
connected by six pipes (325 x 15) mm with the respective
The power of each individual pump is governed by its pressure header, to ensure that natural circulation can take
throttling-regulating valve, Fig. 5.11. The throttling- place when the pumps are disconnected. Each of the pipes
regulating valve is partially closed at the start, and is include a gate valve type C23202K-0160-300 and a check
gradually opened as the reactor power rises and of the valve C20 401-160. The type C20 401-160 check valve is
flow rate increases. Table 5.8 [39] provides the made in the former Czechoslovakia.
characteristics of the throttling-regulating valve.
The exploitation of these by-pass pipes has been
The throttling-regulating valve is controlled from a MCR. modified as a result of the Barselina study [91]. The
study directed attention to the circumstance that in the
5.3.3 MCP Pressure Header event of a Design Basis LOCA (That is, the break of
the pressure header), if one of the check valves would
The functions of an individual pressure header are to: fail to close, this would lead to an increased rate of
• collect the water from all main pumps of one MCC coolant loss. Studies were conducted which determined
loop. This water arrives through the pressure pipes, that adequate natural circulation can be maintained
through the stalled rotor blades of the MCP’s [92]. It
was then suggested to remove these pipes altogether.
In fact, this modification has been adopted in the
Leningrad plants [93]. However, these pipes are useful
during maintenance shutdown. Therefore in the
Ignalina NPP the procedure was adopted to close the
manually operated gate valves within these pipes (see
Fig. 5.1) during operating mode of the reactor and to
open during maintenance.
Table 5.8 Specifications of throttling-regulating valve
[39] (type - RT 96510-800)

Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) < 2.22 (8000)
Pressure drop, MPa 1.766
Pressure, MPa 9.81
Nominal diameter, mm 800
Table 5.9 Specifications of the pressure header of the

MCP [39] (manufacturer - Izhora Plant, Russia)
Fig. 5.11 A schematic representation of the throttling- Length, m 18.204

regulating valve Outside diameter, mm 1040
1 - electric drive, 2 - speed reducer, 3 - pivot arm, 4 -pivot
Wall thickness, mm 70
axis, 5 - top cover, 6 - beam, 7 - disc, 8 - pin, 9 - bottom
88
5.3.5 Pipe Connections between the Pressure Header 1 - disk, 2 - protective cross, 3 - suspender
and the Group Distribution Header the steam is also controlled, and peaks of pressure are
eliminated by the high pressure steam loop (8) The two
Water is distributed to individual group distribution high pressure steam loops, one for each MCC loop,
header by means of 20 pipes (325 x 15) mm. Each pipe consists of pipes and discharge valves, and is connected by
has a manual-control gate-valve, a check valve and a four pipes to the steam zones of the two separator drums.
mixer to mix the cold water from the Emergency Core The Steam Discharge Valve (SDV-A) (10) and six Main
Cooling System (ECCS) and the hot water from the Safety Valves (MSVs) (9) discharge the steam to the
MCC. The type C23201-0160-300 gate valves are closed pressure suppression pool of ACS tower. When the
for servicing the pressure header or the isolation and pressure decreases bellow 5.89 MPa (60 kgf/cm2), two
control valves. The check valve prevents back-flow from valves (which control steam flow rate to one turbine) close
the fuel channels in case of failure of the pressure header. and two similar valves of the other turbine are closed
Fig. 5.12 shows a schematic of a type C20 401-0160 when the pressure falls below 5.39 MPa (55
check valves employed for this purpose. All check valves kgf/cm2) (this is absolute pressure).
have are provided with guard devices (2) which prevent a
disconnected valve disc (1) from closing the flow path to 5.4.1 Protection of the MCC from Pressure Surges
the respective group distribution header. The valve is
partially open when the pressure on both sides is equal. The MCC is protected from over-pressures by a steam
discharge system employing pressure relief valves. One
Mixers protect the MCC from thermal or hydraulic loop of this system consists of:
shocks. Flanges designed to prevent pipe whip in the
event of a pressure surge are fixed to the structural beams • four fast-acting SDV-C which, as shown in Fig. 5.13,
of the plant and to a special framework. direct the excess steam to the turbine condenser (7)
(two for each steam header),
5.4 STEAM PIPING • one fast-acting SDV-A (10),
• six MSVs (9).
These pipes supply the steam from the separator drums to
the turbine and to plant internal plant needs. This The SDV-A and MSVs are located in the high pressure
includes steam for the pressure safety system of the MCC, steam loop (8) joining the four steam headers of the
and through a reducer to the plant steam system. Table separator drums of one loop. The steam discharged
5.10 lists the design steam parameters. through these valves goes into the ACS tower. The
parameters of the steam discharge system are shown in
The piping is schematically presented in Fig. 5.13. From Table 5.11 [43].
the separator drum (1) the steam is carried along 16 pipes
(325 x 19) mm, to two steam headers (2) (630 x 25) mm. Table 5.10 Operation parameters of the steam
From there the steam of one MCC loop is collected by
four steam pipes (3) (630 x 25) mm, and fed to the turbine Absolute pressure in the separator 6.47-6.96
(5). Each separator drum is connected by the pipe line (3) drums, MPa
to two turbogenerators. Absolute pressure of the turbine 6.18- 6.67
supply inlet, MPa
To ensure a uniform longitudinal sink from the separator
Inlet temperature of the turbine, oC 279.5
drum, steam pipes (3) are connected mid-way to the steam
headers (2). Each of the steam pipes (3) has a parallel Water content in the steam flow < 0.5
Steam Discharge Valve (SDV-C) (7) to direct the steam to (mass fraction) at the turbine inlet, %
the condensers of the turbines. The pressure of Maximum flow rates for two turbines 2055-2125
at 4200 MW (th), kg/s
Table 5.11 Parameters of the protective steam

discharge valves [43]
Number Activation pressure Capacity
Trademark per (off/on), MPa per valve,
reactor (kgf/cm2)* kg/s (t/h)
SDV-C 8 6.96/6.77 (71/69) 152.8 (550)
SDV-A 2 7.06/6.77 (72/69) 97.2 (350)
MSV group I 2 7.36/7.06 (75/72) 97.2 (350)
MSV group II 4 7.45/7.16 (76/73) 97.2 (350)
Fig. 5.12 A schematic representation of the GDH MSV group III 6 7.55/7.26 (77/74) 97.2 (350)
check valve * Excess pressure
89
5
7
To To
deaerator deaerator
4
10 9
To ACS To ACS
Fig. 5.13 Steam piping
1 - separator drum, 2 - header, 3 - main steam pipes, 4 - SDV-D, 5 - turbogenerators, 6 - condensers, 7 - SDV-C,
8 - high pressure steam loop, 9 - MSV, 10 - SDV-A
5.4.1.1 Fast-Acting Steam Discharge Valve SDV-C • manually.

Table 5.12 Fast-acting steam discharge valve to
Steam pipes leading to the condensers of all turbines are turbine condenser [39] (type - 1034-300/300-7,
provided with fast-acting steam discharge valves. To manufacturer - Tchechovskoy Plant of Energy
ensure a uniform drain from the separator drum, two steam Engineering, Russia)
pipes are connected to each SDV-C valve. This keeps the
piping hot even when the reactor is shut down. If Number per reactor 8
condensation occurs in the lines, the inclined inlet-outlet Capacity, kg/s 152.8
pipes facilitate free flow of the condensate. Each SDV-C Overpressure protection (excess), MPa 6.96
contains a throttle to decrease the energy of the steam
flow. Opening/closure time, s < 10
o
Operating temperature, C 280
The SDV-C valves admit a portion of the steam from the Pressure at outlet, MPa * 1.0
steam piping, control it in the throttle valves and supply it
Temperature at outlet, oC * 183
to the condensers of the turbines. These valves are
activated under the following conditions : Nominal diameter at inlet and outlet, mm 300/300
- average lifetime, years 30
• reactor startup,
• reactor cool down, - average lifetime between major servicing, years 5
• generation of excess steam, - average lifetime between major servicing, cycles 750
• stoppage of both turbines, - probability of safe operation, % 92
• stoppage of the single operating turbine,
• stoppage of one of two operating turbines, * Design values
• reduction of power of the single operating turbine.
Each valve is connected to an automatic controller and a
An individual SDV-C is limited to a 152.8 kg/s flow rate.
position indicator on the MCR. In the first operating
This adds up to 1222 kg/s for all eight SDV-C in the
mode, the SDV-C is activated by a high pressure signal
steam pipelines or 50% of the maximum 2444 kg/s steam
from the separator drum. In the second mode, the
generated by the reactor at 4800 MW (th). The valve is
computer returns either a "close" or a "keep closed"
activated in about 10 s after the limiting 7.06 MPa pressure
command under a combined action of the following
is reached. The fast-acting steam discharge valve is an
conditions: increased pressure in the turbine condenser
(on/off) isolating throttle described in Table5.12 [39].
(pressure in condenser is more than 0.023 MPa), an
excessive level of the condensate, temperature
Electric drives of the SDV-C are operated in the following
downstream of steam discharge valve is more than
three modes by:
100 oC, or failure of the electric currant. Finally, remote
• controller signals, manual control (third case) is used in transient operation
• logical electronic control,
90
during start-up or cool-down of the reactor, or in the Two types of fast-acting steam discharge valves are
case of failure of the other two operating modes. operated by electric drives. They differ only in their
5.4.1.2 High Pressure Steam Loop activation pressure, which is 7.06 MPa for the SDV-A
and 6.96 MPa (excess pressure) for the SDV-C valve. The
The steam piping consists of two identical high pressure computer control issues either "close" or "do not open"
steam loops. Each of these loops is connected by four directions at 6.77 MPa operation pressure. Remote
pipes (630 x 25) mm to the steam zones of the separator manual operation from the MCR is available.
drums of the respective closed loop of the MCC, as shown
in Fig. 5.10. A high pressure steam loop contains six The MSV are intended for emergency protection of the
MSVs and one SDV-A. The SDV-A valve is connected to piping and other primary system components from
the high pressure loop by two pipes (325 x 16) mm. pressure rises for which the activation of the SDV-A, and
The MSV of the loop and the SDV-A discharge the steam SDV-C safety valves become insufficient.
through their individual pipes (630 x 12) mm to the
fifth pool of the ACS tower. Part of the steam also escapes The activation pressure for separate groups of MSVs are
through closed MSV and SDV-A valves. This steam is given in Table 5.11. The opening/closing time for MSVs
collected and directed through a (630 x 8) mm pipe to the is less that 0.5 s, the time delay for opening is less that 4 s
condenser in the machine hall. The inclined supply and and for closing about 10 s. All of the original 24 Main
discharge pipes facilitate free flow of condensate. safety valves (12 valves per unit) were replaced by new
more reliable French-design valves in 1996. Safety
The SDV-A obtains steam from the steam piping, reduces significant characteristics of these valves, such as
its energy by throttling and directs it to the fifth actuation pressure (on/off) and capacity of these new
condensation pool of the ACS tower. It is activated when MSVs remain the same as for old ones.
turbine load decreases substantially doe to:
5.5 THE WATER FEEDBACK SYSTEM
• loss of electrical AC power,
• one turbogenerator is disconnected and the condenser The water feedback system shown in Fig. 5.14 carries
vacuum of the other turbogenerator decreases. fresh water to the separator drums in either normal,
transient or emergency operation of the reactor. From the
SDV-A is also available to cool the reactor in case of an condenser of the turbine the coolant arrives at the first
accident. It will be activated in those conditions when the stage condensate pump (1), then it is pre-heated in the
opening of the SDV-C valve is insufficient to control the ejector (2) and filtered (3). From the second stage
rise in pressure or when the SDV-C valve fails to condensate pump (4) it is heated in a series of five heaters
function. (6) up to 190 oC, and then mixed with the condensate
from the other turbogenerator and arrives at the deaerator
The activation pressure of SDV-A is set at 7.06 MPa, (8) to be sent into the main feed water pump (5) and to the
nominal steam flow rate after activation is 97.2 kg/s. The main feeder (13). Auxiliary feed water pumps (7) supply
fast-acting steam discharge valve is an (on/off) isolating the coolant to the auxiliary feeder. The liquid stored in the
throttle, as shown in Table 5.13 [39]. deaerators can be used in emergency both through the
main feeder and through the auxiliary feeder (12). The
Table 5.13 Fast-acting steam discharge valve to fifth deaerator is heated by steam from the inter-turbine sink
pool of the ACS tower SDV-A [39] (type - 1034- and from the fast-acting Steam Discharge Valve to the
300/300-7, manufacturer - Tchechovskoy Plant of Deaerator (SDV-D) (9).
Energy Engineering, Russia)
5.5.1 Operation
Capacity, kg/s 97.2 In normal or transient operation of the reactor, for
Overpressure protection (excess), MPa 7.06 pressure variations from 10% to nominal value, feedwater
is supplied to the separator drums by the Main Feed
Opening/closure time, s < 10 Water Pumps (MFWP). The six parallel pumps ensure a
Pressure at outlet, MPa* 1.0 reliable nominal-load operation of the separator drums
Operating temperature, C* o
280 with a 10 % reserve even when one of the pumps fails,
and one, as is the case under normal operating conditions,
Temperature at outlet, oC* 183
is on standby.
Nominal diameter at inlet and outlet, mm 300/300
- average lifetime , years 30 Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps (AFWP) are activated:
- average lifetime between major servicing, years 5
• to fill the MCC before starting the reactor,
- average lifetime between major servicing, cycles 750
• for start-up, shut-down or for low-pressure operation,
- probability of safe operation, % 92 up to 10 % of nominal power,
* Design values • if MFWPs are switched off.
91
Fig. 5.14 Water feedback system
1 - condensate pump of the first stage, 2 - main ejector and seal ejector cooler, 3 - condensate filter, 4 - condensate pump of
the second stage, 5 - MFWPs, 6 - low pressure reheaters, 7 - AFWPs, 8 - deaerators, 9 - SDV-D, 10 - deminiralized water
storage tank, 11 - auxiliary deaerator makeup pumps, 12 - auxiliary feeder, 13 - main feeder, 14 - mixer
In addition to this, the MFWPs and the AFWPs are Feedwater is supplied to the pressure headers by both the
utilized to cool the reactor during an emergency (for main and the AFWPs along two pipes, one (426x24) mm,
example, in case of a LOCA event). Note that the pumps the other (219 x 13) mm to be fed to the emergency
are not tripped in the event of an accident, but continue to headers.
operate until they are able to do so. In accident scenarios
which have been analyzed MFWPs can be stopped due to To avoid cavitation in the AFWPs when they are activated
cavitation or loss of off-site-power. due to a pressure loss in the deaerators, four deaerator
auxiliary makeup system pumps are connected to the
The suction and pressure pipes of the MFWPs are suction headers of the AFWPs. They take water from the
connected to the suction and pressure headers. Each auxiliary deminiralized water storage tanks. The volume
header consists of gate-valve separated chambers to of the water, stored in this tank, should never be less than
ensure normal operation of at least three MFWPs with 1000 m3.
one maintained on standby for servicing. The pressure
piping can feed the two MCC loops if one of the MFWPs A recirculation piping system is included to eliminate
fails. Control valves are installed in the piping of both overheating and pressure fluctuations of the feedwater in
main and auxiliary feed lines to ensure the safe operation the low-power operation mode. These pipes connect main
even with very low pressures in the separator drums, e.g., and emergency feed pumps pressure headers to the
during a transient involving loss of coolant from the deaerator.
MCC.
5.5.2 Operation Parameters of the Water Feedback
Feedwater arrives at the separator drums from the main System
feeder lines, one per the MCC loop, along four pipes (530
x 28) mm, one for each separator drum. The feeder When the two turbogenerators of a reactor function at
system consists of three parallel lines, one standing by, their nominal power, the groups of deaerators pairs and
interconnected at their two ends. the six MFWPs operate on their normal loads. Total
flowrate of the feedwater is then 2444 kg/s. When a single
Two auxiliary feeder systems, one per each MCC loop, turbogenerator is running, only one pair of deaerators is in
supply the coolant to the separator drums from AFWPs operation, the others are disconnected. Total flow rate of
along two pipes (219 x 13) mm. They are connected to the the feedwater is then 1222 kg/s, all other parameters are at
separator drums downstream of the main feeders. their nominal magnitude.
92
In transient operation modes, such as start-up, cool-down 5.5.3.2 Filtration of the Condensate
or low-power operation, feedwater arrives from the
AFWPs, provided the flow rate needed is below 10 % of The combined desalination filters with integral
the nominal value. The level of liquid in the separator regenerators filter-out all electrolytes and all silica acids
drums is then maintained within ± 50 mm of the nominal coming from the suction side of the coolant in the
level. For feedwater parameters in nominal and in condensers. The condensate is compressed to 3.2 MPa
transient operation, see Table 5.14. and filtered in a downward flow across a bed of
H-kationite and OH-anionite. Kations in the coolant are
5.5.3 Components of the System exchanged to H ions on the kationides, and any ions to
OH on the anionite. Filtration cycle takes 95 days, then
Components of the feedwater piping system are described the ionite bed is transferred to the regenerator to restore its
at the beginning of this Section. Here some details of their activity. The filter is an upright single-shell cylinder with
construction are presented. the upper, medium and lower distributors. The parameters
of filters are present in the Table 5.17.
5.5.3.1 Condensate Pumps
Water quality behind condensate filters must meet the
Two-stage lines supply the condensate to the deaerators. following criteria [36]:
The lower-stage pipes carry the condensate from the
condenser of the turbine via the purification system into • Relative electric conduction at 25 oC, µS/cm ≤ 0.1
the suction side of the upper line where it is carried via the • Bulk chloride ion concentration, µg/kg ≤3
low-pressure reheaters into the deaerators. • Bulk silicium acid concentration, µg /kg ≤ 30
• Bulk oxygen concentration, µg /kg ≤ 400
The upright four-stage pumps of the lower pumping line, • Bulk natrium concentration, µg /kg ≤3
specified in Table 5.15 are vertical. The vertical • Bulk copper concentration, µg /kg ≤2
construction of the pumps allows to maintain the pumps
without disconnecting the piping. Their shafts are 5.5.3.3 Pre-Heating the Condensate
mechanically sealed to prevent leakage. The pumps are
installed in a closed container, are connected by shafts The condensate is pre-heated in five regenerating
extending across the concrete wall and are fixed by joints reheaters. Reheater 1 is a double-shell unit, pre-heaters 2,
to the pumps at one end and to the electric motors at the 3, 4, 5, are single - shell vertical units with tube bundles.
other. The higher - pressure liquid - fraction internal flow occurs
in the stainless steel tubes in a shell - side flow of steam of
The pumps of the second stage are horizontal. The a lower pressure. This arrangement reduces the shell -
centrifugal, one - stage, with double - sided rotor, it side pressure and prevents liquid from boiling. The steam
possesses sufficient pressure not only to withstand the goes to the top, but the steam-water mixture is discharged
high resistance of the four reheaters, but also to lift the at the bottom. The reheaters are specified in Tables 5.18 -
condensate into the deaerators, see Table 5.16 [41]. 5.22 [44].
Table 5.14 Operation parameter of feedwater
Parameters * Nominal operation** Starting transient Cooling transient Low load
Pressure in separator drums, MPa 6.47-6.96 0.2-6.96 6.96-0.2 6.96

Pressure in deaerators, MPa 1.28 0.2-1.28 1.28-0.2 1.28
Feedwater flow - rate, kg/s 2055-2125 0-278 278-0 278
Pressure in the pressure header of MFWP,
8.9 - - -
MPa
Pressure in the pressure header of AFWP,
- 0.2-9.1 9.1-0.2 9.1
MPa
Pressure in the main feeder, MPa 8.55 - - -
Pressure in the emergency feeder, MPa - 0.2-8.4 8.4-0.2 8.4
o
Feedwater temperature, C 177-190 30-190 190-50 190
* Absolute pressures
** At 4200 MW (th) power
93
Table 5.15 Specification of the condensate pump of Composition of the filter bed ions KU-2 and AV-17
first stage [41] (type - 1500-120, manufacturer - Table 5.18 Low pressure reheater PND-1 [44] (type
Scientific and Industry Union "Nasosenergomash" - PN-1200-42-4-IA, manufacturer - Industrial Union
Sumy, Ukraine) "Krasnij Kotelshik", Taganrog, Russia)
Number per reactor 4 (2/turbine)
Capacity, m3/s 0.417
Condensate mass flow rate, kg/s 422.5*
Head, MPa 1.117
Pressure, MPa:
Pumping power, kW 559
- of steam < 1.0*
Efficiency, % 80
- of heating condensate < 4.2*
Cavitation margin, m 2.3 o
Maximum temperature of steam, C 150*
Absolute suction pressure, MPa 0.296
Hydraulic drag resistance of condensate, MPa 0.0216*
Temperature of pumping water, oC 70
Heat transfer surface area, m2 1200
Overall dimensions, m:
Heat transfer rate (power), MW 37.9*
- height 3.440
Heater dimensions, m:
- length 1.900
- height 10.450
- width 1.860
- diameter 2.632
Mass of pump equipment (with electric motor), kg 24170
Dry mass, kg 46500
Electric motor (type - VAN (AV) 15-36-8AMU4, Mass with water, kg 70000
manufacturer - "Uralelektrotyazmash", Russia)
Rotational speed, rpm 740 Table 5.19 Low pressure reheater PND-2 [44] (type
Electric motor power, kW 1000 - PN-1900-42-4-IA, Manufacturer - Industrial Union
Voltage, V 6000 "Krasnij Kotelshik", Taganrog, Russia)
Mass of the electric motor, kg 10710
Table 5.16 Specifications of the condensate pump of Nominal condensate flow rate, kg/s 733.9*
second stage [41] (type - 1500-180-2, manufacturer - Pressure, MPa:
Scientific and Industry Union "Nasosenergomash" - of steam < 1.0*
Sumy, Ukraine) - of heating condensate < 4.2*
Maximum temperature of steam, oC 145*
Capacity, m3/s 0.417
Head, MPa 1.766
Heat transfer rate (power), MW 118.3*
Pump power, kW 1141
Heater dimensions, m:
Efficiency, % 84
- height 10.280
Cavitation margin, m 22
- diameter 3.364
Temperature of pumping water, oC 70
Length of shell, m 8.345
Overall dimensions, m:
Internal shell diameter, m 2.200
- height 1.740
Outside tube diameter, mm 16
- length 2.020
Thickness of tube wall, mm 1
- width 1.513
Dry mass, kg 68900
Mass of pump equipment (with electric motor), kg 8715
Mass with water, kg 95000
Electric motor (type - 2AZM-1600/6000UCh14)
Rotational speed, rpm 2975 Table 5.20 Low pressure reheater PND-3 [44] (type
Electric motor power, kW 1600 - PN-1900-42-4-IIA, manufacturer - Industrial Union
Voltage, V 6000 "Krasnij Kotelshik", Taganrog, Russia)
Mass of the electric motor, kg 5280
Table 5.17 Specifications of condensate filters [19] Nominal condensate mass flow rate, kg/s 818.6*
(type - AFISDNr-3.0-1.6) Pressure, MPa:
- of steam < 1.0*
Nominal diameter, m 3.0
- of heating condensate < 4.2*
Nominal pressure, MPa 1.6
Maximum steam temperature, oC 145*
Capacity, kg/s 150
Hydraulic drag resistance of condensate , 0.0260*
Overall height, m 4.1 MPa
Entire mass, kg 6600 Heat transfer surface area, m2 1900
Height of the filter bed, m 1.0 Heat transfer rate (power), MW 79.2*
94
Dimensions, m: * Design values
- height 10.280
Continue Table 5.20 5.5.3.4 Deaerators
- diameter 3.264
The condensate from each turbogenerator is subject to
Length of shell, m 8.345
deaeration in two parallel thermal-jet deaerators. Oxidant
Internal shell diameter, m 2.200
gases, particularly oxygen, are thus eliminated, the
Outside tube diameter, mm 15 condensate is pre-heated and its supply in the main and
Thickness of tube walls, mm 1 auxiliary feed water system is renewed. Aside from this
Dry mass, kg 68200 primary purpose, the deaerators also heat up the feedwater
Full mass with water, kg 95000 and store water for the separator-drums and the ECCS.
Primary deaeration occurs even earlier, in the condenser
Table 5.21 Low pressure reheater PND-4 [44] (type storage of each turbogenerator.
- PN-1900-42-4-IIIA, manufacturer - Industrial Union
"Krasnij Kotelshik", Taganrog, Russia) The deaerators are equipped with reducers and safety
valves. They are heated by steam from the primary
Number per reactor 2 (1/turbine) discharge of the turbines and from the SDV-D during the
Nominal condensate mass flow rate, kg/s 818.6* turbine start-up, as long as the primary discharge pressure
Pressure, MPa: is lower than in the deaerator. To prevent overflow of the
- steam < 1.0* deaerators in the starting operation modes of the reactor,
- condensate < 4.2* excess water from the deaerator can be returned to the
Maximum steam temperature, oC 190* deminiralized water storage tank. The feedback unit of
two expansion vessels and two overflow coolers is capable
of returning water at the rate of 27.8 kg/s.
Heat transfer rate (power), MW 89.8* An individual deaerator consists of a DP-2600 deaeration
Dimensions, m: column and a BDP-120-1-11 deaeration vessel, the
- height 10.280 functions of which are:
- diameter 3.280
Length of shell, m 8.345 • stable deaeration and pre-heating during nominal
Internal shell diameter, m 2.200 feedwater flow-rates from 722 kg/s to 216.7 kg/s and
Outside tube diameter, mm 16 pre-cooling from 10oC to 40oC,
Thickness of tube walls, mm 1 • reduction of the mass content of oxygen below 15
Dry mass, kg 69400 µg/kg for its pre-treatment concentration below 3000
Full mass with water, kg 95000 µg/kg,
• pre-heating from 30oC to 178oC at start-ups, transient
and emergency operation for 30.5 kg/s flow rate and
Table 5.22 Low pressure reheater PND-5 [44] (type
0.94 MPa deaeration pressure, for oxygen
- PN-1900-42-4-IVA, manufacturer - Industrial Union
concentration outside the 15 µg/kg level.
"Krasnij Kotelshik", Taganrog, Russia)
Number per reactor 2 (1/turbine) Other specifications of the deaerator are presented in
Nominal condensate mass flow rate, kg/s 1051.4* Table 5.23 [44].
Pressure, MPa:
5.5.3.5 Main Feed Water Pumps
- steam < 1.0*
- condensate < 4.2*
The main feed water pumps are horizontal centrifugal
Maximum temperature of steam, oC 190* four-stage pumps with internal casings and a balancing
Hydraulic drag resistance of condensate, MPa 0.0390* drum, two radial bearings, one sliding high-pressure
Heat transfer surface area, m2 1900 bearing and high-pressure end seals. These operate on
Heat transfer rate (power), MW 70.8* compressed condensate from the suction headers of the
Dimensions, m: top pumping line. Before starting up the reactor the
- height 10.280 pumps are pre-heated. A pressure-lubricated gear-sleeve
- diameter 3.280 connects the pump to the electric motor. The pumps are
Length of shell, m 8.345 equipped with pressure lubrication units. The lubricant
Internal shell diameter, m 2.200 seals and other heat exchangers are cooled by lake water.
Outside tube diameter, mm 16
Inlets of the pumps are flange-sealed, their upward outlets
Thickness of tube wall, mm 1
are welded together. The pumps are driven by
Dry mass, kg 70000
asynchronous three-phase closed-loop cooled electric
Full mass with water, kg 95000
95
motors. Specifications of the MFWP are presented in Table 5.25 Specifications of the emergency feed water
Table 5.24 [41]. pump [41] (type - PEA 250-80, manufacturer - Frunze
Table 5.23 Specifications of the deaerator [44] (type Scientific and Industrial Union, Sumy, Ukraine)
- DP-2600, manufacturer - Industry Union
"Sibirenergomash", Barnaul) Number per reactor 5 operational + 1 in reserve
Operation parameters:
Number per turbine 2 - capacity, m3/s (m3/h) 0.069 (250)
Maximum capacity, kg/s 722.2 - head, MPa (m) 8.6 (880)
Minimum capacity, kg/s 216.7 - permissible cavitation margin, MPa (m) 0.088 (9)
Working absolute pressure, MPa 0.93-1.28 - inlet temperature, oC 190
Permissible absolute pressure with relief valves in 1.475 - inlet pressure, MPa 1.25
operation, MPa - maximum inlet absolute pressure, MPa 1.57
Hydraulic test pressure, MPa 1.6 - maximum outlet absolute pressure, MPa 11.87
Working temperature, oC 187 - leakage in end-seals, kg/s 0.0055
Admissible wall temperature, oC 200
- admissible concentration of solid particles,
Diameter of column, m 3.451 g/kg 5 x 10-3
Height of column, m 7.536 - power, kW 725
Mass of column, kg 26000 Mass of assembly, kg 8330
Mass of column with water, kg 88000 Overall dimensions:
Internal volume, m3 193
- height, m 1.340
3
Volume of column, m 62
- length, m 2.320
Effective volume of storage (accumulator) tank, m3 120
- width, m 1.290
Reliability:
Electric motor:
- average lifetime , years 30
- type 2AZM1-800/6000 U4
- average lifetime between major servicing, h 50000
- rotational speed 2970
- voltage , V 6000
Table 5.24 Specifications of the main feed water pump - power, kW 800
[41] (type - PEA-1650-80, manufacturer - Frunze - mass of electric motor, kg 3680
Scientific and Industrial Union, Sumy, Ukraine) Operation parameters:
Number per reactor 6 operational + 1 in reserve - efficiency, % 75
Operation parameters: - cavitation margin, m 9
- capacity, m3/s (t/h) 0.458 (1650) - average time between major servicing, h 8000
- head, MPa (m of water column) 8.9 (910) - average lifetime, years 30
- permissible cavitation margin, MPa (m) 0.147 (15)
- inlet temperature, oC 190 5.5.3.6 Auxiliary Feed Pumps
- maximum inlet absolute pressure, MPa 1.57
The auxiliary feed water pumps are horizontal six-stage
- maximum outlet absolute pressure, MPa 11.87
split pumps with divided internal sections and an axial
- leakage in the end seals, kg/s 0.0055
discharge. They carry axial forced-lubricated bearings and
- power, kW 4451 high-pressure end-seals fed by the condensate from the
- mass, kg 12700 suction headers of the second pumping line. All heat
Electric motor: exchangers are cooled by lake water. The outlets are
- type 2AZM1-800/6000 U4 welded in the upward direction, the inlets are flange-sealed.
- rotational speed, rpm 2982 Each pump is connected to an electric motor by a gear
- voltage, V 6000 sleeve of a thick lubricant to a three-phase synchronous
- power, kW 5000 closed-loop cooled electric motor, see Table 5.25 [41].
Overall mass, kg 24700
Electric motor mass, kg 12700 5.5.3.7 Main Feeder
Overall dimensions:
The main feeder consists of three parallel lines (one in
- height, m 1.980
reserve), their inlets and outlets interconnected. Each of
- length, m 2.995
the lines contains:
- width, m 1.830
Operation parameters: • mechanical filter,
- efficiency , % 83 • control valve,
- overall efficiency , % 81 • check valve,
- average lifetime between major servicing, h 8000 • two isolating gate valves.
- average lifetime, years 30
96
Solid particles are filtered out by an upright hermetic- piping downstream of the main feeder. The auxiliary
vessel filter with a spherical cover, which can be removed pumps supplies the water to the emergency feeder which
to replace the bed. Water flows in 500 mm diameter pipes contains:
welded to the main pipelines. Three more end-pieces of
• two isolating gate valves,
10 mm diameter expel the air and maintain a proper
• one mechanical filter,
pressure drop in the filtering bed. The upper part of filter
is equipped with a removable grid and exchangeable filter • two control valves,
bed, and one more removable pipe which feeds the water • one check valve.
to the upper part to be filtered in downward flow. All The equipment operates in the same manner, as the
these units must be replaced whenever the pressure drop respective equipment in the main feeder, but for their
across the filter reaches to 0.3 MPa, as seen in Table 5.26. operation parameters. The characteristic of filter and
control valve are present in Tables 5.28, 5.29.
The control valves maintain proper levels of water in the
separator drums. The option for manual operation of these 5.5.3.9 Mixers
valves is available from the MCR. Some details of the
control valve are given in Table 5.27. Feedwater piping includes mixers for the feedwater and
the return by-pass water from PCS to prevent thermal
Check valves exclude inverse flow from the separator shocks when purified cooled water is supplied into the hot
drums in a failure of the feed-water piping somewhere feedwater piping. Some details of the mixer are given in
between the suction pump and the valve. The gate valves Table 5.30.
disconnect any pipe on the failure of:
5.5.3.10 Valves in the Feedwater Piping
• control valve,
• check valve, All valves are manufactured in the Tchechovskoj plant of
• filter. energy engineering and some valves come from the
The gate valves are operated from the MCR. former Czechoslovakia. Most important among them are
control valves in the pressure piping of both the main and
5.5.3.8 Auxiliary Feeder the emergency pumps. They ensure reliable operation of
the pumps in their parameter ranges even with
The AFWPs feeds water into the separator drum via two underpressure in the suction header. Details are given in
pipes (219 x 13) mm and are connected into the feedwater Table 5.31. Similar type 1046-250E control valves are
installed in the pressure piping of the auxiliary feed water
pumps, they are specified in Table 5.29.
Table 5.26 Specifications of the filter (type-2200.T6.76TU)
Number per reactor 6 Table 5.27 Specifications of the control valve (type
Capacity at 4200 MW (th) power, kg/s 514-531 - 1046-500-E1, manufacturer - Tchechovskoj Plant of
Nominal volume, m3 2 Energy Engineering, Russia) for main feeder
Filtration surface area, m2 9.11
Actual filtration surface area, m2 0.723
Nominal flow diameter, mm 500
Pressure drop in a clear filter, MPa 0.057
Operation pressure, MPa 11.8
Admissible pressure drop, MPa 0.3
Operation temperature, oC 190
Minimum size of removed particles, mm 0.1
Pressure drop, MPa 1.0
Operation absolute pressure, MPa 11.8
Maximum shaft torque, N.m 900
Operation temperature, oC 190
Control unit:
Mass of the filter bed, kg 15
- type 876-E-0-05
Heating and cooling rate, oC/h 120
- power, kW 4.3
Admissible wall temperature, oC 200
Complete closing and opening time, s 80
Nominal pipe diameter, mm 500
Mass, kg 2550
Overall dimensions, mm:
- length 2190
- width 1610 Table 5.28 Specification of the filter (type -
550.T6.77TU)
- height 3550
Mass, kg 12800
Reliability:
- average time between major servicing, h 80000 Capacity, kg/s 153
- lifetime, years 30 Nominal diameter of end pieces, mm 250
- admissible overload cycles in lifetime < 600
97
Table 5.29 Specification of the control valve (type - Table 5.31 Specification of the control valve (type
1046-250-E, manufacturer - Tchechovskoj Plant of - 1046-400-E, manufacturer - Tchechovskoj Plant of
Energy Engineering, Russia) for auxiliary feeder Energy Engineering, Russia)
Nominal flow diameter, mm 250 Nominal flow diameter, mm 400

Operational absolute pressure, MPa 11.8 Operation absolute pressure, MPa 11.8
Operational temperature, oC 250 Operation temperature, oC 250
Pressure drop, MPa 0.98 Pressure drop, MPa 0.98
Maximum shaft rotational moment, N⋅m 470 Maximum admissible pressure drop ,MPa 6.50
Control unit: Maximum shaft rotational moment, N⋅m 1840
- type 793-ER-02-02 Control unit:
- power, kW 1.7 - type B.099.102-05M
Complete closing and opening time, s 53 - power, kW 8.5
Mass of equipment, kg 737 Complete closing and opening time, s 47
Mass of valve, kg 2531
Table 5.30 Specification of the mixer
In normal operation, the PCS extracts cooling water at
Number per reactor 4 flow rates up to 111 kg/s. Operating parameters of the
Outlet (feedwater) flow rate, kg/s 514-531 coolers are adjusted to match those of the filters, for which
Temperature of feedwater, oC 177-190 the inlet temperature should not exceed 50 oC.
Flow rate of purified water, kg/s ≤ 27.8*
Temperature of purified water, oC 30-245 A simplified overview of the PCS is shown in Fig. 5.15.
Nominal pressure, MPa 7.4 Two type CNR-500-115 electric pumps (7) circulate the
water in the PCS during start-up or shut-down of the
* At 4200 MW (th) power reactor. These pumps are not utilized in normal operation
of the reactor. Two regenerators, each consisting of six
5.6 PURIFICATION AND COOLING SYSTEM sections (8) are used to heat the water returning from the
bypass filters of the water purification system. Two
There are two systems which maintain the necessary additional coolers (9) cool the bypass flow upstream of the
quality parameters of the MCC coolant: filters using the coolant of the intermediate loop.
• Water Cooling System, During normal operation of the reactor, the water is taken
• Water Purification System. from pressure headers (5) at a rate of about 111 kg/s and a
temperature of 255oC - 265oC. It is cooled down in the
The water purification system (bypass filters) is intended regenerator (8) to 68oC by the returning purified flow,
to fulfill the following tasks: and post-cooled in (8) to 50oC, before being directed to the
filter. The purified water is passed through the regenerator
• maintain coolant quality at levels which provide (8) to be heated up to 240oC and through the mixer to be
reliable operation of fuel elements and equipment, mixed with the feedwater, and finally arrives at the
• purify the MCC water eliminating corrosion products separator drum (1). A control valve and a flowrate meter
and soluble salts, control both the flowrate and the temperature of the
• control the level of coolant radioactivity, purified coolant. The bypass filters are disconnected as
• provide water for flushing the MCC for maintenance soon as the temperature exceeds 60oC.
operations.
The PCS pump is a centrifugal horizontal single-step
The water cooling system performs the following pump with the two-gear wheel mechanically sealed at the
functions: ends. The particulars are given in Table 5.32 [41].
• pre-cools the coolant of the MCC to 50 oC, directs it to
An individual regenerator is a surface type, horizontal
the bypass filters of the water purification system and
shell-and-tube heat exchanger, made up of two parts, each
returns it back to the MCC, during either normal or
of which consists of three sections. The specifics of which
transient operation of the reactor,
are shown in Table 5.33 [46].
• supplies the coolant to the reactor during a normal
shut-down and in an emergency,
Another cooler is a surface type, horizontal shell-and-tube
• maintains forced circulation cooling of the reactor heat exchanger. Details of the cooler are listed in Table
core during servicing, 5.34 [46]. The bypass filters of the water purification
• cools excess water to 50 oC and discharges it into the system ensure that the properties of the coolant listed in
deminiralized water-storage tank during start-up of Table 5.35 [35,36] are maintained.
the reactor,
• supplies cold water to the auxiliary units.
98
Steam to the turbines Table 5.32 Purification pump [41] (type - CNR-500-
115, manufacturer - Frunze Scientific and Industrial
Feedwater
Union, Sumy, Ukraine)

Capacity, m3/s (m3/h) 0.0555-0.1389
(200-500)
Head, MPa (kgf/cm2)
- for 0.0555 m3/s 12.36 (126)
3
- for 0.1389 m /s 9.81 (100)
Absolute inlet pressure, MPa 0.2-7.8
Water temperature range, oC 15-284
Actual power:
- for 0.055 m3/s, kW 144
3
- for 0.1389 m /s, kW 224
Efficiency for 0.1389 m3/s, % 73
Cavitation margin, MPa (m) 0.167 (17)
Sealing flow rate, kg/s 1.53
Flow rate of leak water, kg/s 0.83
Water
Purification Flow rate in the intermediate sealing loop, kg/s 0.055
Electric motor:
- type AZM1-500/6000UChL4
- power, kW 500
Fig. 5.15 A schematic representation of purification - voltage, V 6000
and cooling system
- rotational speed, rpm 2985
1 - separator drum, 2 - reactor, 3 - suction header, 4
- cooling water flow rate, kg/s 1.81
- main circulation pump, 5 - pressure header, 6 - group
distribution header, 7 - PCS pump, 8 - regenerator, - mass, kg 3000
9 - additional cooler, 10 - deminiralized water storage Overall dimensions:
tank - length, mm 1515
- width, mm 1080
Two types of bypass filters are used to purify water below - height, mm 850
60oC, namely: - total mass, kg 4950
Average time between major servicing, h 10000
• Mechanical perlite filter beds remove corrosion Table 5.33 Specification of the regenerator [46]
particles and lubricants. During normal operation the
perlite bed is regenerated every ten days. During Number per reactor 2
transient operation modes, when the fouling rate of Heat transfer surface area, m2 1284
the coolant increases it is regenerated daily. Heat transfer rate (power), MW 53.7
• Combined ion exchangers remove dissolved salts and
Hydro - testing pressure, MPa 13.8
fission product contamination. The kationide KU-2-
Tube outside diameter, mm 12
8ChS and ionide AB-17-8ChS beds 1:1 is designed
for the nuclear industry. The filtering material is not Wall thickness, mm 1.2
regenerated. starting nominal
operation power
One of the four mechanical filters is always is in operation
operation, while of the two ion exchangers one is active. - flow to the filter (tube internals)
The operating ion exchanger is succeeded by one more flow rate, kg/s (t/h) 55.5 (200) 55.5 (200)
filter to protect the MCC from solid particles in case of inlet temperature, oC 70-284 260
disintegration of the drain grid of the ion exchanger. They outlet temperature, oC 70-124 68
are similar to the mechanical filters, but do not have an absolute inlet pressure, MPa 1.08-9.1 9.1
accumulating layer. Operation with mechanical filters pressure drop (tube internals), kPa 202 202
only is possible while replacing the ion exchangers or - flow from the filter (tube 30-55.5 55.5
while the inlet temperature exceeds 90 oC. Since they are externals) flow rate, kg/s (t/h) (100-200) (200)
low-pressure units, the filters are protected from the inlet temperature , oC 50 50
pressure of the MCC by either gate valves with control
outlet temperature , oC 70-269 245
drainage or by safety valves.
absolute inlet pressure , MPa 0.3-7.9 7.9
pressure drop (tube externals), kPa 18.5-57 57
99
Table 5.34 Specifications of the additional cooler [46]

Heat transfer rate (power), MW 4.16
Hydro - testing pressure, MPa 13.8
starting operations nominal power cooldown
operations operations
- flow to the filter (tube externals) flow rate, kg/s (t/h) 55.5 (200) 55.5 (200) 125 (450)
Inlet temperature, oC 124 68 180
outlet temperature, oC 50 50 -
absolute inlet pressure, MPa * < 2.8 < 9.1 < 2.5
pressure drop (tube externals), kPa 4.0 4.0 79.0
cooling water flow (tube internals) flow rate, kg/s (t/h) 375 (1350) 65 (234) 576 (2075)
maximum inlet temperature, oC 35 35 35
maximum outlet temperature, oC 46.1 50.4 -
maximum pressure, MPa * 0.4-0.7 0.4-0.7 0.4-0.7
pressure drop (tube internals), kPa 24.0 1.0 108.0
* Absolute pressure
The mechanical filter has the form of an upright cylinder Table 5.36 Specifications of the filter [19,44,45]
with a removable flange sealing on the top and with (type - AFNP-1.2-9.0, manufacturer - Industrial Union
welded elliptic ends. The top cover is removed for "Krasnij Kotelshik", Taganrog, Russia)
replacing and servicing. The filtration element has the
form of a cylinder and is filled with perlite. Table 5.36 Number per reactor 4 operational + 1 in reserve
[19, 44, 45] shows some of the technical specifications of Capacity, kg/s:
the mechanical filters. - normal operation 27.8
- maximum 69.4
The ion exchanger is a single upright vessel consisting of Absolute pressure, MPa :
a housing plus upper and lower distributors. The housing - operational 9.35
is a welded cylinder with welded elliptic ends. The - hydraulic testing 12.0
specifications of the filters are given in Table 5.37 Dimensions, m:
[19,44,45]. - diameter 1.30
- height 3.00
The filtering material in the ion exchanger filters is not
Filtration surface area, m2 25
regenerated. The spent material is removed and
Filtering bed:
stored. The covers and the valves are manufactured in
the Tchechovskoj plant of energy engineering, some - number 150
valves were manufactured in the former Czechoslovakia. - dimensions, mm:
diameter 55
length 1055
Mass, kg 8300
Table 5.35 Specifications of water quality [35,36] Pressure drop, MPa < 0.4
Filtration factor for corrosion products:
pre-filter post-filter - normal operation 3-5
o
Water pH at 25 C 6.5-8.0 - - transient operation 20-100
Relative electric conduction, µS/cm ≤ 1.0 ≤ 0.1 Pre-regeneration lifetime, hours:
Calcium hardness, µg(equiv.)/kg ≤ 5.0 - normal operation 240
Bulk chloride ion concentration, µg/kg ≤ 70 ≤3 - transient operation 12
Filtration rate, m/h 4
Bulk mineral oil concentration, µg/kg ≤ 100 ≤ 100
Erosion rate of perlite bed, m/h 2.4
Bulk iron concentration, µg/kg ≤ 50 ≤ 10
Annual consumption of perlite, t/year 2.4
Bulk silica acid concentration, µg/kg ≤ 700 - Reliability:
Bulk copper concentration, µg/kg ≤ 20 ≤2 - average time between major servicing, h 24000
Bulk oxygen concentration, µg/kg - ≤ 15 - average regeneration time, h 200
- lifetime, years 30
- overall number of refills < 600
100
5.7 CONTROL ROD COOLING CIRCUIT strainer (2) and arrives at the pressurized distribution
header (3). From the distribution header the coolant is
The piping of Control Rod Cooling Circuit (CRCC) cools distributed along pipes which contain control valves and
the channels of the CPS rods, fission chambers, Power flow-rate meters to the channels. Outlet water from the
Density Distribution Monitoring System (PDDMS) sensor channels of the control rods, of the PDDMS sensor and of
and Radial Reflector Cooling Channels (RRCC). The the fission chambers is collected by the discharge piping
coolant must be distributed in the circuit to ensure that and directed to a compartment underneath the reactor.
proper temperature fields prevail in the channels of the
control meters and of the graphite moderator. This The RRCC are the peripheral channels within the radial
cooling circuit includes: graphite moderator.
Table 5.38 Specification of the CRCC [2,35,36,37]
• 121 CPS channels containing control rods and safety
instrumentation, Overall flow rate , kg/s 333
• 4 fission chamber channels, into which fission Flow rate , kg/s:
chamber cassettes are inserted during reactor start- - CPS channels, fission chamber channels,
up, (these chambers are removed during operation), 1.05-12.4
PDDMS sensor channels
• 20 channels containing the in-core Power Density
- RRC channels 0.41-0.69
Sensors of the Axial Monitoring (PDMS-A),
Emergency flow rate reduction in arbitrary
• 156 channels of RRCC. 0.97
channel, kg/s
Emergency flow rate augmentation in arbitrary
Other parameters of the cooling loop are presented in 1.39
channel, kg/s
Table 5.38 [2,35,37,36]. o
Water temperature of the circuit, C:
Table 5.37 Specification of the ion exchanger - inlet 40
[19,44,45] (type-AFI-2.4-9.0, manufacturer-Industrial - outlet pre-cooling 70
Union "Krasnij kotelshik", Taganrog, Russia) - maximum admissible outlet temperature 85
- average reactor outlet temperature from the
Number per reactor 1 operational + 1 in reserve 65
RRCC
Capacity, kg/s 55.5 - maximum allowable outlet temperature from
90
Absolute pressure, MPa : the RRCC
- operation 9.35 Maximum temperature inside servomotors of
<85
- hydraulic testing 11.7 the CPS, oC
Diameter, m 2.40 Absolute pressure in the distribution header, MPa 0.4
Filtration surface area, m2 4.5 Channels of Fast-Acting Scram (FAS) rods:
Height of filtration bed, m 1.00 - flow rate of nitrogen per channel, m3/h 0.12-0.70
Volume of filtration bed, m3 5.3 - excess inlet nitrogen pressure , kPa 0.98-4.9
Filtration bed: - maximum admissible concentration of
5
- kationite KU-2-8ChS hydrogen, %
- anionite AV-17-8ChS Inlet purification flow-rate, kg/s:
Mass, kg 26900 - operational 0.55-2.78
Overall hydraulic drag, MPa < 0.4 - starting after a long shutdown 5.55
Filtration factor: Water quality:
- dissolved resins 10-100 - bulk chloride ion concentration, µg/kg 50
- non-volatile isotopes 10-100 - bulk iron concentration, µg/kg 100
Volume ratio of filtration material (purified 80000 - bulk aluminum concentration, µg/kg 100
water /filtration material) - bulk mineral oil concentration, µg/kg 100
Filtration rate, m/h 45 o
- water pH at 25 C 4.5-6.2
Annual consumption of filtering materials, t/years: Recovered water flow rate in coolers, kg/s 794
- HNO3, 60% 1.0 Temperature of recovered water, oC:
- NaCH, 42% 1.3 - inlet < 28
Reliability: - outlet 40
- safe operation time in the starting period, h 2000 Emergency cool-down, with main pumps 300-420
- accrued operation time, h 20000 disconnected, s
- average operation pre-repair resource, h 24000 Maximum admissible concentration of
0.4
- lifetime, years 30 hydrogen of the top and bottom tanks, %
- number of refills < 600
These special type channels maintain a counter-current
The cooling in this circuit, Fig.5.16, is gravity driven. flow. Cold water is carried downward a central pipe and
Water flowing from the top tank (1) penetrates the then returns in up-ward flow along the annulus. From
101
there, the water is carried down under the reactor, to the
return pipes and ends up in the distribution header (7) of
the cooling circuit. The channels which contain fast-
acting scram rods, are cooled by flow of falling film.
Nitrogen is supplied from the top into these channels to
purge hydrogen, which is generated by radiolysis. The
outlet steam-water mixture flow is accumulated in a
separate header and flows down into the bottom tank,
passing the coolers. The distribution header (7) of the
cooling circuit distributes the coolant water to four coolers
(8), two of which are sufficient for normal operation, the
others are on stand by and can be serviced. The coolant
accumulated in the bottom tank (10) is cooled by
recovered water where it is accessible to suction pumps
(11). The bottom tank, 3 m below these pumps is
pressurized. Special connection pipes lie between the outlet
of the coolers and the inlet of the pump, so that when
necessary the bottom tank can be disconnected. From the
pressure side pipes of the pump, water arrives via strainer
(2) into pressure header (12), and is carried up by the
pressure piping (15) to the top tank, which is above the
reactor. Pumps operate to assure that excess water is
available in the top tank. This excess water flows by
means of an overflow pipe (17) to the bottom tank.
When reactor start-up is initiated from a dry circuit, it

must be filled by purified deminiralized water via piping
(9). Another source to fill the circuit is the condensate
from the header of the second pumping stage. In normal
operation the water is continuously purified by taking
portions from pressure header (12) and piping (13) into
the intermediate tank, and by returning via (9). For
repairs the circuit water must be removed from both the
piping and the bottom tank. This is accomplished by
discharge pump (14). Hydrogen from the spaces between Fig. 5.16 Control rod cooling circuit
the top and the bottom tank is removed by the ventilation 1 - top storage tank, 2 - strainer, 3 - distribution header, 4
system (16). Air flow of 0.5 kg/s is supplied to the air - radial reflector cooling channels, 5 - channels for CPS
space above the top tank. The air is then purified and control rods, fission chambers, PDDMS sensors, 6-
vented through the chimney. A suction ventilation of 0.2 FAS rod channels, 7 - distribution header, 8 - coolers, 9 -
kg/s is used in the bottom tank. There are the alarm filler piping, 10 - bottom storage tank, 11 - CRCC pumps
instrumentation for hydrogen content in control rod , 12 - pressure header, 13 - bypass purification inlets, 14 -
cooling circuit tanks (one alarm sensor per tank). These discharge pump, 15 - pressure pipe, 16 - ventilation of
monitors are used to measure hydrogen concentrations storage tanks, 17 - excess water sink overflow pipe
and to prevent the buildup of potentially explosive
hydrogen levels. 5.7.2 Distribution Piping
5.7.1 Top Storage Tank Two pipes, coming from the top tank, carry the water to
the distribution header. The pipes are 300 mm nominal
The top storage tank contains up to 180 m3 of water for diameter and are joined to a single pipe (426 x 8) mm.
emergency cooling. The water inventory of this tank is The header is preceded by a flow-rate meter and a strainer
sufficient that in the event of failure of the CRCC circulation of 400 mm nominal diameter for both coarse and fine
pump, gravity fed water from this tank can provide filtration. The pressurized distribution header directs
cooling to the CPS channels for 5 to 7 minutes. The two flows to individual channels. This is a cylinder
parts of the tank are in separate compartments and (426 x 8) mm with four perpendicularly positioned
constitute concrete enclosures lined with steel sheets 3mm headers made up of two pipes (219 x 10) mm. Individual
thick on the sides and 5 mm thick at the bottom, with piping pipes carry the water to each channel containing control
and instrumentation. The two parts operate as one top rods, PDDMS sensor, fission chambers and RRCC.
tank. Design parameters are specified in Table5.39 [37].
102
Table 5.39 Specification of the top tank [37] Volume of shell, m3 3.109
5.7.5 Connections between the Coolers and the
Dimensions of one part, m: Circulation Pumps
- width 2.00
- length 5.90 The piping from the coolers leads to the bottom storage
- height 9.45 tank. The tank feeds the water via four pipes (426
Total amount of water stored, m3 180 x 8) mm into the pumps. Each pump is preceded by a
Water level from the of the tank, m 7.6 manually operated gate valve. To circumvent the bottom
tank, a bypass piping (325 x 12) mm facilitates the
operation.
5.7.3 Connections between the Instrumentation
Channels and the Heat Exchangers
5.7.6 Bottom Storage Tank
The circuit contains three types of headers:
The bottom tank stores the coolant previously heated in
• headers for the outlet water from the channels of the channels and cooled in the coolers. Also it stores
control rods, PDDMS sensor and fission chambers. excess water from the top storage tanks. Since this tank is
These headers (325 x 12) mm are Y-shaped with at a higher elevation, it creates a higher static suction
identical branches of (325 x 12) mm size, head for the pumps. This is a concrete tank covered by
• headers for the water flows from the channels of fast- steel sheets with a bottom drain. Any leakage is controlled
acting scram control-rods, and accumulated. The tank is lined with steel sheets 3
• header for the outlet water from the channels of the mm thick on the sides and 4 mm thick on the bottom,
radial- reflector cooling channels. These consist of specifications of the tank are provided Table 5.41 [37].
pipes (219 x 10) mm with 13 smaller pipes (76 x 4)
mm welded to the first pipe. This header and the Excess water can be sent to the deminiralized water
distribution header are on the same level. The outlet storage tank by four parallel pipes, each containing an
pipe (159 x 6) mm carries the water to the general electrically powered gate valve.
header to be mixed with the water from the CPS
control rods and other channels. 5.7.7 Circulation Pumps
The general header gives the water to the outlet pipe
(426 x 8) mm to the distributor header (428 x 8) mm. The The circulation pumps unit consist of a horizontal
water is distributed to the individual coolers by pipes (325 centrifugal single-stage pipe with a double sided rotor and
x 12) mm. Each heat exchanger is preceded by a manual a spiral shell, and an electric motor installed on a
operated gate valve. common foundation, as specified in Table 5.42 [37].
5.7.4 Coolers Table 5.41 Specifications of the bottom storage tank

