Abraham Calov's

S.S. Theol. D. & P.P.

DIVINE
METAPHYSICS
Drawn from first principles, represented in the abstraction of Being,
applied to Sacred Theology,
showing

The Genuine Use

The heretical Abuse
Of Transcendental Terms and Conclusions.
Consisting of
The GENERAL PART
revised, and expanded,
and
The SPECIAL PART,
Which is now at last added,
Long and much desired until now.
"The acquisition of it would not be considered human"
1. Metaph. c.2.
YEAR 1650
At the expense of JOACHIM VVilden, Bookseller of Rostock.
LÜBECK
By the letters of ALBERT HAKELMANN

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 Preface on the Principles, and Method of divine Metaphysics

To the truth-seeking

and benevolent reader

GREETINGS!

There are two things that I want from you in advance. First, I kindly contend that you bring a
truth-seeking mind. For this is my one and only goal, to which, with GOD AS GUIDE, I have
striven. If only I had achieved it everywhere! But how could I dare to promise that to myself,
when I see that even by Great Men it has been erred here both most often, and most
seriously. Although where this could be seen, from there I was able to come more easily out
of the deviations into the royal way of Truth. But perhaps I was not always able to perceive
even that, however much I always wanted to beware. To me indeed nothing is more
important, nothing preferable, than to follow the light from above: without which our whole
wandering in the studies of letters is only a certain miserable erring.

However, we cannot follow the light from above, unless we have respected Scripture and
Nature everywhere: From which others were carried off to deviations no sooner than they
were deprived of the guidance of one or both. A part of them heeds neither nature nor
Scripture, either blind by nature, or blinded by the authority of others; A part has respected
Nature solely; It either could not, or did not want to consult Scripture, whose cause is
pleaded either by simple or affected ignorance. Hence so many errors, so many heresies.

Aristotle, the prince of Philosophers, is easily excused, because he observed the things
represented in Nature with one eye most keenly; but he was entirely deprived of the other,
with which he should have beheld the things revealed in Scripture. But today in such great
light they use only that one eye in the \[θεωρία (theory)\] of transcendentals, let them see
to it, lest they deprive themselves of the other, and as blind leaders lead or seduce others
into the precipices of errors.

Of the other Philosophers I note certain ones and of the heretics nearly all, that I may freely
say what I think. These are, whoever so adorn the first Philosophy, the most abstract
discipline, and think it must be adorned, that in investigating the formal concept of
transcendentals, only Nature is heeded and what things are represented in Nature, nor do
they judge it necessary, that the book of Scripture be consulted, and whatever is read in the
same.

Who certainly will never present Metaphysics in the abstraction of Being, nor will they be
able to maintain what they assert with the Philosopher, that Metaphysics is the most general
discipline \[τῶν ὄντων (of beings)\], and its object is Being, as Being, under the most
abstract concept, as it is the first knowable. For you cannot abstract the common concept
except from those things which are known and clear to you.

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Therefore how will the common concept of Transcendentals be able to be abstracted from
the infinite as well as the finite, from mystical and predicamental things, unless the nature of
the infinite as well as of the finite, and the character of the mystical as well as of the
predicamental things has been established beforehand? But that cannot be established
except from Scripture, since in the natural representation of things no mysteries at all are
contained.

Thus the formal concept of Essence, Perfection, Unity, Incommunicability, Duration, Ubiety,
Principle, Cause, Simple, Essential Identity, real distinction, relative opposition, image, etc.
cannot be established in the highest abstraction, if we consider only the lower hemisphere
of nature, and if from those things which are represented in it - Essence, Perfection, Unity,
Incommunicability, Duration etc. - we attempt to abstract a common and most general
concept of the same, then we will be utterly deceived. For the common concept must apply
also to mystical things, and to infinite Being. However, God must not be judged from the
condition of the abject creature. Mystical things are above nature. Therefore they must not
be judged from those things which are in Nature. If it happens otherwise, the way will be
open for heresies.

As we have shown with a great many examples throughout the work,

Similarly, Transcendental Conclusions cannot be drawn from the mere affinity of things and
the principles of Natural cognition.

At the same time, attention must be paid to the truth of Scripture and Theological principles;
For those Conclusions which ought to be so universal and general that they are verified of all
things whatsoever, they certainly must be drawn from the consideration of the nature of all
things, whatsoever they are, whether they are evident to us by the light of reason, or by the
light of revelation.

Otherwise, it will happen that a Conclusion is considered universal which is by no means

universal, but in Theology suffers a certain \[ἐξαίρεσιν (exception)\].

Indeed, I would not hesitate to assert that this is easily the principal cause of the Socinian
heresy, that they do not heed this. For when they observe in Nature that for every person
their proper essence obtains, numerically diverse from others; That every singular is
incommunicable; That every principle is by nature prior to its principiate; That every real
distinction is an essential distinction; that all opposites are of diverse essence: that no image
is the very same thing of which it is the image, etc., from there they gather general axioms
and transcendentals, which they pronounce to be absolutely and universally true, when in
nature they suffer no \[ἐξαίρεσιν (exception)\].

If you allow these to be called such, O Philosopher, what else will you do than pour cold
water on the Photinian heresy? For under those very transcendental and universal principles

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the Socinians will subsume the divine persons, the singularity of the divine essence, the real
distinction of hypostases, the relative opposition etc.

and so they will demonstrate their heresy invincibly even in your opinion from Metaphysical
principles.

On the contrary, the abstraction of terms must be insisted upon: and conclusions must be
traced back to the first principles of cognition, which are contained in the terms themselves.

Whatever GOD has said, this is true, and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not be
at the same time.

The former demands that all things be tested by divine revelation, the latter that they be
tested by the affinity and representation of things. Whatever is congruent with these must
be accepted: What differs from them, must be rejected.

If Philosophers will heed these things everywhere, and do not admit anything in
Metaphysics, except what rests on these principles, then at last they will present a first
Philosophy immune and untouched by every error.

Indeed, I judge that then at last the Churches will be tranquil and blessed, if either
Philosophers (Metaphysicians) truly devote themselves to Theology, or Theologians
philosophize piously, as Schegk says most seriously l.1. demonstr.

Now if on the other hand the cause must be stated, from which disturbances have chiefly
arisen in the Churches, I would not hesitate to assert that this is easily the principal cause of
heresies, that their authors have not philosophized piously. For while they were intent solely
on nature, and called the mysteries of faith to its laws, having neglected the pious study and
scrutiny of the Sacred scriptures, by this very thing they were carried off to the deviations of
errors, and threw themselves headlong into heresies.

As an example I cite the modern heretics, the Socinians especially, the Zwinglians and the
Jesuits, who do not blush to declare this, which I have said, in words, so that they betray
themselves like the shrew-mouse, and express the same thing in deed.

I would produce their words. But what need is there of words, where the testimonies of
things are present.

Let it be permitted to me to set forth one or the other example.

From the Papists, Cardinal Bellarmine l.2. de just. c.7. reasons thus against the justification of
faith most evidently posited in Holy Scripture.

It is not possible for the justice of Christ to be imputed, and it is repugnant to right reason
for the justice of Christ to be so imputed to us, that through it we are formally named and
are just. Is this to philosophize piously, I call upon your faith, Jesuits? To want to reject what
things have the clearest testimonies in Scripture by the pretext of reason! Similar is that he

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tries to prove the truth of transubstantiation (more truly you will have called it a figment)
from congruity according to nature l.3. de Eucharist. c.22. and that in the preface de Sacr.
Eucharist. he thinks; The Real presence of Christ in the Eucharist must be proved from the
judgment of Reason. As if the truth of Scripture should be judged from nature: and divine
revelation should be tested by the scales of human reason? But perhaps this must be
pardoned for the Papists, since this is their \[ἔθος (custom)\], which Peter à Soto proposes in
these words p.84. assert. Cathol. fidei. It is not of the Evangelical Spirit to be intent on
Scripture alone.

However, the Zwinglians are no better than these, if only they were not worse. Most truly
did Philip Melanchthon once pronounce about them in his Epistle to Gorlich, Pastor of
Brunswick in the year 1530, that they have no Christian doctrine, they only philosophize
childishly. For when they once admitted into their mind that God does not set forth
incomprehensible things for us to believe, which was the assertion of Zwingli in the Marburg
Colloquy in the year [15]29, as reported by Dr. Luther vol.4. Germ. Jena p.448 (according to
that saying of Justin in his exposition of the faith p.304 \[τὰ μυστήρια ὑπερ κατάληψιν (the
mysteries are beyond comprehension)\]), they freely trample upon the mysteries, and try to
measure by the measuring rod of reason those things which are evident from Scripture
alone, and attack the articles of faith manifested by divine revelation alone with
Philosophical principles. If you ask the reason, Peter Martyr will respond in the name of all,
in the preface to his work on the books of Kings, because not so much the divine word, as
the words of nature must be followed in Theology.

For what he enjoins blatantly here, that same thing the others express.

Thus you may hear them attacking the express letter of the most sacred testament of Christ
with principles of reason most frequently, because no body can be present in multiple
places, denying the communication of divine properties against the clearest Sun of Scripture,
since no proper [attribute] can be communicated, calling into doubt the election from faith,
against the most evident sayings of the divine Word, because what is eternal cannot be
limited by temporals, evacuating the power of Baptism, although the clear oracles of Holy
Scripture contradict it, because a material thing cannot be the cause of a spiritual thing, etc.

How much more rightly does Jodocus Nahum say, on the First Sunday of Advent, p.18, The
decrees (Mysteries) of GOD are not to be foolishly weighed or examined by the scales of
reason.

If the Socinians are to be heard, nothing will be to be believed, which reason testifies to be
false, according to Ostorodus in his Institutes p.42. Hence the mystery of the Trinity will be
rejected, because it is contrary to reason; of the personal union, because reason testifies the
same to be false; of the generation of the Son from the Father from eternity, and of the

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sanctification of Christ for sins, because reason likewise does not admit these, as the
Racovian Catechism concludes, pp.33, 48, 55, 65, etc.

However, as Chrysostom most seriously pronounces, It is a great danger to commit the

things of faith to human reasons, Homily 2 on Genesis.

Therefore, the things that have been handed down in the Scriptures in clear and plain words
must be accepted with simple faith, and from the Truth of those same words, the indefinite
and unlimited principles of reason must be limited and defined, but by no means is the truth
of the former to be overturned from the unlimited generality of the latter.

Those men urge: Scripture is not against reason but above reason: But in reality they testify
that they not only elevate reason above Scripture, but even against Scripture. Since they
desert and reject the express letter of Scripture for the very reason that they cannot attain
its mysteries by reason, much less comprehend them.

Therefore, they do not say that the mysteries of faith are above reason, because they cannot
be comprehended by reason when revealed in Scripture; But because they cannot be
investigated by reason alone without the external revelation of the Holy Spirit through the
Scriptures.

Evidently, they want nothing to be said in the Scriptures, however most evidently it has been
said, which cannot be comprehended by reason, once it has been known.

A most pestilent error; nay, the first principle of the Socinian heresy! Which will be
demonstrated elsewhere, God willing.

Hence they strive to comprehend all the mysteries of faith by reason, and since they believe
nothing except what they comprehend by reason, from there they retain no mysteries at
last, they evacuate all things, and thus they so elevate reason above Scripture. However, lest
they seem to do this without reason, they produce into the line of battle the arguments of
reason against those mysteries, and their proper seat in Holy Scripture, and thus they arm
reason against Scripture.

And they still boast that they use right reason, and illuminated by the Holy Spirit.

Evidently, reason deserting the light of the Holy Spirit and the Divine Word is according to
them reason illuminated by the Holy Spirit and the light of the divine word.

Just as he who in his actions does not follow the guidance of the Holy Spirit, but obeys the
lusts of his flesh, is a reborn and spiritual man.

Therefore, I would judge; reason, which from its own principles contradicts clear revelation,
is nothing less than illuminated, nor should it be heeded in any way, because then it does
not contain itself within its own sphere, when it affects to judge about these things which
are of mere revelation, since about these, whether they are true or false, it can never judge
from its own principles.

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But to return to that from which I have digressed, I say again, no universal principles can or
should be established in the abstraction of Being, unless they have been confirmed by
induction of all things, whether natural or mystical, and constituted with regard to both the
revelation of Scripture and the representation of Nature; if indeed all provisions and all
provisions for the Masters of the heretics are to be taken away, which they promise to
themselves from first Philosophy.

For this is what we wanted \[διὰ τούτο (because of this)\] to equip our \[ὀντολογίαν
(ontology)\] in the abstraction of Being, to draw all conclusions from the first principles of
cognition, and lest perhaps anything be lacking for the complete doctrine about each one,
partly to show and assert the genuine use, partly to uncover and refute the heretical abuse
of the Jesuits, the Zwinglians, and especially of the Socinians, and indeed among these
especially of Crellius, who is conspicuous in those books de uno DEO Patre (On the One God
the Father).

Hence it is quite clear \[παντελῶς φανερὸν (entirely evident)\], how from the consideration
of Scripture as well as of Nature the most common terms should be abstractly defined and
the general first-philosophical conclusions should be constructed and explained; so that
Metaphysics may truly be called Divine.

For although the Philosopher tries to show the divinity of Metaphysics by certain reasons of
his own: 1. Metaph. 2., nevertheless we judge not undeservedly; that it will only then truly
be divine, if it has been constituted with regard to divine revelation in Scripture and
representation in Nature in the abstraction of Being from the finite and the infinite, from the
predicamental and the eminent. It is not that Metaphysics which has Aristotle or any other
man as its author, but that which acknowledges GOD Himself as author, and is as it were
read in Scripture and Nature, from which also it must be solely drawn; which indeed we,
following the footsteps of any of the best Theologians and Philosophers, have pursued, but
whether we have attained it, it will be in your power, sincere Reader, to judge.

Although also for the sake of those who traduce Metaphysics with I know not whether
greater impudence or ignorance, it pleased us to label it Divine, since we most truly think it
was said by the Philosopher (whatever else the ignorant haters may babble) 1. Metaph. 1.2.
\[οὐκ ἀνθροπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις (the acquisition of it would not be considered
human)\].

But I come to the second head of the preface; where it behooves me to appeal to your
humanity, Reader, that you bring a benevolent mind. For since in this imperfection there is
nothing of perfection, it will be yours to estimate all things from the goal. For in great things
it suffices to have willed and attempted. I have certainly willed and attempted great things;
let it be, through your benevolence, that I have willed, have attempted, if somewhere I have
not been able to attain and accomplish in all things. Augustine desired in his writings not

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only a pious reader, but also a free corrector. I have the same wish here. But just as it befits
the reader to be devoted not to me but to the Light itself, so it befits the corrector to love
not himself more, but the Truth.

The divine office of Metaphysics is that from which it is hailed as the Mistress of the rest 1.
Poster. 7. and Queen 3. Metaph. c.2. and also guide 1. Met. c.2. Its parts are three.

The direction of the inferior disciplines, the confirmation of conclusions from first principles,
and the cognition of all things that are, in the universal, as is accurately taught 1. Metaph.
c.2. These, as the sacred Cynosure, we have respected in the \[σύστασις (constitution)\] of
the first Wisdom, judging thus that Metaphysics is worthy of the name Queen of the
sciences only if it actually conducts itself as such, as it wants to be considered, and vice versa
is unworthy of this title, which does not execute those its duties. For a king is only
equivocally a king, unless he rules his subjects.

From there appears our Method and plan of treatment.

The highest and first duty of Metaphysics is to direct the inferior disciplines. It is directed by
none, but directs the others.

For that reason a Metaphysical precognition was necessary. For since it is the highest of the
sciences, it had to lay the foundation for itself in the \[προγινωσκομένοις (things
foreknown)\] otherwise than the others, which presuppose this one as the highest and
directress.

But because our purpose was to exhibit an \[ὀντολογίαν (ontology)\] in a certain singular
way, it was worthwhile, before access was made to other things, to instruct ourselves with
certain \[οἱονεὶ προγνωστικοῖς (as it were precognitive)\] admonitions about the
arrangement of Metaphysics, as well as about the order and parts of the treatment, and to
open the way for others to the treatment itself.

The necessity and reason of these could not be evident, unless a consideration about the
constitution and division of \[ὀντολογίας (ontology)\] was premised.

Therefore, I wanted to gather admonitions from the same.

2. A precognition of Being, the Object of Metaphysics, was necessary.

The inferior disciplines do not precognize their object, but presuppose it precognized in the
Queen of the sciences. But the object of the Queen of the sciences cannot be precognized
elsewhere. Otherwise, she herself would not be the highest and chief of the sciences.

Therefore, it is necessary that she herself precognize it, both as to the quid nominis (what
the name signifies), and as to the question an sit (whether it exists)? Whence there were
two chief heads of that matter, the explanation of the Name of Being; and the adequate
constitution of the Object of Being as Being, so that with the name first having been
explicated it would at last be evident under what concept Being is the object of first

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Philosophy, namely not as it is accepted equivocally, but insofar as it is positive, real, actual
and incomplex.

Moreover, in order that Metaphysics may direct the other disciplines, it is bound to prescribe
laws to them, to set limits for them, so that they may compose themselves according to the
norm of the laws, and contain themselves within their limits, and finally to decide
controversies arisen in the inferior disciplines, according to that norm which it has given, and
those terms which it has constituted.

Indeed, it hands down laws, when it proposes the most general and most common
principles, which are to be the norm of all statutes of the disciplines, so that nothing should
be asserted or established here, which does not agree with that norm.

Metaphysics accomplishes this while it is occupied with the simple doctrine of Being and of
the transcendental attributes.

For thus it is occupied with the Nature and concept of Being, and also with the formal
concept of the transcendental attributes, so that since the most universal conclusions are
contained in them virtually as in principles, it also collects and elicits the same from them.
For definitions are principles, in which are contained virtually whatever truths are
Conclusions.

Moreover, those most universal Conclusions are the principles of the inferior disciplines.
Therefore, the greatest labor had to be expended on the highest principles, so that all
transcendentals would be constituted and expounded in the abstract.

However, the next concern was to collect from the nature of the transcendentals
metaphysical conclusions that are most universal, and to vindicate the same.

But here I thought that sedulous effort must be given to this, that all things be handed down
both completely and with each thing in order.

Therefore, concerning those things which are in Being and denominate Being
transcendentally, I wanted to treat them in such a way that neither would anything easily be
passed over which would contribute to the consummate doctrine, and that a Method would
be observed most agreeable to the very nature of the affections.

Therefore, it was fitting to consider the nature of the attributes in general, before the
individual ones were exhibited in species.

Furthermore, since some denominate Being unitedly, others disjunctively, it was necessary
to treat the former first as simpler; and that again both universally, by considering their
Nature, and one by one, by weighing them in order.

Here the principal affections presented themselves in the first place, both the absolute ones,
Perfection, Unity, and the respective ones, Truth, Goodness.

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Then had to be added the less principal ones, Duration and Ubiety.

Since the Object had been defined as actual Being.

Of which matter I had the gravest causes, set forth in part also in the treatise, but to be
expounded more fully elsewhere, where it will be required.

Further, the disjunctive affections, after they had been treated in general, were distributed
by us into three classes, which show very well how those affections respect and denominate
their object.

The special distribution of the individual ones and the reason for the distribution is
expounded more fully in its own place in the Method of the treatise.

Briefly, some are primary, others secondary.

The primary ones are also either immediate or mediate.

The former result immediately from the nature of the Object Being, and indeed as Being is
considered in act, in which way absolutely it is denominated Necessary or contingent;
independent or dependent; uncreated or created; act or potency;

Respectively, Principle or principiate, Cause or caused.

The latter result from the Nature of Being by means of the united affections;

Thus, by means of Perfection Being is denominated complete or incomplete; by means of

Unity in the absolute state, simple or composite; in the respective state, the same or diverse;
by means of Truth, natural or artificial; by Goodness, infinite or finite; by Duration,
permanent or successive; by Ubiety, circumscribed or uncircumscribed.

However, I made the secondary affections the five following: Absolute and Respective,
Subject and Adjunct, Sign and signified, Image and Exemplar, Measure and Measured: For
these are transcendental and general terms, nor can they be considered in the special
disciplines, yet they contribute in a certain way also to the direction of the special
disciplines.

And therefore, they had to be considered in that place by all means.

And to these heads I think can be referred easily whatever things contribute to this end.

However, I have so treated each one, that first the name would be explicated, and the
nominal distinctions, afterwards the definition and abstract formal concept would be
expounded; further, divisions would be subjoined and the material variety would be
designated, as much as is enough for Metaphysics; Finally, from these porisms would be
collected, both for showing and asserting the genuine use in the direction of the inferior
disciplines, and for uncovering and refuting the heretical abuse.

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Especially diligent labor had to be applied concerning the nominal distinctions, in order that
they might be accurately discerned from other divisions, in which indeed I have observed a
great many to err most seriously, but others to utterly confound these things with each
other.

But the formal concept of transcendentals cannot be exhibited in the abstract, unless it has
been exquisitely established which ones are so called only in name, which ones in reality.

However, how greatly it matters to assign accurately the formal concept of transcendentals,
this has been given only to sublime intellects to know.

However, whoever transforms Metaphysics into I know not what kind of vocabulary are
ignorant of that, as William Amesius recently presumed to do.

Indeed, if only words were to be expounded here, Metaphysics would be unworthy of the
name of discipline, so far is it from being able to be hailed as Queen of the disciplines.

But divine Metaphysics savors something far more sublime, whose chief work is to
investigate and track down the formal concept of the Transcendental Attributes.

Unless this is established, how will the most universal conclusions be able to be established?
And unless these are infallibly certain, what certitude will there be of the less universal
conclusions in the inferior disciplines, which must be deduced from those as principles and
axioms?

However, as far as the material variety and transcendental divisions are concerned, they
could not be passed over entirely perfunctorily, yet it was not right to overstep the limits of
first Philosophy; Therefore, here a middle and Royal way had to be followed, and those
things which seemed to contribute to the consummate doctrine of the attributes, and to the
duty of the first wisdom had to be adduced, but those which can neither be taught under
that title, and pertain to the special disciplines had to be passed over.

Finally, \[πορίσματα (corollaries)\] or corollaries of the definitions are added for this reason,
so that they may be the principles of the other disciplines. However, I had to note both the
use and abuse of the same for the sake of the heretics and the haters of Metaphysics, or
rather for the sake of the youth, so that it might flee heresies and ignorance, their mother,
worse than a dog and a snake, and indeed with reason.

Although indeed many more things could have been noted than these, nevertheless let
those suffice for the present: to which as to certain common places others will be able to
refer other things, whoever will have reviewed the writings of the heretics more accurately,
and will have desired to explicate the same with equal zeal.

These things concerning the first duty of Metaphysical governance, which was to prescribe
laws to the other disciplines.

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Furthermore, the first Wisdom is bound to constitute limits and to define boundaries for the
inferior disciplines in that part in which it is the dictator and inspector of the same. How that
is done, I will teach, when God will have granted strength and leisure, in the special part,
which is chiefly dedicated to this duty. For in order that ends may be prescribed, it is
necessary for the possessions of all to be known, whence in the special part is given both a
\[διασκεπτικὴ (examinative)\] consideration of those things which are under Being, and a
determination of the objects of each one.

Thus, when the Queen of the sciences will have been so constituted, there is no doubt that
she can preside over justice, and settle controversies arisen in the inferior disciplines. This is
what I say. Controversies which cannot be decided in the inferior disciplines will then be able
to be judged without controversy from first Philosophy, when all its conclusions will have
been deduced from first principles, and the terms of the disciplines will have been
adequately distinguished.

Hence therefore it is permitted to see what are the subordinate duties of Metaphysics,
which contribute to that highest regimen of the disciplines, namely the cognition of all
things that are, in the universal, and the reduction of any conclusions whatsoever to first
principles; so that the most common predicates may be proposed in the abstract, and so
that nothing may be established, which is not confirmed, or cannot be confirmed, from first
principles.

But concerning these things more fully in the treatise On the Philosophical Regimen of the
first [Philosophy].

Therefore, on account of these things I now judged that the first Wisdom must labor in this,
that the Transcendental terms be defined in the abstraction of Being, and the universal
conclusions be reduced to the highest principles.

However, since those two most noble and most general habits, Gnostology and Noology, are
of the greatest service for this twofold duty, therefore it pleased me to call the same the
Counselors of the Queen of the disciplines.

Gnostology advises that all things be proposed abstractly, and by the most salutary
admonitions instructs how that can be done.

Noology suggests the first principles, therefore called by others the Habit of first principles,
so that from the same the first Wisdom may elicit conclusions.

The former therefore is the \[εὑρετικὸς τῶν συμπερασμάτων (inventor of conclusions)\] of

Metaphysics.

Concerning both, things could be proposed that are both most weighty and most pleasant.

But those are not for the present our aim: Perhaps there will be a more suitable place
elsewhere for speaking about these, especially when we will publish the \[στοιχείωσιν

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Νοολογικὴν (Noological Elements)\], which already three years ago, equally with the
\[στοιχείωσις Γνωσολογικῆς (Gnostological Elements)\], having been proposed in public
disputations at Königsberg in Prussia, for the sake of the studious youth entreating it in many
ways and for love of the welfare of letters, I had decided to publish.

But it could not bear the gaze of some, for this sole reason (for they gave no other), that it
was a new discipline.

Meanwhile, most excellent Reader, you may have the Gnostology, now reprinted for the
third time on account of the lack of copies, with very many requesting it; until I will be able
to obtain so much from more serious studies, that it be permitted to devote some labor to
the more accurate treatment of the Noology, for no other end than to fortify the truth
(which is the most ancient of all things) of the Transcendental conclusions.

For it is necessary that all Metaphysical assertions whatsoever be so arranged that their
truth can be demonstrated from first principles: since this is the nature of the first wisdom,
that it elicits conclusions from first principles, therefore called by Aristotle \[σοφία
(wisdom)\].

Which as I perpetually inculcate, so in this treatise I have seriously attempted.

However, if somewhere that has not been accomplished, know, sincere Reader, that I am still
prepared to demonstrate all things from first principles, with at least the truth of the
orthodox faith having been supposed on account of the application of some things to
Theology. Behold, I have only exhibited a certain \[στοιχείωσιν ὀντολογικὴν (ontological
elements)\]. Therefore, I was not able to explicate and dispute controversies at length in the
manner of the Scholastics, but mindful of my aim, whatever things I have adduced I have
briefly confirmed, but by those arguments by which I think it can be satisfied for those who
at least will not have been fascinated by preconceived opinion.

If, however, there is still utterly something alien to the truth in this thorny \[ὀντολογίᾳ
(ontology)\], \[ὥσπερ ἐν ῥοιᾷ σαπρός τις κόκκος (just as some rotten seed in a
pomegranate)\], consider, Reader, whoever you are, that there is no other lot for you and
others than this very one; To err sometimes. For I do not think that you will be similar to the
Heathen Orator, who boasted that no word which he wanted to revoke had ever been put
forth by him. Therefore, as I have tried to follow solely the divine truth, so if somewhere I
have not attained the same, I promise to myself your humanity. For I have not been able to
seek from you anything more than that you bring a truth-seeking and benevolent mind. Thus
may the DIVINE TRUTH and BENIGNITY bless us!

These things, Benevolent Reader, it seemed good to preface when I first published the
Metaphysics: in which there is nothing that I would change at all: I only advise that the
promise about the Noology to be prepared in the same way in which the Gnostology was

13
presented has in the meantime been fulfilled, about which we have spoken in the Preface
prefixed to the whole work; It will be yours to interpret benignly the Zeal for meriting well.

To the Man

Excelling in Talent

And Erudition,

Master Abraham Calovius,

Publishing his

Metaphysics.

14
Calovius, the prince of the sciences, publishes

Metaphysics to most philosophers,

And seizes the palm from all

Who have traversed this path.

While he teaches that this is commonly

Called the nursemaid of sophisms,

He shuts off all the ways of sophisms with twists

And learnedly solves the knots.

This is to turn the riches of Egypt

To sacred uses.

Johannes Quistorpius

Doctor of Sacred Theology and Senior of the same faculty at Rostock.

Virtue, which soars above the clouds on snowy wings,

Has nurtured you, MAN, from your tender years.

The MAN, whom VIRTUE will furthermore raise above the heavens,

You will experience all the riches of VIRTUE.

Stephan Clotz, Doctor

What the study of Wisdom avails, what use it offers,

How faithful a handmaid of Theology it is,

This book expounds, which removes evil abuses

And reveals the true riches of the wealthy art.

The fiery power of our genius, greater things, Calovius,

It promises! If the fates will that he should live long:

15
That he may shed a clear light on his country,

And bring many benefits for the common good.

Thomas Lindemann, Doctor

Of the Medical Faculty

If I had your poetic vein, illustrious Calovius,

I would give verses nearly equal to your merits, Phoebus!

To sing your praises, which God-inspired Virtue,

Goodness of intellect, and diligence deserve:

How much you have benefited Theology and Philosophy, above all the foremost,

By your writings and words:

Especially by the present work, worthy of Lebanon’s

Cedar, which public fame will read frequently:

Which will bring profit to its Sophists, which will travel the seas,

And give perpetual life to its known author.

But I lack that poetic vein. Therefore let prayers take the place

Of songs. Live happily and flourish long!

Count as many harvests as there will be centuries, your writings –

Older than Nestor, you will be a second Methuselah!

Which, with a swift pen but a candid spirit, I proclaimed for my singular friend,

Georgius Kruger

Doctor of Philosophy & Medicine

You withdraw your talent from the world, my dear friend Calovius,

And diligently turning your mind to the heavens, you seek, so that among

Minds you may see yourself set apart, whose glory is

16
To know the ONE BEING, the TRUE and the GOOD. Reader,

Read through what my friend has written in this learned little book,

And you will know I do not deceive at all: indeed you will say all the more

Calovius is ONE, TRUE, and GOOD among

The rest of the Philosophers. And rejoice, people of Prussia,

And prepare crowns worthy of so great a teacher.

To the Most Excellent Man, his most steadfast friend, with utmost goodwill,

M. Elias Taddel, Pastor of St. Peter’s

Church in Rostock.

To the Talent of

M. Abraham Calovius

Candidate of Sacred Theology

Not a flatterer, not the author of a worthless sect

For the truth, Calovius, but you think better things,

And you owe this to Aristotle and to divine Plato,

Yet you side with neither the Philosopher nor with Plato.

Though you often teach otherwise, though you often refute,

You will not for that reason be an unlearned or evil author.

Are you a parrot or a man? Your nurse taught you the words beforehand,

Yet you are the master of the meaning of the words for yourself.

No one here is a slave, if he is, his mind is diminished;

And you were once a boy, henceforth you will be nothing but a King.

17
 M. Johannes Raue of Berlin

Calovius, marrow of the Muses and of Persuasive Philosophy,

And a Light about to rise among the sacred Initiates:

Your pages do not swell with inflated trifles,

Which Mamurra might well think are worthless things;

But it offers something far more refined than those,

To which no one can prefix a black theta mark,

Zoilus will be silent, may he poison this at its birth,

While he does not see you following a path similar to his own.

But he whom the right hand of a better Prometheus has formed,

And who has more than human intellect,

He will sing of you, whom bountiful Pallas honors,

And will be the Muse of your tireless labor.

What you have begun well, run the race course well to the end,

Believe that your praise will never fail you.

With a benevolent spirit, to the esteemed Author and Patron,

Christophorus Altus added this,

Minister at St. Ann’s Church among the people of Elbing.

Our love, Calovius, the immortal glory of Wisdom,

And no small part of the Theological choir.

While your ontological writings earn outstanding praises

And prizes for the sacred cohort of the Goddess.

The learned assembly will extol you with praises while living,

And your fame will be everlasting after death.

You will also bear ample rewards: for the bountiful Trinity

Never denies the rewards due to the meritorious.

18
 To his intimate friend and one to be honored for all time,

M. Balthasar Mejer,

Rector of the Illustrious Tile School.

To the Most Famous Man,

Master Abraham Calovius,

Most Deserving Candidate of Sacred Theology,

Upon Publishing His Metaphysics

Your writings teach, your pious writings, what your keen

Talent can achieve (a great portion of my heart, Calovius)

Your writings teach, and your piety, what zeal, and great

Love of Religion you have. But neither do the sacred writings of the Wise

Escape you, nor is anything that great Aristotle teaches

With rounded speech hidden from you, or what Cicero, the glory

Of the city of Rome, teaches with eloquent voice, or what Plato, or what great

Euclid teaches: to such an extent do the Muses carry you,

A young man, through the highest peaks. What will you be as a Man?

Live, Calovius,

Glory of the Muses and your Homeland, your writings will flourish

Whether they be Meta-physical, or Logical, or Theo-

Logical, or whatsoever others. Only may you proceed

To consecrate your zeal to God, to return your talents,

And to expend much labor in the divine,

And do not doubt, the very favor of God and of men will follow.

19
 M. Andreas Henricus Buchholtz

Just as Aeolus scatters the clouds from the darkened sky

And does not bring forth constant rains,

So you, wise one, moderate your strength

To publish works conveniently.

Dispel the clouds of cares from your heart,

Passing through with a more serene countenance.

I ask, what joy is it to have ascended the peak of good things

With limbs shattered by labor?

Calovius, great glory of Piety and Wisdom,

You who simultaneously give skillful Writings to the world

And more diligently exercise young men dripping

With Parnassian dew.

Spare your works, thus spare excessive labor,

So that in old age you may more steadfastly

Bear labors worthy of your office,

Enjoying a firm body.

To his intimate and revered friend,

M. Johannes Lösel, a Prussian

In Honor of the Most Famous Man,

M. Abraham Calovius, a Prussian,

Candidate of Sacred Theology,

Publishing the General Part of his Metaphysics

20
From the time I began to know you, Calovius, you always

Seemed to me to surpass in showing

An excellent talent, rare, and well-trained in studies,

Whether you aim at Philosophy or also Theology.

You have diligently swum the immense sea of Philosophy,

Through the hiding places of Scotus, through the work of Gabriel.

Your fiery mind has broken through the hidden

Recesses of Aquinas, you have worn down Giles

And the learned writings of Suarez.

The outstanding monuments of your teaching speak of this

Which stand out for learned Men to behold.

Especially this book, revealing the essential concepts of BEING,

Which public fame will read, printed by the presses.

Rejoice in these cares of your mind, splendid intellect.

Apollo is preparing worthy rewards for you without delay.

Thus from the heart,

M. Johannes Fabricius

Of Gdańsk applauded.

With living voice you teach very keenly, Great Calovius,

Illuminating the study of Philosophy with no small light.

Hence the listener seeks that it be left to him in Writing for all time,

By which the perfection may come to be for his weak mind.

Yield place to prayers, may you delay the benefit of none,

And as Ontology teaches the mind for assisting others,

21
So by other Writings may we experience the same.

To the most famous and most excellent Man,

M. Abraham Calovius,

His student at one time. A. E. Composed this.

Joachim Füllebeier

You whom the zeal of an inspired Knowledge leads,

Direct here the lights of your mind,

Do not look upon lazy, sordid phantasms

Or the nonsense of the Sorbonne.

But conceive higher things with a godlike mind,

Here the things trodden by the masses are banished.

Do you seek abstruse things, yet ones most briefly

Drawn out next to the lines?

Read the divine Metaphysics

Of the divine Calovius, but diligently.

But do you seek the unholy throat of heresy?

Use this sword safely.

Therefore let the sect yield, of the most subtle

Doctor, greatest in the world,

(If it pleases the Gods) even the assembly of Scholastics

That has falsely claimed the mouth of a Seraph.

Thus proceed to spread your name by the best

Writings, candid Calovius.

Thus may celestial favor long preserve you whole

For the good of the Church!

22
 Which from his heart the Most Famous Author desires,

Johannes Michaelis,

A Pomeranian of Stralsund.

To the Most Famous and Most Excellent Author,

A most subtle Philosopher,

And Most Deserving Candidate of Theology,

My Teacher and Patron to be honored in place of a parent.

What should I praise beforehand in you, Calovius, venerable Master?

The keenness of your talent? Or the learned discoveries of the Wise?

Or your sacred skill? Or the use of multiple languages?

That you are the shining glory of the Theological order, this

Mystical wars sufficiently testify, and published writings

And this teaching so often from the bridge of the Lectern.

That you are learned in languages, and the ancient discoveries of the Wise,

He who knows how to unravel the cause of the snake-born abortion of reason

And the perplexing sophisms of the foolish wise man, by a clear

Way of thinking for use;

This book on Transcendentals testifies, in which

What has been done, let the fair reader more learned than I judge.

I know well, an honest man will venerate this noble work

Of a lofty nature, Heavenly Wisdom; and silently he will vow,

“May youth be thus formed, thus hereafter informed,

And may the Wisdom of heresies vanish into thin air.”

23
 With utmost goodwill,

Johannes Wilhelm Laman,

A Pomeranian of Greifswald

When lofty Virtue had reached

Marriageable years, she is joined

To Labor, under a favorable star:

And at her first birth, Honor was born.

Calovius, Great glory of Prussia,

While you strenuously undergo

The path of Labor and kindly Virtue,

Thus I judge you the Son

Of kindly Virtue.

About to bear an ample reward,

Which I pray for, which I predict.

Albertus Kieper

We rejoice, sweetest Brother, that you flourish among the Roses:

We grieve that rough thickets hold us.

On one side our own mourning presses us, on the other the public care

For well-being, a matter afflicted, to be doubted in certain dangers;

The Hope to change these by our prayers, by the efforts of the Powerful,

That Hope your writings relieve, and your much-praised

24
Beginnings of talent, seeking with happy success

The golden shrines of VIRTUE and HONOR,

As it proves so often, your Muse not wearied by any

Labor, which now brings forth a new work under a favorable star,

Which if it exercises the learned and those carried away through things beyond nature:

I am not wise. May it merit applause from the whole

Crowd of Muses, thus I APPLAUD, and I PRAY.

And for vigorous strength, and that you be returned to your Native land

For its Uses, and for accumulating Honor with a worthy gift.

I vowed from my heart.

At Mohrungen in Prussia,

On the 15th day before the Calends of August, in the Year 1635.

Fabian Kalau,

Receiver of Electoral Taxes in the same place

Master Abraham Calovius.

Anagram from Ros. Varn.

Ah, you do the work, brandish your pens.

Ah, brandish your pens, Calovius, cultivated in your studies,

And water your Readers with more abundant honey.

25
The living have tasted, many have tasted the rivers

Which flow for you from the inexhaustible fount of your Art.

You do the work with studies and with mature judgment.

Hence a great name arises for you in the world.

ANOTHER

Master Abraham Calovius, a Prussian

Of Mohrungen.

A double Anagram

You, with great daring, purge the School from various diseases,

Ah! You prove the crass abuse of things from Ontology itself.

I had intended a longer poem, and perhaps

To be produced with a slightly greater outpouring of eloquence.

But the narrowness of the paper has cut short my poetic rhythms,

And bids me to dedicate a few words to you.

Yet from these few, gather the greatest signs

Of my affection, thrice-venerable TEACHER.

To the man born for the wellbeing of letters, the Famous Master Abraham Calovius, my
Teacher to be eternally cherished,

With utmost goodwill.

Johannes Mautner, A Pannonian

ABRAHAM CALOV’s of Porus, Doctor of Sacred Theology and Philosophy,

DIVINE METAPHYSICS

Introduction

26
Before we come to the consideration of θεολογίας \[theology\] itself, here at the outset
certain precognitions must be examined; For this singular thing has the highest of the
sciences, that, what for others lays the foundations by the explication of the
προγινωσκομένων \[things that are foreknown\], this also needs to lay for itself, because it is
the highest.

And indeed at the very first throw of the stone: because afterwards the discipline itself is
built upon the same things. Which ought to be done, partly by the proof of Existence, partly
by the declaration of the Name, so that before all things, both That it is, and what of the
name, may be known. 2. Post. 1. For in vain are you concerned about any discipline either to
be adorned or to be learned, when you are doubtful whether the same is to be conceded or
not: And indeed without the name being known, how will you be held by the desire of the
same: Let there be, therefore, προγινωσκόμενα \[things that are foreknown\].

On Metaphysics

I.Concerning the Existence and Nomenclature of Metaphysics.

There is certainly a certain distinct discipline concerning Being in general. 3. Metaph. C. 1.

It is proved 1. This is proved by its proper object. Which is given here distinct from others,
not indeed really, but nevertheless, what is enough, formally, Being, as Being: which is
abstracted from everything, that is. And as these, from which it is abstracted, say,
determinate Beings, fall under science, so no less, that which is common to them all, namely
BEING most general is truly knowable. To our mind, indeed, can be presented both its most
abstract Nature and most common attributes, and highest distinctions: finally all things
pertaining to this. Moreover these cannot be reduced to any determinate Being. For the
most common concept is not more suitable to one than to another. Therefore it requires a
peculiar discipline, just as the objects of determinate quiddity each require individual
disciplines.

2. The need of the inferior disciplines is added. Which all desire a directress both in
establishing the truth of principles and in determining the variety of objects. For they
themselves neither ascend to the first principles, nor can they define their proper objects or
constitute certain limits for themselves, because they are sciences, and therefore need
ἀρχὰς ἑτέρωθι \[principles from elsewhere\]. 6. Eth. C. 7. Therefore another superior must
be constituted, and to this the direction must be committed; on this the rest may depend.

27
But no other can be found, or is allowed to be constituted, than this very one, the
contemplator of Being in General, as the one which alone deduces most universal
conclusions from the highest principles, without which the others can no more be than
rivers flow without their proper source. This, moreover, can alone reduce that infinite variety
of things, whatever they are, to certain objects, since it has knowledge of all things in
general, and therefore it is bound to prescribe their objects also to the other disciplines, as it
finds them under Being. Therefore, that there is a Universal discipline: that it must be
propounded abstractly to satisfy the appetite of our mind, which as it desires to know all
things distinctly in particular, so abstractly in general the most common of all, no one from
the first parents of Philosophy Thales and Pythagoras dared to call into doubt, except Ramus
and those who depend on Ramus, whom we bid ponder what has been said, and we
proceed to the denomination.

II. The Science of Being is commonly called Metaphysics from the order of things, more
rightly θεολογία \[theology\] from its proper object.

For that antiquity contends, For this the evidence and clarity of the thing itself.

The name of Metaphysics, arising from the very denomination of the books τὰ μετὰ τὰ
φυσικὰ \[the (books) after the physics\] of Aristotle by Theophrastus or, as they think,
Andronicus of Rhodes, used by the most ancient Greeks, also employed by Plutarch in the
life of Alexander, likewise not unknown to Damascenus, and rightly given to Latium, was
most familiar. Therefore even today it is not rejected from the use of learning rather
confirmed by the best Master, than unsuitable for expressing the object of this discipline. For
first it designates the order, which our discipline obtains to Physics, or our things to natural
things, but expresses the object itself less perspicuously. Hence it is, that it is also explained
thus: although, as they think, for the diverse signification of the preposition μετα \[after\],
and the comparison instituted of the order of metaphysical things to natural things, some
translate it differently.

By some it is said as if post-natural, not in dignity or nature, but partly by the very invention,
partly by the institution. For because these higher things, about which Metaphysics (treats),
are the furthest of all from the senses \[from which we take the beginnings of
understanding\] hence it happened, that with nearly all other things invented, this very
science at last began to be treated, 1. Met. C. 2. Hence also Metaphysics is to be learned
after the other sciences. The most abstract things are understood with the greatest difficulty,
unless they have been declared by examples sought from the remaining disciplines. Most
general precepts are propounded here, which without a previous cognition of specials
cannot be explained conveniently, because they look to a diverse object. The cause is not so
much the genuine nature of things, as the native weakness, alas! Of our mind. Otherwise in

28
the accurate constitution of the disciplines it would certainly claim the first (place) for itself.
Without which the others can neither be exactly understood, nor justly determined, or
circumscribed by their own limits. Whence this was deserving to be called by Plato their
ἀρχηγὸς καὶ τέλος \[beginning and end\], muniment and perfection.

By others it is explained hyperphysically, transnatural, transcendental: because metaphysical

things transcend all others, if not by nobility of being, at least by community of being; but
they surpass physical things both by nature or generality, and by ἀρχὴ \[preeminence\] or
dignity. The former is evident from the name of Being most common of all: the latter
becomes conspicuous from the dictatorial power of Metaphysics. Therefore Franciscus
Patricius also contends that this science was more rightly called περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν
\[concerning physical things\], than it is said μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ \[after the physics\]. But
whatever the case may be, if we respect the foundation of θέσεως ὀνομασίας \[position of
denomination\] the very nature of things, it will be best able to be called θεολογία
\[theology\].

Thus is expressed the object of the habit, and that in analogy of nearly all disciplines, which
have names taken from the object, indeed of Greek origin, but also by common use Latin.
Our discipline labors over Being, and all those things, which either are referred to Being, or
are contained proximately and indeterminately under Being, and therefore rightly receives a
name from Being. And why should it be denominated rather from that which is extrinsic to
it, common with others, by reason of which it could receive many names, when a proper
name is at hand, expressing the object itself, and akin to the names of other disciplines?

There are also other appellations. However by which Metaphysics is honored rather than
declared. For it is saluted also as the primary, and most honorable, and most noble, and
Queen and Lady, and Eagle and Apex and peak of the sciences, etc. It is called the hinge of
wisdom, the perfection of all cognition, alone free. I omit infinite others.

But this is especially deserving of explication, that it is indicated as wisdom and indeed
primarily. We must know, therefore, that Wisdom is said in two ways.

1\. In common precisely and abstractly, as it is any habitus διανοητικὸς \[dianoetic, i.e.,
discursive\], or discursive, conjoining at the same time with the notion of principles the
notion of conclusions, whatever those principles may be, whatever the conclusions,
provided that in that cognition it is ultimately subsisted. By this very thing it is distinguished
from prudence. As it differs from intelligence by this, that it is διανοητικὴ \[discursive\],
possessing conclusions at the same time and principles; while this is a habitus νοητικὸς
\[noetic, i.e., intuitive\], occupied only about the highest principles. Which common
signification is not new, but already in use, as can be evident even from the definition most
common to the Peripatetics approved by most. By which it is defined, a habitus consisting of
wisdom and prudence. Where certainly wisdom ought to be taken only generally, for any

29
theoretical habitus, discursive of course, \[for the habitus of intelligence, although it ought
by all means to be contained under the definition of Philosophy, is neither comprehended by
the Peripatetics themselves in the word Wisdom, nor can it be comprehended by the same\]
lest the definition be maimed and mutilated. Add that that broad signification is altogether
presupposed by the Philosopher, when the other is inculcated: where namely.

2\. Wisdom is taken specially, determinately and restrictedly, as it is Wisdom first or second,
as appears from 1. C. & 7. Met. C. 1. Thus FIRST Wisdom is, what from first principles elicits
most universal conclusions: Second, what from second principles forms and establishes
conclusions about a determinate subject. And as under the name of this come the Sciences,
Physics 7. Met. C. 11. And others, which are sciences, so that uniquely fits Metaphysics, and
is reciprocated with it. This is truly first: indeed by reason of object and primarily, because it
treats the first knowable, and those things which are referred hither principles, attributes
and distinctions, which are all here first and highest: but by reason of order, δευτέρως
\[secondarily\] and secondarily, because it obtains priority before the other disciplines, and
namely before Physics, which is wisdom, but not first.

3\. Met. 3. This alone is first, because to this alone and solidly both the definition and the
προηγούμενα \[things that take the lead\] of first wisdom are suitable. It is defined 6. Met.
C. 7. Νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης \[intuition and science\], or a habitus consisting of intelligence and
science, understand not formally \[habitus diverse in species are never formally one and the
same in species\] but virtually, because wisdom uses first principles, which is Intelligence,
but under another reason, not as that signately, abstractly, in as much as they are drawn
from the natural representation of things by affinity, and are referred to a certain object: but
exercitively and applicatively, as they serve to form the most universal conclusions
concerning Being, as the foundations of the remaining sciences, to be firmly established, and
therefore besides the principles it at the same time exhibits the conclusions, which is
science. Others say that first wisdom is science and intelligence by efflux, because thence as
it were flows Intelligence, emanate sciences (the latter is absolutely true, the former needs
explication) not by influx or confluence, as if here all Intelligence and sciences should concur
together, which would be a notable confusion of disciplines into one chaos.

By Aristotle ibid. It is said to be the Science having the head of the most excellent things:
because it does not propose naked conclusions, as other sciences do. But deduces them
from the highest and most eminent principles, and teaches to verify them concerning Being
most universal. Which would be absurdly attributed to any discipline besides Metaphysics.
Similarly also the conditions of first wisdom: recalled 1. Met. C. 2., by no means are suitable
to other disciplines, but graphically describe the functions of ours, which therefore are here
to be foreknown and to be repeated from Gnostology, where we have treated of them l. 2. P.
53. Moreover they can be reduced, those six προηγούμενα \[things that take the lead\] to
the three functions or moments of first wisdom. Of which the first and highest is, The
direction of inferior disciplines, which it performs, partly by giving laws, that it may lay the

30
foundations of principles of others; partly by prescribing the boundaries of dominions, that
it may constitute the terms of objects (of other disciplines): partly finally by presiding over
justice, that it may decide and settle controversies arisen in the other disciplines (if there are
any which cannot be decided there). Thence those honorary titles: that it is ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ
\[architectonic\] 3. Met. 12. 5. Met. C. 1. 1. Post. C. 9. Etc. The rest are subordinate; which
tend and are ordered to that direction; such as are the confirmation of conclusions from first
principles: that nothing be stated, which is not deduced from the highest principles: and the
representation of all things which are in general, that the most common predicates may be
declared, and certain orders of things may be constituted, by which individual things may be
exhibited ἅμα καὶ τάξει \[at once and in order\]. For as it solidly establishes laws, it reduces
those things, which it states, to the highest principles: as it rightly prescribes boundaries, it
reduces all things that are, to certain classes: finally that it may duly administer justice, it
accurately recognizes causes, by accurate consideration of terms; recognizes them well
decides, by analogical application, or by adducing limitation and distinction, and thus
according to the tenor of the highest statutes promulgates a definitive sentence, against
which no one dares to dispute further.

