Q.1.

How have studies of regional economies and societies altered our understanding of
eighteenth-century India?

Name-Tanya

Course-History Hons

Roll no.-220791

DSE- History Of India VI

As per C.A Bayley The crisis of 18 century had three distinct aspects.First , was the cumulative
indeginenous changes reflecting commercialization, the formation of social groups and political
transformation. Second is the wider crisis of west and south asia especially deline Of Mughals
and third was the massive expansion of European production and trade during 18.c .In India the
period was characterized by debate about two critical transitions. The first was the transition in
the first half of the century from the Mughal political economy to regional political orders. The
second was about changes and continuities after EIC establishes its control..After the death of
Aurangzeb the decline of the Mughal begins. First half of 18.c in India was characterized by
debate of two different set of schools broadly characterized as ‘Traditionalist’ and ‘Revisionist’
scholars by Shekhar Bandopadhyay.The Traditionalist argued that it was a period of decline i.e
‘Dark age’as a consequence of economic crisis and exploitation by the ruling classes on the
other hand Revisionist scholars put forward that their was political turmoil in terms of regional
assertiveness triggered by economic prosperity.

However the Nationalist or the Traditionalist propose that it was the period of Dark age
they presents varied view on the cause of Dark age. Aurangzeb’s policies and weak
administration of mughal empire was largely held responsible for the decline. According to
Jadunath sarkar it was a ‘Crisis of Personality’.Aurangzeb religious policy and later his Deccan
campaign were identified as main reason behind crisis.Further the succession of weak emperor
and incompetent commanders made the situation worse. T. G.P Spear critique Jagunath sarkar
and argued that that the Mughals had able personalities but they are preoccupied more in self
aggrandizement and had less concern for the fate of empire.Internal weakness inherent in the
the mughal institution and not personality crisis was responsible for the crisis.

From 1950s onwards Marxist historians argue in materialistic terms Like Satish Chandra
argue that their was a fical crisis because structural flaws in the working of the Mughal
institutions of jagir and mansab. The state was not able to maintain the smooth functioning of
their duties of revenue collection and revenue distribution.In 1980s Satish Chandra argue that
few jagirs are Infertile as the result the gap between the estimated Revenue and actual yield
was enlarged that result in Jagirdar crisi with economic undertone and impact functioning of
the state