[37]
The circuit includes four coolers which are horizontal
shell-and-tube heat exchangers and are cooled by the Operation volume, m3 300
recovered lake water in the tubes, to cool a shell-side Width, m 4.8
(outside) flow of the coolant. The specifications are shown Length, m 10.9
in Table 5.40 [37].
Height, m 6.6
Table 5.40 Specification of the coolers [37] Bottom level, m -7.2
(type - 1200TNG-1-6-M8 / 20G-6-1) Water level from the bottom of the tank, m 1.2-2.0
Table 5.42 Specifications of the pump [37] (type
8NDV-Ch-U4 (D630-90K), manufacturer - Industrial
Shell-side pressure, MPa 1.0 Union "Livgidromash", Livny, Orel district, Russia)
Tube-side pressure, MPa 1.0
Length of shell, m 5.942 Number per reactor 4
Average diameter of shell, m 1.200 Capacity, m3/s 0.175
Wall thickness of shell, mm 8 Head, MPa 0.883
Diameter of tube sheet, m 1.240 Cavitation margin, m 5-8
Thickness of tube sheet, mm 30 Efficiency, % 75
Number of tubes 1801 Diameter of rotor, mm 525
Length of tubes, m 6.000 Pumping power, kW 200
Outside diameter of tubes, mm 20 Pressure in suction, MPa 0.3
Wall thickness of tubes, mm 2 Electric motor type A03-355-54
Volume of tubes, m3 2.715 Rotational speed, rpm 1450
Electric motor power, kW 250
103
Voltage, V 380 Efficiency, % 54
Mass of electric motor, kg 2535 Electric motor type 4A132M2
Mass of pump unit, kg 3410 Electric motor power, kW 11.0
A reliable electric circuit is connected to the electric Rotational speed, rpm 2900
motors. The pumps are operated from the MCR. Safe To empty the bottom tank for maintenance the discharge
operation of the pumps is facilitated by pressure-cooled pump sends the water to the intermediate tank. The
bearings and elimination of hydrogen generated by radial parameters of the centrifugal single-stage pump are
dialysis. The bearings are cooled by pure deminiralized described in Table 5.43 [37].
water from the feedwater piping.
5.8 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY
5.7.8 Connections between the Pumps and the Top Tank MONITORING SYSTEM
Pump outlet pipes (325 x 12) mm, each pipe contains a The fuel cladding monitoring system is intended to
strainer, a check valve, an electrically powered gate valve, monitor fuel cladding integrity. An indicative
and a flow-rate meter. The strainer of replaceable nets (of parameter of fuel integrity is the radiation level the
1.6 x 1.6 mm and 0.63 x 0.63 mm grids) filter out the coolant leaving the reactor core. This is characterized
mechanical fouling. The gate valves are open when the by the level of activity of nuclear fission products in
pump is on standby, and are closed when the pump is in the steam and coolant. The fuel cladding monitoring
maintenance. system serves both safety and operational tasks. As a
safety related system it is intended to prevent violation
The pumps are under the bottom storage tanks, well of the design limits or damage of fuel elements and to
below the reactor. They pump the water along pressure restrict radiation impact on personnel, population and
pipes (426 x 8) mm up to the top storage tank well above environment. The purpose of the Fuel cladding
the reactor. To prevent inverse flows, the piping is monitoring system is to identify fuel assemblies with
extended above the water level in the top tank and is leaking fuel elements (fuel cladding failure) during
protected by a check valve. power operation, refueling, transients modes and plane
preventive maintenance. This system also helps to
5.7.9 Other Piping and Auxiliaries determine the necessity and scheduling of unplanned
reloading of fuel assemblies with leaking fuel
Excess water from the top storage tank is directed via the elements. In addition, it also provides redundant
overflow piping of two separate pipes (325 x 12) mm to monitoring of coolant flowrate in fuel channels and a
the bottom storage tank. After maintenance the dry piping check of the fuel type. A schematic of the system is
is filled with water and its supply is continuously renewed presented in Fig. 5.17. There are separate group
by deminiralized water through pipes (57 x 3) monitoring and individual channel monitoring
mm from one of the coolers. The pipes include manually subsystems, which are structurally independent, but
operated gate valves and control valves with electrically are related.
operated drives from the MCR.
The group monitoring subsystem diagnoses fuel
A separate bypass piping (57 x 3) mm takes the water element failure with a delay no longer than 10
from the pressure header of the pumps for purification. minutes. Upon detection of a leaking fuel element it
The bypass pipes contain an electrically operated valve, a activates the warning and alarm signaling that a
manual operated gate valve and a flowrate meter. The violation of fuel cladding integrity occurred, and also
purified water is returned to the main piping via a actuates the signal which activates the individual
manually operated gate valve. channel monitoring subsystem. This subsystem
consists of four identical monitoring trains (A1-A4).
The gate valves disconnect the bypass from the loop, and Each of these trains includes two sampling lines, a gas
the control valve controls the purification supply from the removal device (3), a moisture separator (4), a heater
MCR. In the CRCC the following types of gate valves (5), and two sensors equipped with electric
(type: MA11071-300M-07, MA11071-300M-10, precipitators (6), which are separated by a delaying
MA1175-400-36-2B), check valves (19nz47nz IA- tank (7). Sampling lines are used to transport steam
44078.02 and IA44077-400-2B), and control valves from steam lines of each separator drum into the
(I68055-150-26-2B) are used. chillier (2), where the steam is cooled and condensed.
Radioactive inert gases (isotopes of krypton and
Table 5.43 Specification of the discharge pump [37] xenon) are removed from the condensate by a gas
(type - Ch45/31-K-2D-U2) removal device (3). A moisture separator (4) and a
heater (5) are used to decrease the absolute and
Capacity, m3/s 0.0125 relative humidity of the gas. Condensate from the gas
Head, MPa 0.304 removal device (3) and moisture separator (4) is drained
Cavitation margin, MPa 0.05 to a special drainage system. Operation of the sensors is
Maximum inlet pressure, MPa 0.5 based on electronic precipitation of ions of rubidium
104
and cesium on a wire, which is then moved to the steam-water piping includes two scintillation sensors
scintillation detector to record the beta-activity of the (9). The sensors are placed in a lead protecting cover
precipitated isotopes. The first sensor is used to with apertures for collimation. The protecting cover is
monitor the total activity of radioactive inert gases, the assembled on special carts (10). There are four rows of
second one, the activity of relatively long-lived pipes supplying steam water mixture to the drum
isotopes. Estimation of the state of fuel cladding is separator. Movable enclosures (11) containing the
based on the results of measurements of these two sensor assembly are guided along the rows of steam-
sensors. After passing the sensors the samples of gas water pipes.
are removed by a special ventilation system.
The output from the group and individual channel
monitoring systems of fuel cladding integrity is
provided in an analog mode on paper in recording
6
devices, signal analysis is performed using special
algorithms. The design of the fuel cladding monitoring
5 system provides two possibilities for system operation -
7
with and without use of the plant computer system.
Measurements from group and individual
6 monitoring subsystems are checked in all ranges of
5
reactor power. If fuel assembly with leaking fuel
4
elements are identified by the fuel cladding integrity
3
system, and if operational limits of fuel element
2
damage are violated (that is activity of I-131 in MCC
coolant above 4.0 10-6 Cu/kg, then such a fuel
A1 A2 A3 A4
assembly is removed from the fuel channel. The
1
8
reactor must be shut down immediately, if
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
measurements in corresponding drum separator
9
increase two or more times as compared to the initial
value. The reactor must be shut down if the following
10 failures of the fuel cladding integrity monitoring
11 system are not repaired in a specific time:
Cabinet of fuel cladding integrity monitoring system
• in 2 hours after a simultaneous failure of
both the individual and the group monitoring
Fig. 5.17 Schematic of fuel cladding integrity subsystems,
monitoring system • in 8 hours after failure of the individual channel
A - the train of group monitoring subsystem, B - the
monitoring subsystem (this assumes that the group
train of individual channel monitoring subsystem,
monitoring system is functioning properly) if the
1 - separator drum, 2 - cooler, 3 - gas removal device,
following conditions exist: in the row of pipes
4 - moisture separator, 5 - heater, 5 - heater, 6 - sensor
being monitored there are fuel channels loaded
with electric precipitation, 7 - delay tank, 8 - row of
with fuel assemblies for which the “Coolant flow
steam-water pipelines, 9 - individual channel
reduction” signal is activated or for which the flow
monitoring sensor, 10 - cart, 11 - box
meter has failed.
5.9 MATERIALS
Monitoring of fuel cladding integrity of individual
channels is intended to estimate the state of the fuel
The materials must be weldable, suitable for operation in
cladding by recording the gamma-activity of the
radioactive environment and in other aggressive media. A
coolant in each steam-water pipe exiting the core
list of materials used in MCC construction is given in
block. In addition the system provides spectral analysis
Table 5.44.
and is capable of identifying weather the design limits
of fuel clad damage are violated. It can diagnose the
type of fuel channel loading using relative changes of
signal amplitude generated by the residual activity of
nitrogen-16 in the steam-water piping. The individual
channel monitoring subsystem consists of eight
monitoring trains (B1-B8), Fig. 5.17. Each of these
provides monitoring for two rows (8) of steam-water
pipes going to the drum separators (1). Each
monitoring train measuring the gamma-activity of the
coolant in the
105
Table 5.44 Materials Continue Table 5.44
steel type, unless Materials used in the feedback system

Element otherwise specified Condensate pumps of first stage:
Materials of pressure tubes - pump rotor 20Ch13L-1
Group distribution headers 08Ch18N10T - shaft 40Ch
Cases of control valves 17247.4 - shell 20K, VSt3sp5, VSt3sp2
Water piping 08Ch18N10T - pump stator 20Ch13L-1
Fuel channel: - casing 20Ch14
- lower 08Ch18N10T - pressure cover 09G2S-6
- core zirconium-niobium alloy (Zr+2.5%Nb) - safety bushing 20Ch13
- upper 08Ch18N10T - bearing shell 20Ch13
Steam-water piping 08Ch18N10T - sealing ring 20Ch13
- first stage rotor 20Ch13L-1
Materials used for the steam separation parts
Condensate pumps of second stage:
-Separator drum: - pump rotor 20Ch13L-1
- case- two-layer steel sheet 22K-Sv-08Ch18N10G2B - shaft 40Ch
or 22K-08Ch18N10T - shell 20L-III and 25L-III
- steam piping and steam-zone - safety bushing 20Ch13
connection outlets feed-water pipes 22K-VD - sealing ring 20Ch13
- outlets for downcomers water zone 22K-VD, - bracing pin 35ChM
connections 08Ch18N10T Pre-heater:
- outlets for steam-water mixture - material of shell 08Ch18N10T
flow pipes 22K, 08Ch18N10T - material of tubes 08Ch18N10T
- internal units 12Ch18N10T Deaerator:
Connections between drums in the - vessel 08Ch18N10T
steam zone st. 20 - perforated sheets 12Ch18N10T
Connections between drums in the 08Ch18N10T - other st.20K, VSt3spK, st.20
water zone
Main feed water pumps:
Downcomers 08Ch18N10T
- housing and cover st22K, st22K-VD,
Suction header: 40ChFA
- case 19MN5 (Japan) - shaft 38ChM3FA
- end pieces 22K-08Ch18N10T - wheel and rails alloy 20Ch13L-1
- outlets 22K, 08Ch18N10T - casing and shell 20Ch13
Materials used for the forced circulation - seal ring 20Ch13
Main circulation pump tanks 15Ch2MFA Auxiliary feed water pumps:
Suction and pressure pipes of the MCP: - housing and cover st22K
- pipes 19MN5 (Japan) - shaft 40ChFA
- gates 22K-VD - wheel and rails alloy 20Ch13L-1
- check valves and throttle control valves st.20 - casing and shell 20Ch13
Pressure header: - discharge valve 20Ch13
- vessel 19MN5 (Japan) - hydroseal, ring seal 30Ch13
- covers 22K-08Ch18N10T Mechanical filters:
- outlets 22K, 08Ch18N10T - housing and cover 15GS
Pipes between suction and pressure headers: - filtering bed 12Ch18N10T
- pipes 08Ch18N10T Mixer: 15GS
- gates, reverse, valves 17247.4 Piping:
(Czechoslovakia) - pipes 15GS
Materials used in the steam piping - housing: (Russian made) st.20
Main steam pipes 16GS (Czekoslovakian made) 11416.1
High pressure steam loop st.20 Materials used in the PCS
Other pipes st.20 PCS Pumps:
Framework (SDV-C, SDV-A, MSV): - housing 12Ch18N10T
- casings st.20 - sealed cover 12Ch18N10T
- covers st.20, 20ShTU108-667-77 - shaft 14Ch17N2
- wheel 20Ch13L
106
Continue Table 5.44
Continue Table 5.44 Materials used in the CRCC
Regenerator:
- housing and covers 08Ch18N10T Top storage tank:
- coolers 08Ch18N10T - side sheets 12Ch18N10T
- strainers, filters cover 08Ch18N10T - bottom sheets 12Ch21N5T
- tubes, external diameter 16 mm, 08Ch18N10T Distribution piping 12Ch18N10T
wall thickness 1.2 mm Coolers:
Piping 08Ch18N10T - shell two-layer 16GS + 12Ch18N10T
Intermediate loop Vst3sp2 - tube sheet 12Ch18N10T
Vessel of AFNP-1.2-9.0 filter 08Ch18N10T - tubes 12Ch18N10T
Vessel of AFI-2.4-9.0 filter 08Ch18N10T Bottom storage tank:
Control valves: - side sheets 12Ch21N5T
- case 12Ch18N10T - bottom sheets 12Ch21N5T
- shaft 14Ch17N2 Pumps:
- gate and saddle 12Ch18N10T - housing 12Ch18N9TL
- sealing bed asbesto-graphitic ring AG-50 - rotor 12Ch18N9TL
Gate valve: - shaft 12Ch18N9T
- case 08Ch18N10T - shell 12Ch18N12M3TL
- spindle 14Ch17N2 - cover 12Ch18N12M3TL
- sealing bed asbesto-graphitic ring AG-50 - sealing ring 12Ch18N10T
Gate valve made in Czechoslovakia: - safety bushing 12Ch18N9T
- case st.1724
- spindle AK1N1 and st.17247
Piping 08Ch18N10T
107
6. ENGINEERED SAFETY FUTURES
This Section provides an overview of the important safety F) Main forced-circulation circuit parameter monitoring
related systems of the plant. This includes the reactivity system. Operational parameters are displayed on the
control systems, the plant radiation protection system and Main Control Room (MCR) using visual and
the instrumentation employed to monitor neutronic and recording instruments, annunciation windows plus
radiological parameters. The largest and most extensive mimic diagrams and printers.
system protecting the plant personnel and the environment G) Information computing system (ICS) for data
from radiation in the case of an accident, is the Accident acquisition, processing and graphical display. The
Confinement System (ACS). Also very important are the information computing system is configured in a
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), the ECCS three-level hierarchy, with SM-1M and SM-2M
ensures protection of the core from overheating if a loss- computers and interface facilities.
of-coolant accident occurs in the primary circuit. The
water Purification and Cooling System (PCS) provides The technical monitoring system is schematically
not only emergency core cooling, but also continuous illustrated in Fig. 6.1, and the main parameters which are
purification of the primary circuit water from chemical monitored are listed in Table 6.1 [38]
and radioactive contaminants during normal operation.
These important systems are described in more detail in Table 6.1 Main measured parameters [38]
the following Sections.
Number of
6.1 MEASUREMENT OF REACTOR PARAMETERS Parameter measurement
points
Effective reactor control, both in normal operation and in Graphite temperature 85 (17*)
accident situations, requires comprehensive and timely Temperatures of top and bottom channel
information. This includes visual, electronically recorded 15
guide tubes
and printed information about the operating mode of the Temperature of top biological shield 11
reactor and the status of its components (fuel, control, and Temperatures of roller supports,
reflector cooling channels, graphite stack, metal compensators, and rigidity plates of the 22
structures, forced circulation circuit, etc.). This top and bottom biological shields
information is gathered and recorded by the parameter Temperature of bottom biological shield 10
measuring systems.
Outlet water temperature of the CPS channels 6
Drainage temperature of the CPS channels 235
Reactor parameters are measured by the following
systems: Water temperature in radial reflector
156
cooling channels
A) Fuel and control channel coolant-flow monitoring Temperature of the central hall floor,
19
system. The system monitoring coolant flow through supporting metal structure, and steel shell
fuel and control rod channels consists of tachometric Temperature of reactor vessel 16
detectors and frequency-to-analog signal converters. Temperature of gas mixture in the lines of
2052
B) Graphite and metal structure temperature the fuel channel integrity system
instrumentation system. The graphite stack and metal Fuel element temperatures 64 (16*)
structure temperature measuring system utilizes Temperature of the control rod servo drives 211
thermocouples. Gas mixture sampling, gas pressure in
C) Fuel channel-integrity monitoring system (monitoring 4
reactor space
the temperature and humidity of the surrounding inert Pressure of gas in the reactor space 4
gas). The channel integrity monitoring system consists Coolant flow rate in fuel channels 1661
of gas temperature detectors, reactivity control system Coolant flow rate in CPS channels 235
channel drainage temperature detectors, relative Humidity of gas mixture in the fuel channel
humidity detectors, and equipment to pump inert gas integrity monitoring system distribution 26
through the reactor core block (in case of increasing of header
gas temperature).
Axial neutron flux distribution 160 (20*)
D) Reactor power density-distribution monitoring system.
Radial neutron flux distribution 252
The reactor power (neutron flux) distribution system
includes radial ionization chambers, fission chambers Control rod position 211
and in-core sensor of neutron flux density. Fuel channel activity 1661 (8*)
E) Fuel cladding-integrity monitoring system. The fuel Pressure difference between reactor space
1
cladding integrity monitoring system includes gamma and reactor vessel
scintillation spectrometers and equipment to move the *
Number of instrumented channels
spectrometers in the spaces between the steam pipes.
108
6.2 PLANT RADIATION PROTECTION Ignalina NPP, these gases are released to the environment
through a 150 m high ventilation stack.
Special components and systems are provided in the plant
for the protection of the plant and its environment from To reduce the emissions of radioactive gases, the plant
radiation, both in normal operating mode of the reactor, uses a two-stage purification process. The first stage
and in accident situations. The reactor emergency consists of a holding chamber, in which the activity of the
protection and control systems guard the reactor from gases is reduced by natural radioactive decay. The second
overheating and the release of contaminated coolant or stage uses special filters to absorb radioactive aerosols
inert gas into the environment. The following systems are present in the gaseous effluent.
used for radiation protection and monitoring:
The power plant uses a closed water supply circuit. Liquid
• control and protection system, radioactive waste undergoes special processing. An
• fuel cladding integrity monitoring system, automatic radiation monitoring system provides
• reactor emergency core cooling system, continuous radiation monitoring of aerosol and liquid
• accident confinement system, waste discharge. The external dosimeter service of the
• plant liquid radioactive waste or gas-aerosol waste plant uses dosimeters and radiometric and spectrometric
cleaning, removal or storage system, instruments for the assessment of the radiation conditions
• plant and environment radiation protection in the environment.
monitoring system,
• gas-aerosol and liquid waste monitoring system. 6.2.1 Habitability Requirements
The bulk of the radioactive gases emitted by a nuclear One of the primary goals of nuclear safety systems is to
power plant, consists of inert gases and radioactive maintain secure control of the nuclear chain reaction at all
isotopes of argon (Ar), krypton (Kr) and xenon (Xe). times and to prevent the possibility for the formation of a
These isotopes are formed in the uranium fission process critical mass during reloading, transportation and storing
and, since they do not form any chemical compounds, of nuclear fuel. The Ignalina NPP design incorporates
some make their way into the cooling circuit. The systems for the detection of failure in all barriers to
contribution of these isotopes to the general background radioactive release and of systems which confine
radiation is minimal (in general bellow 0.1 % of the radioactive releases if they occur and mitigate their
natural background in the vicinity of the plant). At the consequences.
Fig. 6.1 Section of RBMK-1500 measurement parameters

1 - coolant leak monitoring system, 2 - fuel channel-integrity monitoring system, 3 - power density distribution monitoring
system, 4 - fuel cladding-integrity monitoring system, 5 - radial reflector cooling channel, 6 - control rod, 7 - temperature
channel, 8 - in-core sensor of the radial power density monitoring, 9 - temperature sensor, 10 - in-core sensor of axial power
109
density monitoring, 11 - fuel channel, 12 - fistula channel for gas sampling, 13 - temperature measurement, 14 - pressure
measurement, 15 - radiation measurement, 16 - flow measurement, 17 - noise measurement
For the RBMK-1500 reactor of the Ignalina NPP the The main task of radiation safety systems is to minimize
following barrier systems are provided: the exposure of operational personnel to ionizing
radiation, and to assure that the release of radioactive
• the innermost barrier is the fuel itself, and the leak- contaminants to the environment is maintained within
tight, corrosion-resistant cladding of the fuel, the authorized limits. Rules of radioactive safety [47]
• the next barriers are the piping of the reactor main Table 6.2 Limits of safe operation of Ignalina NPP
coolant circuit, and the reactor biological shielding, with RBMK-1500 [36]
• finally, the RBMK-1500 is provided with a
complicated partial containment system - the ACS. Parameter Variation
limit
Nuclear power plant states may be classified into Reactivity margin in manual control rods, < 30
operational states and abnormal events. The number
operational states include both normal operation and Reactor power, MW(th) > 4800
deviation from normal operation or anticipated Fuel channel power, MW > 4.25
operational occurrences. The normal operation is an Margin coefficient up to the heat
operation of a nuclear power plant within specific <1
transfer crisis in the fuel channel
operational limits and conditions including shutdown, Margin coefficient up to the linear
power operation, shutting down, starting, <1
load limit of fuel assembly
maintenance, testing and refueling. Deviations are all Calculated graphite cladding temperature, oC> 760
operational processes departing from normal operation Excess pressure in separator drum, MPa > 7.95
which are expected to occur once or several times Water flow in CRCC, m3/s < 0.256
during the operating life of the plant and which do not Water flow in CPS channel with loaded rod,
cause any significant damage to items important to < 8.3*10-4
m3/s
safety nor lead to abnormal events. Reactor and MCC warming rate, oC/h > 30
Reactor and MCC cooling rate, oC/h > 30
Abnormal events refer to all fault conditions which 131
I activity level in MCC water, Ci/h > 2⋅10-5
lead to unplanned shutdown. Abnormal events
relevant to safety, may be classified into incidents and
accidents. Incident is an abnormal event, when the Table 6.3 Main dose limits [47]
reactor safety systems are activated but allowing more
Category Group of sensitive
or less immediate return to normal operation. Accident
organs
is a state defined under accident conditions or severe
accident. Accident conditions are departure from I II III
operational states in which the releases of radioactive A - limit of NPP personnel to
materials are kept to acceptable limits by appropriate permissible dose, Sv/year 0.05 0.15 0.3
design features. B - population dose limit, Sv/year 0.005 0.015 0.03
Those departures of process parameters which can

determine the dose limits and define accepted procedures
lead to an abnormal event during operation are
for their evaluation. The following gradation of radiation
considered as limits of safe operation. Table 6.2
safety principles are maintained:
presents the values of the RBMK-1500 reactor
parameters which, if reached during operation on load, • the allowed limiting doses are not to be exceeded,
are considered as exceeding the operational safety of • there must be a reason for any level of exposure,
the plant. • exposure doses are to be reduced to the lowest level
practicable.
Deviations are controlled by the reactor main
operating and control systems. Necessary For allowable dose limits populations are divided into the
organizational measures are also established to prevent following categories :
exceeding of the limit and violation of the
requirements for safe operation of the plant. • category A - NPP personnel,
Automatic reactor protection devices against • category B - limited part of population, living near
unallowable change of the parameters and failures of NPP,
the power unit equipment are activated on signals and • category C - general population.
setpoints. When indications of deviation from process
parameters occur, the necessary actions including Three groups of sensitive organs are defined in decreasing
reactor shutdown and power drop to a safe level are order of radiation sensitivity:
taken.
• group I - all body, gonads and red bone marrow,
110
• group II - thyroid gland, lungs, alimentary canal, aerosols for each 1000 MW power of the Ignalina NPP
liver, kidneys and other internal organs, which are not are given in Table 6.4.
included in groups I and II,
• group III - skin integument, bone tissue, hand, 6.2.3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
forearms, ankles and feet.
The Ignalina NPP radiation monitoring system includes
The dose limits dependence on the group of sensitive the following equipment [2]:
organs for NPP personnel and the population living in
the vicinity of the plant is shown in Table 6.3. • automatic radiation intensity indicators,
Measurements of radioactivity in the Ignalina NPP area • set of portable radiation monitors-radiometers for
and assessment of radio-nuclide content in food tested are measuring X-ray, α, β and γ radiation within the
performed by the Lithuanian Physical Institute, Vilnius, following measurement ranges:
Lithuania and the National Hygiene Center of Lithuania. α-radiation, part/(cm2.min) 1-3⋅104
Past records show, that population doses arising from the
β-radiation, part/(cm2.min) 10-104
operation of the Ignalina NPP are very low [15]. Based on
γ-radiation, R/h 10-6-300
the data of the laboratory for safety procedures at the
• gamma-ray spectrometers,
Ignalina NPP, average exposure dose to the entire body of
• spectrometers for measuring body radiation doses,
the plant personnel is about 0.004 Sv/year [15].
• radiation spectrometers,
6.2.2 Examination Techniques and Procedures • radiometric and spectrometric equipment for
determining the radio-nuclide content in various
The radiation monitoring system is used to ascertain that media and objects.
the radiation safety principles and norms are full filled.
The Ignalina NPP radiation safety monitoring system Control of plant personnel exposure doses is performed
includes the following monitoring types [2]: using individual thermoluminiscent indicators. Dosimeters
are provided and serviced by the Radiation Protection and
• individual personnel monitoring, Industrial Safety Department Information regarding
individual exposures are stored in computer data bases.
• monitoring of radioactive material effluent in the
environment,
6.2.4 Scheduling of Inspections
• monitoring of environmental objects,
• monitoring of radiation level in the operational areas
Frequency of radiation monitoring inspections are
and in the Ignalina NPP territory,
specified in the monitoring schedules. They are approved
• inspection of the radioactive waste collection and
by the Technical Director of the Ignalina NPP and signed
removal.
by the local representative of the National Hygiene Center
of Lithuania. Inspection of personnel radionuclide
Personnel monitoring includes:
monitoring records at the Ignalina NPP personnel are
conducted in the following cases [48]:
• control of internal and external body exposure dose,
• contamination control of hands, protective equipment, • beginning of employment,
clothes, shoes and quality of their decontamination in
• termination of employment,
the sanitary locks, workshops, laboratories and places
• annually for each employee.
for smoking.
If accumulation over 0.05 x DSA (DSA is permissible
The primary aim of personnel monitoring is the collection
contents of radionuclide in a sensitive organ) is found, the
of information about exposure doses and prompt
testing intervals are increased up to once per three
identification of exposure sources to assure that personnel
months. Individual dosimetry inspection of operational
over-exposure is prevented.
and maintenance personnel are conducted once per month
[49]. Personnel, who serve on preventive maintenance,
Monitoring of radiation levels in operational areas and in
are inspected before and after each preventive
the Ignalina NPP territory includes control of radiation
maintenance task.
dose rates, noble gas and aerosol activity, activity and
radionuclide content in gaseous and liquid release,
radioactive contamination of equipment surfaces, etc. The
Table 6.4 Allowable release of radioactive gases and
limits of permissible release of radionuclides to the
aerosols from Ignalina NPP [36]
atmosphere and the annual allowable release of
radioactive substances with the liquid non-radioactive
Nuclide Allowable release
wastes to lake DrkÖiai are established based on the
conditions that the dose limits specified in sanitary Radioactive noble gases, 500
regulations (OSP-76/87) [47] must not be exceeded. Ci/(day 1000 MW(e))
Values of allowable release of radioactive gases and
111
131
I, Ci/(day 1000 MW(e)) 0.01 A characteristic feature of nuclear power plants built in
89 the West is the containment, or protective shell. This is a
Sr, Ci/(month 1000 MW(e)) 0.0015
large, especially strong, steel and reinforced concrete
90
Sr, Ci/(month 1000 MW(e)) 0.0015 building, usually semi cylindrical in shape, which
137 encloses the reactor and its cooling circuits. The Ignalina
Cs, Ci/(month 1000 MW(e)) 0.015
NPP does not have such a containment structure. Almost
60
Co, Ci/(month 1000 MW(e)) 0.015 all components of the power plant are located in large,
54 interconnected, traditional buildings. This external image
Mr, Ci/(month 1000 MW(e)) 0.015
of the power plant has contributed to the widespread
51
Cr, Ci/(month 1000 MW(e)) 0.015 opinion that the Ignalina NPP has no containment system.
That is not true. In fact, both the reactor and a large
The release of radioactive aerosols to the atmosphere,
portion of the cooling circuit are enclosed in reinforced
release of water to the environment, the concentration of
protective shells. In addition, a complicated large scale
radioactive gases and aerosols in the air of the operational
system is provided whose purpose is to condense the
premises, as well as the analysis of the γ-background steam erupting from the cooling circuit during a possible
and α-activity of steam of the separator drums is accident. This equipment takes up a significant fraction of
continuously monitored and is recorded once per day. the volume of the central power plant building.
Inspection of total α-activity in water of the MCC, water
of the CPS circuit and water of the intermediate circuit are The Ignalina nuclear power plants are cooled by high
conducted once per day. Analysis of the contamination by pressure water. While the reactor is on line, most of the
radioactive substances of the Ignalina NPP territory, thermal energy is found, not in the core, but in the cooling
operational premises, special clothes and other safety circuit. Therefore, if an accident occurs which damages
related equipment is conducted according to a special the cooling circuit (pipe break, valve stuck open, etc.), the
schedule [49]. main function of the containment system is to prevent the
released high pressure steam-water mixture from reaching
6.3 ACCIDENT CONFINEMENT SYSTEM the atmosphere. Generally, there are two containment
types which achieve this result.
The reactors of the Ignalina NPP are protected by a
pressure suppression type containment which, because of The most common type is called "dry containment". This
its specialized nature, is referred to as the Accident is also the simplest type: a sufficiently large and strong
Confinement System (ACS). It differs from the standard building, which can withstand the pressure reached when
pressure suppression containments in several respects. the entire contents of the cooling circuit is suddenly lost
The major of which are : from the circuit (within half a minute). In this case, it is
possible for the pressure to reach 4 atmospheres.
• Not all of the primary cooling circuit is enclosed. Containment buildings are correspondingly large and
• It is made up of a number of semi-interconnected expensive.
compartments.
• It utilizes ten separate pools of water for steam The second, or "pressure suppression" containment type
condensation. uses additional equipment which condenses a part of the
• It includes a "clean air" venting system. released steam to reduce the peak pressures which can be
reached during an accident. Internally, the containment
First three features are similar to the confinement system structure is divided into at least two major volumes, which
used in the VVR - 440/Mod213 Soviet built PWR's, the are interconnected by a flow path submerged under a
last feature seems to be unique. The original design permanent pool of water. When the steam enters the first
documentation for this system was sparse, and a limited section, the pressure rises, and in order to reach the
number of studies were available which analyzed the second section, the steam-air mixture must "bubble"
response of the ACS to accidental conditions. For this through the water. This condenses most of the steam,
reason considerable effort was devoted to the reducing the peak pressure attained.
determination of relevant ACS parameters and to the
evaluation of ACS response to a broad range of DB and The system used at the Ignalina NPP [50] belongs to the
SB-LOCA events. Design parameters were determined second category of containment. It differs from
from construction drawings and where uncertainties containment systems common in Western nuclear plants
persisted, they were verified by direct measurement in the in several important aspects:
plant. The accident types evaluated include the entire
spectrum of break sizes and break locations. Results of • Not all of the cooling circuit (only about 65 % by
these studies are available in [86]. water volume) is enclosed in the containment.
• The containment is made up of a large number of
6.3.1 Purpose and Applicability compartments.
• Condensation of steam occurs in ten water pools
which are separated into two groups of five each.
112
• A controlled venting system is present. This system is The venting of uncontaminated air and the use of sprays
designed to remove part of the clean air after the start makes it possible to lower the ACS pressure with respect
of an accident. It serves to reduce both the peak to the atmospheric pressure. This reduces the probability
pressure and the long term plant-to-ambient pressure of release of radioactive material to the environment. In
difference. addition the ACS serves as a water reservoir. The stored
water can be used for emergency core cooling, as well as
In many other respects the Ignalina NPP ACS has to condense steam released by the pressure relief valves.
features similar to traditional pressure suppression
systems used in the West. Spray nozzles are located in 6.3.2 Design Characteristics of the ACS
several regions where steam can accumulate, It has
provisions for condensing steam released during An overall schematic of the ACS representing a cross-
operational transients (e.g. opening of main safety valves) section through the main power plant building is
and the spray water is cooled by the condenser tray presented in Fig. 6.2. As shown in the diagram, a
cooling system. significant fraction of the total volume of this building is
The ACS performs its function of limiting pressure assigned to the accident confinement system. Its principal
buildup and containment of potentially radioactive gases components are two interconnected ACS towers, each of
released from the primary system in the following way: which contain five vertically-positioned condensing trays.
The water in the pools of these trays, is the medium
• most of the steam produced by flashing of the break which serves as the first barrier to the steam emitted
flow is condensed in the condensing trays. This during a LOCA event. The water of the pools forms a
reduces the pressure and, thus reduces the release of barrier which divides the entire system into two distinct
radioactive material to the environment, parts:
• radioactive species released during the accident are
held in the enclosed compartments until they can be 1 - The compartments in front of the pools. They
decontaminated, encompass the primary circuit piping where a
• during the first stage of the accident, a part of the potential break and the release of high pressure water
uncontaminated air is vented from the ACS, is most likely.
• spray systems are used to condense the steam in the 2 - The compartments beyond the condensing pools. The
remaining ACS compartments. non-condensibles present in the first part of the ACS
• a condenser tray cooling system is employed to cool are pushed into these compartments. Most of the
the pool water and condenser which is provided to the released steam is condensed as the steam-air mixture
sprays. bubbles through the condensing pools.
113
Fig. 6.2 Principal ACS schematic
1 - fuel channel, 2 - main circulation pump, 3 - suction header, 4 - pressure header, 5 - group distribution header, 6 - ECCS
header, 7 - condensing pools, 8 - ACS condenser tray cooling system, 9 - air discharge pipe section, 10 - pipe for removal of
contaminated steam from protection valve, 11 - pipe for removal of contaminated steam from broken fuel channel
The compartments which surround the reactor and the function simultaneously, and analysis show that they
components of the primary circuit, are reinforced and receive an approximately equal portion of the released
capable of withstanding elevated pressures. Their design steam, except for one accident type, which will be
pressure is shown in Table 6.5. They can be divided into discussed below.
the following two subgroups:
The bottom section of the towers contain the steam
• the compartments containing pipes which lead into
reception chamber, the steam corridors, and the hot-
the reactor, and the main circulation pumps. Steam
condensation chamber. In case of an accident, the steam
released into these compartments is directed to the
flows through these compartments and subsequently up to
four bottom condensing pools of both ACS towers,
the steam distribution channels, which are positioned
• the core block itself, and the pipes leading out of the
vertically on both sides of the tower. The lower section of
reactor. Steam released into this zone is directed to the
the hot-condensation chamber stores the water reserves
highest (fifth) condensing pool of the left hand side of
for the emergency core-cooling system and serves as a
the ACS tower.
collection pool for the condensed steam during a LOCA
The principal design features of the Accident event. The hot- condensation chamber is connected to the
Confinement System are presented in Table 6.6. The steam reception corridors by ten overflow
capacity of system is designed to isolate the steam
escaping from the primary circuit in case of the Design Table 6.5 Principal ACS design characteristics [50,51]
Basis Loss of Coolant Accident (DB-LOCA) which in the Parameter Quantity
case of an RBMK plant is taken to be the break of the
pressure header. The design capacity of the ACS in this Maximum accident steam flow into 14700
accident situation is shown in Table 6.5. the system, kg/s
Condensed steam before starting the spray
30300
6.3.3 ACS Structural Characteristics system, kg
Discharged clean air, kg 25000
The structures housing the accident confinement system Maximum water temperature, oC:
are divided into two parts, which are located in separate - pools 1 - 4 88
towers (Fig. 6.2). This feature was dictated by the plant - pool 5 98
layout requirements. However, both halves of the system Maximum permissible excess pressure (MPa) in the:
114
- reinforced leaktight compartments 0.3 condensing pools (volume to the top of the
- steam reception chamber 0.1 barbotage)
- bottom water pipes compartment 0.08 - total spaces above the water surface in the
2 x 4935
- gas-holding chamber 0.08 condensing pools, the air venting channel, and
the channel to the first gas holding chamber
pipes. The purpose of these pipes is to direct part of the
condensate to the steam-reception corridors. On the - gas-holding chambers, not including the 2 x 10170
corridor side the pipes have hydrolocks to prevent steam channel to the first chamber
from flowing into the hot condensate chamber.
The hot-condensate chamber is joined to an air removal

channel to the gas-holding chamber, which is located in
the upper part of the ACS tower. This channel conducts G
the air forced from the hot-condensate chamber and the
condensation pools to the holding chamber. The spill-over
water from the condensing trays falls through this channel
to the bottom of the hot-condensate chamber sump.
Sprays are used in the top part of the reception chamber,

and also in the gas-holding chamber, to condense the
steam which remains in the ACS compartments. The
over-pressure valve is built into the wall of the reception
chamber, their purpose is to release air from the
compartment of heat exchangers of condensate tray
cooling system to the reception chamber, when the Fig. 6.3 Condensing compartment and pool
pressure there decreases below atmospheric levels. 1 - condensate overflow to hot-condensate chamber, 2 -
cooled water supply, 3 - air and non-condensing gas
Five concrete trays holding condensation pools are located removal to gas holding chamber, 4 - water supply for
above the hot-condensate chamber. The pools contain the filling first tray, 5 - water to purification system, 6 -
water reserves needed for condensing the steam released contaminated steam from steam reception chamber
during a LOCA event. A schematic diagram of the first
four condensation pools (numbering from the bottom) is
shown in Fig. 6.3. The space above the pools is connected
by air passageways to he gas-holding chamber. The
height of the overflow barrier (2.1 m) was chosen, by
considering the expansion of the water caused by the
bubbling of the steam. To maintain the initial water level
of 1.1 m, there are 100 mm holes. Rectangular holes,
distributed at a height of 1.2 m, allow the condensate and
hot-water to overflow and spill into the hot- condensate
chamber.
Table 6.6 ACS components [50,51,62]

Parameter Quantity
3
Volume (m ) of water in condensing pools:
- pool 1 - 4 2860
- pool 5 745
Volume of cooling system water, m3 1000
Initial water temperature in the pools, oC 30
Volumes (m3) of ACS facility:
- compartments containing main circulation
2 x 6000
pumps, suction and pressure headers, ECCS
headers (reinforced leaktight compartments)
- compartments up to the ACS towers
4000
(reinforced leaktight compartments)
- compartment enclosing the pipes leading to
4200
the fuel channels and spaces below the reactor
- summed volume of the steam receiving
chambers in the ACS tower, and the steam
distribution headers in the bottom four 2 x 2300
115
The bottom four condensation pools are intended for the of the vent and the rectangular channels including a
condensation of steam from the compartments in which summary of the geometrical characteristics of vents and
the main circulation pumps and the group distribution downcomers is presented in Fig. 6.4. There are 10
headers are located. They are al similar, except for the headers per tray, this results in a total flow area of 11.93
bottom pool which is somewhat smaller (see Fig. 6.3). m2 for condensation trays 2 to 4. At the exiting end the
Part of the cross-section of the bottom pool is taken up by rectangular downcomer channels are provided with a
the steam reception chamber. In each pool, there are 10 saw-tooth edge in order to better distribute the steam and
steam distribution devices, each about 20 m long. The to reduce condensation type oscillations. The steam
bottom pool has 7 devices 20 m long, and 3 devices 10 m distribution devices connect to the steam distribution
long. These are 800 mm diameter pipes connected to channels, and through them to the steam reception
rectangular, sheet metal downcomers which have a total chamber.
height of 1.2 m and are submerged to a depth of 0.9 - 1.05
m in the condensation pool water. A scaled representation
Condensation Length of Number of steam Downcomers Downcomers

pool devices, m distribution devices length L, m number
in both ACT
19.9 14 1.6 336
1
9.95 6 1.6 72
2-4 19.9 60 1.6 1440
8.5 38 2.29 456
5
7.5 2 2.10 20
Fig. 6.4 Sketch of steam distribution devices

The fifth (top) pool (Fig. 6.5) is intended for the downcomers submerged 1.5 m deep under water. This
condensation of steam from the pressure relief valves. 600 device is intended for the condensation of steam released
mm diameter pipes from the SDV-A and MSVs conduct during a potential rupture of a fuel channel. Steam is
steam into the rectangular chambers in the center of the transported to this device from above, by a 600 mm
pool. The structure of the steam distribution devices is diameter pipe. All of the condensing pools are equipped
analogous to those described earlier. The rectangular with cold water distribution headers. Water is provided to
downcomers are connected to each other through holes in these headers from the condensate tray cooling system.
the columns.
The compartment for confining potential "contaminated"
The fifth pool of the left ACS tower is equipped with an gases is located above the condensation pools, Fig. 6.6.
additional 23 m long steam distribution device, which has This compartment is divided by vertical partitions into
116
seven channels, positioned in such a manner that air, or 6.3.4 Condenser Tray Cooling System
other non-condensing contaminated gases coming from
the pools during an accident, would pass through them The Condenser Tray Cooling System (CTCS) is designed
sequentially. A grating is installed in each channel in to remove the energy deposited in the condenser tray
order to even out the flow along the cross-section. pools by condensation of LOCA generated steam, and to
maintain the prescribed water reserves in the condensing
Ten 800 mm diameter pipes, through which clean air is pools during normal and off-normal plant operation.
released into the atmosphere are located in the last During long-term transients the CTCS becomes the major
compartment. The entrance end of these pipes reaches sink for the removal of the decay energy released as steam
into a separate section of the compartment. Hollow metal into the ACS.
spheres are placed at the bottom of each pipe. In their
nominal position they lie on the bottom so that there is a The CTCS is located in enclosures beyond the re-enforced
300 mm space between the ball and the pipe. The water compartments of the ACS. A representation of the CTCS
level in the section is kept at about 300 mm. This is serving one of the ACS towers is shown in Fig. 6.7. The
adequate for covering the ends of siphons coming from a tower itself is shown schematically in the upper portion of
100 m3 storage tank located in the top part of the gas- the figure, a diagram of the main components of the
holding chamber. The volume of the storage tank is filled CTCS and their inter-connections is shown below. The
with water and it is connected by a 1500 mm diameter main CTCS components are:
two pipes to the steam reception corridor. In the event of
• a set of eight shell-and-tube heat exchangers ( four on
one side) of the type designated as 1200 TNG-1-6-
M1/20-4-1. While the reactor is on line, one heat
exchanger can be taken out of operation for
maintenance. Heat transfer surface area measures
426 m2,
• six type D 1250-65 electric pump units with a
capacity of 1250 m3/h delivering a hydrostatic
pressure of 6.5 kgf/cm2 each,
• a complement of piping and valves.
Fig. 6.5 Fifth steam-condensing pool (left ACS tower) G