Hence those Encomia, that this is the Queen of the sciences ἄνωθεν ἰθύνουσα \[ruling from
above\] and has the most certain knowledge. It is most accurate, because it seeks all things
from the highest principles. But most certain by the certainty of Being or object, because it is
versed in things most universal, to which the highest certainty belongs, but not by the
certainty of mind or subject, because our mind is related to things most abstract just as τὰ
τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος μεθ’ ἡμέραν \[the eyes of bats to the light of day\],
2. Met. C. 1. The eye of the nycticorax to behold the sun. Scal. Exer. 1. L. 1. Most certain, by
reason of eminent proof, not of evident demonstration, such as is rather adjudged to
Mathematics. 2. Metaphysicorum, c. 3. That 2. It is διδασκαλικωτάτη \[most apt to teach\],
most apt for teaching, on account of the administration of things in teaching, the
investigation of first causes, the exposition of terms occurring everywhere, but by no means
on account of the prescription of the method of teaching, which is ἁπλῶς \[simply\] Logical.
That it is γενικωτάτη \[most generic\] and knows all things, and that by a threefold way. 1.
Potentially and virtually, while it delivers first principles in which the rest are virtually
contained. 2. Confusedly and commonly: while it considers Being most universally the
highest, and the most common attributes, and therefore attains all things as they put on the
nature of Being. 3. Distinctly and particularly, not indeed by investigating the specific reasons
of individual things: yet by weighing the quiddities of all things, according to general
reasons, by constituting in order all the grades of Being, and by sending those rightly
distributed to the particular sciences. From which it further follows, that although it is the
most difficult, while it intends not confused, superficial and simple cognition, but distinct,
accurate and scientific of things most abstract, yet it is most worthy to be studied by all, and
for its own sake is most of all to be desired by all, if not in its proper form, at least under
another’s; if not by reason of complete knowledge perfectly, yet certainly by reason of the

31
dependence of the principles of others. For the thing to be directed everywhere seeks the
director; and the regulated requires the rule. Why not also the inferior disciplines this
dictator of sciences? Nay rather in every discourse we use concretely its terms, and
applicatively employ the most common principles. All which things, if anyone besides
Metaphysics should attempt to apply, he feigns a Philosophical kingdom μουντζουράδων
\[of monstrosities\], most universal disciplines several, most common principles some and
others, and what absurdities most absurd. But whoever presumes to deny these to
Metaphysics, casts it from the throne and abdicates it from government, which consists in
the said functions.

For Theoretical is the government consisting not in the external direction of Philosophical
professions in human society, which is Political prudence; but in the internal communication
of vigor and life, which is proper to our wisdom. For Metaphysics flows by a hidden reason
into the inferior disciplines, and directs them 1. By supplying Principles to them, which it
proves both ostensively, declaring terms, and κατ’ ἀδύνατον \[by the impossible\], forcing
the opponent denying to contradiction. 2. By adjudicating Objects to the same, which it
foreknows that they are, and what they signify. 3. By suggesting Reasons of deciding
controversies, while it urges the abstraction and formal reason of terms, teaches to institute
the application of universals to specials, and supplies most useful distinctions, concerning all
which practice itself abundantly testifies.

These things concerning the προηγουμένοις \[things that take the lead\]. Therefore there
follows τῶν λεχθησομένων \[of the things to be said\] the

EXECUTION,

Exhibiting

The Consideration of Metaphysics Itself.

From the explication of the name we shall now proceed to the very perception of the thing,
ὄνομα γάρ ἐστιν ὄργανον, διδασκαλικὸν καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας ὥσπερ κερκὶς
ὑφάσματος \[for a name is an instrument, didactic and diacritical of the essence as a shuttle
of a web\], says Plato in the Cratylus. But in two ways, as the remaining disciplines, so also
this of ours can be presented to the intellect.

1. Confusedly and generally, when we propose the nature of the same, to be

considered in a certain προοιμιασμῷ \[prelude\] as it were in general. 2. Distinctly
and specially, when we represent the object itself in its essence, in its attributes, and
proper modes. In both ways we will propound Metaphysics, in a double section. The

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 one prooemial will exhibit the nature of οὐσίας \[essence\] in common: the other
essential, will thoroughly treat the nature of ὄντως ὄν \[being qua being\]. For the
essence of a discipline is completed solely by the distinct and perfect representation
of its object. Nevertheless, not unprofitably is premised a προηγεσις \[prefatory
treatise\] concerning the nature of the habit, that it may first be able to be
established, how the conclusions are to be referred to the object, before the object
itself should come to be evolved.

Ontology‘s Prooemial Consideration

What is taught in the prooemium: Metaphysics will consider nature generally, both in itself
and in its parts: there inquiring into its constitution, here into genuine partition, so that what
it is, and how it should be treated, may be grasped.

The Prior Prooemial Part Concerning the Constitution of \[ὀντολογία (ontology)\]

We experience constitution in two ways, both internally and externally. There we hunt for
the discipline’s essence and proper nature: and settle it partly \[θετικῶς (definitively)\], by
Definition, partly by expounding form and matter (\[ἀναλόγως (analogously)\] speaking).
Here we investigate the external causes, Efficient and final. With these declared, everything
which should be weighed concerning constitution will be spontaneously evident. Therefore,
concerning each by distinct Theorems.

I. Metaphysics is defined as the wisdom of Being, as Being.

There is no doubt that Metaphysics is a most special species, and therefore can be defined.
But here a certain variety is encountered: lest it offend anyone, we embrace this definition
above others, most briefly expressing the nature of the disposition.

Concerning the subject of the definitive proposition nothing occurs which has not been
expedited in the precognita. This one thing is to be observed. Metaphysics is said in not one
way: 1. Generally and Synecdochically, as it denotes all theoretical dispositions, i.e.
\[γνώσεις (cognitions)\] just as wisdom too was said before to be taken in a state of
precision. 2. Specially and restrictedly, as it denotes a certain discipline, and that either
properly and famously, \[ὀντολογίαν (ontology)\] or transcendental Wisdom, or improperly
and less usually that discipline which treats of Spirits, according to Pererius, who contends

33
that this name is more suitable for the latter than the former. With that dismissed, it is
agreed that here it obtains proper signification.

The predicate presents the nature of Metaphysics by a twin concept – one of agreement, the
other of difference. The former is expressed by the word wisdom; the latter by the
remaining words of the definition. The former expresses the form of the disposition; the
latter the matter, or object it is concerned with. Each joined declares the formal account and
nature of Metaphysics.

Indeed it is destitute of form and matter properly speaking, because it is an accident. But
accidents themselves are form. And their subject is in place of matter. Hence in their
definition genera are assumed from form; not neglecting subject. The same is observed in
our definition: from which it is agreed: 1. The Form of Metaphysics, from which proceeds its
proper operation, which is to contemplate Being as Being, so that the mind may be
intensively perfected, and the disposition of the most universal discipline may be produced.
2. The Subject of Metaphysics equally and object. That is the mind, in which are dispositions,
but truly not a book or writing; since a book does not become dispositionally wise. This is
Being as Being, and therefore all things which pertain to this. For when the definition says
that Metaphysics is the wisdom of Being, as Being, it expresses the object. Since dispositions
ought to be defined by objects.

But with the stated object, at the same time are involved all things which are in it, or are
subordinate to it – understand attributes, and specific or less abstract modes. Since a
discipline is nothing other than an object’s full and adequate representation in nature with
its attributes and modes before the mind. Therefore, those who make mention of those
things which are in Being per se and immediately, besides Being, put superfluous things in
the definition, which is unfit.

II. The generic form of Metaphysics is wisdom commonly said; as it abstracts from
first and second.

Genus is the very essence of a thing confusedly and incompletely. But the Essence of
Metaphysics does not consist in an arrangement of precepts; or a mental system: since that
is extrinsic and accidental, separable from Metaphysics, nor does it render us
metaphysicians, unless either novices, to whom arrangements of this sort are not unknown,
are to be hailed as metaphysicians. But from form proceed proper operations: from form is
denomination: To which it is merely and truly per accidens, that it is taught and learned. We
certainly do not disavow that a discipline and doctrine are a means to a disposition, but we
thoroughly deny that its nature consists in that. No, to teach and to learn are relatives. But a

34
Disposition inhabits the absolute Category of quality. But when the generic form is inquired,
it is sought not what this or that relatively, or how it can be called: but what it is in its own
common quiddity, is investigated.

The respects of things can be varied in infinite ways. But the form is the same. But if you take
discipline or doctrine materially, it connotes either a disposition, or an act, whether an
internal concept, or an external sign. But neither concepts, nor letters or voices, their signs,
formally give Being to Metaphysics. But a Disposition is not merely connotatively, as if
respects of teaching and learning were simply superadded, inasmuch as it is considered in its
essence, with accidents cut off.

These most foreign genera are therefore first removed: system, doctrine, discipline. And it is
settled that the remote genus is Disposition. To which the proximate genus is natural
potency, facilitating the same, acquired by diligent study. The proximate is theoretical
disposition. For it perfects the mind intensively, nor does it extend itself outside to
operations: since it finds nothing in its subject, which it may act upon, and thence ultimately
and per se acquiesces in its cognition. Practical disposition and active, prudence, and Art, are
therefore excluded from the nature of Metaphysics by that: whether you understand this in
the Ramist or Lucianist sense (most improperly) as the comprehension of precepts proven
by exercise to a useful end in life (comprehension here is extrinsic, precepts acquired by no
exercise, usefulness to civil life is only most accidental) or you accept it in the Peripatetic
Aristotelian sense for an effective disposition (which is so far from being suitable to
Metaphysics, that it rather is most repugnant to the same (so that it is a contradiction to
define Metaphysics as an art, and that is doubled, if it is called a contemplative art, which is
truly \[ἀδιανόητον (unintelligible)\]. Finally, the proximate genus is discursive theoretical
disposition, which elicits conclusions from principles and is called by the one name Wisdom,
that of course which prescind from first and second. It is evident, Because Wisdom in
common is predicated of Metaphysics in quid essentially and proximately, but not
conversely. Essentially, because first wisdom or Metaphysics (for these have been shown
above to be grammatical Synonyms, not Logical) is essentially wisdom. Not convertibly. For
second wisdoms too (understand sciences) are truly and essentially wisdom.

But Metaphysics is proximately and immediately constituted under wisdom and. Therefore,
the proximate and proper genus of Metaphysics is constituted, which is wisdom as such and
precisely taken. From which it is inferred: first wisdom, or that, whose definition and
requisites have been expounded above, is less accurately constituted as the genus of
Metaphysics. Since genus ought not to be reciprocated with species. If you say, the nature of
this genus is also participated by Theoretical Philosophy, it will be necessary, that you
establish that Metaphysics and theoretical Philosophy are conspecifics of first wisdom, which
is absurd. If by Theology, consider, whether the attributes and definition of first wisdom
square with it, which is altogether necessary. Finally, that neither Intelligence nor science is
the true genus of Metaphysics, is evident from what has been said. For they are opposed

35
species to first wisdom or Metaphysics, and science, under the common genus discursive
disposition. Thus also intelligence as a disposition is opposed to first wisdom, as a
\[διανοητικός (discursive)\] disposition. Besides, concerning Intelligence the matter is by
confession: since both that Intelligence is occupied with the affinity of things, or things
themselves collated among each other, but Metaphysics is occupied with the nature of Being
and the most common notion considered in itself: and that the former expends bare
principles and formally revoked to the object: but the latter employs principles applied
materially, and for eliciting conclusions. Concerning science the matter is more intricate. But
it is certainly true that science is only a notion of conclusions, or of those propositions,
which are not simply first and highest, but hold themselves to first and highest axioms, as
conclusions. Although otherwise science has not only conclusions, but also principles, but
only second ones, which are also conclusions with respect to the first ones. Hence it is
further certain: Science is concerned with determinate Being, proceeds from proximate,
scientific causes and demonstrates certain affections concerning a certain and precognized
subject through the same. But neither of these is suitable to Metaphysics. As it were which
has neither a subject precognized elsewhere and determinate, or scientific affections, or
demonstrations of affections concerning the subject through inferring reasons from the
prior, much less through causal principles: nor does it propose bare conclusions, but ones
propped up by first principles. Those who amplify the word science, and employ it loosely, so
that it designates a habitual notion of conclusions, as they are elicited from principles (not
determinately second ones, but) indefinitely and indeterminately whether first or second,
seem to me to agree neither with the Philosopher, nor with the truth. Such a loose
acceptance has not yet been able to be demonstrated from the Philosopher. But
Philosophers do not permit unusual significations to be imposed on usual terms. Science is a
disposition, caused from particular principles 1. Post. Anal. It is a notion of a conclusion, but
truly not of principles 4. Eth. C. 6. And what, I ask, is science precisely taken, abstracting
from first and second principles? Can science be had, where I do not yet know, that the
middle posited in a demonstration is the proximate and immediate cause of that affection,
which is demonstrated of the subject? Are not subject, principles of being, and indeed such,
which are the proximate (by this very thing it is distinguished from prudence and wisdom)
cause of affections required for science in common? But enough about these things.

III. The subject-mater or adequate Object of Metaphysics is Being as Being.

The nature of a theoretical disposition is such; that it has an Object of contemplation, which
is commonly said to be an Object of demonstration, but less rightly. Since theoretical
disposition and demonstration are not equally broad. But wisdom, as most universal,
requires a most universal subject. For a discipline and Object ought to be of the same
latitude.

36
Wisdom as directrix is bound to revoke all inferior things to certain orders. It is necessary
therefore, that it know all things. Since the virtue of a prince is to know its own to the
greatest degree.

But truly because it does not claim all things for itself in particular under proper quiddity,
nay, nullifies none of inferiors, lest it exhaust its subordinates, so to speak, of their own
goods, which have been conceded to it to be directed, not seized; it cannot otherwise
consider all things universally. And hence its proper object or of contemplation is settled.
Being as Being: and generic or of consideration, everything which is respected to Being as
Being. Each is to be explained briefly. Concerning the proper object it occurs: 1. Materially,
the underlying thing, the common and indeterminate notion, Being, or that highest concept,
common to all things, whatsoever are. And that truly and properly. Not equivocally and
improperly. For an object ought to be one, nor distract our mind here and there. And the
things which are under the object, ought to agree in a common concept. Wherefore Being
equivocally and most broadly taken, as it embraces in its scope even those things, which are
not truly Beings, such as are complex Beings, per accidens, privations, Beings of reason, and
in potency, does not have the account of an object, since these are infinitely distant from
Being, as will be said in subject. Therefore, incomplex, per se, positive, real and actual Being
remains.

They here commonly distinguish Being taken participially and nominally, or as others,
adjectivally and substantively, so that they may designate Being in act, because participles
include the acts of their verbs: but the latter an essence abstracting from actual existence,
which also encompasses under itself no less potential Being, than actual. In the latter
acceptance they constitute the object. But since essence does not attain to the nature of
Being, until it attains existence, as Alexander of Aphrodisias truly says Met. C. 15; Being in
potency is not truly Being, as we will evince in its place; I should very much like to know;
how a common concept of Being in act and in potency can be formed by precisive
abstraction? How that, which is not a truly real Being, and obtains no reality in itself, can be
comprehended under truly said and real Being (which it is \[ἀναμφίβολον (indubitable)\] is
the object of Metaphysics)? 2. Formally, the way of considering, proper notion, and a certain
determination as it were, Being as Being. It is agreed, all disciplines are occupied with Being.
But in another and another way. That therefore is common to them with Metaphysics. But in
this they depart very far from Metaphysics. For this does not consider this or that Being of
determinate quiddity, and in particular. Wisdom does not develop into science. The most
universal discipline does not exhaust the particulars. Therefore, they who constitute either
God, or immaterial substance the Object of Metaphysics are hallucinating being thoroughly
ignorant of the character of Wisdom. Remove all determinate Beings, and send them to the
particular disciplines: what will remain? This, which is common to all things, which are;
Being in common, under the notion of indifference, in highest abstraction, or as Being.

37
I explain. As in reduplicative predications can be taken in two ways: 1. \[αἰτιολογικῶς
(aetiologically)\], and in force of causing, so that it indicates the reason, on account of and
through which the predicate is in the Subject, or also the condition, and cause without which
the predicate is not verified of the subject. 2. \[ἐιδοποιητικῶς (specifically)\], and in force of
specifying, so that it specifies the other term, and that either totally and completely, to
which the other is immediately suitable, or Synecdochically and incompletely, according to
which part it is attributed to it, or modifies the term, to which it is apposed, and under which
mode the enunciation is verified, or finally simply only demonstrates, that it itself is that,
which and of which it is said.

That these modes suffice, is taught in Logic. But it is of no consequence, in the judgment of
Cornelius Martini, whether it is called reduplicative or specificative as, since they differ only
in name, who take these terms one way and another agree in the thing itself.

At present, when I say the object of Metaphysics is Being as Being, either explication is not
unsuitable. Causal, so that the formal and precise cause of the inherence of the predicate in
the subject may be reduplicated. For that Being is the subject of Metaphysics, the reason for
this is the proper way of considering, which teaches us this, that in Metaphysics Being ought
to be considered only formally, essentially, and under the account of Being.

Determinative, because it determines the common Object in this sense: Being according to
essence and the most common quiddity is the proper Object. It therefore implies 1. Being in
the abstract, and universal, and excludes Beings in particular. It implies the common account
of all, it excludes the special consideration of each. For it is abstracted from all, not
concreted from all. It considers all things in the universal, not universally all things. It is the
wisdom of Being, not of Beings. It is occupied with Being as Being, not with every Being. For
they who revoke every intelligible, or Being and every Being to this, compinge all disciplines
into one, and confound the most diverse dispositions. Likewise, they who in Metaphysics
descend to the doctrine of Spirits or of immaterial substance, wander outside the object.
Being no more comprehends spirit as such under itself, than body as body. The mind cannot
be led through the formal account of Being as Being into proper cognition of this or that
Being. For how would what is common to all lead into specific cognition of particulars! But
no disposition cognizes anything, unless it can be led into its notion through the formal
account of the object understood. 2. Being as Being implies the highest abstraction of
Metaphysics, which is according to indifference from all things, whatsoever merit the name
of Being. Some call it abstraction according to thing and account, but permissively, not
positively. But what is this according to thing, or to abstract really from matter and not to
abstract positively? Should it be said, that Being is really precise from matter? And should it
not be said that Being is really precise from spirituality? For it is indifferent. We certainly
concede abstraction to the Object of Metaphysics (not indeed as its formal account, but as a
means propelling Being into the Objective state) but precisive, but of indifference, but only

38
according to account, by which Being is thoroughly immune from conditions restricting to a
determinate quiddity, and is conceived only under the most general notion. So that they err,
who restrict Metaphysical Being to created substance, or precisely substance, or only
predicamental and finite Being. But a higher abstraction can be given, namely from:
substance and accident: from created and uncreated: from predicamental and
extrapredicamental. Which is of Being inasmuch as Being. 3. Being as Being implies an
essential consideration of Being, it excludes an accidental state and extrinsic condition. By
this the Object of Logic, is discerned from the object of Metaphysics. There Being under an
accidental notion, as it underlies second intentions: here under its proper notion it is
proposed in its essence. There it is led to the instrumental workshop, as an object around
which there is operation. Here it is fixed before the mind as an object of contemplation.
Although also in this there is a difference, that the object of Logic \[τῷ λόγῳ (by account)\] is
adequate, and is every knowable, or Being in universal and particular. For the mind can
wander circa every knowable thing, and therefore needs Logical direction, but the object of
Metaphysics is only Being in universal.

The generic object or of consideration is treated in Metaphysics, whether directly or through

order to the direct object, or per accidens. Directly is delivered only the nature of Being and
the common concept. But in order to Being are thoroughly treated both the affections of
Being, and the less abstract accounts of being. No incomplex principles are given here. Those
inhere in Being as Being not essentially, as if they pertain to the nature of Being as such, but
extraessentially, because they affect Being common to all things. These are subordinated to
Being. For the account of the formal object does not prohibit descending to those things,
which are contained under the formal object, but only removes those things, which are
extrinsic to it. Thus Physics, considering body, as natural, does not refuse consideration of
man, as man, but of man as to be beatified, as to be cured etc. For this is thoroughly
extrinsic to natural body, as such. Although there is yet another account of the
transcendental object For because this is thoroughly indifferent to this or that Being,
certainly neither does it include all things, which are essentially subordinated to Being in the
series of things, nor does it promiscuously refuse all things. Therefore, it is to be attended to
the formal account, which is the indifference of Being, as it abstracts from special nature
determinately whatsoever. And thus to consider Being under first lesser abstraction, is so far
from being repugnant to Metaphysics, that rather it is altogether required for its perfect
cognition: inasmuch of course as the less abstract represents, as subsisting and inexisting.
But to consider this or that Being under determinate account and quiddity in the most
universal discipline, thoroughly implies.

Finally, as real, per se, actual Being etc. \[κατ᾽ αὐτό (per se)\] is considered in Metaphysics:
Thus also Being of reason, per accidens, potential etc. Can be considered there, but only
\[συμβεβηκότως (accidentally)\], and per accidens; Inasmuch as opposites placed next to
each other become clearer.

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IV. Causes pertaining to Metaphysics

The first cause of Metaphysics is God. The second efficient causes are distinguished
Philosophers, and among these, Aristotle is almost the first of Metaphysics.

God, in what way is the First cause of Metaphysics The first parts are owed to God. Who
made man capable of Wisdom, instilled a natural desire of knowing all sublime things, and
gave us the whole universe to contemplate. Who moreover excited theoretical minds to the
cultivation of this study, and granted to them a singular acuteness for the investigation of
truth and the highest causes. Which they profanely deny, as many as do not venerate
Metaphysics as a theological gift, or babble that it is opposed to Theology. But they are
ignorant, that all those things which are proposed in Metaphysics, are to be drawn out from
the very representation of all things, which has God as author. Nor do they distinguish
between the truth of Metaphysical principles and the viciousness of application. As true as
the things that are, are, as constant is the analogy of the things that are, so true, so solid are
the truly Metaphysical sayings. But if either these are applied sophistically, or others are
plainly made up, what is this to Metaphysics?

To the second causes we refer the Philosophers, who in every age have devoted
praiseworthy effort to Metaphysics. Of whom it is not now permitted to weave a lengthy
catalog. Concerning Aristotle, and his works in a single word. He, as he is honored by the
ancients with this praise, that he was μεθοδικώτατος \[methodikotatos (most methodical)\],
most studious of order, φιληλάτων \[philelaton (most fond of universals)\], most fond of
universals, and φιλαιτιολογικώτατος \[philaitiologikotatos (most fond of seeking causes)\],
most industrious in the investigation of causes: So he made this most evident in his
Metaphysical writings. For he first devoted effort to directing transnatural things
methodically, and applied his mind to explaining the most common predicates, and
investigating the highest causes. And this with no less happy success than skillful study, if we
wish to estimate with just minds the first adornment of Metaphysics. For nothing is at once
invented and perfected. But the Metaphysical works of Aristotle are completed, with a
commendation of Metaphysics put first in the place of a proem; and the explication of first
wisdom, in two sections as it were. The other exhibits the preparatory books, the other the
treatise books. Those are the first six, in which he lays the foundations of the future treatise,
while he is occupied in the inquiry of principles and object, the explication of the most
common terms, and the constitution of this discipline. Therefore first he is solicitous about
the principles and object in the 4 prior books. But he so acts concerning these, that 1. He
proceeds \[τὰ δοκοῦντα (the received opinions)\] to examine and refute the opinions of the
ancients, concerning the first principles of things, in the first book. After he teaches that the
principles of things are finite, and discusses concerning truth to be drawn out in book 2. 2.

40
\[κατ ̓ἀκριβείαν (according to strict reasoning)\]: he proposes doubts looking to rightly
constituting principles and assigning a subject, in book 3. 3. \[κατὰ τὸ ζητούμενον αὐτό
(according to the very object of inquiry)\] he assigns the Object itself, Being as Being, and
proposes the first complex principle of all, in book 4. Secondly from the principles and object
he descends to the explication of the most universal terms, \[τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου (the
greatest universals)\] of which are numbered almost forty, Principle, and Cause, Element,
Nature, Necessary, One, Many, Being, Being by accident, same, diverse etc. Concerning
which in book 5 which is called the book concerning the number of times \[“quotiens”
meaning how many times a term is used in different senses\]. With these declared, thirdly,
he inquires into the nature and constitution of this discipline, in book 6, that it is the
Theoretical part of Philosophy, and how it is distinguished from others, and that it is not
concerned with Being most broadly taken, as it includes Being by accident, and Being of
reason, he shows, and thus excludes the same from the consideration of Metaphysics. Then
finally the very treatise itself follows, completed in the remaining eight books. Which it is
permitted to distribute thus, that some treat homogeneous things, or what are of this
science: but others ἀλλότρια \[allotria (foreign things)\] and heterogeneous. Those indeed
are proposed first διεξοδικῶς \[diexodikos (in extended fashion)\]; then through a certain
ἀνακεφαλαίωσιν \[anakephalaiosis (summary)\] συντόμως \[syntomos (concisely)\]
repeated. There first he treats the object, in book 7. And indeed the first object, by primacy
of attribution, which is substance. For this is principally Being, and to it, what are said
concerning Being in common, look first: finally with it known, as the principal analogate,
accident is also known, nay the whole nature of Being is in a certain way held. Secondly the
principles of Physics, as second wisdom, first wisdom foreknows and constitutes; namely
matter and form, and also the composite object itself in book 8, and since matter is potency;
form act, he proposes most useful things concerning potency and act, in book 9. Thirdly
finally he weighs the most powerful affection of Being, Unity, and multitude opposed to this
in book 10. Then he repeats heterogeneous things which he delivered. By which he could
have been able to put the finishing touch, but because concerning God and intelligences or
immaterial substances he had only a few certain things known from the light of nature, we
will consider them as if subjoined through an appendix, and indirectly revoked here.
Although they are otherwise heterogeneous; and of Pneumatic consideration. Therefore in
the twelfth book he descends to separated substances, inquires into the first principle of all
things and highest good; and in the last two, the thirteenth and fourteenth, he examines the
opinions of the ancient Philosophers Pythag. And Platon., which they quite obscurely and
intricately fostered concerning immaterial substances. Which are also neglected by
interpreters, because those opinions had plainly expired concerning Ideas and numbers, the
principles of all things, and are not to be recalled into Philosophy by postliminy \[a legal term
for the right to reclaim something\]. These things concerning the Summary disposition of
the Aristotelian books. In which although many things are desired, nevertheless Aristotle is
most worthy of every praise, because he first opened the way, and held forth a torch to
others, but if he sometimes wandered from the path of truth, what wonder? Wherefore

41
those who consult themselves and truth, neither completely reject Aristotle, because in
many things he most nearly attained the truth, nor simply adore the opinions of Aristotle:
because he was human, he could err, especially around the first cradle of Metaphysics. Add,
that he had no acquaintance of divine and mystical things, and therefore could easily slip
around the declaration of Metaphysical terms in the abstraction of Being. For he who does
not have all particulars known, how will he so accurately constitute the formal reason in
abstraction, that nothing can be desired in it! Wherefore one must look to the truth of
things rather than the authority of the Philosopher.

V. The genuine end of Metaphysics is to perfect our mind by the most abstract
cognition of things, and to direct the inferior disciplines; finally to exercise its use
in the highest faculties.

Spurious and genuine ends of Metaphysics

The ends of Metaphysics are others ψευδών μοι \[pseudonymoi (falsely named)\] or
spurious, others γνήσιοι \[gnesioi (genuine)\] or genuine. Those are, to subalternate the
remaining disciplines to itself: and to deliver principles of knowing. For this is practical and
instrumental, belonging to Logic. That can be said only improperly. For properly
subalternation says the supposition of the subject of one under another, with an accidental
differentia taken to: such is not given, if we consider Being, and what are under Being,
particular objects. For it is restricted to being determined through an intrinsic and essential
difference. These things therefore being dismissed, of the genuine ends some are absolute,
others respective. The absolute end is the cognition of Being, and of those things which look
here, namely of the most universal terms, most common distinctions, highest principles, also
of the most common conclusions, and no less of the more express reasons of being. Which
cognition here is not intended to be superficial and shadowy, but solid, but accurate. To
which it belongs, in the explication of the most universal terms to know habitually the
explication, not only the variety of mode but especially the foundation of truth, not only the
use and application, but also the principle, and the formal reason of each term. In
distinctions it is not enough, to know the genuine sense and use of the distinction: but we
especially need to be certain, concerning the certitude and necessity of distinctions. The
conclusions, which are proposed in Metaphysics, as they are commonly called, Metaphysical
axioms, it is not sufficient to teach nakedly, but to deduce from first principles, this at last is
of wisdom. And this is the work, this is the labor. If we descend to the less abstract modes of
being: here also it is especially necessary, to accurately hold the same, and to have well
examined how they exhaust the whole latitude of Being. The respective end is twofold, as
Metaphysics is referred to our intellect, or is compared to other disciplines. That is, to
perfect the intellect according to itself and primarily. Which is done by the representation of

42
those things, in which the intellect especially rejoices, namely which are free from all matter:
and no less by the exhibition of all things in the universal. Since it desires to know all things
by its nature. This cannot be said concerning Physics or Mathematics. Which although they
perfect the intellect, yet not primarily and per se, inasmuch as they know the most universal
things, which are properly of the intellect; but secondarily and per accidens, on account of
the dependence, which they have on phantasy \[sensory imagination/impressions\]. This is
twofold. Internal, which is obtained in Metaphysics itself, and external, which is obtained
outside it. The former is to direct disciplines ἀρχοντικῶς \[archontikos (in a leading way)\],
by the confirmation of principles, and the assignation of objects, and no less by the decision
of controversies, concerning which above. For which end it takes as counselors, so to speak,
the most eminent, namely Gnostology and Neology, The former, that it may know all things
in the abstract: the latter, that it may immovably stabilize its conclusions, concerning which
elsewhere. The latter is, to diffuse itself by its use into all disciplines, and that on account of
the community of terms and principles. Whence Metaphysics is especially useful to all
disciplines: to all faculties, not indeed as some medium, destined to an end, which would
derogate from the nobility of this discipline; but nevertheless as a more eminent cause, in its
way influencing inferiors as Suarez explains Disp.1. sect. 1.§. 4. Moreover the external use of
Metaphysics is multiplex. For if you regard the other disciplines, it is certain, that they act at
least concerning some part of Being, or concerning this or that Being. 3. Met. C.1. But this or
that Being cannot be known, except dependently to the cognition of Being simply. Just as
man cannot be distinctly known, unless with animal known, and animal cannot be known,
unless with body known. Thus what spirit is, what body is cannot be known, unless with
what Being is, what substance is known! Nay also the most common terms, and most
general axioms, not even Jurists or Physicians can abstain from, the accurate cognition of
which however cannot be had except from Metaphysics. Concerning Theologians let me
speak, but in the fewest words. Their office is threefold: διδακτικόν \[didaktikon (didactic)\],
ἐλεγκτικόν \[elenktikon (elenctic, refutative)\], and ἐξηγητικόν \[exegetikon (exegetical,
interpretive)\]. In didactic whether the explication of terms, or the confirmation of
conclusions is regarded, Metaphysical cognition is found to be exceedingly necessary.
Without it there are very many things in Theological matters, which cannot be accurately
known. When it is discussed concerning the first principle of faith, concerning the norm of
controversies, concerning the perfection of scripture; or concerning unity, concerning
Essence, concerning substance, concerning personality, concerning dependence, etc. Takes
place in the topic concerning the Trinity: what will be able to be understood without
Metaphysics! Also Theological conclusions by far the most can neither be dexterously
explained, nor accurately proven without distinct Metaphysical cognition. They cannot be
explained, When namely one extreme, or both are a Metaphysical term, or are clothed with
a Metaphysical term. Of which sort are these: Original sin is an accident. The divine persons
differ really. Essence does not differ really from person. The personal union is the cause of
the communication of properties \[communicatio idiomatum\]: And infinite other such;
which cannot even be understood by those, who are destitute of Metaphysical cognition.

43
They cannot be proven. For confirmation presupposes intelligence. Add that in Theology
there are very many questions, which although through themselves and intrinsically are not
Theological, but rather Metaphysical, yet are applied to Theology. E.g. Whether the first act
of one thing can be the first act of another thing? Whether substance can be without proper
subsistence? Whether a true union is followed by communication? Whether proper things
can be communicated? Etc. The decision of these indeed is especially necessary for the more
accurate Theologian, which nevertheless can be drawn only from Metaphysics. Hence also
what Metaphysics can do in Theological ἐλέγξει \[elenxis (refutation)\] is easily evident. For
it is certain, that there is no heresy, which does not sometimes recur to Metaphysics, and
attempt to mendicate some foundation for its heterodoxy from it, whether by the vicious
application of Metaphysical axioms, or by the quibbling boasting of fictitious principles.
Which is declared not only by the Scholastic disputations of the Jesuits; but especially both
by the Photinian oppositions and innumerable exceptions against the mystery of the Most
Holy Trinity, against the communicability of the divine essence, against the plurality in unity
of essence of persons, the personal characters, subsistent relations, the real distinction of
persons, the eternal generation of the Son, the proper personality of the Holy Spirit etc.; And
by the dogmas and assertions of Zwingli and Calvin concerning the immutable Necessity of
things, the cause of sin, the incommunicability of subsistence and divine properties,
sacramental signs, and the real absence of the body and blood of Christ etc. Which can
neither be examined or refuted without Metaphysical cognition. But whoever with more
accurate Theological study will have devoted effort to first Philosophy piously and soberly,
he certainly will be able to bring the impiety of heresies into the open more easily and to
draw out even the most cunning heretics from their hiding places, he will be able to examine
their dogmas more happily, to refute their principles, to dissolve their most specious
arguments, and thus to vindicate Theological truth from sophistic ἀλλοδοξίας \[allodoxias
(heterodoxies)\], and to preserve it intact and inviolate. Finally, as to ἐξήγησις \[exegesis
(exegesis, interpretation)\] of passages of scripture; also here the cognition of Metaphysics
supplies no small aid. Thus of what sort the goodness is, with which all things are said to
have been made, Gen. 1.31, how great is the power of God, which is above our
understanding Eph. 20, what is the necessity, by which it is necessary that scandals come
Math. 18.7. etc. That it may be dexterously explained, the philosophical consideration of
Goodness, Power, Necessity etc. Helps very much first \[a priori\]. Rightly weighing which
and other things Schegkius, most gravely says; I indeed so judge, that the Churches will then
at last be quiet and blessed, if either good Philosophers give effort to Theology, or
Theologians philosophize piously. L.1. concerning demonstration.

These things which have been said concerning the Constitution of Metaphysics, suggest the
following things concerning its adornment .

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 ADMONITIONS.

I. Whatever will be taught in Metaphysics, must be referred back to Being as Being.

And vice versa. Whatever cannot be referred back to Being as Being, must not be
taught in Metaphysics.

For the object extends equally broadly with the discipline, and is its measure. Hence it is
evident:

1. What things are to be taught, what things are not to be taught.

Homogeneous are those things which concern the nature of Being, and are
found to inhere in and underlie Being as Being. But as much as the indifferent
nature of wisdom and of Being as Being admits. Of this sort are the \[θεωρία
(theory)\] of Being: the explanation of the transcendental Attributes: and
likewise of the less abstract notions of Being.

Heterogeneous are those things which cannot be referred to the aforesaid heads: as are in
general: whatever Beings of a determinate quiddity: which, although they may be
advantageously referred here \[μετὰ φυσικῶς (metaphysically)\] and for the sake of
explanation, nevertheless cannot be pertractated here \[διδακτικῶς (didactically)]\] and
fully, except very impertinently.

Specifically excluded is Pneumatology or the consideration of spirits, and Hexilogy or the

specification of habits, which are referred by some to Metaphysics: but λυολογία [lyologia]
are not comprehended. Finally, the doctrine either of the predicaments (for these are
notional, these are instrumental, these are Logical, they respect predications, not the nature
of Being) or of the ten highest genera is banished from the contemplation of Being as Being,
and therefore also from the territory of Metaphysics. Unless it pleases to refer back those
things which otherwise obtain no seat in the particular sciences, and conduce to explaining
the various modes of being. In which part we do not object.

2. In what way they are to be taught, viz. That a perpetual respect be had to
Being as Being. And therefore also attributes adequate to it are to be
established, having been constituted are to be defined in order to Being: and
the more express notions of Being, and finally the determination itself of the
objects is to be propounded in view of Being as Being.

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 II. All Metaphysical precepts are to be formed in the abstraction of Being.

For the measured is to be applied to the measure. Therefore one must not look only to finite
Being, and to the book of nature. Universal precepts obtain their truth from all particulars,
and from their induction, and that a perfect one, can at last be said to be universal. This is to
be noted accurately; both in the formal notion of transcendental terms, and in the abstract
constitution of common principles.

In both, abstraction from everything that is ought to dominate, and therefore no less from
infinite than from finite being. The terms are not to be estimated from created things only,
but if they are also found applied to mystical things, an analogous common concept is to be
formed abstracting from these simultaneously and from those.

For as the finite and infinite participate in the general nature of Being; so also those things
which pertain to Being as Being. Likewise the most common principles are not to be judged,
which obtain truth only in the other hemisphere, not likewise in the other, and that the
higher: which are formed from the consideration only of the affinity of things set forth in
nature, but do not simultaneously look upon the φύσει [physei] of things expounded in
scripture.

Otherwise it will happen, that such principles are foisted as universal axioms, which have
consisted only by a particular induction of natural things, and obtain truth concerning
natural objects, that is, are merely particular. And from this font has sprung that fictitious
pugna of Theology and Philosophy.

On the contrary as Physical things are not the norm of mystical things, so principles
constructed from the sole consideration of nature ought by no means to measure the
mysteries of faith. But the transcendentals, which indeed it behooves to be common to
both, it is impossible that they truly fight with either.

In what way it can by no means happen, that the universal destroys the particulars. For it is
essential to the inferiors and the particulars. Therefore it cannot be opposed to them.
Wherefore it is to be accurately observed, that faith is not so easily to be applied to the
universality of principles, unless either the induction of all particulars directly proves the
same, or the deduction to the impossible wins for them infallible faith.

III. As abstraction dominates in the formal truth of transcendental terms, so

adequation is to be attended to most of all in material variety.

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This flows from the preceding. For if all Metaphysical precepts are to be formed in the
abstraction of Being, it is certainly necessary no less to exhibit the divisions presenting the
material variety of things under an adequation of every mode, than the descriptions
representing the formal notion of the transcendency of terms under an ultimate abstraction.
Lest either the common concept be too narrow: or the contracting modes insufficient.

For the transcendentals should exhaust the entire latitude of Being. And therefore they
respect not only Being absolutely, but also under this or that state. Wherefore they are also
to be described indefinitely as they denominate Being, and to be represented adequately in
their modes. Therefore let that be the norm of transcendental definitions and divisions.

IV. No conclusion ought to be stated in Metaphysics, which has not been deduced
from a principle, or at least can be deduced.

The first and highest principle is that which is held in the Philosopher 3, Metaph. C. 3. And 4.
And likewise l. 4. Metaph. 6. 4. And 5. Τὸ αὐτὸν ἅμα ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν αδύνατον [to
auton hama hyparchein, kai mē hyparchein adynaton], It is impossible for the same thing to
be and not be at the same time. Which others thus express: The same thing cannot be
affirmed and denied of the same thing at the same time, others thus: Two contradictories
cannot be true at the same time.

There are also those who refer back to this that principle, which is 3. Met. C. 3. And 4. Met.
C. 27. Whatever is, either is or is not. And It is necessary for one part of a contradiction to be
true. But in truth, although this follows from that, nevertheless the one is by no means the
same with the other.

For the former first expresses the repugnance of the terms, To be and Not to be, that they
mutually remove each other. But the latter concludes every medium between to be and not
to be. Which certainly are different. For let there be by an impossibility some
contradictories, admitting a medium, which is by the negation of each extreme, the
repugnance will nevertheless remain preserved.

But concerning that in Noology: But understand the first principle not only concerning to be
and not to be precisely, but also concerning this or that to be restrictedly. Which things
having been thus posited I say: To that principle ought to be applied, whatever most general
conclusions are delivered in Metaphysics. This is required both by the preeminence of first
wisdom, to which it belongs to ascend all the way to the highest principles; and by the
indigence of scientific principles, which certainly need a muniment, that the sciences
themselves may attain their certitude. For an error committed in the first principle, is not
corrected in the second.

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 V. The application of transcendental terms to mystical things, as it can altogether be
done, ought not to be made except \[ἀναλόγως (analogously)]\].

It can, on account of the commonness of the terms. It ought, on account of the singularity of
the mysteries. But it cannot in all things. But in those only, where a certain common notion
obtains. For application presupposes participation.

Contrary to the nature of things, or even without the foundation of application no

application ought to be made. Wherefore also that is to be pondered accurately, and this to
be attended to sedulously. Theology supplies the former. The latter is to be repeated from
Gnostology.

Moreover the foundation of analogy is the infinite distance of things. Not that, which is so
called on account of the denial of all agreement. Otherwise the application will be only
equivocal: which is only \[κατὰ λόγον (according to reason)]\]. But on account of the infinite
excellence of one extreme beyond the other.

Whence analogical application is in eminent force, which is instituted at the same time
\[κατὰ πράγμα (according to the thing)]\]. E.g. When dependence is attributed to the Son
and Holy Spirit in the mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, the denomination of associate causes
in the work of creation, is mere equivocation, the greatest \[ἀκυρολογία (impropriety of
speech)]\], not to be tolerated in an accurate discipline.

But when the Father is called the principle of the remaining persons and the Most Holy
Trinity is saluted the cause of Creation: there obtains an analogical application of terms. That
is, conjoined with the removal of all imperfection, and the attribution of the eminent formal
notion alone.

Thus from the said principle is banished, the primacy of Nature, the dependence,
consecution, illation of the principiate etc. From the cause the successive motion, mutation
etc. Are removed. But there is claimed in eminence that indeed the relation of origin and
procession: but to this the dimanation of the caused thing etc. Evidently the formal of the
transcendentals, to those things, to which application can be made, is not to be denied: But
neither ought the material conditions to be inferred: lest from the conditions of the created
subject mystical things be judged.

For the Physical here holds itself, as opposed to hyperphysical things. But one of opposites,
does not participate in the notion of the other.

VI. True theorems ought to be sedulously discerned from δογματικῶν [dogmatic

ones] and the genuine use of the former from the Sophistical abuse.

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Those are true: which flow from the nature of the transcendentals. Of which they are as it
were certain porisms.

False, are those which are so far from following the character of the transcendentals, that
they rather overturn, or pervert the same. Thus the first principles have the place of a
foundation. The latter have fictitious postulates. Therefore one must both studiously beware
of the latter. Since with one absurdity admitted (especially in a transcendental discipline)
there follow infinite ones.

But concerning the former it is to be sedulously examined, lest by the abuse of sophists and
heretics we allow the truth to be snatched away: and so lose the genuine use. Concerning
which in the progress. For also here.

Use has praise, abuse has blame.

Moreover here concerning the heretical abuse of first Philosophy in general we observe,
both whence it proceeds, and in what way it ought to be examined. The foundation or to
speak more correctly, the πρῶτον ψεῦδος [prōton pseudos] of the abuse is especially
twofold.

The first: that mystical things are judged from natural things. For they are wont to conclude
from finite things to Eminent things: And furthermore to construct universal principles,
Which is to mix things of infinite distance, and to confound them.

Thus those who judge the essence, who the divine persons, who the real distinction etc. In
the mystery of the Trinity by the notion of Essence, of persons, of real distinction in the
terms of Nature: and consequently form transcendental principles according to the norm
only of the Essence, Person, and real distinction of Natural things.

The second is, that the judgment of reason is elevated above the divine notice. When those
things are judged impossible, which seem to be at variance with reason. Of this sort is that:
A finite nature cannot have an infinite mode of subsisting.

But when Scripture teaches that the finite human nature of Christ enjoys the infinite
subsistence of the λόγος [Logos], it is evident, that the contradiction is fictitious, whatever
even reason may have suggested. But concerning these things perhaps in its own place.

The examination of fictitious principles is carried out, by considering the cognation of the
terms. For the agreement of affirmation, the conflict of negation is the foundation. This is
the principle of Calvin.

Union can be true without the presence of the united. Ponder. Union expresses the
undividedness of the united. But with the presence denied there is certainly inferred
division. Similar is that of Sadeeloper. Theol. P. 377. Without quantity the human body

49
cannot be understood. And: Quantity is not posterior to body itself even τῷ λόγῳ [tō logō]
or by definition.

Collect the terms. Quantity is an accident. Body a substance. Therefore an accident will enter
into the definition and constitution of substance; Nor will substance depend anymore,
because it is not posterior to it, nay because it is that very substance. Paradoxes!

But these and many others to be referred to the file crop up in the progress.

POSTERIOR PROEMIAL MEMBER.

On the Division of Ontology.

We have spoken about the genuine constitution of Metaphysics, therefore it remains to

inquire into its genuine division. For we cannot proceed to the distinct evolution of the
individual parts of the Discipline, unless it has been generally established beforehand
Whether and what are the parts of Metaphysics. Although in truth it may be a discipline of
one genus and form by reason of specific unity, and therefore an indivisible habit, because
first wisdom does not have any species under itself, but is itself a most special species,
nevertheless for the sake of the diverse consideration of matter and object it can be
distributed into integral parts: namely intensive analogs, just as other disciplines are also
distributed. The Division is denied, because it obtains unity from the proper form of habit by
reason of the object, namely Being as Being, to which all things are revoked, which are
handed down in Metaphysics. Partition is not denied, because Being as Being can be
understood by the intellect in diverse ways, which if it is explained through parts, a certain,
as they say, partition of discipline emerges. Therefore in how many ways Being as Being can
and ought to be represented, and consequently how many and what parts of Metaphysics
must be constituted, must be stated.

I. There are two parts of Metaphysics: One General, the other Special.

Metaphysics considered as a whole in relation to other Philosophical sciences is entirely

Universal, but if the parts of Metaphysics are compared among themselves, one is more
universal than the other. For when one science is called universal, another special, the
division is of genus into species; but it is a partition, when the two parts of Metaphysics are
called: General and Special. The former happens by reason of diverse object; the latter by
reason of diverse consideration of the same object. And although Metaphysics does not
lower itself to any special Being of determinate quiddity, nevertheless it completely and
adequately revolves its object. Moreover, Being as Being, indeed it must exhibit itself to the

50
intellect under a twofold notion, and be proposed in the discipline. First under the most
common and most abstract notion without respect of determinate essence either of
contraction or of explication at least of the reason of being, i.e. insofar as Being is the most
common concept, and enjoys the most general attributes. Second under the less abstract
notion, and the more express reason of being, insofar as Being is represented through
subsistence and inexistence. Hence the foundation of our division is evident: For in as many
ways as the object can be fixed for the intellect, so many parts of the discipline must be
constituted, see Alexander Aphrodisiensis 3. De anima. C. 8 t. 37. And sciences are cut into
things, (commonly as things) ibid. But in so many ways the object Being as Being is fixed for
the intellect. Therefore. When, however, I call the first part general, the other special, it
must not be thought, that there is a real Metaphysical communion with other disciplines,
whose parts are also designated by the same names. There is indeed agreement in words;
but because the object is most diverse, therefore in reality there is the greatest difference.
For the others have their own objects, and revolve them in that twofold way. Ours claims
Being as Being for itself alone. With these things thus constituted and explained, the pure
divisions of others fall away, who either I. Compress all disciplines into one Metaphysics, or
II. Distribute Metaphysics into a treatise on Being and on the species of Being, Or III.
Consider Being both in itself, and oppositely in non-Being. Or IV. Make Two parts of
Metaphysics, of which the first may treat of abstracts according to indifference, or those
which are common to all both materials and immaterials; the second of abstracts according
to essence i.e. of incorporeal substances; Or V. Constitute three parts: The First concerning
the divisions of Being, the second concerning the cognates, the third concerning the
opposites. Or VI. In another way they make three parts; namely the first concerning
substances disjoined from matter, the second concerning the transcendentals, the third
concerning the predicaments and what are the other divisions of this bran. All are rejected
as inconvenient. For they either most badly confuse diverse objects, and overstep the limits
of transcendental discipline, or absurdly revoke the first contradictories to one object, or
transpose the parts ὡς ἔτυχε [hōs etyche (randomly)]: or they mix in heterogeneous things,
pass over homogeneous things, ἀπαιδεύτως [apaideútōs (ignorantly)], and what other vices,
from which they suffer. There are those who retain and approve our partition, but because
they cherish a false hypothesis about abstraction and the consideration of spirits, they
explain the same less dexterously. For they want the specific consideration of spiritual
substances to be revoked to the special part; and therefore they do not subsist in the
abstraction of Being and the more express reasons of being, but descend to Beings of
determinate quiddity, which is against the nature of universal discipline and the formal
reason of the object.

