Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
PART 2
This document explains the process for Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process
under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, along with an interesting case study.
The IBC is an act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation
insolvency resolution of corporates, partnership firms and individuals in a time
bound manner for maximisation of value of assets of such entities.
• Individual Insolvency
• Individual Bankruptcy
IBBI enforces the IBC, and rules and regulations made thereunder.
Why IBC
Business plans entail informed risk taking to compete and succeed. Businesses may fail
because they are displaced by new businesses or they fail to carve out a competitive space
for themselves.
Either way, failure of some businesses is integral to a market economy. There can be two
outcomes as a consequence of failure:
✓ RESOLUTION: When a business fails, it needs to be resolved at the earliest and
expeditiously. Any undue delay in commencement or conclusion of resolution may
lead to exodus of key stakeholders and aggravate the failure, sometimes beyond
repair. In resolution, the business survives, typically under a new owner.
✓ LIQUIDATION: If the resolution is not possible, an orderly exit mechanism should
allow stakeholders to recover their dues from liquidation proceeds of the
business and free up resources for reallocation. The company is typically shut
down.
1)DEFAULT
On a minimum default of Rs 1 crore by a corporate debtor, a stakeholder
– either a financial creditor, an operational creditor or a corporate debtor
may initiate CIRP in respect of such corporate debtor by filing an application with the
Adjudicating Authority, the National Company Law Tribunal(NCLT).
Additional reading:
https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/nclt-admits-go-air-insolvency-plea-moratorium-
kicks-in-11683699511694.html
The RP role is usually taken up by law firms, consulting firms, audit firms etc.:
https://www.livemint.com/news/go-first-insolvency-lenders-consider-big-
four-auditors-for-resolution-professional-job-report-11684894321446.html
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/k
idnappers-angry-workers-plague-a-210-billion-debt-
cleanup/articleshow/65157244.cms
The RP often faces skepticism from senior management and hostility from the
promoters(who have been forced to hand over charge of the company to the
RP).
7) The RP appoints two valuers to determine the fair value and liquidation
value of the corporate debtor.
✓ Fair value is the estimated realizable value of the assets of the corporate debtor, if
they were to be exchanged on the insolvency commencement date between a willing
buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s length transaction.
✓ Liquidation value is the estimated realizable value of the assets of the corporate
debtor, if the corporate debtor were to be liquidated on the insolvency
commencement date.
8) INTERIM FINANCING
RP needs financing to the run the company on a going concern basis, during
the moratorium period. RP would try to raise interim financing for meeting
various expenses including :
✓ salaries to employees
✓ payment to suppliers of raw material and service providers
✓ maintenance costs of the factory etc.,
✓ fees payable to the RP.
Banks may finance Go First's request for Rs 400 crore interim funding (business-standard.com)
12)The CoC shall, while approving the resolution plan, specify the amounts
payable from the resources under the resolution plan towards insolvency
resolution process cost, to operational creditors, and dissenting financial
creditors. This payment is to be made before any recoveries are made by the
financial creditors who voted in favour of the resolution plan. Creditors in CoC
who abstained from voting and the creditors who voted against the approved
resolution plan are considered as dissenting creditors for this purpose.
13)The RP submits the resolution plan, as approved by the CoC, to NCLT for
its approval.
14)If the NCLT is satisfied that the resolution plan meets the requirements
specified in the IBC and the regulations, it approves the resolution plan.
15)On approval of resolution plan by NCLT, CIRP ends and the moratorium
ceases to have effect.
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO: LIQUIDATION
While the IBC envisages a total time frame of 330 days for completion of the
Corporate Resolution Process, many high profile cases have dragged on for
years.
The case of a steel company illustrates all that went wrong with the 330 day timeframe for
completing the CIRP.
To start with, at the instruction of RBI, the lender(creditor) filed an insolvency petition against
the defaulting steel company with NCLT.
The first challenge came in the form of the promoters of the defaulting steel company,
wishing to bid for the asset as a Resolution Applicant. This posed a “moral dilemma”.
• Should a promoter who has failed to run the company successfully (resulting in
default and insolvency proceedings), be given another opportunity to turn around the
company.
The bigger issue is that the promoter, responsible for the insolvency, now gets to walk away
with the company, at a cheap price, depending on the extent of the haircut/discount faced
by the creditors/banks.
To address this glaring lacuna, IBC was amended to exclude defaulting promoters (with
NPA’s) from bidding for stressed assets.
To overcome this constraint, the promoter’s bid was submitted through an apparently
unconnected party, though it did not withstand scrutiny. The bid was found to be ineligible.
Apart from the promoter another bid was received from a giant European steel company.
The related party of this European company was a defaulter at yet another Indian company
and hence this bid was determined to be ineligible.
• The related party then paid up the overdues.
• The European company now became eligible to bid(i.e., submit a Resolution Plan).
• The Committee of Creditors accepted its bid, involving a “reasonable” haircut, with
the prospect of realizing an amount higher than what banks were hoping to get as
part of the Insolvency process.
The matter did not end there. The original promoter submitted yet another proposal, which
involved a full pay out for creditors and withdrawal of insolvency proceedings. Banks were
astounded. If the promoter did indeed have the resources to pay off creditors, why wait all
this while, dragging the company through insolvency, almost losing it to a competing tycoon,
and then present a last minute bid to save its “crown jewel”. Where was its financial
wherewithal to follow through on its bid, were some of the questions that arose. This last-
minute bid of the promoter, ultimately did not see the light of the day, after further litigation.
But then it was too early to rejoice for the banks which were hoping to reverse the provisions
made for the non-performing assets. The winning resolution plan cut a much larger share of
the pie for financial creditors and a smaller share for “operational creditors”. The latter cried
foul, and went to the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In an apparent act of judicial overreach,
the Tribunal ordered an equal share for both types of creditors, completely ignoring the
decision of the Committee of Creditors. It did sound fair though, should not everyone get the
same payout? But traditionally financial creditors (suppliers of finance) are secured, while
operational creditors (suppliers of goods and services) are not. Having agreed to supply on
an unsecured basis during a state of the company’s solvency, can operational creditors seek
an equal standing with secured financial creditors, when the company is taken to the
insolvency court?
The government stepped in to address this anomaly, by amending the IBC to give primacy to
the Committee of Creditor’s decision, which comprises of Financial Creditors. Of course, the
operational creditors did not take this well, and challenged this again at the Supreme Court.
The apex court held that operational creditors and dissenting financial creditors are entitled
only to their notional liquidation value and not more. It stressed that the final discretion of
what to pay and how much to pay to each category or sub-category of creditors is vested
with the CoC.
Finally, after a more than two years, and multiple litigation and bidding wars, the steel
company was taken over by the winning Resolution Applicant, the European steel giant. The
erstwhile promoters of the steel company, lost the “crown jewel” of their group.
Note: although the title of the document is NPA Part 2, the IBC applies to any
default, not only to NPA(default of 90 days).
This document provides a perspective on the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process in a simple to understand manner. It
does not purport to cover all applicable laws and regulations in detail.