1 - cooling water, 2 - section for condensing steam from
protection valve, 3 - section for condensing steam from
fuel channels, 4 - steam pipe from protection valve, 5 -
steam pipe from ruptured fuel channel
a LOCA which produces a pressure rise in the inner ACS
compartments, a pressure pulse is transmitted through
this pipe to initiate the flow of water in the siphon.
The top part of the gas-holding chamber is provided with

a set of sprays. In the event of an accident which produces
moderate steam releases over a long time period, their Fig. 6.6 Gas-delay chamber
purpose is to reduce the partial pressure of the steam in 1 - cooling water, 2 - section of gas-holding chamber, 3
the gas holding chamber and to cool the compartment. - 100 m3 water tank, 4 - air discharge to environment, 5 -
Water is provided to these sprays from the condensate tray pipe transmitting the pressure pulse, 6 - siphon, 7-
cooling system. floating ball
117
Fig. 6.7 Condenser tray cooling system
1 - heat exchanger, 2 - valve, 3 - water pump, 4 - check valve, 5 - mass flow rate gauge, 6 - ACS tower
As shown in Fig. 6.7, the main water supply is the • to the BSRC sprays by means of 200 and 100mm
ACS Hot Condensate Chamber (HCC), water is drawn diameter pipes,
from the HCC pool through five 400 mm diameter • to the gas delay chamber sprays through 200mm
pipes. The valves provided on the suction side of the and 100 mm diameter pipes.
system are normally maintained open. To ensure
reliable operation in the case any two pumps are not In Fig. 6.7 the lines supplying the sprays are indicated in
available, a 600 mm interconnection is provided at the upper left hand and lower right hand corners of the
both the pump suction and pressure sides. An alternate schematic representing the ACS tower.
water supply is the sump of the Bottom Steam
Reception Chamber (BSRC) which receives the The secondary side of the ACS heat exchangers is
overflow condensate from the HCC and the runoff supplied with service water via a 1200 mm header at a
from the BSRC sprays. At both the inlet and the outlet flow rate of 8400 m3/h. The minimum flow through
of the heat exchangers valves are normally maintained any heat exchanger is rated at 1500 m3/h. Operator
open. control of the pump units is maintained from the
MCR. In case auxiliary power is lost, the pump units
The CTCS pumps deliver water to the following and valves are fed off the emergency power sources.
systems of the ACS Tower:
The operation of the ACS condenser tray pool cooling
• to condensing pools 1-4 by means of 600 mm system is initiated when the temperature of water at
diameter pipes which in the distribution net the four bottom pools reaches 35oC or at the fifth pool -
narrow down to 300 mm and finally to 150 mm, 50oC [88]. This system can also be activated by the
• to the level 5 condensing pool via a 600 mm ECCS start up signal two minutes after initiation of
diameter pipe which at the distribution end a LOCA.
narrows to 400 and 200 mm diameter,
118
For normal power operation, in addition to the • removal of steam-gas mixture from reactor cavity
outlined CTCS, a separate pump system is available. It to the condensation system by the steam-gas
is designed to maintain the prescribed water inventory release circuit in case of a rupture of fuel or special
in the level #5 condensing pools and has the capability channel.
to exchange water between the two ACS towers during A simplified schematic of reactor pressure relief
scheduled maintenance. This system consists of two system is shown in Fig. 6.8. In the reactor pressure
X90/85 K-1-2G type pumps with a capacity of relief system, a steam-gas mixture is discharged from
90 m3/hour generating a hydraulic head of 8.5 the top of the reactor cavity through four 300 mm
kgf/cm2. If the situation warrants it, the auxiliary diameter and one 600 mm diameter pipes located
deaerator makeup system pumps can also be used to along the periphery of upper metal structure. The pairs
supply water to the HCC pool. This system consists of of 300 mm diameter pipes and 600 mm diameter pipe
4 pumps and a 1500 m3 water tank. In addition, the are connected to four 400 mm diameter pipelines that
deminiralized water distribution system which penetrate the boundary of ACS. Within the ACS, each
includes 3 pumps and 2 tanks of a 5000 m3 capacity pair of the 400 diameter mm pipes is connected to one
each can be switched to supply water both to the HCC 600 mm diameter pipeline which terminates at the
pool and to the auxiliary deaerator makeup system. header of the steam distribution devices within the
fifth suppression pool, and they also connected to one
The availability of the CTCS is one of the group of the three membrane safety devices (350 mm
requirements of normal plant operation. Thus diameter) within the ACS. The bottom pipes terminate
operating procedures require the shut down of the in the second group of the three membrane safety
reactor unless the following equipment failures or devices within the ACS. When the membrane safety
deviation from the design norms can be corrected: devices perforate (i.e., if setpoint of 59 kPa is
exceeded), the steam- gas mixture is discharged into
• 5 minutes after a water level in one ACS the ACS suppression pools 1 to 4.
condensing pool drops below 950 mm, or water
temperature rises to 35 oC at condensing pools The requirement for overpressure protection system is
1-4 or to 50 oC at pool 5, to have the capacity for coping with design basis
• 30 minutes after water temperature at a level accident involving one pressure tube rupture. Cavity
5 condensing pool reaches a value 50 oC while an pressure exceeding 0.314 MPa has been described as
main safety valves opens and subsequently fails to having the possibility to lift the upper-head shield
close, or 2 minutes after any two main safety assembly breaking the reactor seal, the pressure tubes,
valves open and subsequently fail to close despite and affecting the operation of other safety functions.
of corrective actions,
• 8 hours after 2 pumps of the condenser tray pool The efficiency analysis of the reactor pressure relief
cooling system fail to operate, system installed at Ignalina plant in 1996 showed that
• 2 hours after 2 diesel generators fail to the capacity of the existing system makes it possibly to
automatically take a load, or immediately unless withstand multiple rupture of up to 9 pressure tubes
the remaining diesel generators are able to start under a conservative assumption of simultaneous
up 4 pumps of the condenser tray pool cooling guillotine ruptures.
system.
6.3.5 Reactor Cavity Overpressure Protection

System
Protection of the reactor cavity against

overpressurization is an important part of the safety
system of RBMK-1500. This system is intended to
ensure reactor vessel leaktigthness and integrity of
reactor metal structures under accidents caused by a
rupture of a fuel or special channel, with resulting
pressure growth in reactor cavity. The protection
system provides:
• fast scram by the signal for the increase of the

reactor cavity pressure over the setpoint 7.36 kPa
(750 kg/m3),
• immediate manual rector shutdown by the operator
in case integral water leakage in reactor cavity
exceeded 10 kg/h,
119
The venting systems functions as follows. The pressure
increase in the steam-removal tunnels, is transmitted to
G
the 100 m3 volume tank (3) (Fig. 6.5) through the impulse-
G transmitting pipe. The additional pressure initiates flow in
G
the siphons (6) and water starts to flow into the air
G venting compartment sump. When the water level rises,
G
the hollow metal spheres (7) float and close the inlets of
4 2 the pipes (4). The pipes are closed within ~5 minutes.
1
After ECCS signal initiation (1-2 seconds after the break)
the CTCS pumps starts. During next 5 minutes the
3 nominal flow rate is reached. Cooled water is provided to
G the four condensation pools and to the sprays in the
G
steam-reception and the gas holding chambers (Fig. 6.2).
The condensed steam in the pools leads to an increase in
the water level from 1.1 to 1.2 m, there it overflows weirs
G and spills out into the hot-condensate chamber. Since the
height of the overflow barrier is 100 mm above the initial
5
level of water in the pool, overflow from the pool begins
~20 seconds after the start of steam condensation. This
Fig. 6.8 Simplified schematic of the reactor prevents entrainment of water in the air current into the
pressure relief system air removal channel. The gas velocity at this time is lower
1 - reactor, 2- the fifth ACS suppression pool, 3 -
than 3 m/s, and the amount of spray carried away is small.
suppression pools 1-4, 4 - steam distribution devices,
The hot-condensate chamber can hold additional 152 t of
5 - membrane safety devices (350 mm diameter)
condensate, the excess, (~360 t) flows through the
6.3.6 Description of ACS Response
overflow openings into the steam-removal corridor and
reception chamber.
The reactor cooling circuit of an RBMK-type reactor is
rather complicated. The core is cooled by 1661 separate
Due to the condensation of the steam in the pools and the
channels. These provide steam to four steam separators.
reception chamber (by the spray system), the pressure at
The water and condensate mixture from each separator is
the accident location begins to decrease. When the
returned to the core by three (of four) pumps. Thus the
pressure at the accident location is lower by about 5 kPa
system consists of pipes of various diameters. The impact
compared to the pressure in the compartment of heat
on the accident confinement system, i.e. the quantity of
exchangers at condenser tray cooling system, the over-
steam and hot water released, will depend on the size of
pressure valves open and air from the compartment of
the broken pipe. To be conservative, it is assumed that it is
heat exchangers flows to the steam-reception chamber.
the biggest pipe in the in a given piping section. The DB-
LOCA event, that is the largest break for the entire system
6.3.6.2 Rupture of the Group Distribution Header
is a complete guillotine rupture of the 900 mm diameter
pressure header.
The Group Distribution Headers (GDH) are important
components of the primary system which accept coolant
6.3.6.1 Accident in the Reinforced Leaktight
water from the PH and distribute it to the core channels.
Compartment
A schematic of the piping between the PH and the GDH
is shown in Fig. 6.9. As shown in the diagram, in order to
The ACS response to a loss-of-coolant-accident depends
reach the GDH (6), coolant water must pass through a
to a marked degree upon the location and the nature of the
flow limiter (2), a valve (3), a check valve (4) and enter
break which leads to primary system coolant loss. The
the GDH through a ‘water mixer’(5) which in the event of
DB-LOCA analysis assumes the rupture of a Pressure
a LOCA combines the primary system flow with ECCS
Header (PH) (4) (see Fig. 6.2) The initial blowdown rate
water. The schematic also shows a bypass line (8) and
of the steam produced by such an event is about 14.7 t/s
three entry ports for ECCS water (10).
[38]. From the break compartment the flashed vapor and
compartment air first flows through the steam-release
The rupture of a GDH has disrupts the coolant supply to
tunnels to the BSRC of both ACS towers. From there, it
~40 fuel channels and generates a pressure transient in
passes along the corridors leading to the steam
the ACS compartments. A complete rupture of the GDH
distribution headers of the bottom four condensation pools
leads to a reversal of the coolant flow direction in fuel
and is forced to bubble through the pool water. During
channels (7) and an adequate cooling of the fuel. Of more
barbotage the steam condenses, while the air and other
concern is a partial rupture which could lead to flow
non-condensable gases pass through and continue to the
stagnation and heat up of the fuel. This problem has been
air- removal channel and the gas-holding chamber. From
addressed in [87].
there part of the clean air is vented to the atmosphere.
120
6.3.6.3 Rupture of a Fuel Channel
Rupture of a fuel channel releases steam and liquid water

into the inner spaces of the reactor graphite block. The
graphite has a large heat capacity and elevated
temperature, thus most of the liquid is vaporized. The
steam-gas mixture from the reactor load goes through
eight 300 mm diameter and one 600 mm diameter pipes,
then through four 400 mm diameter headers to the steam
distribution devices (4) and to the membrane safety
devices (5) (see Subsection 6.3.5, Fig. 6.8).
After the temperature of water at the fifth pool reaches

50oC, the CTCS is switched on, cooled water is provided
to the fifth condensation pool and to the sprays in the gas-
holding chamber. Meanwhile, the water pipes from the
cooler to CTCS pools 1 - 4 are disconnected. The hot
water pours through the overflow holes into the hot
Fig. 6.9 GDH rupture after the check valve condensate chamber, from where it again goes to the
1 - pressure header, 2 - flow limiter, 3 - valve, 4 - CTCS coolers.
check valve, 5 - mixer, 6 - GDH, 7 - fuel channels, 8 -
bypass line, 9 - flow meter, 10 - ECCS headers
The presence of a check valve and their influence on the
direction of break and ECCS flow divides potential GDH
breaks into two general types:
a) break before the check valve,

b) break after the check valve and the ECCS mixer, but
before the piping to the fuel channels (Fig. 6.9).
Case b generates a more intense break flow and is of more

interest as a possible challenge to the ACS. Reference [86]
analyzes a broader range of scenarios, here only the case
which has the maximum impact on the ACS will be
considered.
Through the rupture the steam-water mixture discharges

into the bottom water pipes compartments. After the
pressure of steam at these compartments exceed 59 kPa,
the special valves are opening and steam-water mixture
flows through the steam release tunnel to both ACS
towers. Further, the system works analogously to an
accident in the Reinforced Leaktight Compartment. A
GDH break represents a ‘mid-size’ LOCA. Thus the
short-term loads imposed by the accident are substantially
smaller then in the case for the DB-LOCA case
considered in Subsection 6.3.6.1. They approach a peak
value of ~130 kPa and thus do not threaten ACS integrity.
The real challenge to the ACS is to ensure that the long
term confinement capability is not impaired. This has a
special importance for this event, because there is a small
probability that a GDH break event could be accompanied
by partial fuel damage and thus could have radiological
consequences.
Long term analysis have been carried out which indicate

that the ‘long term’ peak pressure (which occurs
approaches, but does not exceed the peak pressures
achieved short after the break [86].
121
The volume of air released to the atmosphere will be
equal to the amount of gas coming with the steam until 6.3.6.5 Small Pipe Break Accident
the closing of the release pipes (maximum 1000 m3).
Water is provided to the section in order to close the The accident events analyzed up to this point assumed
release pipes (see Subsection 6.3.3, Fig. 6.6) by the MCR that the biggest pipe in the room is the one that breaks
operator's signal, or automatically, on a signal from and that the pipe ruptures completely. This maximizes the
radioactivity meters in the outlet of the air release pipes. amount of steam and hot water that is released. However,
in reality, smaller breaks have a higher probability of
6.3.6.4 Inadvertent Opening of the MSV’s occurring. A characteristic of accidents involving small
pipe breaks in the MCP room or the bottom water pipes
The RBMK-1500 plant is provided with a total of compartments, is that air from the pipes and the accident
12 MSV’s. The steam released from the MSV’s during rooms is pushed out at a slower rate. Therefore, there it is
over-pressure events is directed to the top-most condenser probable that a relatively large amount of air remains in
trays of the ACS towers. When a protection valve has the inner ACS enclosures after the venting pipes in the
actuated, one or both ACS towers operate, depending on gas-release room are shut by the action of the siphon. The
which high pressure steam loop experienced the abnormal larger air content increases the gas-holding chamber
pressure increase and the actuation of the SDV-A or pressure. A mitigating factor is that the air enters
MSVs. In the rest of this description, the operation of a sufficiently slowly that it can be cooled. The spray
single ACS tower is described. The operation of the other system is turned on in the gas holding chamber at the
two is analogous. The steam goes through 600 mm time when the gas release pipes are closed, consequently
diameter pipes to the rectangular chambers in the fifth the pressure does not exceed 160 kPa, even in the case
condensation pool (see Subsection 6.3.3, Fig. 6.5). when no air is vented at all. The closure time of the
Afterwards, it goes to the steam distribution devices and gas release pipes is designed to be ~5 minutes so that they
then, bubbling through the water, is condensed. Air, would not close before the initiation of the spray system,
displaced from the supply pipes and chambers by the ensuring isothermal compression of the air. In other
steam, gets to the holding chamber, while an equal respects, the operation of the system does not differ from
volume of clean air is released through the release pipes to its operation in the event of a large break accident.
the atmosphere. The two valves (vacuum breakers) are
build into the wall of these rectangular chambers. Their 6.3.6.6 Hydrogen Release
purpose is to release air from the gas-holding chamber to
rectangular chamber, when the pressure inside the During LOCA type accidents hydrogen is released
chamber is lower by about 1.5 kPa compared to the together with steam-water mixture in the ACS
pressure in the gas-holding chamber. compartments. The hydrogen arises in the reactor core
from process of radiolysis of water and steam-zirconium
After the temperature of water at the fifth pool reaches interaction of high temperature.
50oC (no later that five minutes after the opening of the
valve) the CTCS switches on, and cooled water is In all of the accident cases considered, if pressure header
provided to the condensation pool, where it is distributed of MCP breaks, approximately 85 m3 (7.7 kg) of
by means of the water header. Water heated to the hydrogen is released in the ACS compartments [85]. It is
maximum temperature, 98 oC, is poured over the barrier difficult to calculate the hydrogen concentration in the
to the hot-condensate chamber. There, it mixes with the gas- holding chamber accurately, because it is not known
cold ECCS water. From the hot-condensate chamber, the what proportion of it is released into the atmosphere with
water again goes to the cooler pumps. the air. But, assuming the worst case that all of the
hydrogen is still in the gas-holding chamber, then its
At the same time, cold water from the CTCS coolers is concentration would be 0.29 % of the entire volume. That
provided to the sprays in the gas-holding chambers. The is much less than the allowed limit, 0.4 % [50], and it
water pipes to the other pools are closed. The closing of is not necessary to take any special precautions to prevent
the valves in the lines to pools 1 - 4 and opening to pool 5 formation of an explosive mixture.
and to the spray system occurs automatically. The
provision of the water necessary for the closing of the air-
release valve is switched on by the operator or by the
radioactivity detectors at the exit of the gas release pipes.
This reduces the probability that contaminated air would
be released to the atmosphere. Due to the long gas path
through the channels, the contaminated air cannot reach
the release pipes by diffusion during the valve closure
period (5-10 minutes). Eliminating the consequences of
the opening of the protection valves, water from the hot-
condensate chamber and the top condensation pool is
cleaned in the power plant's water purification system.
122
In other pipes and compartments where there is a danger system. The BWPC are tested by air pressure up to about
of hydrogen accumulation (steam reception chamber, 1 kPa and the Reinforced Leaktight Compartments (RLC)
steam distribution channels, top condensation pool and the ACS tower by an excess pressure of about 2 kPa.
isolation compartments, the top part of the gas-holding Test results are compared with the results measured at the
chamber), there must be hydrogen concentration meters start of the unit's operation. During leakage tests visual
and forced circulation. If necessary, the hydrogen and audio inspections are conducted in the pressurized
concentration can be reduced to allowed limits by means compartment. After a stable pressure is reached the
of forced circulation. pressure source is turned off and the rate of pressure
decrease determined using manometers. The
There are an alarm instrumentation for monitoring experimental results are employed to evaluate the leakage
hydrogen content in the ACS compartments (32 alarm rate and the equivalent leakage area.
sensors for each unit). This monitoring capability reduces
the probability that explosive hydrogen concentrations Criteria for leakage of the ACS compartment of the
could accumulate in the ACS compartments. Ignalina NPP unit 1 state that total equivalent leakage
area should not exceed 0.486 m2 . During testing of the
6.3.7 ACS Leakage Testing ACS of the Ignalina NPP unit 2 at the start of operation,
the equivalent area for the reinforced leaktight
Leak testing of the ACS is conducted at least once a year compartments was found to be 0.0069 m2. For the ACS
during preventive maintenance by visual examination of towers these corresponding values were 0.0049 (left) +
valves, seals of hatches, leaktight doors, tunnels of 0.0059 (right) = 0.0108 m2. For the bottom water
pipelines, devices and cables. Results of the testing are communication compartments it was 0.0217 m2. The total
recorded. equivalent leakage area of the ACS for unit 2 was 0.0394
m2. Typical results for the ACS of unit 1 and unit 2
Pressure testing is performed using plant compressed air leakage test are shown in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, respectively.
or by employing a venting device of the re-circulating
Table 6.7 ACS leakage test results of the Ignalina NPP unit 1 [52]
Compartment Excess testing Range of pressure Time of pressure Equivalent area of

pressure, kPa changes, kPa drop, s leakage, m2
RLC 1.45 1.45 to 0.5 13 0.294
BWPC+RLC 1.20 1.20 to 0.5 11 0.0455
ACS towers 0.80 0.80 to 0.5 14 0.219
Table 6.8 ACS leakage test results of the Ignalina NPP unit 2 [53]
Compartment Excess testing Range of pressure Time of pressure Equivalent area
pressure, kPa changes, kPa drop, s of leakage, m2
RLC+BWPC+ACS towers* 3.96 2.0 to 1.0 130 0.0406
RLC+BWPC+ACS towers** 4.40 3.0 to 2.0 206 0.0850
RLC** 4.60 2.0 to 1.0 125 0.0308
BWPC** 0.50 0.5 to 0.2 13 0.0356
Left ACS tower** 0.80 0.80 to 0.5 117 0.0142
Right ACS tower** 0.80 0.80 to 0.5 98 0.0170
*
By special preparation of ACS for testing
**
Without any additions to the structure
6.4 REACTOR POWER CONTROL operation, for reactor control and safety, special
parameters - the reactivity coefficients are used.
Reactor neutron power control is the main key for reactor
operation. Without reliable power control safe reactor 6.4.1 Reactivity Coefficients
operation is impossible. In this Subsection the RBMK-
1500 neutron power control system, the so-called Control One of the fundamental parameter groups which
and Protection System (CPS) is described. The power of influence the nuclear power plant's safety and
the nuclear reactor is regulated by inserting special rods of controllability are the so-called "reactivity coefficients".
a neutron-absorbing material into the core. After the They quantifies the effect which various other parameters
Chernobyl accident this system was significantly (e.g. fuel of graphite temperature, amount of steam) have
improved. For description of the effectiveness of the CPS
123
on the core neutron activity. For reactor stability, it is shows that, according to the measurements taken at that
essential that the overall reactivity coefficient be negative. time, the steam reactivity coefficient, i.e. the change in
reactivity due to a change in the density of the reactor
In an RBMK reactor, one of the components of the overall coolant (steam-water mixture), αf = 0.7βeff. Before the
reactivity coefficient, namely, the steam reactivity above-mentioned changes to the core, this parameter was
coefficient is positive. This means that, when the volume as high as 3.3 at the Ignalina NPP.
of steam in the core increases, the neutron activity also
increases and, consequently, so does the amount of energy It is worth emphasizing that the steam reactivity
released. This is not the only type of reactor with this coefficient is not proportional to the change in reactivity
property - both sodium-cooled fast neutron reactors and that would occur if all of the cooling water suddenly
heavy-water cooled CANDU reactors have positive vaporized and only steam remained in the core. That
coolant vaporization coefficients. In this case, it is would be a very large change in coolant density. The
important to ensure that the other components of the steam reactivity coefficient is measured by introducing a
reactivity coefficient are sufficiently large so that the relatively small change in the amount of steam (by
positive reactivity introduced into the core in any possible Table 6.9 The state of the reactor at the Ignalina NPP
mode can never exceed 1βeff (i.e. the "effective" fraction of [55]
delayed neutrons, obtained by adding the 235U and 239Pu
Parameter Unit 1 Unit 2
fission). For the sake of clarity, the parameter βeff is
discussed first before discussing the current state of Measurement date 08.14.92 04.09.92
reactivity coefficients at the Ignalina NPP. Reactor power, MW(th) 4050 4050
Fuel burnup, MW days/kg 7.38 7.47
It is possible to categorize the neutrons released in the
Number of fuel assemblies 1606 1606
fission process into two groups:
Average power of one fuel assembly,
• prompt, i.e. those which appear during fission, MW days 819 829
• delayed, which appear from several seconds to several Operational reactivity reserves,
tens of seconds later. manual control rods 53.9 53.9
The number of neutrons in the second group is much Number of Supplementary
smaller, e.g. in the case of 235U fission they make up only Absorbers (SA's) 52 54
0.65 % of the total neutrons, in the case of 239Pu - only
Number of group SA's included in
0.21 %. With the reactor operating at a constant power,
above number 44 40
delayed neutrons in the fuel are such that βeff = 0.45 %
[3]. However, this small fraction of delayed neutrons is Flux tilt coefficients:
extremely important. Briefly stated, while the core KZ 1.25 1.25
reactivity is less than βeff, reactor power changes occur KR 1.31 1.39
slowly and they are easily controllable. When the Reactivity coefficients:
reactivity exceeds this value, the situation changes and the power αN, (10-4 β/MW) -1.9 -1.9
reactor becomes more difficult to control. Therefore, all steam (measured) αf, β 0.7 0.7
reactors used in power plants must be constructed so that steam (calculated) αf, β 1.02 1.07
their positive reactivity is compensated and never allowed core water vaporization αw, β 0.4 0.45
to exceed 1βeff.
Before the Chernobyl accident, the RBMK reactors did

not have this property. The destructiveness of the changing the feedwater temperature). The reactor power
Chernobyl accident is due in large part to the fact that the is held constant by the CPS, and the change in reactivity
unit 4 steam reactivity coefficient reached between 4β and is determined by noting the new CPS rod positions. If the
5β (where a positive void coefficient is determined as a feed water supply were to be cut off for some reason and
relation of measured reactivity with βeff value). Changes all of the water in the core were to vaporize, the coolant
introduced later (see Subsection 6.3.2.4) reduced the density would change from 0.6 g/cm3 to almost zero. It is
steam reactivity coefficient in the RBMK reactors. The impossible to measure this change directly. According to
values of this and other reactivity-related parameters are calculations, also presented in Table 6.9, the reactivity
shown in Table 6.9. would increase in that case by a factor αw = 0.4β. The
reliability of the calculation can be evaluated by
As shown in the Table, the reactor power coefficient in comparing the steam reactivity coefficient calculated by
both units at that time reached αN = -0.00019 β/MW. the same method. The calculated value of this coefficient
That means that if the core power increased for any is approximately αf = 1β, i.e. greater than the measured
reason (at a constant cooling water flow and temperature), value. Therefore, it may be assumed that the actual water
its reactivity would decrease. Therefore, further increases vaporization coefficient might be somewhat lower than
in power would be prevented or at least reduced. This the calculated value. Reactivity coefficients depend on the
relation between power and reactivity is a necessary state of the core. They are affected by control rod
condition for stable reactor operation. Table 6.9 also positions, number of supplementary absorbers and,
124
especially, by the degree of fuel burnup. As the fuel burns
up, its proportion of 235U decreases and its proportion of The results of the calculations show that when the fuel
plutonium isotopes, especially 239Pu, increases. This has a burnup reaches 10 MW days/kg and more, the steam
double effect on the steam reactivity coefficient. First, reactivity coefficient begins to increase sharply. This has
since the proportion of delayed neutrons in 239Pu fission is economic implications. It shows that, in order to limit the
smaller, as the proportion of this isotope in the fuel size of the positive steam reactivity coefficient, it is
increases, the value of βeff decreases, and the reactivity necessary to reduce the average fuel burnup. This is clearly
expressed in units of β increases. Secondly, 239Pu has a shown in the data presented in Tables 6.10 and 6.11.
low energy resonance in the absorption cross-section. This
cross-section is sufficiently low that, as the neutron These Tables summarize the history of steam reactivity
spectrum hardens (which occurs when the amount of coefficient measurements at both units of the Ignalina
moderating water decreases), the average 239Pu cross- NPP [57]. To show the state of the reactor, the Tables
section increases. This increases the absorption of show its power level (column 2) and average burnup of
neutrons by 239Pu and, therefore, the core reactivity. one fuel assembly (column 3).
3.2
235 As shown in Table 6.10, during the initial commissioning
Steam reactivity coefficient, %
Fuel enrichment in U
2.8 of the unit, when the fuel was completely fresh and there
2.00% were a large number of supplementary absorber rods in
2.4 2.40% the not-fully-loaded core, the steam coefficient was even
negative. As the core was fully loaded with fuel and the
2 degree of fuel burnup increased, the steam coefficient
became increasingly positive. After 1986, steps were
1.6 taken to reduce it. About 50 supplementary absorbers
were loaded into the core (meanwhile removing fuel
1.2
assemblies), and the average fuel burnup was reduced.
0.8 These steps allowed the positive steam coefficient to be
kept at the 1β level.
0 10 20 30
Rate of fuel burnup, MW days/kg
The presented data shows that the state of the reactivity
Fig. 6.10 Void reactivity coefficient versus fuel burnup coefficient (during the measurement period) meets the
safety criteria. If it is assumed that the calculations and
measurements correspond to reality, then it is very
Fig. 6.10 show the calculated steam coefficient as a unlikely that a positive reactivity greater than 1β could be
function of fuel burnup [56]. The conditions assumed in introduced into such a reactor. A accident similar to the
the calculations do not fully match the current fuel one that occurred at Chernobyl unit 4 is then excluded.
conditions at the Ignalina NPP, so the calculated value of
the steam coefficient cannot be used directly.
Table 6.10 Measurements of steam reactivity coefficient and means of reducing it at the Ignalina NPP unit 1 [57]
Average fuel Reactor loading, numbers of: Reactivity Steam
Date of Reactor burnup, reserves, reactivity
measurement power, MW MWdays/ Fuel assemblies Supplementary Water numbers of coefficient
(fuel assembly) absorbers columns MCR
84.03.20 1650 43 1436 214 11 42 -0.9
84.11.05 3420 - 1478 138 45 50 -0.26
85.03.22 4330 50 1545 101 15 46 0.4
85.04.18 2470 - 1551 80 29 75 -0.7
85.07.06 4600 720 1572 74 14 35 1.9
85.08.13 2460 - 1585 46 28 37.3 1.76
85.08.20 2450 - 1585 46 28 65.2 1.65
85.09.06 4500 - 1606 46 8 59.2 1.73
86.02.06 4500 1143 1659 1 1 37 3.3
86.08.01 4280 1162 1657 1 3 42 2.6
86.10.05 3120 1160 1658 1 2 51 2.1
87.04.09 4270 1124 1652 1 8 56 1.75
87.07.15 3350 1120 1652 1 8 53 1.7
87.12.24 3360 942 1595 53 13 47 0.5
88.02.13 3340 968 1605 53 3 45.2 0.9
88.08.09 3350 943 1606 53 2 50.6 0.8
125
89.01.06 3900 940 1606 53 2 54.5 1.0
90.09.05 4050 960 1605 53 3 54.2 1.0
90.11.24 4000 885 1607 52 2 56.2 0.8
91.07.19 3900 845 1604 52 5 53.7 0.7
92.08.14 4050 819 1606 52 3 53.9 0.7
96.03.20 4050 843 1607 53 1 55 0.92
97.02.07 3550 812 1471+140* 49 1 56.7 0.7
* Fuel assemblies with 2.4% enriched 235U with erbium
Table 6.11 Measurements of steam reactivity coefficient and means of reducing it at the Ignalina NPP unit 2 [57]
Average fuel Reactor loading, numbers of: Reactivity Steam
Date of Reactor burnup, reserves, reactivity
measurement power, MW MWdays/ Fuel assemblies Supplementary Water numbers of coefficient
(fuel assembly) absorbers columns MCR
87.10.03 2260 59,4 1434 216 11 44.6 -0.9
88.04.21 4300 522 1505 123 33 46.8 0.3
88.11.11 3950 760 1574 81 6 51.8 0.7
88.12.18 3960 828 1592 65 4 51.6 0.8
89.02.11 3900 850 1597 60 4 51.4 0.8
89.05.06 3900 875 1599 55 7 48.9 0.87
89.05.11 2300 879 1599 55 7 49.9 0.88
89.09.27 3900 877 1604 54 3 57.1 1.0
90.04.06 3900 900 1605 54 2 54.1 0.8
90.04.06 2200 900 1605 54 2 41.4 1.4*
91.02.09 3900 865 1605 54 2 54.1 1.0
91.11.29 4100 833 1605 54 2 53.7 0.8
92.04.09 4050 829 1606 54 1 53.9 0.7
96.06.25 3400 848 1411+195* 53 2 55 0.6
97.02.27 3800 966 1226+397* 33 5 53.9 0.75
* Fuel assemblies with 2.4% enriched 235U with erbium
Beginning in 1995, the replacement fuel assemblies 6.4.2 Measurement and Control of Reactor Power
being loaded into the Ignalina NPP had fuel pallets
with a different composition. The new fuel is 2.4% 6.4.2.1 Reactor Neutron Flux Measurement
enriched 235U (instead of 2.0% enr. fuel) and,
includes 0.4% by mass of the burnable absorber Reliable measurements of reactor neutron flux (power
Erbium (68Er). The use of the new fuel makes it density distribution) are essential to the effective and safe
possible to remove supplementary absorbers out of control of a large nuclear reactor. If the coolant flow
the core. This reduces parasitic neutron loss in the through the reactor channels were single-phase, power
core and makes it possible to increase the fuel production could be determined by conventional means
burnup, improving the economical parameters of the from the coolant flow and temperature differences.
reactor. Replacement of the 2.0% enriched fuel However, in a RBMK reactor, the fuel is cooled by boiling
with 2.4% enriched fuel with Erbium, decreases water, so another method is necessary. This method is
the steam reactivity coefficient, makes the power based on neutron flux or gamma radiation intensity
coefficient of reactivity more negative, increases measurements, which are used to calculate the power
the operational reactivity margin, and reduces the released in the fuel assemblies. The neutron flux or
flux tilt coefficient KR. Tables 6.10 and 6.11 gamma radiation are measured at discrete locations in
include information the number of fuel assemblies separate, pre-chosen reactor channels, and then are
of the new type that have been loaded into interpolated and extrapolated to the other channels.
both units up to 1997. Replacement fuel will
increasingly use the new type fuel. Eventually the The neutron flux and at the same time the reactor axial
core loading will consist of 2.4% enriched, Er spiked and radial power density field in the core are measured by
assemblies. two methods (Fig. 6.11). In the first method, the
126
1
-4
-5
-6
-7
-8
-9
Fig. 6.11 Neutron flux measurement location

1 - reactor core region, 2 - reflector region, 3 - radial biological shield, 4 - fission chamber, 5 - ionization chamber for reactor
startup, 6 - ionization chamber for normal reactor operation, 7 - chart recorder channel, 8 - LAC- zone, 9 - LEP-zone
neutron flux is measured by high precision detectors, cooling system - the CRCC. This system is described in
located outside the core, where the neutron flux is lower. more detail in Section 5.7.
In the second method, the neutron flux is measured by
non-inertial sensors, located right in the reactor core The fission chamber (type KNT-31-1) is inserted into the
[35,38]. radial reflector channel by a special suspension bracket,
shown in Fig. 6.12. The internals of the suspension
As mentioned, in the first method, the neutron flux is bracket consists of a support plate (2), tube and coupling
measured by high precision detectors, located outside the (3), external (5) and internal (6) bushings.
core, which uses:
Shell (4) is fixed to the upper part of a CPS channel by
• four fission chambers, two screws (not shown). Power regulator (1) is fixed to
• eight ionization chambers during reactor startup, the support plate (2). To reduce the effect of vibration, a
• sixteen ionization chambers during normal reactor rubber seal (12) is inserted between (4) and (2). The
operation. conductor (tube and coupling) (3) is connected by
couplings (7) and (13) to the fission chamber (8) and to
Ionization chambers are located in special peripheral the power regulator (1), and hermetic seals (10) and (11).
radial ionization chamber channels, and the fission External bushing (5), fastened the seal (11) make up the
chambers are located in reactor reflector channels. The magnetic screen of the fission chamber, and the internal
ionization chambers and the fission chambers are placed bushing (6) is the electrostatic screen for the fission
in the same channels as the control rods. These channels chamber. The space between the fission chamber (8) and
are described in Subsection 4.3.1. All these channels are the bushing (6), as well as between the two bushings (5)
cooled using a system separate from the fuel channel and (6) is filled with insulation layers of glass fiber. The
127
two bushings are filled with highly purified nitrogen (type Fig. 6.12 Cross-section of a suspension bracket of the
VTU35ChP-662-63) to prevent corrosion and to enhance fission chamber
insulation. The suspension bracket is suspended in such a 1 - power regulator, 2 - support plate, 3 - fission chamber
way that the fission chamber is properly oriented within conductor (tube and coupling), 4 - shell, 5 - external
the reactor core. Total length of the suspension bracket is bushing, 6 - internal bushing, 7 - conductor connection
12.94 m, its mass is 20 kg. Length of the shell (4) is 15.98 (coupling),8 - fission chamber (type KNT-31-1), 9 -
m, its mass is 76.32 kg. The shell is fabricated of stainless insulation, 10,11 - hermetic seals, 12 - seal, 13 - coupling
steel type 0Ch18N10T.
The ionization chamber (type KNK-53) for reactor startup protective plug (10) to the ionization chamber (7) for
is mounted on the suspension bracket and placed in a reactor startup. The ionization chamber is fastened to the
special channel within the radial biological shield. The box of contacts (1) via a beam of variable length and three
suspension bracket, Fig. 6.13 consists of shell (3), a pins (8). The top (4) and the bottom (6) parts of the rod
conductor contact support box (1) and a thick external are tied by the sleeve (5) on three screws. Its length can
protective plug (11). The box of contacts (1) is connected be adapted to the central position of the ionization
to the instrumentation system via three couplings (12). chamber (7) in the reactor core. Insulation layers (2) of
The threads of the conductors run across insulators (2) of the conductor fibers are fastened to the flanges of the
the contact box in longitudinal slots of the internal beam. The shell is filled with highly purified nitrogen up
to 0.02 MPa at 20 to 30 oC through a special tube (13),
which is sealed after the filling operation is over. The
suspension bracket casing is fastened in the CPS channel
by two screws insulated by sleeves from the flange of the
shell (3). The shell (3) is spaced from the internal wall of
the CPS channel by seven sets of guides (9) and the
insulation ring. Total length of the suspension bracket is
13.066 m, its mass 75.5 kg.
d
d
d
d 42
128
d
Fig. 6.13 Suspension bracket section of the ionization Fig. 6.14 Cross-section of the suspension bracket
chamber for reactor startup ionization chamber for normal reactor operation
1 - contact support box, 2 - insulation layers, 3 - shell, 1 - insulators, 2 - top protective plug, 3 - shell, 4 - top
4 - top rod, 5 - sleeve, 6 - bottom rod, 7 - ionization rod, 5 - bottom protective plug, 6 - bottom rod, 7 -
chamber, 8 -pin, 9 - guide, 10 - internal protective flange, 8 -top boundary of the reactor core, 9 -
plug, 11 - external protective plug, 12 - couplings, 13 ionization chamber No 1, 10 - inside of ionization
- nitrogen tube chamber, 11 - conductor, 12 - ionization chamber No 2,
13 - ionization chamber No 3, 14 - joint, 15 - guide, 16
- valve for nitrogen filling
The ionization chamber for normal reactor operation is As mentioned above, in the second method, the neutron
placed in the radial biological shield of the reactor. Three flux (reactor power) is measured by non-inertial sensors,
ionization chambers for normal reactor operation (type located right in the reactor core, Table 6.12. Their
KNK-53M) are held by suspension brackets, their purpose is to provide information about local core power.
construction being similar to those of the ionization For this purpose, the reactor core cross-section is divided
chamber for reactor startup, Fig. 6.14. The suspension into sectors, called Local Automatic Control (LAC) and
bracket of this ionization chamber is inserted into the CPS Local Emergency Protection (LEP) zones. The twelve
channels. LEP zones overlap and, unlike the LAC zones, fully cover
the entire reactor cross-section. The signals from the
The ionization and fission chambers are of different sensors in these zones are processed by the Power Density
sensitivities and measure neutron flux on either Distribution Monitoring System (PDDMS). This system
logarithmic or linear scales, Table 6.12 [35,37]. A generates the signals which are used by the CPS to control
logarithmic scale is used during reactor startup and the reactor power. Monitoring of neutron flux (reactor
shutdown, while a linear scale is used during normal power density distribution) is explained in Table 6.12
reactor operation. Twenty-four ionization chambers, [37,38].
located in eight radial ionization chamber channels, are
used not only for neutron flux measurement but also for 6.4.2.2 Power Density Distribution Monitoring System
direct reactor power regulation. Each radial ionization
chamber channel controls one corresponding control and Power release in the reactor core is measured and
protection system rod (shown in Fig. 6.11 by arrows). controlled by the PDDMS. This system collects data from
flux sensors, discretely distributed in the core, then
129
performs initial processing on the data and passes it to the • provides signals to the ICS for periodic computation
Information Computing System (ICS). The completely of the reactor power, reserve coefficients (margin to
processed information, showing the radial and axial allowed power limit) for each fuel channel, and other
power distribution and deviations from power setpoints, is general reactor parameters,
presented on an informational display (tableau) in the • generates a general reactor power signal, used in
MCR. Besides this fundamental function, the PDDMS various systems (chart recorders, CPS, etc.).
also:
The PDDMS consists of:
• records and displays information about flux going
above allowed limits, heat exchange crisis and fuel • radial and axial power density distribution sensors,
element overload, • electronic equipment,
• generates LAC signals for the CPS for local automatic • calibration sensors and electronic equipment for
control, testing the operating sensors,
• generates LEP signals when flux goes above set limits, • special mathematical software in the ICS, used to
and provides these signals to the CPS for local power process PDDMS data.
level protection of the reactor,
Table 6.12 Neutron flux measurement [37,38]

Instrument Purpose Measurement range Number of
channels
Fission chamber Provides data to CPS Logarithmic scale (10-12 to 10-7) Nnom 4
Ionization chamber for Provides data to CPS Logarithmic scale (10-10 to 10-4) Nnom 3
reactor startup Provides data to CPS Logarithmic scale (10-8 to 10-1) Nnom 4
Provides data to CPS Reactor startup period from 1 to 10 s 1
(10-3 to 1.2) Nnom
Total: 8
Ionization chamber for Provides data to CPS Reactor startup period from 1 to 10 s 3
normal operation (10-3 to 1.2) Nnom
Provides data to CPS Linear scale (10-8 to 1.2) Nnom 1
Control of corresponding CPS Linear scale (10-3 to 1.0) Nnom 8
Total: 12
Control of corresponding CPS Linear scale (10-3 to 1.0) Nnom 8
Total: 12
Chart recorders Provides data to MCR Linear scale (10-8 to 1.2) Nnom 4
Total radial ionization chamber channels: 24
Non-inertial sensors Provides data to PDDMS for control Linear scale (10-3 to 1.0) Nnom 12 LAC
connected to the PDDMS of corresponding LAC rods zones
Provides data to PDDMS for control Linear scale (10-3 to 1.0) Nnom 12 LEP
of corresponding LEP rods zones
Table 6.13 Reactor power density distribution monitoring system sensors
Purpose of detectors Location Type Specific features Number of Sensor

channels characteristics
Mapping of axial flux Evenly distributed in
distribution (by reactor height) CPS channels PDMS-A the core 12 Non-inertial
At the periphery of the 8 Non-inertial
core
Total PDMS-A: 20
PDMS-R1 Connected to LEP 55 Non-inertial (hafnium

system oxide emitter)
Mapping of radial flux Fuel channels PDMS-R1 Connected to LAC 72 Non-inertial (hafnium
distribution and LEP systems oxide emitter)
PDMS-R2 Monitoring of power 125 Inertial (silver
130
density distribution emitter)
Total PDDMS: 252
Radial power density field sensors are located right in the Fig. 6.15 Sensor for the radial power density monitoring
fuel assemblies, Table 6.13. The reactor structure allows (PDMS-R)
for about 500 fuel assemblies with hollow central carrier 1 - sensitive element, 2 - biological shielding, 3 - sealed cable
rods. Of these, 252 are used for radial power distribution connector, 4 - cable
sensors, and not less than 250 are free to be used for PDDMS equipment by a cable (4). To protect the
periodic calibration of the sensor sensitivities. cladding of the sensitive element from corrosion, the
sensor body is filled with inert gas (argon). The sensitive
The radial power density distribution instrumentation element is an emission sensor manufactured from 3 mm
consists of 127 non-inertial sensors with hafnium oxide diameter temperature resistant cable encased in a stainless
emitters PDMS-R1 and 125 inertial sensors with silver steel cladding further covered with magnesium oxide. The
emitters PDMS-R2. central conductor of the cable is made either from
hafnium oxide PDMS-R1 or silver PDMS-R2.
Radial flux distribution sensors belong either to the LAC
or to the LEP systems and are divided: The flux distribution along the height of the core is
measured by 20 in-core power density sensors of axial
• connected to the LEP system non-inertial sensors
monitoring (PDMS-A). These are located in separate CPS
(with hafnium oxide emitter) are the in-core Power
channels. Twelve PDMS-A sensors are evenly distributed
Density Monitoring Sensors Radial (PDMS-R1),
within the reactor core, while eight are located at the
• connected to the LEP and LAC systems and directly
periphery of the core, in the first cells of the radial
controlling corresponding LAC zone rods, non-
reflector.
inertial sensors (with hafnium oxide emitter) -
PDMS-R1.
The PDMS-A consists of a special suspension bracket, in
The inertial Power Density Monitoring Sensors Radial the shell of which are inserted four two-stage chambers of
with silver emitter (PDMS-R2) are uniformly distributed type KT-21. A suspension bracket, Fig. 6.16, consists of
in the reactor core and used for monitoring of reactor the following parts: flange (1) sealed by screws (2) on the
power density distribution. Table 6.13 gives the top of the CPS channel, cassette (4) with a protection
characteristic information about the radial flux sleeve (3), displacer (5) and guide (6). Fig. 6.16 illustrates
distribution sensors. the structure of the suspension bracket, without showing
the chambers. Cover (12) is fastened to flange (1) and has
A radial power density monitoring sensor, Fig 6.15, four couplings (13) for the contacts of the conductors from
consists of a sensitive element (1) in a sealed stainless the chambers. Cassette (4) is a tube with sleeve (3) and a
steel body, sealed cable connectors (3), and biological flange (9) at the end. In the cassette eight tubes (10) are
shielding elements (2). The sensor is connected to the welded, each cassette is 11mm in diameter of 1 mm thick
walls with 120 holes of 20 mm diameter at 100 mm
spacings for cooling water to enter from the control rod
1 70
cooling system. Six more holes of 15 mm diameters are
made at the bottom near the flange (9). They also let the
3 cooling water in and reduce side absorption of the
2
construction materials of the cassette. Each of displacers
(5) contain eight 9 mm diameter tubes (7) of 0.3 mm
d 14
thick walls. Cooling water comes in through six radial 15
4 mm diameter holes near the flange (8) and is released
d 6
through eight 6 mm diameter holes in the bottom of the
displacer. Four tubes of the cassette contain type KT-21
sensors (gamma-chambers), the other four are used in
experiments. A special indicator is placed in the central
d 16 tube (11) during check-over operations. It indicates the
level of radioactivity of the cassette walls and its readings
are introduced as corrections in the error rate estimations.
Total length of the suspension bracket is 18.192 m, its
1
volume is 60 kg, it is made of stainless steel type
12Ch18N10T.
The structure of a three-axial bi-sectional gamma chamber

(type KT-21) is shown in Fig. 6.17. The body of the
chamber is made from 0.3 mm thick corrosion resistant
d 6
steel, and filled with argon. The body (2) is welded to the
131
cable conduits (3). Inside, there are two 100 mm long
electrodes (1), 875 mm apart from each other. Each
electrode is connected to one conductor of four bi-
sectional, practically non-inertial, gamma chambers at d 14
separate heights, allows measurement of the tri-axial
cable, and has an electrically independent cable conduit d6
(4) to the measurement equipment. The use flux
distribution at eight points along the height of the reactor. 3 4
d6
d7 d 20
2
L,mm
1 10522
2 12272
3 14022
4 15772
Fig. 6.17 Tri-axial bi-sectional chamber used in the

PDMS-A detector
1 - electrodes, 2 - body, 3 - cable conduit, 4 - conduit
Fig. 6.16 The suspension bracket for in-core power