II. The General part of Metaphysics speculates Being in the most abstract reason
and complete indifference, as to nature, and the most common attributes, which
are in Being per se, apart from the principles of being.

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It is called General, Universal, Common and Syncritic [Συγκριτική (Comparative)].

General, not because Being may be a genus, and embrace species under itself, but because it
evolves Being in general and in ultimate abstraction.

Universal, because it treats of those things, which can be universally attributed to all things
whatsoever: and because it exhibits the most universal conclusions.

Common, because it does not attain Being under this or that mode as it obtains its proper
reason, either of subsisting per se or of existing in another, but is occupied in the common
reason of being.

Syncritic [Συγκριτική (Comparative)], because the affinity and comparison of things

generates the transcendentals, which it solely ponders as remaining in the state of
indifference apart from the distinction or discretion of Being. For although the disjunct
attributes of Being seem to import the distinction of Being, in truth however they do not
import it. But they only denominate and affect Being under that indifference disjunctively.
Affections are one thing, divisions another, about which later. Here therefore Being is
represented under the most abstract, most common, most general notion, under complete
indifference, as far as it prescind from all things, which are, and implies nothing of those,
which are under it either immediately, or mediately, and consequently excludes every
difference, is considered only in its Nature and in its equally widely extending attributes.
They are called transcendentals, namely Being and what are in it per se, not from the
nobility and eminence of existing but from the community and indifference of being. For in
that way God is rather transcendent, and Damascenus l.1. orth. Fid.c.11. says that the Trinity
is transcending all things. But in this sense they transcend by the community of Entity and of
predication those which both rise above all the classes of things, and can be predicated of
individual things, such as are Being, and what are of the same latitude with Being, either as
purely synonymous and equipollent, or as paronymous attributes, about whose number and
order in the general part itself. Some also revoke to the common part the principles of Being,
because they think that in every discipline the subject and its principles and affections ought
to be evolved under the general notion of the subject. But in truth as we freely admit these
things concerning the sciences according to Aristotle 1. Post.c.7. t. 57.& 76. So we state that
the reason of wisdom is far different. For this because it is highest, is concerned with Being
in the universal, wherefore it recognizes no principles. Indeed complex principles, from
which it elicits the most universal conclusions, cannot be denied to it, unless wisdom
without principles is imagined by manifest contradiction. But in truth incomplex principles
whether they may be causes, or only superior reasons inferring, from which the attributes
may emanate, and through which it may be proved that the transcendent affections are
verified of Being, none can be named in Metaphysics. Not Causes: for cause is not cause in
infinitum. Therefore it must be stopped in the first efficient, as far as it is efficient. But in

52
truth the efficient as far as it is efficient, is an affection of Being. Therefore an affection must
be conceded without an efficient cause. If this, much less will the subject of the efficient as
far as it is efficient, namely Being, have principles of Being. And, if you suppose the subject
of Metaphysics Being as Being affected by principles of being, it follows, that no Being is
given, which does not recognize principles of being. And consequently they must also be
attributed to God, and you will have God not God. For although in the sciences not so much
the causes of the object as of the affections are sought, nor must that but these be proved;
nevertheless because the affections are immediately in the subject, they will by all means
come forth from the principles of the same; and consequently it must be taught that the
same are verified about the subject through principles. Moreover neither do inferring
reasons have a place here. Being can indeed be considered in its essence, and as if in the
first moment, so that the affections may be beheld as if in a second moment, namely in
actual denomination and emanation. But it is not asked, whether the affections of Being
emanate from Being, but it is debated about this, whether some superior reason may be
given, from which the affections of Being may be inferred and through which they may be
predicated of Being? Just as the immutability of God infers his eternity, independence
omnipotence. Where indeed we do not deny that one affection can be deduced from others:
but that there is first immediately and proximately given some superior reason of
emanating: from which the affection of Being may be inferred, we do not concede. For Being
as Being is the highest of all, and has nothing superior to itself. But Being itself cannot be
such a reason, because the principle and the principiated are not the same. Then much less
will it be saluted as an affection of Being, because through a reason of this kind the
affections ought to be demonstrated about Being. But principle and affection do not agree in
one concept, as Dn. Gutkius says. Wherefore no incomplex principles are found here. Which
was to be proved.

III. The Special part of Metaphysics considers Being in lesser abstraction, whereby
through subsistence and inherence the more express reason of being is fixed: and
with the variety having been designated and revoked to certain classes of all
things, whatsoever are, and obtain being, it constitutes objects of determinate
quiddity, precognizes the constituted, dismisses the precognized to the inferior
disciplines, which it therefore specifies, orders, and accurately circumscribes by
their own limits.

It is called discretive [διακριτική (discretive)] or discretive [διακριτική (discretive)], and this

only Synecdochically because it distinctly proposes the more express orders of being, which
infer some διάκρισιν [diákrisin (discretion)] or discretion [διάκρισιν (discretion)] namely of
substance and accident. By which name it is also indicated as the special part, not because it
contemplates the species of Being, but because it proposes and explains the more special

53
grades of being, and the less abstract reasons of Being, or because it considers those things,
which are contained under Being in the mode of species. It is called II. Particular, because it
revokes all particular Beings in the universe to certain orders, and constitutes the highest
heads of all things, whatsoever are, indeed also as if it may fix before the eyes all Beings in
particular represented in a certain table, so that the variety of things may be exhibited for
viewing generally in this universal discipline, and the specific consideration of individuals can
be dismissed to the proper seat, which it has in other disciplines. III. It is called Proper not
from the consideration of determinate Beings under proper quiddity, but from its most
proper function, which it exercises here especially in the determination of objects and the
direction of disciplines. For after it has exhibited all things by a certain ἀγωγῇ [agōgē
(abduction)]; promptly no less than accurately it knows how to revoke that infinite variety of
things to certain objects. Which since it cannot claim for itself to be considered more
specially, for the reason that they may go beyond both the nature of universal discipline and
the indifference of Being as Being, this remains, that it may remit the same to other sciences
to be evolved, and consequently may precognize these things in some way. From which it
will have this, not only how many objects there may be, which require special consideration,
but also to which disciplines they must be committed, so that as far as can happen, the
individuals may be most ordinately treated in their own seats. Hence therefore the
constitution of the Disciplines (inasmuch as they depend on the object): hence the division:
hence the order: hence the measure and the terms. Thus from the explication of the names
the functions of this part are established one by one in the theorem having been exposed, to
which nothing must be added, nothing detracted. Moreover, they add who drag the special
consideration of spiritual Nature here. They detract, as many as pass over the determination
of objects with dry foot. Finally, all confusion must be avoided, which they do not shun, who
seize the disjunct transcendental attributes through the transverse, and mix those things,
which are of the general, into the special part. About which in the progress.

Now from the things having been said let us collect certain ἀξιομνημόνευτα
[axiomnēmóneuta (noteworthy things)] about the order and parts of Metaphysical
treatment.

Admonitions

I.It is proper for Metaphysics to constitute its own object for itself: and to speculate the
constituted object.

This then should be the first concern, that before all things, an adequate object of
Metaphysics may be constituted, and the other, that the same may be accurately known.

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This one has singularly before others, this is common. For indeed all sciences speculate their
own objects, but none defines and assigns an object to itself.

For they depend on Metaphysics. But this, because it depends on no superior, itself
constitutes for itself an object, to which as to a foundation all things are recalled, which are
of Metaphysical consideration. Therefore, with the object having been constituted, it
contemplates all things, which pertain to the object, so that it may thoroughly and
adequately treat the object. Wherefore it ought to be so occupied around its object, that
first it may expound, what that most common concept may be, which is included intimately
in all things, which are true, and can be said about all things. Afterwards it speculates more
highly and inquires into the nature of its object, of Being as Being, into the attributes, which
are in Being, into those things finally which are found proximately indeterminately under
Being, and thus more accurately expounds all those things, which ought to be considered
around the evolution of the object.

II. Metaphysics contemplates the Nature of Being as Being, but hands down nothing
concerning the principles of Being.

Concerning that, many things can be disputed, and not a few things usefully taught, But,
what about the principles of Being? Since none are given. There is no cognition of non-
Being.

But Maccovius is absurd, who not only assigns External principles to Being but also internal.
External, the efficient God, because Being in general may depend on God, and the end,
which likewise he makes God. Internal, the essence, and besides that another, which
hitherto by no one of the Metaphysicians has rightly been named, which he confesses he is
able neither to name, nor to perceive the nature of it, nevertheless to be necessary, because
nothing is able to be composed from one principle. 1.1. Met. C. 2. & 3. All which things are
most absurd. For if Being which is the object of Metaphysics acknowledges God as efficient
and final cause, God himself also will have an efficient cause, or will be the efficient cause
and end of himself. The reason is, because Being here is considered most universally, and in
Metaphysics it is dealt with concerning such a Being, which comprehends all things under Its
scope, as Maccovius expressly confesses chap. 2. P. 5. Furthermore if Being, as such is
composed, from component principles, in what way will its disjunct affection be simplicity
and composition? Is simplicity an affection of composite Being? But Maccovius states the
affection of Being to be disjunct by which it is simple or composite, concerning which he
deals with c. 10. P. 76. He asserts, simplicity to be a mode of Being, through which Being is
said to be devoid of composition: either of all composition in the universe, just as God alone

55
is simple, or of some composition, just as a creature is simple. P.76. Thus therefore Being,
which is the object of Metaphysics, is composite, God also who is simply and absolutely
simple according to Maccovius will be composite, which is contradictory. Finally the essence
is not a principle of Being, accurately speaking, much less ought another unnamed principle
to be assigned to it, since Being is not principiated: but rather it prescind from principle, and
principiate. Confer also part. Special. Tract. 1. Cap. I...

III.The disjunct Attributes of Being are to be accurately discerned from the modes as it were
specific.

For those affect Being and are said Paronymically concerning Being.

The disjunct from the specific modes. These somehow include the very Essence intimately,
so that thence Being may be predicated Synonymically concerning them. Those are outside
the essence of that to which they are attributed, these pertain to the very essence itself,
those are expressed disjunctively concerning Being, yet in such a way that in a certain
respect they can be said concerning one and the same subject. These discretely set forth
Being, and divide it and as subalternately opposed never concur. Thus for example,
dependence denominates Being together with independence nor is it essential to any Being
in particular from a priority, nor does it simply repugn, that it be attributed in a certain
respect to that, which can also in another way be called independent: as finite substance is
dependent effectively, although it may be independent subjectively &c. But substance and
accident is concerning the essence of this or that Being in particular from a priority and is
predicated concerning them Being synonymically: and finally they are never able to concur,
in such a way that what are now substances, afterwards may be accidents ..etc

IV.The proximate Modes of Being in Metaphysics ought not to be neglected.

I call proximate Modes, which are immediately under Being, subsistence and inherence, and
what pertain thereto: provided that a difference not yet be added to Being, contracting the
same to a determinate quiddity. Thus around substance it descends into consideration of the
individual, of suppositum, of Person, around accidents it expounds in how many ways they
may affect substance &c.

V.It belongs to Metaphysics to propose all things.

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Which it performs not only by constituting classes of things; but also by presenting individual
things in their classes. For it is helpful to have the series and type of things, which the whole
universe has, in sight, and to survey with one intuition. That which is able to be of no
discipline except this most universal one. Thus in the universal all things are known by
cognition at least confused, general and common: and what individual things merit accurate,
distinct, special consideration can be segregated, and adjudicated to other disciplines. Which
things besides admit a diverse mode of considering can be indicated, and most well will be
able to be dismissed to their own sciences. But what things are not of that moment, so that
they may be subjected to the liberal disciplines or are not able to be referred to any
particular sciences, all those things either it will be enough to intuit in their own order.
Finally objects by this pact are constituted with no trouble, to which evidently all other
knowable things are to be recalled, lest any of these things which are able to be known be
omitted, but all things be proposed most distinctly. For it is not able to be said, how greatly it
matters that each thing be taught, and learned in its own seat: By which our mind may know
individual things, as far as it is able to be done, most ordinately.

VI.It belongs to Metaphysics to precognize the objects of inferior disciplines, and to assert
the disciplines themselves.

Two principal reasons. To two principal things are able to be recalled whatever things are of
the Metaphysical function. The first is to explain dexterously its Own Object. The other to
assign justly objects to the other disciplines. There it does what it is: Here, it constitutes,
what is to be done. That belongs to Metaphysics absolutely, while it contemplates Being as
Being: this relatively while it precognizes determinate Beings and moderates the disciplines.
Let us expedite both things, as follows: Maccovius treats in Metaphysics not only concerning
incomplete Being; but also concerning complete Being: and therefore after he had dealt with
substance and accident, as incomplete Being, he discusses concerning the complete
(proposition) lib. Metaph. Chap. 7. Which he makes either principle or principiate. And that
either immediate or first, or mediate, or what depends on the prior, which he assigns
threefold, definition, Axiom, Postulate, The Principiate he subdivides into contingent and
necessary. But indeed against \[τὸ πρέπον (to prepon)\] these things are dragged to
Metaphysics: seeing that it has for Object Being insofar as Being with Maccovius agreeing, of
which the affection according to him is One, The Species, are Substance and Accident. By
what right therefore is complete Being dragged here, since the object ought to be stated as
incomplete! Is the complete contained under the incomplete? Add that concerning
principles it comes to be discussed elsewhere, than in Metaphysics, which now uses first
principles, so that thence it may deduce the most universal Conclusions. But the First
principles pertain to the Habit of Intelligence, which is commonly therefore called the Habit
of principles. Alstedius makes a peculiar discipline \[πρὸ πάσης (pro pases)\] Philosophical

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Archeology. But there is no need of that, nor are disciplines to be multiplied beyond
necessity. But all confess this, that by direct treatment it must not be dealt with concerning
complete Being in Metaphysics, nor concerning propositions, since the nature of the object
of Metaphysics. Least of all permits that. But in what way it may pertain to Metaphysics, and
ought to be treated there, part. Gen. Metaph. Tract. Pr. C. 4. Th. 4. Will be taught. But
concerning the complex principle it will be dealt with tr. 2. Part. Gen. C. 14. Th. 1. Maccovius
besides refers to the direct treatment of Metaphysics the cognate of Being, which he calls
Being of reason or intentional, to which he recalls the image, and the opposite of Being,
which is non-Being, either simply such, or according to something, as is privation concerning
which he deals with in the special part of Metaphysics But it is \[ἄτοπος (atopos)\]: because
Being of reason pertains rather to the nominal distinctions of Being, which is distinguished
\[συνωνύμως (synonymos)\] into real and of reason, concerning non-Being likewise it is
more rightly dealt with in the general part around the nominal distinction of Being into
positive and negative, as will be apparent there. But the image is a real Being, concerning
the nature of which it must be discussed around the less principal affections of Being, as will
be taught in its own place. But let these things suffice concerning the Proœmial things.
There follows the essential consideration of \[πρᾶξις (praxis)\].

PART ONE. GENERAL ONTOLOGY

Exhibiting Being in its highest abstraction and what pertains to it per se.

One ought to begin with the highest generalities where we remain within the bounds of the
same object; especially when special things cannot be known at all, or only with difficulty,
without prior knowledge of the general. This is the case here. For while remaining within the
limits of Being qua Being, the less abstract modes of being cannot be known unless the
highest abstraction of Being is first known: what falls under Being cannot be established
before it is established what Being itself is: particular beings may not be determined before
Being in general has been accurately unfolded. Since, therefore, the first part of ontology is
general, we also place it first: About to contemplate first Being in its highest abstraction,
insofar as it is separated from all inferiors and can be said of all.

Two things present themselves here to be expounded: namely, the most universal Nature of
Being, and the most common Attributes which belong to Being in general. So that it can be
established concerning Being, what it is that all things participate, and what are those things
which universally denominate the same. Concerning which in order.

GENERAL PART, FIRST TREATISE

Or Simple Theory of Being.

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I call it the simple Theory of Being, which contemplates the quidditative nature of Being
precisely in the abstract notion without any attribute and simply. Which is rightly placed
first. For it is the foundation of all the rest. Because all things must be brought back to Being,
and treated in relation to Being. Moreover, the very nature of Being cannot accurately be
established, unless it has first been known how Being is adequately constituted, or how it
ought to come under consideration. This is what I say: two things must be dealt with here,
first it must be foreknown what is meant by Being in the highest abstraction: Secondly, it
must be known what Being is under that aspect? For there the adequate constitution of the
object: here the abstract representation of the constituted; There it must be looked into
concerning the ὀνοματολογία [naming] of Being. Here concerning the πραγματολογία
[treatment]. The account of the Name shows how far one must ascend, so that the highest
concept may be had in which to stop. The declaration of the Thing teaches what is the
highest definition of the concept, what the nature: For what Aristotle bids presuppose as the
subject in disciplines, that does not prejudice our position elsewhere. For it ought to be
understood of particulars, which depend no less on their superiors in respect of the subject
than of the principles. But our Object depends on nothing. It acknowledges nothing superior.
Wherefore Metaphysics itself both constitutes and foreknows the same. Since it neither
receives it from another discipline nor is it established by the work of the senses. For it is the
highest and most remote from the senses. Hence it is no less needful to inquire into the
adequacy of the object of Metaphysics, than into its formal nature.

FIRST ARTICLE

Precognition of Being.

Many things must be expounded in this precognition. But before all the Name of Being must
be declared. Which being known, it will be possible to define without trouble in what way
our discipline here treats adequately of Being qua Being, since the whole matter depends on
the unfolding of the name.

SUBSECTION I.

Unfolding of the Name.

But concerning the name very many things present themselves. First indeed the nominal
description, what Being is by force of the Name! But then the various distinction of Being, in

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how many ways the name of Being is said and distinguished! Which, since they cannot be
expounded briefly in a distinct way, must be dealt with in order concerning each.

The nominal description of Being can be derived both from the very name of Being, and
from the relationship of the Name. There attention will have to be paid to the origin of the
name and to its signification. Here to the relationship of related names, partly by reason of
Etymology, partly by reason of what is signified. Concerning which in order

CHAPTER I.

Origin and signification of the name BEING.

I. Being is derived from I AM to express the τὸ ὄν [Being] of the Greeks.

Seneca openly confesses ep. 58 that he cannot render in Latin the τὸ ὄν of the Greeks. He
does indeed translate it as What is; But he judges that there is much difference between this
and that. Philosophers render it with the single word Being, forming a participle from the
verb Sum [I am] by analogy with the Greek word. But whoever spurns both this word formed
by ὀνοματοθεσίας [name-giving] rightly granted to Philosophers and now frequently used,
and other similar words

Which are very many in Metaphysics, as being less Ciceronian, let him abound in his own
judgment, but, if he meditates an emendation of terms, let him universally do this, that he
change all technical words received in use by whomsoever in disciplines, in faculties by all,
which seem less Latin to the purer and more elegant, and that the same be accepted by all
let him seek a universal privilege. We judge thus: In the appellations of common and vulgar
things one must speak with the common people; but in the terms of disciplines, by which
the nature and power of things is to be expressed only approved artificers must be followed,
the very truth of things. But Being a participle also passes into a noun: whence its diverse
signification, Nominal and Participial, concerning which in the distinction of Being.

II. Being is taken either adequately or inadequately.

Words have value by use as coins. This can be said especially of the diverse acceptation of
Being, which is manifold, because the name of Being is used by Philosophers ἁπλῶς [simply]
and almost never not employed. But it is taken either adequately or inadequately. In this

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latter way either less broadly or too strictly. Broadly in three ways. 1. Most generally for
everything concerning which something can be enunciated or which can be enunciated
concerning something, and that either precisely, whether the predication be affirmative or
negative: or strictly, so that it is only affirmative predication. The foundation of this broadest
signification is that all predication takes place by the substantive verb Is, whether explicitly
or implicitly, and it is impossible for something to be attributed to something, unless it be
conceived after the manner of Being: Being extends as broadly as predication. In this sense
4. Met. 1. Privations and negations are called Beings, add also Beings of reason and fictitious
ones because it is truly said The darkness was upon the face of the deep Gen. 1.2.
Bartimaeus is blind Mark. 10. 46. An idol is nothing 1 Cor. 8. 4. Purgatory is a Non-Being &c.
2. Less generally for everything which Obtains being whether in itself or in its causes and
thus extends itself to Beings in potency. For to these is attributed to be able to be: and
therefore they are called Beings not because they already are, but because they either will
be, or at least that they be does not imply [a contradiction]. Thus children are said to be in
the loins of their parents, while they do not yet actually exist, whence they consequently go
forth, when they begin to be actually. Thus Heb. 7. 10. Levi is said to have been in the loins
of Abraham, and v.7. to have come out of his loins. 3. Again Generally, for everything which
truly obtains positive and real being in the nature of things in whatever way, how also
created Beings, artificial ones, per accidens, and also modes of Being are included. But then
Being is taken too strictly either in the sense of perfection and κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν [par excellence],
or including imperfection. The former: when 1. It is attributed to God alone. For He alone
absolutely is, both on account of independent subsistence, by which He has Being from
Himself, and is His own Being, and the being of all others, He to Himself: He is to all, and
through this in a certain way He alone is, says Bernard. Both on account of lack of limits. For
that alone is, which is eternal, in temporals past things pass away, present things fly off,
future things do not yet come to be. God alone, because He is eternal, therefore simply is
Being, whence Plato in the Timaeus thinks that God alone properly is, but the other things
which arise, are changed & perish, are more truly not than are. Understand συγκριτικῶς
[comparatively] in relation to Him, who remains the same beyond. 2. To complete substance
alone excluding both accidents and prime matter. 3. Met. 2.

In the sense of imperfection Being is taken concretely for that only which has essence as
something diverse from itself, the foundation of which acceptation is the Grammatical
nature of the word, because it is a concrete. Hence God cannot be called a Being but is
rather αὐτοουσίως [essentially] abstract Essence itself.

The adequate acceptation of Being is for true real and positive essence itself as the object of
Metaph. Is constituted. But Being can be considered either Generally, as it embraces
everything which pertains to Being qua Being, or specially, as it is separated from affections
and proper modes. In which last signification it is contradistinguished from mode, which in
this way is not a Being, but something of Being, or Being itself modified, as presence,
dependence, are not Beings but modes of present, dependent Being.

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 Corollaries.

I. Being does not express a defect but an excellence.

For it is named from ESSE [TO BE], which recedes from Non-Being. But this is nothing other
than the highest defect: That therefore cannot import a defect: because the same cannot be
and not be at the same time. Hence the more something is a Being the more excellent also it
is, because it is the more elongated from defect and imperfection. God therefore is the most
excellent Being. Because He is maximally Being. But creatures do not attain to this
excellence, because any of them has more of Non-Being than of Being, as Plato says in the
Theaetetus: Thus man only has the being of man, but not the Being of Angel, heaven &c. But
God alone has the Being of all, eminently of course not formally, and to God nothing can
accrue which He did not have before. This is why He appropriates to Himself the name of
Being Apoc.1.4. Exod.3. 14. But the things which are outside God recede in a certain way
from Being, not because they are not, but because they can not Be, and be deprived of their
being.

II. Being is the most common of all names.

For in the broadest signification it embraces all things which have Being in whatever way.
Therefore there is nothing which cannot come under the name of Being, nay by this very
fact that it has Being, it is a Being. I say in whatever way: for I still speak of the commonness
at least of the Name, which as has been seen, extends to all things.

III. Being is transferred.

Because it is transferred from common use to Philosophical use. For commonly this or that
particular thing is called a Being, and it denotes a concrete. But in first Philosophy Being is
taken universally, cutting off this or that particular being and indicating Essence in the
abstract.

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The foundation therefore of this signification is the common acceptation of Being, by which
everything that is, is denominated.

CHAPTER II.

Etymological cognates of Being.

The Etymological relatives of Being are chiefly the following: Est, Esse; Entitas, Essentia;
Essentiale, Essentialiter: concerning which in this chapter.

I. Est [it is] and Esse [to be], are no less broad than the Name of Being itself.

For Being is named from Esse; and imports nothing other than id quod EST [that which IS].
Being therefore is attributed to all things which come under the name of Being, and EST is
said of all things. Besides, both are said equivocally: 1. Substantively ὑπαρκτικῶς
[existentially], as God is. 2. Copulatively συνδετικῶς: as God is omnipotent. 3. Servilely and
ἐμφατικῶς [emphatically] as God is in the heavens. In Rhetoric however 6.3 Reg. 3. He brings
forth yet another signification, by which it would be taken Tropically through Irony as 1. Cor.
4. 8. Now ye are full for ye are not. He adds: but the copula EST can ONLY sustain Irony,
because it alone can be put for its contrary is not, which is what happens in Irony: Although
we do not approve this, we nevertheless accept that he ingenuously confesses that the
copula can sustain no other trope, and thus contradicts to their face the men of his religion.
We unfold the equivocation of the word thus: But EST is used either within a Proposition, or
outside a proposition. Within a Proposition it either notes the agreement of the predicate
with the Subject, or the act of existing; The former Logicians call is of the third: the latter of
the second adjacent. There it copulates and joins those things which are the same either
κατ᾽ οὐσίαν [essentially], or essentially, or at least κατ᾽ ἄλλως [according to something else]
and existentially, that is by reason of the suppositum, or subject, and therefore συνδεσμός
[copulation] does not exclude, but is presupposed. Here is imported only existence, or
ὕπαρξιν [subsistence]. The Act of Being, whether absolutely, what a thing is, or with a
certain mode it is indicated, in what way or where it is? &c. Outside a proposition it likewise
infers the act of being. Except that sometimes it is employed in explications, as equivalent to
signifies: As when I ask: what is this? Or I explain this is, where I seek nothing other than
either to know what this means? Or to teach what this denotes, or to declare that which was
said before by significant words.

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It is clear from these that two significations of Est can be established, so that Est is taken
either ὑπαρκτικῶς [existentially] or substantially, or it expresses what a thing is, or what it is
in whatever way, say, either essentially or extra-essentially: or σημαντικῶς [significatively] or
σημειωτικῶς [indicatively], when it is employed in declarations and elucidations, and what
words signify is expounded. Other significations of this word do not occur.

The ESSE [TO BE] is taken generally or specially. Generally for the variety of proposition to
which it is attributed to everything which is truly either affirmed or denied of something.
Thus it corresponds to the broadest signification of Being, and is attributed to everything
which in any way Is. Here pertains the distinction of esse, that it is either true & real, or
diminished, as Scotus calls it, and possible, or known or objective, which is called diminished
by Thomists. The former is attributed to actual things consisting outside the fiction of the
intellect, so that all things which are in the nature of things are said to have true and real
Being. The latter to possibles: how creatures had from eternity diminished and possible
being. The latter to second intentions &c. Specially the Esse is taken for true, real actual and
positive Being. Of this various modes are wont to be set up: namely Being of Essence, which
is the very nature of things. 2. Of Existence, by which a thing is posited with its actuality. And
according to Flandrensis 4. Met. Q. 3. Art. 6.n.2. one absolute being, & universal or of the
whole nature, another particular or of this or that nature. And this is either substantial or
accidental.3. Of Subsistence, which belongs to substances and κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν [par excellence]
to suppositum or persons. 4. Of Inexistence such as is of all accidents, concerning which &
similar things more at length the most famous Wegerus p.m. in Met. Prelect. But The Esse is
not rarely opposed to Essence and more fully denotes Existing, as when it is a question of
composition from Essence & Esse. Similarly when the Esse is posited absolutely, it is wont
for the most part to infer Existence. Finally, a distinction is made between Esse as Quod
[what] and as Quo [by which] concerning which in Capreolus & others.

II. Entitas [Beingness] and Essentia [Essence] are sometimes taken as synonyms:
but sometimes they are contradistinguished from each other.

They are equivalent, when each expresses the Abstract of positive and real Being: Although
they are subject to the same equivocations as Being itself. Essence besides is said not only of
the very nature & quiddity of a thing, but also of state and condition: as when human
essence through the fall is said to be depraved, it is also wont to designate the counsels,
pursuits and character of men.

They are distinguished: For either 1. Entitas is taken more broadly, insofar as it is the abstract
of Being whatever kind it be, so that it may enter into a proposition, whereby Essence is
taken more strictly, as the abstract of real Being. Thus Gerhard. De Monte, & Combachius.

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Or 2. Entitas expresses only the most diminished mode of being, how the mode of a being is
called a certain Entitas, Essence denotes the very quiddity of a thing: Thus Scharffius. Or 3.
Entitas and Essence are so discriminated at least in corporeal substances, that although each
seems to imply both matter & form, yet essence is said to be more formal, Entitas more
material, because the ultimate complement of essential grades is form; but Entitas is said to
be as it were the quantity of Being, and therefore principally to infer matter the root of
quantity, as it seems to Eustachius de S. Paulo: Or IV. Finally Entitas is taken for the quiddity
of an integral whole or integrating part, insofar as they are considered under this integral
composition: And Essence for the quiddity of a Metaphysical essential whole: which is
common or proper Essence. In this sense we say that nothing can be added to or taken from
a thing, the species remaining invariate by reason of essence 8. Met. C. 3. Yet something can
be added to & taken from it by reason of Entitas the species not being varied. For integrating
parts can be changed, essential parts are immutable, as the species itself. Thus it is wont to
be commonly taken. Whence it is asked: what difference intercedes between Entitas &
Essence? Some want Entitas to be an intrinsic mode of Being; Others stand on the distinction
of reason (yet not fictive) therefore because there is a diverse mode of composition, from
genus & difference, & from integrating parts. But when they are interchanged with each
other, no distinction at all takes place. Some indeed want Essence to be the principle &
formal nature of Being, from which the transcendent affections of Being flow, so that
Essence can be said to be the principle of ἀποδείξεως [demonstration]. But although I
concede that Essence is an Etymological conjugate of Being, and an abstract only
grammatically, yet I do not admit that in the Metaphysical sense they differ as abstract &
concrete. Least of all that this discrimination intercedes, which is between principle &
principiate. Essence indeed is the nature of emanating affections, but in that way, in which
Being itself One does not attain its affections more properly than the other. Nay Essence
expresses nothing diverse from Being, but seems only to imply a certain habitude to those
things which proceed from Being. Therefore, it is commonly described as the first radical
principle of all properties & Operations which belong to a thing. From which it is clear: that
Essence is indeed the principle of the Emanation of affections: but it cannot be said to be
the constituted principle of Being. Αὐτόθεν! [Obviously!] For the principle is not the
principiate itself. But Being in Metaphysical usage is essence itself: And devoid of all
concretion. Since even those things which are proximately under Being must be considered
abstractly: And therefore Being itself cannot be a concrete. But a principiate cannot be
constituted from one constitutive principle. But what, I ask, will be named other than
essence, which adequately constitutes Being itself together with essence? Nothing indeed.
By no right therefore is essence established as the constitutive principle of Being. But far
more ineptly are essence & Being said to be really distinguished, as opposite species under
one genus, as Timplerus madly says not worthy of refutation. Being and Essence are not
distinguished really.

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 III. Essentiale [Essential] and essentialiter [Essentially] are wont to be said in many
ways.

The Essentiale considered absolutely in itself generally denotes that which pertains to a
thing either intrinsically, as something of the essence or the Essence itself; or extrinsically, as
a term is said to be essential to a relate, because a relate cannot be defined except in
relation to a term. In this signification it embraces all things which in some way at least
pertain to the essence of a thing: not only what is constitutive, whether a priori, but also
what is consecutive, or a posteriori is essential, not only what is included intimately in the
essence, as the potential of matter is said to be essential; but also what pertains to the
perfection of the same, as the potentials of the soul are essential: not only what constitutes
a thing absolutely, but also what pertains to the constitution of a thing under this or that
state. As every form intrinsically determining is said to be essential denominatively. As
original justice is essential to man not as such, but as he is considered in the state of
innocence. I say: intrinsically. For those things which extrinsically denominate a thing are not
easily said to be essential to a thing, except they are perhaps seen known by reason of the
thing seen, known &c. But Specially The essentiale is taken for that which is of the essence a
priori constitutively, intrinsically, simply and absolutely, how internal principles and
constitutive parts of a thing both Physical and Metaphysical are called essential. Respectively
essentiale is considered in relation to those terms to which it is contradistinguished. Which
we observe to happen variously.

Armandus de Bello visa notes from Augustine in divine names some are called essential, as
Substance, Goodness: others Personal, as Father, Son: others notional as Paternity, Filiation
&c. Of which it is predicated in Quid [What], that in Quis [Who], this in Quo [By which],
concerning which he treats at length tract. 8, ac 10. To 18. At other times Essentiale is
contradistinguished to reale; or also extraessentiale. For although res [thing] and Essence
are Synonymous, yet the usage of conjugates is different. But essentiale is wont to be
contradistinguished to reale, either in the explication of distinctions, or in attribution or
union. There essentiale is narrower than reale. For not every real distinction is essential,
although every essential distinction is real & true. Thus persons in the Holy Trinity are
distinguished really, but by no means essentially. But here reale is wont to denote veritatem
rei [truth of a thing], that a thing truly is what it is said to be; but essentiale also to import
the mode & special nature of attribution, that essentially through essence it is what it is said
to be. Thus we say that in the Holy Eucharist there is a real union of the body of Christ with
the blessed bread, yet by no means an essential one. God is said to have died realiter [really]
of course & realissime [most really], not however essentialiter [essentially], that is the
sacramental union is most true indeed & most real, God indeed most truly & most really
died; but neither is the body of Christ united to the Eucharistic bread through nature and

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essence, but through & on account of divine institution, nor does to die belong to God
through nature & essence but through ᾀδιοποΐας [taking of properties].

The Extraessentiale is opposed To Essentiale, when this designates what is of the essence of
a thing constituting intrinsically; that, what is not of the essence of a thing but outside it:
The former in Logic takes the notion of Synonyms the latter of Paronyms. It is also wont in
this sense to be opposed to accidentale. Although not quite adequately, unless it is rightly
explained.

Here I would like to bring in the explication of the terms Esse de Essentia [to be of the
Essence], esse extra essentiam [to be outside the essence] & esse per essentiam [to be
through the essence]. To be of the essence is said either generally everything which in
whatever way is essential: or specially, whatever is part of the essence whether
Metaphysical or Physical. Thus they are wont sometimes to distinguish between essentiale &
esse de essentia [being of the essence]. For not everything essential in whatever way is
strictly and specially of the essence. Hence to be outside the essence is said either broadly
everything which does not have a necessary connection with a thing, whether it be
considered absolutely, or in a certain state modified & respectively: how piety is outside the
essence of man, both absolutely & as learned &c. Or strictly, what does not enter into the
internal constitution of a thing, or is not part of the essence. As risibility is outside the
essence of man. In nearly the same way the terms are used: Esse de ratione [to be by reason
] & esse extra rationem rei [to be outside the reason of a thing]. To be of the reason of Being
is what pertains to the being of a thing & is contained within the concept of a thing. Outside
the reason of Being, which is not contained, or included in the concept of a thing. Thus
difference is said to be outside the reason of genus & vice versa, because in the concept of
genus it is not included, and therefore in the formal sense, insofar as genus is separated
from difference; not in the identitive sense: insofar as on the part of the thing it is identified
with it: For every determining is outside the reason of the determinable, to which it is
superadded.

Suarez distinguishes disp. 30. Sect. 5.n.8. between the Esse de Essentia [to be of the
Essence], & Esse in re idem cum essentia [to be in reality the same with the essence] or Esse
ipsam Essentiam [to be the Essence itself], and declares this by individual difference, which
in reality is not distinguished from the individual nature, and yet is not of the essence of the
same. He says that to be in reality the same with the essence, it suffices that in reality there
not be a distinction. But to be of the Essence it is required that the essence of a thing cannot
be fully constituted precisely by that which is said to be of the Essence & consequently, that
this very thing be so included in its nature, that in nothing can such an essence be found, in
which whatever is said to be of the Essence of such a Nature is not of its essence.

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Thus he wants the Essential attributes in divinis to be the same with the essence of God in re
[in reality] & of the essence of God, but the personal relations although in the thing itself
they are the essence of God, yet they are not of the essence of God, thus indeed the
essence of God is conceived fully constituted with the relations precisely, & any person taken
one by one is constituted fully & perfectly God through the same absolute essence without
the other relations. For relations are incommunicable.

Finally, to be through essence is said either by reason of attribution independently, or by

reason of intrinsic constitution. In the former way we say God is just, true &c. Through
essence, that is, from Himself through His own being and independently, because as He
Himself αὐτοουσίως [essentially] is, so without any dependence all attributes must be
claimed for Him. In the latter sense man is said to be rational through essence, i. E. Κατ᾽
αὐτοπρώτως [primarily] in the first mode of predication, as he is considered in his essence
apart from some addition. Whence it is clear that something can belong to a thing through
essence in the latter way, that is by reason of its nature, although the same does not belong
to it through essence in the former sense, that is independently originally.

From the explication of the preceding term it is clear in how many ways Essentially is said.
Briefly: It is said either by reason of agreement, when one thing is pronounced to agree with
another essentially; or by reason of dependence, when one thing is indicated to depend on
another essentially. But one thing is said to agree with another essentially, either when it is
of the essence of the same constitutively, as difference, e.g. rationality belongs essentially to
man & erudition to the erudite, & matter & form are of the essence & constitution of body,
or when at least consequently something pertains to the essence, as disciplinary capacity
belongs essentially to man, or when it is included in the formal concept of the same, as
Soncinas wants inherence aptitudinally to belong essentially to accident. Or when it is so
related, that without it the thing can neither be understood, as without term a relate, or be
thought to have perfect Being, as are potentials in the soul, and in this way according to
Bonavent. They are said to belong to it essentially, as can be seen in Castaneo distinct.p.37.
or finally when something belongs to a thing originally & independently. Thus God is said to
be good essentially & independently, a Creature participatively, dependently ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου ἀτου
[from another].

But one thing is said sometimes to depend on another essentially, either as on its
constitutive: Thus man depends essentially on rationality & rational soul: they call it formal
dependence: or as on a term; Thus relation essentially depends on a term: because a relate
cannot be conceived without order to a term, which is called objective dependence, or as on
a productive, as creatures depend essentially on the creator. i.e. dependence follows the
essence of creatures, as a property or mode affecting Being, whence it is called consequent
dependence.

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Finally, observe; It is one thing: For One to Be Essential; but another thing For One to Be
Essentially: Thus soul & body are one essential, yet they are by no means one Essentially i. E.
Indeed both constitute one essential, but they do not mutually constitute each other
essentially.

Corollaries.

I. Things which are said to be something, cannot be said to be Non-Being,

For contradictories are not true at the same time. Thus when the flesh of Christ is said to be
life-giving John. 6.51. by what impudence is it denied to be life-giving &c.

II. To be truly something, and to signify the same are ἀσύστατα [incoherent]

For to be and not to be, but only to signify are opposites. Thus these assertions cannot stand
together at the same time. The bread is the body of Christ; & the bread signifies the body of
Christ: the is of the proposition always presupposes a foundation συνδέσεως [of
connection], & is capable of every modification, because it is the most common term, as I
dispute elsewhere.

III. Everything which has Entitas, is a Being by its own Entitas.

Alex.de Ales.7.Met.t.5. If it be an alien Entitas, now also another Being will be constituted.
And therefore everything that is, must necessarily have its own Entitas. Vainly therefore is
feigned an Entitas & reality truly so called, which something has in its causes, although it is
still destitute of its own Entitas.

The same proceeds concerning any denomination of Being, so that whatever does not have
that from which it is denominated (neither from itself, nor from another, either by real
possession, or at least by true imputation) ought not to be denominated from it. Which is to
be opposed to those Calvinists: who say that the faithful children of the faithful are not by
their own, but by their parents’, i. E. By an alien faith, which nevertheless is not in them, nor
can be imputed to them. For whence will this fictitious imputation be proved?

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 IV. With Being posited essence cannot be denied, & reciprocally.

With essence denied Being itself cannot remain.

For essence is that through which Being is what it is: whence rightly Timpl. 1. Metap. C.5. No
Being can consist without its essence, neither absolute without absolute, nor respective
without respective. Which again is to be urged against those who number baptized infants
among the faithful, yet derogate faith from them, which is as if someone should say
Calvinists are erudite without erudition, men without humanity.

V. Of one Being there is one Essence.

E 6. Top.c.3. For if there were two or more essences, they could not fail to be plural Beings.
Each essence constitutes a Being, absolute an absolute, relate a relate, against Timplerian
ineptitudes.

VI. He who is ignorant of the essence of a thing, is ignorant both of it and of the
thing.

But as Essence is known either adequately or inadequately, either a priori or a posteriori, so

also the thing itself.

VII. Essential by reason of mode is not Essential to a thing simply.

For what is essential to a thing with a certain mode in a determinate state, with
reduplication taken, is not what simply belongs to Being in its quiddity abstractly considered.
Whence Flacians most wickedly infer that original sin, because it is essential to man as
infected with original sin, is essential to man simply. For to man as man it is entirely
accidental to be in the state of sin, although man as fallen, before regeneration, cannot not
be in the state of sin.

VIII. What is posterior to Being cannot be of the Essence of Being.

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For what is of the Essence, without it the thing cannot even be conceived. But who would
deny that what is prior can be conceived essentially, the posterior not being conceived
essentially. I cannot therefore marvel enough at that Anton. Sadael. L. De sacr. Mand. Corp.
Christ. C.7.obj. 14. Without quantity the human body cannot be understood, since it is
certain that quantity by nature is posterior to the human body. For it is an accident, which
certainly τῷ φύσει is posterior to substance.

IX. With the Essential denied a posteriori the very essence of the thing is not
immediately denied.

Because the posterior as it does not constitute the prior; so its negation does not
immediately take away that which is prior. For the abstract nature of a thing is understood
with those things cut off which follow the thing. Nay even outside the mind in the nature of
things the essence itself can be constituted, if maximally those things are denied which are
called essential a posteriori. Provided a real difference intercedes; as we shall teach
elsewhere.

X. What is said of something really, does not at once belong to the same essentially.

For the former only expresses the truth of attribution; but the latter intimates the mode &
special nature of attribution, which is Synonymic. Hence vice versa: With the essential
nature of attribution denied the truth of attribution ought not to be immediately denied.
Thus Bergius ineptly denies in Stereom.: that bread is properly & truly called the body of
Christ for this reason: that it is not the body of Christ through essence. In the same way I
would deny that Bergius is truly a Theologian, because he certainly is not a Theologian
through essence.

XI. What is of the nature of a thing, without it the thing cannot even be conceived.

It is clear from the mere declaration of the terms. Thus personality is not of the nature of
essence, because this can altogether be conceived without mention of the former.

XII. Not whatever is really the essence itself, is immediately of the essence.

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For it is one thing real or essential identity, another thing the proper formality of the thing
itself or essence. Thus Unity is really the Entitas itself, yet it is not of the essence or formal
nature of Being. Against the Photinians, who want person to be of the essence in divinis,
because person on the part of the thing is the essence itself. But yet the divine essence can
be considered absolutely apart from τρόπον ὑπάρξεως [mode of subsistence]. That
therefore does not constitute the essence itself.

XIII. Not everything which belongs to something essentially, also belongs to it

independently & originally.

For the former notes the intrinsic mode of having. The latter denies to it dependence on any
extrinsic. But something can have another essentially or intrinsically; although the same has
received it from elsewhere & extrinsically: thus of course the Essence itself or Nature of a
thing, from which the same flows, is from another and depends. Thus to the Word of God
belongs the power of converting, regenerating &c. Essentially, that is, intrinsically,
inseparably, necessarily and perpetually on account of θεοπνευστίαν [divine inspiration],
without which the word of God is not the word of God: although the same power the word
of God has from God Himself participatively & communicatively. Whence Dn. Mylius in
A.C.art.13.p.198 says it is an implanted power in the word of God, not naturally but by
reason of a supernatural principle, &c.

XIV. Whatever is from another is not immediately denied to be through essence what
it is.

It flows from the preceding. I only add an example: The Son of God has essence from the
Father through eternal generation, yet He is truly and is said to be αὐτοουσίως [essentially]
and through essence God, or as Dn. D. Gerhard speaks: Christ is truly and from Himself God,
but is not from Himself God in Exegesis of place 4. §. 67. For to be from Himself excludes all
communication, or procession from another. But to be from Himself is opposed to accidental
& unequal participation, which is most remote from that most holy mystery.

XV. Whatever truly belongs to a thing must be attributed to it either Essentially or

Extraessentially.

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It is certain from immediate opposition. For essentially is attributed to a thing what is of the
essence of the thing: But Extraessentially what although it can truly belong to a thing &
denominate it, yet is not of the essence, but outside the essence of the same. And therefore
this is true in the abstraction of Being. And this is the foundation of the whole Logical
doctrine concerning Synonymic & Paronymic predication. Since according to Biel, univocal is
what is predicated of some essentially, not importing something outside the nature of the
subject of which it is predicated. But Paronymic predication is said to be that in which
something of this kind is predicated of the subject, from which the subject is denominated
either on account of conjunction, or some other habitude, and yet is not of the essence of
the subject, but imports something outside the nature of the subject.

The Calvinists most wickedly abuse it. Thus Beza in resp. Margin. To Colleg. Mompelg. Obi.6.
to antith.s. Nothing can be said of the humanity of Christ, unless it either is essentially, or
accidentally & subjectively inheres in it. Thus others infer: if the Eucharistic bread is the body
of Christ properly, this is said of it either essentially, or accidentally; and by this very thing
they seek to cut the throat of orthodoxy, concerning the communication of properties in the
person of Christ, & concerning sacramental predications in the article concerning the Supper.
To the contrary: Not everything which denominates a thing belongs to the same
extraessentially, is immediately an accident inhering in the thing subjectively. For the
foundation of denomination can be either a union of substances, or another habitude. Thus
a body is called animate on account of the union of soul & body: The soul is outside the
essence of the body, yet does not inhere in it subjectively. God is denominated from creation
creator, on account of habitude to the creature, as it were to the effect: but not because
creation inheres in God accidentally &c.

CHAPTER III.

Synonymic Cognates of Being.

There were relatives of Being by reason of Etymology. There follow those which cherish
relationship with Being by reason of what is signified. They are called reciprocal Synonyms of
Being, which are converted with Being simply. For reciprocation is twofold: One in reality by
reason of Essence; the other by reason of Suppositum. In the former way Synonyms are
converted, which express the same Essence, and therefore are said to be simply converted.
In the latter way Attributes are converted, which are found in as many Supposita, as the
thing itself with which they are said to be converted. But the Synonymic Cognates of Being
either are equivalent to Being in every way: or are at least taken for Synonyms of Being in a
certain way; although they differ from Being in a certain respect arising from the imposition
of the word. The former are Res [Thing] & Aliquid [Something]; The latter Existence, Form,
Nature, Notion, Quiddity, Term. Which we shall see in order.

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 I. Res & Aliquid are equivalent to Being simply.

And that from the more than daily use of Philosophers, which has for foundation the
origination of the words. For each is commonly numbered among the Transcendentals. And
therefore either denominates Being, or signifies the same as Being. But that it does not
denominate is clear, because nothing of Res & Aliquid is implied which is not implied in
Being. And that Being is said to be Res or Aliquid abstractly, not Concretely, or at least
Paronymically, is most well-known. Avicenna indeed wants Res to be distinguished from
Being, because Res precisely expresses Essence, but Being the same together with Existence.
But Res is also wont to note that which Exists and Being can be taken precisely for that which
at least can be, but does not yet exist. Timplerus makes Being the genus of res: And Aliquid
the genus of Being. Most ineptly, as Dn.Jac. Martin. Demonstrates in Partit. Met. & Dn.
Scharf.in Theor. Transc. He therefore being dismissed we would like to examine the
Synonyms 1.

Concerning Res the Etymology occurs. But Res are said to be named from ratus, rata, ratum,
so that it notes firm & real Entitas: or from reor, reris, so that only a respect to the intellect is
imported, and it is noted what we can think. In that way it is said only of real Beings; in this
way also of beings of reason.

Whence the distinction between Res real and res of Reason. Or between Res which is
formally before the operation of the intellect, & which is only fundamentally, or, whose
nature is not before the operation of the mind in reality, except as to the foundation. 2.

Homonymy: Res is taken in various ways, equally as Being itself, as it either most generally
denotes everything which falls under a concept, or properly, what has Real Being, or most
strictly denotes infinite Being. And otherwise Res is opposed 1. To Narration among
Historians, who distinguish the truth of a thing from the truth of narration. 2. To Persons, &
facts among Rhetoricians, who say that praise & blame are either of things, or of persons, or
of facts. 3. To signified voice among Logicians, to whom every Theme is said to be either Res
or voice. 4. To Apparent & intentional among Physicists, who say that the Color of clouds is
intentional, not Real, And likewise of Species: as when they are said to be in the senses not
the Things themselves, but the Species of things. 5. To Hope in Sacred writings, where it
notes Present good, as hope regards future good: Thus we are said to be saved not in reality,
but in hope. 6. To Simulacrum, type, or shadow among Theologians, as when they say Christ
was immolated in the O. T. By reason of type, in the N. As to the Reality 7. Among
Metaphysicians it is opposed either to Being of Reason, or to that which is through the
fiction of the mind: or to Mode, and that either when Mode designates the state & condition
of Being, as most commonly we distinguish between Res & Mode of a Thing: or when by
Mode is understood something affecting, & as it were lastly determining the state & nature

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of existing of a thing, yet not adding a new proper Entitas, but only modifying the preexisting
one, as the Union of actual quantity with substance, Suarez Disp. Met. 7.f. 1.n. 17. Such a
distinction is between nature & suppositum. 3. The Conjugate or abstract of Res: Realitas.
Which indeed according to the first Scotist inventors of the word is distinguished from Res &
reale: But in the mind of most other Scholastics it is opposed to the mode of reality.