From the 1960s onwards, certain economic historians, particularly Irfan Habib,
attributed the decline of the Mughal Empire and the ensuing political and social unrest to fiscal
factors. Habib argued that the excessively high land revenue demanded by the central
government in Delhi led to widespread rural exploitation, which in turn caused peasants to
migrate and rebel. This situation triggered an agrarian crisis that ultimately weakened the
empire’s political foundation. While Athar M. Ali agreed with Habib's model of a fiscally
centralized state, he suggested that the decline was less due to high land revenue demands and
more because of a shortage of jagirs This shortfall arose from the empire's political expansion
into less fertile regions, particularly in the Deccan.However J.F Richard mentions that the crisis
was the ‘artificial one’ and the land wa coverted into Khalisa land and there was fertile land in
Deccan.
As per Seema Alavi The downfall of the Mughal Empire is seen as both a cultural and
economic failure. The empire's decline is linked to Europe's rise as a global commercial hub
between 1500 and 1700, which increased the demand for luxury goods, driving up costs in India
and worsening the financial strain on the ruling elite. To cope, agrarian exploitation intensified.
M. Athar Ali attributes the decline of the Mughal Empire to a cultural failure of the ruling elite,
particularly their inability to adapt to the superior technology and scientific advancements that
Europe developed between 1500 and 1700. He points out that Indian regional powers like
Mysore and the Marathas, despite attempts to modernize their armies with French assistance,
also failed. Leaders such as Haidar Ali, Mahadji Sindhia, and Tipu Sultan made efforts to reform
their military and promote commerce, but they did not establish schools or institutions to absorb
Western knowledge. As a result, these regimes remained reliant on the outdated Mughal
ideological framework
Aa per Seema Alavi The ‘traditionalist school of thought’ in projecting the theory of
Dark age focuses on the imperial centre alone and took no cognizance of the diverse ways in
which Mughal institutions were bei:hg modified and transformed at local and regional levels so
as to pave the way for a subtleshift of power away from Delhi to the regions.Hence the
Revisionist view also exist that focuses on the economic prosperity and emerging regional
powers and therefore neglecting the total decine or ‘ Dark age’ theory.
As per C.A bayly the eighteen century saw not o much the declie of the mughal ruling
elite,but its transformation and acent of inferior social groups to overt political power.The
Revisionist school pointed that there was simultaneous development in society and culture then
how it can be classified as a period of decline.There was emergence of Succesor states (like
Bengal,Hyderabad and Awadh), Warrior states(Marathas,Sikhs,jats, Afgan kingdoms) and
Principalities(Rajput, Mysore) gaining independence. C.A Bayly argue that the creation of new
wealth and social power in proviences result in the decline of Mughal power.
PJ Marshall argues along with Bayly that the conflicts of the 18th century were
exaggerated in the traditional interpretation and therfe were many region that remained
unaffected despite the political turbulence in some areas of Mughal control. He says that the
coastal areas were less effected production of good for export was encouraged. Bayly and
Marshall propose that the 18th century was not marked by decline rather it was a period of
economic re-distribution and political de-centralisation.
Among the factors for Mughal decline Muzaffar Alam critiqued Irfan Habib’s view that
the zamindars led the uprisings of the oppressed peasants, which were later responsible for the
state formations in the 18th century. He points out that due to caste, clan and territorial
distinctions, zamindars were not unified in their rebellion against the Mughals, but were in fact at
war with one another. Alam also argues for a context of local economic prosperity which led to
zamindars ascendency.Muzaffar Alam notes that Awadh experienced significant growth and
prosperity, which increased the power of the zamindars. As history shows, power often leads to
corruption, and the zamindars were no exception. They began exploiting their newfound wealth
and defied Mughal orders. When they rebelled, the Mughal subedar in the region strengthened
his position by leveraging the unrest as a bargaining tool with the emperor. This dynamic
contributed to the regional assertion that ultimately bolstered the suba’s political economy. Alam
supports his argument on fiscal prosperity with evidence from regional and imperial Persian
literature and Urdu poetry, concluding that the eighteenth century was far more complex than
previously believed. Similarly, Chetan Singh suggests that political unrest in Punjab resulted
from tribal societies adopting a sedentary lifestyle, which intensified the strain on an agrarian
economy already suffering from ongoing disruptions.
 However, Alam’s argument has faced criticism from within the revisionist school,
particularly by scholars like John F. Richards and V. Narayana Rao. They highlight Alam’s
reliance solely on Persian sources, which they argue may distort his conclusions, especially when
analyzing resistance to Mughal authority. Additionally, Athar Ali criticizes Alam for comparing
revenue figures from the Ain-i-Akbari with those of the 18th century without accounting for the
inflation in prices, leading to an inaccurate depiction of revenue growth
Bengal’s path to independence in the early 18th century was driven by the decline of
Mughal authority and the rise of local powers. Murshid Quli Khan, appointed as Bengal's Diwan
and later Nazim, consolidated both political and financial control, making Bengal effectively
autonomous while still remitting revenue to Delhi. The province's prosperity, fueled by European
trade and the support of powerful bankers like the Jagat Seth family, further strengthened its
autonomy. Successive rulers, including Shujauddin Muhammad Khan, maintained nominal
loyalty to the Mughals, but by the 1730s,especially because of the coup of Alavardi Bengal
became operating independently.
According to Stewart Gordon and Burton Stein ‘ war and pillage’,along with their
connections to regional economies, were central to the transition of the eighteenth century. Stein
introduces the concept of military fiscalism, where military involvement in revenue extraction
and distribution became crucial, especially during times of war. In south India, the need to
maintain large military forces made consistent revenue collection imperative, which was often