-1
density sensor of axial monitoring (PDMS-A) -2
1 - fastening flange, 2 - fastening screw, 3 - protection -3
sleeve, 4 - cassette, 5 - displacer, 6 - guide, 7 - displacer -4
tube, 8 - displacer flange, 9 - cassette flange ,10 - cassette
-5
tube, 11 -central tube, 12 - cover, 13 - sleeve for conductor
contacts -6
Fig. 6.18 Reactor power density distribution

monitoring system sensor distribution in the reactor
cross-section
1 - PDMS-A, 2 - PDMS-R1 connected to LEP system, 3 -
PDMS-R1 connected to LAC and LEP system, 4 - PDMS-
R2, 5 - LAC zone, 6 - LEP zone
Fig. 6.18 shows the distribution of PDMS-R1, PDMS-R2

and PDMS-A sensors and of LAC and LEP zones in a
cross-section of the reactor core. The PDDMS, analyzing
132
the sensor signals, sends information to the IC, as well as neutron flux and to shut down the reactor in an
to the MCR. This system also analyzes the sensor data by emergency. Ionization chambers in 8 of the 24 radial
LAC and LEP zones, and sends signals to the CPS. This ionization chamber channels are connected for direct
data is used for neutron flux correction in the respective control of the neutron flux. Each radial ionization
zone. If two or more PDMS-R1 sensors in a single LEP chamber channel operates one corresponding automatic
zone indicate a reading above a prescribed limit, this control rod (shown by arrows in Fig. 6.19 [2,37]).
system then sends a signal to the CPS for shutting down
the chain reaction in the given LEP zone. If such In the second method, the neutron flux is controlled
shutdown signals are present simultaneously in three or according to the signals from the PDDMS. The reactor
more LEP zones, then the PDDMS and CPS work core is divided into twelve LAC and LEP zones. The LEP
together to execute an immediate reactor shut down. zones completely cover the entire core. The LAC and LEP
absorber rods in these zones are controlled based on the
The PDDMS is very important to the control of the corresponding PDDMS detector signals. Also, the
reactor. If both sensor systems for either of the automatic control of flux in the above-mentioned 12 zones
combinations, PDMS-R1 and PDMS-R2, or PDMS-R1 can be supplemented by manual control. Manual control is
and PDMS-A, fail completely, the reactor shut down performed based on parameters computed from the
manually. If any one of the PDMS-R1, PDMS-R2 or detector readings, which are shown on the MCR displays
PDMS-A systems fail, and the failure cannot be corrected (e.g. core power distribution).
within two hours, the reactor must also be shut down.
6.4.3.2 Control Rods
6.4.3 Control and Protection System
Control rods - neutron moderators are inserted in special
The power of the nuclear reactor is regulated by inserting
channels of the CPS, which is independent of the fuel
special rods of a neutron-absorbing material into the core.
channel system. This is done to maintain the CPS in
operation in case of emergency, when the fuel channel
The RBMK-1500 reactor power and the relative power
fails.
density at the periphery of the core are controlled by the
CPS. An especially important function of this system is
the shutdown of the reactor in the case of an accident.
This system also allows manual adjustment of the power
distribution in the core, to compensate for fuel burnup,
poisoning and temperature effects. The CPS automatically
maintains reactor power to within 1 % of the setpoint.
The CPS comprises:
-1
• neutron flux measurement instrumentation, -2
-3
• special equipment for information processing and -4
system control,
• implementation mechanisms and absorber rods, -5
• control panels. -6
-7
The CPS includes two subsystems: -8
-9
• Local Automatic Control (LAC), - 10
- 11
• Local Emergency Protection (LEP). - 12
- 13
Both of these subsystems use signals from the Power
Density Distribution Monitoring System (PDDMS). The
LAC system automatically stabilizes the neutron flux
distribution in the core. The LEP system ensures reactor
emergency protection from exceeding allowed fuel
assembly power in separate sectors of the core, and backs
up the LAC system in case of failure.
Fig. 6.19 Arrangement of control and protection
6.4.3.1 Neutron Flux Control system absorber rods in the core
1- fission chamber (4 per reactor), 2 - ionization chamber
The neutron flux is controlled by two separate methods for reactor startup (8 per reactor), 3 - ionization chamber
(Fig 6.19). In the first method, discussed in earlier for normal reactor operation (12 per reactor), 4 - chart
sections, the neutron flux is measured by fission chambers recorder (4 per reactor), 5 - LAC zone (12 per reactor), 6
and ionization chamber for reactor startup and normal - LEP zone (12 per reactor), 7, 8, 9, 10 - Manual Control
reactor operation. These chambers are used to register Rods, 11, 12 - Shortened Absorber Rods, 13 - Fast-
133
Acting Scram Rods constitute a joint of an original construction. The bottom
telescopic joint (7) ends with a clamp for the topmost
water-displacer chain (8), these are graphite-loaded
Control rods are placed in an autonomous cooling loop chains, connected by clamps, similar to the graphite-
with its own pumps and heat carrier (more detail about absorber chains. The bottom of the water displacer chain
this circuit were described in Section 5). Both external is equipped with an end-piece, which rests on bottom of
and internal shell of the control rods are wetted by the channel in the active zone.
downward water flow, which is heated to 40 or 90 oC. As
the reactor is in operation, the interior space of the In 1997 control rods of the 1st type were re-designed.
channel is filled with water irrespection of the positions of The new control rod type has a special absorber "skirt"
the rods. An extraction of a moderator rod from the active at the bottom of absorbing section of the rod, which
zone would mean its replacement by water, which is an covers the telescopic joint between absorber and
active neutron absorber. To avoid this, most of the control graphite displacer. When such a control rod is
rods are equipped with both an absorber of boron carbide inserted into the core, the telescopic joint slides into
portion and graphite portion which substitutes that water. the inner part of the absorber, and the "skirt", moving
A considerable improvement of graphite balance is downwards, partly covers graphite displacer. This
achieved. makes it possible to eliminate the water column in the
bottom part of CPS channel. The "skirt" consist of
The RBMK-1500 reactor contains control rods of three 14 segments, that are joined so that they form a
types. The parameters of the three types are presented in cylindrical surface around the telescopic joint of the
Table 6.14 for their design shown in Fig. 6.20. The control rod. The absorber material used in the
constituent parts of Type 1 (MCR) shown in the segments of the "skirt" is Dy2TiO5, and is located
inserted position one short and six normal: fastening inside the stainless steel tubes. Material for the
unit (5), absorber (6), telescope joint (7) and graphite (8). telescopic joint itself is aluminum alloy.
Fig. 6.20 Control rod design

a - withdrawn position, b - inserted position,
1 - suspension steel tape, 2 - fastening unit, 3 - absorber,
4 - telescopic joint (pull), 5 - graphite
Fastening unit (5) secures the rod to the damper, absorber

chains (6) contain neutron absorbing boron carbide B4C,
1650 kg/m3 density, inserted in annular channels of a
special alloy type SAVTI. At the top end the tube is sealed
and its bottom end is equipped with a clamp for the
subsequent chain. The bottom chain ends with a joining
device where the top of the telescopic joint (7) moves
freely, so that the rod-channel lengths can be adapted to
the CPS channel's length. The top of the telescopic joint
(7) and the bottom end of the lower most absorbing chain
134
Table 6.14 Structural types of control rods [62] and to drag of the gas, the rod can be rapidly inserted into
the active zone. The gas pipe facilitates equal pressure of
Geometrical the gas at the top and the bottom ends of the rod.
parameters
Type of control Neutron Graphite A radial bearing in the clamp permits the rod to rotate
rod absorber portion Distance Number freely in its channel and prevents any twisting of the
portion length, of travel, of suspending steel tape. A damping support on the bottom
length, mm mm rods of the channel saves the rod from failure in case it drops.
mm
Type 1, Manual 6772 4560 6550 147 Rapid insertion of a FAS rod is facilitated by the absence
Control Rods of water in the channel. In normal reactor operation the
(MCR) rods are in the withdrawn top position and the channels
Type 2, 4088 6700 3680 40 are cooled by water-film flows from the sprayers.
Shortened
Absorber Rods Each of the absorbing and displacing chains in arbitrary
(SAR) rods are equipped with four protrusions to maintain
central positioning of the rod in the channel. An annulus
Type 3, 7200 - 7000 24 of about 2 mm is formed between the rod and the channel
Fast-Acting wall to provide free motion of the rod.
Scram Rods
(FASR) Control rods of Type 1 (MCR) and Type 2 (SAR) are
Re-designed 6772 7034 6590 - suspended on steel tapes via dampers, which absorb their
MCR lifting and bottoming shocks and protect from twisting.
Servo drives of the rods were discussed in Section 4.
Total: 211
6.5 EMERGENCY PROCESS PROTECTION
Rods of Type 1 (MCR) control the radial field of energy
SYSTEM
emission. Rods of Type 2 (SAR) are similar in
construction to rods of Type 1, but they are inserted The process parameters are not processed by the CPS,
upwards into the active zone, and control the depth wise but by the Emergency Process Protection System
variations of energy emission. As observed from upside (EPPS). The EPPS is a system of safety functions
down, each rod consist of one fastening unit, six water using process parameters to trip the reactor or reduce
displacer chains and four neutron absorber chains. The reactor power if abnormal process conditions in the
design of their constituent elements and joints is the same reactor core protection, the main coolant system, the
as in Type 1, but the telescopic joints are replaced by rigid separator drum, the turbine generator, reinforced
joints. leaktight compartments and electric power supply.
This system generates signals that are issued to the
Rods of Type 3 (FASR) contain no water displacer chains. CPS in order to actuate the reactor protection features
They are intended to rapidly cease the nuclear reaction. based on process parameters. Besides generating
Each of the rods is inserted in a channel which is cooled integrated signals for CPS, EPPS generates signals for
internally by a downward flow of nitrogen gas, and actuating safety systems (ECCS, ACS, diesel-
externally by a gravity film flow of water. The housing generators, etc.) and process safety-related systems of
tubes of their absorber lengths are 74 mm in diameter, normal operation (components of the CPS cooling
compared to 70 mm in rods of Type 1 and Type 2. circuit, gas circuit, etc.). The same system is also
Separate chains in Type 3 rods are fixed in an original involved in the control of process in the nuclear power
manner, to allow internal cooling by water. Next to the plant. The EPPS:
absence of water-displacing chains, the most important
• monitors the process parameters and the current
feature of Type 3 rods is the internal tube for the gas
state of the process equipment,
cooler flow, which is closed by a biological cover at the
• retrieves required data from the CPS and from the
top.
power density monitoring system,
Each rod of type 3 consists of seven hinged chains of • detects departures of the monitored parameters
boron carbonate, their tops clamped to the lifting device. beyond their setpoint,
A sprayer at the lower ends creates a film flow of water • receives signals from the manual control switches
over the CPS channel walls. The top clamp is used and buttons,
simultaneously with the biological cover. It is a cylinder of • generates signals according to the prescribed logic
a specific alloy type SAV and has 55 mm diameter and is and issues them to the lower-level control systems,
700 mm long. The gas tube which is introduced into the • continuously monitors its own performance for
sprayer at the bottom end. Since there is no hydraulic the internal failures as well as allows periodic manual
rod is fastened to the clamp at the top end tests under operating or shut-down conditions to
detect latent failures,
135
• transfer analogue and digital data on the process ∗ decrease of water flow to the CPS distribution
parameters and its own performance to the header to 0.25 m3/s (920 m3/h),
indicating and recording devices. ∗ excess pressure decrease in the CPS distribution
The EPPS consists of the following 13 separate header to 0.15 MPa (1.5 kgf/cm2).
subsystems: 10) Emergency protection against low levels in ECCS
1) Emergency protection against fuel channel breaks: accumulators: An AZ-1 signal is generated in
A FASS signal is generated in response to an response to a level drop in the accumulators
increase in excess pressure in the reactor cavity to down to 4550 mm as indicated by the standard
∼7.5 kPa (750 kgf/m2). level gauges.
2) Emergency protection against pressure rise in ACS 11) Emergency closing of throttling regulating valves
compartments: A FASS signal is generated due to of MCP: An AZ-4 signal is generated when
a excess pressure rise in the ACS compartments to valves close.
∼2 kPa (200 kgf/m2 ). 12) Protection on temperature rise at condensation
3) Emergency protection against out-of-range pressure trays of the ACS: Pumps and heat exchangers are
in drum separators: An AZ-1 signal is generated in activated if temperature in pools 1 to 4 rises to
response to a excess pressure rise in separator 35 oC, or if temperature of pool 5 rises to 50 oC.
drum of either loop to 7.26 MPa (74 kgf/cm2). 13) FASS on pressure rise in the MCC compartments:
A FASS signal is generated in response to
4) Emergency protection against out-of range levels in
pressure in the ACS compartments to ∼2 kPa
separators drum: An AZ-1 signal is generated in
(200 kgf/m2 . This latter subsystem has been
response to level gauge readings at the scale from
added to provide a redundant scram signal for
-1200 mm to +400 mm given below:
loss of coolant accidents.
∗ level -500 mm when reactor operates at powers
below 60 percents of nominal power, The EPPS includes appropriate process parameters
∗ level -1000 mm at any reactor power, sensors, three sets of data processing equipment for
∗ level +250 mm at any reactor power. subsystem 1 through 12, three sets of data processing
5) Emergency protection against low flow in the MCC equipment for subsystem 13, and the appropriate
and MCP trip: An AZ-1 signal is generated due a connecting cables. Initiating of reactor protection and
multiple MCP trip in either loop, or due to a flow safety related systems is carried out through voting
decrease in either loop to 1.39 m3/s (5000 m3/h) in logic upon redundant parameter measurements. Every
two out of three operating MCPs, or one of two time a protection is actuated or disabled a light-sound
operating MCPs. signal appears on a special panel in the main control
6) Emergency protection against low feedwater flow: room. The signals are recorded in the TITAN
An AZ-1 signal is generated if feedwater flow to monitoring system. Special engineered means prevent
either loop reduces to 50 percent of the current unauthorized access to the actuation/disabling means
value, which corresponds to the current reactor for protection and interlocks.
power in range of 60 to 100 percent of the nominal
power. 6.6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM
7) Emergency protection on load rejection and trip of
turbine generators: An AZ-1 signal is generated in 6.6.1 Purpose of the ECCS
response to trip of both turbine generators, or the
single operating turbine generator (i.e., closing of Even after the nuclear chain reaction has been stopped by
the stop valves or the main steam gate valve and of emergency protection AZ-1, heat continues to be released
their bypasses) and load shedding by both turbine within the reactor. This is due to three causes:
generators or by single operating turbine generator
(i.e., drop of excess pressure downstream of • the nuclear fission rate is decaying exponentially, but
the turbine stop-control valve below 1.27 MPa for a brief time it is still contributing energy,
(13.0 kgf/cm2)). • radioactive decay of fission products,
8) Emergency protection against the loss of AC power • release of heat which has accumulated in the fuel
supply: An AZ-1 signal is generated if power assemblies, graphite stack and reactor metal
supply is lost. structures.
9) Emergency protection against voiding of CPS
Calculations show that the heat accumulated in the fuel
channels: An AZ-1 signal is generated in response
assemblies is removed by the coolant in the first 100-120
to:
seconds, but the graphite stack cools down to the coolant
∗ water level in the CPS circuit head tanks temperature only in 5-7 hours. In the first few hours,
dropping down to 5.15 m, as indicated in the twice as much heat is released from the graphite stack, as
main control room, (i.e., 5.8 m above the would be released due to radioactive decay. Table 6.15
bottom of the tanks), shows the thermal power of an RBMK-1500 reactor as a
136
function of time during emergency protection AZ-1 (from within the primary system. Table 6.16 shows an estimate
the moment the control rods enter the core) [38]. of the time dependent ECCS flow rate in the first hour of
Table 6.15 Thermal power of an RBMK-1500 reactor the maximum design basis accident (a guillotine break in
as a function of time, during emergency protection AZ-1 a pressure header of MCP) [38].
Time Ntherm/Nnom, % Table 6.16 Estimate of ECCS flow rate during a
0 100 DB-LOCA
5s 98
10 s 86 Time, s ECCS water flow, kg/s
20 s 55.6
30 s 35.8 0 1700
1 min 15.0 5 1630
2 min 8.1 10 1520
3 min 7.0 20 1100
5 min 6.5 30 710
10 min 5.5 40 500
30 min 4.54 60 370
1h 3.35 80 280
5h 0.82 100 230
10 h 0.59 120 220
24 h 0.44 3600 208
6.6.2 System Description
In case of an emergency (e.g. break in a primary circuit The Emergency Core Cooling System can be divided
pipe or a failure of some control system elements) cooling into two subsystems: a system which provides
of the reactor core is maintained by the ECCS. This emergency coolant water immediately after a break
system is designed to respond before the fuel elements occurs (the short-term system) which is served
overheat as a consequence of the accident. In case of a primarily by accumulators having a limited capacity
break in a large diameter pipe, there is the possibility that and a long-term systems served by pumps which can
the coolant water in the channels above the break reverses draw from large water reservoirs. A schematic of the
direction and flows from the separator drum downward entire system is presented in Fig. 6.21.
through the core and out through the break. For most
break location the presence of check valves and the The short term ECCS cooling system consists of
volume of the ECCS prevent this from happening. 3 independent trains each of which is capable of
However, for breaks in several locations, e.g. for a supplying ~50% of the required cooling capacity. Two
guillotine break of a GDH or for breaks of the pipes of these ECCS trains obtain cooling water from
leading from the GDH to the fuel channels, reverse flow accumulators pressurized with compressed gas (22)
will persist. Analysis has shown that the reverse flow of and the third draws water from the main feed water
even a high quality steam-liquid mixture can keep the pump (4). The Main Feed Water Pump (MFWP) is
channels from overheating. supplied with water from the deaerator tanks (2). The
short- term ECCS delivers water only to the damaged
The initial ECCS flow rate depends on the up-stream coolant loop. Once the signal for activation of ECCS
accumulator pressure and the pressure decrease rate is
137
1
4 2
5 6
7 8
9 10
13
11 12 15 16 17 18 19
14
21 22
20
23 1
27 28 29
24 25 20 26
Fig. 6.21 Emergency core cooling system (only one loop of MCC is present)
1 - makeup from demineralized water reservoir, 2 - deaerators, 3 - auxiliary feed water pumps, 4 - main feed water
pumps, 5 - mixer for the feed water and the return water from the PCS, 6 - separator drum, 7 - main feeder and
auxiliary feeder, 8 - reactor, 9 - suction header, 10 - MCP, 11 - fast acting opening valves on pipelines from auxiliary
feed water pumps to ECCS header, 12 - fast acting opening valves on pipelines from main feed water pumps to ECCS
header, 13 - ball type flow-rate meter, 14 - isolation and control valve, 15 -GDH, 16 - mixer for the main coolant and
the ECCS water, 17 - check valve, 18 - pressure header 19 - throttling type flow-rate meter, 20 - ECCS headers, 21 -
flow limiters, 22 - ECCS accumulators, 23 - hot condensate chambers of ACS towers, 24 - ECCS pumps, 25 - fast
acting opening valves on pipelines from ECCS pumps to ECCS header, 26 - fast acting opening valves in pipelines
from ECCS accumulators to ECCS header, 27 - ECCS bypass line, 28 - throttle bypass, 29 - fast acting closing valves
in pipelines from ECCS accumulators
received, and the loop where the break has occurred is (29) close so that the accumulator gases do not enter
identified, the fast acting valves (26) from the primary system.
accumulators and the fast acting valves (12) from
main feed water pumps to the ECCS headers of this The long term ECCS also consists of three
loop open. In order to maintain the required amount of independent 50% capacity trains. Two of these trains
the ECCS water in the feed line from the ECCS obtain water from the hot condensate chamber (23)
accumulators, there are the intermediate throttling (they are served by six ECCS pumps (24), with a
stage (28). As the water level in the accumulator tanks capacity of 70 kg/s each) while the third one uses the
drops below a specified set-point, fast acting valves Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps (AFWPs) (3) (total of 6)
to draw water from the deaerator (2). The ECCS
138
cooling is directed into 3 independent headers The main characteristics of the pumps serving the
(20) on each side of the reactor. Each header is system are shown in Table 6.17. The column label
connected to a pipe with a check valve. As shown in ’Number per reactor’ lists the pumps available for
Fig. 6.21 beyond the check valves the individual standard operation and pumps provided for back-up.
ECCS pipes join together and are connected to a GDH
mixer (16) which uses a flow limiter (21). This limiter The deaerator tanks and the hot condensate chambers
reduces the amount of water which could be by-passed are supplied by the auxiliary deaerator makeup system.
in the event that the header itself is ruptured. The long This system consists of a 1500 m3 capacity
term ECCS supplies water to both circulation loops demineralized water tank and the deaerator auxiliary
after the valves (11, 25) open. The water supply in the makeup pumps which supply water to the deaerators
deaerators can be supplemented by the auxiliary make- or
up water system (1).
Table 6.17 Characteristics of the ECCS and auxiliary deaerator makeup system pumps
Pumps Number Main characteristics Remarks

per reactor
Main feed water pumps (PEA1650-80) 6+1 Capacity of single pump 1650 m3/h Can not be operated
Head 8.9 MPa by diesel generators
Auxiliary feed water pumps (PEA250-80) 5+1 Capacity of single pump 250 m3/h Can be operated
Head 8.6 MPa by diesel gen.
ECCS pumps (PEA250-75) 5+1 Capacity of single pump 250 m3/h Can be operated
Head 8.1 MPa by diesel gen.
Pumps of deaerator auxiliary makeup Can be operated
system (to supply water from 3+1 Capacity of single pump 500 m3/h by diesel gen.
demineralized water tank) Head 2.2 MPa
Pumps to supply water from special Can be operated

cleaned condensate and primary grade 2+1 Capacity of single pump 500 m3/h by diesel gen.
water tanks to demineralized water tank
Table 6.18 Water reservoir capacities for the ECCS
Amount Number Main parameters Remarks

per reactor
Water reservoir (accumulators) 16 Total volume of the water 212 m3 Usable amount
Total volume of gasses 202 m3 of water - 177 m3
Gas pressure 9.1 MPa
Water temperature 10-30 oC
Deaerators 4 Total volume of the water 480 m3
Water pressure 0.95-1.27
MPa
Hot condensate chambers 2 Total volume of the water 1000 m3
Pressure
atmospheric
Demineralized water tank 1 Total volume of the tank 1500 m 3 Must be maintained
at 1000 m3
Treated condensate and primary grade 3* Total volume of each tank 5000 m3 All three tanks must
water tanks hold at least 5000 m3
* These tanks are common to the two units of the Ignalina plant
to the hot condensate chambers. The pumps are started primary grade water. This water supply allows the
automatically when low liquid level trips a set-point. If system to operate over the long term cool down period.
the water level in the demineralized water tanks The various reservoirs which are available for the
decreases, according to operating procedure operators ECCS are listed in Table 6.18.
should manually start the stand-by pumps which can
draw on three tanks storing cleaned condensate and
139
The emergency power supply for the Ignalina NPP is The signal for the initiation of the ECCS requires the
provided by 6 diesel generators per unit. In the event coincidence of 1) a pressure increase in compartments
of a loss of off-site power they are started up and can surrounding the main circulation piping and 2) either or
supply emergency loads in about 35 seconds. The both of the following:
diesel generators provide power supply for AFWPs,
ECCPs, CPS pumps, but MFWPs and MCPs are • low level in separator drums,
tripped in the case of loss of alternating current power. • low pressure difference between MCP pressure header
an separator drums.
6.6.3 Operation of the ECCS
Either of the latter two signals indicates which half of the
The ECCS is designed to provide cooling during the circuit is damaged. The ECCS initiation signal triggers
following types of accidents: the opening of fast acting valves in pipelines from the
accumulators and from the MFWPs (short-term system).
• rupture of downcomers or pipes connecting the
Cooling water is thereby delivered to the damaged half of
separator drums in the liquid phase region,
the reactor. Flow rate is controlled by valves in the
• rupture of GDH, MCP piping or MCP header,
throttling bypass lines.
• rupture of piping in blowdown and cooling system,
• rupture of steam line upstream of main steam isolation
During the first minutes, when the short-term ECCS is in
valves,
operation, diesel generators are started, AFWPs and
• failure of main safety valves to re-close after opening, ECCS pumps are started, and valves are opened, which
• loss of feed water supply to separator drums. enables the long-term ECCS to supply water to both
halves of the reactor GDHs. In case of feed water flow
disturbance due to failure of MFWS pumps, indicated by
low pressure in the MFWS pressure header or low feed
water flow rate, the AFWPs and ECCS pumps start and
valves are opened to direct water to the GDH’s on both
halves of MCC.
Fig. 6.22 presents a block diagram summarizing the

conditions which lead to ECCS activation.
∆P across MCP
P ≥2 kPa in MCC P ≥2 kPa in feed pressure header and
Separator drum level
compartments water units ≤-1000 mm
separator drum
compartments ≤600 kPa
OR OR
AND
Actuation of ECCS Actuation of MFWPs Actuation of AFWPs Actuation of ECCS

accumulators to to supply water to to supply water to pumps to supply
GDH of accidental GDH of accidental GDH of both sides water to GDH of
side side both sides
AND
Feed water flow Pressure in Pressure in

All MFWPs ≤50% of required MFWPs pressure AFWPs pressure
trip flow header ≤7 MPa header ≤7 MPa
Fig. 6.22 ECCS actuation logic
140
7. AUXILIARY SYSTEMS
This Section describes the numerous cooling circuits - water required for up of equipment.
of the plant. This includes circuits using purified and The system for recovery and purification of DW
demineralized water employed for cooling safety includes three subsystems (Fig. 7.1):
related equipment around the core block, circuits for
cooling pumps, diesel generators and the service water • pumping station of the contaminated DW,
circuit which uses lake water. Gas mixtures are also • DW purification facility,
employed for cooling purposes in special locations. • pump station of purified DW.
This is described in the Subsection outlining the
Reactor Gas Circuit. 7.1.1 Pumping Station of the Contaminated DW
7.1 RECOVERY AND PURIFICATION OF The pumping station of contaminated DW consists of

DEMINERALIZED WATER a receiving tank for contaminated DW (1- see Fig.
7.1), three pumps (2) for supplying water to the DW
The water from the MCC, which contains a small purification facility and two pumps (3) which
amount at radioactive materials is referred to as periodically mix the water in the tank to prevent build-
demineralized water. A system is provided for the up of sediment. The tank has a volume of 1500 m3 and
collection and purification of this Demineralized is combined located at a 12 m distance from the
Water (DW). The purpose of the system is to collect building B1 (B2) (see Section 1). The tank is made of
contaminated water, to purify it and to supply purified reinforced concrete and is clad inside with stainless
water where it is needed. During normal operation at steel sheets of thickness from 3 to 5 mm. Sensors are
any reactor power level and during planned preventive available for monitoring the temperature and liquid
maintenance the DW collection and purification level in the tank. Design specifications for the tank are
system performs the following functions: presented in Table 7.1.
• Collects and purifies DW from the following
sources: The pumps (2, 3) are located in building B1 (B2).
Design specifications for the pumps are provided in
- contaminated water from the tank of condensate the Table 7.2. Process piping, connecting the tanks
of the turbine generators, with the pumping stations, are designed as leak
- water from leaks and contaminated water from protected of “tube-in-tube” type, and they are placed in
the fuel storage tanks and the control rod cooling the shielded channels. The tank and the shielded
circuit, channels are provided with a remote leak monitoring
- water from backflushing of ion exchange filters system.
of the DW purification facilities,
- contaminated water from the hot condensate
chambers of the ACS,
- water resulting from hydraulic testing (after Pump station of 11 Pump station of
repair and hydraulic testing of low pressure contaminated DW purified DW
condensers) and water resulting from the flushing
DW
of turbine generator equipment, purification 10
- excess water from the primary circuit during facility
2 6
reactor heating up. 3
4
1 5
• The system supplies purified water to the following 9
7
equipment:
- low pressure turbine condensers and to the seals 8
of the purification and cooling system pumps
(during their operation),
- refueling machine, Fig. 7.1 Schematic representation of system for the
-control rod cooling circuit during planned recovery and purification of demineralized water
preventive maintenance, 1 - receiving tank for the contaminated DW, 2 -
- fuel storage tanks and hot condensate chambers pumps for supplying DW to the purification facility, 3
of the ACS, - mixing pumps, 4 - DW purification facility, 5 - tank
- water required for backflushing of ion exchange to collect purified DW, 6 - auxiliary deaerator makeup
filters and for other needs of the DW purification pumps, 7 - pumps to supply water for internal needs
facilities, of DW purification facility, 8 - feed-water pumps, 9 -
138
fuel storage pool, ACS, turbine generators and other Table 7.4 Specifications of tank of purified DW
systems, 10 - deaerators, 11 - tanks of primary grade
water Number per reactor 1
Table 7.1 Specification of reception tank for Diameter, m 18.5
contaminated DW Height, m 7
Working volume, m3 1500
The pumps are provided with two independent power
Diameter, m 18.5 sources and switchover between them is provided
Height, m 7 automatically.
3
Capacity, m 1500
7.1.2 The DW Purification Facility
Table 7.2 Specification of pumps The DW purification facility (4) consists of three
perlite filters to eliminate insoluble substances and
Pump of DW supply to the purification petro-chemicals from the water, two ion exchanging
Number per reactor 3 filters to extract soluble salts and a trap filter to protect
Pump head, MPa (kgf/cm2) 0.83 (8.5) the tank of purified water from possible ingress of ion
exchange resins. Equipment of the DW purification
Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) 25 (90)
facility is located in building B1 (B2). Design
Drive power, kW 55 specifications are presented in the Table 7.3.
Pump of DW mixing
7.1.3 The Pumping Station of Purified DW
Pump head, MPa (kgf/cm2) 1.37 (14) The pumping station of purified DW consists of a tank
Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) 25 (90) to collect purified DW (5), auxiliary deaerator makeup
Drive power, kW 100 pumps (6), feed-water pumps (8) and pumps (7) to
supply water for internal needs of DW purification
facility. The feed-water pumps (8) are intended to
Table 7.3 Design specifications of the DW supply water to fuel storage pool, ACS, turbine
purification facility generators and other systems. The tank (5) is located
near to the tank (1) to receive contaminated DW. The
Perlite filters
purpose of tank (5) is to collect purified DW,
Number per reactor 3 emergency water overflow from deaerators and
Working pressure, MPa (kgf/cm2) up to 0.98 (10) primary grade water if the deaerator auxiliary makeup
Capacity, kg/s (m3 /h) 8.3-27.8 (30-100) system is in operation. The design specifications of the
Diameter, mm 1200 tank are presented in the Table 7.4.
Height, mm 3540
No less than 1000 m3 of purified DW would be
Filtering surface, m 2 13.5 maintained in the tank of during reactor operation at
Ion exchange filter any power level should. Pumps (6, 7, 8) are located in
building B1 (B2) at an elevation -7.20 m. Pumps for
Number per reactor 2 the auxiliary deaerator makeup (6) are placed 1.2 m
Operating pressure, MPa up to 0.98 (10) above the floor of the room to prevent flooding. There
(kgf/cm2) is a concrete ceiling above the pumps. The power
Capacity, kg/s (m3 /h) up to 33.3 (120) supply to the auxiliary deaerator makeup pumps (6)
Diameter, mm 2000 and feed-water pumps (8) is provided through
Height, mm 4320 individual cables from the safety bus. In case of loss of
offside power, the power supply is automatically
Volume of filtering media, m3 6
switched over to the diesel generators. Pumps (7) are
Ionic trap filter provided with two independent power sources, and
switchover between them is provided automatically.
Cables are covered with fire proof compounds. The
Operating pressure, MPa up to 0.98 (10) design specifications of the pumps are presented in the
(kgf/cm2) Table 7.5.
Capacity, kg/s (m3 /h) up to 33.3 (120)
Diameter, mm 600 Table 7.5 Specification of pumps
Height, mm 3000 Feed-water pumps
Filtering surface, m 2 4.6
Pump head, MPa (kgf/cm2) 0.83 (8.5)
139
Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) 25 (90) To provide water supply for the systems listed above
Drive power, kW 55 one of the pumps should be in operation and the
second should be in standby mode (the third can be
Pumps to supply water for internal needs
under maintenance).
of the DW purification facilities
Number per reactor 2 7.2 AUXILIARY DEAERATOR MAKEUP SYSTEM
Pump head, MPa (kgf/cm2) 0.83 (8.5)
Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) 25 (90) The Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup System (ADMS) is
Drive power, kW 55 intended to supply water to the deaerators during
7.1.4 System Operation reactor start-up and cooling down. Under accidental
conditions it supplies water to deaerators and to the
Contaminated DW is delivered through the piping hot condensate chamber of the ACS.
into the receiving tank (1). From the tank Table 7.6 Required water quality
contaminated DW is supplied by pumps (2) at a flow
rate of 8.3-22.2 kg/s (30-80 m3/h) to the purification Requirements Quality of
devices (4). The required water quality before and to the chemical water after
Parameter
after purification is presented in the Table 7.6. composition of purification
contaminated
During filtering the pressure drop on perlite filters is DW
increasing. When the pressure drop reaches 0.39 MPa pH 6,0-8,5 6,5-8,0
(4 kgf/cm2) the operator puts an auxiliary filter in
Electric conductivity, no more
operation and takes the exhausted filter out of 1,0
µSm/cm than 20
operation to remove contaminated filtering perlite and
to produce a new filtering layer. Also, perlite filters Concentration of no more
10
are taken out of operation if the concentration of petro- chloride ions, µg/dm3 than 100
chemicals in the filtered water increases above 100 Concentration of
µg/dm3. After the perlite filters, water is conveyed no more 100
petro-chemicals,
than 500
subsequently through two ion exchanging filters, µg/dm3
which are loaded with strong acidic cationite and
Hardness, µg-eq/dm3 - no more than 3
strong alkaline anionite to purify water from dissolved
salts. Periodically the DW purification facility is in Corrosion products
- no more than 20
outage for chemical regeneration according to the recalculated into Fe,
degree of exhaustion of ion exchanging material. After µg/dm3
the ion exchanging purification, water is conveyed via
trap filter and comes into the tank of purified DW (5). During normal operation at any power level and
during planned preventive maintenance the equipment
Nominal capacity of the DW purification facility is and piping of the system perform the following
22.2 kg/s (80 m3/h) with maximum capacity 27.8 kg/s functions:
(100 m3/h). In emergency conditions the capacity of
the facility can be increased up to 55.6 kg/s (200 • maintenance of water reserve above 6000 m3,
m3/h). In this case the water purification is provided
• storage of condensate (which is produced after
only with the perlite filters.
utilization of plant drainage water), primary grade
water and water from demineralized water
Water is supplied to the plant unit systems from
purification facilities (see Subsection 7.1.2),
tank (5) by pumps (8):
• supplies water for the following:
• during power operation water is supplied into low - continuos makeup of turbine condensers,
pressure turbine condensers at flow rate - filling of equipment,
11.1-33.3 kg/s (40-120 m3/h), - internal plant needs of water purification
• periodically water is supplied into the fuel storage facilities,
tank and the ACS for exchange purpose to • water supply into control rod cooling circuit,
maintain water quality in the systems within the • water supply for sealing of Purification and
operational limits, Cooling System (PCS) pumps,
• during refueling purified DW is supplied into the • water supply for sealing of Main Feed Water
refueling machine, Pumps (MFWP) and Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps
• water supply to other systems is performed (AFWP) when the main condensate system is not
periodically and is controlled by the operator in operation.
according to requirements.
140
During reactor start-up and cool down the ADMS with remote monitoring, for the detection of leaks.
supplies water to deaerators in order to ensure proper During operation at any power level at least 5000 m3
operation of the AFWPs. of water is maintained in the first three tanks (1, 2, 3),
total volume of water can be up to 15000 m3. The tank
For accident conditions the ADMS provides water to of purified DW (4) - maintais a volume above 1000
ensure long-term cooling of the reactor. It is designed to: m3. Pumps (5) are used to supply water from the first
three tanks into the tank of purified DW. Pumps
• supply water from water reserves (up to 6000 m3) to (capacity - 500 m3/h) are located in the building of
deaerators to ensure the proper operation of AFWPs, waste-water tanks (see Section 1). Pumps of the
• supply water to ACS hot condensate chambers in auxiliary deaerator makeup system (6) are used to
order to ensure the proper operation of ECCS pumps. supply water into deaerators (9) or into the hot
condensate chambers (10) of the ACS towers. Pumps
7.2.1 General Description designated as item (7) are used to supply sealing and
cooling water to pumps (6). The smaller tanks (8)
A schematic of the auxiliary deaerator makeup system (capacity of 50 m3 each) are intended to provide a
is presented in Fig. 7.2. A tank (1) with a capacity of reserve of sealing and cooling water for the ADMS.
5000 m3 provides a reserve of condensate (which is The technical specifications of the ADMS pumps are
produced after utilization of the plant drainage water). presented in the Table 7.7. Pumps (7) and tanks (8)
are located in building B1 (B2). All equipment
and piping of the sealing and
Table 7.7 Technical specification of the auxiliary
9 9 9 9 deaerator makeup system pump (type - KsVA500-
220, manufacturer - NPO named after Frunze,
2 Sumi, Ukraine)
8 8
10
1 3 7 Flow capacity, m3/h 500
Pump head, m 220
11
Required cavitation margin, m 2.5
6
4 Temperature of feed water at the
no more than 125
5 pump inlet, °C
Pressure at the pump inlet, MPa no more than 0.98
Fig. 7.2 Process scheme of auxiliary deaerator Pump power, kWt 375
makeup system Rotation speed, rpm 1480
1 - condensate tank, 2 - tank for receiving of
condensate or primary grade water, 3 - primary grade
water tank, 4 - tank of purified DW, 5 - pumps to Table 7.8 Required water quality in the ADMS
supply water into tank of purified DW, 6 - auxiliary tanks
deaerator makeup system pumps, 7 - pumps to supply
pH 5.5 - 7.2
sealing and cooling water for ADMS pumps, 8 - tanks
of water reserve for sealing and cooling of ADMS Electric conductivity, µSm/cm no more than 1.5
pumps, 9 - deaerators, 10 - hot condensate chambers Concentration of chloride Cl ions,
of ACS towers, 11 - auxiliary pipeline µg/dm3 no more than 10
Concentration of petro-chemicals,
µg/dm3 no more than 100
The second tank (2) is intended to provide a reserve of
Hardness, µg-eq/dm 3
no more than 3
either condensate or primary grade water (which is
obtained through purification of artesian water). The Corrosion products recalculated no more than 20
third tank (3) supplies a reserve of primary grade into Fe, µg/dm3
water. These tanks are located in the building with the
facilities for recovery of liquid radioactive waste (see
Section 1). The fourth tank of purified DW (4) cooling water supply to the ADMS pumps have 100%
(capacity 1500 m3 ) is intended to provide a reserve of redundancy. All pipelines of the system are placed in
water from the diaonized water purification facility. special conduits. They provide a water supply at a
The tank (4) is located at a 12 m distance from the flowrate ~20% higher than is required according to
building B1 (see Section 7.1). All tanks are made of safety conditions.
reinforced concrete, the inner surface of which is clad
with stainless steel of thickness from 3 to 5 mm. They Water quality in any tank should comply with the
are installed on special foundations and are provided requirements (Table 7.8).
141
• pumps (1, 2, 3) to hot condensate chambers of
7.2.2 Operation Procedures of the Auxiliary ACS of unit 1 and unit 2 at a flow rate up to 750
Deaerator Makeup System m3/h.
To ensure reliable operation of the AFWS pumps for a 7.3 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM
range of accidental conditions, the water level in the
deaerators is maintained by water supplied by the The Service Water System (SWS) employs lake water
ADMS pumps (6) which takes water from the tank of to provide cooling for the thermo-mechanical
purified DW (4). When the level in the deaerators (9) equipment of the plant both in normal and accidental
decreases down to 430 mm the standby mode ADMS regimes. In normal operating regimes the SWS is
pump is started automatically. After a time delay of used for cooling the thermo-mechanical equipment of
10 seconds the special regulating valve maintains both the plant, the equipment in the auxiliary buildings and
the pressure at the discharge section of the ADMS as a water supply source for fire fighting systems
pump at 1.96 MPa (20 kgf/cm2) and the level in (see Table 7.9).
deaerators at H=1500mm. If the discharge valve of the
pump is not open in 2 minutes, this ADMS pump is 7.3.1 General Description
switched off, and a stand-by pump is started to provide
water supply into the deaerators (9) with a flowrate of SWS consists of a water intake and a water discharge
500 m3/h. If this flowrate is not sufficient and the level canal, a lake-side pumping house, and the supply and
in the deaerators continues to decrease and reaches discharge water lines.
230 mm, the second ADM pump, which is in standby
mode, is started. Two operating pumps can provide The plant is located on the south bank of lake
water flowrate of at least 1000 m3/h. In parallel with 'UNÖLDL, which is used as the ultimate heat sink. The
the water supply into the deaerators (9) water is also water level is 141.6 m above sea level; its surface area
supplied to cool the suction side of the AFWS pumps. of the lake is 49 km2, its water inventory - 0.4 km 3,
If the water level in the deaerators increases up to average depth is - 7.6 m, maximum depth - 33 m. The
H=2150 mm and all AFWS pumps are switched off, water level in the lake is raised ~1.3 m by means of
the signal for switching off the ADMS pumps is dams. A water level drop could occur only if the dams
generated. are destroyed as a result of external impact: an
airplane crash, an earthquake or a terrorist act. In this
If the water volume in the tank of purified DW (4) case the minimum water level in the lake will be
decreases, the operator manually starts one of the governed by the elevation of rivers beds, which
pumps (5) to compensate the losses at a flow rate of at originate in the lake, and will decrease to 140.3 m
least 500 m3/h from tanks (1, 2, 3). This action allows above see level. The open water intake and discharge
the system to operate during long term periods. canals are common to both power units, the potential
change in the water level is taken into consideration in
If necessary, the ADMS can supply water into the hot their design.
condensate chambers (10) of both ACS towers (at a
flow rate of at least 1000 m3/h) using a separate There is a population of a double-shell mollusk of a
pipeline. The decision is made by the operator after species called "dreissena" in lake 'UNÖLDL, which
decrease of the liquid level in the hot condensate periodically, especially in summer time, finds its way
chamber is under control. into the SWS system. In order to secure the system’s
operability its design provides for a possibility of back-
During the first phase of the implementation of flushing some of the equipment (see Table 7.9) with
recommendations from the Barselina project, a design service water. There is also a connecting 800 mm
for the reconstruction of the ADMS was developed. pipeline between the suction and discharge water
According to this project an auxiliary pipeline 200 pipelines, which is used for back-flushing the SWS
mm diameter (11) was installed in 1995 to make it water pipelines during an outage.
possible to supply water by pumps (5) from tanks (1, 2,
3) directly into the deaerators (9) and the hot The lake-side SWS pumping house contains six
condensate chambers of the ACS (10). Installation of vertical type centrifugal pumps (2 or 3 are in
the auxiliary pipeline (11) has improved system operation, 2 are in stand-by, and one pump can be
reliability , as it makes it possible to supply water by: taken out for servicing).
• pumps (1, 2, 3) directly into the deaerators at a A stand-by pump starts automatically if an operating
flow rate up to 650 m3/h, pump stops. The pumps are connected to a 6 kV bus,
• ADMS pumps of unit 2 directly into the deaerators pump per bus. Technical specifications of the SWPs
of unit 1 at a flow rate up to 1100 m3/h, are given in Table 7.10. The operation of the service
water pumps is supported by the pump bearing cooling
142
and lubrication systems and a movable screen flushing pipelines. For maintenance each of the pipelines can
system. be isolated, while the cooling water demand of the
SWS consumers is met using the second pipeline. In
From the intake canal water is delivered to the water case of loss of power for internal needs the valves in
intake chamber of the Service Water Pumps (SWP). the discharge pipelines remain in the ‘open’ state. The
There it passes through strainers and is pumped to a suction and discharge pipelines are equipped with
common discharge header. From the header water is adequate instrumentation the readings of which are
supplied to SWS consumers via two 1600 mm displayed in the control room. All SWS pipelines and
discharge pipelines. Each of the water pipelines is valves are made of carbon steel and designed for a
capable of providing the full flow rate at the maximum gauge pressure of 0.98 MPa (10 kgf/cm2).
water demand. If the SWS of one of the power units is
taken out of service, water can be supplied to the Table 7.9 presents service water flow rate data to the
equipment by the operating the SWS of the other unit. SWS consumers in the main and other buildings on
Water is supplied to the equipment via two pipelines, site at various operating regimes of the power unit.
each of which is connected either to one of the supply The nominal operating parameters of SWS are
water pipelines or to a part of the ring-circuit presented in Table 7.11.
Table 7.9 Service water flow rates to main equipment at tcool = 28 0C
Water flow rates for various operating regimes, kg/s (m3/h)

Equipment Number Nominal Start-up Cooling Loss of Emergency SWS
down power cooldown maintenance
*
Control rod cooling system 4 833 833 (3000) 833 417 417 27.8-1.7
HEs ** (3000) (3000) (1500) (1500) (100-50)
MCP air cooler ** 8 133.3 (480) 133.3 (480) 133.3 (480) - - -
MCP oil cooler 8 55.5 (200) 55.5 (200) 55.5 (200) - - -
HEs of IC-1 ** 8 166.7 (600) 500 (1800) 1667 (6000) 1667 (6000) 1667 (6000) 1667 (6000)
HEs of IC-2 ** 2 215 (774) 215 (774) 215 (774) 215 (774) 215 (774) 83.3 (300)
HEs of reactor metal 2 45.8 45.8 45.8 - - -
structures ** (165) (165) (165)
HEs of spent fuel pool 3 133.3 (480) 133.3 (480) 133.3 (480) - - 320
HEs of ACS condenser tray 8 - 2333 2333 2333 2333 -
cooling system (8400) (8400) (8400) (8400)
HEs of fuel cladding 2 2.8 2.8 2.8 - - -
integrity monitoring system (10) (10) (10)
HEs of the off-gas clean-up 5 - - -
55.5 55.5 55.5
system and the Helium (200) (200) (200)
Clean-up Plant
HEs of air coolers of 6 141.7 141.7 141.7 - - -
recirculating facilities (510) (510) (510)
(WA67-69)
HEs of special ventilation 2 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 -
system (WZ51) (300) (300) (300) (300) (300)
HEs of special ventilation 2 27.8 27.8 27.8 - - -
system (WZ56) (100) (100) (100)
HEs of the purification and 2 5.27 5.27 5.27 5.27 - -
cooling system pumps (19) (19) (19) (19)
MFWP 7 50 (180) 10-50 (36-180) - - - -
AFWP*** 6 6.7 (24) 6.7 (24) 6.7 (24) 6.7 (24) 6.7 (24) 6.7 (24)
Other equipment of 2.36 2.36 2.36 - - -
buildings “A”, “B” and “D” (8.5) (8.5) (8.5)
Other equipment of the 486 486 486 486 486 -
turbine hall (1750) (1750) (1750) (1750) (1750)
Auxiliary buildings 2193 2193 2193 2193 2193 2193
(7895) (7895) (7895) (7895) (7895) (7895)
143
Total 5444 7111 6833 5278 5278 2566
(19600) (25600) (24600) (19000) (19000) (9239)
* Water is supplied from the SWS system of an operating unit
** Equipment designed for back-flushing with service water
*** Now the SWS is used as emergency source of cooling
Table 7.10 Specification of the SWS pump (type 1000V-4/6.3-A)

Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) 2222-3250 (8000-11700)
Head, kPa (m of water column) 500-421 (51-43)
Minimum suction pressure, kPa (m of water column) 19.6-34.3 (2.0-3.5)
Electromotor capacity, kW 1600
Electromotor voltage, kV 6
Speed, s-1 (rot/min) 8.3 (500)
Table 7.11 Nominal SWS operating parameters operation of the unit is allowed for no longer than 2
hours.
Cooling water temperature, oC 6-28
(depends on the season) 7.3.2 HEs of ACS Condenser Tray Cooling System
Temperature increase in HEs, oC 7-10
Supply water pressure at the lake-side 0.49 HEs of the ACS condenser tray cooling system are
pumping house, MPa (kgf/cm2) (5.0) intended to remove heat generated by steam passing
through the ACS condensation pools. A continuous
Pressure at discharge, MPa (kgf/cm2) 0.098 (1.0)
service water supply is provided by a ring-circuit of
1200 mm diameter water pipelines, and later via two
600 mm diameter pipelines for each group of four HEs
From hot condensate chamber of ACS To pumps
(Fig. 7.3). The service water is discharged from each
1
HE group via a 600 mm diameter pipeline into a
discharge water ring-circuit. When the temperature of
the water in the ACS condensation pools exceeds
35 oC, or an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
2
signal occurs, the normally closed discharge valves are
Secondary side ACS opened automatically, and service water is supplied to
3 cool the ACS HEs. If necessary the valves can be opened
manually, either locally or from the main control
From SWS
4 room.
5
7.3.3 Diesel Generators Cooling System
To SWS
Service water is supplied to Diesel-Generators (DG)
Fig. 7.3 Flow diagram of the HEs of the ACS via three 800 mm diameter pipelines connected to the
condenser tray cooling system SWS main SWS water pipelines. Service water is used to
1 - heat exchanger, 2 - valve, 3 - ring circuit for water cool the water of the DG internal, the DG circulating
supply, 4 - flow meter, 5 - ring circuit for water oil and air. Three DGs of each power unit are supplied
discharge from the SWS water pipeline of unit 1, while the other
three DGs are supplied from the SWS water pipeline of
unit 2. Such an alignment allows a prompt switch-over
SWS is a safety relevant operation system, which also if the SWS of one of the units becomes inoperable.
performs auxiliary (support) safety functions in Supply of service water is initiated automatically
emergencies. SWS provides cooling for the safety following start-up of the DG. In case of a loss of
equipment (diesel-generators, HEs of ACS condenser service water the DG remains available for 7 min.
tray cooling system and HEs of the AFWP sealing
system) under normal and abnormal conditions. In 7.4 INTERMEDIATE CIRCUITS
case of an accident which leads to the loss of SWS, the
reactor must be immediately scrammed by pressing the Intermediate Circuits (IC) are intended for:
AZ-1 button (emergency protection). At nominal
reactor power at least 4 SWPs must be operable, • removal of heat from MCC equipment to ensure its
2 pumps may be tagged out for maintenance. In case of availability in all modes of unit operation (the heat
a reduced redundancy of SWPs the full power is rejected to the service water system),
144
• prevention of radioactivity release to the tubes-in-case, with straight
environment from equipment connected to the Heat exchanger type
tubes, horizontal, with fixed
primary circuit (IC interpose an additianal barrier tube grids
against release of activity from the equipment to Number per reactor 8 2
the environment via the service water).
Inner diameter, mm 1200 1200
Length of tubes, m 6 4
There are two independent intermediate circuits:
Tube material Steel st.20 Steel st.20
• intermediate circuit for Purification and Cooling Outer diameter of the tubes,mm 20 20
System (PCS) water additional coolers IC-1, Number of passes through
1 1
• intermediate circuit for MCC equipment IC-2. inner space of heat
exchanger
IC-1 should provide heat removal from the primary Configuration of tube bundle triangle triangle
circuit during reactor cool down (as one stage in the Heat transfer surface, m 2
641 427
decay heat removal process) and permanent cooling of
MCC water in the additional coolers of the PCS.
Before being directed to the bypass filters, the water is Table 7.14 Technical specification of pumps of IC-1
cooled down to a temperature below 50°C. and IC-2
IC-2 provides cooling water for the following Parameter Value

components:
Circulation pump of the IC-1, IC-2
(type - Ah500/37)
• bearings and seals of ECCS pumps,
• coolers of the MCP seals, Number per reactor (for IC-1) 8
• heat exchangers of the MCP shaft sealing system, Number per reactor (for IC-2) 3
• coolers in the Fuel Claddings Integrity Monitoring Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) 83-194 (380-700)
system (FCIM), drum separators, primary circuit Discharge pressure, MPa 0.372-0.441
piping and PCS piping, hydrostatic bearings of the (kgf/cm2) (3.8-4.5)
MCP,
• heat exchanger of the MCC high pressure sensors, IC-2 pump of water pressure increase
• heat exchangers of the cutting machine which is for FCIM coolers (type - Ah20/18)
employed for reducing the height of fuel clusters Number per reactor 2
before transfer to the storage pool, Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) 4.2-6.9 (15-25)
• heat exchangers of the AFWPs seals.
Discharge pressure, MPa 0.118-0.196 (1.2-2.0)
(kgf/cm2)
The main safety related task of the IC-2 system is to
ensure availability of the ECCS pumps, AFWPs and IC-2 pump of water pressure increase
MCP. for refueling machine (type - VK-2/26)
Capacity, kg/s (m3/h) 0.75-2.22 (2.7-8)
Discharge pressure, MPa 0.196-0.59 (2.0-6.0)
Parameter Value
(kgf/cm2)
IC water flowrate during normal 333 (1200) 7.4.1 Intermediate Circuit of the PCS Water Final
operation, kg/s (m3 /h) Coolers IC-1
IC water temperature in the inlet of IC-1
25-35
heat exchanger, °C IC-1 includes a circulation circuit which consists of
IC water temperature in the outlet of IC-1 the following:
15-20
heat exchanger, °C
• 8 heat exchangers, where IC water is cooled by
Pressure in the discharge of IC-1 pumps,
0.343 (3.5) service water (taken from the lake),
MPa (kgf/cm2)
• 8 pumps, which provide circulation of coolant in
Level in IC-1 expansion tank, mm from the circuit,
800-1150
the top • expansion tank, which is intended to provide
required pressure in suction lines of the pumps.
Table 7.13 Technical specification of heat
exchangers of IC-1 and IC-2 Nominal parameters of IC-1are presented in Table 7.12.
Parameter IC-1 IC-2
145
Technical specifications for the main equipment are MPa (kgf/cm2)
presented in Tables 7.13, 7.14. Level in expansion IC-2 tank, mm from 800-1150
the top
During power operation of the unit, 2 pumps and up to
Service water flowrate during power 194 (700)
4 IC-1 heat exchangers are in operation. During
operation, kg/s (m3/h)
reactor startup 4 pumps and 4 heat exchangers are in
operation. During reactor cooldown 6-7 pumps and 8
heat exchangers of the IC-1 are available for the The intermediate circuit IC-2 operates continuously
forced circulation mode operation of the IC-1. Control regardless of the operation mode of the unit. One main
for the starting and shut-off of pumps, opening and IC-2 pump and one IC-2 heat exchanger are active
closure of valves (except maintenance valves) is during normal operation. Auxiliary pumps for
provided from the main control room. Service (lake) increasing the pressure of the water coming to FCIM
water flow rate is adjusted manually using valves in are switched off during normal operation, and IC-2
the outlets of the heat exchangers. The adjustments water comes through the bypass pipeline from the
are made employing readings from service water flow discharge header of the main IC-2 pumps. If the
meters installed in each heat exchanger and pressure provided in the discharge header by running
temperature meters installed in the IC-1 outlets of heat the main IC-2 pump is not sufficient to supply water to
exchangers. coolers of the FCIM, then one or both auxiliary
pumps are started. Regulation of service (lake) water
Service water pressure in the heat exchangers is flow rate is made manually using valves in the outlets
higher than pressure of IC-1 water, this prevents of the heat exchangers. Adjustments are made
ingress of IC-1 water to the lake in case of leaks in according to the measurements provided by service
the heat exchangers tubes. water flow meters installed in each heat exchanger and
temperature meters installed in the IC-2 outlets of heat
In case of loss of off-site power, IC-1 operation does exchangers.
not change.
Pressure of service water in the heat exchangers is
7.4.2 Intermediate Circuit for MCC Equipment IC- higher than pressure of IC-2 water, this prevents
2 ingress of IC-2 water to the lake in case of tube failure.
IC-2 includes a circulation loop which consists of the In case of loss of off-site power, IC-2 operation does
following components: not change.
• 2 heat exchangers, where IC-2 water is cooled by The radioactivity of IC-1, IC-2 water and service water
service water (taken from the lake), is monitored. Water quality ranges are presented in the
• 3 main pumps, which provide circulation of water Table 7.17.
in the loop,
• 2 auxiliary pumps, which are intended to increase The IC-1, IC-2 circuits are filled and makeup water is
pressure of IC-2 water and to supply water to supplied using primary grade water from the
FCIM coolers, expansion tanks (makeup is provided automatically).
• expansion tank, which is used to provide required
pressure in the suction lines of the pumps. 7.5 FISSION PRODUCT REMOVAL AND
CONTROL SYSTEM
Nominal parameters of IC-2 are presented in Table 7.15.
Technical specifications for the main components are Fission products from the core region can penetrate into
presented in Tables 7.13, 7.14, 7.16. the compartments which surround the MCC piping and
components in various ways. Special venting systems are
employed to lower the radioactive background in these
compartments. If the air temperature rises above 70 oC, it
is cooled by the heat exchanger. If fission products are
Table 7.16 Main components connected to
Parameter Value
intermediate circuit IC-2
IC water flowrate during normal 111-139 Number of IC-2 water
operation, kg/s (m3 /h) (400-500) components flowrate for
IC water temperature in the inlet of IC-2 25-30 Components (per reactor) components,
heat exchanger, °C kg/s (m3/h)
IC water temperature in the outlet of IC-2 15-20
heat exchanger, °C ECCS pumps 6 1.39 (5)
Pressure in the discharge of IC-2 pumps, 0.44 (4.5) Coolers of MCP sealing 8 2.22 (8)
146
Heat exchanger of the system
2 2.22 (8)
for MCP shaft sealing The released radioactive gas cleaning system is utilized to
clean gas which is collected in the reactor space, helium
Coolers of the system of
8 5.56 (20) cleaning equipment, turbine condenser and the back of
sampling from drum separator
the refueling machine, cleaning and releasing the cleaned
Coolers of the system to gas to the atmosphere [59]. The released gases are cleaned
sample water from hydrostatic 5 5.56 (20) of iodine, aerosols and inert radioactive gases to a
bearings of MCP, primary recommended norm. Released gases are transported by
circuit, purification and two vacuum pumps VVN-1-12 (one pump is in an
cooling system operational mode, and other is in reserve). The capacity of
Coolers of the FCIM system 4 0.139 (0.5) the pump is 750 m3/h. Before release the gases are
cleaned of radioactive iodine and aerosols in aerosol filters
Coolers of MFWPs and and carbon absorbers. Because aperture cross-sections in
13 1.11 (4)
AFWPs sealings separate compartments of the gas delay chambers are
large, the gas flow velocity is small and gases are left in
Table 7.17 Water quality in IC-1, IC-2 the chamber to 10 hours. During this period a majority of
radioactive elements are decayed. Just before to getting to
Parameter Value the 150 m high venting stack, gases pass through an
additional activity reduction chamber. Here released gases
pH 6.0-10.0
are dryed in ceolite filters and radioactive inert gases are
Mass concentration of Cl, µg/dm 3
100 cleaned using the absorbers with activated carbon SKT-3.
Conductivity, µSm/cm 3.0
The block-schematic of the reactor gas circuit with
Mass concentration of iron, 2000 released gas cleaning system is shown in Fig. 7.4.
µg/dm3
Radioactivity, Bq/kg (Cu/kg) 7.4 (2.0⋅10-10) 7.5.2 Reactor Channel Integrity Monitoring
System
Reactor Channel Integrity Monitoring (RCIM) system

detected, the air is forced through filters. The filtered air is performs reliable integrity monitoring of fuel
vented to the environment from the 150 m high venting channels, reflector cooling channels and control rod
stacks. The most contaminated gases are gases from the channels in the reactor.
circuit employed to cool the internal cavities within the
core block. These gases (helium-nitrogen mixture) are The reactor channels' integrity are monitored by
treated by a special gas-discharge cleaning system. permanent monitors, measuring temperature and
relative humidity of gas pumped through RC. The
7.5.1 Reactor Gas Circuit and Vented Gas initial data is processed by ICS "TITAN" and is
Cleaning System requested by the computer from all the measuring
points with a period of 30 s.
The purpose of the gas circuit of the RBMK-1500 reactor
is to provide the helium-nitrogen mixture (about 10 %
The reactor core is subdivided into 26 zones according
nitrogen) used for cooling the internal reactor cavities.
to the number of RCIM group valves. Sensing lines
Pressure of the gas mixture is 0.5 - 2 kPa. Gas circulation
connect RCIM group valves with all gas housings of
improves heat removal from the graphite stack (see
the fuel channels (1661), control rod cooling circuit
Subsection 4.2.1), control rods and reflector cooling
(235) and reflector cooling circuit (156) channels.
channels, as well as protects graphite stack from oxidation
at high temperature conditions. The pressure of the inert
Gas flows coming from the zone sensing lines merge
gas mixture between the fuel channel and the graphite
in a single flow in a respective RCIM group valve and
stack serves as an indication of the leak tightness of fuel
can be directed (by switching over the valve
channels. A rupture of a fuel channel is diagnosed by the
positioner) either to the "Venting" header (normal
appearance of water steam in the released gas mixture.
regime), or to the "Enhanced suction" header (an
Gas contaminated by radioactive steam is removed from
accidental regime to dry the graphite stack and
the gas circuit. The inert gas also protects the reactor
localize moisture in reactor cavity). The flowrate of
metal structures from corrosion.
gas pumped through the channel housings increases
The gas circuit includes [58]:
from 0.1 m3/h in the
• monitoring the integrity of the reactor channels
system,
• gas supply of the circuit auxiliary equipment,
• helium cleaning equipment,
• released radioactive gas cleaning system.
147
"Venting" regime to 0.5 m3/h in the "Enhanced cleaning unit, 11 - gas delay chamber, 12 - filter,
suction" mode depending on the number of aligned 13 - activity reduce device, 14 - venting stack
RCIM valves (no more than 4 group valves can be
aligned at a time). 7.5.3 Venting System for the Reactor and the MCC
Compartments
In order to monitor relative humidity at the reactor
cavity outlet there is a zone humidity detector All compartments in the reactor building are divided into
downstream each of RCIM group valves. When service and non-service compartments. The purpose of the
relative humidity in a group valve increases to 70 % a venting system for the reactor service compartments is to:
"humidity" alarm is sent, and after processing by the
plant Information and Computer System (ICS) • provide sanitary-hygiene and temperature conditions
"TITAN" the alarm is indicated in the MCR. in these compartments,
• prevent possible pollution of indoor and ambient air
A thermocouple is installed in each of the sensing by toxic substances,
lines upstream of the group valve to monitor the gas • remove excess heat from the compartments with
temperature. If the gas temperature in the RCIM process equipment,
system exceeds 40 oC a preventive alarm signal is sent • cooling to concrete structures of the reinforced leak-
and after processing by ICS "TITAN" the alarm is tight compartments.
indicated in the MCR.
The reactor non-service compartments are vented by a
When there is a leak from fuel channels, control rod special venting system. The purpose of the special venting
cooling circuit or reflector cooling circuit channels system is the same as that of the ordinary venting system
into the reactor cavity, the gas humidity increases and (which is venting reactor service compartments), but it is
a zone detector triggers. On receiving the "humidity" intended for non-service compartment. There is a higher
alarm one or several (up to 4) group valves are probability for radioactive fission products in these
switched over to the "enhanced suction" regime. The compartments, therefore, air from the non-service
search for a leaking channel is carried out by compartments is cooled and cleaned by filters.
monitoring a temperature increase of the gas mixture
in a sensing line. Air venting is performed using venting units VDN-17,
VDN-10 and VDN-12.5. These are centrifugal, high
pressure units with sinus-shape six-blade rotor ventilators.
The ventilator shaft and the electric motor shaft are
connected with a bushing. Ventilators differ by the shell
1 2 3 4 5 6
structure and capacity.
RBMK-1500
8 7
N2
9 10
14 13 12 11
Fig. 7.4 Reactor gas circuit with released gas cleaning

system (block schematic)
1 - monitoring the integrity of fuel channel system,
2 - vacuum pump, 3 - electric heater, 4 - gas circuit
condenser, 5 - iodine filter, 6 - helium compressor, 7
- receiver, 8 - nitrogen supply and regulating device, 9-
helium-nitrogen supply and regulating device, 10 - gas
148
Air from the compartments, where a lot of heat is absorbers are vertical, cylindrical-shape devices, where air
generated, are cooled before proceeding to the filters. This is filtered through an impregnated carbon type CKT-3
is done in air coolers of type VO-267/2510-62-MU-U4. load placed into a special assembly.
Air coolers consist of ribbed tubes connected by collectors.
Service water is used for cooling, the temperature of In those locations where air supply channels penetrate a
which is about 25-28 oC. In the coolers air is cooled to 70 fire-prevention partition-wall, they are equipped with fire-
o
C. resistant valves. In the MCC compartments, air reception
channels are equipped with leaktight valves, which shut
Decontaminated air is cleaned in the aerosol filters of type channels in emergency situation (such as, if the MCC
A-17 and D-23KL. These filters are used for air cleaning pipelines are ruptured and radioactive steam is released
of radioactive and toxic aerosol products. A very fine into the compartments). They serve to protect from
polymeric fiber of type FP is used as filtering material. radioactive steam-gas mixture release to the atmosphere.
Filters are not regenerated, their filtering materials are not
changed, they are permanent. Main components of the special venting system structure
are characterized in Table 7.18 [60]. All listed systems
For cleaning of released contaminated air with radioactive operate continuously.
iodine isotope carbon type AUI absorbers are used. The
Table 7.18 Special venting system structure [60]
Venting Purpose of the system Venting compartments Air venting

system capacity, m3/h
WZ-51 Exhaust from the reactor hall via stab Reactor hall 48000
floor with purification at aerosol filters
WZ-52, 53 Exhaust from NPP rooms with Spent fuel pool , spent fuel assembly transfer
purification at aerosol filters channel. Bottom tank of control rod cooling 198800
system. Gas delay chamber in the ACS
tower. Rooms of RCIM system
WZ-54 Exhaust from NPP rooms with the Reactor hall. Compartments of feedwater
following discharge to the stack without and main steam pipelines. Top tanks of 400000
purification control rod cooling system. Compartments of
ECCS pipelines. Compartments of pumps
and heat exchanger of IC. ACS tower
WZ-55 Exhaust from NPP rooms with the Compartments of control rod cooling system
following discharge to the stack without pipelines. Compartments of IC. ECCS 300000
purification process corridor. ACS tower
WZ-56 Exhaust from PP rooms with double MCC compartments. ACS tower. 39000
purification
WZ-57 Exhaust system of concrete cooling MCC compartments 105200

WZ-58 Exhaust system of concrete cooling MCC compartments 105200
149
8. ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
This Section provides an overview of the systems and 200000/330. Power of each autotransformer is equal to
components which serve to deliver the power 200 MV⋅A. The autotransformers have a device for
generated by the plant and which assure that internal voltage regulation under load. The device type is
plant needs for electric power are met. The internal RNOA-110/1000. 15 positions are provided to regulate
power supply must provide electric power to voltage in a range (115 ± 6) kV.
components of safety related systems for all
conditions, this includes accident conditions and loss The open 330 kV switchyard is designed using "4/3"
of off-site power events. principle (four circuit breakers per three connections)
and consists of two sections. Circuit breakers are
8.1 OFF-SITE POWER SYSTEM placed in two rows. The first section of the open
switchyard 110 kV is designed using “Double system
Connections to external 330 kV power grids are of buses with bypass” structure. The second section of
provided using an open 330 kV switchyard. The plant open switchyard 110 kV is connected to the first
is connected to the Lithuanian power grid using two section through two circuit breakers C101 and C102.
transmission lines L-454 and L-453, 330 kV each, to The second section has the same design as the first
the Belorussian power grid using three transmission one. The following transmission lines are connected to
lines L-450, L-452 and L-705, and to the Latvian the second section: L-Vidzy, L-Opsa, L-Statyba, L-
power grid using one transmission line L-451. DukÖtas. These transmission lines are intended for
district power supplies, so they are not essential for
Connections to external power grids at 110 kV are electric power supply for the plant in-house operation.
provided using the first section of the open 110 kV
switchyard. The plant is connected to the Lithuanian Air circuit breakers of VNV-330/3150A type are used
power grid using one transmission line “Zarasai” in the open 330 kV switchyard. Air circuit breakers of
110 kV, and to the Latvian power grid using one VVBK-110B-50/3150U1 type are used in open
transmission line L-632. switchyard 110 kV. To supply power loads on voltage
level 330 kV and 110 kV, aerial transmission lines are
Connections between the open switchyards at 330 kV used. Electrical connections of external grids 110 and
and 110 kV are established using two coupling auto- 330 kV are presented in Fig. 8.1.
transformers AT-1 and AT-2, types ATDCTN-
Ln - 452 Ln - 454 Ln - 705

Molodechno Ln - 453 Utena- Belorussia
Line to Vidzy Line to Dukstas Ln - 450 Utena- Neris Ln - 451
Line to Statyba Ln - 632 Polotsk Panevezys Liksna
Line to Opso
Line to Zarasai Daugavpils
110 kV II section 330 kV

110 kV I section AT-1 AT-2
1PRT 2PR 3PRT 4PR

T-1 T-2
1TR 2TR 3TR 4TR
1BA 1BB 1BC 1BD 1BE 1BF 1BG 1BH
1BU 1BV 1BW 1BX 1BY 1BZ
TG-1 TG-2 I UNIT II UNIT
Fig. 8.1 Circuit diagram of power supply at units 1 and 2

AT-1, AT-2 - autotransformers 330/110 kV, T-1, T-2 main transformers, 1TR - 4TR - unit service transformers, 1PRT
- 4PRT - unit auxiliary transformers, 1BA - 1BH - working buses (6 kV), 1BU - 1BZ - safety buses (6 kV), TG-1, TG-
2 - turbogenerators
149
8.2 ON-SITE POWER SYSTEM One working bus 6 kV of normal power supply system
is connected to each 6 kV winding of unit service
On-site power system includes normal and auxiliary transformers through two circuit breakers of
power supply system for in-house operation, and also VEM 6-3200 type and current conductor of TZMEP-
emergency power supply system. All loads are divided 10/3200-128 type. There are eight working buses 1BA,
into three groups according to allowed power 1BB, 1BC, 1BD, 1BE, 1BF, 1BG, 1BH at one unit
interruption time. Each group is also divided in (see Fig. 8.1).
subgroups according to a voltage level. Loads of the
group I AC and DC power should not be interrupted at 8.2.2 Auxiliary Power Supply
all or at most interrupted for intervals not exceeding
20 milliseconds. The most important components of The auxiliary power supply system consists of the
the safety systems belong to this group (Emergency external power sources (off-site grids 110 kV and
Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Auxiliary Feed 330 kV), auxiliary transformers (four transformers per
Water System (AFWS) valves, Control and Protection unit) of TRDCN-63000/110-75UI-1PRT, 2PRT and
System (CPS) logic, process protection logic, electric 3PRT type and of TRDCN-63000/110-4PRT. Power of
protection, etc.). For loads of the group II power the 110 kV windings is equal to 63 MV·A, and power
interruption should not exceed several tens of seconds. of each of the two 6 kV windings, which are not
This group encompasses the remaining components of connected to each other, is equal to 31.5 MV·A. The
the safety systems (ECCS and AFWS pumps, etc.). transformers have device for voltage regulation under
Components not belonging to these two categories are load. Device type is PC-4. 19 positions are provided to
placed in group III. According to [61], they should regulate voltage in a range (110 ± 9) kV.
have two independent power sources with automatic
switchover provisions. They allow power interruption Using the current conductor (TZMEP-10/3200-128
during automatic switchover and may not require type) only one working bus of 6 kV through circuit
power after reactor scram. breaker of auxiliary connection (type VEM 6-3200)
and one safety bus of 6 kV through circuit breaker
Normal and auxiliary power supply systems are (type VMPE-10) can be connected to one 6 kV
divided into classes according to voltage level. There winding of the auxiliary transformer (see Fig. 8.1).
are three classes: 6 kV and 0.4 kV AC power and These connections are based on the principle that each
220V DC power. auxiliary transformer backs up the corresponding unit
service transformer. Auxiliary transformers are
8.2.1 Normal Power Sources connected to different sections of the open switchyard
110 kV by two aerial transmission lines of 110 kV.
Each turbine generator is connected to a step-up main Auxiliary transformers 1PRT and 3PRT are connected
transformer T-1 having windings of 24 kV, and T-2 to the transmission line PRT-101 and auxiliary
using current conductor 24 kV mod. TEKNP-24-2400- transformers 2PRT and 4PRT are connected to the
560UI (see Fig. 8.1). Main transformer type is transmission line PRT-102 by OD-110U/1000UI type
TC-1000000/330-69UI, and its power is equal to breakers.
1000 MV⋅A [62]. The windings at the high voltage of
330 kV of the main transformer is connected to the Switchover of power supply system to auxiliary power
open switchyard 330 kV of Ignalina NPP by aerial sources occurs in the following cases:
transmission line by means of two circuit breakers.
• if the voltage on the 6 kV bus fed through normal
Two unit service transformers for in-house operation 6 kV connection decreases below 0.25 Unom for
of TRDNS-630000/35 type are connected to the more than 0.5 seconds,
current conductor of each turbine generator by joint • frequency decrease below 46 Hz for more than
connections of current conductors of TEKNE-24- 0.5 seconds on at least one working 6 kV bus.
10000-750UI type. Each unit service transformer has
one winding of 24 kV and two windings of 6 kV, Switchover is allowed if the voltage level of the
which are not connected to each other. Power of the auxiliary power source exceeds 0.85 Unom. If voltage of
24 kV winding is equal to 63 MV·A, and power of the 6 kV working buses decreases below 5.7 kV,
each 6 kV winding is equal to 31.5 MV⋅A [62]. There operating procedures do not allow activation of power
are four unit service transformers 1TR, 2TR, 3TR, intensive loads.
4TR at one unit (see Fig. 8.1). The unit service
transformer has a device for voltage regulation under 8.2.2.1 6 kV Power Supply
load. Device type is SDV-41-1250. 19 positions are
provided to regulate the voltage in a range (24 ± 9) kV Eight 6 kV working buses (1BA - 1BH) are provided
[62]. for each unit of the Ignalina NPP. Each of these is
connected to the unit service and auxiliary
transformer. These working buses are used for power
150
supply to high voltage electric motors and 6/0.4 kV transformer assembly - not more than 2.5 seconds.
transformers. The electromotor of each component Power interruption time during switchover of power
obtaining power from a 250 kW to 5600 kW are distribution assemblies is determined by the operating
connected individually to a power distribution device time of control relays.
for in-house loads of working 6 kV buses in order to
decrease the consequences of a bus failure. Redundant 8.2.2.3 DC 220 V Normal Power Supply
components related to turbine generators are
connected to different power distribution assemblies The DC bus is intended to provide direct current for
for in-house loads to 6 kV working buses which the following circuits: the control circuits of the
normally take power from the working buses of automatic control and protection systems, the 6 kV
another turbine generator. and 0.4 kV buses, the emergency evacuation lighting
in the main corridors and rooms, and the automatic
During normal operation six 6 kV safety buses are control and protection of electric and process systems
connected to six 6 kV working buses through two designed for common purposes.
circuit breakers (VMPE-10 type) in series (see Fig.
8.1). Maximum allowed current through the circuit During operation the DC bus takes power from a
breakers is equal to 1000 A. rectifier of TPPS-800 type, which is connected to a
6 kV safety bus through circuit breaker VMPE-10 and
8.2.2.2 0.4 kV Power Supply a cable connected to transformer 1BP07 (power
400 kV⋅A) of TSZ-400/10 type. The rectifier is
Loads of the group III at an 0.4 kV voltage level take connected to a DC bus by two cables through two
power from transformer assemblies (KTPSN-0.5 type), automatic devices of ABM-10 type and to ±230 V
which are connected to 6 kV working buses through buses of the I and III sections of the DC bus. The
circuit breakers of VEM-6 or VMPE-10 type plus accumulating battery (type SK-60) is connected in
transformer and automatic circuit breaker “Electron” parallel to the DC bus using two connections through
of E-16 type. The transformer assembly KTPSN-0.5 two component commutators. Nominal battery
has two power sources: power from its own capacity is 2160 A⋅hours. The battery consists of 122
transformer and a standby one from a 0.4 kV safety cells. During normal operation 104 battery cells are
bus. connected to 220 V buses by a component
commutator. ±242 V buses are intended to provide
Working and auxiliary 6/0.4 kV transformers are power for the solenoid drives of the 6 kV circuit
connected to different 6 kV working buses. Power of breakers. These buses are connected to the I and III
working and auxiliary 6/0.4 kV transformers is equal sections of the DC bus of 110 battery cells. During
to 1000 kV·A. They refer to transformers of TSZSU- recharging of the battery the rectifier is connected to
1000/10, TSZ-1000/10, TSZSA-1000/10 types with the recharging transformer (type 1BP17 of TSZ-400)
voltage regulation in the range (6±2) kV [62]. Voltage through a circuit breaker of VMPE-10 type and a cable
regulation is possible only during transformer connected to a 6 kV working bus. Switchover of the
maintenance. rectifier from an additional charging transformer to a
recharging transformer is made by the operator
The components requiring the most power are manually while both transformers are disconnected
connected to transformer assemblies directly, namely from the bus. Between the DC buses of unit 1 and unit
the 0.4 kV electric motors with power demands of up 2 there are cable junctions which can be used for
to 160 kW, distribution buses for power supply to additional charging of accumulating batteries in case
motor-operated valves, control cabinets, to of failure of additional charging device or for power
components with power demands up to 10 kW and supply to loads of ± 230V in case of failure of the
buses used for lighting. accumulating battery.
During operation power supply to 6 kV and 0.4 kV 8.2.2.4 Cables

loads is provided using unit service transformers,
working 6/0.4kV transformers and connections of Cable lines from sections, assemblies and buses to
power distribution assemblies. The 6 kV circuit consumers are housed in special cable rooms, cable
breakers of auxiliary 6/0.4 kV transformers are closed, wells, cable channels and placed on cable scaffold
and all 6 and 0.4 kV safety buses are at power and bridges. Directly close to consumers, cables are housed
ready to be connected. If there is no power, to the in corridors and process rooms. Cables are laid in
junctions of the 6 kV or 0.4 kV busses, or to power cable shelves, cable trays and boxes.
distribution assemblies then the automatic switchover
logic will switch on power distribution assemblies to Horizontal cable lines in rooms are split into cable
auxiliary connection by automatic starting of the compartments. Fire resistance limits for cable doors
stand-by equipment. Power restoration time during and cable barriers are above 0.75 hour; for safety
switchover of bus 6 kV is not more than 1 second, of system rooms they are above 1.5 hours. Vertical cable
151
wells are split into compartments restricted by the circuit breakers in series, connection to a diesel
building structure floors. generator, and connection to a bus related to an
auxiliary transformer (Fig. 8.2).
The 6 kV cables are laid on shelves or trays at a
distance of a cable diameter from each other. The Electric motors of a 6 kV voltage level are connected
0.4 kV cables and the control cables are laid to buses through circuit breakers and cables along with
separately. Standard cross-section cables having a 6/0.4 kV step-down transformers providing power to
diameter from 35 to 240 mm2 are used. Vertical 0.4 kV distribution buses of reliable power, additional
distance between shelves is above 250 mm, the 6/0.230 kV charging transformers, and rectifiers of
distance between cable lines is above 700 mm. The 0.4 uninterruptible power. Consumers are distributed in
kV power cables are laid on shelves close together, such a way that single purpose components are
and control cables are laid in bundles having a connected to different buses.
diameter no more than 100 mm.
In each 50 m strait section at the beginning and end of Each 6 kV safety bus has a control device for
a cable line, on both sides of a barrier penetration automatic switchover to auxiliary power sources. If
cables are marked with tags. Cables are placed in lines either voltage on the bus decreases down to 0.5 Unom or
in such a manner that cables for common end users the frequency of the bus decreases down to 46 Hz for
are not laid in the same lines. Cable lines of different more than 1.5 seconds, then a control device for
trains of safety systems are usually laid in different automatic switchover to auxiliary power sources starts
rooms. Only by exception it is permitted to lay cables the diesel generator. If the voltage level or frequency
of no more than two different safety trains in one of the bus is not restored to normal, when the signal
room. In this event cables are laid on shelves of “DG ready” has been actuated, then the signal is
different walls in the room. Cable penetrations generated to disconnect the following:
through walls must be separated by a distance above
500 mm. • loads of all reconnection steps except those, which
can not be disconnected. All procedures of
To prevent initiation and propagation of fire cables are switchover to standby components are blocked
coated with a OPK type fire protection composition. (forbidden),
The “Polistop” type or “Poliplast” type, provide fire • both circuit breakers of working connection and
resistance for up to 1.6 hour. Power cables are coated circuit breaker of auxiliary connection (if it is has
with the composition individually, and control cables - been on).
in bundles. Cable rooms and wells are equipped with
an automatic fire alarm and an automatic fire After disconnection of some loads the circuit breaker
extinguishing system. The alarm trips when there is a of the connection to the diesel generator is closed by
signal from a single sensor, and the automatic fire an automatic switchover to auxiliary power sources,
extinguishing water spray starts when there is a signal and loads which are still connected to the bus are
from two sensors. restarted (I step of reconnection). After restart is
completed for all loads at the I step of reconnection
8.2.3 Emergency Power Supply System (time moment is determined automatically according
to current decrease and voltage restoring) blocking of
The system consists of two subsystems: a system of II step loads restart is canceled by automatic
reliable power and a system of uninterruptible power. switchover to auxiliary power sources, and AFWS
pumps are started by automatic switchover to auxiliary
8.2.3.1 Reliable Power Supply System power sources. After full restarting of all loads at the
II step of reconnection, which is determined according
The system of reliable power comprises six to current decrease and voltage restoring, blocking of
independent trains. Each train consists of the III step loads restart is canceled by automatic
following: switchover to auxiliary power sources, and auxiliary
deaerator makeup pumps can be restarted then if
• 6 kV safety bus, necessary.
• independent emergency diesel generator,
• 0.4 kV safety buses,
• power distribution equipment.
6 kV Power Grid of Reliable Power
The grid includes six 6 kV safety buses 1BU, 1BV,

1BW, 1BY, 1BX, 1BZ. Each of the six safety buses is
housed in a separate room, and has three incoming
connections: connection to a working bus through two
152
1 10 Fig. 8.2 Circuit diagram of emergency power
2
supply system
1 - auxiliary transformer, 2 - diesel generator, 3 - 6 kV
3 circuit breaker, 4 - safety bus (6 kV), 5 - 6/0.4 kV
4 9 auxiliary transformer, 6 - safety bus (0.4 kV),
7 - rectifier, 8 - 6/0.23 kV recharging transformer,
6 kV 6 kV 9 - working bus (6 kV), 10 - service transformer,
11 - accumulator battery, 12 - DC buses, 13 - inverter,
5 8 14 - switch
6 7 11
0.4 kV 12
=220 V
0.4 kV
14 13
Table 8.1 List of loads according to steps
Component Pnom, kW Step Operational mode

Transformers of reliable power supply 1000 1 disconnection forbidden, operating
Pumps of control rod cooling circuit 250 1 disconnection forbidden, operating or in standby
Service water pumps 1600 1 disconnection forbidden, operating or in standby
AFWS pumps 800 2 in standby, start due to automatic start of standby
equipment
ECCS pumps 800 2 in standby, start if necessary
ACS pumps 320 3 in standby, start if necessary
Deaerator auxiliary makeup pumps 500 3 in standby, start due to automatic start of standby
equipment if lock is not actuated
Primary grade water pumps 320 3 in standby, start if necessary
Pumps of water fire extinguishing 250 3 in standby, start due to fire signal
Pumps of foam fire extinguishing 500 3 in standby, start due to fire signal
Pumps of purification and cooling system 500 3 in standby, start if necessary
Diesel Generator Control Automatic start can be initiated by the following three
control devices:
Irrespective of how the diesel generator is started, the
following procedure is observed: • automatic switchover of unit loads to auxiliary
power sources,
• the start-up signal opens the electro-pneumatic • turbine generator power drop control panel,
valves of the compressed air start-up containers, • automatic switchover of safety bus to auxiliary
• compressed air starts up the diesel generator, power sources.
• fuel ignites and diesel generator commence
operating. Automatic Start Due To AZ-1 Signal
The signal to start all 6 diesel generators is generated
Manual Start
by an automatic switchover of unit loads to auxiliary
power sources due to an AZ-1 signal generated by any
Diesel generator can be started manually from the
cause including a trip of turbine generators. This start
main control room or reserve control room, and also
is not related to voltage level in the 6 kV safety buses.
locally using the control cabinet in the diesel generator
room. It is also possible to start all diesel generators by
a group control switch for the group I equipment in
Automatic Start in Case of Loss of Off-Site Power
the reserve control room.
Automatic start of all six diesel generators occurs if
Automatic Start there is a simultaneous voltage decrease on buses of
the switchyard 110 kV and on 330 kV side of
153
autotransformers AT-1 and AT-2 of open power
distributing system of INPP down to 0.7 Unom for more
than 2 seconds, irrespective of reactor emergency
protection operation. During a turbine trip and closure
of steam regulating valves power drop control starts
three diesel generators that can be connected to 6 kV
safety buses, which normally are fed from tripped
turbine generator. This start is provided independently
from voltage level on these safety buses. Decrease of
either voltage on 6 kV safety bus down to 0.5 Unom or
frequency on 6 kV safety bus down to 46 Hz for more
than 1.5 seconds causes start of DG, which can be
connected to this bus.
Table 8.2 The characteristics of diesel generator of

ASD-5600 type [62]
Characteristic Value
Maximum power without restrictions, kW 5600
nominal voltage, V 6300
Number of AC phase three
Nominal frequency, Hz 50
Nominal rotational speed of the shaft, rpm 1000
Fuel consumption at full power, g/kWh 228
Specified operating time without
interruption before the first diesel 1600
generator maintenance outage, h.
Fuel reserve in the flow tank of every
diesel, m3 10
Fuel reserve in the outer tank of every
diesel, m3 100
154
In case of loss of off-site power two independent 8.2.3.2 Uninterruptible Power Supply System
signals are generated to start the diesel generators:
The system consists of six independent trains. Each
• from the control device of the automatic switchover train includes:
to auxiliary power sources of each 6 kV safety bus,
• due to loss of power in 6 kV working buses AZ-1 • accumulating batteries of SK-60 type with
signal is actuated and automatic switchover of unit component commutator of 6352B/2 type,
loads to auxiliary power sources actuates signal to • DC bus,
start all six diesel generators. • uninterruptible power assemblies, which comprise
rectifiers with an additional charging transformer
Automatic Start In Case Of Simultaneous Loss Off- and recharging transformer, inverters of PTS-200
Site Power And Actuation of Reactor Scram type, thyristor switchover devices of TKEP type
and thyristor switchover devices of TKEO type,
In case of simultaneous loss of off-site power and an • power distribution assemblies of uninterruptible
actuation of the reactor emergency protection system power.
three independent signals to start diesel generators are
generated: Accumulating battery
• from the control device of the automatic switchover The accumulating battery consist of 122 cells of the
of unit loads to auxiliary power sources due to the SK-60 type (S - stationary, K - for short-term
AZ-1 signal to start all six diesel generators, discharge, 60 - battery number) [62]. An SK-60 cell
• from the control device of the automatic switchover consists of the following parts: jars, positive/negative
to auxiliary power sources of the 6 kV safety bus to plates, separators and electrolyte. Sulfuric acid
start corresponding diesel generator, solution in distilled water with the density of 1.18
• from a power drop control due to a trip of each g/cm3 is used as electrolyte. Lead peroxide PbO2 on
turbine to start three diesel generators. positive plates, lead Pb on negative plates and
electrolyte serve as active materials entering into
If connection of a diesel generator to the safety bus is electrochemical reactions. The plates are separated by
not necessary (voltage and frequency on the bus do not acid-proof insulation which prevents them from
decrease), then the diesel generator is switched off closing onto each other. The plates of one sign are
automatically in 25 seconds. soldered to make a block. Blocks are placed in a tank
filled with electrolyte. Wooden tanks lined with plastic
Reliable 0.4 kV Power Supply are used in the EV01-EV07 batteries. The tanks are
mounted on porcelain insulators. Cells joined together
Each 6 kV safety bus provides power to three 0.4 kV in series by lead joints make an accumulating battery.
safety buses (transformer assemblies of KTPSN-0.5
type) through circuit breaker, cable and transformer All accumulating battery tanks are covered with glass
(Fig. 8.2). There are 18 such 0.4 kV buses at one unit. to minimize electrolyte loss due to gas bubbles formed
during charging and re-charging. The size of the glass
The 0.4 kV safety buses provide power to: cover is such that the gap between the edge of the
glass and the tank walls amounts to 5-7 mm. Due to
• electric motors with power from 40 to 160 kW of this gap the electrolyte present on the glass cannot
safety systems and most important electric motors drip into the casing or the racks.
of normal operation systems (oil pumps of turbine Battery rooms are vented by independent in-flow and
and sealing of main generator shaft, rotation of out-flow ventilation apertures to remove hydrogen and
turbine shaft) through automatic circuit breakers of to maintain required temperature. Battery charging is
A3700 type with remote control, terminated in the case the ventilation is not active.
• electric motors with power from 11 to 55 kW
through automatic breakers and magnetic starters, DC Power Supply
• working connections of power distribution
assemblies of reliable power and auxiliary DC buses in each train of the system are normally
connections of power distribution assemblies of connected to TPPS-800 type rectifiers (Fig. 8.1),
uninterruptible power, buses used for emergency which are connected to 6 kV safety bus through
lighting etc. through automatic circuit breakers VMPE-10 type circuit breakers and cables with
with manual control. Power distribution assemblies transformers 1BR01(02-06) of TSZ-400/10 type
of reliable power are intended for power supply to (transformer power is equal to 400 kV⋅A, voltage -
0.4 kV drives with power bellow 10 kW of motor- 6/0.23 kV). The rectifier is connected to a DC bus by
operated valves of safety systems, for power supply two cables through two automatic ABM type devices
to control circuits and communication equipment to ±268 V buses of the I and III sections of the DC
etc. bus. A lead-
155
acid accumulating battery of the SK-60 type is also - under nominal voltage and load 100 A, % 5
connected in parallel to the DC bus using connection Air natural cooling
through component commutator. The characteristics of
the rectifier of the TPPS-800 type are presented in
Table 8.3 [62]. power to the inverters. In the case of failure of the
inverter, a TKEP type thyristor switchover device
AC 380/220 V Uninterruptible Power Supply switches over to safety a 0.4 kV bus in 0.005 -
0.015 seconds if there is power on the bus. If there is
power on both connections, then they are
There are no common buses of the uninterruptible
synchronized.
power supply. Inverters (devices used to transform
direct current to three-phase alternate current 380V
The TKEO type thyristor switchover device provides
50Hz) of PTS-200 type are fed from buses ±268 V
fast interruption of connection to a failed component.
through automatic devices and cables. The main
This is necessary to decrease the power interruption
characteristics of PTS-200 type inverter are presented
time for the other components connected to the same
in Table 8.4 [62]. In the 1st, 2nd and 3rd trains there
inverter. Interruption time is 0.015 seconds (Table
are 3 inverters connected, and in the 4th, 5th and 6th
8.6).
train there are 4 inverters connected in each train.
Loads, which can not tolerate power interruption more
than 0.02 seconds, are served from the output of Table 8.4 Main characteristics of inverter PTS-200
inverters through a TKEP type and a TKEO type type [62]
thyristor switchover device. Thyristor switchover
device of the TKEP type has two incoming Characteristic Value
connections - a working connection from the inverter
and an auxiliary connection from a 0.4 kV safety bus Input voltage, V 190-290
(Table 8.5) [62]. Output voltage, V 380-400
Output frequency, Hz 48.5-51.5
During normal operation inverters take power from
Nominal output current, A 200
TPPS-800 type rectifiers. In the case of loss of power,
a connection inverter, takes power from an Output power, kW 110
accumulating battery without additional switchover. Total output power, kV⋅A 138
The accumulating battery is under continuously Efficiency under nominal conditions, % 87
charged during normal operation.
Asymmetry of output voltage, V 8
After the connection of diesel generator with a 6 kV Non-sinusoidness of linear voltage, % 5
safety bus the rectifier is automatically started, and it Non-symmetry of phase loads, A, no more 60
begins to charge the discharged battery, providing than
Air-natural cooling
Table 8.3 Main characteristics of the TPPS-800
type rectifier [62]
Table 8.5 Main characteristics of switching device
Characteristic Value TKEP-100 type [62]
Nominal output power, kW 200 Characteristic Value