From Res it is distinguished as something less than res, so that it notes something
incomplete, or a part, or an affection of a thing. Hence they say that in one thing there are
plural realities, which they otherwise call formalities, as in man the Realities are to be of
substance, living, animal, rationality; of Being One, True, Good &c. A distinction is also wont
to be made between formal reality, subjective & objective. Formal is said to be any essential
grade of a thing, thence also called formality. Subjective Reality is everything which can be
contracted through any act: Thus Matter has its own reality, because it can be actuated by
form: likewise genus, because it can be contracted by Difference. Objective is that which can
be objected to the intellect: It is said to be known objective being, such as intentional Being
has. To the mode of reality is sometimes contradistinguished Reality itself, as when the
Scholastics distinguish in the article on the Trinity between the whole reality, & every mode
of reality, saying the whole reality of the Father is communicated to the Son, yet not
according to every mode of reality; for it is communicated only according to the absolute
mode, not the respective, since relations are mutually incommunicable.

Concerning the other Synonym of Being Something observe likewise 1. Its Origination. But
something is said either as if having some quiddity or something else The former
denomination denotes absolutely that which has Essence, and is opposed to non-Being. But
the latter has relation to another, and signifies either a disjunct affection of Being by which a
Being is denominated diverse from another, or a respect following from Unity, from which
flows diversity, and therefore division itself from another. But this latter derivation is not
attended to here. For thus it would not be a synonym of Being, but rather pertain to the
affections of Being. In the former however it is equivalent to Being. For Being is named from
Essence, Something from quiddity: But Essence and quiddity are Synonyms. Add the use of
Philosophers, and also the signification of the Greek word running back with Being. 2. The
relationship of the Name. Related to it are other, & otherness, and also someone &
something according to diverse Etymology. But other & otherness either signify generally
everything which in whatever way is diverse from another, whether according to thing, or
according to reason, whether essentially or accidentally. Thus whatever is not simply the
same, is said to be other, provided another and another concept is imported, as when I say;
One is other than Being &c. And thus otherness is either of opposition, or of disparation: or
of determinable & determinative: or of inclusion & indetermination, concerning which see
Castan: & let there be added otherness of sustaining & affecting &c. Or Specially as it infers
real division from another, which happens according to Essential attributes. In this way
Difference most properly is said to make other, but common & proper other. Difference
infers essential diversity, other only accidental: As on the contrary identity infers essential

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identity, likeness accidental; thus the Fathers say the glorious body will indeed be with this
mortal body like but not other. Or most strictly, as it imports division of one substance from
another, how accidents are not so much said to be something other, as to be of something.

It is also wont to be distinguished between other & another; Other expresses essence,
another suppositum & person, thus in the Triune God it is said there is ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος,
[another and another], not however ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο [other and other]. On the contrary in the
God-Man Christ it is said there is other, not however another & another.

Someone & something likewise differ. For someone is the same as some other one, &
imports otherness of Suppositum or person: But something is said as if some other what, &
infers otherness of quiddity or essence, concerning which vid. Armand.de Bello Visu tr. 1. C.
23.

Here refer the following terms 1. Ad aliquid πρὸς τι, which differs from aliquid or something
because this imports absolute essence, the former relative, & is equivalent to Relation,
whose being is to be to something. 2. Esse aliquid [To be something]. But something is either
truly on the part of the thing as animal is man: or fictively by reason of the mind combining
even without a foundation in reality, as mountain is golden &c. 3. Esse apud aliquem [To be
with someone], which is referred either to person, & signifies familiarity, so that it is the
same as to be with someone: or power, as when it is said with God not to be impossible
every Word: or recession to oneself from business, when someone is said to be with oneself,
when he is free from business, & enjoys quiet or it is referred to place both from which, and
to which: or conjointly it notes both Person & place, as to dine with the prince. 4. Esse
alicujus [To be of someone]: which is sometimes used absolutely & notes dominion, or
simple possession, or causality & author, or complacence, or familiarity, sometimes with
addition, concerning which see Dn. Kesler. Met. Photin.f.3.pr. 1.

II. Being with a certain respect to the act of being is called Existence, and likewise
form: With a certain respect to operation Nature: with respect to cognition
Notion, Quiddity, Term.

Let us see each one. 1. Existence, which here we take strictly not for subsistence, nor
abusively for the state & condition of a thing but properly, as it expresses actual Essence is
not the principle, or mode determining Being, but is equivalent to Being, yet so, that it infers
something which is not connoted by the word Essence, namely actuality, by which a thing
stands outside its causes, understand either positively, as it has emerged from causes, or
negatively, as it could not even be in causes; therefore it is called a synonym of being with
respect to the act of being. It is clear: Because it is converted with Being by that
reciprocation which is called by reason of Essence. For nothing can be said concerning being,

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insofar indeed as it constitutes the Object of Metaphysics, which cannot be said concerning
essence, & vice versa: For the object of Metaphysics must be constituted actual Being, since
abstract essence & precisely conceived, as it is in potency, is distinguished from actual
essence, as non-Being from Being according to Dn. Jacob. Mart.part. Met.l.2.f.3. n.15. But
existence & actual essence by reason of the same οὐσία are the same. For there is
absolutely nothing either of determinate Entitas, or having only the nature of mode, which
existence signifies besides actual essence. Further, Existence is Transcendent, which extends
itself as much to accidents, as to substances; it will therefore be said, either that it is a
Synonym of Being, or an affection of Being: But the latter cannot be said, for it neither
denominates Being extraessentially: nor is numbered either among Unity, or Disjunct
affections. It remains therefore that Existence is a Synonym of Being. Add, that also Dominus
Scheibl. L. 1. Met.c. 15. Par. 27. Acknowledges that Existence effects that a thing may truly
be a thing, & be drawn out from nothing. And Dominus Scharffius has for an axiom that of
Alexander ab ales; Essence never attains to the nature of Being, until it attains the being of
Existence Disp. 2. Theor. Trans. Ax. 13. But Existence according to Castaneo as Essence is
either Real which a Being has on the part of the thing existing outside causes: or Objective,
which is attributed to a thing, as it is known by the intellect. I omit other things.

Form, because it is that through which a thing is what it is, is equivalent to Being, but with
connotation of act.

Understand the form of the whole or Metaphysical, which is attributed to every being, as it
actually is, and therefore is either substantial or accidental: but not the form of the part or
Physical, since this is only the Constitutive principle of a natural Body. Hence Formality,
formal notion, according to form, formally. Formality, which either is every notion or concept
by which something is conceived, or denotes the essential grades of a thing, in which sense
it is also wont to be distinguished from form as a part from the whole; Thus humanity is the
form of man, animality & rationality are the formalities of man. Formality is also
distinguished from Reality, while this notes the essence of a thing, but the former also
implies the ultimate act of being; Thus in the generation of a mixed thing the corruption of
the elements is said to happen; As to the formalities, not the Realities. Formal notion notes
either the precise quiddity of a thing without material conditions, e.g. When I say: It is one
thing, what belongs to a thing simply as such under the formal notion, another what belongs
to a thing materially as such or such, as to Relation under the formal notion precisely
belongs τὸ πρὸς τί to be referred, or to be To. But that some Relations are also accidents, to
which also τὸ To be in must be attributed, this is not by reason of formal relation but is
proper to this relation namely accidental. Or it notes the ultimate actuality of a thing, which
determines Τὸ material or the common nature apt to be contracted & determined; Thus
Genus has the nature of matter, Specific Difference is called the formal notion. According to
Form to be is said, what is attributed to a thing in abstraction, or is included in the adequate
concept of a thing with accidents, extrinsic respects, & special conditions cut off thus
according to Substance formally is subsistence, prescinding from subsistence terminated in

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itself & dependent from elsewhere: But to stand under accidents is a special condition of
finite substance &c. Formally is variously taken, as it is opposed 1. Τῷ accidentally, as man
formally or quidditatively is a rational animal, or 2. Τῷ virtually or effectively thus the Sun is
not formally hot, but efficiently. Or 3.τῷ eminently: thus God contains in Himself all the
perfections of Created things not formally, but eminently. 4. Τῷ Identically, how a distinction
is wont to be made between the formal & identical sense, or 5. Finally Τῷ Materially, and
that variously, 1. By reason of diverse parts both Physical: thus some things belong to man
materially by reason of the Body, some formally by reason of the soul. Thus Analogically a
Syllogism is said to be good materially: And so forth whatever effect. And Metaphysical: thus
something can be represented either materially, as the Common or generic concept: or
formally, as the difference, & proper concept, 2. By reason of diverse consideration of the
same in abstraction, in Contraction: For what belongs to a thing precisely, this is attributed
to it formally: what contractedly, this materially.

Nature since it is the internal principle of operations. 6. Metap. C. 12. Is said to be any Being,
insofar as it has respect to proper operations: although otherwise it is said ambiguously, as
can be seen from 5. Met.c.4., For it is taken 1. Most Generally for everything which can be
explained by a certain description, as when I treat of the nature of privation, the nature of
Being by accident, the nature of Second intentions &c. 2. More Specially for Substantial
Essence, thus Accidents are not nature, but something of natures & natural. 3. For any cause
whether nature naturing, which is God, or nature natured, which is either Universal, or
particular, as Heaven, and other Physical things are called natures. Thence therefore
Specially it designates the author of nature; Or also the series of natural Causes; As when we
say something happens according to nature that is, the series of natural causes, & the course
of nature. 4. For Essence Composed from matter & form, or also for the very principles of
the composite, matter & form: thus matter in Physics is said to be the passive principle, form
the active. To Chemists nature is said to be Spirit, matter body, form soul, so that Spirit is the
medium binding these, concerning which in Physics. 5. For the ultimate Difference of a thing:
Thus humanity is the nature of man. 6. For proper accidents or properties, or also the
inclination, genius & singular disposition of something, both in a good and in a bad part, as
in that of Horace: You may expel nature with a pitchfork; Thus the nature of man after the
fall is to sin, to which pertains the special acceptation for temperament: Thus the Physician
is called the minister of nature. 9. For that which is in from the first nativity; Thus to
Ephes.2.3. we are said to be by nature children of wrath, thus diseases are said to be natural,
which are born with us. Principles are said to be implanted in us by nature, because they are
in us from birth, if not formally, at least virtually. Finally, nature is specially opposed to
person, as it notes essence absolutely contradistinguished to personality, or the mode
contracting Essence, thus in Christ there are two natures, One person &c.

Notion, since it expresses the very essence in respect to our cognition, extends as broadly as
Being itself. For it is wont to note the notion by which it is expressed in definition, which is ὁ
τί ἦν εἶναι λόγος [the formula of the essence] Otherwise this word is λήψις [an acceptation],

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denoting 1. Intransitively the intellect itself, or also the rational power. 2. The operation of
the mind either the most powerful argumentation: or probation, or ratiocination; Or also
διάνοιαν λογικήν [logical thought], or the method mode of treating, which is undertaken
with right reason: or finally all in general, as Cause is taken for effect, 3. Fiction of the mind
without foundation in reality, as when a Being of reason is said, or that which is feigned by
reason. 4. Depraved use of reason, as in that common saying: what is reason in Sacred things
except deliration? Or for the mode, & condition of something or also diverse consideration
of the same, thus most usually we say, the nature of this is one, of that another &c. Its
Cognates are not obscure, by reason, in reason, of reason, with reason, by reason. To be by
reason is said, what depends on our mind, either only feigning, or conceiving, concerning
which about Being of reason. In reason denotes that which exists in the mind Subjectively.
Of reason, what is contained in the concept & essence of a thing, to which is opposed that
which is outside the reason, concerning which before. With reason, what is undertaken or
carried out with the light of reason &c. By reason, that is, either in respect in general, or by
the judgment of the mind, or by the fiction of the intellect &c.

Quiddity is Being, insofar as it is objected to the intellect, & is expressed by definition: or as

it answers to the question What is. It is very often said τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι what the being was of a
thing, and therefore expresses either the nature & Essence of a thing, thus form is the
Quiddity of a thing, although some are wont to distinguish between essence & Quiddity, so
that the latter is the whole being of a thing, but the former the ultimate reality, according to
which something is constituted in its proper species: or the definition of a thing, explaining
its nature, as rational animal is the quiddity of man How Quidditatively is said in how many
ways, you will learn from Castaneo.

Term is taken equivalently to Being, importing only a respect to our cognition, which begins
from accidents, & is terminated in the Essence. Add that any thing terminates our intellect in
itself indeterminate, since it is in potency to all things. But otherwise it is taken 1. For
anything which can be known in whatever way 2. For a second notion, and that diversely, as
is known from Logic. 3. For a technical word, as term from which & to which, & what are
other significations.

Corollaries

I. One thing has one nature & vice versa, plural natures constitute plural things.

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Taking the terms strictly & in the same way. For thing & nature are synonyms by reason of
Being, Therefore also among themselves. Concerning the Photinian abuse of these
Theorems see Dn. Keslerus part. Gen. Met. Photin.sect.1.pr nc. 1. &2. ·.

II. Plural realities do not infer plural things.

Understand inadequate Realities, but not ultimate ones. For of one thing there is only one
ultimate reality or form. But according to the mode of abstracting plural inadequate
concepts are given in one thing, since diverse modes of conceiving do not immediately
import diversity of essence: Thus the same divine essence can be conceived under the
reality of Being, substance, spirit, independent. The ultimate concept only is adequate to the
essence itself: but the rest which are broader do not import another essence, but
inadequately establish the same.

III. Another is the name of person.

It is clear from the usage of speaking: For it infers diversity, and that not essential, as other,
but personal, by which one suppositum stands apart from another: Hence: those which are
related as another & another have diverse subsistence: thus when John.14. 16. Another
paraclete is promised, hypostatic otherness is rightly gathered thence.

IV. Another is he who is with someone: & another he with whom the former is.

It is clear from the former. For another is the name of person. When therefore one is said to
be with another, certainly the same person cannot be meant, if we speak properly. Hence it
is clear, when ὁ λόγος [the Word] God is said to have been with God Joh. 1. 1. That the
person of ὁ λόγος is one, & of God with whom ὁ λόγος was, another. But thence Socinus not
except sophistically infers that ὁ λόγος is not equally God, as the Father with whom ὁ λόγος
is said to have been; Personal distinction is inferred, not inequality of essence, which is
implied to be most simply the same by the very fact that it is also said θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος [the
Word was God] in the same place.

V. Everything which is, by this very fact that it is, cannot not exist.

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For existence is that by which first & formally essence is constituted in the latitude of
positive & real and also actual Being. And Essence constituted in act is Existence itself,
whence with Existence denied, it is impossible that the Essence itself be preserved: as
Keckermann errs most egregiously feigning the Essence of creatures from eternity before
Existence. The dogma of his Error was that he saw in sacred writings some things were
decreed from eternity concerning men to come into being only in time, whence he asserts
that we have essence from eternity, existence in time. Vid. Part. 1. Met. C.11. But what kind
of essence will it be? Created, or uncreated? If the latter, it is not a creature, but a creative
essence. If the former, it will indeed exist from eternity, since creation is terminated at
existence. And therefore we shall have creatures existing before they existed, created before
they were created. Those who object that real essences are attributed to creatures, even if
they do not exist, so that they may be distinguished from fictitious & impossible things,
exceedingly abuse the terms. It is fictitious, & an impossible real essence without existence,
since Τὸ real being does not belong to a thing which is through mere non-repugnance. And
the essence of a creature in potency is not said, except by extrinsic denomination from the
divine power, which infers no reality in the creatable.

VI. Every Being has its own existence.

For it has its own Essence constituted in act, which is existence itself. For a distinction must
be made between existence & Subsistence. Existence is of that which is outside causes, & is
indifferent to the mode of existing, by leaning on another as sustaining, or to the mode of
existing without something sustaining. But Subsistence is a determinate mode, limiting
existence to Τὸ existing per se without something sustaining: thus the human nature of
Christ in Christ has its own actual essence, or proper existence, but since it leans on the
divine nature, by which it is sustained, it is destitute of its own Subsistence. But that mode
by which it depends on another sustaining does not destroy its own existence, as neither
does the existence itself of the Son of God intrinsically constitute τὸ existing of the human
nature. Whence a distinction must be made between existence complete & terminated in its
own genus, & existence complete ultimately in the genus of Substance, so that to an
individual nature existence terminated in the genus of nature is not repugnant, which
nevertheless in the nature of Substance is not altogether complete, until it attains
Subsistence, concerning which in the special part. Hence it is inferred that existence is not
only of the whole, but also of the parts, and therefore is not always a simple Entitas, or
always composite, but such as the essence requires, & as this is total, nor is existence partial,
so it can be divided, as, the members have partial essence, therefore also existence. And not
only the subject obtains its own existence, but also the accidents which inhere in the
subject. Likewise also the modes of a thing, as they obtain their own being, diverse from the
being which the nature has which they modify, so also they obtain their own existence, as

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subsistence by reason of substantial nature. Timplerus also infers that not only singular
Beings, but also universals have their own existence. But he presupposes the false
hypothesis, namely that the essence of universals is distinct from the essence of particulars,
concerning which in its place.

VII. Of one Being there is only one existence.

It is clear from the identity of essence & existence. But it must be understood proportionally,
as namely a Being is one, whether simple or composite: so also its existence is one. But from
this it is not allowed to argue to the unity of subsistence, because this is a further mode of
existing Being, because it can be one or another with the same essence remaining.

VIII. Existence is the ultimate actuality of a thing.

Of course of Being qua Being, but not as affected in a special way. Ultimate is said by reason
of Essence, which it places in act: To Thomists first by reason of properties & operations, into
which it flows.

IX. Existence is not more perfect than essence, nor the latter than the former.

For they are ἁπλῶς [simply] the same. Whence the language of those must be corrected
who say more is required for existence than for essence. For the things which are required
for actual essence, the same and no other pertain to the existence of the same thing.
Timplerus produces the properties of man required for his existence, but ineptly. For they do
not constitute man, but follow him constituted: they do not make that he exist, but when he
exists, they emanate from his actual essence.

X. Existence is intrinsic to all things, & essential.

Nay, because it is plainly the same with essence, it cannot fail to belong essentially to things,
as they are, so that not even to Creatures is Existence Extraessential: For by that very fact
that Creatures are, they obtain actual being, and therefore cannot be destitute of existence,
which is essential to them insofar as they are creatures. Essential, I say, not that

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independently & through essence, or originally, as αὐτοουσίως [essentially] it belongs to
them, but that intimately, intrinsically without any adventitious respect it is included in the
essence itself, or rather is the essence itself. Existence indeed is accidental to the creature,
as it is objectively, but not as the creature is, or insofar as it is truly & positively, whence
συγκριτικῶς [comparatively] in relation to God, from whom creatures have being, both
Essence, & Existence is attributed to them at least accidentally, that is, dependently, & by
participation.

XI. With Existence communicated essence cannot fail to be communicated at the

same time.

For it is impossible that existence be without essence, since not even can it be conceived
that something be existence itself without actual essence, therefore with Existence
communicated nothing other than the Essence itself is communicated, and therefore with
subsistence communicated it cannot happen that the essence itself not be communicated,
as which subsistence itself subimplies. Thence it is most rightly concluded from the
communication of the subsistence of τοῦ λόγου [the Word] made to the humanity of Christ
to the communication of the divine nature itself under the hypostatic character of τοῦ
λόγου.

XII. Whatever is, is through form what it is.

Of course through the Metaphysical form, which is the very quiddity of the thing: For each
thing through its own essence has the act of being, and therefore also through form, as it
were, which is the essence itself with connotation of actuality.

XIII. What is of the material of a thing, that must not be inferred in the formal of the
same.

For what is of the species, as species, this is by no means included in the genus; thus the
material is related, as the special condition: The Formal, as the abstract & general nature;
and therefore what is of the former ought not to be inferred in the representation of the
latter. Thence it is that it is said concerning a term judgment should not be made, as it is
found in this or that Species, but according to that which it infers in the mode of abstraction.
For many things often belong to a term by reason of a certain subject, which in abstraction &

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proper concept ought not to be attributed to the same. Wherefore it is taught accurately in
the habit of intelligence: The material of things, conditions & real respects must be
discerned from the formal, or abstract & general nature. And it is one thing the abstract
quiddity of a thing, another thing the special condition & quality in a certain subject, and
neither should the latter be estimated from the former, nor the former be inferred from the
latter. In which the Photinians stumble, while what are accidents of Physical generation, or
also pertain to the nature of natural generation, ἀμεταθέτως [invariably] they infer in the
abstract definition of generation, & consequently require in the hyperphysical, &
transcending all nature generation of the Son of God.

XIV. A formal concept is to actuate & restrict the material, not to overturn it, or to be
repugnant to it.

I say the formal concept (in another sense) that is proper & adequate or specific, does not
oppose the material or generic & common, but limits it, restricts it, & with it intrinsically
constitutes the thing itself. It is clear: because the proper does not derogate from the
common, species does not take away genus, and therefore also the adequate concept is not
repugnant to the inadequate concept. Thus they sin, who with Trelcatius define baptism as a
Sacrament of the N. T. Consisting of the relation of sign & signified. For the formal to consist
in a bare τῷ πρὸς τι is simply repugnant to the Sacramental nature of the new covenant. I do
not adduce more.

XV. Nature as property, is not nature, as quiddity.

For it is one thing the quiddity of a thing, another thing the property flowing from the
quiddity. But each is wont to come under the name of nature, not observing which
homonymy Flacius seems to have fallen into error.

XVI. One thing, another notion.

For each thing has its own notion, since notion is the very definition & essence of a thing,
whence not even relations differing as thing & thing can have other than a diverse notion.

XVII. Quiddity is the very Essence of a thing.

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Τὸ τί ἦν is said to be the quiddity of a thing, which expresses the very what is, or essence, Yet
they are wont to distinguish between cognition of quiddity, & quidditative, indicating the
former, by which a thing is known confusedly inadequately & through concepts either only
negative or less distinct, so that at least something of the quiddity becomes known. Calling
the latter, by which a thing is known distinctly in proper concept according to the ultimate
difference & adequately, as when natural cognition of God is said to be Indeed of some or of
quiddity, yet not quidditative & adequate.

XVIII. Everything which is can terminate the intellect.

There is given a twofold relation of a thing to the intellect: the other essential to the divine
intellect, which the thing itself does not terminate, but by which it is terminated: The other
is accidental to the human intellect, which in itself indeterminate any thing can terminate.
For as it has knowable being, so it is not doubtful but that it can be apprehended by our
mind. But while this happens, the intellect is said to be terminated.

CHAPTER IV.

Nominal distinctions of Being

The name of Being has become known descriptively; now it must be known distinctively. But
here nominal distinctions of Being present themselves, both very many in number, & most
grave in weight, concerning which briefly in general, then in Species in this Chapter it must
be dealt with.

I. The distinctions of Being are certain special respects of Being most broadly taken,
employed by authors, partly corresponding to the diversity of Being by reason of
certain affections, partly immediately belonging to Being, as they intimate the
equivocation of Being.

Nominal distinctions are altogether given, since even those things which are truly not Beings
participate equivocally in the name of Being: but they can indeed, & ought to be expounded
somewhere, since at least through proportion Beings of reason, per accidens &c can be
understood. Although directly they do not have a seat in a certain discipline, yet insofar as

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they can be known indirectly, they pertain in actu signato [in the mode of signifying] to
Metaphysics, as in Exercise to other disciplines: And that therefore, because this is
maximally Universal, &, since it contemplates being it ought not altogether to neglect those
things which are Beings through proportionality, or rather apes of Beings, and that the more,
the more clearly the nature of Being becomes known from opposites. Nay not even can the
object be rightly constituted on account of the great variety of beings, unless these
distinctions having first been unfolded. But concerning them it ought to be dealt with in this
place before of course Being itself is constituted & constituted is defined, and that at least by
reduction, since through themselves they are not Knowable: for they altogether refuse
direct treatment, since they approach to the nature of non-Beings, and therefore neither
here nor elsewhere can they be treated directly. Since they are not properly divisions of
genus into species, or of thing into modes either affecting, or contracting for a species ought
to participate in the nature of genus, as also a mode: to these however the nature of real
Being is repugnant, & they agree only in name] But rather they are distinct definitions of an
equivocal name in its equivocates; therefore it is said in the definition that they are special
respects of Being most broadly taken, as it notes everything which is intelligible in some
way: Such nevertheless which are not feigned in vain, but either by Aristotle, or by other
authors of good note have been employed, & can be reduced partly to Being itself, as c.it is
said one being is in act, another in potency: partly to the affections of Being, as c.by reason
of Unity it is said one being is per se, another per accidens &c. The use therefore of these is
not only that the broadest distinctions may become known, but that our object may be
rightly constituted with equivocals removed, proper natures of it adduced, the concept of
Being may be formed the more exactly, that finally the nominal distinctions by reason of
affections may be accurately discriminated from the affections themselves, which is
especially necessary.

II. The first distinction of Being is into Positive & negative. The former has a positive
essence, the latter denies & takes away essence: And it is either purely negative,
or privative, which so differ, that the former expresses an altogether denial of a
thing, but the latter only the lack of a thing, or positive essence, in a subject apt
to receive the denied thing.

The foundation of the distinction is in 4. Met.c. 1. Where negations & privations are called
Beings, of course not by reality of essence but of predication & Agreement, since they can
be brought into predications, although in a certain common concept they do not truly &
really agree, and therefore only equivocally come under the name of Being. For positive
Being alone is true Being, which is said by others to have Essentially its properly due perfect
Essence: by others to note a form or habitude perfecting its subject. But neither does it
formally import perfection of being itself, nor can it adequately be defined as a perfecting

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form, but rather it only infers true Entitas posited & constituted in the nature of things, such
as all things have which are posited in act, both substances and accidents. Whence it is clear
that positive strictly taking imports a certain true Entitas, but not except εἰκονικῶς
[figuratively] is attributed to those things which remove & take away Entitas. Although
otherwise they are wont to distinguish between positive rigorously & strictly taken, as now
defined, & improperly & more broadly taken, as it extends itself also to those things which
formally express a defect & privation of Entitas, as when Theologians do not hesitate to call
original sin positive. But negative cannot be known except indirectly by oblique cognition,
because it has in itself no formal act, & therefore cannot scatter a proper Species, through
which it is directly represented to the intellect. It is known therefore through habitude to
positive removing it. But it can be taken either concretely, or abstractly: In this way it
expresses negation precisely: In that it implies something positive in the Subject material
signification: thus by the name of Blind not only is expressed the lack of sight, but is
connoted at the same time the animal in which such lack is found. But Scholastics distinguish
negation so that one denies only the Special act of essence, & leaves the general, another
takes away the act not only special, but also general. The former is called infinitating & of
the formal it notes negation of the term to which it is added: Of the material it connotes all
other things besides that term to which it is added, as Τὸ non man infinitantly taken besides
man, whom it denies, extends itself to everything which is, or is not, concerning which in
Logic: See first operations of the mind of the most famous Wegerus.sect. 1. C.10. The latter
is either purely denying, or depriving. Each can be considered either insofar as it removes
some essence, or as it is in a Subject through the mode of some positive form. In this way
they are truly non-Beings In that way however besides all fiction of the intellect they can
belong to things, & have their own Truth, although not without the operation of the mind
compounding, or dividing, yet without all fiction, and thence can be called real, not by
positing essence, but by truly (understand Logical Truth of predication) removing the same:
as Bartimaeus is truly Blind, man is truly non-horse. Negation can be founded in the intrinsic
nature of the subject, as the negation of hinnibility in the intrinsic difference of man: But
Privation has its foundation not in the intrinsic nature alone, but in some form, or added
condition, as the Blindness of Bartimaeus is founded not in his nature, but in another
condition excluding his sight. Whence the difference of each is not obscure, that they differ
of course by the distinction of the including & the included, so that negation expresses lack
precisely without aptitude of the subject: but privation at the same time subimplies the
aptitude of the subject, habit or power of receiving. Which is a difference, taking the term
broadly, essential not merely material: for although the subject with its aptitude is extrinsic
to privation, yet the order to such an apt subject is not extrinsic, but is especially intrinsic &
essential. Pure negation therefore is negation of a thing from an inept subject to receive it. It
is also wont to be called negative nothing, and non-Being. Which is said ambiguously:
properly they call non-Being that which is complex, concerning which the Logician, such as is
a false proposition: or incomplex, concerning which the Metaphysician, which is absolutely
non-Being, & has no mode of Being at all, as purgatory, chimera, non-Being. To which

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nevertheless Τὸ nihil [nothing] does not simply want to be equivalent according to Dn. Stahl.
Καταχρηστικῶς & improperly non-Being is taken, either 1. For the perishable, & that which is
not eternal, how all creatures are called non-Beings. Or 2. For that which has imperfect
being, as matter is called non-Being. Or 3. For that which does not subsist per se, in which
sense accidents are said to be in a certain way non-Beings. Privation is taken variously:
Actively it is the taking away of something, as when someone is said to deprive another of
goods: Passively, either improperly for the lack of form in any subject, even not capable:
either because it cannot receive form, except according to the most remote genus, as a
stone is called blind, because to see is not repugnant to substance. Or according to the
proximate genus, as when a mole is called blind, because sight ought to belong to an animal:
or indeed according to specific nature, but not according to definite time, as commonly a
Puppy before the ninth day is thought to be blind: or Properly for the absence of a thing in a
capable subject to receive it at the time defined by nature, and therefore for the lack of
form, which either already was, or ought to have been in a certain subject, as blindness
privation of sight. Whence it is defined by Damasc.c. 58. Dial. Στέρησίς ἐστι τῆς ἕξεως
ἀποβολή [privation is a casting off of habit]. It is called Logical privation, which is
distinguished from Physical (as commonly thought the absence of substantial form in matter
with aptitude to receive it), because the latter presupposes form, & follows it: The former
excludes form, whether which inhered before, or which ought to have been in. But
understand natural form, not accidental, either which is owed to the subject naturally, not
which belongs to it extrinsically, by adhering to it, or surrounding the same, of which sort are
the privations to be poor, naked, celibate &c. For these are only privations most improperly
so called, since every privation is of a thing implanted by nature 6. Top. C.3. Wherefore when
a form only extrinsic accidental not pertaining to the integrity of a thing, but merely
adventitious either as an ornament, or as a protection is taken away from a thing, it is an
improper privation. But that is properly privation, which expresses the lack of form inferring
essential perfection, whence not only is it denied nudely, but also violence is inferred. For
with the good pertaining to the natural perfection of the subject taken away, it is necessary
that the subject itself suffer a certain defect, if not utter destruction.

But since one privation is stronger than another, they distinguish between total & partial
privation. Total privation or perfect is of potency (not first, which they doubt whether can be
separated from the subject, but second, which they define by the disposition of organs)
which takes away both act & potency: partial, which only takes away act, but leaves potency.
Others say total privation takes away the whole essence of a thing, partial only according to
some grade. From the former they deny regress can be made to Entitas: although from the
latter not rarely it is given, as regress is given from some diseases to health, from death to
life naturally it is not given.

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 III. The second distinction of Being is into Real Being & Being of Reason. Real Being is
that which outside the fiction of the intellect truly obtains being. Being of
Reason, which does not have true being, except through the fiction of the mind.

The foundation of the distinction is that each in its own way has truth: either in nature, or in
our mind. The Reale is said ambiguously: For it is wont to be opposed to vocal, how real is
said to be a theme which is not a significative voice: or to modal, in which sense real is said
to be what is not a mode of a thing: or to Essential, insofar as Τὸ Reale respectively
expresses everything which truly has being, whether it constitutes the essence through the
mode of a part, or follows through the mode of an accident, or is united to a thing in some
other way, as erudition in man is indeed real, not essential: or to intentional, and that in a
twofold way. Either as real generally notes everything which has being in whatever way
outside the fiction of the mind, whether that being is truly posited in the nature of things, or
is at least truly removed from things, or finally at least does not imply a repugnance to being
posited in that way: in which way it also embraces privations & negations, since they belong
to things, even & our mind not feigning, as also beings in potency, as which can at some time
truly be, as it specially imports such an essence which is posited in the nature of things, and
therefore truly is before all fiction of the mind.

The Conjugate of Realis is the term Realiter, which merits a peculiar explication. But Τὸ
Realiter is wont to be contradistinguished besides 1. To that which is essentially, concerning
which above. 2. To effectively & virtually: thus the Sun is said to be present to us not really,
but only according to virtual operation. 3. To verbally, or what is according to saying only; Or
also which consists not so much in reality, as in words only. Thus the communication of
properties is said to happen really, not verbally. 4. To Objectively, which is also said not in
one way: For Objectively is either what is in Idea before the act of being in the divine
creative mind or human effective mind through similitude & representation: thus we are
said to have been before creation not really but objectively & ideally: thus a house is in the
mind of the artificer objectively, not really. Or what is in type or figure through presentation
& prefiguration: thus Christ as man was present in the O.T. only under types & shadows Or
what is in our either senses or minds through presentation & intentionally, whether outside
this presentation it already is in reality, or at least in Hope. In the former way notions or
symbols of things are said to be in our mind (or also in the senses) Objectively, not really. In
the latter sense Eternal Life is said to be in us by reason of ἀρραβῶνος [down payment] &
presentation &c. Here really is opposed to that which is through reason either conceiving
with a foundation presupposed in reality, or feigning without a foundation.

The description of real Being is of this place, insofar as it becomes known at least from Being
of reason opposed. For we do not yet descend to the πραγματολογίαν [treatment] of Being,
where the formal nature of Being (as it is the object of Metaphysics) must be inquired into. I
say therefore Real Being is that which does not have being only from our mind. Being of

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course true posited in nature, or which persists truly without fiction. Without fiction, I say,
not without operation of the mind: For real Being is not only what is outside the intellect, as
God angels, natural bodies & accidents, but also that which does not have being except
within the intellect, although it is not simply feigned by it, as first concepts or noemata,
scientific habiti; And therefore the very operation of the mind is real, because it is produced
by real emanation from a real cause: and it is in the mind really & subjectively. Whence
some distinguish between external & internal real Beings. It should be observed here that
Being in the mind, Being from the mind, being from the mind in the mind are distinct things.
In the mind are those things which are objected to the mind, so that they also have true
being outside the intellect: From the mind are either those which obtain no real being, &
depend solely on the operation of the mind or which according to the direction of the mind
having been produced to the outside obtain real being. From the mind & in the mind at the
same time are those which have the intellect both for efficient cause, & for receiving subject.
Commonly some things are said to be in the intellect Subjectively which are in it both really,
as they have true & real being in the intellect itself: and intentionally, as they are objected to
the intellect, as first notions, or concepts of things or intelligible species, habiti, potentials &
acts of understanding. Some things are said to be in the intellect Objectively consequently,
because they are not so much in the mind, as they follow the cognition of things, and
therefore depend entirely on reason, except that they presuppose a certain notion in reality,
from which our mind takes occasion for itself of feigning concepts of this kind. Therefore,
they have a purely intentional being, & outside the intention of the mind they are nothing,
as second notions. Finally, some things are said in that way to be in the mind Objectively,
because outside the mind indeed they obtain Real Being, but also the same as they are, are
objected to the intellect knowing, as are all things whatever are outside the intellect really,
insofar as they are objected to the intellect intentionally. Hence it can be clear what a Being
of reason is: of course Being of reason taken transitively is said in three ways 1. Subjectively,
which is in reason as in a subject of inherence as a potency, habit in the rational soul. 2.
Effectively what is made by reason, which also truly & really exists in the intellect, either
elicitively how speculations are from reason, & Practical cognitions, or directively, that which
is in the intellect only virtually & causally, how from reason are all artificial works, which are
formed according to the idea conceived in reason. Thus the whole of nature has its being
from Reason, or from Mind (divine). 3. Objectively, about which as object reason itself is
versed. But it can be objected to the intellect either what besides objective being also has
real being, either by subsistence or inherence either within the mind or outside the mind, or
finally by agreement, so that it truly belongs to a thing, although it is not a real form, as
privations, when they are objected to the intellect, or what outside that objective being is
not truly & really, either so as to subsist, or so as to inhere, or so as at least to truly belong to
a thing: To the former, Τὸ objective being is accidental, to the latter essential: The former is
truly outside the fiction of the intellect, the latter has being in a certain way at least through
the fiction of the intellect. The former is only conceived by reason: the latter simply feigned
by reason. The former they say to be in reason purely objectively: the latter objectively

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consequently. Although it is said more rightly that a fictive Being of reason is either in reason
objectively absolutely, as figments, which have no foundation in reality, as a golden
mountain, purgatory: or is in the intellect objectively consequently, as relations of reason,
second intentions &c. Thus to man insofar as he is objected to the mind, consequently is
attributed species, subject, major term minor &c.

In this place Being of reason is taken as it is opposed to Real Being, and therefore a Being of
reason is not that which is in the mind subjectively: for this has an essence apt to inhere,
acknowledges real causes & is endowed with its own affections, nor that which is from the
mind effectively; For to be an effect is an affection of real Being: nor that which is objectively
consequently in the intellect, since poetic figments, and other Beings of reason are, although
they do not follow a thing as it is objectively in the intellect under a certain habitude of
reason (for the intellect can combine most diverse things without any foundation in reality)
but formally a Being of reason is that which does not have true being except through the
fiction of the mind, or which has only objective being in the intellect, That is, which is indeed
represented to reason, but outside that representation is not given in nature, and therefore
which has being only in a concept representing a thing nowhere existing. Others thus: A
Being of reason is that which since it does not have entitas in itself, is nevertheless thought
by reason as a Being. Concerning the causes of a Being of reason through proportion the
Scholastics dispute many things, which we do not here repeat: see the erudite discourse of
the most famous D. M. Wolderus patron & honored friend disp.met. 4. Th. 23.

But (to touch on the division in a word) one Being of reason is said to have a foundation in
things, another is denied to have it: The former is feigned by the intellect, not because it is
founded on nothing at all at least in a certain way & according to parts, but because
according to itself as a whole it does not have what it supposes as a foundation, or to which
it corresponds through proportion. Thus when from here & there from nature parts are
taken, & contrary to the course of nature are disposed in the mind, by its work are united, as
in Cerebrus, chimera, goat-stag &c. The latter has only a complement from the intellect; But
in reality supposes some foundation, either by reason of the Mode of understanding
imperfectly; Or by reason of the thing to which it is attributed through non-repugnance: And
it is either positive or negative. Positive is said to be relation of reason. Negative either is
pure negation, or privation, as in the preceding Theorem. Of course not as they truly deny &
deprive, but insofar as they are conceived through the mode of something positive: as when
I attribute to a lion to be non-man, to air to be dark, to Bartimaeus to be blind, as something
positive, which can only happen through the work of reason. Suarez describes Relation of
reason, which the intellect feigns through the mode of an ordinated or referring form of one
thing to another, which in the thing itself is not ordinated or related, concerning the
conditions & divisions of which he treats disp. 4. Sect. 6. Where it can be seen, as also
Scheibl.c.ult.part. 1.Metap. The chief relations of reason are second intentions, which to
Cajetan are said to be those attentions of the intellect, by which in things presented to it it
intuits those things which belong to them from the invention of the intellect; Thus they are

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wont to call technical terms in Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric, concerning which we have said
some things Cap. I. Can. 8. Part.2. Gnostol.

IV. The third distinction of Being is into Being in act & in potency. In act is what
subsists through itself or obtains the act of being in itself & truly persists in the
nature of things. In Potency is what lacks the act of being, yet to receive it
through the power of the producing cause is not repugnant. It is also called
possible, to which is opposed impossible.

The foundation of this distinction is the dual acceptance of Being, by which it is taken either
nominally; insofar as it precisely says Being without implying actuality of being, or
participatively, by which it denotes existing essence. Thus, Being does not signify some
common concept to Being taken nominally and participatively, but immediately has a double
signification, which is either equivocal or very much approaches equivocation, according to
some translation founded on some proportionality, says Suárez very rightly in Disputation 2,
Section 2, no. 8. Hence he further disputes that Being, as it is signified in the force of the
name, can properly be divided into Being in act and Being in potency. And Being in act is the
same as Being taken participatively. We gladly allow that Being so generally taken can
comprise both Being in potency and Being in act under itself: Thus results this distinction of
the name: And we dare that, which has the power of potency. Mr. Jac. Mart. says in Exercise
of Metaphysics, Book 1, Exercise 3, Theory 6, just as in Book 1 of Metaphysics by Aristotle,
Being is divided into one and many, not indeed so that it is the same Being of multiplicity
and of being capable of unity, but because these are differences of the whole of Being, in the
same way, with Aristotle, act and potency, which Averroes in On the Soul, treatise 6, says are
very opposed differences, not to any species in particular, but we attribute to universal
Being, namely, whose species are analogically some in potency, some in act. This, I say, we
have accepted in the sense that, just as the division of Being into one and many is an
equivocal distinction (for many are not Being, except nominally), so the distinction of Being
into act and potency is merely nominal and equivocal: But not at all, as the common
Metaphysicians decree, to be counted among the disjoint affections of Being. For every
affection of Being materially includes Being itself, so much so, that what is not Being in itself
or rejects essence, cannot at all be considered an affection of Being. It is impossible for an
affection to contradict its subject, or to wholly deny the same. Since then, to be in potency is
the lack of true and positive being, it is wrongly established as its affection. But that Being in
potency is not truly Being will later be evidently proven: now briefly I declare both actual
and potential Being to be distinct. They are distinct to be act or potency, and to be action or
in act or in potency. By this, Being is denoted disjunctively, as either it actualizes, or can be
actuated. This proposes different states of Being, as it can exist by potential or does exist in
act. Being is understood in act and potency in three ways: 1. Of different Beings, one of

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which truly is and exists, the other can exist. 2. Of the same Being in different states, as it is
understood either to exist or to be in potency, before it exists. Or, 3. of the same Being in
different respects, as the same is considered under actual existence or even under the
possibility, which exists together with its existence; for while something exists, it can be: this
sense is improperly taken, and conceived in the actual itself potency to act. In this sense,
Being in potency denies existence, but as it posits sometime the same. Finally, Being says
simply non-repugnance to existence: & this sense of this place is, if indeed Being by potency
is said to us that, although deprived of the act of being, can exist without contradiction, and
so in potency are all things that can be made, whether they are in proximate or remote
potency, whether they already have causes so disposed that they can be produced by the
same, whether at least what they produce involves no contradiction. That is said to be
impossible, which simply cannot be made: because, if it were made, some contradiction
would be imported. Actual Being is ambiguous: For a thing can be understood to be in act. I.
Objectively, that is proposed to the intellect, as it can be made, or not opposing, which
involves no contradiction to be made, & this very improperly, is said to be in act. 2. As for its
quiddity or essence, whether its essential predicates are verified without actual existence.
Thus, always are those which are said by the reason of eternal truth in predication. 3.
Positively, of those which are constituted in the act of existence, either by a perpetual
reason of being, which takes place in incorruptibles, or by some succession of individuals,
either continuous or discontinuous, which yet in their time do not fail. In this way, man, lion,
horse always exists. This way the rose exists, namely in a defined time; for it does not fail in
spring regularly. We understand by Being in act that which exists, or placed in nature, is
constituted outside causes, emerged from the causes within which it previously existed
virtually, as creatures after being constituted by God in actual being, or as it simply rejects
causes, and never not obtains its existence, as the supremely actual Being, God, to whom it
is opposed to be in potentiality.

V. The fourth distinction is in Being as composite (complexum) and as non-

composite (incomplexum). The composite represents multiple concepts, the non-
composite represents a single concept.

Some things are said κατὰ συμπλοκήν (kata symplokēn, according to a conjunction) and
others ἄνευ συμπλοκήν (aneu symplokēn, without conjunction). The composite is further
divided: it can be either of aggregation, called Physical, which exists concretely, or of
enunciation, called Logical, consisting of two concepts. Although in Logic the composite is
taken in two ways: 1. Generally, for any combination of multiple things or concepts whether

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through enunciation or not, such as combination given in the first operation of the mind, as
in incomplete sentences, definitions, etc. 2. Specifically, for the combination found in the
second and third operations of the mind. This is said to be a combination in word and in
reality. However, Being through combination can also be as to word only, like a sentient
animated body, i.e., animal. The composite of aggregation is called Being per accidens,
which is said to be that which does not have a unity of essence: Is this accurate enough? It
will be examined around the doctrine of unity. Here it is noted Being per accidens is said 1.
in terms of cause, as a casual and fortuitous effect. 2. In terms of inhabitation and
inexistence, or adherence, where it exists contingently as foreign, or adheres per accidens,
as a man is a Philosopher per accidens, water is in a vase per accidens, etc. In word: that
which is attributed τυχόντως (tychontōs, fortuitously) to a thing either because of some
συνδύα (syndyia, coincidence) or because of some other relationship. The former is called
accidental in terms of manner or causality. The latter, accidental in terms of sameness or
predication. Here, Being per accidens is said in terms of οὐσίας (ousias, substance) or
aggregation, which is defined as having something foreign in its essence, and cannot be
referred to a certain Category. And such is either through concretion, as of accident with
subject, or through aggregation either ordered or disordered, like Philosophy, Republic, a
pile of wheat, or stones: opposed to it is per se being, which is said to be Being per se either
in terms of the agent, according to its intention and power, or in terms of Being, whether it
is solitary and without another, or has the ultimate actuality, or does not essentially have
being participated from another, or denotes one thing, to which is contrasted what is not
one, except per accidens. The non-composite then consists in that which obviously
represents one concept, and either διόλου (diolou, entirely) that which excludes all
composition, as transcendentals are; or καθ' αὑτό (kath' hautó, per se), which in its kind
excludes certain composition, namely with something foreign, or even rejecting
composition, maintains its simplicity, and can be placed in a certain Category, like all
predicamental concepts.

Corollaries

1. Whatever is said to be Being, it must have some relationship to true Being.

For the foundation of equivocal denomination must not be entirely absent.
Thus, what comes under the name of Being must have at least some
proportionality and comparison to truly said Being. E.g., privations and
negations are said to be Beings in terms of true attribution: Entities of reason
are certain quasi-images of real Entities: Those in potentiality can eventually
become Entities. Finally, Entities per accidens can, in their own way, be
reduced to Being per se.

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2. Equivocal denomination of Being is not participation in real Being. For even
Homonyms at least share the commonality of the name, not the quiddity of
the thing, from which it is clear that there cannot be some abstract and
common concept of Being with respect to those that come under the name
of Being, and when truth and reality are attributed to them, it is to be
understood as happening through equivocation and ἀμφιβολίαν
(amphibolian, ambiguity): Because, at least diminutively, they are Beings, but
properly speaking, they are not Beings.

3. Being and non-Being imply the primary contradiction. For to be and not to be
is the most manifest contradiction: in the strength of which all contradictions
have their force. Hence it is clear: between Being and non-Being there is no
middle. For contradiction implies immediacy.

4. Between Being and non-Being, there is infinite distance. Not positively

because of the infinity of one extreme, but negatively, because of the
immediate opposition, and the negation of all congruence. For in nothing do
Being and non-Being agree. It is mere ignorance to bring back to some
common concept Being and non-Being: Or to sustain them both in Logical
operation, which one Platonist and some Ramists have attempted: Both
bumping into primary principles.

5. There are no accidents of non-Being. I. Of that which is truly and completely

non-Being and under that consideration. For one must distinguish between
non-Being simply, and non-Being in a certain respect. To this refer future
Entities, past, privative, etc., which as they are in a certain respect, so they
have accidents in a certain respect. Thus, the Resurrection of the dead,
foreseen faith, death, etc., have their attributes, because they are in a certain
respect. Hence the Sophistic Calvinian argument, which concludes: faith is not
the cause of election because it was not from eternity; must be met by
distinguishing between the act of faith and its consideration. Or between
being actual and known. For even that which is in known being, at least, can
have some being at that time, even when it is not yet actual, due to cognition
or foresight. As that from eternity men were chosen, although they did not
have being from eternity, etc.

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6. Non-Being has no intrinsically denominating accidents, as if purgatory is not,
it is neither hot nor cold. However, denominating accidents can be attributed
to it extrinsically, from the actuality of the intellect, imagination, or appetite.
The faculties can exercise their acts even around non-existing things. It can be
known by the intellect and through imagination, and loved by the appetite
even what does not exist. Another matter is for the external senses, which
require objects actually existing and present. Others distinguish between real
and intentional accidents. Thus, the end, when not yet existing, moves
intentionally. And between true or fictitious accidents. Thus, when the
Chimera, the Solar Palace, purgatory is described by accidents. Where such
attributes are, such is the subject, that is, merely fictitious.

7. There is no knowledge of non-Being. Understand of non-Being through

composition or of a false proposition, as well as of non-Being simply; namely,
knowledge of it cannot be given.. Positively affirming, and per se directly.
However, knowledge of a false proposition, and of non-Being can be given
privatively, destructively, or per accidens & indirectly. Thus, in Physics, the
vacuum & infinity are destroyed, in Theology, the absolute decree of election,
etc. And at least indirectly, negative Being is known, by negation. Positive
essence.

8. What is not, cannot perish. Namely, as to cease to be: for it implies non-Being
to define being: yet, what is in potentiality can perish, so as not to follow
being, either simply or in a certain respect such or being, thus when a tree is
cut down, all its fruit, even which actually does not exist, is said to perish.
Similarly, a man guilty of the crime of lese-majesty, both he and all his
posterity, as yet not existing in the nature of things, are judged to be lost.
Scripture says that even the descendants of major sins participate, although
they do not actually exist. And truly, theologians assert the whole human race
perished in Adam as in the root, although it had not yet been. Perished, not
by losing what it actually had, but by losing what it could and should have
had. Perished not by actual destruction, but by the most certain guilt of
destruction. Perished not essentially, as if it no longer exists, or as if it never
began to exist from Adam's posterity, but accidentally, as it is not naturally
endowed with original sanctity and justice, which was destined and owed to
it, now when it actually exists. Hence, the trivial argument of Socinus that the

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 human race in no way perished in Adam, because at that time it truly was
not.