managed by the military itself. War and military mobilization, therefore, became key drivers of
change (Stein, 1985).
Gordon presents a model of state-building in the Malwa region that revolves around the
Marathas’ practice of “marauding” and “pillaging” as they integrated the region into their
commercialized polity (Gordon, 1977). Frank Perlin adds to this by highlighting the high levels
of commercial activity in the region, arguing that commercialization was not solely driven by
state demand (Perlin, 1983). In contrast, Barnett examines the formation of the state in Awadh,
where the economy was sustained by the nawabs’ clever manipulation of revenue reports to
deceive the British about their true financial resources (Barnett, 1980).
Historians Herman Goetz and Bernard Cohn explored 18th-century society from different
angles. Goetz in his work “music and architecture ”, highlighting the resilience of Mughal
society through the evolution of its artistic and architectural styles, even as the empire declined.
Cohn focused on Banaras, analyzing how Mughal zamindars and alimdars manupulating power
structures to carve out independent states.Both stated collapse as weel as continuities with the
emergence of regional powers.
According to J.C Heesterman it was a ‘cyclical alignment ‘ rather than a collapse
characterized by 18 century. He describe the Rise,fall and decline of Mughal based on Hindu
political theory.Heesterman’s explanation of eighteenth-century society is unique, emphasizing
that change was inevitable due to a fundamental contradiction within the Indian concept of
kingship—the unstable connection between power and authority. Power, represented by the king
as the organizer of social conflict, and authority, symbolized by the Brahmin as the renouncer,
exist in opposition to each other without a mediating priesthood. This “illegitimacy” of power,
according to Heesterman, makes cyclical change unavoidable.However his theory was not
supported by many historians.
Revisionist historians like Ashin Das Gupta, B.R. Grover, and Karen Leonard emphasize
the regional shifts in trade and banking institutions that earlier scholars, such as Habib and Ali,
overlooked. Das Gupta contends that inland trade expanded even during periods of decline, and
corporate mercantile institutions continued to thrive. While traditional ports like Surat and
Masulipatnam faced a downturn due to decreased international trade, new colonial ports such as
Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta emerged. B.R. Grover examined rural commercial production
and identified the rise of new provincial markets that helped absorb this production, offsetting
the decline in foreign trade. Karen Leonard argues that merchant activities transitioned from
Delhi to regional areas, fostering local economic vitality.
As per C.A. Bayly the regional political crystallization was a Consequence of three
important developments. First, the Incorporation of mercantile organizationinto politics which
Can be termed as commercialization of politics this resulted inThe formation of a new class of
intermediaries. Second, the Gentrification process, in which those serving the Mughals Started
serving new powers locally and started investing in Small towns. Finally, the maintenance of
large armies and the use of their service in revenue collection it can be described As military
fiscalism. These revenue-collecting intermediaries Who disappeared during the rise of English
power are Categorized by C.A. Bayly and Sanjay Subrahmanyam as ‘portfolio capitalists’.
C.A Bayly mentions that Gentry became strengthened as through the case of Awadh and
Rajasthan it is evident that their power was linked to increasing consolidation of landed
powers.’The latter was being expanded And strengthened as more and more people converted
their state-Derived prebendal rights to private inheritable wealth.(Singh, 1990; Bajekal, 1990).
Frank Perlin challenges the idea that political decline necessarily led to economic decline.
He argues that in the 18th century, political decentralization and the localization of power
occurred alongside the rise of new political structures and socio-economic changes. This shift
was reflected in the movement of smaller lordly courts and urban functions to rural areas, such as
small towns and villages. However, Athar Ali critiques Perlin’s view, asserting that he overlooks
the influence of the Mughal Empire on Indian society. Ali contends that revisionists, like Perlin,
tend to dismiss the importance of the imperial economy by focusing solely on local political and
social groups, which makes it easier to conclude that there was no economic decline.
Therefore The study of regional economies and societies has transformed our
understanding of eighteenth-century India by revealing a more complex and multifaceted period
than previously thought. Rather than a straightforward decline after the fall of the Mughal
Empire, regional dynamics show that there was both continuity and change. Revisionist
historians argue that the period saw the rise of new political and economic orders, driven by
localized power, economic prosperity, and the emergence of successor states and warrior
states.C.A. Bayly and other scholars emphasize that commercialization, the formation of new
social groups, and political decentralization were key factors in this transformation. These
developments allowed regions such as Awadh, Bengal, and the Maratha territories to assert
greater autonomy, maintain economic stability, and even thrive, challenging the traditional view
that the entire subcontinent experienced a “dark age.”Historians like Muzaffar Alam and Stewart
Gordon demonstrate that regional prosperity, military fiscalism, and the involvement of local
elites like zamindars played crucial roles in the reconfiguration of power. The regional assertion,
far from signifying total decline, invigorated political economies and facilitated new political
structures.Thus, studies of regional economies have shifted the narrative from one of overarching
decline to one of economic redistribution and political reorganization, showing that while
Mughal central power weakened, regional economies adapted, ensuring continuity and resilience
across much of India during this

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alavi, Seema(ed.). (2002). The Eighteenth Century in India. New Delhi
 • Bayly, C.A. 1988. Indian Society and the making of the British Empire. Cambridge:
Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar. (2004). From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India.
New Delhi: Orient Blackswan