Nominal rectified voltage, V 240 Nominal voltage, V 380
Nominal rectified current, A 800 Nominal current, A 100
Accuracy of voltage stabilization, % 2 Maximum permissible time of overload
Accuracy of current stabilization when 5 in case of current value equal to:
charging battery, % - 1.1⋅Inom, min, no more 120
Regulation range of rectified voltage in than
case of power supplied from: - 1.2⋅Inom, min, no more 60
additional charging transformer, V 190-290 than
recharging transformer, V 190-360 Air-natural cooling
Regulation range for current stabilization, 120-420
A
Output voltage ripple factor, no more than: Table 8.6 Main characteristics of disconnecting
device TKEO type [62]
- under nominal voltage and nominal load, 8
% Characteristic Value
156
Nominal voltage, V 380 is made to a corresponding train of the reliable power
supply.
Nominal current, A 250
Maximum permissible time of overload Power Supply of Control Cabinets of Functional and
in case of current value equal to: Group Control
- 1.1⋅Inom, min, no more 2
than Control of the main systems of the plant (process
- 1.6⋅Inom, min, no more 1 protection devices of reactor, main circulation circuit,
than emergency core cooling system, accident confinement
Disconnection time, ms, no more 15 system and control rod cooling circuit, automatic and
than blocking devices of main circulation pumps and other)
is provided via control cabinets of functional and
group control.
All components of the safety systems are connected to
different buses of reliable and uninterruptible power Components, which are necessary for the emergency
supply systems according to the permitted power cooldown of the reactor, can be controlled from both
interruption time. the main and the reserve control rooms. There are two
sets of control cabinets. Each set consists of six trains.
8.2.4 Power Supply to Instrumentation and Control Each train is connected to a corresponding train of
Systems uninterruptible power supply system, and an auxiliary
connection is made to a corresponding train of reliable
The system of power supply to instrumentation and power supply.
control devices ensures operation of monitoring,
recording and control devices, blocking devices, A system to switch the control function to the reserve
warning devices, emergency and preventive control room is powered by 220 V DC coming from
protections of main process equipment for all modes of the accumulating batteries. Each of the six circuits is
unit operation. The power supply to instrumentation connected to a corresponding train of the
and control devices is designed in a way to provide uninterruptible power supply system.
power to all steady, transient and emergency modes of
unit operation ensuring normal operation, limits and To ensure functional and group control of the
conditions of safe operation, equipment availability equipment signals from instrumentation, control
and optimization of working parameters. devices and protection devices are directed to the
control cabinets. Also feedback signals re component
Power Supply of Reactor Control and Protection status are provided to the control cabinets.
System
Power Supply to Instrumentation and Control Devices
Control cabinets of the reactor control and protection
system are fed from six power distribution assemblies. The power distribution buses for the instrumentation
Each power distribution assembly has two incoming and control devices have two incoming connections for
connections for the automatic starting of standby the automatic starting of standby equipment. The
equipment. A connection is made to one train of buses are connected to the corresponding train of the
uninterruptible power supply system, and an auxiliary uninterruptible power supply system. Auxiliary
connection - to another train of uninterruptible power connections are made to either the corresponding train
supply system. Control cabinets of control rod drives of uninterruptible power supply system or to the train
are fed from six power distribution assemblies. Each of the reliable power supply system.
power distribution assembly has two incoming
connections for the automatic starting of standby Power Supply to Process Protection Buses
equipment. Connections of three power distribution
assemblies are made to one train of uninterruptible Power distribution buses for process protections are
power supply system, and working connections of the connected to one of the trains of the uninterruptible
other three - to another train of uninterruptible power power supply system and with a corresponding train of
supply system. Auxiliary connections are made to the reliable power supply system through an auxiliary
corresponding train of the reliable power supply connection. However, process protection systems of
system. the main circulation circuit are connected to the
uninterruptible power supply system through auxiliary
Drives, selsyns of control rod drives and selsyns of connections.
position indicators are fed from the power distribution
assemblies. Connection of power distribution Power Supply to the Information Computer System
assemble is made to a corresponding train of
uninterruptible power supply, an auxiliary connection
157
The information computer system is fed from nine power supply system, and working connections of the
distribution buses. Each bus has two incoming other communication network are made to the reliable
connections, and the connections of each bus also power supply system. Auxiliary connections are made
have two incoming connections for automatic starting to the reliable power supply system.
of the stand-by equipment using a TKEP type thyristor
switchover device. Power Supply to Radiation Monitoring Equipment
All six trains are connected to the uninterruptible Power to the control panel of the radiation monitoring
power supply system, and three trains provide power equipment is supplied using two connections to the
for two distribution buses using different TKEP type reliable power supply system. There is an automatic
thyristor switchover devices. Auxiliary connections are start of standby equipment for these connections.
made to all six trains of the uninterruptible power Power to the equipment used for radiation monitoring
supply system, and three trains provide power for two is supplied through two connections to automatic start
distribution buses. Switchover of power supply from of standby equipment. Working connections are made
standard to auxiliary connections is performed to either uninterruptible power supply system or
manually by operators. reliable power supply system. Auxiliary connections
Power Supply to Fire Extinguishing Equipment are made to either reliable power supply system or
normal power supply system accordingly.
The power supply for the fire extinguishing equipment
is provided through two connections for automatic
starting of standby equipment. Both units are
connected to the uninterruptible power supply system.
Auxiliary connections are made to the reliable power
supply system on unit 1, and with the uninterruptible
power supply system on unit 2.
Power Supply to the Communication Network
Power for the communication network of the main

control room and the central control room is supplied
through two connections using automatic starting of
standby equipment. Buses of the communication
network of the main control room and the central
control room are connected to the uninterruptible
158
9. STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM
This Section provides design and operating parameters is not confined). Some of the rooms are equipped with
for the turbine, the generator, the steam supply system pressure gauges which are tied into the emergency
and associated equipment. protection system. A break in these rooms (i.e., in the
compartment of the reactor building) will trip the
9.1 MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM reactor, and it will initiate ECCS flow within about
two seconds.
Steam is supplied to each turbine by means of 8 steam Both the short-term as well as the long-term ECCS
pipelines (630x25) mm from each of the 4 steam functions are activated. The remaining compartments
drums (see Section 5.4). The pipelines include and corridors (i.e., the volumes within turbine
isolation valves, instrumentation and control sensors, building) do not have any pressure gauges to provide
valves used to heat up the drainage pipes, plus SDV-D an excess pressure signals to the emergency protection
and SDV-C valves. Each pipeline is supplied with one system. If a steam piping break should occur in any of
flowmeter and two Main Steam Isolation Valves these rooms, reduction of reactor power and long-term
(MSIV-I) and MSIV-II with bypasses. The MSIV-I ECCS are initiated by out-of-range readings of steam
bypasses are intended to decrease the pressure flow parameters.
difference across the valve during its opening. Four of
the MSIV-II have two bypasses, each with an isolation 9.2 TURBINE AND CONDENSER
valve and a regulating valve, making it possible to
vary the heat up rate of the turbine and regulating The steam turbine is a condensing turbine of type
valves. Two SDV-D valves are connected upstream of K-750-65/3000. It is designed to work together with
the MSIV-I by means of branch pipes. Downstream reactor RBMK-1500, has single stage intermediate
branch pipes connect to the SDV-C valves. Drainage steam superheating and no regulated steam bleeds. It
is provided to empty and to heat up the pipelines. is intended to drive an AC generator of type TVV-
800-2 at 800 MWt power, to carry the base part of the
The SDV-C valves are described in the Subsection load, to provide normal and emergency regulation of
5.4.1.1. SDV-D are fast acting isolating and regulating power to an external grid and to cover the variable
valves, and can be controlled either manually from the part of the load. The turbine is assembled on a single
MCR or automatically by a regulating device. There shaft and has five cylinders, which includes one high
are two SDV-D valves, each rated at 201.4 kg/s. They pressure cylinder and four low pressure cylinders
are used to decrease main steam pressure down to the with eight discharges and four condensers. The
pressure in the steam header for in plant needs, and technical specifications of the turbine are presented in
for the heating of deaerator feed water. The technical the Table 9.2.
specifications of the SDV-D valve is presented in the
Table 9.1. The high pressure cylinder uses a two-stream design.
There are 6 pressure cascades in each stream.
Equipment and piping of the system are located in a Cascades 1, 2, 3 of each stream are placed within the
limited access zone in the main section of the main inner case. Cascades 4, 5, 6 are placed in two casings -
building in rooms periodically accessed by personnel. cascades 4 and 5 are placed in the first casing along
All these rooms and corridors are vented to the the stream flow, cascade 6 is placed in the second one.
environment (i.e., a discharge from the steam line The inner case, casing and outer case form the circular
break chamber, from which steam is bled-off to the
Table 9.1 Fast-acting steam discharge valve to condenser. The circular chamber, formed by the
deaerators (SDV-D) [62] (type 1034-300/300-E, casings, is used for steam bleed-off to the Low
manufacturer - Tchechovskoy Plant of Energy Pressure Reheater - 5 (LPR-5). The low pressure
Engineering, Russia) reheaters are described in the Section 5.5.
Number per reactor 2 Steam distribution in the turbine is of the throttle type.
Capacity, kg/s 201.4 The steam intake chamber is cast together with the
Equivalent diameter, inlet/outlet, mm 300/300 inner case, and steam is supplied into the lower half of
the High Pressure Cylinder (HPC), where two flanges
Working pressure, MPa 7.1/4.2
o
are placed to connect the steam supply branching
Working temperature, C 285 pipes from the Turbine Isolating and Regulating
Time to full opening, s 10 Valves (TIRV). From the HPC steam passes through
Maximum cross-section of valve gate, cm2 286 four lines to the four steam-separator reheaters. The
steam-separator reheater SPP-750 is constructed from
Average lifetime, years 30
a single vessel. The heating steam (live steam,
Weight, kg 1353 pressure
158
6.5 MPa) to the reheater is removed ahead of HPC. In Temperature of steam after separator -
the separator water drops are separated from the steam steam reheater, °C 263
and the steam is reheated, (steam moisture after the
last stage of the high pressure cylinder is 14.7 %, and Intake of steam occurs symmetrically from two sides
after the reheater it is 1.0 %). Technical specifications into the lower half. Discharge branch pipes of the LPC
of the steam-separator reheater are presented in the are connected to an intermediate pipe and to a
Table 9.3. From there the steam is fed to the Low condenser by welds. Steam bleeds are located in each
Pressure Cylinders (LPC). Each of the four LPC is of LPC after cascades 1, 2 and 4. Steam comes from
two-stream design with five pressure cascades in bleeds to LPR-3, LPR-2 and LPR-1 correspondingly.
each stream.
The main turbine shaft consists of five rotors,
connected to each other. It is connected to the rotor
Table 9.2 Main technical characteristics of the of
turbine K-750-65/3000 [62]
Number per reactor 2 Table 9.3 Technical specification of steam-
separator reheater SPP-750 [62]
Power, MW 750
Type of steam distribution throttle Number for one turbine 4
Design structure of turbine 2LPC-HPC-2LPC Thermal power, MW 48.1
Number of cylinders, pcs 2 Hydraulic resistance, kPa (kgf/cm )2
2.45 (0.025)
Number of LPC discharges, pcs 8 Parameters of reheated steam at the inlet:
Number of cascades in HPC, pcs 6x2 flow rate of wet steam, kg/s 212
Number of cascades in each LPC, pcs 5x2 pressure, MPa (kgf/cm2) 0.47 (4.8)
temperature, °C 149
Rotation speed of rotor driven by rotor 3.8
humidity, % 15.3
device, rpm
maximum pressure MPa (kgf/cm2) 0.69 (7.0)
Nominal rotation speed of turbine rotor, rpm 3000 maximum temperature, °C 164
Length of working blade of last cascade Parameters of reheated steam at the outlet:
of HPC, mm 1030 steam flow rate, kg/s 181
Dimensions of turbine (without condenser): humidity, % 1.0
length, m 40.6 steam temperature, °C 263±3
height from maintenance level, m 5.2 Parameters of heating steam at the inlet:
width (measured with HPC balcony), m 8.7 flow rate, kg/s 31.1
Absolute pressure of live steam: pressure, MPa (kgf/cm2) 6.19 (63.1)
nominal, MPa (kgf/cm2) 6.38 (65.0) temperature, °C 278
maximum (in case of trip of one humidity, % 0.6
turbine), MPa (kgf/cm2) 7.55 (77.0) maximum pressure, MPa (kgf/cm2) 7.36 (75.0)
Nominal temperature of live steam, °C 279.5 maximum temperature, °C 289
Dryness of live steam: Height, mm 13240
nominal 0.995
Outer diameter of the case, mm 4000
minimal 0.99
Maximum mass flow rate of live steam to Case wall thickness, mm 24
the turbine, including mass flow rate of 1222 Weight:
heating steam to intermediate circuit, (4400) dry, kg 162000
kg/s (ton/h) filled with water, kg 264000
Calculated steam dryness after separation 0.99 Filled volume:
Calculated absolute pressure in condenser total, m3 102
given calculated temperature of cooling 4.41 case, m3 77
3
water equal to 15°C and flow rate 122600 (0.045) tubes with upper and lower chambers, m 25
m3/h (to 4 condensers), kPa (kgf/cm2) Total surface of flow to the shutter, m2 29.2
Maximum temperature of cooling water,
Number of tubes in the bunch of steam 8420
when reliable turbine operation is 33 reheater, pcs
ensured (with decrease of power), °C
Outer diameter of tube of the bunch, mm 16
Absolute pressure of steam in turbine 0.108
seals, MPa (kgf/cm2) (1.1) Wall thickness of tube of the bunch, mm 2
Absolute pressure of steam incoming into 0.485 Design length of heat exchanging part
8200
LPC, MPa (kgf/cm2) (4.94) of tube bunch, mm
159
Outer heat exchanging surface of tube speed increases by 10-12% above nominal values.
3468
bunch, m2 Actuation of any ring in the device leads to closure of
Width of tube bunch desk, mm 400 all TIRVs. Test of the rings and sliding valves, which
are controlled by the rings, can be performed by an
increase of rotation speed or by modulation of the oil
a generator by stiff clutches. The rotor of the LPC is supply to the rings at nominal rotation speed. After
welded and stiff, the rotor of the HPC is forged from a actuation of the safety device, reopening of the TIRV
single piece and is flexible. Turbine design makes it is possible only after the rotor rotation speed is
possible to remove moisture from the steam flowing decreased down to 3050 rpm.
through the turbine and thus keep steam humidity at a
minimal level. The turbine case, blades and rotor seals The turbine is provided with two redundant
are designed to resist erosion and corrosion caused by electromagnetic protecting devices. These are actuated
wet steam. The surface of the horizontal joint, by the following conditions:
contacting surfaces of diaphragms of the inner case
and the casing of the LPC are clad with stainless steel. • local manual actuation,
In case of steam flow through the horizontal joint of • remote manual actuation by the turbine trip key,
the HPC provisions are made for the removal of • actuation of protective measures which generate a
drainage water. The turbine includes a special turbine trip.
sprinkler device to the discharge branch pipe of the
LPC to prevent its overheating during startup and Actuation of any of protecting devices leads to closure
when the turbine load is below 150 MWt. of the TIRVs.
The turbine is equipped with a regulating and Measures designed to prevent a turbine run-away
protecting system, which provides control of turbine during a turbine emergency trip due to backflow of
operation and automatic maintenance of required steam from the LPR and the header of the in-house
parameters during power operation of the turbine, steam supply, and to prevent ingress of a steam-water
during loading, unloading, start-up and shut-down. It mixture from the reheaters into the turbine include:
protects the turbine from over speeding and initiates check valves of KOS type installed in steam supply
an emergency trip in accident conditions. The pipes from bleed-off to LPR-2, 3, 5, in pipes to the
automatic regulation and protection system is an header of the in-house supply and in pipes to boilers of
electric hydraulic system which can be controlled in the intermediate circuit of district heating. Each check
two ways - employing the hydraulic or the electric valve includes a hydraulic drive, which is actuated by
hydraulic control mechanisms. condensate through two automatic valves. The valves
are controlled by electric magnets. The magnets are
Standard control is based on an Electric Hydraulic controlled by a signal coming from either the end
Control System (EHCS). It is provided by the breakers, which are installed on the drives of the
electronic part of the regulation system ASUT-750. TIRV, or from generator circuit breakers.
EHCS, as the principal means to regulate the turbine.
Spent steam from the LPC is directed to turbine
A Hydraulic Control System (HCS) serves as an condensers (type K-16560). The turbine condenser is
auxiliary means of control. This system is provided intended to condense waste steam coming from the
with hydraulic sensors monitoring the rotation speed turbine. In addition to this, the condenser receives
of the turbine rotor (impeller and sliding valve of the steam bypassing the turbine (from SDV-C valves)
speed regulator), hydraulic components for regulating during startup and during transient operation modes.
feedback and mechanism of turbine control. The HCS It is also used to collect leaks and blowdown water
is in a standby mode if EHCS is in operation. coming from equipment and valves. There are
4 condensers installed for one turbine. They are
An automatic regulation and protection system single-flow, two-path condensers with provisions for
actuates TIRV drives, which are used to supply and to the removal of noncondensable gases located in the
regulate the steam flow through the turbine within the central section. The technical specification of the
operating margins for the EHCS and HCS modes. The turbine condenser is presented in the Table 9.4.
system features the ability of HCS to affect EHCS
operation by a ball relief valve. This valve performs a Each condenser has atmospheric valves, which protect
protective function and serves to mitigate the condenser from excessive pressure loads.
consequences in case of loss of electric load and failure Atmospheric valves are designed for pressures of
of EHCS. 103 kPa. Because of the vacuum in the condenser, air
enters through any available openings. This air and
An automatic ring type safety device is provided to noncondensable gases are removed from the central
protect turbine from exceeding rotor rotation speed part of the condenser by the main steam ejectors. The
limits. The device is actuated, if the rotor rotation noncondensable gases include hydrogen and oxygen
160
which, if present at certain concentrations, can form the generator serves as the in-house power source
an explosive mixture. The hydrogen is generated by (via service transformers 24/6 kV).
radiolysis, when the two-phase water-steam coolant
passes through the reactor core. An ejector propels this Each unit is equipped with two TVV-800-2UZ turbine
gas mixture into a combustion chamber where generators. A rigid coupling connects the generator
recombination of H2 occurs. The resulting vapor-gas with the steam turbine. The generator is a synchronous
mixture is then directed to the de-contamination unit three-phase electrical machine. The excitation system
where the activity of gas-air mixture is reduced is powered from an auxiliary three-phase synchronous
before 50 Hz generator (exciter) which is connected with the
Table 9.4 Technical specification of turbine shaft of the main generator by a rigid coupling. The
condenser K-16560 [62] technical specifications of the generator are presented
in Table 9.6.
Number per turbine 4 Table 9.5 Technical specification of the main
Cooling surface, m2 16560 turbine ejector of EPO-3-220 type [62]
Calculated mass flow rate of condensed 176.4
Number per turbine 4
steam, kg/s (ton/h) (634.91)
Steam pressure , MPa (kgf/cm2) 0.785 (8)
Absolute steam pressure near condenser 4.41 (0.045)
flange, kPa (kgf/cm2) Steam temperature, °C 172
Temperature of cooling water: Steam flow rate , kg/s 1.055
in the inlet, °C 15 Capacity related to Steam-Gas-Air
in the outlet, °C 26 Mixture (SGAM), kg/s 0.06
Number of cooling tubes, pcs 16440 220 Pressure of SGAM after I cascade, 0.402
Dimensions of cooling tubes, mm 28x1, 28x2 kPa, (kgf/cm2) (0.0041)
Active length of tubes, mm 11460 Temperature of SGAM after I cascade, °C 23
Tube material copper-nickel alloy Pressure of steam in the discharge, MPa 0.11-0.13
Number of water passes, pcs 2 (kgf/cm2) (1.1-1.3)
Mass flow rate of cooling water, kg/s 8514 Flow rate of cooling water, kg/s (ton/h) 152.8 (550)
(ton/h) (30650) Temperature of cooling water, °C 31
Water speed in the tubes, m/s 1.95 Length of hydraulic lock between second
Hydraulic resistance in water piping, kPa 51.0 (0.52) and third cascade, m 8
(kgf/cm2) Length of hydraulic lock between first
Hydraulic resistance in steam piping, kPa 0.432 and second cascade, m 4
(kgf/cm2) (0.0044)
Permissible absolute working pressure in 196.2 (2.0) The generator cooling system is designed as follows:
the water volume, kPa (kgf/cm2) stator and rotor windings are cooled directly by
Condenser weight in working conditions, 572000 distilled water and hydrogen, respectively, while the
kg active steel parts of the stator are cooled indirectly by
hydrogen. The generator has been designed as a closed
sealed machine. The gas-tight body consists of three
it is released to the atmosphere. The technical sections: a central section and two end sections. The
specification of the main steam ejector is presented in central section which contains the stator core with the
the Table 9.5. windings is integral. The stator winding is three-
phase, two-layer.
The condensate is retrieved from the turbine
condensers by two groups of condensate pumps. Each The winding rods are braided from solid and hollow
group consists from three pumps (one is on stand-by) conductors. To cool the winding, distilled water flows
for each turbine (see Section 5.5). in hollow conductors. Outer stator shields are
combined with inner shields to which the shields of
9.3 GENERATOR the internal fans are connected. All sections of the fan
shields are isolated from the inner shields and from
The turbine generators convert mechanical energy of each other. The generator rotor is a single-piece
the rotating turbine shaft into three-phase a.c. 50 Hz forging made from special steel which ensures its
24 kV electricity. Operating together with a 24/330 kV mechanical strength under all operating conditions.
main transformer, the generator supplies power to the The rotor winding is made of copper bars with a silver
grid at 330 kV. Under normal operating conditions, additive. Wedges which hold winding in slots have
intake and outlet holes to let the cooling gas in and
161
out. The holes coincide with internal channels in the performed by operators manually. The systems can be
conductors of the winding coils. The rotor winding is changed when the generator is operating within the
cooled directly by hydrogen in a self-ventilation grid. Slip-rings which supply excitation d.c. to rotor
pattern, with gas taken from the air clearance in the winding are installed on the rotor shaft downstream
machine. Hydrogen circulates in the generator body from the bearing on the exciter side. An excitation
driven by fans installed on the rotor shaft. To cool current is supplied to the slip-rings by a brush cross-
hydrogen circulating in the body, four gas coolers are arm. The cross-arm with the brushes is mounted on
installed in the end sections of the generator. the foundation-plate near the bearing. The slip-rings
and the brush set are cooled and ventilated by fans
Each generator has its own excitation system; there is mounted on the rotor shaft between the slip-rings, with
also a backup excitation system shared by two air taken from the turbine hall.
generators. The change from one system to the other
is The joints connecting the stator body and outer shields
Table 9.6 Main characteristics of turbine generator are sealed by rubber seals. Inner shields (relative to
TVV-800-2UZ [62] the stator body) are sealed with a circular rubber cord.
Mechanical strength of all parts of the body and outer
Number per reactor 2 shields is sufficient to withstand pressure resulting
Full capacity, kVA 889000 from hydrogen explosion inside the generator. The
Active power, kW 800000 generator shaft sealing system prevents hydrogen
leakage along the rotor shaft penetrations via end
Stator voltage, V 24000 shields of the generator body.
Stator current, A 21400
Rotor current, A 3800 Thrust bearings in the generator are of a stack type,
Rotor voltage, V 600 they are movable, with a self-positioning ball insert.
The bearing installed on the exciter side is isolated
Capacity factor 0.9 from the foundation-plate and oil pipelines to avoid
Efficiency, % 98.75 bearing currents. Exciter bearings are isolated from
Connection of stator winding phases Star-to-star the fourndation-plate as well.
Frequency, Hz 50
To make the system explosion-proof, the generator
Rotational speed, rpm 3000 and the auxiliary systems are equipped with
Flywheel torque, TM2 56 instruments monitoring hydrogen leakage. Signals
Critical rotational speed, rpm 690/1960 from the sensors are picked up by the MCR. In case
hydrogen appears in the bearing casings, gas trap and
Nominal hydrogen overpressure in the
490 other locations, the operator injects nitrogen there to
body, kPa
prevent formation of an explosive mixture. Hydrogen
Nominal distillate overpressure at the composition in the generator body is monitored
442
stator winding inlet, kPa continuously.
Nominal temperature of incoming
40
distillate, °C All generator systems holding oil are equipped with
Permissible temperatures: foam fire extinguishers. Other fire extinguishing
means are available near the generator and serve to
Temperature of generator stator 75
confine potential ignition locations in small volumes.
winding, °C Nitrogen supply is provided to extinguish fire in the
Rotor winding temperature, °C 115 generator body, exciter, bearings, seals, 24 kV current
Temperature of active stator steel, °C 105 buses.
Distillate temperature at stator winding
85
outlet, °C
Temperature of hot gas in the generator
75
body, °C
Temperature of hot gas at the brush
75
cross-arm outlet, °C
Oil temperature at bearing/sealing inlets, 45
°C
Oil temperature at bearing/sealing outlets, 65
°C
Maximum permissible excess of rotor
winding temperature over temperature 75
of incoming cold hydrogen (40°C), °C
162
10. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
Several projects related to the safety analysis of the report was Ignalina NPP responsibility, supported by
Ignalina NPP or its safety systems have been RBMK design institute, RDIPE and Western engineering
performed. The joint Lithuanian - Sweden Barselina companies. The review was undertaken by Western and
project - the first probabilistic assessment for RBMK Eastern technical support organizations, including
type reactors - was conducted [63]. A peer review of Lithuanian Energy Institute. A Panel of international
this Ignalina PSA project was conducted by Pacific nuclear safety experts, Ignalina Safety Panel, was
Northwest National Laboratory. The hardware established in accordance with the Grant Agreement. The
required to use US Nuclear Regulatory Commission objectives and role of ISP was to monitor and supervise
computer code for conducting probabilistic risk the scope and production of the SAR and its review
assessment was purchased and delivered to the processes and to make independent recommendations to
Ignalina Safety Analysis Group. A plant analyzer and the Lithuanian Government, Ignalina NPP, VATESI and
computer workstation were delivered to the ISAG, Donor Countries regarding a decision for continued plant
with additional hardware to support the extension of operation and implementation strategies of the SAR and
the Ignalina plant analyzer to multiple simultaneous RSR recommendations once the assessment was finalized.
users. An evaluation of the RBMK-1500 accident The NSA provided 8.5 million ECU to fund the external
confinement system [64] was performed by a joint assistance work.
team from Ignalina Safety Analysis Group and the
Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of The clear separation of the SAR production and its
Maryland. The study of the RBMK-1500 ACS was independent review, performed in parallel and providing
performed using the state-of-the-art codes RELAP5 interactive feedback has proven very effective in ensuring
and CONTAIN, and is the first study that analyzes not an objective in-depth assessment. The SAR and RSR
only short-term, but also long-term (up to 24 hours) teams have identified safety issues and make
aspects of LOCA transients for primary system and the recommendations on necessary safety improvements in
ACS. design, operation and safety culture required as sound
basis for plant operation. All recommendations were
An in-depth safety assessment of the Ignalina NPP was accepted by the Ignalina NPP and included in new Safety
undertaken and as a result a Safety Analysis Report has Improvement Program [66]. Implementation of all
been produced [62] and reviewed [65]. The safety improvements will greatly improve the safety level of
assessment of Ignalina NPP is the first attempt to Ignalina. Main SAR results are presented in Sections 10
perform Western-type safety analysis for any Soviet- and 11 of this Source Book.
design nuclear power plant. A plant-specific Safety
Analysis Report is produced which will form the basis As to system analysis, the SAR defines more than
for decisions on future operation of Ignalina NPP. 50 systems which constitute the main operational, safety
The SAR aims to: grade and related support functions of the plant. The
scope of analysis of these systems include Engineering
• assess the current level of safety of the plant Assessment of the capability of existing systems,
through an analysis and its review comparable to assessment of the value of options for removing or
that commonly performed for Western nuclear reducing non-compliance’s and Single Failure Analysis.
power plants, System analysis is performed primarily to demonstrate
• identify and evaluate any factors which may compliance with deterministic rules and standards in
limit the safe operation of the plant in the force in Lithuania and safety practice in the west.
foreseeable future, Assessment of the value of options forms an important
• assess the Ignalina NPP safety standards and input to the categorization and justification of non-
practices, compliance’s. Particular emphasis was laid on
• recommend any additional improvements which compliance with the single criterion. An investigation was
are reasonably practicable and provide estimates carried out to determine whether all systems which are
of their cost and schedule. claimed as providing protection against faults are able to
carry out their functions in the event of any single failure.
The safety analysis will consider a safety assessment The procedure to be followed in the work programs
of both units at the Ignalina NPP. The main reference required that the vital safety system functions be shown
plant for the project is unit 1, but a survey is included to conform to IAEA Safety Practice [67]. Non-
which defines the differences between unit 1 and compliance’s with requirements for robustness against
unit 2 and assesses their safety. single failure had to be justified. Additional safety aspects,
such as the impact of maintenance, testability, reliability
or external events (fire, flooding) on system functions
The assessment consist of two elements: Safety Analysis
were considered according to Western practice.
Report and an independent Review of Safety Report. The
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The reports of system analysis performed represents
The depth of assessment of particular system depends significant efforts and form a compilation of issues
on category of system. The category definitions are as such as:
follows:
• system description, design, operation,
Category A - These systems are front line safety of • related functional and regulatory requirements,
mitigation systems, or important process • demonstration of capabilities and compliance’s
systems. A full Engineering Assessment with requirements,
and Single Failure Analysis was • assessment of system and single failure shortcuts,
performed for category A system. • consideration of recommendations raised in past
studies and missions,
Category B - These systems are deemed to be less • compilation of non-compliance’s and related
important than category A systems from recommendations.
a safety perspective, and there assessed
in less depth. An Engineering In order to present a coherent picture of the system
Assessment was performed for each analysis performed in the SAR, this Section presents
system and includes consideration of the results integrated according to the following major
single failures. functions:
Category C - These systems are considered less • reactor control and protection,
important as category A or B systems, • emergency process protection,
but a separate Engineering Assessment • emergency core cooling,
was prepared nevertheless. The depth of • accident confinement,
the assessment is somewhat less than
• feedwater and steam supply (normal heat removal),
that for category B systems.
• support functions.
The Engineering Assessment typically comprises the
It is necessary to emphasize that as a general
following:
consideration in this work, the international team has
performed and reviewed analysis similar to that
• identification of safety-related and non-safety
performed for the Ignalina NPP on NPPs that in theory
functional and design requirements based on the
were designed to very strict Western standards and
review of the system description and relevant
criteria. In all cases, issues were identified that
Lithuanian regulatory documents,
required corrective actions. This is not unanticipated.
• identification of relevant regulatory requirements It occurs every time such analysis is performed. In
from Lithuanian documents and IAEA guides, fact, the international reviewers would have been most
• identification of requirements imposed on system surprised to have a comprehensive investigation not
by connected and support systems, identify anything that needed to be improved. This is
• identification of requirements imposed on the why regulators request NPPs to perform new
system by other safety-related systems, assessments and investigations - it leads to continuous
• assessment of compliance with the functional and safety improvement.
design requirements, with the regulatory
requirements, and with requirements imposed by 10.1 REACTOR CONTROL AND PROTECTION
other systems, SYSTEM
• a review of critical installation aspects,
• a review of critical operational issues, including The CPS is an integrated system which provides for
testability, maintainability and system and normal reactor control and power regulation, as well as
component reliability, automatic safety-related reactor shut-down when certain
• a review and assessment of any issues identified at reactor operational limits are exceeded. So, the Control
the start of the SAR project, and Protection System serves for dual purpose of reactor
• an assessment of the differences between unit 1and power control during normal operation and reactor
2. shutdown under accident conditions. Such a dual purpose
system would not be allowably by Western safety
The Single Failure Analysis for a system is performed authorities. The SAR study of the CPS confirmed the
by identifying in the system, and assessing the impact findings from the previous RBMK safety studies that
of, its failure on the safety performance of the system. there was inadequate separation of the control and
Recommendations are identified if single failure of a protective functions within the CPS. Specific problems
component can impact the ability of the system to meet identified includes:
its safety objective.
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• sharing of common sensors used for both automatic study for a second shutdown system. Several options were
power regulation and initiating emergency reactor investigated in this study and a second shutdown system
shut-down under accident conditions, with ball-type absorbers was proposed. Ignalina plant
• inadequate spatial separation of critical redundant staff engineers have visited the United Kingdom and
instrumentation and power supply cables, convinced that operating model of the shutdown system
with ball-type absorbers does not exist, in spite of
• physical arrangement of all start-up range statements that such system are used at British plants.
instrumentation in one cabinet, Development of a new shutdown system which has no
• physical arrangement of all power setpoint devices in predecessors would require inadmissible long period of
one cabinet, time which is commensurable with plant operation
• sharing of common setpoint devices for automatic lifetime. This drastically change the opinion of Ignalina
control and initiation of reactor shut-down, staff about the shutdown system with ball-type absorbers
• inadequate analog signal isolation between circuits and thus such an option was not accepted by the Ignalina
used for reactor shut-down and those used for display NPP on October 9-13, 1995 in the Vienna meeting where
and monitoring. design options for second shutdown systems for RBMK
reactors [68] were discussed. Therefore, the plant asked
The Safety Analysis Report does not make a safety case an European Commission to initiate an additional project
which justifies the acceptability of the current design of and provide financial support to perform a feasibility
CPS. The design features of the system are only provided study of a second shutdown system for Ignalina NPP,
in a very limited detail in the system description. This taking into account experiences on the development of
description focuses heavily on the power distribution independent shutdown systems for RBMK reactors.
control and local area regulating systems. Very little
description is provided regarding the emergency reactor The RSR evaluated the limited design information
shut-down provision which effect safety and reliability. contained in the CPS system description, and the SAR
The Engineering Assessment was prepared to Engineering Assessment and Single Failure Analysis. In
substantiate the case that the CPS is in compliance with order to understand the basic design details the RSR
key regulatory requirements. The Engineering conducted two walkdowns of the installed system and
Assessment actually produced is based on a very large met with Ignalina plan personnel involved in operation
number of proprietary internal RDIPE technical reports and maintenance of the CPS. These walkdowns were
which have not been released for independent done without the benefits of any detailed wiring diagrams
assessment. In a number of areas the Engineering of the CPS. The Ignalina staff were responsive and they
Assessment states that regulatory requirements is met. attempted to provide all requested plant documents. The
The documentation does not in all cases state how the walkdowns, limited as they were due to lack of the wiring
requirement met. The documentation does not provide an diagrams and schematic, confirmed the basic design
identification of what parts of the regulation there is concerns of the SAR team. The walkdowns and
compliance, specific design features which are not in subsequent discussions with plant staff also identified
compliance with regulations, and the technical some CPS safety issues not identified by the SAR work.
justification for allowing continued operation despite the The RSR reject the safety case presented in the SAR
non-compliance’s. The Single Failure Analysis is submittal on CPS based on the failure to provide the basic
supposed to confirm that no single failures are present design information and supporting information contained
that can defeat the functioning of the system. Thus the in the referenced topical reports which justify compliance
key documents prepared to demonstrate the safety case with regulatory criteria. The RSR recommended that
fail to identify basic design and operational Ignalina NPP [63]:
characteristics, fail to demonstrate how regulatory criteria
are complied with, and fail to show that there are not • install a trip memory reset button in each of the AZ-1
major single failures present in design. and FASS trip channels to permit electronically
resetting the channels,
The position taken by SAR was: because the CPS not • promptly prepare, and submit for VATESI approval,
designed to Western standards, the lack of separation the necessary design and safety information on the
between control and protective function is pervasive, it CPS which is comparable to that required by any
was proposed that instead of trying to separate the two Western nuclear regulatory authority,
functions within the existing CPS, a second diverse • perform and submit for VATESI approval a complete
shutdown system be designed and implemented. This Single Failure Analysis performed from bottom up
diverse system would provide fast shutdown for all versus simplified top down approach used in the SAR
accident sequences and covers all accidents within design submittal,
basis set for Ignalina NPP. However, such a system • prepare a safety case justifying continued operation of
requires approximately four years to engineer, install and the existing system based on completion of the above
commission. Ignalina NPP agreed with this proposal. two actions. Such a safety case will identify how the
EBRD has already funded through the Safety specific design non-compliance’s will be dealt with
Improvement Program of Ignalina NPP [22] a feasibility during plant operations, where additional technical
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specification limitations are warranted, and where trip function being deliberately disabled without the
other interim measures will be implemented, operator’s knowledge.
• pursue installation of a diverse shutdown system.
Very much similar to the case for the CPS, the SAR does
The Ignalina Safety Panel holds the view that the most not make a safety case which justifies the acceptability of
important safety issues in design and operation must be the current design of the EPPS. The design features of the
resolved without delay. Among the SAR’s system are only provided in very limited detail in the CPS
recommendations are the installation of second system description. Very little description is provided
independent shutdown systems at both units, but this regarding the emergency reactor shut-down provision
would take about 4 years. The Ignalina Safety Panel did which effect safety and reliability. For the major concerns
not recommend the installation of such system at unit 1 listed above, the SAR assessment noted the following
because it is expected to be shut down between 1999 and justification and recommendations for improvement:
2002. In particular, the ISP recommends that before either
unit restarts from its 1997 maintenance outage the • The use of common trip units for protection and
following items related to CPS should be resolved: control violates Western independence principles. It
should be possible to at least segregate into physical
• single Failure Analysis of the control and protection trip units, the functions of reactor protection and
system should be completed, normal operation. This conditions is particularly noted
• design and procedural modifications required to in the following key process trip functions:
compensate for control and protection system
deficiencies should be identified and implemented. ∗ reactor protection for loss of CPS channel cooling,
∗ reactor protection for loss of both turbines,
A number of issues concerning CPS, that were raised by ∗ reactor feeder pipes compartment over-pressure
SAR and RSR teams have been resolved by the Ignalina trip,
NPP and, in the opinion of VATESI, the planning of ∗ leak-tight compartment over-pressure trip.
compensatory measures for lack of scram diversity has
reached an acceptable stage to permit restart. Ignalina It is recommended that a new diverse and separated trip
NPP plans to introduce an independent high pressure be installed in Ignalina NPP as a least cost alternative to
scram parameter aimed at removing residual concerns complete reconfiguring of the existing EPPS.
about ATWS scenarios during the next outage. The other
follow-up actions to resolved critical CPS issues are • The potential loss of several trip functions in an area
further discussed in detail together with related EPPS event such as fire, due to the lack of physical
critical issues in the next Section. separation of cabling of the channels, is significant.
This must be addressed and corrected with high
10.2 EMERGENCY PROCESS PROTECTION priority.
SYSTEM • The latch with automatic 40 second reset in contrary
to Western practice. The SAR team concludes this
The Emergency Process Protection System is an should be replaced by a permanent latch such as a
integrated system used to trip or reduce the reactor power channeled or parametric trip reset. This would then
for abnormal process parameter conditions. The EPPS is require the operator to investigate any anomalous
also used to provide for the protection of major channel trips to establish the cause of channel trip and
equipment. This equipment protection function was not take any corrective actions.
assessed in the SAR because the capability is not credited • The annunciation will alert the operator to any
in the safety analysis. The SAR assessment noted that the deliberate disabling of a detection function even
major areas of concern are: though this loss will not disable the reactor trip
function. But, since the alarm system is enabled on the
• there is a mixture of reactor safety functions and first disabling of a transmitter circuit, means must be
normal reactor operating functions operated by the developed to detect subsequent disabling of transmitter
same circuitry, contrary to Western safety principles, circuit, so that a reactor trip function cannot be
• there is a lack of physical separation of cabling of the deliberately disabled without operator knowledge.
channels which potentially could lead to loss of
several trip functions in an area event, such as a fire, The RSR underlined that the system analysis of
• all circuits in force to trip reactor by AZ-1 use a 40 CPS/EPPS were not based on sufficient as built detailed
second latch to seal in a momentary trip condition, documentation of the system configuration. Reliable
which then automatically resets the circuit when the Single Failure Analysis were not performed. The recent
signal is no longer present. This does not allow the safety standards of CPS/EPPS raises lots of concerns.
operator to investigate spurious or anomalous trips Particular weaknesses in system independence
and take corrective action to prevent their recurrence, (control/protection), lack of segregation, lack of diversity,
• the annunciation system design and operational defects in the operation of the CPS/EPPS (reset procedure,
protocols do not preclude the possibility of a reactor automatic reset function) do not allow RSR to support any
166
statements of conformance to the minimum requested and Control Department at Ignalina NPP, and with
reliability of the shut-down function and actuation of vital external guidance from Swedish experts (ES-Konsult
safety systems. AB). The scope of the analysis produced focuses (as
originally intended) on single failures arising from
The final RSR review of the SAR evaluation of internal faults within the CPS-EPPS-TITAN systems
CPS/EPPS resulted in the rejection of the submitted and associated support systems (e.g. power supplies,
CPS/EPPS safety case based on the failure to provide the ventilation). Very detailed analysis has been
basic design information and supporting information. The performed to find out whether failure of a single
RSR recommends the Ignalina NPP promptly prepare and component could cause a loss of safety function. Due
submit for VATESI approval, the necessary design and to potential for severe consequences the shutdown
safety information on the EPPS portion of CPS which is function is of utmost importance. External faults (such
comparable to that required by any Western nuclear as fire and seismic) while acknowledged to be
regulatory authority. This submittal should include a important, are being dealt with via other Ignalina
comprehensive safety justification, reliability and single safety improvement program [66] efforts currently
failure assessment, and an integration assessment of the under way and are not as extensively dealt with in the
CPS/ECCS. Once the action noted above is complete, the study.
Ignalina NPP should present a safety case to justify
continued operation of the current system, which includes The review of this study consisted of detailed review of
additional technical specifications or limitations, where the Single Failure Analysis documentation by a team
necessary, and any interim measures required to consisting of members of the original Ignalina RSR
compensate for system design weaknesses during plant team including experts from the Ignalina Safety
operations. This safety case must be submitted for review Analysis Group and Western organizations.
and approval to VATESI. The RSR also recommends that Summarizing the major conclusions and findings [70]:
should the decision be made to install a new diverse shut-
down system to complement the existing CPS, Ignalina • The review found that the Single Failure Analysis
NPP should perform a comprehensive safety and (SFA) was carried out in compliance with the
reliability assessment to document how the EPPS will recommendations of the RSR and Ignalina Safety
interface and be impacted by such an installation. This Panel (ISP) and used the required IAEA safety
assessment should also include documentation of how the guides and standards.
new diverse system may address current EPPS
weaknesses. As recommended follow-up actions, the The study considered 21 postulated initiating
RSR identified the strong need for INPP to: events which place a wide spectrum of demands
on the proper functioning of the CPS/EPPS. The
• perform a complete Single Failure Analysis of RSR reviewers looked at CPS/EPPS logic dealing
the CPS, including provision of all the necessary with all 21 PIEs. The 21 PIEs chosen, were
in-depth supporting documentation to allow developed from the list used in the Barselina PSA
VATESI to review the issue. This should include Report [63]. The body of the analysis
functional block diagrams, circuit schematics, systematically looked for undetectable (latent)
and wiring diagrams, faults and documented the results via failure
• perform a detailed assessment of the EPPS reset modes and effects analysis tables. The RSR
memory circuits, reviewers were provided with all documentation
• install buttons/circuits to permit resetting of the requested, and answers to all technical questions,
tripped channels in the CPS, and were able to duplicate much of the analysts
• perform an engineering assessment, design and work. This provided high confidence in the
testing towards a diverse shutdown system. This integrity of the analysis.
includes demonstrating that the diverse system
will address identified problems with the existing • Original RSR concerns [65] regarding safety
CPS, impact of AZ-1 reset logic and EPPS 40 second
• develop compensatory measures to increase the logic pulse/reset have all been fully resolved and
reliability of the scram function in the short term, the reviewers conclude there are no single failures
• prepare a safety case justifying limited or safety concerns.
continuing operation of the existing CPS/EPPS.
• The RSR review of the SFA identified the issue of
INPP has been fully responsive to these non-compliance with current standards [71] for
recommendations and initiated the effort to perform a analog signal isolation between CPS measurement
detailed and comprehensive Single Failure Analysis channel signals and the TITAN system. This was
[69] and prepare a safety case. The work was expected from past safety reviews of RBMK-type
performed by a team of analysts from the Lithuanian reactors. The SFA clearly notes that the current
State Information Technology Institute, with analog signal interface circuits are designed to
significant technical input from the Instrumentation preclude a fault originating in the CPS from
167
propagating back to the TITAN system. The future modifications designed to improve the
circuit design uses only a 1kΩ resistor to isolate reliability of the CPS/EPPS utilize “de-energize to
the CPS from faults originating in the TITAN trip” logic.
system. This design is not in conformance with
generally accepted Western nuclear safety • The RSR reviewers thoroughly reviewed all 21
standards [71]. The interfaces between CPS/EPPS postulated initiating events evaluated in the
and TITAN involve circuits of an older design CPS/EPPS Single Failure Analysis. This included
which do not possess current day analog signal detailed technical review of the submittal
isolation devices. However, based upon materials, issuing requests for further back-up
information provided by the INPP it is clear that documentation and schematics, and meeting
the impacts of such adverse interactions will be no
more severe than the loss of a single CPS/EPPS
channel - in the worst case. In view of this, the
RSR reviewers have concluded the design meets
the single failure criteria and is acceptable. The
RSR reviewers, however, recommend that future
modifications designed to improve the reliability
of the CPS/EPPS (such as the DAZ system being
implemented to address one of the RSR
recommendation) address the most current
industry standards for analog signal isolation.
• The RSR review of digital signal isolation based

primarily on solid state optical isolators is
acceptable and is in conformance with generally
accepted Western nuclear safety standards.
• The physical separation between inputs and

isolated outputs on the Relay Type “RES 8” is not
in conformance with generally accepted Western
nuclear safety standards. This lack of physical
separation is not a new issue. The RSR review of
digital signal isolation based on conventional
relay circuits concludes their usage is marginally
acceptable.
• The EPPS logic extensively uses “energize to trip”

logic, whose availability is significantly less
reliable that “de-energize to trip” logic typically
used in Western designed NPPs. The availability
of “energize to trip” logic, whose failures are not
self-annunciating, is very sensitive to the
thoroughness of the testing programs designed to
detect latent faults. In this area, the Single Failure
Analysis results are very sensitive to assumptions
regarding the adequacy of the testing programs.
The RSR reviewers performed a limited review of
the test procedures for the most sensitive logic
(e.g. loss of off-site power) and found that INPP
apparently has sufficiently comprehensive
programs in place in this area. The RSR reviewers
were not able to completely review all areas - but
from what was observed have confidence such
programs exist and that these are being carried
out at a frequency specified in the Technical
Specification [72]. This was verified by a sample
review of INPP testing records. The issue of
“energize to trip” logic was thus concluded to be
resolved as far as single failures are concerned.
The RSR reviewers, however, recommend that
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several times with the analysts who prepared the suitable measure to eliminate the potential single
study. Based on these reviews and the further failure in this area.
responses provided by the INPP, the RSR The review concluded that the Single Failure Analysis
reviewers concluded that the SFA submittal was a thorough, comprehensive analysis which
demonstrates that there are no single internal exhaustively pursued the existence of potential single
failures capable of defeating the overall failures capable of defeating the overall functioning of the
CPS/EPPS functioning for the following combined CPS/EPPS. The effort which was carried out by
Postulated Initiating Events (PIE): Ignalina NPP and their contractors was fully responsive to
the recommendations of the RSR and Ignalina Safety
1. Loss of coolant accidents occurring in all Panel and has increased the level of confidence that the
zones and including rupture of fuel CPS/EPPS constitutes a strong line of defense. Such
channels (PIE 1) confidence could not be demonstrated without carrying
2. Flow stop in the fuel channels (PIE 2) out this work. While the reviewers conclude that the
3. Loss of external power (PIE 3) examination of the CPS/EPPS was comprehensive, this
4. Loss of feedwater (PIE 4) must not be interpreted to imply that the reviewers can
5. Trip of 2/2 main turbines (PIE 5) state with absolute certainty that there are absolutely no
6. Rupture of main or auxiliary feedwater other single failures present in the CPS/EPPS design. The
headers (PIE 6) reviewers do believe that there are no other obvious single
7. Rupture of ECCS headers (PIE 7) failures which have not been considered based on the
8. Ruptures or loss of flow in the CPS design information reviewed. During the course of the
cooling system (PIE 8) review, several single failures were identified and the
9. Failure of the de-aerators (PIE 9) Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is addressing the resolution
10. High rate of change in power in the start- of these. This outcome is not unexpected and is typical to
up mode (PIE 10) safety investigations performed and reviewed for nuclear
11. High rate of change in power in the power plants throughout the world. The work was done
power mode (PIE 11) under considerable time pressure and there was no time
12. Overpower (PIE 12) for the reviewers to validate all of the information of the
13. Decrease in drum separator level (PIE plant that was used in the analysis. Of the single failures
13) identified, only one was found to be potentially able to fail
14. Over-pressure in the drum separator (PIE a system. However, justification was made by Ignalina
16) NPP that an immediate solution is not necessary. This
15. Low flow (PIE 17) was supported by several arguments: the low probability
16. Manual trip of the reactor (PIE 18) of the relevant initiating events, the low probability of the
17. Decrease level in ECCS accumulators single failure, very mild consequences of possible
(PIE 19) transient and the reasonable likelihood of compensating
18. Increase in drum separator level (PIE 20) operator actions due to the slow development of the
19. Loss of 2/2 main turbine load (PIE 21) consequences. VATESI’s conclusion is that operation of
the plant for short term time is permissible, but that a
• An electrical interface circuit related single failure systematic approach to a physical resolution is required.
mode was identified in the course of the RSR Ignalina therefore plans to design a permanent fix and
review, which is potentially capable of defeating implement it at the next scheduled outage.
the proper functioning of the CPS/EPPS for two
postulated initiating events. The circuits in 10.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM
question are a series of coincidence circuits
(“TEZ K” modules) taken from un-isolated The ECCS functions to cool the fuel during LOCAs
redundant trip channel local coincidence signals. and some operational transients. The Emergency Core
They are brought together at one point for the Cooling System works in conjunction with the Main
purpose of performing cross-channel checks on and Auxiliary Feed Water System. The ECCS is
the failure of AZ-3/AZ-4 (PIE 14) and local supported by several other systems, such as Service
emergency protection (PIE 15). The coincidences Water System, Intermediate Cooling Circuit,
were installed for diagnostic/alarm purposes - but Emergency Power System, Accident Confinement
a fault on the “TEZ K” module circuit board System, Parameter Display System, Deaerating and
integrated circuits will fail all trip channels used. Feedwater Facility, Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup and
The un-isolated circuits were only found on the Demineralized Water System. The adequacy of the
logic for protection against PIEs 14 and 15, and ECCS design has been subject of analysis of different
there is no indication the problem is present on SAR teams dealing with system and accident analysis
logic for protection against other PIEs. The RSR as well as with equipment qualification. The major
reviewers thus recommend that Ignalina NPP finding of the SAR was that no single failure of ECCS
study this circuit further and recommend a equipment or equipment in support function would
result in failure to meet its safety requirements. In
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general, the three short-term trains and three long- and activity is released directly to environment. A
term trains provide a high degree of redundancy and recommendation has been made to initiate ECCS
ensure that there is adequate flow to cool the fuel, based on the rate change of drum separator
although the main and auxiliary feed water pumps may pressure and accident analysis shows that fuel
be unavailable as a consequence of the break location failures are precluded with early ECCS initiation.
or environmental effects. Impairment of the auxiliary • When calculational uncertainties are taken into
feed water pumps can also be caused by a number of account in the analysis of partial breaks, fuel
different single failures. However, the accident failures and possibly fuel channel failures, are
analysis shows that in these cases the accumulators predicted because ECCS initiation is not
and ECCS pumps provide adequate cooling. sufficiently prompt to prevent fuel heatup. A
Nevertheless, the loss of one short-term train and one recommendation has been made to initiate ECCS
long-term train represents a reduction in defense-in- based on low flow in multiple fuel channels.
depth. Accident analysis shows that ECCS is initiated
promptly on this signal, and predicted cladding
The SAR considered the overall ECCS design as and pressure tube wall temperatures are well below
adequate, provided the agreed upon modifications are the failure criteria. A reactor trip based on this
implemented. The modifications identified involve parameter is already being installed, so the
mainly initiation logic. The quoted consequential recommendation is to extend the signal to initiate
failures have been justified on the basis of the ECCS.
following arguments: • Accident analysis shows that downcomer breaks
result in large amount of water accumulating in
• during all the accident scenarios for which the rooms above the ACS. The drainage capacity is
main and auxiliary feed water weaknesses are such that large pools of water, which may devolve
expected to emerge, the remaining trains of ECCS organic iodides, exist for long periods of time. In
pumps or accumulators are considered sufficient, addition, the operator may have difficulty ensuring
• more realistic calculations and engineering that the needs of ECCS recirculation are met
judgment led to the identification of success because of low drainage rate. A recommendation is
criteria for ECCS well below those assumed using made to improve drainage capacity.
calculations performed at the design stage. • Accident analysis shows that for breaks which
affects both loops (e.g., steam line break)
The actual ECCS design was found to have more oscillation in emergency core cooling flow delivery
redundancies built in than originally recognized from to the loops can occur. Pressure in a loop increases
3 x 50% to 3 x 100%. This permits reduction or due to emergency core cooling inflow, so flow is
complete elimination of need for supplementary then diverted preferentially to the other loop. Its
contribution by main or auxiliary feed water, capability pressure then builds up, causing flow to go to the
to withstand all consequential failures, assumed other loop. Although adequate flow is maintained,
outages and single failures. the operator may have difficulty diagnosting
phenomena and controlling ECCS flow. A
The main recommendations resulting from the recommendation has been made to provide
assessment of the ECCS and its connected and support improved operator training or consider
systems are as follows: modification that would ensure that emergency
core cooling water is delivered to the location
• Environmental effects may incapacitate the main where is needed.
and feedwater pumps for certain break locations • The auxiliary feed water pumps have neither an
but in these cases the accident analysis shows that over-current protection trip in case excessive
adequate cooling after the first 10 minutes can be throughput, nor flow regulation devices to prevent
provided by 4 ECCS pumps. The current excess flow. Therefore, the response of pumps is
Technological Specification [72] permits 1 ECCS indeterminate for certain accidents (feedwater or
and 1 auxiliary feed water pump to be out of service steam line breaks). In order to ensure adequate
for maintenance, and another pump to be taken out defense-in-depth, a recommendation has been
of service for up to 72 hours. If the letter pump is made that Ignalina NPP take steps to ensure that
an ECCS pump, and if an additional ECCS pump the pumps do not burn out due to excessive
is assumed to fail due to single failure, there may throughput, by either installing over-current
only be 3 ECCS pumps available. A protection or preferably by introducing flow
recommendation has been made to change the limiters to prevent excessive flow.
Technological Regulation to permit at most 1 • There is a lack of analysis of the dynamic effects
ECCS pump being out of service for maintenance. on pipework following LOCAs, e.g., waterhammer
following check valve closure. A recommendation
• There is no automatic ECCS initiation following has been made for Ignalina NPP to request the
certain steam line breaks. Fuel failures can occur designer to either provide the calculations or
170
perform new ones to demonstrate the adequacy of • prevent the accumulation of hydrogen to reach
the piping system. explosive concentration level,
• The seismic walkdown of the ECCS identified • permit periodic sampling of water for analysis of
several areas where improvements are required. chemistry and quality,
Recommendations were made to inspect pump • annunciate alarms in control rooms whenever
anchors, to replace existing piping anchors with system alignment or plant parameters are in
ones connected to structural beams, and to install unsafe positions or outside allowable limits,
bumpers to prevent damage due to piping • permit periodic testing of functional operability of
interaction. pumps and valves, the operability of the
All of these recommendations are accepted by Ignalina compressed air system, the leak tightness of
NPP. The ECCS and AFWS have undergone reinforced leaktight compartments during periods
important modifications during 1996, e.g., the safety of preventive maintenance, and absence of
injection of water is now directed to the GDHs. The clogging of pipes to sprinkler systems.
system description and system analysis have not
considered these modifications homogeneously. The The primary support and service systems relevant to
Single Failure Analysis performed by the SAR have to the ACS that are not mentioned above are:
be characterized as conservative but must be repeated
using recent system configuration and actuation. • Measurement of RBMK-1500 parameters and
their display in main control room which is
10.4 ACCIDENT CONFINEMENT SYSTEM required to provide the operator with information
on the status of equipment and conditions in the
The ACS consists of a set of structures and equipment, ACS,
whose main functions are to confine radioactive • Electric Power Supply which provides power to
releases in case accidents and to provide a source of pumps and valves in the system,
water for emergency water injection to the primary • Power Supply to Instrumentation and Control
circuit in case of LOCAs. In this last case, part of the Devices which provides power to instrumentation
steam lost from the break, after condensation, can be and control devices,
used for restoring the water source for ECCS. The • Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup System which
geometry of the ACS does not permit a similar reuse provides a supply of makeup water to the hot
of the liquid lost from the break, which is collected in condensate chambers of the ACS and can be
drains and then reused after clean up. As in the other brought into service manually for long term
RBMK plants of the most recent generation, the makeup when there is insufficient inventory in the
confinement envelopes only parts of the pressure hot condensate chambers,
boundary, mostly the parts filled with liquid or located • Deminiralized Water System which collects and
in lower positions. In the design stage, it was decided purifies contaminated water from the hot
to envelope only those pipes whose rupture was condensate chambers of the ACS and then returns
expected to result in the most significant radiological the water back to the hot condensate chambers
releases. A description of the ACS is given in Section and which can be used as an alternative makeup
6.3. The main design functions of the ACS are: source in the event of failure of the Auxiliary
Deaerator Makeup System,
• ensure that dose during normal and off-normal • Service Water System which provides cooling to
plant operation as well as following any design the ACS heat exchangers when temperature on
basis accidents do not exceed the dose, the shell side exceeds a pre-determined limit and
• prevent pressures in leaktight compartments and which must provide the ACS with sufficient
chambers, in the short-term and long-term, from cooling flow to remove the initial stored energy
exceeding specified limits, and residual decay heat,
• prevent temperatures of concrete structures of • Ventilation System which regulates the
leaktight compartments and chambers, in the temperature in ACS rooms containing the ACS
short-term and long-term, from exceeding pumps and heat exchangers, control cabinets and
specified limits, other equipment needed to perform ACS
• receive and condense steam from the Main Safety functions,
Valves in case of over-pressure transients and • Radiation Monitoring System which monitors
when MSVs are tested, radiation level in the ACS and provides a signal
• receive and condense steam from SDV-A under to isolate the ACS on high radiation levels,
normal operation for depressurization of the • Compressed Air System which provides air to the
primary circuit and when the valves are tested, ACS to dilute hydrogen in the event that
• receive and condense steam released after a break hydrogen concentration exceeds 0.4 % by volume
of one fuel channel, and compressed air to the siphons for functional
• store a minimum of 1000 m3 of water for use by tests of the discharge pipe closure and sealing.
the ECCS in accident conditions,
171
A detailed Engineering Assessment and separate ACS permits critical parts and components to be
Single Failure Analysis were performed for the ACS maintained as required both during outages and
in the SAR. Separate assessments were performed for during normal operation. Reliability records shows
connected and support systems. In general, the ACS that the reliability of critical components is consistent
and its support systems were found to be adequately with testing performed, and with the test and
capable of performing their safety function. Testing of maintenance intervals.
all active components is performed with acceptable
test intervals, and is governed by test instructions. The main limitation of the ACS in performing the
Visual inspections both during shutdown periods, radioactive releases confinement function, as
when all parts of the ACS and compartments are compared to Western compartments, is the limitation
acceptable, and of critical parts during power of the envelope to part of the primary circuit. This
operation, are carried out with acceptable scope and means that ruptures outside of the ACS envelope lead
frequency. The design of the to easy release of radioactive isotopes to the
environment. The deficiency in the mitigating
capability and in the defense-in-depth concept, is
demonstrated to be acceptable for design basis
accidents, but does not leave margins for mitigating
accidents beyond the design basis, involving possible
loss of integrity of pressure boundary outside ACS and
multiple failures in ECCS.
Another important limitation is the high leak rate of