9. Privation presupposes a habit. It is related to the previous [corollary] and is

verified concerning subsequent or logical privation, not accidental or physical
privation. It presupposes a habit either de facto, as it was in the subject, or de
jure, as it should have been in existence. For it is said to be deprived of a form
or Entity, even that which is at least apt to have that form and does not have
it: thus, we call a man Blind, even if he never had sight but has been blind
from birth. Similarly, original sin in us is the privation of the original justice
that was due to exist, although none of us were endowed with it from the fall.
It receives light from that to which the habit is denied (namely, due to
suitability, not always due to real inherence); without it, privation cannot
apply.

10. There is no regression from privation to habit. Επί τῆς ἱερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως
ἀδύνατον εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι (Epi tēs hierēseōs kai tēs hexeos
adynaton eis allēla metabolēn genesthai, “Upon privation and habit, it is
impossible for a change into one another to occur”). This is true of the same
habit numerically, to which regression does not occur naturally, although it
may be possible by the power of the first agent and in a supernatural way, as
the resurrection of the dead teaches. For there is no contradiction in the
body, which perished, returning numerically the same. These terms do not
mutually negate each other, to perish and to return anew, that, with the
preservation of numerical identity. For neither by death do bodies simply
annihilate, nor by return are new ones created. Indeed, it is nature’s decree
that what once perished never returns numerically the same, because it
seems irrational. But God can also make what is naturally impossible, which
even Plato acknowledged, according to Augustine in “De Civitate Dei” (The
City of God), Book 2, Chapter 26. Concerning habit of the same species, it is
certain that it can be naturally restored, hence there is a natural regression
from it from a partial privation, which takes away the act but leaves the
potentiality, like from sleep to wakefulness, from night to day; although
nature does not allow regression from total privation, which also takes away
the potentiality: for without potentiality, return to act is not given except by
the power of Him who can restore potentiality, and consequently grant the
act. Such regression, therefore, is not immediate, but mediated, not physical,
but hyperphysical, like from blindness to sight, etc.

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11. Privation is malefic. Either joined with the corruption of the subject.
Understand about privation properly so-called, which is of a perfection
naturally due and intrinsic; without which or failing which, it cannot happen
without some violence being inflicted on the subject. True privation is either
beyond or against the nature of the thing, as it denotes the lack of what
naturally exists. But those privations that change nothing in the thing, but
denote the absence of something at least adventitious and extrinsic, are
improperly called privations. Hence it is evident that original sin, if it is only
the lack of a supernatural gift and extrinsic defect, such as original justice,
which the Scholastics designate by this title; is called a privation most
improperly: or if it is properly called a privation, as it indeed is, it necessarily
implies an injury to the intrinsic faculties and powers, not without violence. In
which sense the Orthodox say that it is not merely the absence of good, but
also the presence of evil. Understand not formally, as it is the lack of
perfection, but materially, as it is joined with the lack of natural perfection
significant corruption and depravity of the rational soul, by which all faculties
are corrupted and depraved.

12. Privation has no efficacy. Πᾶσα τέρησις ἀργόν ἐστι καὶ ἄπρακτον (Pasa terēsis
argon esti kai aprakton, “Every privation is inactive and ineffective”), a
statement of Plutarch in “De Primo Frigido”: understand that from such
privation no positive effect emanates: since the effect cannot exceed the
power of the cause: however, an act can be attributed to privation under
another consideration, e.g., consecutively, as one’s corruption is said to be
Another’s generation: or occasionally, as the demise of the Republic offers the
occasion for remedies. 2. Distinguish between simple and habitual privation:
The former denotes mere lack, the latter implies an underlying corrupt habit,
like original sin, which is described through habitual concupiscence, is
effective in our members in producing evil fruits. 3. Deficiency can follow
privation, if not effect, as disease follows fasting. 4. Even by moral causality, if
not by natural, as Christ’s death is said to be the meritorious cause of
salvation, although it is not a mere privation but encompasses all of Christ’s
obedience and eminently contributes to our salvation by divine designation,
as theologians say.
13. Every real being exists in nature. This distinguishes it from beings of reason;
hence, what does not exist in nature cannot be said to be a real being. Thus, a
rose in winter is not in nature, and therefore is not something real; But in

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 nature is considered everything that is constituted outside of nothingness and
persists in this universe. Conclude from this that purgatory is not something
real, but a fruitless figment of reason, because where can it be proven to exist
in the universe? Every real being is in nature.

14. . What has objective existence does not have real being. Understand this of
what has diminished and possible being, or in idea, as well as of what signifies
true being and prefigures as a shadow; thus, those are absurd who commune
the body of Christ as really present in the Old Testament, which then existed
under objective being (for if really, it is necessary that it was present to others
truly, before it truly existed, or as if it were truly, before it had the act of being
and emerged from causes), or in the category of things that are present to
faith intentionally, they feign to be present really, and what is said to be
present by representation and signification equivocally, they dare to assert
are present truly and really: these indeed I will believe to be true, when
shadow has been demonstrated to be body, intentionals to be real, fictitious
to be true.

15. It is not contradictory to attribute real predicates to a being in potentiality.

For these demand at least the truth of attribution, not the actuality of being.
Hence, essential attributes belong to a being disregarding act and
potentiality; indeed, even those that are certain to follow the thing when it
achieves actual existence are usually claimed for it even under considered
potential being; thus, the lamb is said to have been slain from the foundation
of the world because of the certainty, although the same also is understood
of its efficacy, strength, etc.

16. To a being in potentiality as such, a real operation cannot be attributed.

Because it implies a contradiction to be in potentiality and to operate. Thus,
absurdly and contradictorily, some Reformers teach that infants are saved
through potential faith or what exists solely in potentiality. Conversely: such
faith, either as it is under potentiality, apprehends Christ’s justice, or as it is
foreseen or even predestined, that which actually will be thereafter. If the
former: there is manifest absurdity, that which is in potentiality as such to
operate actually or to apprehend something and embrace it: If the latter, then
certainly it apprehends either actually or in potentiality. If in potentiality at

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 least, then infants are also justified only in potentiality: For as is the
apprehension of Christ’s justice, so is the justification. If it apprehends
actually, then certainly faith to be generated at some point before it becomes,
actually apprehends, which is absurd. Calvinists abuse this corollary when
they deny faith to be the cause of election, because foreseen faith at least
exists in potentiality. But by the same reasoning, foreseen faith would also be
denied as the cause of salvation or the decree of saving, and foreseen
unbelief denied as the cause of reprobation and damnation. Therefore, it
should be noted that a being in potentiality, as such, cannot be a cause in
terms of real influx: yet, it can, in terms of moral causality: just as misery κατ’
ἄξιον (kat’ axion, according to worth) can be said to be a cause in some way,
and externally incites mercy in eternal election. Add that when faith as in
potentiality is said to be the cause of election, real operation is not attributed:
but faith as foreseen is said to be only that, in view of which God decided to
save men, not as it exists under objective being, but as it will agree in reality
with believing men, and thus in them will be the means of apprehending
Christ’s justice and obtaining eternal salvation.

17. There is no knowledge of a being per accidens. That is, which occurrences
happen by reason of cause, do not fall under knowledge. As causal and
fortuitous, this or that in exercise, knowledge. For to know is to recognize
something through its cause. But what is predicated ἐν τύχῃ (en tychē, by
chance) due to the subject, is not excluded from sciences, as accidental
attributes, especially those which are said of the subject per accidens or
παρωνύμως (parōnymōs, derivatively) but necessarily, such as some consider
to be proper; finally, what exists per accidens, by reason of συμβεβηκός
(symbebēkós, accident ), about these knowledge is given, when specifically,
and at least indirectly, as sometimes actively, partly insofar as they are
referred back to being per se; partly as they are considered under that
concretion, where they become the objects of subalternate sciences; Thus,
Music claims the number of sounds, Optics the visual line, Statics the heavy
body for itself. Otherwise, when beings per accidens present themselves in
disciplines as concrete and through aggregation, they are to be resolved into
the concepts by which they are constituted, and thus to be known.

SUBSECTION II.

Designation of the Object.

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It remains that we define in what way Being is taken here, the Description & Attributes of
which are to be investigated next. For neither will it be allowed to establish the abstract
nature of Being accurately, nor to expedite the consideration of the Affections, unless the
equivocals having been dismissed & the signification having been constituted adequately,
concerning which the following will deal.

CHAPTER V.

Adequate constitution of Being.

We proceed through ἄρσις [denial] to θέσις [affirmation]; But in the fewest words.

I.Being, as the Object of Metaphysics, cannot be accepted in generality so general that it

extends itself to privations, negations, Beings of reason, in potency & complex.

It is proved from the nature of the object: which is the common concept really & truly
participated by those which it embraces under itself. But it is not allowed to abstract a
certain common concept from the aforesaid: Since they do not accede to Entitas, but rather
recede from it: They are not truly Beings, but truly deny or feign entitas, or do not yet have
it, but at least can have it &c. They cannot be reduced to one formal nature with positive
real, actual, incomplex Being, since that most broad signification establishes nothing certain
for our mind, but rather distracts it here & there.

From the consideration of the Transcendent affections, for they are such that they by no
means allow themselves to be reduced to an object of this kind. But the object follows the
nature of the affections: & attributes do not contradict the object, but affect the same. But
see, whether negative Beings are perfect? Or privations good? Whether fictive Beings of
reason are true? Whether those which are in potency can come under the name of cause or
caused? Whether complex Beings finally obtain unity?

From the modes as it were contracting: For the object ought to be exhausted by those things
which contract the object. But Substance & accident do not exhaust that latitude of Being as
it most generally extends, as has been said. For to what class will negations & privations be
referred? They do not have a Subject of inherence, although a subject of attribution is not
denied to them. Where will Beings of reason look? Indeed they are not within except the
intellect, yet they are not subjectively in the intellect. Therefore they have properly no

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Subject. But what concerning Being in potency? Will it be substance? And thus subsist
through itself; Therefore it will persist in nature, which must be said ἀναφανδόν
[impossible], not to be said that it inexists: For inexistence subimplies existence which
cannot be said of Being in potency. It remains therefore that the object of Metaphysics
neither can, nor ought to be accepted under that generality. Which is further clear in species
considering each one which comes under the name of Being in that latitude. For it appears
that they are said to be Beings only by name alone; But they do not participate in the nature
of essence. For the negative takes away & denies essence, & is infinitely distant from Being,
and is plainly non-Being, Privation however formally expresses the lack of essence, and
therefore imports the defect of essence, although by reason of the subject it materially
connotes the aptitude of receiving: which nevertheless does not make privation to be truly
Being. The figments of reason & second intentions do not truly have essence, but only are
conceived to have. For that reason they are Beings of reason. The same must be established
concerning Being in potency For that in itself has no reality, which however it is said to have
in its causes, that does not constitute Being in potency intrinsically. For causes are External.
And everything which is, has its being intrinsically & essentially. And each thing has its own
essence, through which it is what it is. But what is that proper being, which Being in potency
has? Remove the power of the cause, what will Being in potency be in itself? Besides: The
Reality which an Agent has, that it may produce that which can be made by it, is the power
and faculty of the agent itself, but is not the reality of that which can become. And therefore
it does not absolve Being per se; Much less does it constitute potential Being. From the
faculty of acting that is denominated which can act, not what is possible. E.g. The Faculty of
generating is proper to that which actually is by which it is denominated to be able to
generate, and it is an accident in it (I declare the thing by a natural example) τὸ to be able to
be generated or to be produced through generation is of that which is said to be in potency,
and posits nothing of reality. Is it to be said that Τὸ generable has its entitas through the
reality & power of generation? That which is not in act will be intrinsically constituted
through that which is in act! An accident in act will be the reality of a substance in potency?
Further possibility is said through only extrinsic denomination from the agent & non-
repugnance on the part of the possible thing belonging to the same, and therefore they do
not posit true Entitas in it, which Metaphysicians commonly urge against the reality of
objective potency whether Scotistic, or fictitious. If therefore that potency is not real, how
will that which is in potency be able to be real? For as from act or actuality something is said
to be in act, so from potency it is said to be in potency. For Τὸ to be in potency is the
denomination of that which does not yet exist, but has objective potency or of non-
repugnance to existing. Although otherwise the distinction of Hurtado is not displeasing, by
which he says it is one thing for a thing to have potency to existing, another to be in potency
to existing. For he understands the former concerning an existing thing, which exercises
potency: since it is not destroyed but perfected through act: but the latter he takes with
aptitude to existing & lack of existing. But to have objective potency to existing is the same
as to be in potency. That therefore since it is non-Being, & this will be non-Being. For from a

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non-Being that cannot be denominated which truly is Being. Truly therefore Dn. Scharff.
Disput.9. Th.30. th. Tranf. Being in potency is that which is not yet truly, but can be. And
thes.33. Act is an affection of Being, by which it is denominated to be in act, which of course
is outside nothing & truly exists outside causes: Whence anyone can gather that what is not
in act is not outside nothing, and therefore that potency is not an affection of Being, & this is
what Dn. Gutke says th. 36, contempl. Metaph. II. Potency (which is opposed to Entitative
Act) is bare objective potency, which is called the bare term of the action in the power of the
agent, although it is attributed to that which in itself is nothing. And further: Every Being is
an Entitative act & posited outside nothing. Whence he rightly collects that the imaginary
potency of Scotus is not an affection of Being. But concerning Being in potency he says it can
still be doubted whether any Being is given which is at least in potency? Nay rather that it is
no longer to be doubted, that potential Being is truly non-Being, those things which have
been said persuade. The only thing I add: To be in potency is said both by reason of creation,
& generation, & emanation & effection.

By reason of creation what can be produced from nothing, as creatures before they were.
Which it is certain were nothing before creation. For otherwise they would not be created,
but transmuted from one being into another being, or drawn from real being of essence to
real being of existence. For creation is the production of Being from nothing: or the calling of
that which is not, that it may be. But what already has reality before it is created, that is not
nothing. By reason of generation is called possible what can be generated: But that before
generation does not have being, although the causes are disposed to generating. For the
effect does not follow causes although maximally disposed, unless they are posited in act.
But the act of generation being posited that bare potency is no longer. By reason of
emanation Accidents & properties or immanent acts can be called possible, which to be
before they emanate, & receive being is said as absurdly as for something to truly be
(concerning those things which can become) before it becomes. By reason of effection all
makeable things are called possible. Which if they truly are before they are produced, &
obtain real being in their causes (either in power or habit) there is no reason why artificers
either apply their hand to the work or labor at all. But of these enough.

Finally To complex & per accidens does not so much express Being as Beings; Therefore, just
as it does not participate unity, except equivocally at least, so neither Entitas.

II.Being, which is here to be considered, is positive, real, actual, incomplex Being.

This is left from the preceding theorem. For those things having been removed which are
truly not Beings, those remain which are truly Beings. Therefore those are to be dismissed:
since they have been considered only indirectly for the sake of the adequate constitution of
the object. But these remain. And thus a common concept will have to be abstracted from

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these only which have positive real actual, &c. Being, & consequently also their attributes
only are to be investigated which belong transcendentally to all those; And it is confirmed
that no more common real concept abstracted from these which truly are is given, insofar as
they are, which can be adequate to our discipline. And thus it is clear Being qua Being how
far it extends itself & how broadly it extends.

Corollaries.

I. What is not Being per se, that is not intelligible per se.

῾Ως γὰρ ἓκαστον ἒχει τοῦ εἶναι ὃυτω καὶ τῆς γνώσεως [As each thing is related to being, so
also to knowledge] 2. Met. C. U. Whatever therefore is not per se κατ᾽ οὐσίαν [according to
essence] but only through habitude to Being, or κατ᾽ ἄλλως [according to something else],
that also ought not to be known per se, because it cannot. Whence it is clear why
concerning negations, Beings of reason, complexes, potentials in Metaphysics it is not dealt
with directly & per se.

II. Those which are said to be equivocally, are denominated by transcendent

affections only equivocally.

For as the Subject, so the attributes. Thus to negations & privations goodness or perfection
cannot be attributed, except through mere equivocation. Hence vicious acts, because
formally they are ἀνομία [lawlessness], do not enjoy transcendental goodness, nor
acknowledge an efficient cause, but a deficient one, nor have the nature of an end, but
deviate from the end &c. Thus to second Notions causes are assigned through
proportionality, as also to figments of reason affections are wont to be attributed. Beings in
potency, as such, as they do not have Entitas, so neither do they participate in those things
which belong to Being per se. Therefore absurdly through potential faith some of the
Reformed assert infants are saved, lest they be compelled to attribute to them actual faith,
which reason in no way perceives. Of course faith in potency, which nevertheless is truly
non-Being, will be the organ apprehending salvation: That which is not in act, will apprehend
in act: and it will be the cause of actual justification: or if they do not want this: it will at
least apprehend in potency and therefore infants will be saved only in potency Similarly
whatever affections will have been attributed to complex Beings & per accidens, let them be
thought to have been attributed to them only equivocally, namely as such: for insofar as
they are revoked to unity, they are understood to have Entitas, and therefore also those

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things which follow Entitas, as the Church is one through aggregation by mystical spiritual
union, under which it is considered, & is called holy, catholic &c. And so in others.

III. The more express modes of Being do not pertain to those which are said to be
Beings equivocally.

The cause is ready at hand: because they represent Being, as it is the object of Metaphysics,
not as it is taken most generally, so that it also embraces those things which truly are not.
Thus privations are not properly said to inhere (since inexistence is of that only which
obtains positive being) still less to subsist per se; Whence it is altogether absurd to call
Original sin a substance, since it does not even participate the formal nature of Accident (in
the strict sense of positive of course & true, which is denominated by the transcendent
affections, goodness, perfection, &c.) but rather is from the class of privations. Similarly
when proponents of subtle arguments say that the flesh of Christ was really present &
exhibited by a real act to the Fathers in the O. T.: it is mere ὁμωνυμία [equivocation] &
sophistry unworthy of the divine mysteries. For what real subsistence? What real exhibition
of that which does not yet exist in reality? Since the flesh of Christ in the O. T. Was not yet by
a real act. But whatever does not yet exist by a real act, that cannot be exhibited by a real
act, nor be really present: unless someone wishes to establish absurdly & through
implication of contradiction Real Accidents of a non-Being (NB real not intentional, which
two the Calvinists confound in this question, which I wish to be noted) & thus an accident
without a subject: these are the words of the great Theologian & Philosopher Dn. D.
Graverus, on absurdities chap. 3.§. 36. And so concerning the rest of the Beings of reason,
per Accidens, possibles: which since they are not truly Beings strictly speaking, are neither
Substance, nor Accidents, and therefore subsistence & inexistence is attributed to them only
by analogy. Thus Objective potency neither subsists through itself, which is said to exist in
the most imperfect way: nor properly inheres: for thus it would be the potency of Sustention
&c.

IV. Potency is a name of imperfection.

Understand concerning objective potency, which denies the act of existing, for as existence
is perfection, so its lack is imperfection. From which it follows that objective potency is not
to be attributed to God in any way, since this imperfection, the lack of the act of being, is
absolutely repugnant to God. For a possible God is not God. Gather further from this, since
the potency of generating is attributed to the Father, & τὸ to be able to be begotten to the
Son in divinity, that imaginary objective potency is not to be conceived, which excludes act,

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as if the Son of God was under possible being, & the Father obtained potency first, before
He deduced it into act: Let these imperfections be most alien from the most pure act: but
potency ought to be conceived as most highly actual, and that through ἀναλογίαν [analogy],
in a most eminent way & one agreeing with this mystery, which must be carefully
maintained, lest either indulging the speculations of scholastics, or conceding anything to
the sophistries of Photinians, we be led away from the simplicity of faith, & carried away into
pathless places of errors, but these νηφαλίως [soberly].

THE SECOND ARTICLE.

Contemplation of Being.

From the Foreknowledge or diligent explication of the name & adequate constitution of
Being we are carried forward into the Definition of the Thing or the very contemplation of
Being.

But the θεωρία πραγματώδης [substantial theory] of Being will be able to be worked out in
shorter lines, where having dismissed the prolix disputations of the Scholastics concerning
the formal, Objective concept, the fundamental, Ideal, Universal State of Being, Univocation,
Analogy, Equivocation &c., we will have contained ourselves within the boundaries of
στοιχείωσις [elementary instruction]; & δεῖ πᾶν λαμβάνειν καθόλου, ἀλλὰ τὸ χρήσιμον.
[one must assume everything universally, but what is useful.] Nay indeed the aforesaid
contentions, for the most part concern not so much ὄν [being], as τὸ γνωστὸν ποιητόν. [the
makeable object of knowledge.] Since every knowable has objective being, is represented by
a formal concept, & is denominated Univocal or Analogous &c. And therefore they pertain to
this place only exercised, because concerning the Concept & state of Being it is inquired.
Whatever therefore ought to be considered here can be revoked to the description of Being.
To which I also refer the concept of Being how it presents itself to the intellect, namely
absolutely & in precision as it is abstracted from all things; but not yet relatively & under a
more express nature, as now it is found in things immediately inferior. For this respect,
which it obtains to inferiors, will be better explained in the Special Part. Here we will persist
in the abstract nature.

CHAPTER VI.

Description of Being.

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Being cannot be defined, because it implies a contradiction for the most Universal to be, &
either to acknowledge something above itself more General or equal to itself. But it ought to
be described, and that both through relation to our mind, as it is considered abstractly, and
by reason of inexisting, insofar as it is posited in nature.

I. Being is that most general thing, which is known as first of all most powerfully.

When we consider Being in relation to all things, whatever they are, insofar as they are
objected to the mind, two distinct things offer themselves in the advertence of our mind; by
which the concept of Being is both constituted & distinguished from others; the Material
which constitutes Being itself in the very relation of the mind, but so that it is still broader
than our concept, It is τὸ most general. For it is truly said concerning Being that it is the most
general concept, since all things whatever are constituted outside nothing are Beings. But it
is not reciprocated with Being, because the affections of Being are also most general. For
they extend equally broadly with Being: Therefore is added the formal, which in that
advertence of the mind not only constitutes Being, but also distinguishes it from the most
general affections, and therefore is converted with Being; τὸ to be the first known.

For Being is the first known, as to Intellectual cognition, that actual & primordial or original
one, not that distinct & accurate one, but confused & exoteric. Which must be understood
concerning Being, insofar as it is rooted in singulars. They call it singularized. This is, Any
singular Thing presented for knowing, when before this never known, before all things
actually presents itself to our mind, at least confusedly under the notion of Being: so that I
first know it to be a Being, which is objected.

For this is the nature of our Intellect, that in the cognition of things it begins from the most
common, & thus consequently descends to the adequate notion of things. Our intellect is a
natural agent which while it proceeds from potency into act, tends from the more imperfect
to the more perfect. But the most imperfect of all is the Concept of Being, therefore it first
actuates & terminates our mind, but the rest which express the thing more distinctly, &
establish its being more perfectly, are finally known in a posterior place. And that is so
manifest, that even infants can refute those contradicting. For when they know nothing else
concerning the object presented, they certainly do not ignore this, that it is a Being or Thing
or something, and therefore they are wont to attribute this most common concept to all
things, although they never know this or that thing, as to proper & more special concepts.

There is therefore no doubt but that Being is the first known; & through this the community
as it were material (namely of the most general) is restricted to the concept of Being alone,
& is distinguished from the affections. For the affections are not known first by the intellect,

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but only follow the first & highest concept. Hence arises convertibility by reason of essence,
because τὸ the first known can be attributed to nothing except the concept of Being. From
which it is clear what is the nature of this concept.

Let us speak distinctly concerning this. Concept, as is clear from Gnostology, is either formal
or objective. The formal concept of Being is the intelligible species immediately &
adequately establishing for the intellect that most common Object in the actual perception
of the same, or it is the species by which Being is ideally present, established for the mind,
which we say is one in reality not only in name, and is prescinded from inferiors, not only by
reason, but really. It is one in reality, because it is singular & individual, as any representative
species, the sign of which also is the word Being, as words are σύμβολα τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
παθημάτων [symbols of the affections in the soul]. 1. Concerning interp. C. 1. For the word
Being is one & simple & when heard indeed the mind is not distracted here & there,or
establish plural natures for itself. E.g. either of man, or of Angel, or of God &c. But rather
conceives to be common to all these things. Therefore it is abstracted from inferiors:
Substance namely & accidents concepts, and that really; since our mind needs one species
to conceive substance or accident: another for the common nature to both. For a formal
concept requires conformity with the represented object, which would be none, if the
formal concept of Being qua Being were the same with the formal concept of substance or
Accident. The similitude of one thing is not the similitude of the other.

Thence it is clear what the objective concept of Being is, the nature of Being common to all,
according to which any Being is said, which is represented by the formal concept. This
likewise I say is one and abstracted, but by a unity of reason not of thing; By an Abstraction
of precision, not of exclusion. One I say it is: for besides that the formal concept could not be
one, unless its unity were founded in the proportioned object of itself also one: its unity is
clear from this, that not only is the root of unity given. The agreement & similitude, which
any Being has with any: because in the common nature of Essence all things agree, but also
a sign of the same is our mode of understanding;

For when we conceive Being, there are not implied in that concept plural things, or are not
conceived, which are under Being, whether copulatively, or disjunctively or without any
conjunction, as our very intellection teaches. For thus conceiving Being, I abstract it as much
from Substance & Accident, as I abstract man from Peter & Paul: Because I conceive Being as
clearly not penetrating Substance & Accident, as I clearly conceive man not penetrating
Peter & Paul, whence Mendoza proves, that the concept of Being is as much one, & does not
import the concept of Substance & Accident, as the concept of man is one, & does not
import the concept of Peter & Paul.

But because that concept nevertheless is common to inferiors ἁπλῶς [without qualification]
either according to essential participation; therefore it cannot be one on the part of the
thing, apart from all work of the mind; For universal unity is not real, but gets unity from the

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intellect with the foundation of the agreement of things presupposed or by denomination
from the concept of the mind, which is not actually found in Being, as it is posited in nature.

It is abstracted, but precisively, which abstraction happens by knowing the most common
concept the distinct and determinate natures of being not being apprehended. For since the
concept of Being on the part of the thing is included most intimately in all things of whatever
Entitas or grade of being, therefore it is free from all concretion & is most simply one and
abstracted, but since that nature of being common to all can be separated from none, it is
clear that exclusive abstraction does not take place here; and therefore separation must not
be feigned by reason of Being, but abstraction must be conceived by reason of the mind.

The concept of Being excludes no inferior really, because it is imbibed intimately in all things;
but neither does it include any of them formally, because it is prescinded from all, & is
considered under that precise being illimitedly.

II. Being is what intrinsically has positive being persisting in nature apart from the
fiction of the mind.

This is a sort of description of Being, not insofar as under the relation of our mind its most
abstract concept abstracted from all things is represented, as in the preceding theorem, but
insofar as Being is communicated to all inferiors: And therefore it establishes what equally all
things whatever truly are by communication.

For although the same seems to be declared by the same, yet it behooves us to be content
with that, since otherwise it is not allowed in these most abstract things. Therefore such a
description is extorted by necessity, which it suffices to be adequate. For there is no Being,
concerning which it cannot be said that which is expressed by this description, provided it be
observed;

That the having Essence is not distinguished really from the Essence which is had, nay rather
these are simply the same: as also GOD is said to have immortality, omnipotence apart from
any either composition or distinction. Nay essence is Being itself: as has been said above,
and essence is said only to have Being for the mode of our cognition.

Dn. Gutke thinks that in this way Being the object of Metaph. Is not described but the
suppositum or Individuated Being. But as it is certain that the said description can be applied
to any Being in the individual, so it cannot be denied that all things, whatever have the
nature of Being, agree in that formality. Nay because it can be said concerning all, therefore
it is rightly had for the adequate description of Being.

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And what is to be said concerning unity or concerning the rest of the affections? Are they
not able to be attributed to singulars? But do they therefore depart from the number of
affections? I would not think otherwise. Therefore the same judgment concerning their
Subject.

It must be observed therefore accurately, that both this & the antecedent description can
optimally consist, provided the difference of each be preserved: namely that the former
formally explains the concept of Being contradistinct to all others, and therefore ought not,
as some wish, to be applied to inferiors; but the latter establishes the common nature of
being, which all things participate, and therefore can be said concerning all.

Thus we think the opinions of the most accurate Philosophers can optimally consist together.
Others with Thomas describe Being, what has Essence apt to really exist: or with Mendoza,
to which it is not repugnant to exist, which they so explain: that this aptitude, or non-
repugnance by no means denies the being of a thing, but only expresses precision to actual
being. But that Being must not be described under that precision, nor can it establish a
certain common concept, the antecedents have most evidently taught.

Those who define Being, what is affected by the principles of being, do not seem to
understand what the highest principle is? Indeed if this Being is, & affected by the principles
of being, it will not be the highest, and thus an infinite regress cannot be avoided.

They are also wont to investigate the nature of Being a posteriori, & to assign τεκμήρια
[signs] of essence, which are either absence of contradiction: or definition or operation. That
argues a thing can be, this expresses the very being of a thing this signifies essence. For
those things which do not involve repugnance, those can be; those which are expressed by
definition or description, those truly obtain being. Those which exert themselves through
operations cannot fail to exist; But these are not reciprocal.

Everything which is can be, but not everything which can be immediately is. Therefore the
argument ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμεως [from potency] is not valid; thus it is not yet proved that
Angels are given, when it is shown that it is not repugnant for there to be complete spirits of
this kind independent of body; another argument is needed by which their existence may be
evinced.

Whatever can be described altogether has positive being, because οὐδὲν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας
λόγος ἢ ὄρος [nothing is the definition or term of essence]. But not vice versa, Everything
which is can be described. For there is no doubt but that very many things lie hidden & are
concealed from our cognition. Finally everything which operates obtains true & real being.
For effect argues cause, but not everything which is operates. It is commonly said, Being is
the radical principle of all operations. But operation itself also is Being, therefore it also will
be the principle of operations & so on to infinity.

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 Corollaries.

I. Being is first of all things.

By primacy ὀντικῶς [ontologically], because most general, and therefore its concept is most
simple, because it itself cannot be resolved into others prior to it, but into it are resolved
ultimately all the rest; By primacy γνωστικῶς [gnostically], because first known. But when I
say first known, it is clear that there are also things secondly known, & consequently
γνωστὸν [object of knowledge] absolutely and simply so called, as it expresses the first &
second cognition, rightly infers the common & precise γνώσεως [knowledge] nature, from
the fact that there are both the first known, & those things which are known secondly.

II. The concept of Being does not belong to the inferiors.

Essence namely in the relation of our mind; for only Being is that most common concept of
all most known. Which is said of nothing else. Being therefore is contradistinguished in the
nature of the knowable from all other things, whatever are knowable; And therefore it does
not communicate its being to inferiors, unless you wish, not without contradiction, to say
that Substance or accident is the first known.

III. Essence is most intimate to all things.

For without essence they are by no means Beings. Essence is the first & most general form,
therefore it ought not to be repugnant to Being. The absurdity of the Timplerian opinion is
clear, which attributes also a respective Essence to absolute Being. As a thing is, so is its
operation.

IV. Any essence has a determinate operation for itself.

Understand reduplicatively, namely, whatever has an operation. For operation follows the
nature of essence, & as a thing is, so also it operates. Whence reciprocally the very Essence
of a thing is gathered from the operation; both absolutely that it is, & has being, whatever

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operates. For if it were not, it could not operate: and determinately, that its being is such, as
its operating. Thus I argue most rightly the true & independent Deity of Christ from the truly
& merely divine works which are attributed to Him in the scriptures, &c.

V. The essences of things are eternal.

Understand concerning the essential connection & identity of that which is of the essence;
in this sense. Whatever is of the essence of a thing, it is necessary that it perpetually belongs
to the thing; and therefore it is said to be of eternal truth, by reason of course of agreement,
not of attribution & real inexistence, Essences belong to things necessarily, & cannot fail to
be attributed to them. Thus human being cannot be derogated from man, even as
considered in the divine mind.

Mendoza thus speaks, that Essences belong to things necessarily; because God willing to
produce man for example cannot attribute to him the essence of a stone, because He would
not make a man, but a stone. Hence therefore it is clear. Whatever is of the essence of a
thing, that is inseparable from the thing. Nay without it the thing cannot even be conceived.
Thus if faith is in infants, knowledge cannot be denied to them: since it is of the nature of
faith: although it cannot be explained satisfactorily, how knowledge of the mysteries belongs
to them; it suffices that knowledge of this kind can be excited in infants also by the Holy
Spirit in a peculiar way.

2. Concerning the essence of things considered both under actual being & under possible &
intentional being. For thus the ideas of things were in God from eternity, to the exemplar of
which the things themselves were formed, which for this reason are said to be of eternal
truth. If Plato had thought this, he would be refuted undeservedly by the Peripatetic school.
For nothing is more certain than that all things were produced according to the archetype in
the divine mind, whatever things were produced.

Thus much on the essence of Being: follows THE LATTER TREATISE OF THE GENERAL PART.
Or the doctrine of the Attributes of Being. From the simple Being’s essence, we proceed
directly to the doctrine of affections, which we present both in general and in particular.
By investigating the nature of affections and considering each in order

ARTICLE ONE

The doctrine of transcendental affections

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 CHAPTER I.

The nature and division of the attributes of Being

Three things come to be considered concerning the affections of Being in general: 1.

Whether they exist? 2. What is their essence? How are they divided?

I. There are certainly affections which emanate from the nature of Being, and can
be proven of Being generally.

Concerning the existence of affections, it is not so much a doubt whether they are given, as
it is controversial what their origin is and how they are proven of Being. For it is agreed upon
by nearly everyone that there are most common predicates which can be said of any Being,
in such a way however, that they do not express the essence itself, and therefore are not
simply Being itself, but affect Being. Thus Being is said to be one, true, good, etc. Not only is
there the concept of Being, first of all, but also other most general secondary concepts, or
such which presuppose that first concept and follow it, which we call affections and modes
of Being. Soncinas requires two things for affections: First, that the concept of the subject is
prior to the concept of the affection. Second, that the affection follows per se the nature or
concept of the subject. Others say three things are required: 1. Distinction, that the affection
is not formally the same as that of which it is an affection. 2. Denomination, that it
denominates a thing, as something posterior to and consequent upon the thing. 3.
[Antipstrophē] (reciprocation), that by reason of the supposition it recurs with the subject.
But all these square with the concepts that are most general along with Being. For these
recur with Being on account of generality, so that every Being is one, true, and vice versa;
Everything true, one is a Being. These denominate Being, because any Being is denominated
by unity, truth, etc. These are formally different from Being, although objectively the same
as Being. For although they intimately imbibe the Essence, nevertheless Being does not
include the affections themselves in its concept. 2. They are called modes of Being; where it
must be observed that the term ‘mode’ is not taken as elsewhere in Metaphysics, for a
nominal and equivocal respect, or for a certain state and condition of a thing, or for a more
determinate nature of being, or for a mode of subsisting, or for personality, or for a mode
specifically so called, about which Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, Section 1, n. 17, but
rather for a mode affecting Being and intimately including it, which will be clear from the
description.

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 II. The affections of Being are most general concepts, transcendentally
denominating Being.

They are defined by the most general concepts, by which is expressed that which holds the
place of matter in this description. For they agree in this with their subject, Being, namely
that they are no less most general than Being, its attributes, on account of the adequation of
the subject and affections. But when it is added that they denominate Being, by that very
fact the nature of the affections is specified as formal. In explaining which it should be
observed: 1. The Subject which they denominate. I say this is Being or Essence, understand
not so much according to the precision of the mind as according to the fundamental state,
positive real actual Being. Unity certainly does not denominate Being according to the state
which it has in the mind, of universality. Thus perfection, truth, goodness is not so attributed
to that highest concept, as it is first known, and as formally under that abstraction it is only
in the mind, but to things themselves, as they are considered in nature and obtain true
being. Likewise, to be a cause or caused, simple or composite, etc., is not to be vindicated
for Being according to all states and the highest generality, and ultimate abstraction, as is the
most indifferent and unlimited concept of Being. For in that way it has the nature of neither
cause nor caused and is cut off from every affection and is of all the most simple. But these
denominations ought to be attributed to Being constituted in the nature of things, as outside
the intellect it has objective fundamental being, and under that disjunction participates in
the attributes. Thus God is a cause, creatures are effects. The former is simple, the latter
composite, etc. In short, this is what I say: the affections are verified of Being, and are
understood to denominate the same in personal supposition not simple; they are said of
Being restricted not abstract; they belong to Being exercised not signified; or are attributed
to it not so much as it is first known, as it is rooted in singulars. Which is to be accurately
noted. Furthermore, the affections denominate Being, not the modes of Being, which
restrict Being itself to a certain nature of existing. For modes are not so much Beings as
natures of Being either formally or even really distinct from the Being which they modify, as
subsistence from a subsisting thing, Personality from nature, etc. Therefore, since modes in
their precise formality do not include Being, neither ought those things which are per se in
Being be predicated of them. Thus person in the abstract is not attributed to be dependent
or independent, but essence and nature; subsistence is not denominated a cause or caused,
etc., but substance. Understand primarily and [kat’ auto] (per se) and [reduplicative]
(reduplicatively) insofar as they are modes and are considered under that formality; for thus
far they are distinct from Being. Which likewise is to be studiously observed. 2. Respect to
Being, which they denominate transcendentally; by which words two things are implied: 1.
The convertibility and adequation of the affections with Being. They are adequate to Being,
that is, they extend as broadly as Being itself, so that no positive, real and actual Being can
be found to which these very affections cannot be attributed, each one in its order. I speak
of positive, real, actual Being; for to privations, beings of reason, in potency, affections are

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not owed, as said above, and thus they are converted with Being, not indeed conceptibly
(which is, when nothing of a thing or of reason is enclosed in one concept which is not
enclosed in the other, in the way Synonyms, likewise a definition and the thing defined are
converted), yet denominatively, since every Being is denominated by those affections, and
vice versa: everything which enjoys these affections has essence. So that Being is one, and
every One is a Being, etc. And thence they are said to denominate Being transcendentally,
because these, equally with Being, transcend all the categories and can be said of all things.
Which will be proven in species about each one. 2. The distinction of the affections from
Being, and their proper formality. It is said that they denominate Being, by which is implied:
first, that they are not simply Being itself. It is agreed; for affections follow per se the nature
of the subject, but are not the subject itself. This is of the nature of every affection. But truly
it is not necessary that it be distinguished from the subject really, it suffices if formally. For
one thing are affections in scientific rigor, which are in a subject by the mode of Accidents,
so that they are distinguished really from the subject. But another thing are affections taken
more broadly and eminently, for which it is enough that they denominate the subject,
although not with a real distinction from the subject. The Scotists indeed contend that Being
is not included quidditatively in the affections, but is distinguished from them ex natura rei,
however much they concede that the attributes of Being are something positive. But this is a
manifest contradiction—that there be given something positive in which Being is not
intrinsically and quidditatively included. On the contrary, whatever is separately and with
every precision of that which is said to be distinguished from it according to the thing, is
one, perfect, true, good, etc.; unity, perfection, truth, goodness, etc. Does not differ from it
according to the thing. But Being separately and with every precision of that which is distinct
from it according to the thing, is one, etc. Therefore. Thus with Mr. Stahl, Metaphysical
Disputations, vol. 2, c. 36. Add that they essentially include Being itself; and therefore
cannot be conceived without Being, and consequently do not differ really from Being.
Therefore a discernment of reason remains. For the attributes are not simply the same as
the subject, but a discernment of conceived reason intervenes, because they are explained
by diverse concepts; nor are they said identically simply of Being. Thus it is not of the nature
of Being that in the formality of one, etc., nor is the predication identical when Being is
called One, etc. Furthermore, Being and its affections admit of contradictory predicates. The
former is first known; the latter are not first known. I conclude therefore that the attributes
are not simply Being itself, namely formally. For any attribute can be taken either concretely
and materially, in which way it implies the essence itself, or abstractly and formally, in which
way it is distinguished from Being. In the former sense the attribute is Being itself, namely on
the part of the thing. In the latter sense it is not Being itself, but a certain discernment
intervenes on the part of the concept. From which gather that the attributes of Being do not
formally add to Being something real, or a certain positive mode diverse really from Being,
or a new peculiar Entity. For this which would be added, if it were positive, would certainly
be a Being, and thus would again have its own affections, about which the same could be
said; and thus a process would be made to infinity. Add that Being could not be predicated

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of most simple Being, if Being as such were endowed with affections really distinct from
itself. Or certainly it must be said that simple first Being itself is composed by a real
composition, by a certain Mixture. What therefore do they add to Being? Either a negation,
or a certain respect of reason. For with the positive removed, nothing else remains which
can be understood to be included in an affection beyond the Entity itself. Thus Unity
bespeaks a negation of division; Truth involves a respect to the intellect, and so concerning
the rest, as will be taught in its place. Second, since it has been said that the Affections
denominate Being, it is given to be understood that they do not participate in the nature of
Being [sunōnumōs] (univocally), as those things which are essentially inferior to Being, but
that they affect Being itself extra-essentially, and therefore are said [parōnumōs]
(paronymously) of Being. For one thing is an Affection of Being, another its division, as
advised above. Affections imbibe and include Entity not by formal participation, but by real
denomination at least. But divisions do not denominate Being, but participate in its nature
[kat’ isōn] (according to equality) and formally include Being itself. Hence it is that Being is
predicated of the members of a division abstractly and Synonymically, as substance is a
Being, etc. But truly of the members of a disjoined affection, or even of United affections,
predications ought rather to be made paronymously and in the concrete, as Being is One,
not oneness and oneness is an affection of Entity, but not truly a Being. For the subject is not
an affection, and ought to be distinguished from the latter at least formally. Wherefore in
the formal concept the one is not the other. For although One (the same judgment
concerning the rest) includes Entity, nevertheless because it imports the same only
subjectively and materially, but does not truly say it formally and abstractly, therefore it is
said to denominate it. This is what I say: The formal nature of One is not attributed to Being
essentially, but only denominatively, insofar as Being is said to be in a state of indivision. It is
not of the Essence and formal concept of Being, or is not conceptibly the same as Being
itself, although it is the same fundamentally. And in this maximum interval the
transcendental affections of Being stand apart from other scientific affections, which are not
the same objectively and fundamentally with that which they denominate, although the
same can be said subjectively materially. Accidents constitute one thing with the subject, but
not per se but per accidens; for they are also fundamentally by reason of the objective
concept and on the part of the thing constituted outside the nature of the subject, and
therefore differ really from the subject. Thence they are said to be defined [pros] (in relation
to) the subject. Which cannot be so said of transcendental affections. Whence it is further
agreed that predicamental affections denominate the subject insofar as they emanate from
the same as effects from a cause. But not so transcendental affections. Thus One, e.g., does
not denominate Being as an effect its cause, but as a certain conceivable nature taken from a
certain state, namely indivision.

III. The affections of Being are twofold: United and disjunct. The former are
converted with Being simply, unitedly, and adequately denominate it without any

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 disjunction per se. The latter are converted with Being under disjunction, and
denomininate it transcendentally with an illation of opposition.

There are various most general attributes of Being. But all can be recalled to these two
headings, that some are reciprocated with Being unitedly, but others disjointedly. Some
indeed distribute the affections of Being in a first division into primary and secondary, and at
length make the latter simple or conjoined. But the former distribution is pleasing to us,
because in each genus both of United and of Disjoined are found both of first and of second
order. That there are affections convertible with Being unitedly is not in need of prolix proof.
For it is agreed that Being is called one, true, good, etc., and this reciprocally, so that every
Being is one, true, good, etc., and vice versa. It is agreed that Being is called a cause, but not
adequately except under disjunction, because every Being is a cause or caused, etc. The
reason therefore of the distinction of the general attributes of Being is situated in this, that
some modify Being without the illation of an opposite, others affect Being adequately not
unless under the respect of opposition. But in what way the former are converted with
Being simply, and the latter exhaust the latitude of Being disjointedly, and therefore each
one is adequate to Being, a special [Diaskepsis] (Examination) will teach.

Corollaries

I.The attributes of Being are true, real, and positive. For they are not fictitious, or Beings of
reason; they do not take away or deny essence, but truly belong to Being beyond the
operation of the mind, and on the part of the thing imply the essence itself. Thus God is one,
true, good, a cause, independent, etc., with no one even thinking. Creatures obtain their
unity, goodness, are effects, depend, etc., apart from every operation of the mind. But truly
those which 1. Are not real do not merit to be called affections of Being. Hence Universality
is not a transcendent attribute of Being, since things are not universal except through an
operation of the mind. For everything which is, by that very fact while it is, is singular. But
the Universal arises through an operation of the mind, outside of which it formally is not.
Those which 2. Do not posit Being, but are opposed to Being, cannot be called attributes of
Being. For no attribute is Contradictory to its subject. Absurd therefore is Timpler’s affection
of Being, Impossibility. For this altogether and totally excludes Being, both actual and
potential. What is impossible neither has essence, nor can have it.

II.The affections of Being do not differ really from Being. The reasons have been adduced in
the precepts. E.g., through truth there is not denoted another essence which is distinct from
that which is denominated true, but that same essence is denoted under a certain state,

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namely as it is conformed to the intellect. It is one thing to be something real, another to be
something really distinct from Being, which is manifest from the divine attributes, which are
most true and most real; yet they are not distinguished really from the divine essence. The
divine Intellect is real, but not really distinct from the essence of God. Thus transcendental
attributes are true and real, although they do not import a real distinction from Being. From
which it is agreed that real predicates belonging really to a subject do not always infer a real
composition with the subject. Unity in Being does not make a real composition, because it
belongs even to most simple Being. For if one as such imported a real distinction from Being,
then surely it would infer the same in every Being. What belongs to such as such is best
gathered from all, etc. Let the same be the judgment concerning the rest.

III.The affections imply the essence itself. Namely [pragmatikōs] (really), not [noēmatikōs]
(conceptibly). It is clear thence how the divine attributes are God Himself, according to that
saying of Rabbi Haccadosh in Gale Razeia: Nothing is found in God which is not God Himself;
which is true of the divine attributes on the part of the thing, not on the part of the concept.
For the divine essence can be adequately conceived (under the formality of infinite spirit)
although by the same act of the mind the individual attributes of God—Justice, Mercy, etc.—
are not conceived. But on the part of the thing, that the divine Essence identifies to itself all
things which are in divine things, as the Scholastics say, as the justice of God, the mercy of
God, the essence itself of God, with respect to the acts of Justice and mercy, etc. The
Essence of God [tē kai alla] (in one way and another) is distinguished from the affections [kai
allon kai allon epibleōs tropon] (and by another and another way of considering) (for there
can be different notions of one and the same thing, which the barbarians call formalities,
says Scaliger, Exercitations 307, Section 15), but it is not distinguished from them really, or as
the Philosophers elsewhere say, the objective concept is one, but the formal concepts are
distinct.

IV.The affections follow the character of Being. Or the attributes are so said of Being, just as
the proper nature of Being to which they are attributed requires. Since therefore the nature
of finite Being is one thing, of infinite another, and they agree in the common concept only
[analogōs] (proportionally), it is agreed that the attributes are to be applied only [kat’
analogian] (according to analogy), and an altogether same nature and identity is not to be
imagined. Which can be understood both concerning the Transcendentals and concerning
more special attributes. The Transcendentals are identified with essence. Therefore they are
intimately included in the essence both of finite and of infinite Being, but in the former they
are to be considered the same as finite essence. Thus to Creatures perfection, goodness are
ascribed, but finite; causality, but dependent, etc. But to God whatever affections are
attributed are to be conceived under an infinite and most eminent nature—Perfection,
Goodness, Actuality, etc. Special attributes also simply follow the character of their subject.

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Whence again arises a diversity of attribution. Thus it is no wonder that those things which
for us are only accidents are essential to God, since they are not said univocally of God and
of us. E.g., Justice, Mercy in us are accidents; in God, God Himself. Beautifully Scaliger
somewhere: In GOD power is not diverse from essence, but is of its own alone and is to itself
both that which it is and this whole which all things are.

V. Affections are posterior to Essence. An affection is truly in abstraction, in that the concept
of Being is prior to the concepts of the transcendental affections, and in application; in that
the essence of any being is prior to the affections themselves, even if not in terms of the
thing itself, but in terms of the concept, insofar as one and the same thing is considered in
one nature before another. From this, it is easy to gather that affections do not enter into
the essence according to the precise and formal reason, and thus are not predicated as
synonyms of Being. For synonyms are those which signify not only one thing, but also one
reason. Now, although the affections of Being speak of one and the same simple essence,
yet since this is done under many and diverse reasons, which our intellect apprehends in
diverse ways, they do not produce the same understanding in us, they do not have the same
reason, and thus they are not formally included in Being.