the ACS, first of all unit 1, mainly attributable to the
complex geometries and to the absence of metallic
liners on some boundaries. This limitation affects the
mitigation capability during design basis accidents and
beyond DBAs. Even accidents amongst DBAs might
unduly challenge the confinement function due to the
leaktightness limitations. Although the limitations
outlined restrict its performance, ACS design
requirements have to be met in order to avoid
exceeding limits to external doses during the loss of
coolant accidents inside it.
The significant deficiencies found by assessments are

in the area of structural integrity tests and leak rate
tests. There have been no structural integrity tests of
any of the compartments at pressure equal to either the
design pressure or maximum accident pressure. Leak
rate tests performed at a pressure of about 2 kPa are
too low to permit accurate extrapolation to leak rates
at design pressure or maximum accident pressures. It
may not be practical to perform structural integrity or
leak rate tests at higher pressure, due to leakage from
the ACS. Nevertheless, confidence in the ability of the
ACS to perform its function under accident conditions
needs to be demonstrated. Additional findings and
recommendations have been identified both by the
SAR and RSR teams include:
• there is no evidence that adequate analyses have
been performed in order to demonstrate the
capability of the structures to withstand expected
peak pressure during design basis accidents, to
verify the strength of the steam distribution pipes
and pool structures against expected dynamic
loads, or to exclude consequential pipe breaks due
dynamic loads induced by LOCAs and subsequent
additional loads to ACS,
172
• there is no evidence that ACS can withstand
seismic loads or loads arising from other possible The main SAR finding are:
external events (missiles, pressure waves),
• in the Engineering Assessment there are neither • the main feed water pumps will be tripped on low
reference to analyses nor requirements addressed to discharge header pressure within a few seconds of
the expected simultaneous discharge of steam to MCP pressure header rupture. They cannot fulfill their
the dedicated pool from safety valves (high short-term safety function under this event,
pressure) and from broken fuel channels (low • the Deaerating and Feedwater System and its support
pressure) in case of loss of coolant accidents in the systems are not qualified against external events or
reactor cavity. against dynamic loading while performing safety
functions. Furthermore, the main and auxiliary feed
The accident confinement system was not built water pumps are susceptible to failure following
according the recent regulatory requirements. The certain feedwater line and possible steam line breaks,
need to demonstrate the structural integrity of the ACS • there are positions in the feedwater line where a break
to withstand expected peak pressure during design would disable all the main feedwater pumps,
basis accidents still remains. The steam distribution • there is no evidence that the main and auxiliary feed
pipes and pools were never verified to withstand water pumps would operate satisfactory under
dynamic loads. decreasing deaerator pressure conditions,
• long term heating and pressurization of the deaerator
The above mentioned ACS deficiencies have been cannot be guaranteed. It has not been demonstrated
recognized as highly safety important and Ignalina that the specified auxiliary feed water pump
Safety Panel recommends to perform safety cases for maximum cooldown rate of 120 oC/h would not be
the ACS before licensing. It was also recommended
exceeded.
that before either units restarts from its 1997
maintenance outage planning should be completed and
The Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup System is a safety
development started on a safety case for the Accident
system with two main safety functions - to provide
Confinement System.
makeup water to the deaerator after a reactor trip to
supply the auxiliary feedwater pumps and to provide
Ignalina NPP has placed a contract with Lithuanian
makeup water to the ACS after LOCA to supply ECCS
Energy Institute to assist in preparation of the safety
pumps. The main SAR system analysis findings on this
case for Accident Confinement System. The intention
system are as following:
of the developed work plan is basically in line with the
recommendations of the Ignalina Safety Panel. The
• single failures in active components will not result in
plan has been reviewed by Western experts and further
unavailability of the Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup
recommendations were made to address relevant
System during first 24 hours after accident. After that
technical matters in sufficient detail. The work has
time the capacity of the bypass line from the
started and will be finished by the end of October
Utilization of Liquid Radioactive Waste Pumps will be
1998.
sufficient,
• the system can be disabled by single pipe rupture,
10.5 FEEDWATER AND STEAM SUPPLY
• the bypass line from the Utilization of Liquid
SYSTEM
Radioactive Waste can manually be actuated to deliver
cooling water with sufficient flow rate after 30 min.,
The results of system analysis for the following systems
are discussed in this Section: • the Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup System is vulnerable
to fire accidents, which could disable the system.
• Deaerating and Feedwater System,
The main steam pipelines downstream of the drum
• Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup Supply System,
separator divide pipelines to two parts: live steam
• Steam Supply and Pressure Relief Systems.
pipelines and hot steam pipelines. Live steam pipelines
form closed loops which are the pressure relief devices -
The Deaerating and Feedwater System is used first of all
MSVs and SDV-A valves. Hot steam pipelines go
for normal operation. Secondly, its safety function under
ultimately to the turbines, but contain the SDV-D valves
various accidental conditions is to provide water with
for normal operation and the main steam isolation valves.
suitable subcooling to the main and auxiliary feed water
The SDV-D bleed steam to heat the cold deaerator
pumps. After a large or medium break-LOCA it provides
makeup water when the turbines are tripped. The main
water to the main feedwater pumps for the first two
SAR findings are:
minutes, as MFWS is used as the third 50 % train of short
term ECCS. After any LOCA it provides water to the
• accident analysis shows that the relief valves are
emergency feedwater pumps if those are demanded to
sufficiently sized to keep over-pressure after design
supplement the ECCS pumps in the long term mode. After
basis transients to within 15 % of the normal working
any transient it provides water to the auxiliary feed water
pressure of the primary circuit,
pumps as preferred providers of long-term makeup.
173
• there are no important single failures which could
disable either the pressure relief or steam supply The Service Water System represents a vital and
function, common support system for a number of operational
• the systems are not seismically qualified nor are they and safety systems. The SAR indicates there is the
qualified against dynamic loading, lack of segregation of the service water distribution
• there is no equipment qualification program for the within the whole plant. The Service Water System is
systems, and one should be developed. built in two trains. The system function is not proven
Summarizing this Section, it is necessary to notice that to be single failure tolerant, if an initiating event starts
the system analysis for the Deaerating and Feedwater within the Service Water System, which may cause
System and Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup System show shut-down due to loss of operational function or
the weaknesses in system capabilities. The limit of flooding, but which simultaneously degrades the status
operation of the Deaerating and Feedwater System with of the SWS for the support of safety functions such as
regard to break sizes in the primary circuit is not assessed. ECCS, ACS or AFWS. The SAR gives no evidence
The Auxiliary Deaerator Makeup System can be disabled that the plant could be cooled down without Service
by single failure or manual interaction. The safety case for Water System under the existing components
the steam lines concludes that there are sufficient relief specification, system configuration and operational
valves to keep over-pressure after transients to within 15 procedures in force. The ECCS, AFWS and PCS rely
% of the nominal pressure. System analysis does not cover directly or indirectly via IC on Service Water System.
the main steam isolation valves nor dynamic loads in the There is a potential for the plant to survive the losses
case of overfilling of the drum separators. of Service Water System and Intermediate Circuit. The
credibility of the mutual support of the neighboring
10.6 SUPPORT SYSTEMS units has still to be demonstrated, with regard to
tolerable downtime/periods of loss of service water for
The primary safety functions are supported by many different front line systems. The loss of Service Water
other systems which have the following basic System can be caused by fire and seismic events.
functions: supply electric power or compressed air to Improvements made during the last two years are not
equipment and instrumentation, provide raw and considered or assessed homogeneously within the
processed information to the operator, provide SAR. The system analyses have to be adapted to the
alternative sources of cooling water for fuel under recent plant configuration.
post-accident conditions, provide cooling water to
equipment, provide ventilation, etc. The results of the The Intermediate Circuit consists of two separate
system analysis for following support systems are circuits for different cooling functions. Redundancy is
discussed in this Section: built in for pumps and heat exchangers to the Service
Water System. Both circuits have single trains of
• Electric Power Supply System, piping and connections to the corresponding
• Service Water System, components to be cooled. IC-1 provides cooling to the
• Intermediate Circuit, Purification and Cooling System among others and
• Purification and Cooling System, has safety functions for low pressure residual heat
• Ventilation System. removal. IC-2 is used for cooling non-safety
components, but also for safety related cooling of
A detailed Engineering Assessment of the Electric ECCS and AFWS pumps. The dependence of ECCS
Power Supply System has been carried out by SAR on the availability of the ICC-2 is a high order critical
and in particular in-depth demonstration of issue. A failure of ECCS consequential to loss of IC-2
compliance with the corresponding IAEA safety guide has to be postulated forming part of the design basis.
[73]. The high degree of redundancy in the Electric No evidence is given in the SAR that the cooldown of
Power Supply System provides assurance with respect the plant can be achieved without cooling of bearings
to reliability of the power supply. One exception from and seals of the multistage ECCS pumps.
sound trainwise design was found in the automatic
transfer of Instrumentation and Control and other Besides the operational functions such as cleaning up
loads between redundant uninterruptible power and purging of primary coolant, the following
sources. The resulting dependency between buses characteristics and safety related functions are
must be assessed and eliminated, wherever possible. recognized to be the Purification and Cooling System:
RSR recommended that Ignalina NPP perform an extension of the pressure boundary outside he ACS
evaluation of the effect of persistent degraded voltage and low pressure residual heat removal. The PCS
or AC-frequency to determine minimum under normal operation receives water from the
voltage/frequency levels required to close breakers pressure headers of both loops to clean up to the
and operate equipment. The results should be used to required water quality. In case of breaks of the
determine if the 50 % nominal voltage or 46 Hz AC- pipelines of the PCS system, it has to be isolated to
frequency setpoints provide adequate protection of limit the amount of primary water escaping from the
vital equipment. pressure boundary. During reactor cooldown the
174
system is actuated to perform its residual heat removal that ventilation will fulfill its safety functions
function. According to Engineering Assessment of the following an accident when additional equipment will
system, pipe ruptures in the PCS are mitigated by be operated and escaping steam will tend to increase
relieving to the ACS and by subsequent automatic both temperature and humidity in the reactor building.
closure of the isolating valves. However, the
consequences of pipe breaks in the PCS and the Summarizing the assessment of the support systems it
design requirements of the mitigative systems as well is necessary to mentione that system analysis
as residual heat removal function have not be assessed identified few high priority non-compliance’s related
in the SAR system analysis. to vulnerability due to lack of physical separation or
The SAR has shown that there are more than inadequate fire protection, lack of redundancy and
250 ventilation sub-systems for various purposes at the failure of passive piping. Individually, these
power unit. The safety task of the ventilation systems deficiencies do not in themselves represent major
are to prevent contamination of indoor and ambient air safety problems. However, the large number of low
by radiological and explosive substances, to provide priority findings indicates a reduction in defense in
airflow towards more contaminated premises only and depth provided by automatic systems, and potentially
to provide conditions for the operation of the plant leads to an increased reliance on the operator.
safety functions. The ventilation systems were
installed before there were requirement for such
systems to operate despite natural phenomena such as
high wind, earthquake and flood. It therefore is not
proven to withstand such natural phenomena. An
obvious weakness in ventilation is related to the
availability of reliable ventilation and thus habitability
of the main and emergency control rooms in case of
external events. However, the SAR assessment has
not demonstrated
175
11. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
Operating nuclear power plants require a safety analysis Western-style safety analysis report, but the
report which confirms the original design basis and completion of such a SAR would have consumed
describes the behavior of the plant for all potential several times the resources budgeted for the in-depth
accidental conditions. In accordance with regulatory safety assessment of Ignalina NPP. The scope,
requirements, the safety analysis should be based on the especially the scope of the accident analysis, was
current status of the systems, structures and components therefore defined as including assessment specific
of the NPP, and should consider all the modifications essential items [75]. A list of 23 accidents was
carried out during upgrading outages including those developed which was intended to cover the “worst
changes which are committed for implementation. For the case” for each accident category in the sense that these
Ignalina NPP this information is presented in several sequences bounded those accidental events which were
reports. This includes the TOB [74], the Safety Analysis not included. In order to ensure that no important
Report [62] and additional anticipated transients without sequence was omitted an assessment was made by
scram analyzed in the SAR [62]. Task Group which undertook the development of a
Fault Schedule. The goal of this task was to prepare a
The initial safety studies were performed by the Russian summary of all the accidental conditions which can be
design institute, RDIPE [74]. For the evaluation of break identified as having the potential to lead to fuel
flow of a steam-water mixture from the rupture an damage or a release of radioactivity from the plant.
equilibrium two-phase flow model taking into account the However, a thorough comparison of the accidents
hydraulic losses along the pipeline length was used. considered in the Ignalina SAR with initiating events of
Critical flow of subcooled water through the break was an extended Fault Schedule showed that they are bounding
calculated using a non-equilibrium flow model, which most of the credible events and no sequences were found
approaches the equilibrium model as the degree of which would have required a modification of the essential
subcooling is reduced. Calculations of the transient items list of accidents specified in the Guidelines for
pressure response were performed using quasi-static production and review of Ignalina SAR [75].
correlations for energy and mass transfer processes. The
RDIPE calculations ware performed before 1989 and This Section incorporates material from the SAR Report
therefore used the design thermal power level of 4800 [62] and Barselina Phase 4 Report [63].
MW. However, after the Chernobyl accident the
maximum permissible thermal power level of Ignalina 11.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCIDENT
reactors was reduced up to 4200 MW. ANALYSIS
The SAR computations reflect the present operational Design basis accidents are events which bound accident
power level of about 4200 MW. The accident analysis categories (e.g. the guillotine break of the largest pipe in a
performed in the SAR were undertaken using Western system). The response of the plant to DB accidents is
state-of-the-art computer codes. System codes such as evaluated using conservative assumptions. The nuclear
RELAP5 and ATHLET were used for thermal-hydraulic power plant, its systems, structures and components is
analyses and modern Russian codes such as the then designed to withstand the evaluated loads for such
3-dimensional codes SADCO and MOUNT which events without releasing harmful amounts of radioactive
incorporate coupled neutronic-thermal-hydraulic materials to the outside environment. A set of DBAs is
calculations were used for evaluating reactivity initiated postulated for each type of reactor, covering the
accidents. A review of the verification and validation consequences of all failure combinations. The following
studies which had been performed for each of these codes groups of design basis accidents are considered for
was undertaken as part of the quality assurance program. RBMK-type nuclear power plants [76] :
The Western codes had been validated extensively for
PWR and BWR reactors but had only limited validation • Accidents initiated by equipment failures, including
for conditions relevant to the RBMK. The Russian codes loss of flow transients.
had undergone varying degrees of verification. In order to • Loss of coolant accidents.
compensate for this lack of extensive verification, the • Reactivity initiated transients.
codes were used cautiously when any of the critical and • Fuel handling accidents.
unverified regimes were encountered. • Other accidents.
A number of accidents sequences which have to be Design basis accidents are classified according to the type
analyzed in accordance with current Lithuanian of initiating events. A list of initiating events which
regulations were not explicitly addressed either in the should be analyzed for each group of DBAs is given in the
Ignalina TOB [74] or in the SAR [62]. As noted in Subsections which follow.
Section 10, the SAR was initially conceived as a
175
Depending on the accident sequence, the process used to mechanisms. The following conditions are sufficient to
assess consequences of a particular design basis accident confirm that the fuel cladding integrity is maintained in
in the Ignalina SAR involves different assessment tasks an accident [62]:
[62]. If the fuel cladding loses its integrity, a key barrier to
a release of fission products is breached, and the coolant • maximum fuel enthalpy remains below 712 kJ/kg,
in the heat transport system becomes further • fuel temperature does no reach the UO2 melting point
contaminated by radioactive released from fuel. In turn, of about 2800 o C,
the contaminated coolant can be released into the • fuel cladding temperature does not exceed 700 o C.
environment by means of normal leakage or by means of
accidental discharge either inside or outside of the These simplistic criteria are useful for a fast screening of
Accident Confinement System. If the accident does not accident analysis results. If these conditions are not
challenge the fuel cladding and pressure tube integrity, no exceeded, no further analysis is required to confirm that
detailed analysis of other accident issues need to be the accident does not threaten the fuel cladding integrity.
performed. If there are fuel failures, mass, energy and If any of these criteria is exceeded, it does not necessarily
fission product transport paths must be defined for explicit mean that fuel failures have occurred. It means that
analysis of radiological consequences. The maintenance supplementary analysis is required. During an accident,
of pressure tube integrity is one of the design targets for fuel cladding can fail due to thermal-mechanical
the design basis accidents. Should a pressure tube fail, it interaction between the fuel and the cladding, or due to
must be shown that the integrity of the reactor cavity is thermal deformations of the cladding under positive or
not jeopardized. In addition, for all accidents with mass negative pressure differentials. The first type of failure is
and energy discharge into the Accident Confinement prototypic of rapid and large fuel power excursions where
System, the integrity of this system needs to be verified in a hot, and possibly molten, UO2 material may come into
order to confirm that the transport path used in analysis of contact with the cladding material. The other failure
radiological consequences are correctly defined. These mechanisms are associated with cladding temperature
steps ensure that, for all accidents addressed in analysis, excursion, either when the external pressure is higher
the compliance with the regulatory dose limits will be than the internal one, or when internal pressure is higher
demonstrated with adequate confidence. than external one. In first case fuel cladding could fail due
to collapses onto the fuel pellet stack and deformation into
One of the tasks undertaken in the SAR project was the any gaps between fuel pellets, while in the last case fuel
development of a set of acceptance criteria for each type of cladding could fail due to ballooning of hot cladding away
accidents [62]. The following acceptance criteria are used from the fuel pellet stack. Cladding temperatures at which
in accident analysis: the failure occurs due to cladding collapse are listed in the
Table 11.1 [62]. These failure conditions were quantified
• fuel cladding integrity criteria, for the operating pressure of 7 MPa and the lowest
• pressure tube integrity criteria, internal pressure within the fuel element as a function of
• heat transport circuit integrity criteria, axial gap between the fuel pellets. Cladding temperatures
• reactor cavity integrity criteria, at which the failure occurs due to cladding ballooning are
• ACS integrity criteria, listed in the Table 11.2 [62].
• permissible doses.
Regulatory document [77] prescribes the acceptable Table 11.1 Temperatures of failure by cladding
conditions in terms of how many fuel rods can have collapse at P=7 MPa [62]
perforated cladding, and what type of fuel cladding failure
is permissible: δ, mm 2 4 6 8 10 14 20
• number of fuel rods with perforated cladding is not to T,o C envelope 1300 1300 1280 1260 1240 1120 900
exceed 1 % for all the rods in the reactor,
• number of rods that are perforated such that the T, o C onset 1200 1200 1180 1150 700 700 700
coolant can come into contact with ceramic fuel is not
to exceed 0.1 % of all the fuel in the reactor.
Regulatory document [77] defines also that the peak Table 11.2 Temperature of failure by cladding
cladding temperature must not exceed 1200 o C and that ballooning [62]
the local fuel cladding oxidation must not exceed 18 % of
the initial wall thickness. These criteria are pertinent to ∆P, MPa 1.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0
the maintenance of coolable fuel geometry during an
accident and beyond. T, o C envelope 1000 830 800 790 780
Fuel cladding integrity criteria conservatively define the T, o C onset 850 730 700 700 700
cladding failure thresholds for all fuel cladding failure
176
Pressure tube integrity criteria conservatively define the Table 11.3 Meteorological parameters
pressure tube failure thresholds. The following conditions
are sufficient to confirm that the pressure tube integrity is Discharge Pasquill Wind Deposition
maintained in an accident [62]: height, m weather speed, m/s factor, s/m3
category
• pressure in the pressure tube does not exceed 0 F 2 5.8 10-5
13.4 MPa,
• pressure tube temperature in any cross-section of its 50 F 2 9.15 10-6
wall does not exceed 650 o C. 150 B 2 1.40 10-6
If any of these criteria were to be exceeded, the affected
pressure tube can potentially fail and supplementary
analysis must be performed to establish whether or not the The regulatory dose limits are taken to be the key criteria
pressure tube integrity is maintained. of acceptance. Permissible radiological doses to the
population after an accident are defined by [78] as
The requirement for the integrity of the heat transport follows:
circuit is not prescribed by regulations, but has been
employed in the Ignalina SAR [62] to avoid complex and • whole body dose to a member of the population not to
costly analyses of accident consequences following exceed 50 mSv,
pressure boundary failures. The heat transport circuit can • critical organ, i.e. thyroid, dose to member of the
withstand three pressure levels. The pressure tubes can population is not to exceed 300 mSv.
withstand at least 13.4 MPa. All fuel channels are
hydrostatically tested at this pressure. The piping between For design basis accidents, the doses are to be
the MCP check valve and the pressure header is designed accumulated for a period of one year after the accident at
and hydrostatically tested to withstand at least 12.3 MPa. and beyond the Ignalina NPP exclusive zone, i.e., beyond
The rest of the of the heat transport circuit piping is a 3 km radius from the plant. In analyses of design basis
designed and tested to withstand at least 10.4 MPa. accidents doses are evaluated by conservative analyses
These test values are applicable to operating temperatures that assume:
because the ratio of yield stress at the two temperatures is
less than 1.4. The lowest of the test pressures is taken to • fission products escaping from the plant are released
be the acceptance criterion for the accidental as a single “puff” at the elevation appropriate to the
pressurization of the heat transport system. postulated accident,
• least favorable meteorological conditions are assumed,
The maintenance of reactor cavity integrity is a derived Table 11.3,
requirement of acceptable plant response to any accident • a critical individual, i.e. child, is assumed to remain at
that involves a discharge of coolant into reactor cavity. the boundary of the plan exclusion zone indefinitely.
Permissible pressure loads on the reactor cavity structures
were quantified by the designers of these structures. The One of the requirements for the accident analysis is to
permissible loads were evaluated for casing, upper and account for the effect of single failure in the accident
lower plates. The lower plate can withstand 294 kPa analysis. The single failure criterion is defined in the
cavity pressure, the casing can withstand 255 kPa cavity IAEA Code of Practice on Design [79]. In order to
pressure. The lowest pressure value corresponds to comply with IAEA practice, analyses would ideally be
conservative estimates of pressure needed to lift the upper performed as follows:
plate. Cavity pressure exceeding 214 kPa has been
described as having possibility to lift the upper plate • assume that each mitigation system is operating at the
breaking the reactor seal, the pressure tubes, and affecting start of the accident, with as much equipment
the operating of other safety functions. The smallest of out of service as is allowed by the operating
these loads is taken as a conservative criterion for procedures,
maintaining the integrity of the reactor cavity. • perform the accident simulation assuming that all
systems operate as described above plus assume that
The Ignalina NPP is protected against accidental one component of the system has failed,
discharges of contaminated coolant by an Accident • repeat the simulations as many times as necessary,
Confinement System. This system is described in Section each time assuming a different single failure of one
6.3. In accident analysis the maintenance of ACS integrity component of one system,
is a derived acceptance criterion. Permissible pressure • evaluate consequences of all cases and select that
loads in ACS compartments are summarized in Table 6.5. which produced the worst consequence.
These values are adopted as the acceptance criteria in
accident analysis. An acceptance hydrogen concentration This ideal approach is difficult to apply in practice and in
in any ACS compartment is taken to be 4 % by order to meet the intent of [79] a conservative approach
volume. was adopted in the Ignalina SAR project:
177
Some accidents in this group are subject to only one of the
• assume that all mitigating systems with equipment above issues, e.g. a pump power seizure concerns only the
credited in the analysis simultaneously experience a issue of the power-cooling mismatch in the channels.
single failure of one of its components when the Other accidents encounter several above issues
component is called upon to act, simultaneously, e.g. a loss of AC power supply encounter
• if the analysis with the plant configuration assumed a loss of circulation as well as pressurization. The
above produces results which meet the acceptance equipment failure accidents addressed in SAR are as
criteria, no further analysis of this accident sequence is follows:
required. However, if the results indicate a non-
compliance with acceptance criteria, it is permissible • single MCP trip,
to analyze a less conservative progression of the • multiple MCP trips,
accident sequence. This less conservative analysis can • MCP seizure,
be achieved by assuming that one or more systems • loss of normal AC electrical power supply,
operate in a manner consistent with operating limits, • turbine generator trip,
as opposed to having all mitigating system failed • loss of main heat sink,
simultaneously, • loss of feedwater,
• additional failures of mitigating systems caused as a • grid frequency reduction,
consequence of initiating event are taken into account. • spurious opening and failure to re-close of the
main safety relief valve.
The analyses evaluate two initial plant states: Design
Reference state where all processes and protective systems However, in accordance with regulatory requirements
function as designed, and a plant state where a failure is [76] the following accidents initiated by equipment failure
assumed in each system that is active during the Design should be also analyzed:
Reference accident. This last state is refered to as the
Multiple Failures (or Limiting ) Plant state. • break of GDH check valve disk,
• break of disk of MCP check valve or main gate valve,
In addition to the rules for evaluating the effect of single • reduction or loss of flow in one fuel channel,
failure for each initiating event, the following • complete station blackout,
deterministic rules are also applied in accident
• failure of feedwater system.
simulations:
Consequences of all the accidents initiated by equipment
• the most effective absorber rod is assumed to be failure are explored by three cases that are simulated
unavailable, explicitly: MCP seizure, loss of AC power and loss of
• the second trip parameter is credited in accidents feedwater supply. The remaining accidents are assessed
where two parameters are available. Where the second qualitatively. It is explained how these latter cases relate
parameter is not available, it must be shown that a to the simulated cases, or it is shown that adequate
sufficient time is available from manual intervention provisions are available in the current plant to make the
following an unambiguous annunciation of the accident benign.
accident in control room,
• in order to cover any undetected failures in the signals For the pump failure cases the automatic power reduction
or trip activation logic, where the system has 2 out of is the only required mitigation action. Analysis of the
n logic, the trip is credited when last signal is reached. most severe conceivable power-cooling mismatch shows
that cladding dry-out is avoided. A combination of a
11.2 ACCIDENTS INITIATED BY EQUIPMENT timely power trip, a pump costdown, and relatively early
FAILURES ECCS water injection maintains the cladding and
pressure tube wall temperatures below their initial values
All accidents initiated by equipment failure occur in the for accidents that involve a global impairment of forced
intact heat transport system. Therefore, the following circulation, i.e. a loss of AC power and a loss of feedwater
issues are relevant to this family of accidents: supply. There is no potential for power-cooling mismatch
in accidents that maintain forced circulation, e.g. turbine
• an imbalance between the heat generation in the trip and loss of main heat sink. The accidents that lead to
reactor core and the convective heat removal from the an impairment of steam removal from the heat transport
core if and when the forced circulation is lost or system, i.e. loss of AC power, loss of turbines and loss of
impaired, heat sink, activate the MCC over-pressure protection
• a pressurization of the heat transport system if and system. The SAR analysis shows that this system is
when the turbines are disconnected, adequate, if the timely power reduction is given.
• a long term coolant makeup to the heat transport
system if and when the main heat sink is lost. The SAR analysis shows that the reactor power is reduced
in a timely manner in all accidents initiated by equipment
178
failures. Either power setbacks AZ-3 or AZ-4, or a trip • break of pressure tube,
AZ-1 are performed by the CPS on signals by the EPPS. • break of service water pipeline,
There are at least two EPPS signals issued in close • break of purification and cooling system pipeline.
succession, based on diverse process parameters. Hence,
reliable signals are available to activate the reactor power The LOCAs addressed in the SAR include the
reduction. following accidents:
The short-term ECCS is not activated in any accidents • full break of the MCP pressure header,
initiated by equipment failures because there is no break • full break of the GDH downstream of the check
in the MCC to produce the necessary conditioning signal valve,
of high pressure in one of reinforced leak-tight • full break of steam separator downcomer pipe in
compartments. However, the long-term emergency core drum separator compartments,
cooling function is activated quite early in accidents that • partial breaks in a GDH downstream of the check
involve an impairment of steam removal or feedwater valve which can lead to flow stagnation conditions,
supply. The long term emergency feed water supply is • partial breaks in the pressure header which could
preferentially provided by the AFWPs drawing hot water potentially lead to stagnation conditions,
from the deaerators. If AFWPs cannot provide this • full feedwater line break,
emergency supply, the ECCS pumps, already running in a • full steam line break in different compartments.
re-circulation mode, supply “cold” water from the
condensate chambers in the ACS. No automatic system is The SAR concluded that the Ignalina NPP is quite
available to regulate the emergency water supply in the well protected against the breaks that occur in the
long term, and to establish a long-term heat sink for the reinforced leak-tight compartments if they do not
removal of decay and stored heat. These functions are result in local flow degradation. A prompt activation
performed by operators. Analysis shows, that adequate of the ECCS occurs for breaks with large discharge
time is available to initiate the manual operator actions. rates and for breaks with coincident failures that
impair global circulation. However, the emergency
Thus, results of analysis show, that the class of events core cooling system activation is not fast enough to
included under accidents initiated by equipment failures ensure that dangerous, early temperature excursion do
are unlikely to cause power plant conditions that would not occur following partial breaks in one GDH.
result in violation of the design criteria to avoid fuel However, note that if local deterioration of channel
damage, maintain integrity of pressure boundaries, and cooling occurs during this LOCA scenario, the
not exceeded regulatory dose limits. The existing contaminated coolant discharges to the ACS. Analysis
protective system at the Ignalina NPP are adequate to also shows that four emergency core coolant pumps,
bring the plant into a safe state following all accidents i.e. either the ECCS pumps, or the AFWPs, are
initiated by equipment failures. sufficient for adequate long term cooling.
11.3 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS In the LOCA scenarios analyzed, the peak fuel
temperature did not exceed 1200 oC, and the fuel
Pipe breaks in one of the two main circulation loops, cladding oxidation did not reach the maximum allowable
the service water system and purification and coolant levels. The fuel cladding failure criterion of 700 oC is
system as well as steam and feed water line breaks are exceeded in the following LOCA scenarios: full break
classified as loss of coolant accidents. The full range of the pressure header accompanied with multiple
of loss of coolant accidents have been assessed. Piping failures, full break of the GDH, and partial break of
breaks resulting in a loss of coolant from the circuit the GDH. Analysis shows that, except for the last case,
may occur within the reinforced leak-tight the fuel cladding failure criteria are violated for only a
compartments of the ACS or in compartments that are very short period of time during the initial phase of
connected to the outside environment. In accordance accident. Thus, fuel cladding failure is not expected in
with regulatory requirements [76] the following loss of the first two cases. In the LOCA scenario with flow
coolant accidents should be analyzed for nuclear stagnation conditions in one GDH, fuel elements could
power plants with RBMK-type reactors: fail in several channels. Design modification to
improve the activation of the short-term ECCS was
• break of MCP header or pipeline (e.g., full break of recommended and accepted by the Ignalina NPP. This
MCP pressure header), improvement would be implemented during
• break of a group distribution header downstream implementation of the SIP-2.
and upstream of check valve,
• break of steam separator downcomer pipe, The SAR analysis shows that for all LOCAs which
• main feedwater line break, occur inside the reinforced leak-tight compartments,
• main steam line break, pressure tube temperatures do not exceeded the failure
• break of water communication line, criterion of 650 oC. Results of analysis also states that for
• break of steam-water communication line, all breaks inside the reinforced leak-tight compartments,
179
the existing prescribed public dose limits would not be • withdrawal of a group of three rods in the center of the
exceeded. core at full power and during start-up,
However, for breaks outside the ACS, especially for main • voiding of CPS including:
steam line breaks, peak cladding and pressure tube ∗ loss or interruption of water supply to the upper
temperatures as well as doses could exceed acceptance storage tanks,
criteria. The main reason of this is that breaks outside ∗ various CPS coolant flow blockages,
of the reinforced leak-tight compartments do not trip the ∗ air entrapment in the CPS circuit following outage.
reactor nor do they activate the ECCS. Violation of
acceptance criteria could also result due to a large Initial conditions have been defined to account for most
number of pre-existing cladding failures permitted unfavorable operational conditions. Perturbed axial and
during normal operation, and due to a limited radial power distributions have been defined which
drainage capacity in the vented compartments. The maximize the effect of the reactivity insertion. For
SAR analysts propose a number of hardware dynamic simulations, power setback signal, the first
modifications and changes in regulations and neutronic trip signal and any trip signal based on process
procedures to overcome the design weaknesses and to parameters were neglected.
better protect the surrounding population against
radiological exposure after steam rupture events. First For the single rod or group of three rods withdrawal
of all an additional early reactor trip and emergency accidents both at full power and during start-up no safety
coolant injection for all break locations, based on the problems arise because the absolute power remains low
dP/dt measurements in steam separators should be and the maximum values of key safety parameters are
installed. This modification will be implemented in maintained well below their limiting values. The analysis
the immediate future at the Ignalina NPP. The SAR covers reactivity insertion for high and low rod worth’s.
also recommended as a safety enhancement measure to The consequences of high reactivity insertion are limited
keep the number of pre-existing fuel rod failures as due to the generation of early trip signals, which terminate
low as achievable. Means to rapidly remove the the transient earlier than in cases with low reactivity
contaminated water from compartments that are in insertion. Also, neglecting the first shutdown signal does
direct communication with the environment will be not create problems concerning the safety limits.
developed and implemented.
Total voiding of the CPS channels in the reactor at
Downcomer breaks outside the ACS do not result in operational conditions can cause a reactivity insertion of
violation of safety criteria. However, reactor hall over- up to 4-5 β. The highest reactivity insertion is obtained for
pressure protection may not be sufficient to prevent the low values of the operational reactivity margin, i.e. when
release of contaminated coolant to the environment most of the rods are withdrawn from the reactor. The
and provisions to improve the reactor hall over- worst case of CPS voiding is a loss of coolant above the
protection will be installed during implementation of reactor core, producing a draining of all CPS channels.
the SIP-2. The water level in the channels decrease by gravitational
forces, thus the process is not very fast. Due to different
11.4 REACTIVITY INITIATED ACCIDENTS types of control rods and different control rod insertion
depths, the flow velocities differ significantly in the
Reactivity initiated accidents are accidents which are different channels. Thus, the reactivity insertion is non-
induced by postulated faults in the CPS. In accordance uniform in the CPS channels. In addition, the reactivity
with regulatory requirements [76] the following insertion is not very fast. The fastest possible complete
reactivity initiated accidents should be analyzed for voiding of CPS channels in the core occurs in about 10
nuclear power plants with RBMK-type reactors: seconds, while the slowest voiding occurs in about 50
• continuous single rod withdrawal, seconds. Multiple scram signal are generated and if the
• continuous rod bank withdrawal, reactor shutdown function is available on demand, no
• rod ejection, safety limits are exceeded.
• rod drop,
Assessments of reactivity initiated accidents show that the
• faulty actuation of reactor emergency protection,
Ignalina NPP is adequately protected against this type of
• refueling error including improper fuel placement,
accidents. The fuel channels remain adequately cooled
• inadvertent emergency core cooling system actuation,
both in cases where all systems operate as designed, and
• voiding of or gas ingress into control rod channel
when additional equipment or component failures are
cooling system.
postulated to coincide with the initiating event. Multiple
signals are available either to reduce the reactor power or
In the SAR the following cases were analyzed:
to shut down the reactor. The main issue is detector
• withdrawal of a single rod in the center of the core coverage, which is shown to be adequate for central and
and at the periphery at full power (4200 MW) and peripheral, single and multiple control rod withdrawals as
during start-up (240 MW), well as CPS voiding accidents. The single failure criterion
is applied through the loss of signals due to the loss of one
180
detector group of six. The loss of a group of detectors does
not significantly impact detector coverage because there • the plant achieves a new steady state,
are many redundant signals based on the remaining • acceptance criteria are violated,
detectors, i.e. acceptable consequences are obtained • conditions are encountered in the simulation that
whether or not these signals are available. cannot be reliably described by the available
11.5 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT mathematical models.
SCRAM Results provided by the base-case simulation include list
of all available scram actuation and power set-back
Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) are signals as well as the minimum time available for
accident sequences involving a non-LOCA transient of accident mitigation. The issues addressed in the analysis
moderate frequency (about 1.0/ year, e.g. turbine trip) or include:
infrequent incidents (about 3⋅10-2/year, e.g. reactivity
events) and failure of automatic reactor scram. Major • the ability of fuel channels to withstand a local power
objectives of ATWS analyses are to demonstrate that the rise due to rod withdrawal and sensitivity of
pressure boundary of the reactor coolant will not fail, the protective systems for this postulated events,
pressure suppression system will not fail, safe long term • thermal-hydraulic stability under reduced flow rates
shutdown is reached and heat removal capacity is and high power levels,
sufficient. The ATWS are commonly considered as • rate of pressure rise when steam generation rates
design basis accidents or as accidents to be dealt with in exceed steam relief rates,
the licensing process for Western reactors. For RBMK • time necessary for reaching critical values of safety
reactors ATWS are not design basis accidents and no parameters,
previous analyses of such accidents were performed. The • plausibility of effective operator intervention.
ATWS studies in the Ignalina SAR are the first of the
kind for RBMK reactors. These analyses have a different The following conclusions were drawn regarding the
purpose from DBA studies. The purpose of the ATWS ATWS sequences for the Ignalina NPP. Continuous
studies in this project is to identify the need for possible withdrawal of one control rod with ATWS from full
future design modifications to the shutdown system, to power are controlled by local automatic control/protection
determine the minimum time available for accident system. Total reactor power is kept nearly constant, while
mitigation and to make a step towards developing the maximum local power excursion at full power was
accident management measures and procedures. The 175 %. Detector coverage is such that the reactor setback
ATWS scenario can lead to unacceptable consequences. or trip signals are generated within about 10 and 16
The failure probability of the overall scram system is the seconds of the start of rod motion for star-up and full
major concern at Ignalina NPP. According to the power levels, respectively. Redundant trip signals are
assessment the failure probability may be 4⋅10-4 per generated within a short time span, so single failure of
demand or higher. The magnitude of this failure trip signal are inconsequential. At powers below the
probability highlights the importance of the ATWS issue normal operating range acceptance criteria in fuel
for Ignalina NPP. Four different Anticipated Transients channels are not violated.
Without Scram were addressed in SAR:
Failure of one MCP is inconsequential because the flow
• maximum reactivity insertion by continuous single from the operating pumps compensates for the trip of 1
rod withdrawal at full power and during start-up, out of 3 MCPs in one circulation loop. The local
• partial loss of flow due to MCP failure, automatic control/protection system maintains the plant
• loss of main heat sink (loss of both turbines with loss within a safe range of operation. Flow instability is not
of condenser vacuum), encountered even when the power is not reduced. The
• loss of preferred AC power. acceptance criteria for fuel and pressure boundary are
met. This conclusion applies to the whole normal
The analyses were carried out using the following initial operation range from 1000 MW to 4200 MW. There is
and boundary assumptions: All systems that affect the adequate time for operator action.
reactor power and are not active during normal reactor
operation are assumed unavailable. This applies to the During reactor operation at full power a turbine trip with
24 FASS rods, 24 LSR rods and the CPS operation modes loss of main heat sink leads to failure of the pressure
BAZ and AZ-1. All systems active during normal boundary within about 3.5 minutes (likely between core
operation remain functional during the accident as long as outlet and MCP suction header) because steam production
they are not affected by the consequences of the accident, exceeds the steam removal capacity of 2 SDV-A
e.g. LAC system, pressure and level controllers. Systems and 12 MSRVs. Total reactor power is maintained nearly
that do not affect the reactor power and are poised to be constant by local automatic control/protection system.
activated by the accident, e.g. relief valves, ECCS, are However, eight different power reduction signals were
assumed available. The base-case simulations is identified before pressure boundary failure. Effective
performed until one of the following conditions is operator intervention, i.e. manual scram is possible. If this
reached: ATWS were to occur at some steady state operation power
181
level higher than 2650 MW, the sequence of event will channels that can rupture simultaneously or
remain the same, only there will be more time available sequentially without damaging the reactor by
for operator intervention. The relief capacity is sufficient exceeding the 214 kPa peak pressure load on the upper
at reactor power level below 2650 MW, so the manual lid of the reactor cavity. The capacity of the existing
scram is a highly probable terminator of transient, since reactor cavity over-pressure protection system
long delay can be tolerated. introduced at the end of 1996 is 9 ± 4
Loss of preferred AC power results in constant reactor simultaneous or closely-spaced-in-time channel
power due to functioning of the local automatic ruptures at full system pressure. If the above channel
control/protection system. Due to costdown of the MCPs ruptures occur at reduced system pressures, the
and loss of main feedwater steam production rises discharge of the coolant will be smaller, and hence
considerably and will be in excess of the steam removal capacity of the reactor cavity over-pressure protection
capacity of the 14 discharge valves (2 SDV-A and 12 system to relieve this discharged coolant will be
MSRVs). Flow instability could occur after 10 higher. This capacity rises to 25 ± 12 at 4 MPa.
seconds and dangerous cladding and pressure tube wall
temperatures after 40 seconds. The acceptance criterion The range of uncertainty associated with the analysis
for main coolant circuit pressure of 10.4 MPa is violated is quite large, i.e. about 50 %. The primary reasons for
after about 1 minute. Multiple pressure tube ruptures are this are the scenario-specific variability of the break
likely to occur. Although the operator may be able to flow, and the uncertain characteristics of the flow path
manually insert control rods, this may not prevent a through the reactor cavity. In addition, there are
pressure boundary failure. uncertainties concerning the deformation of the
graphite stack after channel rupture, uncertainties
The results of ATWS studies demonstrate the lack of regarding the graphite surface area that will be in
inherent safety features in the RBMK design. The power contact with the discharged water and the stored heat
is not reduced by means of inherent physical processes that will evaporate this discharged water. If the stack
such as steam generation. The reactivity loss due to fuel deformation remains small, the discharge water-steam
temperature rise (Doppler effect) is not effective enough to mixture flow rate will be rather “isotropic” and
prevent major damage of the core. The local automatic evaporation could be almost complete, i.e. 100 %. If
control/protection system assumed available under the stack deformation creates vertical free “channels”,
analysis rules turns out to be detrimental in some cases the discharged water will be quickly forced out of the
since it tries to maintain the power level. graphite stack and additional evaporation will be
small. Therefore the range of the amount of steam
The apparent lack of the effective inherent safety features generated from the discharge into reactor cavity is
in RBMK reactors leads to one high priority quite wide - from about 30 % to almost 100 %.
recommendation, that a second fast acting, independent Improved analytical methods which might decrease
and fully diverse reactor shutdown system needs to be the noted uncertainties are not available in the short
installed. The second shutdown system has to be designed term. Since the consequences of the multiple pressure
to ensure its functionality at conditions prevailing during tube rupture can be catastrophic, it is necessary to
and after the accident, and to provide safe long term continue investigations related to this issue in order to
reactor shutdown. Development of second reactor better understand physical phenomena which can lead
shutdown system is under progress, but its to multiple pressure tube ruptures and to develop more
implementation requires 3-4 years. Compensatory accurate prediction methods for the reactor cavity
measures which have the potential to reduce the overall over-pressure issue.
risk are implemented at Ignalina NPP until a second
shutdown system is in place. 11.7 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT
11.6 POTENTIAL INITIATORS OF MULTIPLE A probabilistic safety assessment of the Ignalina NPP was
PRESSURE TUBE RUPTURE performed in conjunction with the Barselina project [63].
The project is a multilateral co-operative study conducted
The SAR project evaluated the capability of the by Lithuanian, Russian and Swedish experts. The
Ignalina NPP reactor cavity structures to withstand Barselina project, four phases of which have been
coolant discharges that might be encountered during completed, was initiated in the summer of 1991. Its long
accidents which involve fuel channels ruptures. The term objective is to establish common perspectives and
range of coolant discharge conditions from the unified bases for assessing severe accident risk and
ruptured pressure tubes into graphite moderator stack establishing requirements for remedial measures for
has been quantified. The consequences of various RBMK reactors. In this project the Swedish BWR
coolant discharges into the hot and rather confined Barseback is being used as a reference plant and the
reactor stack in terms of peak pressures within the RBMK-1500 at the Ignalina NPP is being used as the
reactor cavity have been evaluated. The venting applicant plant.
capacity of the reactor cavity over-pressure protection
system is expressed in terms of the number of fuel
182
The Barselina project has been split into four phases. fuel channels of the reactor. Such accidents do not lead to
Phase 1 included familiarization with and analysis of a loss of core structural integrity and this category can been
limiting number of safety systems and one single looked upon as resulting in medium severity
initiating event. It ran from October 1991 to the end of consequences. The “severe” accident category is
March 1992. Phase 2 included analysis of the principal characterized by severe accidental conditions caused by
components for all important safety systems and extension significant deviation from the design scenario and
to several initiating events, but excluding external events accompanied by the rupture at high pressure of more than
and with limited treatment of human factors. This phase 3 and less then 9 pressure tubes before the
ran from April 1992 to February 1993. During phase 3,
from March, 1993 to June, 1994, a full scope Probabilistic
Safety Assessment (PSA) model of the Ignalina unit 2 was reconstruction of reactor cavity over-pressure protection
developed in order to identify the reduction of risk that system and 9 pressure tubes after reconstruction. Such an
can be achieved with possible safety improvements. The event can be accompanied by fuel melting or fuel damage
probabilistic methodology was applied on a plant specific in more than 90 fuel channels. This is the most severe
basis for a channel type reactor of RBMK design. To consequence.
increase the realism of the risk model a set of
deterministic analyses were performed and plant-specific The accident sequence model for reactor cooling is a
data base were developed and used. A general concept for phased mission model divided into three time period:
analyzing this type of reactors was developed. During
phase 4, July 1994 to September 1996, the Ignalina PSA • Short term cooling 0-2 minutes.
model was further developed, taking into account plant • Intermediate term cooling 2 minutes - 1 hour.
changes, improved modeling methods and extended plant • Long term cooling 1 hour - 24 hours.
information concerning dependencies (area events,
dynamic effects, electrical and signal dependencies). The
PSA model is also updated to reflect the “as built” plant. The phase 4 results indicate that the overall core damage
The phase 4 PSA work used insights from the peer review frequency is lower than the phase 3 results. The reason for
performed by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories on this is the implementation of plant safety improvement
the phase 3 work. Another review is planned for phase 4. features, and improved analytical procedures which
eliminated unnecessary conservatism’s. The new results
The scope of the PSA study in the Barselina project is as are also balanced by the improvements in the modeling
follows. The source of radioactivity is the reactor core. of the CPS and ACS systems. The quantitative results
The PSA also is based only on full power operation. obtained are based partly on plant specific data and partly
Internal initiating events such as transients, LOCAs and on generic data. The results are not intended to show
Common Cause Initiators as well as internal hazards, absolute risk levels, but to give a risk topography and to
such as fire, flooding and missiles are taken into serve as a basis for identifying risk dominant features and
consideration. Final consequence of the accident is core systems design aspects and hence serve as a basis for
damage, equal to level 1 PSA. During the work, however safety improvement.
the core damage states have been defined in such a way,
that the results can be used partly as level 2 results - the The general results show a probability of the “violation”
damage stages represent 4 classes of environmental end state to be in the order of 10-2 per reactor year. This
impact. probability is dominated by single channel blockage
events. The assessment of probability value is based on
The hazard states in the core are evaluated on the basis of operational data. To date 3 such cases have occurred in
the development of accident event sequences resulting in the RBMK reactors. However, the design of control
conditions of either “safe conditions”, “violation”, isolation valves has been changed, which should have a
“reactor core damage” and “severe accident”. The plant is positive impact on the initiating event probability. The
considered to have met the “safe condition” requirements “damage” and “accident” end states show probabilities
when temperature limits are not exceeded or exceeded in together on the order of 10-5 per reactor year, the same
no more then 3 fuel channels, but cladding temperature of range as is expected for “core damage” as defined for
800 oC are not exceeded in any channels. Safe operation Western reactors.
limits are listed in Table 6.2. If the fuel cladding integrity
is breached in more than three channels due to cladding The risk typography is shown schematically in Fig. 11.1.
defects and damages or because the cladding temperature The characteristic of the risk topography is that for
limit of 800 oC is exceeded, the state is classified as “damage” and “accident” end states transients dominate
“violation”. The “violation” category can be regarded as the risk rather than loss of coolant accidents. Transients
belonging to relatively mild consequences. The reactor contribute more than half of the total frequency.
core damage category is characterized by severe Furthermore it is the long term failure to cool the core that
accidental conditions caused by significant deviation from produces the dominating contributions, Fig. 11.2. The
the design scenario which lead to cladding temperatures distribution of risk between short term, intermediate term
above 800 oC in no less than 3 and no more than 90 and long term contribution shows that most of the
183
sequences lead to damage or accident only in the long
term. Only the core blockage sequences lead to damage in
the short term. This demonstrates both the high
redundancy of the front line engineered safety systems
and the “forgiving” features of the reactor. Low power
density and a high heat capacity enables the reactor to
survive at least a one hour total loss of electrical power
without core damage. In the long term, support functions
184
2.0E-05 2.5E-05
Total for CCI in EPSS:

Long Term Total for area events:
Term
Int. term 2.0E-05 Total for general CCI:
1.5E-05
Short Term Total for transients:
Total for blockages:
Total for LOCAs:
Core damage frequency
Core damage frequency

1.5E-05
1.0E-05
1.0E-05
5.0E-06
5.0E-06
0.0E+00
Total for general CCI:
Total for area events:

Total for transients:
Total for CCI in EPSS:

Total for blockages:
Total for LOCAs:
0.0E+00
Short Term Int.Term
Int. term Long Term
Fig. 11.1 Damage and accident contributors in Fig. 11.2 Damage and accident contributors in short,
different initiating event classes [63] intermediate and long term cooling [63]
become more important and their failures become Since January 1996 a newly formed internal PSA group at
thedominating contributions. The results indicate that a Ignalina NPP is responsible for the probabilistic safety
long term lack of coolant leads to severe environmental assessment. The experience and information from the
consequences because the core damage is assumed to Barselina PSA phases provides valuable information to
occur at high reactor pressure. Human factors also other projects, e.g., the in In-Depth Safety Assessment of
contribute significantly to the core damage frequency. the Ignalina NPP project, for development of the event-
However, the development and introduction of event- based Emergency Operating Procedures and Reliability
based Emergency Operating Procedures is still not and Maintenance Management System [63].
accounted for in the phase 4 results.
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12. SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND PLANT OPERATION
12.1 OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The responsibility for direct administration and
The Ignalina NPP organizational chart is given technical management of the key operations
in Fig. 12.1. Operating functions involve the departments are delegated to the technical director.
executive decision making and actions relating to the The technical director bears ultimate responsibility for
operation of the plant both during normal operation making decisions essential to plant operation,
and in emergencies. General management activity at maintenance, and technical support. The technical
Ignalina NPP is the function of Director General who director deputy for operations provides technical
is the manager of the utility. He carries personal control over the key plant departments involved in on-
responsibility for the safe operation of the plant. The line operations. He is also in charge of industrial,
following officials are responsible directly to the radiological and fire safety in operations. All
Director General: plant technical director, manager of operating staff is under his authority. The plant shift
Safety and Quality Assurance department, deputy supervisor provides the administrative control of the
director for logistics, deputy director for personnel, composite shift staff consisting of control room
deputy director for economy, deputy director for operators and shift operators in workshops.
security (physical protection) and manager of the
department of international projects. Operating service organization chart is shown in
Fig. 12.2. Organization is based on the established
The Plant Board is created at Ignalina NPP according clear-cut interaction of different structural levels. The
to existing Lithuanian legislation. The following said interaction can be divided into:
officials are member of the Board:
• operating control over the shift staff by the plant
• Director General, shift supervisor,
• Deputy Economic Minister (Parent representative), • administrative and technical management of the
• Technical director, shift staff by department managers.
• Deputy director for economy,
The nature of interactions between administrative units
• Deputy director for personnel. are specified in administrative procedures. Rights and
responsibilities of each component of the organization
Along with the Ignalina NPP administration the Board structure are specified for all operating modes.
is the managing body of the enterprise, and the
Director General is the Chairman of the Board. The Organization of operational responsibilities at the
Board performs policy making functions such as Ignalina NPP are based on the workshop system, in
setting management objectives and making decisions which responsibility for the various systems and
on financial and manpower resources. The Board equipment in the plant, excluding the main control
reports to the Ministry of the Economy. room, are assigned to different units called
“equipment workshops”. There are eight workshops:
Reactor, Turbine, Electrical, Instrumentation and
BOARD Control, Chemical, Process Nitrogen and Oxygen,
of DIRECTORS
District Heating and Underground Communication
Services, and Decontamination workshops. The
DIRECTOR GENERAL control room operating staff can be considered to be a
SECRETARIAT SAFETY
COMMITTEE ninth “workshop”, whose equipment responsibility
includes all the central control logic and equipment,
the control rooms, the control panels, and which has
FINANCE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL the key function of controlling all operational,
MANAGEMENT
MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT
maintenance, and testing interventions to the
OPERATION operating plant. Each workshop is led by a manager,
MAINTENANCE who reports directly to the plant technical director.
Each workshop is technically responsible for the safe
operation and maintenance of the equipment and
PERSPECTIVE
SAFETY &
QUALITY PROVISION SECUTIRY
systems assigned to it, and each workshop is a true
PLANNING SERVICE
SERVICE
ASSURANCE
SERVICE
SERVICE organization with its own shift supervisor, in
additional to functional manager. Field operators are
part of the operating shift organizations within
Fig. 12.1 The Ignalina NPP organizational chart
workshops, while the main control room operators
185
report directly to the plant shift supervisor. issues needing immediate resolution it is recommended
that the Ignalina NPP should commit to an appropriate
management structure to ensure safe operation of the
Technical Director plant, efficient implementation of necessary safety
improvements and adequate support of the licensing
process.
Technical Director Technical Director
Deputy for Deputy for The Lithuanian Ministry of the Economy established a
Operations Maintenance
coordination group for the preparation and guidance of
the Government strategy to address the recommendations
Operations Service
of the ISP. This coordination group has proposed and the
(Plant Shift Supervisor) Government endorsed the proposal, that the existing
Lithuanian company law is completed so that a Board of
Governors of the Ignalina NPP can be established and the
Shift Staff
Reactor Maintenance Director General can be given full authority for safe
Workshop Staff
operation of the plant.
Shift Staff
Turbine Maintenance 12.2 ROLE OF OPERATOR
Workshop Staff
Operation is a complex of activities performed by the

Electrical Maintenance operating staff to ensure safe and reliable operation of
Shift Staff
Workshop Staff the plant equipment. The operating staff is an
authorized shift of personnel on duty, including
I & C Maintenance managers, operators and technicians who maintain
Shift Staff
Workshop Staff operational control over technological processes at the
plant and configuration change-over. The operating
Chemical Maintenance
staff is managed by a head of operation services who is
Shift Staff a technical director deputy for operations. The head
Workshop Staff
for the operation services administers activities of the
Process Nitrogen operational personnel of the plant: directly administers
Maintenance
Shift Staff and Oxygen
Staff control room personnel and through the deputy heads
Workshop
for workshops for operation, operational personnel of
the workshops. The plant shift supervisor is the senior
District Heating operational principal of the shift. During his shift, the
and Underground Maintenance
Shift Staff
Communication Staff
plant shift supervisor, through the deputy and heads
Workshop for workshops, performs general technical and
operational management of the Ignalina NPP. From
the operational point of view, the plant shift supervisor
Decontamination Maintenance
Shift Staff
Workshop Staff reports to the Lithuanian State Power System
dispatcher. He must receive permission from the
Fig. 12.2 The Ignalina NPP operating service Lithuanian State Power System dispatcher to perform
organization chart planned changes in operational conditions of
equipment, for which the dispatcher is responsible.
The plant shift supervisor subordinates to the plant
The organization and management of the maintenance technical director, technical director deputy for
function parallels that described above for operations. operation (head of operation service) and deputy head
Maintenance service is charged with maintenance for operation service. The deputy plant shift supervisor
including all types of repairs, equipment upgrading, is a senior operational leader for the shift at the unit.
testing and field adjustment. Maintenance personnel During his shift, the deputy plant shift supervisor,
are located in the equipment workshops. Coordination through heads of workshops and operational personnel
and management of their maintenance activities is the of the control room, performs technical and
responsibility of technical director deputy for operational management of the unit. On the
maintenance. He reports directly to the plant technical operational level, all on-duty shift personnel report to
director. the plant shift supervisor through heads of workshops
shifts and the deputy plant shift supervisor. They must
Plant organization was evaluated in the “In-Depth Safety follow the orders of the plant shift supervisor with
Assessment of the Ignalina NPP” [62] study completed in respect to operation of the plant, excepting only
1996. The Ignalina Safety Panel criticized plant situations where the operator believes that the order
management for lack of direction and failure to promote a will affect the safe operation of the reactor or safety of
proper safety culture. As one of the most important safety personnel. During mitigation of accident consequences
186
at the unit (plant), all workshop personnel present at training, is established. The program includes
the plant become subordinate to the plant shift theoretical training, training in the use of plant
supervisor regarding the issues related to the accident. systems, simulator and on-the-job training. Up to 1997
In case of the illness or injury of plant shift supervisor, the full-scope simulator at Smolensk NPP was used for
coordination of work at the units is the responsibility basic training of operators, but from 1998 the full-
of the deputy plant shift supervisor of unit 1 until scope simulator at the Ignalina NPP will be employed.
another plant shift supervisor arrives at the plant. A program is provided for the enhancement of
During his shift the orders of the plant shift supervisor professional skill enabling the personnel to promoted.
can be recalled only by decision of the plant technical
director or his deputy for operation. In case of errors Before a shift starts working, operational personnel
or inappropriate actions, the plant shift supervisor can involved in key positions must pass alcohol level and
be relieved of his responsibilities by the plant technical physical tests at the plant medical office.
director or his deputy for operation. In that case,
management of Ignalina NPP performance will be Operational personnel carry out duties according to the
responsibility of the plant technical director or his schedule, approved by the Director General. It is
deputy for operation. prohibited to be on duty for the duration of two shifts or
within a time which is more than two shifts. In
The head for each workshop shift administers the exceptional cases, operator replacement is possible under
entire on-duty personnel at that workshop. He reports a written decision of the plant shift supervisor or the
administratively and technically to the head of technical director deputy for operation. Operator
workshops and his deputy for operation, the plant shift replacements must be registered in a special record-book.
supervisor and deputy plant shift supervisor. Orders
issued by the administrative-technical personnel of The plant shift supervisor is authorized to implement the
workshops and divisions to his own operational following objectives:
personnel on issues under plant shift supervisor
jurisdiction are to be performed only with the • during his shift, he possesses authority to require that
agreement of the plant shift supervisor. personnel carry out urgent and precise actions while
undertaking their duties,
The key responsibilities of the on-duty shift include • to slow down any activities at the plant if non-
control of all plant activities, both safety and non- compliance with norms, rules and instructions have
safety, to the extend that the activities affect plant been identified,
operations in all modes of operation. Within the plant • to recall from his post any operational personnel who
organization, all workshops must obtain control room cannot perform his duties,
authorization to perform work that may affect plant • to control personnel performance during planned and
operation. The primary responsibilities of the on-shift accident switching, place in operation or shutdown
control room staff and the distribution of duties units,
includes the following: • to supervise accident mitigation activities at the plant
units and fire extinguishment,
• safe operation of equipment, • to control integrated radiation doses for shift workers
• nuclear and radiation safety assurance, and to take measures to reduce these doses,
• implementation of the dispatcher center schedule • to disregard orders of higher ranking authorities if
for electric load, they lead to a predicted reduction of safety of
• placing equipment in a maintenance status, personnel and hazard to equipment,
• placing equipment in operation after maintenance, • to summon operational and maintenance personnel to
• testing of equipment after maintenance and secure normal plant performance.
acceptance for operation,
• implementation of schedules of equipment, pumps The plant shift supervisor must bear disciplinary, judicial
and improvements of protection systems, normal and administrative responsibilities in accordance with the
operation systems and safety-related systems’ tests, Laws of the Republic of Lithuania for the following:
• implementation of schedules for operating
equipment walkdowns. • accidents, malfunctions of equipment, accidents due to
his fault or due to the fault of subordinated personnel,
Operating personnel is provided in accordance with • incomplete instructions provided by the higher
industrial standards. The operating staff is grouped ranking administrators well as consequences related
into seven shifts. Five shifts work on regular basis. thereto,
The sixth shift is a back-up for the main shift and the • implementation of requirements as set forth in the
seventh shift undergoes periodic training and review normative-technical documentation, rules and norms
operating procedures. Each shift consists of 137 on nuclear and technical safety, Technical Regulation
persons. For each shift job description an initial and [72], employees statue and operational instructions,
advanced training program, including emergency
187
inspection schedules and orders and decrees of the reactor in case of a clear threat to personnel and the
plant, main equipment,
• violation of labor and production discipline. • reject implementation of any activities if it is not
described in the operational instructions or there are
The plant shift supervisor controls on-duty personnel deviations from existing procedures.
activities as well as equipment status (faults, deviation
from normal conditions for equipment operation, place in In case of significant events in the operating condition are
operation, place in maintenance status) at the beginning identified or equipment damages occurs, a control room
and end of the shifts. During accident mitigation the plant operator must urgently take measures to restore
shift supervisor must first secure operation of electricity operational conditions or mitigate the abnormal conditions
supply of plant’s demand and residual heat removal. In and stop unfavorable events. He must then immediately
case an accident occurs at the plant which leads to the inform his superiors. In the event of an accident control
release of radiation, the plant shift supervisor must direct room operator must follow the “Technical Regulation”
the accident mitigation activities before the plant technical [72], “Instruction for Elimination of Accidental Situations
director or technical director deputy for operation arrives. at the Ignalina NPP” [80], “Instruction for Elimination of
Nuclear Accident at Ignalina NPP” [81], “Temporary
The key responsibility of the main control room operators Guidance for Management of Beyond Design Loss-of
is to assure normal safe operation of all equipment in Coolant Accident with Loss-of-Off-Site Power at Ignalina
compliance with requirements of official instructions, NPP” [82]. Division of responsibilities during accidents
including operational instructions, nuclear and radiation elimination at Ignalina NPP include the following:
norms, and normative-technical documentation,
Technical Regulation [72] under normal and accident • deputy plant shift supervisor - elimination of the
conditions. For normal operation the duties of the control accident situation at the unit,
room operators include: • leading engineer for unit control - elimination of
accident consequences in the zone of his responsibility
• supervise of the normal operation parameters on the for the thermal equipment of the unit. Securing of cool
signal monitors, indicative instruments, displays of down of the reactor core,
“TITAN” system, on base of reports delivered by the • leading engineer for reactor - maintenance of nuclear
subordinated personnel, who walkdown to review safety of the reactor and control of the process
working equipment, occurring in the reactor,
• supervise of the prepare to place in operation • leading engineer for turbine - elimination of the
protection and safety-related systems on the pumps accident conditions for the turbines and auxiliary
feasible-to-operate, reinforcements status, parameters equipment.
of the systems on the information signal board,
displays from “TITAN” system and mnemoschemes Each control room operator is responsible for:
at the control room,
• supervise of protection sound systems automation and • failure of equipment and malfunctions due to his fault
blocking, or due to the fault of operational personnel because of
• implementation of schedules for testing and switching incorrect instructions delivered by him,
to standby equipment, • failure to stop the development of an accident or
• implementation of all technologic operations improper mitigating actions initiated by himself or by
according to the check lists for switching, subordinate operational personnel.
• identification of faults on the operating equipment,
appraisals of influence on equipment operational Regardless the unit status, control room operators, must
capabilities, requirements to settle faults by the stay at their work places. It is prohibited for them to
workshop personnel or equipment owner, perform activities which do not relate directly to processes
• implementation of instructions received from higher occurring at the unit. Access to the control room is
ranking plant administrators. restricted and entrance is permitted only with permission
of the deputy plant shift supervisor. The list of persons
An operator from control room has the authority to having the right to enter control room under normal
perform the following: operation and of persons having the right to stay in
control room during abnormal conditions must be
• to disregard orders received from higher ranking approved by the plant technical director. When the alarm
administrators, if these are clearly mistaken and might actuates, the operator must:
impair the safety of personnel and equipment,
• prohibit activities of any kind on operating equipment, • clarify the cause of the alarm, checking instrument
if these activities can lead to accidents or incidents, indications, mnemoschemes, display from “TITAN”
• independently carry out operations to alter a condition system, and information on computers,
of the operating equipment, even to shut down a • inform the deputy plant shift supervisor of its
occurrence,
188
• restore equipment to normal operation parameters, based emergency operating procedures are being
• delegate tasks to subordinated personnel, inspect developed at the plant in 1998.
equipment,
• if there is a failure to restore equipment to normal 12.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT
operation conditions, or if personnel report equipment
failure, then a switch to the standby equipment or a The provision of an appropriate framework for
shutdown of the faulty equipment must follow. operational safety is provided through the plant
management system. This system covers all aspects of
All operations at the unit such as preparation of plant operations both on day to day and long term
equipment to be placed in operation, the placement of basis. In May 1995 the Director General defined the
equipment into a maintenance status, re-activation of safety and quality assurance policy of the plant. The
equipment after maintenance, testing and switching following is stated in the declaration:
on of standby equipment, must be recorded on the
equipment check list attached to the operational • the Ignalina NPP management bears full and
instructions. Operations must be performed by a formal responsibility for the plant safety,
control room operator and documented with • plant safety has a top priority which supersedes
signature. A control room operator must record the economic and production requirements,
following references of equipment operation and • plant management pledges to ensure maximization
status: of efforts related to plant safety and will strive for
the improvements in this area.
• operations during the shift, switching of
equipment and other work accomplished The technical director deputy for operation is in
according to the operational instructions and charge of engineering, radiation and fire safety in
under instructions of higher ranking operational operation. The plant shift supervisor is charged with
personnel, engineering, radiation and fire safety on shifty basis.
• any changes in the electric systems, The responsibility for industrial radiological and fire
• operating conditions and observation re. safety within plant department lies with heads of
equipment faults, stating the number of a fault departments. Radiation Protection and Industrial
regardless of unit status, Safety department is responsible for managing
• failure of equipment operation and deviations activities aimed at safe and healthy labor conditions at
from pre-set parameters, the plant, prevention of accidents, limiting personnel
• cases when automatic protection devices switched- exposure to radiation, and control of environmental
on, effects. About 80 specialists are working with
• instructions received from higher ranking radiation protection related problems.
operational, administrative personnel and
instructions directed to the subordinate personnel. The technical director deputy for operation, the state
inspector from VATESI, the deputy head of Nuclear
Operating procedures are used to guide control room Safety division and the inspector from the Safety and
operator activities under normal conditions, incidents Quality Assurance department inspect performance of
and accidents. Operating procedures are designated to the operational personnel daily. Inspection objectives
cover all aspects of operation and ensure reliable, include:
efficient and safe operation of the plant. Four types of
operating procedures are employed: • surveillance over implementation of the plant
requirements, norms and rules as regards nuclear
1. Normal Operating Procedures. safety, and regulations and procedures which
2. Abnormal Operating Procedures. secure nuclear safety required to be followed by
3. Operator Response Procedures. operators,
4. Emergency Operating Procedures. • control over protection and safety-related systems,
• control over performance of the on-duty shift and
Normal Operating Procedures describe the actions its compliance with the requirements as set in the
required during normal operation of the plant systems employees statute and operational instructions,
and its components, they specify tests, configuration • account of significant operational events and
control, removal and restoration of equipment. failure of equipment,
Abnormal Operating Procedures have been developed • control over shift tasks and inspection schedules.
for coping with deviations from normal operating
modes. Operator Response Procedures specify main Comments received from plant workers are recorded in
control room operator actions in response to small the operational record-books. Comments provided by the
deviations. The Emergency Operating Procedures VATESI state inspector must be recorded in the “Record-
currently used at the plant make use of an event-based Book of VATESI” with an obligatory written
approach to accident management. The new symptom- confirmation of the plant technical director and the deputy
189
plant technical director for operation. The remarks state supporting functions, such as quality assurance and
scope of the work to be accomplished, the responsible safety review. The responsibility for quality assurance
persons and procedures dealing with the completion of rests with all managers. The Safety and Quality
these tasks. Assurance department is responsible for development
and implementation at the Ignalina NPP of the
Equipment malfunction and significant events effective quality assurance program. Safety review of
occurring at the Ignalina NPP are reported and operational safety at Ignalina NPP includes activities
investigated. The key tasks in the investigation of of
significant events are as follows:
• identify the causes for significant events,

• establish organizational and technical measures
required to restore normal conditions,
• evaluate methods which would lead to the
avoidance of significant events and to improved
equipment performance.
Heads of workshops and divisions performing the analysis

of significant events for normal conditions must take
necessary measures for timely preparation of measures as
well as measures to eliminate the identified deficiencies in
the performance of operative and maintenance personnel,
to remove equipment defects, and to improve quality of
equipment maintenance. Investigation of workshop
malfunctions must be started immediately after
occurrence. Identification of primary causes as well as
collection of descriptive notes from personnel in
charge of equipment operation and personnel who
were operating the specific equipment prior to the
failure, must be made by the plant shift supervisor, the
deputy plant shift supervisor and heads for workshop
shifts. Investigations of workshop failures must be
completed within 10 days of the occurrence of the
failure. Under emergency conditions, investigation
time can be extended by the plant technical director,
but not for longer than 15 days from the date of the
malfunction. The Commission to study malfunctions is
established and headed by the workshops head or his
deputy for operation. The Commission must
investigate the failure and prepare a report. The
outcome of investigation and proposed measures must
be included in the “Record-Book for Workshop
Malfunctions”. Report copies are distributed to the
appropriate affected groups and to the Reliability
Group. Proposed measures indicated in the report must
approved for future application.
Equipment failure and significant events at the

Ignalina NPP are also analyzed by the Safety and
Quality Assurance department. When investigations on
significant events at the Ignalina NPP are undertaken by
the Safety and Quality Assurance department, a
“Report on Violation at the Ignalina NPP
Operation” is issued in which cases are analyzed and
parallel analysis on behavior of the operational
personnel is performed. The report must be studied by
operational personnel.
Review functions are those involving critical

monitoring of the performance of the operating and
190
the line organization, supplemented by the Safety and
Quality Assurance department and the newly formed
plant Safety Committee. Both organizations report
directly to the Director General.
At the beginning of 1995 the Safety and Quality

Assurance Department was established at Ignalina
NPP. The Director General delegated to that
department the responsibility for monitoring and
evaluation of safety of the plant. The department is
responsible for the elaboration and adoption of the
safety assurance program for the plant. The
department must submit its independent evaluations of
plant safety directly to the Director General, and will
focus on the requirements set forth in nuclear power
engineering and industrial safety standards,
regulations, instructions dealing with problems of
operation, upgrading, maintenance, testing of plant
equipment and systems important for safety. The
Safety and Quality Assurance department performs
independent safety reviews of specific activities and
reviews work completed by workshops, departments
and plant services. It suggests revisions and
improvements to these organizations. The department
is involved in the independent assessment of plant
modifications.
The new Ignalina NPP Safety Committee was formally

established on February 15, 1996 by the plant Director
General, to provide advice to the Director in
implementing his basic responsibilities for plant
nuclear safety. The Committee is composed of 9
experienced individuals from the plant organization
and outside experts. Committee members and the
Chairman are appointed by the Director General. The
Committee functions as an independent reviewer. It
will meet regularly, once a month as a minimum, to
discuss safety issues arising from its review of various
plant reports and observation of activities. Emergency
unplanned sessions will be held if required.
Appropriate plant staff will participate to present
safety issues. The plant Safety Committee performs
more strategic reviews of the plant safety-related
activities. The Committee is particularly interested in
the following areas:
• Plant modifications.
• Revisions to “Technical Regulations” [72] and
limits and conditions for operation.
• Revisions to procedures and safety rules.
• Operating experience and event reports.
• Quality Assurance program.
• Safety Improvement Program.
Safety and Quality Assurance Department functions as

Committee secretariat. Formal agendas and protocols
with tractable formal recommendations are employed.
191
13. PLANT MODIFICATIONS
This Section summarises the major safety related The reduction of the positive steam reactivity coefficient
modifications that have been implemented in the at the Ignalina NPP, from +4.5β to +1β, was achieved by
Ignalina NPP. This encompasses the important installing from no less than 52 additional absorber rods
structural and procedural modifications implemented in the core, and increasing the effective reactivity reserve
after the occurrence of the Chernobyl incident and the to from 53 to 58 manual control rods. In addition,
ongoing and projected modifications whose purpose is replacement fuel enrichment has been increased to 2.4 %.
to bring the INPP safety criteria up to western safety
standards. The increase in emergency protection system effectiveness
was achieved by three independent means [54]. In the first
13.1 POST-CHERNOBYL MODIFICATIONS modification the old type of absorber rods were replaced
by a re-designed type, in which the water column in the
After the Chernobyl accident, technical and organizational bottom part of the CPS channel has been eliminated (Fig.
changes were prepared and implemented in order to 13.1).
improve the operational safety of all NPP’s with RBMK
reactors. These changes had the following objectives: Secondly, the modernization of the CPS rods servodrive
increased their speed of insertion into the core. This
• reduce the positive steam reactivity coefficient to less
allowed a reduction of the insertion time from 18
then 1 β,
seconds to 14 seconds. When these changes were
• redesign control rods in order to increase the prompt
implemented, the prompt effectiveness of the emergency
shut-down reactivity,
protection system reached 0.9 β/s, which is about 8
• install programs designed to calculate the effective
times higher than the value before the Chernobyl
reactivity reserves and to display the results at the
accident.
operator's panel,
• eliminate the possibility of disconnecting the The third stage of increasing the control and protection
emergency protection system when the reactor is at system effectiveness was to install a new design of the
power, fast-acting scram rod in all the operating RBMK reactors.
• modify technical specifications re pump operation to This new design eliminated the water which used to slow
ensure that even at low power a sub-cooling margin is down the rod movement. The channel walls are now
maintained at the reactor inlet. cooled by a thin film of water, while the rod moves in a
gaseous environment.
re-designed
The new design was tested at the Ignalina and St.
FASR MCR SAR MCR Petersburg NPPs in 1987-88. Fig. 13.2 [54] shows that as
the 24 FAS rods are fully inserted in less than 2.5 s,
achieving more than 2β of negative reactivity (left
0 0 -20 -20 -30 diagram). The diagram on the right shows the reduction
0
+15 in power when the FAS rods are inserted.
+225
+276
+291
+657 +657
+675 +675 +685 +700 +700
+724 +700 +701 +730
Fig. 13.2 Fast-acting scram system test, at reactor

Fig. 13.1 Redesign of the RBMK-1500 manual power N = 0.4Nnom [54]
control rods [62] (all dimension are in cm) 1 - calculated, 2 - St. Petersburg NPP, 3 - Ignalina
NPP
191
Besides the improvements mentioned above, several other present time fifteen of safety-related engineering projects
important improvements were made which increased the sponsored from the NSA have been completed, others are
CPS effectiveness: under way. All in-service inspection equipment and
• the number of shortened absorber rods was increased

up to 40,
• automatic reactor shutdown was provided for when
reactivity reserves fall below 30 manual control rods.
All of these mean to improve the neutronic characteristics

of the reactor and increase the emergency protection
system effectiveness and thus diminish the chances of an
uncontrolled increase in reactor power.
13.2 MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTED DURING

THE SAFETY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
As noted in previous Subsection significant safety

improvements were done by the plant after Chernobyl
accident. Efforts to upgrade the Ignalina NPP safety were
accelerated when Lithuania assumed control of the plans
in 1991. To meet the safe operation goal, the
management of the Ignalina NPP together with the
Lithuanian Ministry of Energy and assisted by
Western experts prepared the Ignalina NPP Safety
Improvement Program [22]. It was approved by
VATESI in 1993. The objective of the safety
upgrading program is to increase and maintain the
Ignalina operational safety level until it is
permanently closed. The program recognizes the need
for better fire-protection system, procedures for proper
documentation of plant equipment and improved
reactor protection system.
Lithuania’s original intention was to contribute about

$5 million of its own funds to plant improvements.
Because of general difficult economic situation within
Lithuania, it was quite clear that part of the SIP could be
realised only with technical as well as financial assistance
from Western countries. For this reason, a Grant
Agreement [83] was signed on February 10, 1994 in
London between the Lithuanian Government,
Ignalina NPP and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development on behalf of the
Nuclear Safety Account (NSA). This agreement is the
first significant Western financial aid for an RBMK plant
and is only a second such grant approved to help an
eastern European nuclear power plant from NSA. The
accord provides for a grant of 33 million ECU. The grant
was to fund short term safety upgrades in support of the
SIP being implemented at Ignalina plant. As part of the
overall improvement program, the EBRD funds are to
support 20 projects in three area:
• Operational Safety Improvements,

• Near-Term Technical Safety Improvements,
• Provision of Services.
Operational safety improvement and short-term safety

improvement projects are listed in Table 13.1. At the
192
special tools for maintenance have been delivered and the necessity to do same changes in the design of the trip
engineering studies, including seismic upgrading system. The most important changes are related with trip
walkdown, are all complete. The ultrasonic In-Service logic. The EBRD has approved changing of contract
Insperction (ISI) equipment for the reactor channels will related trip logic. Seismic monitoring equipment has been
provide important direct evidence of channel conditions. delivered to the plant, but most the important problem is
Site acceptance tests were successful. The ARKI to get permission for construction of seismic stations at
Technical Documentation Management System has been the territory of Lithuania, Belorus and Latvia. In
in operation since February 1996. Since that time, accordance with working plans seismic stations in
utilization of the system has been extended and about Lithuania should be mounted in 1997.
forty additional users have been connected. The system The Safety Improvement Project is not restricted to
currently contains more than 20,000 different documents. the safety upgrading project at Ignalina NPP. It
Hydrogen monitoring system on both units are now in encompasses also the NSA-funded Safety
service. All 24 safety valves have been delivered and were Improvement Program, in addition, the Ignalina NPP
installed during 1996 outages. All 76 motor gate-valves has ongoing bilateral cooperative projects with
have been delivered. Twelve at unit 2 and ten valves at Sweden, USA, Germany, UK, France, Belgium, Italy,
unit 1 are in service. Fire protection improvements are Switzerland, Canada, Finland and Japan. Sweden is
now well advanced and visitors to the plant will see especially active in Lithuania. Geographically the two
evidence of new fire resistant paint and fire dampers. RBMK reactors at Ignalina NPP are the closest
Radioactive release and environment monitoring RBMK plants to Sweden. This makes Ignalina NPP a
equipment have been delivered to the Ignalina NPP. natural focus-point for Swedish interests. The most
However, due to failure of the supplier company (SEA) important technical safety projects implemented by
assembling work has not started and design Swedish assistance encompass fire protection
documentation as well as computer software have not equipment, including improved alarms, sprinklers and
been delivered. SEA has promised to take further action fire isolating partitions in various plant locations.
only in September of 1997. Main actions related to built Sweden has provided modern inspection equipment,
full scope simulators are completed in October of 1997. including cutting equipment which has been used for
Equipment for a trip system due to low flow in the GDH, the installation of a pressure relief pipe from the
low reactivity margin for unit 1 and cables for both units reactor cavity to the accident confinement system. The
have been delivered. Similar equipment for unit 2 is object of the latter project is to enhance the pressure
already tested at the manufacturers sides. There is a relief
Table 13.1 EBRD funded safety improvement projects at Ignalina NPP
Item Project Supplier Contract value, MECU

A-1.1 Steam separator and primary circuit visual inspection equipment GES Alsthom (UK) 0.70
A-1.2 Ultrasonic in-service inspection equipment for steam separator, pipes, Force Institute (Denmark) 0.60
etc.
A-1.3 Ultrasonic in-service inspection equipment for reactor channel MAN Energie (Germany) 1.42
A-1.4 Radiographic inspection equipment ABB-TRC (Sweden) 0.13
A-2.1 Special tools for maintenance Furmanite Int. (UK) 0.43
A-2.3 Seal rings for fuel channels Advanced Products (USA) 0.24
A-4 Radioactive release and environment monitoring SEA (Italy) 1.72
A-5 Design documentation upgrading IVO (Finland) 0.52
A-6 Full scope simulator Atlas (Germany) 5.49
B-1.1/3 Engineering study of additional shutdown and protection systems AEA Technology (UK) 0.63
B-1.2/5 Low flow and low reactivity margin reactor trip systems Westinghouse (USA) 6.36
B-1.4 Upgrading for the TITAN system SAIC (USA) 0.4
B-2.2a Seismic upgrading (walkdown) ISMES (Italy) 0.4
B-2.2b Seismic upgrading (equipment) - 1.37
B-2.4 Hydrogen monitoring system Electrowat (Switzerland) 1.45
B-3.1a Safety valves Sebim (France) 2.68
B-3.1b Motor gate valves FIAT-AVIO (Italy) 2.25
B-5 Fire protection equipment SVT Brandshutz (Germany) 2.71
Total 29.18
193
capacity of the reactor cavity. This was achieved by • Ignalina NPP should develop and implement
using remotely controlled equipment to cut out a emergency operating procedures and provide an
600 mm penetration into the cavity and install piping improved definition of the limits and conditions of
leading to the ACS. As a result, the reactor cavity is safe operation.
now able to withstand multiple ruptures of 3 up to
9 pressure tubes. Other Swedish assistance projects Among the SAR’s recommendations is the desirability to
include NDT testing, development and install a second independent shutdown system at both
implementation of the plant quality assurance system, units. This involves a significant hardware up-grade and
physical security and communications system could be expected to require about 3-4 years for
upgrades. The Ignalina NPP has signed an agreement completion. The Ignalina Safety Panel did not recommend
worth $2million with Swedish International Project the installation of such a system at unit 1 because is
Nuclear Safety and the US Department of Energy to expected to be shut down in relatively near future. For
install a new computer network and database system to unit 1 the development of an economic and speedy
improve plant safety and productivity. The contracts resolution of the control and protection system issue is
cover computer hardware, software, and training for required which will be able to provide an acceptable
the reliability maintenance management system for the remaining years of the operation before its
system/configuration management process at Ignalina closure. The projected longer life of unit 2 requires a more
plant. The USA will purchase the computer hardware reliable solution. According the Panel, Lithuania must
and training for plant personnel, while Sweden will carry out an estimated about $120 million worth of safety
purchase computer software. The new system will improvements, which includes the installation of an
monitor the state of the plant and warn operators of independent shutdown system for unit 2.
any irregularities. It will also link up the plant‘s seven
existing databases, which currently operate To operate beyond June 30, 1998 unit 1 will have to be
independently of each other. Symptom-based relicensed by VATESI. The operation of unit 1 beyond
emergency operating instructions is under 1998 would depend on the results of the nuclear safety
development and will be finished at the end of 1997 in assessment, the cost of continued safety upgrades and
cooperation between Ignalina NPP and Pacific energy situation in Lithuania. The Ignalina Safety Panel
Northwest National Laboratory. required substantial changes in the attitude of the
regulator with regard to safety problems. VATESI must
13.3 NEW SAFETY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT develop a regulatory regime for the licensing process and
for monitoring of Ignalina NPP operation using bilateral
As described in Section 10, an in-depth safety assessment and multilateral assistance.
of the Ignalina NPP was undertaken in 1995-96 and as a
result a plant-specific Safety Analysis Report was As noted above, the SAR was initially conceived as a
produced which will form the basis for decisions on Western-style SAR, produced by the plant with help from
future operation of Ignalina NPP. The SAR and RSR Western experts. However, such a SAR would have
teams have identified safety issues, made many consumed several times the resources budgeted for the in-
recommendations on necessary safety improvements in depth safety assessment of Ignalina NPP. The scope was
design, operation and safety culture. Implementation of all therefore defined as including assessment specific
improvements will significantly increase the safety level essential items. The intention was that it should take the
of the Ignalina plant. The Ignalina Safety Panel holds the form of a justification by of plant safety level in 1996, and
view that the most important safety issues in design and the explanation of how the intended improvements will
operation must be resolved without delay [84]. At the establish an acceptable safety level for remaining years of
close 1997 these issues are as follows: operation until plant closure. The objectives point out that
the SAR is intended to aid VATESI in making a licensing
• The Ignalina NPP should introduced an appropriate decision, but it is not stated that the SAR will form the
management structure to ensure safe operation of the complete basis of the safety case prepared for licensing.
plant, efficient implementation of necessary safety The SAR is a major contribution to the licensing process
improvements and adequate support of the licensing currently being undertaken by Lithuanian regulatory
process. body, VATESI. Some issues were not covered by the
• The safety case for the reactor control and protection assessment and remain to be resolved between VATESI
system should be completed by the Ignalina NPP. and Ignalina NPP. For this purpose the International
• The safety case for the accident confinement system Licensing Assistance Project was established. Its goal is to
should be provided by the plant. support VATESI during application of the SAR and RSR
• The safety case for the structural integrity of the results in the licensing of the Ignalina NPP.
reactor cooling system should be provided by the The Ignalina Safety Panel concludes that the measures
Ignalina NPP. defined by the Safety Improvement Program, partially
• A fire hazard analysis for all safety systems should be funded from NSA, are in general supported by SAR and
carried out by the plant. RSR results. However, the scope of these studies is not
sufficient to resolve all licensing issues and continue
194
operation. The ISP recognises the urgent need for and • Reactor trip and ECCS actuation based on the dP/dt
supports an integrated international assistance program signal in steam separator.
that builds upon the Safety Improvement Program of • Automatic actuation of ECCS on low flow in multiple
Ignalina NPP and includes guidance to VATESI and its channels connected to one GDH.
technical support organisations. • Assessment of waterhammer effect on GDH check
valves and connected pipelines.
The ISP recommended that the Lithuanian Nuclear Safety • Justification of omission of an assessment of accidents
Advisory Committee should monitor the follow-up at shut-down.
process of the Ignalina Safety Assessment and provide • Analysis of reactivity initiated events for core with
necessary authority. The international component of the new fuel design which is 2.4 % enriched and
committee is broadened by inviting membership from the containing erbium burnable poison.
USA, France, and Japan in additional to the members
from Sweden, Germany, UK, Finland and Ukraine. Among the long-term safety measurements the most
important is the development and installation of a fully
The Lithuanian Government agreed that the independent diverse shutdown system. Other important
recommendations of the ISP were extremely important for safety are as follows:
the enhancement of nuclear safety at the Ignalina NPP.
• Introduction of an early reactor trip and ECCS
The Government of the Republic of Lithuania also
actuation for all break location in MCC and steam
reported that they will ensure that the organizations
systems.
within the country’s nuclear energy sector will take all of
• Modifications to ensure ECCS is automatically
the necessary actions and that the necessary resources
injected to the unbreached reactor half.
would be made available.
• Improvement of redundancy and reliability of ECCS
accumulator pressure control.
The new Safety Improvement Program (SIP-2) of the
• Development of strategy for local flow degradation in
Ignalina NPP [66] is based mainly on the
intermediate and long term (ECCS injection
recommendation of the Ignalina Safety Panel, Safety
management and depressurization).
Analysis Report production and its independent review.
• Improvements to drainage in steam separator
The SIP-2 has been already developed and approved by
compartments.
the Lithuanian authorities. Experience of the first Safety
• Improvements of the reactor hall over-pressure
Improvement Program and safety-related problems
protection.
identified within Ignalina NPP were also taken into
account. The SIP-2 will be continuously up-dated and • Improvements of fire protection systems, including
revised annually and should be completed in three years fire load reduction, separation of fire compartments,
(1997-1999). All activities within the new Safety installation of fire and smoke detectors and alarms.
Improvement Program are divided in three groups: • Development and implementation of the Equipment
Qualification program for set of safety related
• Design modifications, electrical equipment.
• Management and organization development, • Analysis of hydrogen concentration in ACS
compartments.
• Safety Analyses.
• Complete accident analysis in long term including
Design modifications include system improvements for accidents during reactor shut-down, internal areas
normal operation, such as feedwater regulation, events and external events.
development and implementation of hazard protection, • Evaluation of the impact of safety related component
accident prevention and mitigation measures. aging and Importance Analysis to identify
Management and organization development includes components potentially contributing high risk.
implementation of symptom-based operational • Partial ATWS analysis.
procedures, system for maintenance and configuration • Continue analysis of reactor pressure relief` system to
management, Quality Assurance program and Safety determine margins.
Culture system. The new Safety Improvement Program
includes the 6 most important safety measures All the tasks of the first Safety Improvement Program
recommended by the ISP to be resolved in short-term, which were not completed have been included in the SIP-
safety problems to be resolved before licensing and safety 2. Among them are construction of the on-site interim
issues to be resolved after licensing. The six safety issues spent fuel storage, development of cementation facility for
needing immediate resolution are listed above. The other spent ion exchange resins and others discussed in
most important safety problems which should be resolved Subsection 3.2. Some new safety improvements proposed
before licensing are as follows: by the plant itself are included in the SIP-2, such as
replacing of batteries and DC switch-gears at unit 2,
• Safety evaluation and stress analysis of operation with
implementation of safety panel at unit 2, development and
graphite - pressure tube gaps exhausted (gripped
installation of solid waste incinerator, upgrading of
pressure tubes) and transient induced thermal stresses.
pipeline of SDV-D valves.
195
include continued development of management skills at
A special Project Organisation was established at the all levels of the organisation, a Program for increasing
plant to implement the SIP-2 program. Project Safety Culture awareness of all staff, combining with
management and project staff have been appointed by the Safety Culture audits of individual parts of the plant
Director General of the Ignalina NPP and have been organization, splitting-off of non-core activities of
relieved from other duties in order to be able to devote Ignalina NPP into separate independent companies
their whole efforts to the Project. A Steering Group for the during 1997-1998 activities, setting up of a new
supervision of the Project composed of members from the Department for Perspective Planning and introduction of
plant and from external bodies has been established. a new efficient and transparent economy administration
Quality Assurance (QA) program for the Project which system that can serve as a management tool. The
will be in line with general plant QA program has been Department for Perspective Planning will be responsible
developed and implemented. At the close of 1997 some for long-term planning, public and staff information,
specific project management actions have already been business development, management and organization
implemented by the plant in response to the SAR and development and governmental contacts.
RSR findings. Other changes are under way. These
196
K. Almenas
A. Kaliatka
E. UÖpuras
IGNALINA RBMK-1500. A SOURCE BOOK. Extended and updated version
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.

IGNALINA SAFETY ANALYSIS GROUP

The University of Maryland,

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Ignalina Safety Analysis Group,

ISBN 9986-492-35-1  Ignalina Safety Analysis Group,

1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT ................................................................................... 17

Fig. 1.1 General panorama of the Ignalina NPP

Table 1.1 Specific status of the RBMK plants

Table 1.1 Specific status of the RBMK plants [1]

Generation * Status Number of Number of

Ignalina 1 2 operational 211 1661

Fig. 1.1 General panorama of the Ignalina NPP [2]

Fig. 1.2 General units arrangements [2]

Fig. 1.3 Panorama of auxiliary services [2]

Fig. 1.4 Plan of the Ignalina NPP main buildings [2]

1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS

The Ignalina NPP belongs to the RBMK-type of reactors

Coolant water (steam-water mixture)

Table 1.3 Comparison of BWR and RBMK-1500 reactor parameters [3]

Parameter BWR* RBMK

Thermal power, MW 3800 4800

* General electric design

Ignalina NPP Project

General Designer of General Designer of

Fig. 1.8 Scope of responsibility for the Ignalina NPP project

Labour and Welfare Ministry of Internal

Fig.2.1 Location of the Ignalina NPP

Table 2.1 Population distribution

In the Ignalina NPP area, fog is observed during the entire

Maximum dust intensity is observed in May, and

The length of the lake is 14.3 km, the maximum width is

Total volume of water is about 369⋅106 m3. It should be

The hydrographic schematic of lake 'UNÖLDL is presented

'UNÖLDL lake drainage area, km2 613

A number of lakes are present in the area of the Ignalina

Nearly all surface discharge (74 %) flows to the south part

From May to October in the 1984, the evaporation from

The other side of the effect of Ignalina NPP to the amount

The Ignalina NPP is located in the area of the East-

The surface in the Ignalina NPP area is rough. Their

The requirements for considering an aircraft crash

A) There were no such regulatory requirements at the

Note, that the nearest air route Svir-Rokiškis is ten km to

• reinforced leaktight compartments in case A,

Steel type Chemical composition, %

Temperature, oC 10ChN1M 08Ch18N10T 22K

20 - 210 - 205 - - 200 -

α - coefficient of thermal expansion, 1/K,

Fluency, n/cm2 σu, MPa σy, MPa εu, %

• 20 oC for aluminum and titanium alloys,

Table 3.6 Physical-mechanical zirconium alloy properties [24]

Working Fluency, Test temperature, σu, σy, εu, δ, %

Hardening - 300 580 480 70 13

3.3 DESIGN OF CONCRETE STRUCTURES

3.3.1 Standard Construction Practices

The NPP concrete, which serves as a structural

Heavy concretes for radiological protection, which can be

Variation of structural and material properties caused by

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The hydrographic schematic of lake 'UNÖLDL is presented

'UNÖLDL lake drainage area, km2 613