VI. Affections are predicated of each other mutually and of Being in an identical sense, but
not formally. The former is due to essential identity; the latter is due to formal diversity. I
illustrate the same with the attributes of God. These are truly predicated both of God and of
each other identically, as really the same. For each divine attribute is infinite, just as God
Himself, and therefore includes all the others in reality. For whatever is simply infinite,
certainly includes all things. The justice of God really includes the Being of God. The Being of
God is infinite. The infinite comprehends all things, therefore it really includes the justice of
God along with the divine essence. Hence the abstractive predication, 'God is justice itself,'
'God is mercy itself,' in an identical sense or insofar as these are essentially the same, since
Jehovah is justice, and He is mercy itself. But when with one act of the mind we conceive of
the Essence of God, with another His justice, with another His mercy and other attributes,
hence neither justice is predicated of the divine essence, nor mercy of justice, in a formal
sense. Thus the attributes of Being; Unity, Truth, Goodness, etc. are predicated of Being and
of each other mutually in an identical sense, insofar as they are really one with Being and
among themselves, yet not in a formal sense, because the conceivability of Being is one
thing, of Unity another, of Truth another, and finally of Goodness another. I say that the
affections are predicated of each other mutually: that is, insofar as their opposition does not
prevent it. This convertibility of predications therefore takes place in affections united
simpliciter: but in disjunct ones only under the relative exception of opposition. The
members of disjunct affections are opposed to each other. Therefore they cannot be
predicated in the direct case of each other. Cause is not the caused effect, etc. The

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theologians' limitation on this is analogous: all things are in God one [not only essentially but
also really] unless the opposition of relation prevents it: for here, although essential identity
remains because of the utmost unity of essence, yet a real distinction occurs because of the
opposition of the personal relations. Hence the mutual enunciation of each other is denied
to the persons. It is not permitted to say, 'The Father is the Son,' or 'The Son is the Father,'
etc. For opposed relations are incommunicable to each other. But predication presupposes
communication.

VII. Affections must be attributed to Being, not to the modes of Being. Modes can be
considered either abstractly in their ultimate formality, or concretely in all the Entity which
they imply. Whether purely and in themselves insofar as they modify, or entitatively and in
the thing which they modify. In the former sense they are contrasted with essences; in the
latter they imply the essence itself. In this way there is no doubt that they claim for
themselves the attributes of Being: since essence is not without affections, which are
inseparable from essence. I am speaking of the transcendentals; which do not really differ
from Being. For the case is different with the predicamentals, which make a real composition
with the essence. In the other sense, then, the modes come to be present, when it is said
that they do not participate in the affections of Being. And this is said very truly. For if these
affections are attributed to modes, essence cannot but be presupposed: since affections
require essence beforehand; as attributes require a subject: nor can they be without it. But
when a mode is taken abstractly, purely and formally, it does not imply essence, but is
contrasted with it, as is clear.

He used it wrongly against the Photinians, who judge that the attributes of Being ought to be
attributed to the Personal Relations which require [hypostasis] in the most simple divine
essence. And so they sophistically argue: The three Persons are either finite or infinite
eternal: But neither can be said. Therefore they are plainly not. In a word: they are three
modes of subsisting of one and the same infinite Being. For these three are one.

2. Against some Calvinists, who do not hesitate to assert with Alsted that the Son of God
depends on the Father, and the Holy Spirit on the Father and the Son, originally that is and
personally. But in that way they will have a dependent essence, since dependence
denominates the essence. Therefore let them see how they can escape contradiction: while
making the independent essence at the same time dependent.

ARTICLE TWO

The Specific Doctrine of the Transcendental Affections of Being

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We will put forward the united affections before the disjunct ones: partly because they are
simpler and like the stems of these, and partly because without them it is not so easy, nor so
accurate, to know the others, as the treatment itself will show.

FIRST CLASS

Of the Transcendental Affections

Exhibiting UNITY

But we can, or rather we must, view these in two ways. 1. Universally as they are defined
and divided. 2. Individually, as each is unfolded and explained in order.

FIRST SUBSECTION

Considering the Affections of Unity Universally

CHAPTER II

The Nature of the United Affections

It is explained what they are and how many there are; and each is proved concerning Being,
and their inherence in Being is established.

I. The united affections are most general attributes, which only modify Being, with
reciprocal denomination. They are also called simple: because they are simply
predicated of Being, and are convertible with Being, and are called
transcendentals or transcendent affections: Although by some the transcendent
affections are confused with the transcendentals. For not every transcendent,
which transcends the predicaments, is immediately an affection, since it is further
required that its affections add something of reason to Being, and thus produce
another conceivability. They are truly most general attributes, because they
belong to every non-Being, and that simply and conversely, by which they are
distinguished from the other class of affections. Therefore there are three

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observable features of them, namely that they modify Being, and that
reciprocally, and finally that they only modify, without inferring the opposite.

1. The general modification distinguishes them from other predicates,

synonymous ones, that is. For the synonymous predicates of Being are one
thing, such as Thing, Something, Existence, etc. The paronymous attributes
are another: One, True, Good, etc. Those simply signify the same thing as
Being. These obtain another formality from Being. In the former, Being is
expressed by other names alone: in the latter, Being is denominated under
another and another state. From this it is clear that Existence is not a united
affection of Being, because it signifies the same as Being itself. Existence is
not a true mode of Being, although it is sometimes so conceived by us, says
Mr. Jacob Martini in his Metaphysical Prelections, cited by Mr. Scharffio Disp.
6. Theor. Transcend.c.1.th.6. For it denotes the intrinsic and formal reason of
Being, no differently than Thing, or Something. Thus the formal reason of
Being is actual essence. But Existence does not imprint any other concept on
the mind than actual essence. Therefore it is not a mode of Being, so as to
affect it with denomination. By which words it is very clearly taught that
Existence is a synonym of Being, and it is simultaneously hinted that the
Metaphysical Object of Being is nothing but the actual.

2. The reciprocation of Being distinguishes its affections from other modes;

Which can indeed denominate Being, yet in such a way that they do not run
back with Being. For not every mode is an affection of Being, although every
affection is a certain mode of Being.

3. The negation of opposition, or to express it affirmatively, simple modification,

formally constitutes the united affections and distinguishes them from the
disjunct ones. For the united are those which only modify Being, not
importing respect to the opposite, as Unity denominates Being as one, not
importing respect to many. But the disjuncts not only modify Being, but also
look back on themselves, as opposites, and hence in a disjunct sense they are
not said purely affirmatively of Being: Thus I cannot say, Being insofar as it is
Being is a cause, but it is either cause or caused.

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II. The united affections are either primary or secondary: The latter define the state
of Being more intrinsically. The former somehow more extrinsically, insofar as
they do not so much respect Being itself, as the ends of Being. The variety of the
united affections causes certain genera to be constituted, to which they may be
reduced in order. We indeed say some are primary, others secondary. The former
denominate Being more in its own proper state: or they express the more
intrinsic state of the thing, so called because they connote such a negation or
relation, which seems joined to things in a more intimate complex, and so to
speak, maintains a closer familiarity with the essence of the thing, than the
denominations of the others, which we call secondary. These latter therefore say
something about the extrinsic state of Being: because they do not so much define
the Being of the thing, as express the ends of Being, according to which it
remains in Being, or is understood to be somewhere, which the things to be said
will make plain. Here let the foundation of the division be noted, on which the
number of the united affections rests, which is the very definition. Namely, as
many predicates as there are differing from positive, real, actual Being only
formally, adequately and reciprocally denominating it: or only modifying it, so
many united affections of Being must be granted. But here it will soon be proved
that not only can the affections commonly received by all in use be subsumed,
but also others to be enumerated in addition.

III. The primary united affections are either absolutely simple, which only connote a
negation, be it of defect, as Perfection, or of division; of which kind is Unity: Or
with a certain reasonable respect simple, when they infer a relation either to the
intellect, which is Truth, or to the will, which is Goodness. The affections are
divided according to the diversity of denomination, by which they affect Being
differently. But since by this denomination nothing positive and real is added to
Being, it is necessary that something negative or of reason accedes, in respect to
which the affections are formally distinguished from the subject. When the mind
adverts to this, it simultaneously regards the Being common to all, it finds in it
both that every Being can be considered under the state of a certain negation,
and that under the respect of reason, and thus universally enunciates this very
thing concerning Being. Hence the most general attributes: Of which this is the
order: Those which say a simple negation most intrinsic to Being are prior to the
others, which involve a respect of reason. The absolute, that is, are prior to the
respective. Those are called absolutely simple, because they connote no relation
of reason, they are absolved by simple negation: and without any respect they
denominate the essence. These, with a certain reasonable respect added, are
called simple, because they import a certain relation, and thus denominately
Being relatively. Each must be derived from the essence, as attributes, and be

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convertible with the essence, as united attributes. Therefore, the negation of the
thing is intrinsic and twofold, or to speak otherwise, Being subsists under a
twofold state of negation, in that division or defective entity is denied of Being, so
that it is then undivided in itself, and lacks nothing that is required for its Being.
No other negations occur, which are intrinsic to Being and apt to denominate it.
But these are internal, and affect Being transcendentally. Internal, because they
belong to the thing without an external respect. Things are undivided, and they
are perfect by themselves, through themselves, and in themselves, not by
something adventitious, not by some external denomination, not by a merely
accidental denomination. For undivision or perfection does not flow from
Essence, as an effect from a cause, but as a certain conceivable reason, truly
belonging to Being, which is enclosed within its most simple complex. They are
transcendent and adequate, because they are said reciprocally of Being. But two
things are required for reciprocation, namely that both Being is said of each, and
each of every Being. Both are constant here. For every perfect thing and every
one thing is a Being. To be undivided, and without defect, does not signify a mere
negation, but materially imports the very essence, truly positive. Nay, the
negations themselves formally affirm something in reality, as will be said of each.
And conversely. Every Being is one. Every Being is perfect. There is given no
Being, which is contained under the Metaphysical object, which is not undivided,
for if it is divided entitatively, then the essences will be divided. Because Being
and essence are synonymous. But where the essences are divided, there are
many Beings. But many Beings are not a Being. It is a contradiction for Being to
be many Beings as such. Therefore, every Being remains one. Thomas proves it
another way. Every Being is necessarily either simple or composite. The simple is
individual both actually and potentially. The composite is individual potentially,
and thus the composite as such is not divided. Therefore every Being is in some
way individual and consequently one. The same regarding perfection. Every Being
is essentially perfect is commonly taught by the Peripatetics. Nor indeed can they
[think] otherwise. For the perfect, according to Mr. Jacob Martin, is that to which
nothing is lacking for its due integrity. Or, according to Combachius, The perfect is
that which does not lack goodness. But this is universally true of all things
whatsoever. For they have Being which is required for Being, nor do they lack
goodness, since every Being is good by the common voice of all. Let us repeat the
matter from first principles. Everything that is, has those things which are
required for Being. For it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be
simultaneously. Therefore, whatever is, is perfect. Every being has an essence.
But indeed essence consists in indivisibility, and admits neither too much nor too
little. Therefore it will be perfect. Provided that is perfect to which nothing can be
added, nothing taken away. Finally, whatever is, is either created or uncreated.
The uncreated is the highest Being, to which if essential perfection is denied, a

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 manifest contradiction will be implied. As for created beings, although these do
not rise to such a degree of perfection as the Creator’s, yet they cannot be
destitute of their own congruous perfection. For the first principle could not
produce anything which was either entirely like or unlike itself, as Scaliger very
subtly says, Exerc.5. But to posit something produced by the first principle as
imperfect simply and essentially, impinges most manifestly on that highest
principle. For thus the produced thing will be something entirely unlike the first
principle, which is impossible. So much for the united affections which add a
negation to Being.

But Truth and Goodness imply a Relation. For a twofold relation belongs to things before our
mind’s operation, and is essential to them (from the posterior), both to the intellect and to
the will. No other relations intrinsic and adequate to Being are to be found. But these
deserve the title by the vote of all.

1. They are internal, because the respect to the intellect and will is not really
different from Being itself. Since Being is conformed to the intellect, and
agrees with the will. Here we can use Averroes’ proof, or rather Aristotle’s, 4
Metaph. C, with Mr. Arnisaeus. “Things which are generated and corrupted by
the same generation, and are not divided from each other, but are the same.
But Being and the true, the good, are generated and corrupted by the same
generation. For when a perfect man is generated, so simultaneously a true
man and a good man.” The same is also proved from the absurd. No Being
would be simple, if the relations added from truth and goodness inferred
composition in the Subject. For these belong to every Being, and therefore
also,

2. They are said adequately. For just as the True and the Good materially
includes the very essence by the nature of affections, so every thing that is
can be denominated true and good. Whatever is, is either God or depends on
God. God cannot but be true and good. Nay, every Being is truth itself and
goodness itself. Since by order to the divine intellect and will, all other things
have the denomination of true and good. Therefore what depends on God
cannot be unlike its archetype: But all things are conformed to the divine
mind and will, by which they are as it were images and expressed things.
Therefore, all things obtain essential Truth and Goodness.

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 IV. The secondary united affections are two: Duration, which connotes the
permanence of Being, and Ubiety, which connotes presence-somewhere. These
affections posit Being under a kind of extrinsic respect, although they are truly
intrinsic to it. For to be, to remain, and to be somewhere, seems to say an
extraneous respect to time and place, or more generally to the now and here: But
indeed they are essential to Being. For Duration does not really differ from
Existence, since duration adds nothing real to Existence. For if it added something
then in whatever endures it would make a real composition: which is absurd,
because even the most simple divine essence is said to endure. But since neither
can any entity distinct and really diverse from actual existence be named, which
duration superadds to existence; the act of permanence, that is, the continuation
of Being, does not differ from the actual essence itself. From which it is further
clear: Everything that endures, exists, and everything that exists, endures. The
former, because duration says the continued act of existence, and thus materially
implies existence. The latter, because nothing at all can be said which is utterly
destitute of duration. For everything that is, while it is, and has some tract of
Being, by this very fact is denominated from duration. Seeing that duration is
both momentary and lasting, and no less belongs to successively existing beings,
than to a permanent being, as will be proved below.

The same must be held regarding Ubiety; which says any reason for presence-somewhere:
To be somewhere does not denominate a thing under a real discrimination from the essence
of the thing, but is intrinsically rooted in the essence of the thing. Whoever maintains the
contrary, must necessarily assert that presence-somewhere cannot be attributed to a most
simple Being, which is absurd. Nay, and those other Beings, which are denominated from
this attribute, will not be Beings through themselves, but through accident, which is again
inconvenient. Furthermore, to be somewhere is also convertible with Being, because that
which is somewhere, is a true Being: the opposite of which is impossible; and conversely.
Everything that truly is, if it in fact exists in the nature of things, is somewhere. For if it were
not somewhere, it would be nowhere. But it implies a contradiction for a Being to be and to
be nowhere. The same is further clear by induction of all things that are. Finite and infinite
Being exhausts the whole latitude of Being. But the infinite is somewhere through ubiquity
or omnipresence: because not excluded anywhere: But the finite which is, also requires an
where, yet a definite one, so that it is included in a certain where, and thus every being is
truly said to be somewhere.

Corollaries

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 I. The simply united affections run back conversely with Being. Not by reason of
essence, but of supposition, so that whatever is said to be perfect, one, true,
good, to endure, to be somewhere, must altogether have positive, real Being,
constituted through itself in actuality. And conversely; whatever has Being of this
kind may be truly said to be perfect, One, True, Good, to endure and to be
somewhere through itself. As we shall soon explain individually. Therefore, in
however many supposits these affections are found, in that many the Essence is
prerequired reciprocally: As many as have their essence, that many also enjoy
these affections.

II. The number of the united affections is determinate. The number of the disjunct
attributes perhaps cannot be so definitely limited; For they are exceedingly many,
which under disjunction exhaust the latitude of Being. But apart from those
enumerated, no others occur which are simply and unitedly convertible with
Being. This is evident from the precepts. Alsted adds Number, order, beauty. But
needlessly and beyond necessity.

He defines Number as a mode of Being to be understood as numerable: And he makes it

twofold. Absolute, which is numerable in itself, and respective, which modifies the thing of
Being as numerable in comparison with others. Further he asserts that the respective
number is founded on the absolute, which is the unity of essence. Empty words! If the
absolute number is the very unity of essence, why is a distinct affection of Being from unity
feigned? But what is the respective number? If the actual collation of many things? It is
nothing but a function of the mind. Therefore it is not an affection of Being. If the
numerability of many things? But order cannot but infer plurality. But plurality removes
unity. Therefore that numerability is not rooted in unity.

Order for Alsted is a mode of Being, by which Being is understood to be unconfused, and for
him it is again both absolute and relative. He refutes Timpler; who made inordination along
with order a disjunct affection of Being, but he is equally absurd. Where there is order, there
is multitude. It is Alsted’s own rule: But in Being considered in itself there is no order; that is,
absolute order, according to the same author. Therefore, in one Being considered in itself
there is multitude: a manifest repugnance. This relative order is plainly heterogeneous! For
what have the united and simple affections of Being, as such, to do with the mutual
conglobation or coordination, or subordination of things? Finally, Beauty according to Alsted

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is a mode of Being, by which it is understood to partake of comeliness. He says this is a kind
of corollary, and as it were the colophon of the other affections, and arises from the
agreement of Being with intellect and will. But in very truth, if I grant most fully that beauty
ought not only to be strictly taken for the quality of a body arising from convenient situation
and temperament, but also broadly for any agreement suitable to every being, yet it will not
on that account be a peculiar affection of Being. That agreement is nothing other than
Goodness itself, which if you please to call Beauty, I shall not object. Or if you prefer, let it be
the Colophon of Goodness, and thus it will be reduced to Goodness. In this sense I admit
what is beautifully said by Iamblichus: “Beauty is the circle of divine light emanating from
the Good, residing in the Good, always refluent through the Good and to the Good [Greek:
circulus divinae lucis ex bono manans, in bono residens, per bonum et ad bonum semper
refluens].” But I wonder that Alsted did not introduce more united affections, desirability,
admirability, lovability, etc. Since he posits every Being as desirable, admirable, lovable.

III. Every Being has its Perfection

Understand this of the transcendent, essential perfection necessary in its kind for each
thing. Otherwise it is certain that not every Being obtains whatever special perfection, or is
perfect absolutely and simply. Thus spirits obtain their own proper perfection; not that of
body. Bodily substances have their own perfection, not that of spirits, accidents are perfect
in their way, although they do not attain that perfection which belongs to substances. But
whatever things do not have the perfection owed to them, those are not. With the
inseparable attribute denied, the subject itself is also denied.

IV. Everything that is, is one

Namely, insofar as it truly is, and through itself, not through accident. For things which are
through accident, also have only such unity. Thus the world is not one, except by reason of
order and by aggregation. They have as much of unity as they do of Being, 4 Metaph. Ch.6.
But if it happens that something is in a certain respect manifold, nevertheless it is still also
one in some other way. Thus things which are many in parts, are one in the whole, etc. In
sum: There is given no multitude, which does not participate in unity. For unless many
Beings are sustained by unity, they will not even be.

V. Every Being is true and conversely

It is evident from the adequation of Being and the true, which infers reciprocal predication.
And first, because every thing really is, you conclude that the false is not in things. For it is
impossible for the same thing to be and not be simultaneously. The other, that it
presupposes essence, you can apply specifically to the divine essence, in this way: He who is

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the true God, has truly the divine essence. Hence I refute the Photinians. The Racov
Catechism p. 64 says: “Christ, although the true God by nature, yet is not that one God
Himself, who through Himself and in the most perfect way is God.” A most open
contradiction, to call the true God (let verbal deceptions be absent) who is not God by
essence, by nature, or who does not obtain the divine essence and nature. To call the true
God, to whom the definition of the true God does not belong. The true God, who is not one,
who is not most perfect. Truth is identified with essence. The divine essence is most unitedly
one, so to speak, and most perfectly perfect. Therefore, who is the true God, (N.B. not only
called God in name, but is the true God) who is not that one God, the most perfect Being of
all?

VI. What is not good, is not even [a Being]

This is true concerning transcendental goodness: which God has through essence: And all
things which are from God, through the communication of grace. Thus even the devils,
insofar as they are, have essential goodness, and everything that in any way is, either is
good, or is in [some] good. As privations, sins, etc. Although they do not formally have
goodness in themselves: yet they are in good as the material. Thus vicious acts considered
materially as motion are not destitute of transcendental goodness, although by reason of
the defect and privation, and thus they are not formally good. E.g. in theft the material is the
taking possession, which in itself is not evil, the formal is the unlawfulness, and the privation
in that taking possession is in no way good, but fights against the divine will. Therefore
insofar as a thing fails from goodness, to that extent it also fails from Being. So that no
positive Essence can be evil, which should be noted against the Flacians asserting a
substantial evil, and the Manichees impiously feigning some highest principle of evil
opposed to the highest good.

VII. Duration is essential to things

For Duration is the very Existence on the part of Reality. Therefore the duration of things is
immutable with respect to essence. Hence the divine duration cannot be communicated to
any created thing, which is outside of God.

VIII. Ubiety belongs inseparably to every Being

Since it belongs to every Being and thus also to accidents: For analogically at least an
accident is in a subject, which is certain, consequently an accident is also said to be
somewhere. Scaliger Exerc 359.s.5. says: “Where is a necessary circumstance for all Beings
except God.” But what prevents ascribing an where to God? Who is where, and thus is
nowhere not. Inseparably, because an affection cannot be separated from its subject.

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Therefore also Ubiety belongs immutably to every Being. “For all things that are are
supposed to be somewhere [Greek: Ta gar onta pantes hupolambanousin einai pou],” says
Aristotle 4 Phys. C.1.

SUBSECTION II.

Considering Affections

INDIVIDUALLY.

Now therefore, with God’s help, let us examine the individual united affections, in which the
greatest moment of transcendental wisdom is placed. We will observe that order which the
preceding subsection has shown, about to progress from the primary to the secondary, from
the simply simple and absolute to the relative and with rational respect simple.

CHAPTER III.

On perfection.

Perfection, among the absolute and simply simple the first, we contemplate in the first
place. For it seems most proper to essence. And certainly the highest and closest necessity
intervenes between perfection and the essence of a thing. Which is the cause that great
Philosophers have perfection for a synonym of being. But we cannot rise to these. We
acknowledge a great kinship; We cannot acknowledge an ἰσοδυναμίαν [equality of power] in
every way. The concept of perfection is one thing, of being another. When I apprehend
essence precisely, I do not conceive distinctly and expressly perfection. Although in reality
essence and perfection are the same. And perfection is only predicated paronymously of
being, while it is permitted to call a being perfect, not perfection itself. Otherwise every
Being would be perfection itself, which is quite absurd. Add that to be perfect is not said
essentially of every Being. Therefore neither of Being as such. Finally, that essence and
perfection admit contradictory predicates, which is a sufficient argument of formal
distinction. Join these to the things said in the previous chapter. Ponder each one; You will
not doubt that perfection deserves a place among the united affections. Of this I consider
both the ὄνομα [name] or Noun, and the things which are according to the Noun,

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distinctions; and the νόημα [concept] or concept, and what is the analogical participation of
the concept.

I. Perfection transitively denotes the act of perfecting; possessively the state of the
perfected thing, as in this place.

Perfection is named from perfecting. It is taken, therefore, by force of the noun both
effectively and transitively for the act of the one effecting, by which a thing is made and
perfected, and subjectively, for the thing already produced and perfected, or the term of the
action. There it designates the influx to perfect being, and is of the number of those beings
which are not, except they become; As Scaliger says, Exercitation 6, sec. 5. Here it denotes
the perfect being itself, and the thing which has attained its complement. That is called
perfection in the causal sense, and from the extrinsic; this in the formal sense and from the
intrinsic. By the Greeks that is called τελείωσις [perfecting]; this ἐντελέχεια [actuality], or
even τελειότης [perfection]. The former perfection can be considered in two ways: both in
order to the producing cause, which it denominates perfecting, and in which it presupposes
the power and potency of acting, which is of perfection, and with respect to the work
produced, which is said to be made perfect. And in which is inferred the potency of being
perfected, which is an argument of imperfection. For action revolves between two, the
agent and the patient. It is a flux from the agent, as a principle into the patient as a subject.
That perfects, and therefore obtains its perfection. For act presupposes the power of acting.
This is perfected, and therefore of itself is not yet perfect. For what becomes, is not yet. Thus
that act, by which God powerfully perfects creatures, denominates God perfecting, and
argues in God an eminent power of perfecting; but it says that creatures are perfected, and
therefore in need of perfection, God does not perfect Himself by acting, because He cannot
be perfected, but creatures, which without God are not perfectly, nay plainly are nothing at
all. The latter perfection expresses the formal act of a thing proceeding from another and
perfected. It denotes, therefore, the internal perfect being, but at the same time connotes
the external principle by which it was made. To this corresponds the Greek word τέλειον,
perfect, which is as it were πέρας τοῦ τέλους [limit of the end] brought to the end. For τέλος
is the final perfection. And each thing is then said to be τέλειον, when it has attained its end
or τέλος. And something attains perfection either without succession, which is made perfect
as soon as it is made; thus as soon as God spoke, all things were made perfect; or with
succession, which is first intended, then begun, then continued, finally consummated and
completed, thus all things in heaven and earth within the hexaemeron [six days] of creation
are said to be perfected and to have received their complement. Therefore, in this sense
Thomas [Aquinas] truly says: What has not been made cannot properly be called perfect. A
distinction should be made between the first imposition of the word and the transferral of
the same to another use. For not rarely is the use of a word wont to deviate from the first

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imposition. Wherefore Thomas rightly subjoins: but because in these things which are made,
then something is said to be perfect when from potency it is led forth into act, this noun
“perfection” is transferred to signify all that to which being in act is not lacking, whether this
be through the mode of perfection (that is, of extrinsic production or influx of the one
perfecting), or not. By the first imposition the word “perfect” involves manifold
imperfection, because it infers dependence from the extrinsic. But by the more celebrated
signification of the word all imperfection is refined, because the perfect denotes that which
denies defect. Others distinguish between the participial and Nominal acception of the
word, because that infers a respect to something perfecting, just as all passive participles are
explicated through a respect to an agent, this prescind from respect and designates in the
abstract that to which nothing is lacking in its essence, whether it has that perfection
dependently from elsewhere or not. Now it is agreed that perfection here is not taken 1.
Transitively for the effective act but possessively for the formal act. For here the question is
not about the effective agent, but about the united affection of being. Action is a formality
of the efficient [cause]. The efficient cause is a member of the disjoined affection, which is
adequate to Being only with the caused. But the state or possession of perfect essence
denominates being universally. Since every being has a perfect essence. But that is to be
understood 2. Of the perfect not according to the first imposition but according to the
transferral, or of the perfect not participially, which has perfection dependently from the
extrinsic, but nominally, which has intrinsic perfection prescinding from respect to the agent
and dependence. For the perfect is converted with being. But not every being is made. It is
contradictory to say that God is made. Therefore, the perfect designates that which does not
fail of its essential integrity. Consequently, it is equivalent to the perfect Whole, which they
call a perfectional whole. Since, according to Scaliger, each thing is said to be whole to itself
and perfect, because of those things which it ought to have, nothing is lacking to it. Although
elsewhere a perfectional whole is so called on account of the totality of perfections and
totally includes every perfection. In which sense God alone is to be called a whole of
perfection, or as Scaliger [says], a whole without parts.

II. Formal perfection is taken either ἁπλῶς [simply] and absolutely or σχέσει
[relatively] and comparatively. In that way any perfect thing is considered in itself,
in this way things are compared among themselves, and thus one is often said to
be imperfect in comparison to another.

This distinction is necessary, so that transcendent perfection may be investigated. For one
thing is absolute perfection, which belongs to any Being in itself without collocation to
another; another is comparative, by which in the σύγκρισις [comparison] of things one is
said to be more perfect than another. That is proper to this place, not this. For that is
identified with the essence; this not likewise, since essence does not admit of more and less,

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but according to this one is said to be more perfect than another. Thus one Metal is more
perfect than another, matter in comparison to form is imperfect. Creatures do not deserve
to be called perfect in relation to the highest perfection; not because a certain imperfection
is in them in the genus of being, but because the participation of perfection is of diverse
mode in the special way of being. For essentially and absolutely nothing is imperfect; every
metal in its genus is perfect; prime matter itself has its own perfection, since it is not
destitute of those things which pertain to its being, creatures in general have perfect being
by participation; each one in its own order. For it should be noted that in another sense
absolute perfection is contradistinguished to perfection according to quid [in a certain
respect], so that the former belongs to that which has the highest perfection, as God alone
is perfect; the latter is that which, although mixed with imperfection, is nevertheless due to
any nature; it is called perfection in a certain genus, such as belongs to creatures. Thus
Angels, men, etc. Are said to be perfect, and any creature has the perfection due to it. For
we call perfect that which does not have admixed to it a contrary. That gold is said to be
perfect which has nothing of other metals mixed in. Wine is the more perfect, the less of
watery humor is in it. A half-educated man is imperfectly educated, because erudition is still
joined with a certain rudeness. And so in other things perfect according to quid. Thence that
is absolutely perfect which has no admixture of imperfection, and lacks every defect. But the
rest which are perfect according to quid, because they have something of imperfection, are
also wont to be called imperfect by reason of the same. Thus also they are said
comparatively to be imperfect (which in an absolute sense, or in their own being are
altogether perfect). Thus imperfect virtues, or half-virtues, although not yet perfectly
corresponding to right reason, are nevertheless perfect in their own genus. Where a
distinction should be made between due perfection and undue. The absence of that is called
privative imperfection, when to a being is lacking something of those things which are truly
due to its entitative grade, as if a man is blind or deaf. The lack of this is called negative
imperfection, when to a being is lacking not indeed what it ought to have in its own order,
but what is of perfection in another; as when a tree cannot speak as a man, it is said to be
negatively imperfect. Man is imperfect negatively, because he does not foreknow future
contingents. Others explain positive and privative perfection differently; That by the
concession of every good, this by the removal of every evil. Thus Thomas attributes to the
Angels before the fall a perfect state, not positively by the plenitude of every good, which
includes confirmation in good, but privatively, as removing every evil of fault and
punishment even before confirmation in good.

III. Perfection is either essential or accidental. And this is both natural, and artificial,
and moral, and spiritual, and celestial.

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Essential pertains to this place and denominates Being transcendentally. It is called Essential,
because it concerns the essence itself not constitutively but consecutively. For nothing is
more proper to real being than to have its perfection in its essence. And therefore accidental
is that by which nothing is lacking of those things which, indeed, do not concern the essence
of the thing, but are required for the integrity or well-being, or of operation or ornament.
The former is inseparable from the thing as the essence. Therefore, opposed essential
imperfection is not given. The latter is separable, if not by force of nature, at least by virtue
of a superior power. Therefore, no contradiction is implied if it is said to be separated from
the thing, on which account it is called accidental. Whence also accidental imperfection
occurs. Moreover, this perfection is Natural, by which nothing is lacking to the thing for the
natural state; and it is either internal or external. Internal perfection is both of quantity, in
that which has the quantity due to it. Thus to any nature, both animate and inanimate, a
certain quantity is due. Whence the natural maximum, beyond which the perfection of
nature cannot ascend; the minimum, below which it cannot descend in any genus, as is
taught in Physics. Thus absolutely perfect in quantity is the world; According to quid, e.g., a
man having attained his due Nature, both of quality of faculty, which has the powers due to
it in the grade of its nature. Thus fire has perfect heat; the Sun perfect light absolutely; and
anything endowed in its genus with the natural faculties due to it is said to be perfect. Thus
man in the primeval state can simply be said to be perfect, as to natural faculties, according
to quid, etc. External is of the end, in that by which it enjoys its end, and that is perfect both
effectively, which can produce such as it itself is; as the same man can generate another, and
imitatively, which perfectly imitates something, just as a disciple τὸ παράδειγμα [exemplar]
which he strives to express. Thus nature, emulous of perfection, whose idea is in God, that it
may attain its end: and representatively, which is said to be a perfect image, which exactly
agrees with the exemplar. Moreover, these things which have been said about natural or
physical perfection can also be applied ἀναλογικῶς [analogically] to other modes of
perfections. Thus also it is easily agreed what natural imperfection is. An example of
imperfection of quantity in excess is a giant; in defect a dwarf. Thus lukewarm water is
imperfect by reason of quality, because it has neither heat nor cold perfectly. By reason of
end an infant is said to be imperfect, because he cannot yet generate. 2. Artificial; by which
nothing is lacking to the artificer of those things which are required for his art. And I include
under the name of art every intellectual habit. And that perfection is said to be absolute, by
which someone excels in an art, provided it is given to anyone to attain the highest grade; as
a perfect Musician or Logician who excels in that art of singing or of arguing; and according
to quid, who has attained at least some perfection. 3. Moral, according to which nothing is
lacking to someone in the habit of virtue, which in that order is both eminent and singular,
such as heroic perfection, and common and according to quid comes under the name of
perfection, as when someone is said to be perfectly just, brave, who is endowed with that
habit. 4. Spiritual, which is of faithful men in this life; and it is both imputed, by which they
are said to be relatively perfect by the most absolute perfection of their Redeemer
apprehended by true faith; and inherent, because to them is ascribed perfection in spiritual

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things, not consummated but inchoate; not absolutely but comparatively, not so much by
reason of act as of endeavor. For they are called perfect in opposition to others of either
injustice or hypocritical justice, or in relation to the term of perfection to which they aspire,
although with great imperfection. The former by an extrinsic denomination, the latter by an
intrinsic, both truly and really belong to them; but of these things the Theologians [treat]. To
whom also pertains 5. Celestial perfection, which they ascribe to the blessed in the other
life, where there is the complete consummation of perfection. With accidental perfection
removed, essential perfection remains to be considered. To this place also belongs that
distinction of the perfection of parts, which they call of essence, and define by the totality of
the parts due to it, and of the perfection of grades, or of eminence, which is defined by
excellence in all grades and moments of due perfection. The former has an affinity with the
transcendent, or certainly plainly coincides; the latter not likewise. Since no grades of
essence are given, as it admits neither of more nor less. Each is wont to be applied more
particularly to the modes of perfection. Thus, they say Aristotelian Logic is perfect by reason
of parts, not of grades. The works of the regenerate are perfect in this life, not by reason of
grades, that they are most eminently perfect, but by reason of parts, because they
correspond in their own way to the individual precepts of the decalogue.

IV. Perfection is a united attribute of Being, by which a thing is denominated free

from all Entitative defect.

The formal notion of perfection is expressed by a negation, by which it is conceived in Being,

the not being destitute of those things which pertain to the integrity or to the being of the
thing. Schwartz says perfection is that outside of which it is not possible to take any part, as
that to which nothing is lacking, but that is to be taken of absolute perfection, which is
eminence, not of transcendental essential perfection. By Averroes it is defined as the perfect
in which nothing is found by which it may be said to be imperfect. But that also should be
explained dexterously. Mr. Scheibler describes the perfect as that to which nothing is lacking
for the essence, and he says perfection is nothing other than essence lacking defect of those
things which are required for it. From Aristotle Metaphysics 5, chapter 16, and that of the
Jurists, Digest 1, On the Origin of Law: Nothing is perfect which does not consist of all its
parts. Thus, running through the individual genera of Being, any one is said to perfectly
obtain its being, for no other reason than because it is destitute of none of those things
which are required for being in its genus. Whence it is agreed that by this negation the
formal [aspect] of perfection is expressed. The accidental perfections accede, which likewise
cannot be explained otherwise than through a negation of this kind. Natural perfection is
that by which nothing is lacking to the thing for the goods of nature. Artificial, by which
nothing is lacking for the habit of art, and so consequently. Thence, therefore, essential and
transcendent perfection will express a negation by which nothing is lacking for the essence

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of the thing. For the essence, I say. Not for the accidental state of the thing, or a condition
which is outside the essence. For the lack of that does not destroy transcendental
perfection. Prime matter in its being is perfect, although it lacks that accidental perfection
which it receives from form. Man is essentially perfect, even he who is deficient in those
things which are required for special perfection. For example, if he has been mutilated of
limbs, or is blind, deaf, etc., for these do not pertain to the being of man as such, provided
the principal members are not lacking, without which man cannot be, but the union of soul
and body is dissolved. It can, therefore, be very well said that the formal [aspect] of essential
perfection is Indefectibility. For as it is impossible that Being remain with the essence taken
away, so it is impossible for the essence to remain with those things lacking which pertain to
the essence. So that any thing may be rightly said to be indefectible, not absolutely [in the
sense] that it can in no way fail of entity, but determinately, [in the sense] that with Entity
preserved it cannot lack those things which are of the essence.

V. Perfection is twofold. Eminent and Contracted. That is which encompasses every

perfection and excludes every imperfection, both privative and negative; And it is
of God alone. This expresses a definite perfection, and excludes imperfection at
least privative, and is of all things which are from God.

Eminent is said, not only because it stands out above all things, but also because it is
without any aptitude to be limited. Damascene calls it τὸ ὑπερτελειῶς τελειότατον [the
superperfectly most perfect] perfect beyond perfect, and before perfect. It includes every
perfection by an eminent containment agreeing with itself. It excludes every imperfection,
because what is most absolutely perfect can fail in no way: both privative, since nothing is
lacking to it for the integrity due to it, and negative, so that nothing of possible perfection is
lacking to it which is due at least to another; namely formally, but to this it is claimed
eminently. Thus God is most absolutely perfect, so that plainly nothing is lacking to Him, or
can be lacking, either στέρησις [privation], that is privatively, or ἀποφάσεως [negation], that
is negatively. Whence God is called by the Hebrews by such a word which is derived from
universality, because in God are all good things. By the Greeks παν [all] or Whole, not
because He is composed of many things, but because in Him as in the fount of all things the
perfections are had, Scaliger elegantly [says]: παν does not signify a numerical distribution of
nature, but the infinity of essence. Which the Egyptians express hieroglyphically by a circle,
which is the most perfect of all figures, returning into itself, and by its capacity embracing all
things. That saying of Hermes is well-known: All things [are] to God, in You o Being, All things
from You; You give all things, and receive nothing; You contain all things, and [there is]
nothing which You do not have. For You are all things, nor is there anything else which You
are not. Otherwise, perfection is ascribed to God in a fourfold manner: 1. Originally, because
He alone gives it. 2. Essentially, because He alone is His perfection. Scaliger Exercitation 365,

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sec. 6. 3. Virtually, because He is able without any aid, or even through the most vile organs
to work most perfectly. 4. Actually, because both His ἐνέργεια [activity] is perfect, since
through His will He does without any motion whatever He does, and the ἐνεργήματα
[products] are perfect, which He produces, each one in its own genus. Contracted perfection
is limited and restricted, so that it is not repugnant for a more excellent perfection to be
given in the grade of Being. And this perfection is mingled with imperfection, not privatively,
as if it were destitute of its due integrity, For thus every Being is indefectible. But negatively,
because it does not have all grades of perfection possible in the whole latitude of Being. For
each creature has more of non-being than of being, since it does not rise above the nature
due to it, and does not attain other perfections. Moreover, the contracted perfection of
creatures can be considered both in the first moment, or by reason of essence, which
κυρίως [properly] is so called, since any one has its due nature; and in the second moment,
or by reason of those things which follow the essence, which are both affections and proper
operations, and as they can be absent from their subject without contradiction, so they do
not pertain to transcendental perfection. Similar is the distinction of perfection into
σωματικήν [bodily] of constitution, ἐνεργητικὴν [active] of operation, τελικὴν [final] of
attainment of end.

Corollaries

I. Whatever is perfected is perfected by another.

For to perfect oneself the same thing cannot, by bestowing essence on itself. Although often
someone is said to perfect himself, by acquiring for himself accidental perfection. For since
perfection expresses an effective act, it necessarily infers him by whom is the perfection of
another. The same is not the cause of itself. We can also apply this in particular to spiritual
perfection. He who is destitute of all spiritual perfection, nay is wholly immersed in the
opposed imperfection, certainly cannot in any way spiritually perfect himself. For just as he
who is destitute of all natural faculties can in no way acquire for himself natural faculties, So
he who is altogether destitute of spiritual perfection, left to himself can obtain no such
perfection, but must be perfected by another.

II. Effective perfection expresses no mutation in the one perfecting.

For although in creatures it is joined with motion, and requires a previous intention,
nevertheless that is not to be ascribed to effective perfection, as such, since God acts

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without motion or mutation or previous intention. Lombard explains it: When we say that
God makes something, we understand no motion to be in Him in operating, or any passion
in laboring, as is wont to happen to us, but we signify a new effect of His eternal will, that is,
by His eternal will for something new to exist. Just as from the heat of the sun it happens for
some things to be made, yet with no motion made in it or in its heat, So also by the will of
God new things have being without mutation of the author, who is the one and only and the
principle of all things. Thus the Fathers explain how God was not changed through creation,
nor received an increase of perfection. Since the perfection of God is in this, that it is the
same itself, therefore that which is of another does not increase it. Just as to unity it confers
nothing to its perfection that it is the principle of number. For even if it were not the
principle of number, nevertheless it would be perfect, and when it was made the principle of
it, nevertheless it was not increased. Thus God also before creation was perfect, and after
creation was not increased, says Justin in Questions and Responses to the Orthodox, q. 13,
p. 361.

III. Not everything which is perfect obtains absolute perfection.

For there are grades of perfection, namely special not transcendental. For a thing is said to
be perfect not only that outside of which it is not possible to take any part, as Metaphysics 5,
chapter 16, or which is consummated in every part; But also in another way a thing is said to
be perfect, whatever under some notion of Being has the perfection simply necessary and
essential; in which way a boy can be said to be a perfect man. And similarly the Theologians
say that remiss Charity, although it may be called imperfect with respect to intense,
nevertheless simply and as to essence is perfect. In which way John says, 1 John 2: He who
keeps His word, truly in him the charity of God is perfect. Thus Schwarz, Disputation 10, sec.
1, n. 15, which should be noted against other Scholastics and Papists, who strive to elicit
complete perfection of charity from the name of perfection.

IV. Perfection does not admit of more and less.

For essence alone is perfection. But of whatever thing the essence is indivisible, Scaliger,
Exercitation 106, sec. 2. It consists κατὰ στιγμὴν καὶ ἀκαρὲς [according to a point and an
instant] in the indivisible, and in a point, Metaphysics 7, 6, 7. Therefore, as it receives neither
intension nor remission, so also it does not suffer division, Timpler Metaphysics 1, 2, q. 7.
Hence Scaliger asserts that they abuse the patience of the wise who say a form is greater or
less. For any essence has its own perfection, which can neither be exceeded nor diminished.
Alsted, Metaphysical Encyclopedia, chapter 2, rule 3. Understand, therefore, the canon

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about essential and transcendental perfection, but not about special and accidental
perfection; By reason of which one is more perfect than another, nay even than itself in a
different state. Moreover, essence is ἀμερές [partless], and destitute of parts. Namely in
itself abstractly, and as pure form, although κατά τι [in a certain respect] by reason of a
certain subject or suppositum and concretely it admits division. Hence the blessed Meisner,
Philosophical Part 1, Section 4, Chapter 3, Question 2, distinguishes between the whole and
the essence of the whole, because the whole itself indeed is constructed and integrated of
parts, yet the essence of the whole is single and most simple, and admits no component
parts at all. For to be composed belongs to the whole, as to compose belongs to the parts.
But essence, as it does not compose, so neither is it composed, but gives to the composite a
one and undivided being. Since in essence there is no place for multitude, as Alsted rightly
[says] in the same place. Therefore, it is ἀφιλόσοφον [unphilosophical] and ἄλογον
[irrational], what the same there with Goclenius and other associates contend, that a certain
essence can be intended or remitted by addition or detraction of parts; obviously so that
they may obtain that αὐτοκλασίαν [fraction-hood] is part of the essence of a sacrament,
which nevertheless can be absent from the sacrament with its essence preserved. But
neither does essence have parts, nor does an essential whole remain with an essential part
removed. Moreover, they confound both the partial acts of a sacrament with the very
essence of the whole sacrament, as is clear from what has been said, and the acts φυσικοὺς
[physical] and μυστικοὺς [mystical], which has been shown elsewhere.

V. To the perfect nothing can accede or recede.

It is again true of essential perfection. For essence is like number, to which nothing can be
added or detracted without change of species, Metaphysics 8, text 3. And the perfect is that
to the increase of which there is no place for accession, or to the diminution for decession,
Scaliger, Exercitation 249, sec. 1, or which admits neither προσθήκη [addition] nor
ἀφαίρεσις [removal]. Therefore, because perfection is constituted in a point. What,
therefore, is purely essence, and nothing except perfection itself, that admits no accession,
and no decession. Against the blasphemies of Vorstius, who joins accidents to the most
simple and most perfect divine essence, and does not fear to attribute new decrees and new
knowledge to Jehovah. And certain Calvinists who attribute συμπάθειαν [sympathy] to
Christ even according to Deity, and in this way cannot fail to admit that a certain perfection
accrued to perfection itself in time. Moreover, they abuse this axiom, the Photinians, to
overthrow the incarnation of the λόγος [Word], because nothing can accede to God on
account of His highest Perfection. Gregory of Valentia responds that the λόγος was always
man eminently, because as God He contains all perfections in Himself, but was made man
formally, therefore He received no increase of perfection. Thomas [says] that the λόγος is
said to be man only according to a relation of reason, according to the dependence of

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human nature, which is here perfected, and alone is changed. Others respond that through
essence nothing temporal is predicated of God, but through the mode of a cause, as creator,
or through the mode of union, as the Word was made flesh. Therefore, it is predicated of the
λόγος not ἀμέσως [immediately] and παθητικῶς [passively], but ἐμμέσως [mediately] and
ἑνωτικῶς [unitively], not that He is perfected, but that He received humanity into Himself, so
that He might perfect it, that it might subsist προσωπικῶς [personally]. Just as neither is a
man perfected, who yesterday naked, today is clothed, since the flesh of Christ is said to be
His veil, Hebrews 10:20, but of these things let us speak soberly. One thing is a physical
accession, by which a thing is perfected, another hyperphysical, by which something is
united to another without its own perfection; as to a separated soul no perfection will
accrue when it will be united again with the body. No perfection accrued to God when He
produced creatures and began to be present to them. Nothing accrues when He is conjoined
with believers, so that He may be in them, and they in Him. Which things [pertain] to the
Theologians.

VI. Whatever perfection is in creatures, all that is to be attributed to God.

For He Himself is the highest perfection, from which is all perfection. Therefore, in Him also
is contained every perfection, since nothing is in the effect which is not in the cause,
obviously by containment either formal, according to its proper concept, such as are the
perfections absolutely and simply such, which in their abstract notion infer no imperfection,
so that it is better to have them than not to have them, as power, wisdom, intellect, will,
etc., which are attributed to God, not indeed in that way in which [they are attributed] to
creatures and univocally, but analogically, and in a more perfect mode, removing all
imperfections which they import materially in creatures, as that they are really distinct, that
they inhere accidentally, that they have a term, etc. Or virtual, according to eminence,
because in God are perfections which are such according to quid [in a certain respect], and
formally involve imperfection, for example, sensation, discourse, etc. These are attributed to
God eminently, both by reason of excellence, because more excellent perfections are in God,
and by reason of power, because He Himself powerfully produced them, and can furnish in a
more noble mode whatever belongs to them. Thence by way of eminence and causality we
are carried forward in the cognition of God, nay in these consists the whole moment of
natural theology, as is taught in Pneumatics.

VII. To the most perfect no defect can be ascribed.

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For if any even the least defect should fall upon Him, He would not yet be most perfectly
perfect. Therefore, no defect is imputed to Him without contradiction, whether subjectively
or effectively, because neither can there be in Him, nor can there be from Him any
imperfection. It is not in Him, because defect is repugnant to a most perfectly simple nature.
Hence, all passive potency is banished, so that He is most pure act; all imperfection, so that
He is perfection itself. Not from Him, because He cannot fail, who is indefectibility itself.
Away, therefore, with the voices more than blasphemous, which impute crimes to God!

VIII. The perfection of creatures is participated.

For they are a certain ἀποσκίασμα [shadow] and ἀπεικόνισμα [image] of the highest
perfection which is in God, who communicated Himself through a certain gracious ὁμοίωσις
[likeness]. But in created things is beheld partly an image of the divine perfection, namely in
intellectual nature, partly a certain vestige in things devoid of reason, which is taught
elsewhere. There is no creature, whatever it may be, [which is] its own being; it is not
essential perfection itself, whatever is besides God. As it has Being by participation from
God, so also it obtains only participated perfection. Wherefore an infinite power of acting
can in no way be ascribed to any of creatures, as such, because this argues infinite
perfection. For an attribute is not in the whole genus more perfect than its subject.

CHAPTER IV.

On Unity.

Here there will be two chief heads of the treatise. One ὀνοματολογικὸν [terminological],
which will be occupied chiefly with the Nominal distinctions; the other πραγματολογικὸν
[ontological], which will inquire partly into the abstraction of unity, what it is in common,
what it of itself implies, partly into restriction, how many kinds of unity there are in nature,
what things are to be observed about the modes of one, but especially will diligently explain
the nature of union.

I. Unity is either of a thing or of Reason. That is singular; This universal. Singular is

that by which a thing is incommunicable to inferiors through multiplication of
itself. Universal is that by which a common nature is apt to be in many inferiors
with multiplication of itself.

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One is said in three ways: 1. Absolutely and generally, for everything which is determined by
unity, whether it be out of many, or cannot be out of many. 2. Relatively and specially, for
that which indeed in itself is not many, yet is among many and out of many, which either are
or can be. 3. Exclusively and eminently, which is so one that it is not out of many; or to which
it is repugnant to be with another of the same unity. In this way καθ᾽ αὐτοουσιώδη
[essentially in itself] God alone is one; so that, namely, besides Him there is not or cannot be
another God, therefore He is unique and solitary in that highest grade of unity. In that mode
the individual creatures have their own unity, since along with them it is not repugnant for
other things to be created or to have been created, which can be numbered among them.
Finally, in that sense ἁπλῶς καθόλου [simply in general] everything which is, is one, because
each thing has its own unity in its own genus. Moreover, this unity is transcendent and
Metaphysical and an affection of Being, not quantitative and Arithmetical, which is defined
as the principle of number; since it is rooted in essence, is converted with Being, and
denominates Being absolutely, as previously proved. To investigate the nature of which, the
explications of Nominal distinctions are to be premised, of which the first is into Universal
and singular. It might seem strange to some that we make [the division] into universal and
singular of unity, which is an affection of Being; since it seems to be a peculiar affection of
Being? But it only seems so. In reality it is not. For every disjoined affection has members
really existing before the operation of the mind; since affections are real, they do not
depend on the mind. The same as Being itself, which is not except within the true and real.
But the universal is not formally outside the intellect and before the operation of the mind a
real quid [something], insofar as it is universal. For everything which exists, by that very fact
while it exists, is singular, as Boethius rightly [says]. And no unity existing in a thing is
common. The ideas and universal natures existing separately, which Plato is believed to have
believed, have long since been exploded. There is no common man really separated from
singulars. For if he is separated, he is not in them intrinsically and essentially, that is, Peter is
not a man; but if he is universal, he ought to be in them intrinsically and essentially; and yet
a common nature cannot at the same time be separated from singulars and be in them. For
it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time. And this is why we
do not think that unity should be referred to the real distinctions of unity, because universal
unity arises only through reason, outside of reason it does not exist; only singular unity is
truly real and is supposed in things without the operation of the mind. Whence that is called
of reason, this of the thing. But the universal is considered in two ways: 1. By reason of the
material, it is the very nature accepted according to that being which it has in a singular
thing together with others participating in the same; it is called universal in potency,
Physical, concrete, and in many. 2. By reason of the formal, and it is the common notion
abstracted and represented through a concept, by which the thing stripped of singulars is
precisely fixed. It is called universal in act, Metaphysical, abstract, and after many. To the
former universal unity is not yet attributed; but the latter indeed implies that unity. For two

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things are required for the universal in the latter consideration, mental unity and real
multiplicity. That is attributed to the universal abstractly under the mental precision by
which the common nature is abstracted from inferiors with the individuating conditions
precise, by which it has a certain unity in the mind; this belongs to it relatively insofar as the
inferiors contained under it are beheld at the same time with an aptitude πληθυντικῶς
[plurally] of being in them; which multiplicity is not always actual, but ought to be real.
Therefore, it has that indifference from the mind; furthermore, abstracted nature does not
obtain this relation to many, except insofar as it is apprehended by the mind; and therefore,
formally it is not universal except in the mind. But since common nature does not respect
inferiors in the same way, but sometimes is in them by the mode in and equally, and
sometimes diversely and unequally, the universal is wont to be distributed into univocal and
analogous. Which distinction is not properly of this place; nor ought it to be inculcated here
ex professo. For it touches upon the nature of the knowable and is revoked to it through the
mode of an Affection, as demonstrated elsewhere. The Logicians moreover deal with
universals around the doctrine of Synonyms and Paronyms; and these five predicables are
commonly called universal. But it should be observed: 1. That the Logician does not effect
nor contemplate universals, but only imposes second notions on universals. 2. That it is most
falsely asserted that there are five universals; both because the notion of universal does not
belong to all Predicables, and because not every universal is of the number and census of
the Porphyrian Predicables. Difference is adequate to species. Property and accident are
predicated only extra-essentially. There remain only Genus and Species, which nevertheless
do not exhaust the whole latitude of universals. Since an abstracted common notion does
not suffer to be included within the predicamental boundaries, which is proved elsewhere.
Now briefly about the singular. The singular is what is indivisible to inferiors. Therefore, it is
called an individual; because, namely, it infers a negation of this kind according to which a
singular thing is not divisible into many such Entities as it is itself. And incommunicable: by
quidditative communication to inferiors, in which it may be multiplied. But any thing obtains
its individual act through itself without anything adventitious. For let there be something
else on which this haecceity [thisness], as they say, or singularity depends, distinct from the
singular itself; if that exists, it will not be able not to have the act of being individual,
therefore about it again the question will remain, whence is it? And thus further to infinity.
To avoid which we say that the proper nature of the thing itself is the principle of its
individuation. For it does not need another principle, which through its own entity is what it
is. What is simple, is individual through its own simple Entity. What is composite, is singular
through its intrinsic component principles. The same is the principle of essence and of this
singular essence. Because the singular essence is not other than essence as such; But in
reality they are the same, they are distinguished only through inadequate concepts.

II. Unity is either per se or per accidens. We call that essential, this accidental. That
is which constitutes a Being per se, having an integral and undivided essence.

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 This, out of which many things complete of themselves are reduced to a certain
indivision and constitute a Being per accidens. And it is either subjective of
concretion, or adjunctive of consociation, or collective of aggregation.

The same is the notion of unity as of being; namely, one thing καθ᾽ αὑτὸ [essentially] per se,
another κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς [accidentally] per accidens; about that in the following theorems,
about this in the present, as to the description and distinction. Three things are required for
one per accidens: 1. Actual containment of many. 2. The complete notion of the things
contained. 3. An extra-essential habitude. For in a simple essence [there is] nothing per
accidens. But when many things concur, let each one be so compared that it is both
complete of itself in the notion of being and does not include the other, but respects it
extra-essentially even in the conjunction itself. For what things are not complete, nothing
prohibits reducing them to a common essence, especially if they have themselves as act and
potency. And what things ought to constitute one per accidens cannot be essentially the
same. With these things observed it is clear why three genera of this unity are constituted
not inconveniently. 1. By reason of subjective concretion, dispersed accidents convening in
one subject are one, as Theology and Philosophy in a Philosophical Theologian, and the
subject itself with the accidents, as doctrine with the soul. Whence concretes which consist
of subject and accident, or of accident and accident. 2. By reason of conjunctive association,
unity is either interior in the accidental unity of a suppositum with a certain permeation, as
in ignited iron, or exterior which happens by grafting, juncture, glue, or suture. 3. By reason
of collective aggregation, unity is given in Beings through aggregation either of the ordered,
such as a Republic on account of the order of those commanding and obeying, or of the
unordered, as in a heap of stones, where there is no order. Accidental unity, therefore,
differs in many ways from essential unity. 1. By reason of the subject: That denominates a
Being per se, this a Being per accidens. 2. By reason of form: That consists in the indivision of
essence; this in the concretion or aggregation of many things. That of itself infers no
composition, this is not except with accidental composition. That is of absolute perfection;
this only according to quid [in a certain respect]. With that lost the thing itself is taken away;
with this dissolved the things do not cease to be, but cease to be present to each other per
accidens. But now to unity per se itself.

III. Unity is a transcendental attribute by which a Being is denominated

quidditatively incommunicable and undivided Entitatively.

Unity is wont to be described in two ways; 1. From the formal notion, 2. From the
consequent condition. That is Entitative indivision; this is respective division. According to
that a thing is said to be undivided in itself; according to this divided from anything else.

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That belongs to Being adequately, since every Being is undivided, and vice versa. This
inadequately; since not every Being is in a state of division or diversity. Therefore, the former
more rightly constitutes a united affection; the latter pertains to the disjoined affections,
flowing from unity, by which Being is said to be the same or diverse. Therefore, with division
or diversity dismissed to that place, we weigh only Entitative indivision. What that indivision
is, Philosophers sharply dispute. Briefly, it is such a notion of Being that it presents itself to
our mind to be beheld as immune from every congeries of many of one nature, and from
every aggregation of many complete Beings of diverse nature, and also as immune from the
virtual containment of many participating in itself παρωνύμως [paronymously], or by which
division into many complete things, or into things essentially inferior to itself, is denied to
Being. Most optimally, in my judgment, the matter is settled by removing rational unity and
unity per accidens. For thus is manifested the unity of the thing and per se; because through
unity a thing is indivisible and has an essence of itself undivided. It is indivisible into many
essences such in number as it is itself. It has an essence of itself undivided, that is, not
consisting of many complete things essentially divided. We can, therefore, say that with
respect to the reason of one, on the one hand there is indivisibility with respect to those
things which it cannot have below itself as essentially inferior; for otherwise it would be a
universal, which is one only through reason; on the other hand, there is indivision with
respect to those things which it has within itself as essentially constituting, if it be
composite; or with respect to its own simple Entity, if it be free from composition. For
without this indivision it would not be one per se, if, namely, the conjuncts respected each
other only extra-essentially, and indeed as per se divided and obtaining complete being. By
reason of the former, aptitudinal multiplicity is excluded, because it is indivisible. By reason
of the latter, actual multitude is repugnant, because division is denied. For multitude is
nothing other than the division of things, by which beings are divided among themselves
and are many. What therefore defines unity both incommunicability and indivision, I would
not absurdly say, but I should wish it to be rightly accepted: 1. For I am speaking of real
unity, which does not depend on the operation of the mind, and which is only of singulars.
But who would deny that singulars are incommunicable? Since in that very thing consists the
distinction from universals, which are communicable to many contained essentially under
them. 2. Therefore, I designate the incommunicability by which the singular, which alone is
truly one, is constituted and adequately distinguished from the universal, which is a negation
of the aptitude to communicating itself by essential participation by reason of the many
contained under it. Because the singular cannot have others below itself, in which it may be
multiplied through the communication of itself, and of which it can be said quidditatively on
account of essential communication. Which is to be studiously observed. 3. I join
incommunicability and indivision; although I am not ignorant that others do not at all join
these, but constitute the indivision of one, the incommunicability of the singular formal. For
I urge the same thing; since there is not given in reality unity besides the numerical and
singular, and a certain universal, the nature of one cannot be fully and adequately explained
unless both are joined. For whatever makes for adequately defining real and per se unity, so

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that it may be distinguished partly from mental unity, partly from one per accidens, all that
is to be adduced into the definition of real and per se unity; And therefore, there is to be
expressed no less that which constitutes singular unity than that which absolves one per se.
In that sense, not in another, I accept the definition of Henry of Ghent, which the Master of
Subtleties [Duns Scotus] proclaims to be most acute. Unity is the privation of divisibility in
itself, of communicability in another. This expresses both; and what constitutes one per se,
and what absolves singular one? The negation of divisibility in itself makes a thing to be one
per se, so that it does not embrace actually divided essences. The negation of
communicability in another causes a thing to be one with numerical unity by which it is
incommunicable to others, nor can it be in others by essential participation.

IV. Unity is either undivided indivisible or undivided divisible; That denies both the
act and the potency of division; this denies only the act, it infers the potency.
Undivided indivisible unity is a mode of Being which through its essence excludes
all divisibility. And it is of God alone.

This restriction of unity is analogical. For the less anything is divided, the more it is one.
Alexander of Hales distinguishes between one through unity and one through union; which
distinction ought to be explicated altogether according to this of ours. Moreover, others
make undivided indivisible twofold: Most simply simple, which is neither divisible nor can
enter into the constitution of another; which can be said only of God, who both in Himself
repels every division, and outside Himself does not enter into the internal constitution of
anything divisible. And simply simple, which does not admit of resolution into other things,
although it can be composed with another and enter into the constitution of another; which
again is said to be simple either through the mode of abstraction, which is most highly
abstracted, as Being and the rest of the transcendentals; or according to the mode of
designation in a composite, as an insectible point. We in the present place accept only one
undivided indivisible, namely God, who is one with most single unity, so to speak. For
abstractions obtain a unity of reason, not of the thing, precisive, not positive. A point, which
is simply ἀτομικὸν [indivisible], is only conceived by the mind, and refuses not so much
entitative as quantitative division. God alone obtains both the highest and simply simple
simplicity; because to Him alone belongs both incommunicability and indivisibility in the
most eminent way. Incommunicability: because it is altogether repugnant for the divine
essence to be communicated to many Gods; since nothing equally fights with Deity as a
plurality of essence. For it implies a contradiction to grant many infinites, so that the Pagan
πολυθεΐα [polytheism] is not sufficiently wondered at. But that is beyond all wonder, that
this highest incommunicability of the divine essence consists with a singular and
incomprehensible communication. For the divine essence is not only incommunicable to
many essences in number, but is also common to many diverse supposita, which subsist in

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that one incommunicable essence without any division and multiplication. Which is certain
from faith. It indeed seems similar to the communication of the universal to the singular, on
account of which similitude Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, book 3, chapters 4, 5, 6,
calls the divine essence common and the persons individuals; but in reality it is not such;
since in a Being most highly singular the notion of universal genus and species in no way has
place; but it is a communication of nature to supposita. Monologion [Anselm] truly [says]:
The divine nature is one in number in the three persons. But a universal nature ought not to
be one in number in many but by an essential communion, which is above the individual.
And Augustine [says]: The divine essence is predicated of the three persons, not as a whole
of parts, nor as a genus of species, nor as a species of an individual, but in another ineffable
and incomprehensible way. Which is to be noted against Piscator, who indicates the divine
essence as a genus, the divine persons as species. The highest indivisibility is claimed for our
God, because no composition in God. For division presupposes composition. Thence in that
most highest unity of the most holy Trinity there is a mutual περιχώρησις [coinherence] of
the supposita, by which, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, book 6, last chapter, each one is
in each one, and all in each one, and each one in all, and one all. For περιχώρησις
[coinherence] is an argument of unity. And the more intimate and close that is, the simpler
and more sublime this is, so that they labor in vain who hold them for opposites.

V. Unity in the divided divisible is a mode of Being which is undivided through the
concourse of diverse things. Its causal principle is the unition of distinct things;
the formal [principle] is the indivision of the united things; the consequent or
effect is the communion resulting from the union.

It is called divisible not by reason of the state of the term, that in this unity, as such, division
has place, or that the condition of this unity and its state is such that it can be divided, but
by reason of origin and principle, that formerly they were divided through essence, which
under this state are undivided by grace of union, and that they do not obtain indivision καθ᾽
αὑτὸ [essentially] and per se and independently, but κατ᾽ ἄλλο [accidentally] and per
another extra-essentially and dependently. Briefly, it is called divisible not on the part of the
post [the end] but on the part of the ante [the beginning], or not by reason of the terminus
ad quem [end term], but by reason of the terminus a quo [beginning term]. For it cannot
always be dissolved, but sometimes is indissoluble, and the more anything is indissoluble,
the more it approaches to the highest and principal unity; the more easily it can be
dissolved, the more it recedes from that highest unity, which is in no way divisible. But
divisible unity is most rightly described through the indivision of diverse things, according to
that of Aristotle, Metaphysics 4, chapter 6: τὰ πολλὰ τρόπον τινὰ μονάδι διαιρεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν
ἔργων [many things in a certain way are distinguished from works by unity]. Dr. Werenberg,
Metaphysical Exercises 6, thesis 3, defines unity in general, a certain mode of Being, which

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follows the union of parts in a whole, by reason of which the parts convene in a common
essence, and are distinguished from the essence of other things, but these things rightly said
are applied to the one undivided divisible in species; Only let the word “part” be explicated
loosely; for those concurring to this unity are as certain parts, the concourse of which is a
certain convenientia [agreement] in a common essence, by reason of which this one is
adequately distinguished from other things. Which is clear from the consideration of the
principle and the effect. The principle of this unity is twofold to be explicated, the causal,
which is in place of the fundament, and the formal, in which consists its notion. But we say
the effect is that which necessarily follows upon that unity, so that it cannot be without it.
That is the unition of things diverse by their nature; This, the concourse and indivision or
union of the united things. This, finally, is the communion following the union, which on
account of the dignity of the matter we will declare here more amply.

VI. Unition is the act by which diverse things are coupled to unity, so that the divided
may obtain a certain indivision.

Two things are to be considered in union: the Act and the State. That is transitory, this
remains. That is the cause through which the united things obtain a certain unity, this is the
condition of the thing obtaining such unity. Therefore, unition is properly called the act
conjoining, union in truth the state of conjunction. Here it is to be accurately noted that
union is from the class of Relations. Therefore, around union are to be observed: 1. The
Subjects or extremes, which are things different by nature, since union is between many. 2.
The Fundament, which is either remote or proximate. That is the affection of those things,
namely the aptitude to union, when they have themselves as δύναμις [potency] or potency,
and ἐντελέχεια [actuality] or act, that is, one is perfectible, by which it can be actuated and
perfected, the other is potent to perfecting and actuating. The potency is the appetite of
that act. The act is the perfection of the potency. For if each is a potency, they cannot be
conjoined to one another. If each is an act, a Being per se cannot arise. Out of two entities
constituted in perfect act, one per se is not made. This (the ratio fundandi [reason of
founding]) is the actual conjunction of natures, by which the unibilia [unitable things]
become actually united; or the unition itself. For it is not enough that one can perfect the
other and be united with it, but it is also required that they actually be joined and concur.
Hence 3. The relatum [related], the nature which is referred in that conjunction, and the
correlatum [co-related], the other nature to which it is referred. 4. The Terminus which
results from the actual conjunction of distinct natures, which is the suppositum or person,
etc. Hence now arises the relation partly from the respect of the extremes to the term,
partly from the σχέσις [relation] of the term to the extremes. The former is of the diverse
things in one undivided term; the latter is the communion of the term itself to the diverse
natures. That has itself as antecedent; this, as consequent, whence that is called the general

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notion of cause, this of effect. Which things are necessarily required in every true, real,
substantial, properly called union, so that with either one of these denied, the union itself is
taken away. Whence it is now understood what unition accomplishes! That it is the
proximate fundament, which posited, union cannot fail to result. And therefore, union
primarily and immediately rests upon it, about which now more amply.

VII. Union is the communicable concourse of things distinct by nature.

Or as the Greeks Suidas and Phavorinus [say], henosis esti sundrome koinonike ton dietoton
pragmaton [union is the communicative convergence of distinct things].

Regarding this definitive proposition, we must attend: 1. To the subject or the defined, which
is henosis [union]: Now union is taken either actively, for the act of uniting, or passively for
the passion of the unitable and the connection of united things, or relatively for the relation
and mutual respect of the united.

There it is the uniting on the part of the effecting agent: Here on the part of the unitable
things: Here it is the union and uniting itself. This latter results from the former as the formal
effect proceeds from its formal cause. Moreover, the modes of union (its homonyms) are
multifarious; Damascenus, in book 3 on the Orthodox Faith, ch. 3, enumerates several
modes, some of which almost infer mere confusion, others a mere naked relation.

Of this kind are: 1. Kata sunchusin [according to confusion], by confusion, as of powder from
diverse aromatics. 2. Kata parathesen [according to juxtaposition], by juxtaposition, as when
from honey and water mulsum (honeyed wine) is made. 3. Kata phuramon [according to
intermixture], by intermixture or mass, as bread is made from water and flour. Of that kind
are kata philían [according to friendship], by friendship. 2. Kata metochén axiómatos
[according to participation of dignity], by participation of dignity. 3. Kata koinonian
onomatos [according to communion of name], by communion of name. 4. Kata eudokian
[according to approval], by approval. For us it may be permitted to distinguish [unions] thus:
one union is proper, another improper. That is saluted by itself and properly as union, but
this by habitude towards that, and by equivocation or less properly comes under the name
of union. And improper union is either verbal, or notional, or habitual, or real. It is verbal,
which consists in the mere attribution and agreement of words, as in figurative and
improper locutions, e.g. “Herod is a fox.” It is notional, which is found between genus and
species or individual, and is called union kata metochén [according to participation].
Habitual is that which arises through relation, outside of which it truly is not. This consists
among those things which bear some habitude at least towards one another without real
conjunction. And it is either social, in the society whether conjugal between spouses, or civil
between citizens, or spiritual between members of the Church: According to the triple

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hierarchy it can be called Domestic, Political, Ecclesiastical: or moral, consisting in the
congruence of habits and homonoia [concord] or mutual consensus. That is called the union
of persons, this of wills. Real but improper is the concurrence of many things to constitute
one accidental or per accidens [by accident].

Therefore it is called kata sumbebékos [according to accident], or accidental, when either

diverse accidents concur in one subject, or diverse substances [concur] to one per accidens:
which union is called improper, not because it is merely verbal and figurative or notional and
respective: For it is truly distinct from those, since it is true and real, by which those things
concurring to an accidental union are truly and really united and conjoined, without any
impropriety of words; and therefore in that union the true and real presence of the united
things is required, not merely some conjunction or mutual habitude suffices: But it is called
improper; because its term is not one per se, which accurately speaking and strictly alone is
truly one. For one per accidens is a Being per accidens: but that is called Being only by an
analogy of proportionality.

In brief, it is said to be an improper union not in a rhetorical but in a metaphysical sense,

which must be most studiously noted. Moreover, accidental union is either of accident and
accident, or of substance and substance. That is estimated from the unity of the subject,
when two or more disparate accidents are united and coupled in one subject, or an accident
is united with its subject, as in sugar whiteness and sweetness: likewise virtue with the soul,
whence the white sweet, the virtuous soul. This latter results from the concurrence of
diverse substances in a Being per accidens, which occurs either by sunchusin [confusion] or
confusion, as in mixed things, where diverse species are mingled, an example of which is
hydromel (honeyed water), or by paráthesin [juxtaposition] or juxtaposition, as in
aggregates, e.g. a heap of stones, or by parastásin [assistance] or assistance, such as is the
case both in contiguities present to one another, as when one thing stands beside another:
and in continuities, as when two planks are joined together.

It can also be said: the accidental union of substances is either according to quantity, and
that either continuous through agglutination, or discrete through aggregation,
accumulation: or according to quality, through commixture.

Moreover, accidental union is either interior, when the united things intimately permeate
one another; or exterior, when they are joined only extrinsically without permeation, as in
assistance and juxtaposition. That one perhaps infers some henosis [union]; this however a
mere naked systásis [conjunction]. That one more properly approaches the union properly
so-called: this recedes further from it: and is still found in great variety: it is mediate or
immediate, greater or lesser, nearer or more remote.

To the accidental union we may in a certain way refer the Sacramental union, as well as the
spiritual and the celestial, of which the former is in the Holy Supper between the earthly and
the celestial thing. The second between the believing heart and Christ in this life: the third

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between the blessed and the Holy Trinity in the other life. The first is called symbolic, the
second gracious, the third glorious. But you should observe that this mystical union is said
only by analogy [kat’ analogían], by removing, that is, all imperfections, and conceiving [it]
eminently. Nay indeed, [you should observe] how closely it approaches the union strictly so-
called in Metaphysics.. For it even infers a certain communication, however much it is not
terminated to one except per accidens. To deduce this elaborately here is not our purpose.

Thus much concerning the subject.

In the predicate we have the definition or explanation of the union properly so-called:
regarding which the matter and form of union must be noted. The matter is named ta
pragmata dietota [the things distinct], the things or natures distinct, which are diverse
substances. I mean substances. For from accident and accident, just as from accident and
subject, there cannot be made a Being or one per se. They must be diverse and distant not
by local separation, but by diversity of nature, that is, disparate by nature, not however
separate and set apart. Diversity is required. For to union many things must necessarily
concur. In the meantime, among things which are one, no union is given. Hence it is that the
Theologians say that in the Holy Trinity there is not so much a union given, as a most simple
unity by reason of the essential identity of the Persons.

This also is the reason why there is not a union properly so-called between Genus and
Species, or Species and Individual, because these do not really differ: but the united things
must be really diverse:

Add, that they must be disparate by nature: which should be understood of them not only
outside of union, but even in the union itself.. For true and proper union does not remove
the diversity of the united things: and that [diversity], in respect to which the united things
regard one another, brings with it no mutation.. But union accomplishes nothing other than
to actually conjoin the unitable things, as it finds them, the diversity and disparateness of
the things remaining intact. From that, however, separation is by no means inferred. It is one
thing to be distinguished, another to be disjoined, and it is not the same thing to be
disparate and to be disseparate: For they are called disparate by reason of essence, not local
distance. For it implies a manifest opposition in the apposition, for things to be united and
separated, conjoined simultaneously and disjoined.

Moreover, that distinct things by their nature may be conjoined, that habitude of things is
required, by which they regard one another, as act and potency either properly or at least
analogically, so that one can perfect the other, one can be perfected by the other: whereby
the one bears itself actively, the other passively. I gave the reason above. Thus the soul and

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body bear themselves as act and potency. The soul’s role is to perfect, the body’s to be
perfected. The former is the principle of perfection: the latter the subject.

The form of union is set forth under a twofold concept, common and proper. The common is
denoted by the word sundromé [convergence], i.e. concourse (namely, of diverse
substances, of which one is as act, the other as potency or quasi): and it is also called
sunduasmos [conjunction], conventus or conjunction, and the things themselves are said to
be sunduázontas [coming together]. Two things are to be noted here: The truth of the
Conventus; The unity of the Terminus. Diverse natures truly and really come together, and
that in one terminus. Therefore this concourse is not fictitious, or intentional, or habitual, or
accidental and improper, but true, real, substantial and proper. Here is no mixture, no
confusion, but a true union. The terminus is not one by concretion or aggregation or
juxtaposition, but one kata sunénosin [according to union] by true and substantial union,
and thus one per se.

The terminus is called henosis [union], because in it is unity by reason of the sundromé
[convergence] and concourse. But since not every substantial concourse occurs to one per
se, therefore the specific differentia, sundromé koinoniké [communicative convergence], is
added. This is the truly proper and adequate concept of union, because it ultimately
constitutes real, substantial and properly so-called union, and distinguishes it from improper
union;

Now observe accurately the distinction between sundromé koinoniké [communicative

convergence], and koinonía [communion], the act of communication, which are distinct, as
antecedent and consequent and (taking the terms broadly) as cause and caused. For the
actual principle of communion is the very communicative concourse itself, and it
presupposes a communicable conjunction. Then, just as the unity of things differs from
plurality, so also union differs from communion. For in union there are many things, as one,
in communion they are regarded, not as one, but as two distinct, yet not separate.

VIII. Communion is that by which, on account of the union, that which is proper to
one is communicated to the other without its multiplication or transfusion, yet
truly and really.

Here communion must be distinguished; for one kind is by reason of the common terminus
henosis [union], another by reason of the other nature, which can be perfected, and can
participate in the other’s perfection. What the latter is can be gathered from On the Parts of
Animals, Bk. 2, ch. 2 [of Aristotle], that it is that by which the united things, retaining their
distinct natures, really participate in the common principle on account of the union.

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This latter [kind] has now been defined from the indicated foundation, with the spurious
modes removed, from which the proper reason easily appears. Namely, that it is the
common possession of properties, arising from this, that the more perfect of the united
things truly and really communicates its own properties to the more ignoble, yet without
multiplication or transfusion. And thus there is here no metábasis [transition] or alloíosis
[alteration], but a true metádosis [impartation], by which it happens that what belongs to
one kat’ autó [per se] and per se, is participated by the other kata sundúasin [by
conjunction] through and by reason of the union.

The former [kind of communion] precedes in the order of nature; this latter follows. Both
are necessary in a true and substantial union: both the participation of the common
terminus by reason of the natures, and the perfection of one nature from the other by
reason of the properties. With one lacking, the unity through the union cannot be
preserved. For as to the former: just as there cannot be a relation without a correlative, so
there cannot be a union properly so-called without it. A terminus is required, in which the
united things may come together in the union and not constitute one: so if no mutual
respect is established towards these things, that terminus will be found not to belong either
to one or the other of the united things, but to be common to both, inasmuch as each
remains in it.

As to the latter: Just as it is impossible for one real [being] to be constituted incommunicable
from many incommunicables (because from two acts per se an act one [in number] cannot
be made, as Scaliger [says] Exerc. 6, s.5), so act and potency cannot concur to constitute one
per se, without there immediately following a certain períchōrēsis [mutual interpenetration]
and circumincession, by which the act perfects the potency, and the more perfect of the
united things intimately pervades that which needs perfection, and communicates to it
some perfection.

In every union there is dúnamis [potency] and entelécheia [actuality]; the latter is not
without the communication of properties, with proportion preserved, so that the former
receives and is perfected, the latter perfects and imparts, and thus those things which
belong originally and per essentiam to this one cannot be denied participatively and per
koinōnian [by communion] to the other. The reason is, that through a true union there
results a unity of supposit. When therefore the more noble of the united things acts or
operates, the operation cannot but be ascribed to the whole supposit. But it cannot act
separatively and apart, but by reason of the substantial sundúasis [conjunction] it acts with
the communion of the other, which the unity of the common principle requires, or the
participation of the common terminus of the union. Further, one cannot operate with the
communion of the other, unless it has first communicated to the other the power of acting,
since it does not obtain that from itself. Certainly there is no communion in action, of those
things which do not have a common power of acting, there is no energetic koinōnía
[communion] without a true communion.

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For how can that be admitted into the consortium of action, which is utterly destitute of all
power of acting (as far as that action goes)? E.g. the members of an animal’s body are said
to sense, therefore they have the power of sensing, either by nature or by the grace of
communication. For the second act cannot be without the first. From which it is most
efficaciously concluded; if the communion of properties is denied, the communion of
energies or operations is denied. If the communion in acting is denied, the participation of
the common terminus is denied. If the participation of the common terminus is denied, the
union itself is denied.

IX. Union is twofold, Natural and Personal. The former is when two incomplete
natures concur to one nature. The latter [is] when two natures, one complete and
the other incomplete, are united to constitute one Person.

The adequacy of the division is clear. For the union properly so-called, whose nature and
requirements we have just described, occurs between substance and substance, which are
as act and potency, and is terminated to one per se. But the unitable substances can only
bear themselves in this twofold respect. Either both are incomplete, or one is complete and
the other incomplete: For from several complete [substances] one per se cannot result. But
one can proceed from each incomplete, provided they regard one another as act and
potency, as is evident in the example of matter and form. Moreover, there is no repugnance
of terms that a complete nature should assume an incomplete one to constitute one Person.

And here an analogy of dunamis and entelécheia [potency and actuality] is given. Whether a
finite and created person could at least by the absolute power of God assume an alien
incomplete nature, the Scholastics dispute, as can be seen in Gregory of Valentia, disp. On
the Incarnation of the Word of God, contr. 1, q. 3, p. 6, with Gabriel and Occam affirming,
and Cajetan, the Gandavian, and Durandus denying along with other followers of Thomas,
who [say] that to terminate an alien nature belongs properly to the divine Person on account
of its infinity.

Otiose [ineffectual] subtleties and useless [discussions]. But that the divine Person of the
Logos assumed the human nature is certain by faith, nay reason itself teaches that such a
union is not one of those things impossible in its lone and extraordinary mode. For it
involves no contradiction whether we regard the assuming divine Person or the assumed
human nature. Not on the part of the assuming Person. For it is of infinite perfection, and
therefore can infinitely supply that which pertains to the perfection of the office of human
personality, so that by the force of it the humanity coheres substantialily as by a terminus
and complement, so that the singular humanity exists in the nature of things, which alone
properly and formally belongs to the reason of personality. The imperfections which are
adjacent to created persons are utterly exiled here. Nor on the part of the assumed human

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nature: since two things are said of it, neither of which implies a contradiction: namely that
it both lacks a proper personality, and subsists by an alien one. It can lack a proper
personality without contradiction: since the supposit is a mode posterior to the nature, nay
in created things really distinct from the nature. And indeed everything prior can exist
without the posterior, provided it is not something transcendent, or something distinct, from
whose complete negation as to each of its parts some contradiction would follow. And those
things which are really distinct in a finite essence, can altogether be separated from each
other, at least by infinite power.

What is lastly true of personality and nature in general, will be proved in particular.
Moreover, that the human nature, destitute of its own hypostasis, can be elevated into the
hypostasis of the divine Word, and subsist by it, is clear from this; that the Person of the
Logos has altogether that perfection, that it can terminate and substantialily complete a
singular humanity, in itself not yet terminated and completed in subsisting. If the Logos can
supply this to the humanity, the humanity could also receive it from the Logos. For the active
power of God corresponds in the creature to an obediential power, so the reason of the
division was established from the nature of the unitable substances.

Now it also becomes clear from the consideration of the unitive terminus. Whatever things
concur in the union, are terminated to one incommunicable [being]. But [a being] is
incommunicable by reason of the subsistence proceeding from the substantial and natural
principles, by which the nature is terminated in itself and independent in subsisting: or by
reason of subsistence from elsewhere, when indeed the substantial principles are complete,
but lack an ultimate act of subsisting emanating from their own and natural principles, so
that it is terminated and personated by the subsistence of another. The truth of the division
is established, besides what I have added.

Formerly we divided divisible unity by reason of the union into Physical or essential, and
adequate or singular. And we made this latter both mystical of the Word and Spirit, and
hypostatic of the Logos and humanity. Now the sagacious reader easily discerns from what
has been said concerning union, what we may desire in that division.

But now the nature and truth of the members of our division must be explained.

The Extremes in Natural Union

In the natural union the extremes are two incomplete natures (incomplete not only in being
but also in subsisting) of which however one is more perfect than the other, so that this
latter can also be perfected by the former: which are matter and form. For the latter has the
role of potency, the former of actuality. Therefore the former can be perfected and actuated:
but it belongs to the latter to perfect and actuate. Hence the remote foundation of the union

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of matter and form is evident. The proximate is the actual uniting or act conjoining matter
and form.

Thence the terminus, the natural composite or complete nature incommunicably subsisting
through itself and considered in itself: in which the aforesaid extremes concur. Hence the
form thoroughly fills the matter, and actuates and determines it, where it wholly
communicates itself to it, and constitutes one composite with it, and locates it in a certain
specific kind of Being, and renders it one incommunicable. Therefore there is a relation
given when the subject is considered in order to the terminus: namely the relation of matter
and form in the natural composite.

Conversely, a correlation results, if the habitude of the terminus to its subject is considered,
which is the communication of the complete nature as terminus to the incomplete natures
matter and form, which both come together in the common nature or composite. This union
and communion infers both the mutual immanence of the substantial principles (thus
matter and form are called in the composite) with the períchōrēsis [mutual interpenetration]
of matter and form, and also the communication of properties. For the act of the form is
communicated to the matter, which [act] is twofold, substantial and accidental. The former
gives being to matter, so that it is some such thing; the latter, to operate, so that joined to
the form it comes into the communion of actions. For without the former, matter would be
indeterminate; without the latter, it would be excluded from operation, and thus would not
at all be actuated, or certainly would in no way concur to the acts of the composite, both of
which are equally absurd.

Certainly there would be no union, unless the form actuated and terminated the matter,
which is mere potency and indeterminate in itself. None at all [would there be], if the
communion of operations, unless the form communicated the faculty of acting to the
matter, which in itself is merely passive. Therefore the composite would neither arise
through the union, if the communication of substantial act is denied, nor would any
operation or any effect proceed from the composite, if the communion of accidental act is
denied. Hence Scaliger accurately concludes: “That from matter and form one [being] results
for this reason, because they are an internal cause through mutual communication
interchanging with one another reciprocally giving and receiving, each in its own mode some
perfection, with proportion nevertheless preserved, since the form is perfective, the matter
perfectible, and it belongs to actuality to give, to potency to receive,” Exerc. 307.s.27.

That therefore the substantial act is communicated to matter congrexui et sustásei [by being
gathered and set together], by which the form enters into and pervades all the particles of
matter intimately, so that there is not even the smallest part which is not informed, precisely
because the form is whole in the whole and whole in any part. “Form is so divine a thing,

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that, though it is a substance, it thoroughly fills another whole substance, so that from both
one [being] results,” says Scaliger, Exerc. Cit. S.29.

That it participates in the accidental acts of the form, is proved by the fact that otherwise
nothing would rightly be ascribed to the whole composite, if there were no communion of
matter and form in acting... Therefore for this reason the form must communicate its
perfections to the matter, which conduce to this [communion in acting], yet on the other
hand the form cannot in turn receive imperfections from the matter, since the matter bears
itself merely passively. But where it seems to communicate any imperfection to the form,
that results not so much into the form, as into the whole composite.

Finally the predication proves each, an infallible demonstration. For the form is predicated
formally of matter, e.g. “matter is informed”: and the properties of the form are predicated
of matter, e.g. “the power of seeing, of sensing” [is predicated] of the body, which is
therefore denominatively called living and sensitive. But such predication presupposes
communication as its foundation.

In the same way the personal union can be declared from the general nature of union, not
without fruit... The extremes are the divine nature as actuality and the human nature as
potentiality, the latter being complete in subsisting, the former incomplete... Although there
is not given a geometrical proportion between them, yet a proportion of habitude and order
cannot be denied, such as usually exists between the potency and object.

For both the divine Personality and the human nature are per se such, that the human
nature can depend on the divine Personality as on a terminus. The former is in the position
of actuality, the latter of potentiality. The concourse of both bids us piously consider that
saying of Augustine, Ep. 3 to Volusianus: “In this mystery the whole reason of the fact is the
power of the Doer.”

Moreover, they do not concur as an abstracted personality with a nature, but as a nature
hypostatized or a Person with its own nature destitute of proper personality... The reason of
the unitable extremes is no other before the union than in the constitution, though it is
other as regards the external condition and state.

The divine Person cannot be at all without nature, even internally in itself, much less as
other and extrally. As therefore before the union the Personality is not without nature, so
neither in the union. But since the union formally is sundromé koinōniké [a communicative
concurrence], it is clear that the same must also be said concerning the hypostatic union, if
indeed it should be called a true, real and substantial union. Therefore it cannot but infer
both the mutual immanence of the natures, and also the communication.

Without the former, there is no conjunction; without the latter, only a mere sustásis
[conjunction]. The truth of the conjunction requires the true presence of the concurring

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natures; so that wherever one united [nature] is, there the other cannot but be. The unity of
the terminus cannot be preserved without the communion. But in this union, partly and
períchōrētikōs [by mutual interpenetration], partly and achōrístōs [inseparably], the
terminus is constituted the united Person. When the Word became flesh, the flesh was also
truly made the Word’s, so that the divine and human nature constitute one Person.

Which indeed cannot even be thought, unless the Son of God communicated His subsistence
with the assumed flesh. For how could God and man be truly and really one undivided
Hypostasis, unless the assumed humanity (which in itself is asustatos [not self-subsisting]
and does not subsist except in the Person of the Word) was truly and otherwise made
participant of that very Person? This is further accurately proved from the nature of relation
by the Most Reverend and Excellent Dr. Mislenta, my most honored preceptor, in his
Sacrosancta Disquisitio, p. 31.

The communion of the Hypostasis is followed by the communication of idioms. For the
communicative concourse is followed by the actual communication. This is manifest from
the general doctrine of union. And this urges so much the more efficaciously, by how much
this union is more intimate. For if in every union this communication is necessary, so that
from it the reason of distinction is sought between sundróme and koinōnía [concurrence
and communion], it is evident that in the most intimate union the communication is
supremely necessary.

Furthermore, we may apply to this hypostatic union in particular that argument adduced in
the general doctrine, which was taken from the communion of operations. For that both
natures act with the communion of the other, so that the operations of each nature, though
distinct, are not however separate but most intimately conjoined, and thus each nature
concurs conjointly to produce one and the same [operation], orthodox antiquity has long
maintained against the Nestorians.

From which the communication of idioms is invincibly concluded by the apodeixis proposed
above. Not to mention what is singular here: that in the divine [nature] Person, Nature, and
Idioms are the same, and thus from the most simple Divinity follows absolute identity. That
argument ad hominem is immovable, according to that commonplace: “Those things which
do not differ really, if one is communicated, the other also is communicated.”

Hence even Valentia, by the force of truth, is compelled to acknowledge, disp. General. Q. 2,
p. 3, that the humanity has those divine idioms, yet not that these are really communicated
to it, but that it subsists through them. A merely Jesuitical evasion! On which nevertheless
the whole Jesuit disputation rests. Who ever said that the humanity is the divine idioms
themselves? What is this saying, “The humanity subsists through the divine idioms”? How
can it subsist through the divine omnipotence, if it does not have it, and that not merely
extrinsically but also intrinsically perfecting it? For if it subsists completely through it and so

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to speak hypostatically, it certainly has it as a kind of substantial complement of itself: since
it does not have it per se and from itself or naturally, it has it by communication and gift, the
words are of Valentia himself, no less against himself than against his accomplices.

For that which the humanity has as a certain substantial complement of itself, certainly does
not perfect the humanity merely extrinsically... But the Jesuit affirms that the humanity has
the plenitude of divinity. With what face then does he contend that it has the same only that
it may subsist through it, and so as to be as it were extrinsically perfected, as he himself
explains?

Finally, how does the humanity have omnipotence, omniscience, etc. By a true real
communication, if it is not omnipotent, omniscient by a true real denomination? To say that
omnipotence is communicated to the humanity, and to deny it omnipotent through the
grace of this communication, is an open antiphasis [contradiction].

But I do not wish to add more. It is evident that the general doctrine of union can usefully be
transferred to the special modes of union, though to pursue them more specially belongs
not to Metaphysics but partly to Physics, partly to Theology...

Corollaries

I. Everything which is, by that very fact, because it is, is singular.

Two things I express here: 1. That all things which are in nature, insofar as they exist, are
singular. 2. That they are singular for that reason, because they are; and therefore, the
particle “because” is here both αἰτιολογικὴ [causal] and ἀποδεικτικὴ [demonstrative]. That,
while it specifies what things are singular; this, when it indicates the cause why they are
singular. There it is asserted that all things which truly and positively exist are individuals;
here the principle of individuation is defined, the very nature and essence of things. The
former is agreed, because everything which exists has a determinate Entity in itself one, and
therefore individual; for a thing truly one can neither be divided in itself nor distributed into
many such as it is itself. Besides, whatever is in the world besides God is produced.
Therefore, singular, because the action of a cause cannot be terminated except to the
singular. But who denies that God is singular, denies God. For if the divine essence is
universal, it will be multiplicable to many inferiors or to many Gods essentially diverse, which
is simply impossible and contradictory. All things, therefore, which exist, insofar as they
exist, are singular; from which it follows that the universal, insofar as universal does not exist
in nature. For although universal natures are rooted in singulars, nevertheless they are not

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actually, formally abstracted as to the consummated state of universality, except in our
mind, since they arise through the abstraction of the mind, and consist in a noematic
representation under that precisive state. The latter I show: What is the principle of essence,
that also is the principle of individual essence. Everything, therefore, that is, through which
it has being, that is to it the principle of individuation. Thus God through His most simple
essence is singular. Created spirits obtain an individual act with an essential [ordering] to
potency. Therefore, from that they have singularity. Incomplete material substances are
individual through their proper Entity. For as neither matter has being from form nor form
from matter, so neither can they be causes of numerical unity to each other, but both that
and this have proper entity of itself and through itself. Therefore, also numerical unity.
Complete material substances are constituted intrinsically by form coupled to matter by
natural union. Numerical being, therefore, belongs to them not on account of haecceity,
because this is the same as haecceity itself; not on account of quantity, because this is
posterior to that; but from form joined to matter. Accidents, finally, according to themselves
are rendered individual through their own entity, although by reason of emanation from a
subject they receive numerical distinction.

II. Universals are inseparable from singulars.

For they are not only really the same, but also essentially. For universals are of the essence
of singulars. Therefore, they cannot be separated from them, although they can be
prescinded. One thing is mental abstraction, another is real separation. Whence it is agreed
that universal natures which wander outside singulars are a pure figment. Moreover, for a
universal nature to be conceived, many individuals are required either in act or in potency.
For in one a universal nature cannot be conserved, because it is of its notion to be a
multiplicable community. Nevertheless, it is not thence to be inferred that there always exist
many individuals of the same nature. For what of monadic species, the Sun, the Moon, and
other stars? What of Adam existing primarily solitarily? But here someone feigns: Adam was
not simply one, because in his side he had Eve included, and he was the stock of the whole
human race. Eximious reason! Thus there will be no animate which can be called one. Since
to all an αὐξητικὴ [augmentative] or propagative power is imparted. Nay, no such potency
was in Adam to Eve, except obediential. But let us remit these things to their author.

III. Whatever is one per accidens contains many Beings actually divided.

For if diverse natures are reduced to an undivided Entity, the term will be one per se. Where
therefore there is not an actual multitude returning to one by a certain external or

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respective habitude, there is not a Being per accidens. Thus, for example, an aggregate
cannot be said, except what consists of the collection and aggregation of many. The Papists,
therefore, are fatuous with their representative Church. The Church is a certain aggregate. In
the Roman Pontiff what aggregation? Perhaps of the whole Papacy, which he contains
eminently and virtually? Whence into him happens the ultimate resolution of all.

IV. One is incommunicable.

It is clear from the nature of unity and communicability. For the terms of opposition are to
be preserved, whence gather: Whatever communicability alone constitutes the universal,
that alone is repugnant to one or the singular. But that communicability which constitutes
the universal is not by reason of effective communication, and that not communicable as
quo [by which] but as quod [which], as Dr. Scheibler shows. I will say more explicitly: Singular
is not repugnant to communication καθ᾽ ἀλλοίωσιν [according to alteration], or γέννησιν
[generation], or ἐκπόρευσιν [procession], by which one communicates itself to another,
either by producing another similar to itself, although essentially diverse from it, in which
way the Father communicates to the Son an essence the same in species, diverse in number;
or by communicating His own individual essence to another suppositum, which
communication we believe in the eternal generation of the λόγος [Word] and the procession
of the Holy Spirit without detriment to the numerical unity of the divine essence. For such
communicability does not constitute the universal, and therefore is not repugnant to the
singular. 2. Κατὰ συνένδοσιν [according to communication], by which what is of a part is
communicated to the whole, just as a singular form is said to be communicated to the
composite. 3. Κατὰ περιχώρησιν [according to mutual indwelling], when form communicates
itself to the individual parts of matter with its unity preserved. Thus the rational soul is
whole in the individual parts without multiplication or division of itself. 4. Κατὰ μετάδοσιν
[according to participation], by which one is conferred on another κατὰ μετάδοσιν
[according to participation], to common possession, as in union, what is proper to one
nature, although it is and remains singular, is communicated to another of the united things
without multiplication. But it is repugnant to the singular to communicate κατὰ μέθεξιν
[according to participation] according to essential participation, by which something
common is in many essentially inferior, so that in them it can be multiplied divisively. I say in
many inferiors. Thus it is distinguished from that community by which a created substance is
common to many accidents even really distinct, although it itself is one and singular. I add
the aptitude of multiplication, which infers many not only really but also essentially diverse.
And by this very community alone is the singular distinguished; and therefore, that is simply
repugnant to the singular.

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 V. In indivisible Unity there is no union.

If indeed we wish to etymologize; for where there is most highly simple unity, there is no
divisibility. But with this denied no union can be. For true union is of things diverse, namely
as to essence, not as to distance; and it produces at least an undivided divisible unity.
Otherwise, the Orthodox appellate the union of persons in the most holy Trinity that highest
unity figuratively and exoterically.

VI. Union is of divisible things.

Not that it can be easily divided; but that the unibilia [unitable things] were divided before
they were united; and therefore, before union they were divided, which by grace of union
are conjoined, although not dissoluble even to eternity. But that before is necessarily not of
time but of nature. For there are things which are not before they are conjoined to another;
and some do not exist, except when they coexist with each other or are united. That truth
therefore has place in accidental union if you please; in merè σχετικὴ [relative] it has no
place at all.

VII. Habitual union is not real.

For the habitual consists only in σχέσει [relation] and depends on the mind. But the real
obtains its truth without the operation of the mind. That is of things even most distant; this
is none without the conjunction and indistance of things. The notion of that is mental
collation; of this real conjunction. That is not terminated to one, this infers unity necessarily.
Therefore, these modes of union ought not to be confounded among themselves; otherwise
it is done by the Calvinists, who call the union in the Holy Eucharist real which consists in the
bare σχέσει [relation] of the sign to the thing signified. What is this license of reforming
terms? To call real union, which without the operation of the mind is none. To call the
merely improper habitual real. To call the proper one improper: Namely, so that as relation
infers the presence of the related, so relative union infers true conjunction. Heaven and
earth respect each other, as highest and lowest; and therefore, according to the Philosophy
of the Reformed, they are really united to each other. The same is to be thought about
virtual union, by which those are said to be united to each other by virtue, which are by no
means united by reason of suppositum. They likewise call it real, but to deceive the
unskilled. For true and real union intercedes between substances truly conjoined, not
between virtues; it infers a true ἀδιάστασιν [indistance] and indistance of the united things;

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it is not absolved by the habitude or virtue of things absent from each other. The Sun is
joined to the earth by the influence of its virtue. The same is most absurdly said to be really
united to the earth, which the subsequent corollary will further corroborate.

VIII. Union is not without the mutual presence of the united things.

I am speaking about true, substantial, and real Union, not about imaginary, virtual, and
habitual, which as it is called union only equivocally, so it does not infer the presence of
those things which are said to be united in that mode, more truly not united. For the mind
can in no way make present things which are really absent from each other. Whatever
indeed phantasy accomplishes, which exhibits even its absent sensible objects as present,
that infers nothing in reality, and makes a union only κατὰ δόκησιν [in appearance]. That an
influx of virtue does not infer true union was said before. Finally, mere relation does not
impart the presence of the related, since even things most distant from each other are given
to be related. But for union the presence of the united things is necessary, so that without it
there is no union. For union is not without a term. But the term of union is one undivided
thing. Those things, therefore, which do not make one undivided thing, cannot be said to be
united. But what things are not mutually present to each other, it is impossible for them to
constitute one undivided thing. For it would be the same undivided in itself and divided from
itself. Undivided by reason of union. Divided by reason of local disjunction. Let the
Zwinglians see, therefore, how they do not overthrow sacramental union, when they deny
the real conjunction of the celestial and terrestrial thing and wish to admit only a νοητικὴν
[intellectual], ἐνεργητικὴν [effective], and σχετικὴν [relative] presence. But from the
aforesaid principle it is rightly inferred that wherever one of the united things is, there also
the other united to it ought to be. And that an indissoluble union infers the perpetual and
eternal presence of the united things. Hence Leo, Letter 28 to Flavian: After the union in
Christ, neither is humanity believed without true divinity, nor Deity without true humanity.
Those, therefore, who deny that humanity is everywhere present to Deity, dissolve the
union, as much as is in them. It is impossible that things be and remain united, much less
that they have one and the same ὑπόστασιν [subsistence] in number, which stand apart by
intervals of places. And as soon as one of the united totals begins to be outside the other
total, and to be absent from the other, conjunction expires, and union is broken. Because it
cannot happen that the same thing be outside the thing and in the thing, separated and
conjoined. Thus, if the soul is constituted outside the body, union is not preserved, but
ceases. Or if the soul is where the body is not, the soul cannot be said to be totally united to
the body.

IX. As is the union, so is the communication.

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It is clear from the nature of union and communication. If, therefore, the union is real, the
communication cannot be merely nominal. And what is nominal communication? A title
without reality. But titles without reality, as Luther says, are sounding lies.

X. Real union is not without communication of properties.

For union infers communion of the term, by which the united natures [communicate]. This is
followed by communication of properties, because in acting a communion of the united
things is necessary. Therefore, union is said to be the cause of the communication of
properties, not only by reason of κτήσεως [possession], but also of χρήσεως [use]. Which
nevertheless is to be taken limitedly about ἰδιώμασιν ἐνεργητικοῖς [active properties] and
conducing to the end of the union, not about ἀνενεργήτοις [inoperative] and doing nothing
for the union or communion of operation, which is the end of union. Maccovius excepts: If
the divine nature communicates its properties to the human, either it will so happen that
this property in number passes over into human nature, or so that in it the same in species is
effected, but he says that neither can be said. Resp. A third is given: so that neither is there
need here of a transitive communication, κατὰ μετάβασιν [according to transference] from
subject to subject, nor effective, κατ᾽ ἀποτέλεσιν [according to accomplishment]; But that
communication has place which is κατὰ συνδύασιν [according to union] of union, yet truly
and really. He retorts: that he concedes this easily, but divine nature is attributed to human
through union, that is, so that the divine nature is united to human nature in the same
person; so it follows from this that the attributes are also in the same person, both the
properties of the divine and of the human nature. But when the communication κατὰ
συνδύασιν [according to union] is asserted, it is implied not only that the divine properties
concur with the properties of human nature; but it is necessary that a true and real
participation intervene, by which what is per se of one nature agrees with the other by force
of union, if not a mere concourse only is believed, which in any union σχετικὴ [relative] also
has place, but a concourse of communication, as demonstrated in the precepts. It is one
thing, therefore, for the proper things of divine nature and human to concur, another for the
proper things of divine nature to be communicated to human by force of union, without
μετάβασις [transference], yet so that they are truly and really participated by it, which both
from the nature of personal union, and from clear testimonies is demonstrated in Theology.
See what things we have disputed ex professo against the more recent Calvinists about this
theme.

XI. Union formally is not the sustentation of the united.

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Union is nothing other than the indivision of the united things. For as one through unity is of
itself undivided, so one through union does not have unity, except through the indivision of
the united things, and in such indivision consists the union itself. For union is a mode of one
which is undivided through the concourse of diverse things, and a consequent of unition.
But what else is unition than the conjunction of many? From which flows the indivision of
the united things. But those who say that sustentation is the form of union err too much. For
that one of the united things sustains the other, that emanates from union, and presupposes
it as a cause. Because of the union of act and potency, act sustains potency. Nay,
sustentation can be without true and properly called συνδυαστικὴ [uniting] union in merè
σχετικὴ [relative] union. Much less will personal union, which is of all the most intimate and
strictest, consist in sustentation alone, which is demonstrated in the schools of the
Theologians. Add that union is reciprocal, since each is united to the other. But to make
sustentation reciprocal is contradictory. For the sustaining is not the sustained. Union,
therefore, is not formally the sustentation of the united. The blessed Luther uses this
argument: The first act is less rightly defined through the second act; Union is the first act, to
be sustained is the second act. Union, therefore, is not to be defined through sustentation,
etc. Finally, sustentation is either general or singular or personal. The general is common to
all creatures, and therefore the hypostatic union cannot be defined through it. But personal
sustentation is either understood by reason of the hypostasis really communicated to human
nature, by which it is supported, sustained, and subsists; or without the same. If the latter,
what difference will be left between personal sustentation and common, if nothing else is
implied than a bare gestation in the person of the λόγος [Word], a bare sustentation, which
is given also in σχετικὴ [relative] union, by which all things are borne by the word of His
power; and in Him we are, live, and move? If the former, as the communication of the
hypostasis does not formally consist in sustentation and subsistence in the communicated
hypostasis, but this presupposes that, so neither will union consist formally in the same.
Which things are to be noted against Martyr, Beza, Martinius, describing personal union
through sustentation.

XII. Wherever one of the united things is, which are totally united to each other,
there it is necessary that the other of the united things also be.

Thus where the body of a living man is, there is also the soul totally united to the whole
body; and similarly, where the whole λόγος [Word] is wholly united to the whole flesh, there
is the flesh, and vice versa. The reason is agreed from the very nature of total union. For if
one of the united things were somewhere outside the other, it would be in vain a total
union, by which the whole is totally united to the whole. Antwerp and the Ocean are indeed
united, ἁπλῶς [simply] speaking, but not by a total union, but only by a certain conjunction
and adjacency, and therefore not where the Ocean is, there is Antwerp. Similarly in notional

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union, where the head and feet are said to be united in one body not immediately, but by
the mediation of the remaining parts, so that between the head and feet per se there is not
union, but only on account of a certain habitude, namely that they are united in a one third
thing. It is not strange, therefore, that where the head is, there the feet are not, or vice
versa. Wherefore a distinction should be made between total and partial union, and real,
notional, I add also proper and improper. But these things I deem to be clear from the
previous declaration of union.

CHAPTER V.
ON TRUTH.

From absolute affections we proceed to respective ones. The first is Truth, or for that
reason, because only that which is truly good is good. Three things occur here: 1. The
equivocation of the name. 2. The formal concept. 3. The division.

I. Truth is either objective, i.e., of a thing, or conformative, i.e., of the mind, or

significative, i.e., of a sign. We say the former is truth in being; the latter in knowing;
this in signifying.

The true is said in many ways and is distinguished in various ways by the concept of
the name. You will see the various acceptations in Dn. Keckermann Metaphysics part
2, chapter 3, section 1. The distinctions are equivocally in Logic, into complex and
incomplex truth; 2. In truth of things, of sentences, of connections, about which
others [speak]. 3. Into Metaphysical truth, which is the conformity of a thing and the
divine intellect; Logical [truth], which is the congruence of our intellect with the
object; and Ethical [truth], which is the consonance of voice and heart, or of speech
and intellect, with which nearly coincides that which theory proposes.

For truth in being, i.e., entitative and objective truth, is transcendental of the thing
itself, and thus Metaphysical. Conformative truth, which can also be called
intellective truth in knowing, is Logical by reason of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος [inner reason];
or Physical, or rather gnosiological [epistemological] by reason of the foundation and
mode of cognition. It is commonly defined as the adequation or conformity of thing
and intellect. Conformity in representing, not similarity in being. For the intellect
becomes all things, not really but ideally; and therefore it is an adequation not
quantitative but a correspondence; yet a complete and commensurate one, since the
truth of our cognition must consist in the indivisible. Moreover, it is defined as the
adequation of the intellect, because truth consists subjectively in the intellect, which

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 it accidentally perfects and denominates, and indeed in all the operations of the
intellect, both in ἁπλαῖς ἐννοήσεις [simple conceptions], and in σύνθεσις
[composition] and in διάνοια [discursive thought].

Concerning the composed intellect, i.e., the truth both of enunciation and of
consequence, there is no doubt. They are doubtful about the simple intellect and
incomplex truth, which is in simple terms. In this matter I say: it is certain first of all
that truth is in the second operation of the mind in a peculiar way, in which it is not in
the first, as Aristotle has it in On the Soul, book 3, chapter 8. But that special concept
seems to me to consist in this, that the truth of composition at the same time
respects the kinship and affinity of the things which are enunciated about each other,
but in simple apprehension that affinity is not attended to, but only the conformity of
the object and the intellect. About which perhaps elsewhere ex professo. Finally, it
should be observed that the truth of cognition expresses the congruence of intellect
and thing, by which is implied the measure of cognition, or of knowing truth, which
are the things themselves. Moreover, a distinction is made between the measure of
cognition. The former is the independent first cause; the latter are the things
themselves, about which see the Disputation on the basis of cognition. Where we
have distinguished between the objective and real direction of the mind, and the
preparative and intentional [direction]: of which the latter always tends toward truth
and is of the things themselves; the former contributes to the well-being of true
cognition, and is of secondary motions. Thus it supposes both the quiddity of things
and their affinity, by which things are considered either in themselves or among
themselves διακριτικῶς [discretely] or συγκριτικῶς [comparatively]: the latter
terminates the operations of the intellect with a certain facility, both as simple and as
composite apprehension.

Finally, truth in signifying, which they call significative truth, is twofold: one, which is
referred to the mind of the one professing it, the other, which is referred to the thing
existing outside the mind. The former is the conformity of speech with the concept of
the mind, which is otherwise called Ethical and is called veracity; the latter is the
conformity of speech (written or spoken) with the thing about which it pronounces
something, and by some it is called Logical truth. The norm of the former is the
concept of the mind; of the latter are things, not concepts.

II. Truth is the congruence of a thing with the divine intellect.

This is the formal concept of truth, which others express negatively through the

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 negation of fiction, but that only popularly; more accurately through a relation of
reason, which is a congruence not quantitative and of adequation but of imitative
representation, and that to the intellect not any whatsoever but the divine, as the
first truth; although it can also be referred to the human intellect, but that only
consequently and accidentally - not as the thing is true of itself, but as the thing is
known as true. For there is a twofold relation: one essential and intrinsic, by which a
thing is referred of itself to the divine intellect with which it is congruent. The other
accidental and extrinsic, by which a thing is knowable and can move our intellect, so
that it too may become conformed to the thing. The divine intellect terminates the
truth of things; but the human [intellect] is terminated by the truth of things.
Therefore, the essential truth of things should be judged from the former, not from
the latter. For as regards the works of artificers, which seem to be referred κατ'
ἐξοχήν [par excellence] to the human intellect, as being constructed according to the
idea which is in the mind of the artificer - these are only accidental beings; and
indeed, when they have been resolved into their simples, they are in turn referred to
the divine intellect, and thus at least mediately are congruent with it. Moreover,
when truth is said to be the congruence of a thing with the intellect, it must be taken
of the intellect as it prescind from knowing and measuring, that is: the truth of things
is adequate to the divine mind either by reason of cognition (that the things
themselves are such as is the cognition of God) or by reason of measurement (that
the measure of the truth of things is the divine intellect). And therefore whatever is
said to be true involves an essential respect to the intellect of God, either because it
corresponds to God's own cognition or because it depends on the idea which is in the
divine mind. For the divine intellect does not have itself simply as the norm of all
truth, otherwise it would be the norm of itself, which seems unfitting, since a real
distinction intervenes between the norm and the normed, as we shall see in its place,
although it is the norm of all participated truth; yet insofar as it cognizes its own
truth, a most exact congruence, indeed a complete identity of the knowable object
and the knowing intellect, is beheld in this; on account of which truth is claimed for
God in the most eminent way, about which in the following thesis.

III. That congruence is either [one] of complete identity, or of analogical participation.

The former is God's. The latter is of creatures.

God's essential truth is the divine essence itself, as conformable to the divine intellect. To
God is attributed conformative truth, as the divine intellect infallibly conforms with the
intelligible object, so that it can in no way err in its intellection; and significative truth, by

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which God most truly signifies to creatures what he wishes to be revealed to them. But here
all imperfections must be removed, and the highest perfection must be thought. It is an
imperfection that intellective truth in creatures has the object as its rule, to which it must
conform; that significative [truth] presupposes concepts of the mind, and these depend on
the things themselves; but these things must not even be thought in the divine intellection
and signification. For the divine intellect is the cause and norm of all truth in things; divine
veracity is independent of every object. Both divine omniscience and veracity are infallible
and indefectible, and, like God's essence itself, immutable. Hence error and lying are
contradictorily repugnant to God. But about these things in Pneumatics. God's entitative
truth is of this place, which materially is the divine essence itself, but formally implies a
certain relation of agreement or rather of identity. For in God all things are the same. While I
posit these things, it is clear that the concept of measure and measured does not obtain
here, which cannot consist with that highest identity. Therefore, God is not properly said to
be measured in relation to his intellect. Indeed, if you think even of a distinction of reason,
the divine knowledge must rather be proportioned to its essence than vice versa. This being
is not a true God because it sees itself to be the true God, but it sees itself to be the true
God because it really is the true God. Hence the truth of God denotes such a nature as is apt
to induce a true estimation of itself as its proper and adequate concept. And an idol is a
putative or at least fictitious non-true God, since it is not apt to form a proper and adequate
concept of the divine essence in the divine intellect. See Elers's Disputation 4, Pneumatics,
thesis 5. The terminus of divine truth is the divine intellect - not practical but speculative, to
which the divine essence is referred as the known to its knower. For the divine intellect does
not confer truth on the divine essence, but supposes it, and simply intuits it, in which
intuition there is a most eminent identity, since God is truth itself, because he himself
through himself is his essence. Hence it comes about that he alone is the true God, because
he is Jehovah, the true essential truth. But on the contrary, others who are called gods but
are not - for that reason they are not God, because the truth of the divine essence is lacking
in them. Therefore, he cannot or should not be called the true God, who is not himself the
first, highest, independent truth, and αὐταλήθεια [truth itself]. As God is true in himself,
insofar as he himself is what he sees himself to be, so also he is truth in himself, insofar as he
himself is the idea and norm of all things which are outside himself, to which idea all things
which are have been conformed; therefore, the created things themselves are also called
and are true on account of that conformity with the idea in the divine mind. Truly Augustine
says, in the Soliloquies, Volume 1, Book 2, Chapter 5: "That is true which is," because it is
such as God saw it would be from eternity. But all say that that is true which really is such as
it seems to be. From this he infers that every created being is true. For all things which are,
are such as God foresees and always sees. Therefore, everything which is, is true. Moreover,
truth belongs to created things as entity does - by analogical participation, because they
have no less from God that they are true than that they truly exist.

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 Corollaries

I. Truth is one only.

Concerning essential truth there is no doubt, for of one thing there is one essence. Nor is it
to be understood first concerning the truth of a sign. But concerning the truth of cognition,
whose unity the Schillingians call into doubt. But in vain. For the truth of cognition is the
conformity of the intellect with things. But all things are essentially true through agreement
with the divine intellect. Therefore, as necessary and immutable is the conformity of things
and the divine intellect, so necessary and immutable is the conformity of mind and things in
the truth of cognition. For these mutually regard each other. The truth of things depends on
the divine intellect. The truth of cognition depends on things. Therefore, he who makes the
truth of cognition twofold says that which is mutable in the divine intellect. The measure of
truth is the things themselves, which as they remain fixed, so also the truth of knowing,
founded in them, remains immovable. It is therefore clear that there is not a twofold and
opposed truth, and that this πολυθρύλητον [oft-repeated saying] must be proscribed from
philosophy altogether: "What is false in theology is true in philosophy," and vice versa.
Because the truth of theological cognition is the adequation of the notions of the mind with
revealed things. Philosophical truth is the adequation of notions with things known by the
light of reason, or which philosophy acknowledges as its subject. Therefore, there is no
opposition here. A contradiction is about the same thing and with respect to the same thing,
which is not given here. Mr. Mentzer illustrates it in this way: If you ask whether grammatical
truth is the same as rhetorical truth, you are just as absurd as if you were to ask whether a
trope is triangular. The same can be said about theological and philosophical truth. God is
equally truthful in creation and in revelation, since he cannot deny himself. Let us examine
the objects. Propositions with respect to truth are either purely theological, or mixed. The
former, which philosophy alone teaches, theology is ignorant of. The latter, which have been
handed down in theology, are plainly unknown to philosophy. The [third kind are those]
which both philosophy and theology discern and propose. If the first are true in philosophy,
theology does not contradict them in the least, since it is ignorant of them. The second,
obtaining their certitude in theology, are in no way rejected by philosophy, because they
exceed its capacity. The third can in no way be approved by one and reprobated by the
other, since it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time.

II. Between truth and falsity there is no middle.

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The axiom is true both of propositions and of things. Between a true and a false proposition
no other mediates, since they are contradictorily distant: the former indeed agrees with
things, the latter does not agree. I am speaking of propositions not manifold in themselves.
For those which virtually contain several propositions can be half true, half false, as is clear
concerning some exclusives. Similarly, things are either truly what they are said to be, or are
falsely said to be what they are not. But here a distinction must be made between the truth
of being and the propriety of speaking. Everything is either truly this, which it is said to be,
or false - as this gold is either true gold or counterfeit. Yet a thing can be said figuratively
without falsity to be something which it is not truly or properly - as Herod is said without
falsity to be a fox, although he is not truly, that is, properly a fox. For improper locutions can
also be alien to falsity, and the truth of a thing must not be confused with the propriety of
speech. This is to be noted against Smalcius, who gathers that magistrates are true gods
(although there is only one true God par excellence) from the fact that they are not false
gods. But it is one thing to be truly called a god in a figurative and metaphorical sense,
another to be truly God in the proper and native signification of "God." Or: being distinct are
representing God in some way by office, and being endowed with the divine essence. See
Mr. Keckermann, Part 1, General Metaphysics, Section 2, in the Appendix page 91 of mine.
What is said metaphorically and figuratively certainly does not participate in the concept of
the denomination in the proper and native sense. And what does not participate in the
concept of the denomination truly or properly, we cannot without modification or falsity
attribute such a denomination to it. We have dealt with this ex professo against Smalcius in
Natural and Revealed Theology, pages 545ff.

III. Falsity is not in things.

There is indeed in things a defect or lack of perfection and adequation to the norm, as can
be seen in monsters, which [deviate] from the norm of nature; in the errors of art, which
[deviate] from the precept of art; in sins, which deviate from the law; and in vices, which
deviate from right reason. There is also the occasion of falsity or error, the apparent
agreement and affinity of things; yet falsity itself, which is disagreement or inadequacy
between the judgment of the intellect and the object itself, is not properly given in things,
but is only on the part of the intellect.

The subject of the false is the soul, and the origin from within is first the sense apprehending
erroneously, from which is the beginning of understanding. Then the intellect itself, not
sufficiently attending to the affinity and truth of things. The cause is either the highest
perfection of things, or our imperfection of understanding. Moreover, it happens that one
errs not about principles, which are above all exception, but about the deduction of the

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conclusion from the principles. From without, the information of teachers [and] human
authority sows and engenders error, since not infrequently, by attending more to who has
said than to what he has said, one deviates from the royal road of truth.

IV. The most ancient is the truest.

The canon is to be understood concerning the truth of cognition, but not indeed concerning
the truth of being. For in essential truth there are no grades, although there is an order in
being, by reason of which it can be admitted that the most ancient is the truest - that is,
those things which are prior in the concept of being are also prior in the concept of essential
truth, although not better. Moreover, concerning the truth of cognition, that saying of
Tertullian is likewise not to be admitted without qualification. Truth is to be defined not from
antiquity, but from the conformity of the object and the mind. 1. A distinction must be made
between the most ancient absolutely and relatively. Truth is absolutely more ancient than
lying and falsity, which deviate from the truth. Yet relatively falsity can be called most
ancient, as the lie of the devil is most ancient. 2. Truth is to be distinguished from the
manifestation of truth. For as regards manifestation καθ' ἡμᾶς [to us] falsity not infrequently
vies for antiquity with the true, as is clear by the example of heresies. 3. Concerning
theological opinions that well-worn saying is often applied, that the testimonies of venerable
antiquity often furnish an argument for the truth - not indeed that they are the infallible
principle and foundation of truth, since there is one foundation, divine revelation, which
now does not go beyond the bounds of Sacred Scripture, which as the eternal word of God is
the most ancient of all. Truth ought to be examined by the divine intellect, not by the
opinion of any man. The former, not the latter, is the norm of truth. Therefore, whatever
religion or confession agrees with Scripture, that is truly the most ancient and truest. 4. In
juridical rules and political laws the contrary obtains, since a new law derogates from an old
one. For these depend on Imperial Majesty, to whom it belongs to give and abrogate laws.

V. A type is not truth itself.

The reason is manifest: since the typical and the true are thus far opposites, that they are
not simply one. The use is against the Calvinists, who assert that the true body of Christ was
once present in the sacrament of the Old Testament, [and] again assert that they believe in
the true presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, when they admit only a typical and
representative [presence]. And therefore they very badly and ἀλόγως [illogically] confuse
the type with the antitype, the shadow with the body.

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VI. Truth is indivisible.

For truth expresses a complete conformity with its object, and of the object with the idea to
which it is congruent. This is manifest. Since whatever things are true are everywhere
conformed to the divine intellect as the first truth, and are in no way disformed from it -
because they are from it. I explain this. There is nothing in true cognition which is not in the
object or foundation. Therefore, truth is said to consist in a point. For if there is something in
cognition which is not in the object, the cognition will be partly conformed, partly
disformed, and thus partly true, partly false - not simply true. Therefore, while you know
one thing about a thing, which agrees with the thing, [and] another, which does not agree,
you likewise conceive: by that concept indeed you cherish truth, but by reason of this the
concept is false. But in the object or foundation of cognition there are often by far more
things than in the concept, which nevertheless do not derogate from the truth of the
concept. Thus, when the philosopher knows God to be one in essence, he forms a true
concept, even if he does not know [him] to be triune in persons, just as imperfect cognition
can be true. For the concept of truth consists precisely in the conformity of that which is
conceived with the object; which cannot be prejudiced if there are also other things in the
object which are not in the concept. For those things require other concepts, without which
that [concept] can be entirely true. Indeed, if the rest of the things which are in the object
were utterly denied, the truth of that concept would in no way be endangered. As if the
philosopher were to deny that God is triune in persons, [but] assert [him] to be one in
essence, this affirmation will be true, although that negation is most false. In the concept,
the things which are indivisibly one in the object are distinct and thus far opposite. Thus, let
the Calvinist deny that God is the author of sin; let the same one assert that God has
predestined the reprobate to sins: the negation is true; the assertion is most false. Both
concur in the concept of the Calvinist; in the truth of the thing, one overturns the other.
From the mind [of truth] itself the contradiction is manifest, although not from the mind of
that man. Therefore, when he is convicted of contradiction, [it is] most truly indeed
according to immovable truth, but not according to the judgment of the adversary and to his
hypotheses. But if from that assertion someone were to accuse Calvin of maliciously, with
hostile brow, purposely making God the author of sin, he will seem to do him an injustice,
according to the judgment of Mr. Jacobus Martini - not because it does not truly follow from
the Calvinistic view of predestination that this blasphemy [follows]: but because the
adversary does not apprehend or attain to that consequence; and therefore he can indeed
be driven to contradiction and blasphemy, but he must not immediately be accused of
contradiction and blasphemy. The contradiction is true, and truly a blasphemy, even if the
adversary does not apprehend the contradiction, nor attain to the reason by which such a
blasphemy is elicited. It is one thing to truly contradict, another that the adversary is aware
of the contradiction.

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VII. Everything which is, is true in its essence.

For the truth of a thing and its essence are the same, says Alexander of Hales, Metaphysics.
And as each thing is, so it is true. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 2, Chapter 1. Therefore, that
will be true, which truly has what pertains to the essence. For example, a true man is one
who is constituted by a human essence; a true natural thing is one which participates in the
essence due to it. Therefore, that which is outside the essence, whether it be present, does
not confer truth on the thing; whether it be absent, does not take it away. Thus, Christ is a
true man, although his humanity is not a suppositum; the body of Christ is a true body,
although it is not seen or touched - because suppositality does not pertain to the essential
truth of man, much less to the essential truth of a body [does pertain] being actually
touched and seen, which is a merely extrinsic denomination. Thus, there was true fire in the
Babylonian furnace, although it did not burn, etc.

VIII. The first truth is immutable.

The first truth is the norm of all truth. Therefore, [it is] immutable. Moreover, truth is given
in being, in knowing, in speaking. The true being of God is incommutably, with whom there
is no shadow of change. The seeing of God is infallible, and liable to no error. The saying of
God is eternal, and superior to all exception, and therefore ignorant of deception.

IX. Originated truth is not indefectible.

For whatever things depend on the first truth can fail - both so that they are not truly, and so
that they do not apprehend truly, and so that they set forth the recesses of the heart less
truly. Hence the instability of being, the falsity of cognition, the fertility of lies. The former
[are] of nature; the latter [are] of defect of judgment; these [are] of malice.

CHAPTER VI

ON GOODNESS

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There are two points of the chapter. On the formal quiddity, and on the material variety of
goodness.

I. Goodness is the conformity of a thing with the divine will.

It is not so much known as most known that good is taken one way Physically, another way
Metaphysically. Those things can be repeated which were said about perfection. For these
affections nourish a great kinship.

The formal concept of goodness consists in a relation, and that not a real one, but a mental
one – not indeed in that sense, that goodness is nothing outside the fiction of the mind, but
that it is not a certain peculiar entity either subsisting or inhering. For suppose that it is. It
will therefore be something positive, and consequently truly a being, and consequently
affected again by that relation, about which it must likewise be said that it is a being, and
that it has transcendental goodness, and so on to infinity. Add that to the divine essence,
which is transcendentally good (insofar as it is considered absolutely), no real relation can be
ascribed. And therefore not to being, as being. Some confuse perfection with goodness, but
badly. Since it was proven above that they are distinct affections. The former is absolute, the
latter respective. For the former indeed denies only an entitative defect, but the latter adds
a rational respect to the essence, as is clear among all Metaphysicians. But they inquire at
length about this. Of what sort is the relation in good – some asserting a relation or
reflection of the same to itself, others a relation to the will. Hence the diversity of
definitions. Mr. Jacobus Martini explains the concept of goodness through the mode of an
agreeing or proportioned form to something. Thus, those who defend the former opinion.
Mr. Scheibler urges to the contrary: by this concept even evil would be good, since evil also (I
explain the concept a little differently than he does) has an agreeing convenience
proportioned to itself, as it is evil. For evil obtains the things which are required for evil. And
there is no doubt that evil likewise can have a reflection of agreeableness to itself. Although
it does not agree with good, yet it entirely agrees with itself. It can be added that a relation
of identity does not constitute a united attribute of being. But since a relation of diversity
makes a disjunct affection of being, it seems to me that a middle way must be followed, so
that neither opinion is simply rejected. Let goodness be called the due agreeableness of
perfection, let a respect to the will be added. What absurdity follows from this? Certainly
whatever things are good obtain an agreeable and proportioned perfection for themselves.
The material of good is essence, which of course obtains its perfection. To the formal
pertains that agreeableness of perfection. But it does not yet define goodness sufficiently
explicitly. For agreeableness is said πρὸς τι [in relation to something]. Therefore, a terminus
is required to which that which is called good may be referred. If the same is referred to
itself, an agreeableness will certainly be had. But it is not yet clear what the goodness of any

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given thing is. Therefore, let it be referred to the will, and indeed to the divine will – if it is
congruent with it, it will be truly good; if not, not. For evil things also seem to have a certain
agreeableness, but if they are regarded formally and examined according to the norm of the
divine will, it appears that the agreeableness is only pretended and counterfeit. Indeed,
there is no transcendental evil in nature, since good is reciprocal with being.

II. Goodness is either highest and independent, or participated and dependent. The
former is of God αὐτἀγαθον [the good itself], the highest good. The latter is of
those things which are from God, under the highest good.

The Philosopher in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book 5, posits a twofold good: one, which is
good simply and per se; the other, which is good only to someone. We transfer the same to
transcendental goodness, which belongs both to God and to creatures. But God is good
simply, originally, through essence; but the creature [is good] only in a certain respect, by
participation and by dependence. God is the highest good and the archetype; but whatever
is good from God is under the highest, and an ectype. Outside of God nothing is good except
insofar as it is referred or can be referred to God, who is both goodness itself and the
measure of all goodness. Hence Thomas [Aquinas] in Part I, Question 6, Article 4 [of the
Summa Theologica]: The first good is that which is good through its own essence; on
account of this everything is good insofar as it participates in that [first good] by way of a
certain assimilation. Whence he argues: although creatures are called good by their own
intrinsic and formal goodness, yet that goodness depends on the goodness of God as the
efficient, exemplary, and final cause of all goodness extrinsically and causally. Thus God is
the cause and origin of all goodness; the exemplar and idea, the terminus and complement,
from whom all good redounds, in whom all good is reflected, to whom all good aspires. The
things which are from God have their essence, and thus their goodness, from him
intrinsically, but participatively. But a distinction must be made between transcendental
goodness and special goodness. For the former is reciprocal with being, but the latter is
determinate to a certain being. And of the latter there are various grades. There is natural
[goodness], in the congruence of nature, by reason of which certain genera of goods are
constituted, just as there are diverse natures, some surpassing others in perfection. There is
moral [goodness], which in ethics is divided into laudable and honorable goodness, and also
into honest, useful, and pleasant [goodness]. There is spiritual [goodness], which the
theologians call both ἑκτικὴ [habitual] or inhesive and λογικὴ [rational] or imputative. To
these grades or modes of goodness is opposed malice. Hence natural, moral, spiritual good.
But to transcendental goodness nothing is opposed. Since everything which is, is
transcendentally good.

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 Corollaries

I. Every good is perfect.

For each reciprocates with being. But distinguish first and second perfection, essence and
excellence, transcendental and special. For although not every good obtains consummate
perfection in virtues and affections, or in a certain genus of being, yet every good has its due
essential perfection in the character of being. Therefore truly goodness is a perfection
agreeing with every being.

II. Goodness is essential to all things.

Here we oppose essential to accidental, not to extra-essential. For although goodness is said
κατὰ σχέσιν [relatively] of being, yet it does not accrue to it [as an accident]. Let this be
understood of being, and of every being. Therefore every being, as essence, is good. Indeed
whatever is can be called good even through essence, if the distinction is observed which
Hurtado makes in Volume 1, Treatise 2, Commentary on [Aquinas’s Summa Theologica]
Question 6, Number 6, who says thus: That something is good through essence can be
understood in two ways: 1. In such a way that goodness is not some accident extrinsically
advening to the thing, but is intrinsic and essential to it[…] As the thing is not only good by a
goodness intrinsic and essential to it, but also that it is such by the power of its essence
alone and without any dependent order on some extrinsic cause. In the former sense every
being is good through essence, both finite and infinite. In the latter [sense] this [infinite]
being alone [is good through essence], not that [finite being].

III. Goodness consists in intrinsic denomination.

That is, with a rational respect to the divine will. The Scholastics infer from this, as can be
seen in Hurtado, Gregory of Valentia, and others, that man cannot be called good and just by
an extrinsic denomination through the imputation of the righteousness of the Savior. But
absurdly. For 1. Transcendental goodness is not to be confused with special goodness. The
former is intrinsic, the latter can also be extrinsic. Therefore, concerning the former it is true
that it does not consist in an extrinsic denomination; but that should in no way be extended
to all modes or grades of special goodness. Otherwise, if whatever is said of transcendental
goodness must also be said of moral and spiritual goodness, why will these also not be

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called essential? And thus according to Hurtado, moral and spiritual goodness belong to us
through essence. Absurd! 2. Conformity with the divine will completes the concept of good.
Therefore, whatever is conformed to it is truly good, whether it inhere or be truly and really
imputed. Not on the subject but on the norm does goodness depend. If you deny that the
goodness and perfection of another can be imputed by the divine goodness to another, so
that the divine will may acquiesce in it, and so that he to whom it is imputed may be truly
denominated by it, you presume to impose laws on goodness itself, and you deny that the
divine will is the norm of goodness. 3. Extrinsic denomination is twofold, one of mere fiction,
and one of true attribution. The former is without foundation; the latter presupposes a
foundation. The former depends on human thought; the latter does not. The former does
not prove goodness, but the latter does. Moreover, that the imputation of righteousness is
not fictitious but true, [and] depends not on the operation of our mind but on the intention
of the divine will, is for the theologians to prove.

IV. The first goodness is the measure of all good.

The first in each genus is the measure of the rest. Therefore the divine goodness is the
measure of all goodness, namely participated [goodness]. Hence that [saying] of Dionysius:
“As much as a thing has of good, so much it has of God.” To this measure must be compared
whatever is held to be good. If it agrees with it, it will be ἁπλῶς [simply] good and ὄντως
[really]; if not, [it will be] good only φαινομένως [apparently] and δοξαστῶς [in opinion].
Therefore a defect from the first goodness is malice. This therefore is nothing positive or of
being, but a privation and tendency to non-being, as will be said later. From these things I
gather: that evil is not from God, as he is the highest and indefectible good. For the same
thing conducting itself in the same way cannot be the measure of malice and goodness –
much less the cause.

V. Every good is appetible.

As the true terminates the intellect and is intelligible or the object of the intellect, so the
good moves the appetite and is its object or appetible. Moreover, the appetite is twofold.
[There is the appetite] of absent things, which is of desire and expectation; and [the
appetite] of present things, which is of complacency and rest. In both ways, whatever is
good falls under the appetite. I am speaking of the finite appetite, not the infinite; for it
belongs to the latter to lack no good. This [infinite appetite] therefore, since it abounds in all
goods, rests in them; nor can it be said to desire any good, except κατ’ ἀπέμφασιν
[figuratively]. But the finite appetite is stirred up no less by the notion of an absent good
than the possession of a present good appeases it. For it does not rest in those things which

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it has, but desires in addition those things which it does not have, since what is finite cannot
be the highest good. Although every good can move the appetite on account of its
agreeableness, not everything which moves our appetite is truly good, on account of the
native ignorance of the mind. For the appetite of the will follows the judgment of the mind.
But not infrequently that which is truly evil insinuates itself into our mind under the guise of
good. Therefore, the appetite is borne toward it; which, although it cannot appetite evil as
evil, can nevertheless [appetite] evil under the appearance of good. Hence the well-worn
saying: good is either κατ’ ἀλήθειαν [according to truth], or κατὰ δόξαν [according to
opinion].

VI. Every good is communicative of itself.

There is here a twofold communication: one intentional, by which good allures to the love of
itself; the other real, by which it intends the production of something similar to itself. The
former is necessary, since good cannot fail to allure and excite to the love of itself. The latter
is free. For good is not bound to communicate itself to others, although it desires to make
others participants of its goodness. But when it communicates itself in the latter way, the
receptivity of the subject must be taken into account at the same time, since every action is
limited by the receptivity of the subject. God, the highest good, has most graciously
communicated himself to creatures by his most free will. But as this κοινωνία
[communication] of the divine goodness has made creatures exist, so it could not make
them of infinite quiddity and power through themselves, since no creature can be infinite.

VII. Good is not the cause of evil.

Distinguish 1. Good, which is either the highest or under the highest. 2. Evil, which is either
natural or moral. 3. Cause, which is either per se or per accidens. Natural evil happens. For
the cause per accidens is particular nature, not universal [nature]. Moral evil can in no way
be attributed to the highest good, either per se or per accidens. For the cause of evil is
δύναμις ἁμαρτητική [the power of sinning], which is good in itself, but becomes evil through
evil action. But neither that δύναμις [power] nor the malice of the action agrees with the
highest good. For what is evil but a defect of good? But that which is supremely good and
goodness itself can in no way defect from good. For if it could defect, it would be neither
supremely good nor could it be called goodness itself. Every cause truly and properly so
called (I do not contend about the equivocal denomination of cause, to which you may refer
cause per accidens, [which] will be a cause only in name) imports an influx to the being of
the caused, which is something real. As regards the origin of evil, here there is no influx to

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being, but a tendency to non-being; not an effect but a defect. For evil formally and
intrinsically is nothing but the privation of good. Therefore Augustine, in The City of God,
Book 11, Chapter 9: “There is no nature of evil, but the loss of good has received the name
of evil.” But whatever is from God outside of God, God is the cause of it; that is something
positive. Most excellently, therefore, Plato says in Republic, Book 2: “God alone is the cause
of good things, but of evil things it is fitting to seek any other cause besides God.” For he
himself, as the same [Plato] says, is κακῶν μὲν ἀναίτιος, ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἴτιος καὶ εὐπραξίας
[the cause of good things and well-being, but not responsible for evil things].

VIII. Evil is not absolutely necessary.

Because what is absolutely necessary coheres absolutely with its causes, unless it is entirely
independent. But evil does not cohere absolutely with causes, because it is some defect.
Against the Zwinglians, who sometimes posit an absolute necessity of evil.

IX. The evil of punishment must not exceed the fault.

This may indeed seem alien to a metaphysical treatise, but Maccovius urges it in his
Metaphysics against our orthodoxy, Part 1, Chapter 8, page 64, inferring from it that it
cannot be said conveniently that Christ died for the reprobate, in whatever way that may be
said; because thus the punishment would exceed the fault, and God would be unjust if he
punished the same thing twice – once most sufficiently in Christ, a second time also most
sufficiently in their own persons. But there is no consequence. Since the proper cause of the
damnation of the reprobate is unbelief – namely, that they do not believe that Christ died
for them, nor apply the merit of Christ to themselves by true faith. Therefore, they are not
damned simply on account of sins, but because they do not believe. For “he who does not
believe will be condemned.” But this unbelief of theirs, inasmuch as they persist finally in
unbelief, is not the same as the sins which were punished in Christ, if we wish to theologize.
Because that is the ultimate reprobation of Christ, immediately connected with eternal
damnation itself, since the last point of this life is immediately connected with the beginning
of infernal punishments. Nor indeed is God to be accused of injustice, because he damns
those who reprobate the satisfaction of Christ – whom he could damn without injustice on
account of sin alone; how much more with the accession of unbelief and the satisfaction
which he himself ordained for the salvation of men having been reprobated? As a master is
not unjust who accepts payment for all captives, if he leaves in captivity those who prefer to
remain in captivity, the payment of ransom having been disregarded. But let the Calvinists
see whether they themselves do not make God unjust, who damns the reprobate because

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they do not believe that Christ died for them – [a belief] which the Calvinists insist that
Christ did not die for them by the intention of God. Can someone be punished without
injustice for this reason, that he does not believe that which is by no means to be believed,
which is not true but false? Hence Maccovius has finally lapsed into this absurdity, that he
would state that not everything which must be believed is true, in Miscellaneous Colloquies
6, Disputation 4, as if God set forth things to be believed which are not true – by which
reasoning falsity will also be ascribed to the First Truth; because he hands down false things
and proposes them to be believed, which is impious and blasphemous.

CHAPTER VII.

ON DURATION.

The consideration of duration is twofold: General and Special; there its abstract concept is
proposed, here its modes are expounded.

I. Duration is permanence of being.

This is the particular affection of essence which the philosophers call duration, that is, as
they say, the continued tract of being; as Scaliger says, Exercitation 359, Section 6. Others
explain the same thing in other words. Let us first explicate the name. To endure is
commonly said only metaphorically of that which perseveres and is a certain delay of
existence, in which way things which are ἐν ἀτόμῳ [instantaneous], or exist only for a
moment, are not said to endure, because in an instant there is no delay. To this seems to
refer that description of Scaliger. Then [it is said] philosophically and acroamatically
[esoterically] of every thing which exists, whether its duration is instantaneous, or long-
lasting, or perpetual. Usage here deviates from the first imposition of the word. Since in this
sense there is here no delay or tract or extension, but duration is to be distinguished from its
own continuation. For that instantaneous duration seems ἄλογον [irrational] to some, that is
because they do not know how to distinguish the acroamatic [esoteric usage] from the
common acceptation. A existing thing which is conceived precisely in the first instant in
which it begins to exist intrinsically cannot indeed be attributed a continued duration under
that instant, yet not for that reason is all [duration] to be denied to it; since duration cannot
be separated from existence, as will be clear afterwards. Moreover, by reason of the name,
duration is distinguished into imaginary and real, and the latter into extrinsic and intrinsic.
Imaginary [duration] is that which is only conceived by us but in reality is not given; it can

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also be attributed by the mind to non-existing or merely possible things. Real [duration] is
that which, as it truly is in things, so through it at least truly existing things and things
posited in act are said to endure, either intrinsically and in themselves as they are, or
extrinsically and as regards us as they are known to endure. Intrinsic [duration] is an
attribute of being and necessary to a thing; extrinsic [duration] is accidental and does
nothing for the thing. Through the former a thing properly endures; but through the latter
the duration of the thing is discerned. The former is considered here, but in such a way that
it may be declared through the latter. Therefore, let us consider 2. Its definition, in which the
material and formal [aspects] are to be noted. The material is essence or existence. The
formal [aspect] is permanence in being. Materially, duration and existence are the same,
both because duration makes no real composition [with being]; otherwise, it would not be
attributed to the most simple being; and because nothing can be called of the thing which
that [duration] adds to it, and thus beings are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Indeed,
by the force of existence alone, without any other reality or mode distinctly superadded, a
thing endures so as to remain in being; it is not necessary that something be added to it for
this. For this would not be permanence but a certain augmentation, as Dn. Jacob Martini
says in his Metaphysics, Part 2, Section 13, Question 3. Then, if a being were to endure
through something diverse from itself, that would be either subsisting or inhering; if the
former, how would an accident endure; indeed, how would a substance [endure]? By the
union of another substance? For things which are not one essentially must be united. If the
latter, an accident would contribute to the conservation of the thing, or rather would be the
very permanence of the thing! All absurd. Although they are not diverse in reality, yet
duration and existence generate diverse concepts, and therefore they are formally
distinguished, which is clear even from this: because even the duration of God, which is God
himself, differs formally from God; the eternity of God [differs formally] from his essence;
because the eternity of the divine existence is proved through immutability. Much more so
in creatures. For no perfections can be more united in any participated being than in the first
[being]. Moreover, the formal concept of duration is expressed by the word permanence in
the absence of a more significant and suitable [word]. For the permanent is usually
contradistinguished from the successive, when it designates that which alone is at once
[totum simul]; but here permanence is to be taken more generally as it belongs also to
successive being. Since duration reciprocates with being. And thus abstractly, permanence is
said by Suárez to import nothing except preexistence – namely, that the existence which is
said to endure can be conceived as existing before any instant for which it is said to endure,
either according to reason, if it is in [its] whole being, as in permanent things; or according
to the thing [secundum rem], if it is only according to part, as in successive things – since
successive things do not exist except when they are and are said to endure as long as there
are new parts which had not yet been made. See Dn. Jacob Martini in the cited place,
Question 4. Moreover, they define permanence through negation, so that that is said to
remain which is not immediately destroyed so as to cease to be, or is cast down from its
being, about which see Dn. Scheibler in his Metaphysics, Part 1, Chapter 16, Number 16. As

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conservation is the same action persevering in its being, so by proportion permanence is
existence itself not deficient from its being, where if there are not given moments of time,
one may at least estimate duration by moments of nature. Therefore, duration does not
formally import a certain relation, much less does it express an extrinsic denomination to
something else coexisting, or the concept of measuring or measurable, although it can be
known through something extrinsic. And accidentally a certain duration measures, a certain
[duration] is measured, as essence is denominated measure and measured. For a thing
endures even existing solitarily, when no coexistent is given; and duration belongs to things
considered in themselves, not compared among themselves. A thing is not said to endure or
remain in being because it measures or can measure, but it can happen that a thing which
endures may be employed as a measure to make known the measured. Thus, that which is
measurable is now supposed to have duration which can be applied to the measure. But it
happens that one duration measures another, as that successive duration, which on account
of its flowing parts is more observable and more known, is assumed to measure permanent
duration, which is per accidens to duration as such.

II. Duration is either indefectible or defectible, and the latter either defectible in a
certain respect or defectible simply; the former is called eternity, the middle one
aevum, the last time.

They usually propose a twofold division of duration: 1. Into permanent and successive. 2.
Into eternity, aevum, and time. I touch on the former here briefly. For what is permanent,
what is successive, there will be an occasion for discussing below. That is called permanent,
not as duration was defined before (permanence generally), nor as it denotes a duration
indefectible in every way and thus most specially, but insofar as it is opposed to the
successive, and designates a duration of this kind which is not in flux, but has its parts at the
same time [simul] – which belongs not only to God, but also to created things. For although
they are and remain by the continued conservation of God, yet for that reason they are not
successive beings, because in any moment they have their whole being, nor through
conservation is anything added to their being; but what is, insofar as it is, is sustained lest it
cease to be. But the latter will have to be explained more fully here. Its adequacy is clear. For
the defectible and indefectible are opposed contradictorily and do not admit intermediates.
But the defectible, if you consider whatever things are in fact in nature, exists only in a
twofold way, which is indicated in the theorem. For whatever is created, and defectible, is
such either by its own nature, so that it can have an end; or it cannot have an end. A third
[option] is not given here again. Wherefore there are in sum three genera of duration:
eternity, which is indefectible absolutely; aevum, which is defectible in a certain respect; and
time, which is defectible simply. But let us now explain these more specially.

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 III. Eternity is simple interminability of being.

The eternal is said [to be] as it were beyond terminus [extra terminum], because it exists
without end; by others as it were everlasting [aeviternum], and it denotes that which
endures perpetually. In Greek ἀΐδιος, which according to Phavorinus [comes] from ἀεὶ ὄν
and αἰών ὄν, which have the same origin; therefore these two words are interchanged
among the Greeks, as Dn. Jacob Martini notes against Zanchi and Daneau in his Metaphysical
Exercitations, Book 2, Chapter 4, Theorem 13, page 830. Moreover, eternity is taken 1.
Καταχρηστικῶς [catachrestically] for a long-lasting and long-lived time, as when circumcision
is said to be eternal; or also for an indeterminate [time], in which sense that is called eternal
for which no certain terminus is fixed; or for the duration of life, in which way servitude is
said to be eternal of one whose ears were pierced, and in common we promise eternal
gratitude to those who deserve well of us. 2. Κυρίως [properly] for duration without end,
either limitedly, which is without end or terminus ad quem; it is called eternity a posteriori,
such as belongs to finite spirits; or absolutely, which lacks both terminus – a quo and ad
quem; it is called eternity a priori, both a parte ante and a parte post [from before and from
after]. And that again either ἁπλῶς [simply], for that duration to which it is simply repugnant
to have a beginning and end; or δευτέρως [secondarily], for that which does not have a
repugnance to newness of being and termination, although it endures from eternity to
eternity. The former they call eternity absolutely, primarily, and independently; the latter in
a certain respect [secundum quid], comparatively, by participation, and dependently – which
participated eternity the Scholastics dispute can be given.

It matters not whether they always existed or at some time began to be, says Scaliger,
Exercitation 397, Section 20, about immaterial minds. We take the most proper signification
here, in which we define it [as] interminable duration. 1. It is duration, but without
succession, permanent and perennial, which is nothing but a perpetual νῦν [now], and that
fixed, not flowing. There, there is nothing past as if it were no longer, nothing future as if it
were not yet, but there is only is; there is not was, will be, because both what was is no
longer, and what will be is not yet; but whatever is there, is only is. Surely we conceive
eternity in the mode of duration flowing without beginning, without end, or (so to speak) as
some infinite time; not otherwise, I say, can we apprehend it, except through that imaginary
succession. But what is this to eternity itself in itself? 2. It is interminable or indefectible, so
that it is altogether repugnant to it to be terminated or to fail, or to have beginning and end;
by which eternity most properly so called is distinguished both from eternity (if any can be)
participated, and from the remaining durations. Therefore, the formal concept of it is simply
interminability of being; to others permanence, which coincides with that [interminability],
if it is taken as it is incapable of all variation (Hurtado, Metaphysics 17, Section 4, Theorem
23). Boethius defines it (in Book 5 of The Consolation of Philosophy, Prose 6): The complete

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and perfect possession of interminable life all at once. Whence two things are required for
it. 1. Συνέχεια [continuity], because it is all at once and perfect, having no interruption and
succession in itself; nothing past, nothing future; which infer change and imperfection.
Therefore Plato in the Timaeus says: “It is not right to assign ‘was’ and ‘will be’ to the eternal
substance.” 2. ἀπειρία [infinity], that it lacks beginning and end – indeed, that it is opposed
ἀναγκαίως [necessarily] to these terms.

Therefore, this duration belongs to God alone, who alone has indivisible, interminable, and
independent being. Therefore, it excludes all succession, termination, and imperfection.
With him there is nothing past or future, nothing prior or posterior. His [being] has no
beginning, no end; whence Thales described God: “He who has neither beginning nor end.”

IV. Aevum is final indefectibility of being.

Concerning the word, see Dn. Scheibler, Book 1, Chapter 16, Number 15; now we will only
labor about the thing. That aevum is duration is not in need of a long proof. But it is not an
infinite duration but a finite one, since it is essentially diverse from eternity. Bonaventure
seeks this distinction in succession; but more usually succession is attributed at least to time.
Others [say] that aevum is of a natural thing, eternity of a supernatural thing. But these
differences are extrinsic, and not sufficiently adequate. More rightly, if the description must
be sought from the subject, aevum is said to be the duration of things created indefectible
by nature, just as eternity is the duration of the uncreated and simply indefectible being, and
time [the duration] of things defectible by nature; but most rightly of all the formal concept
of aevum is represented in itself, the subject being precisely cut off: since the subject is not
of the essence of affections, therefore final indefectibility of being is defined by us in the
abstract, from the negation of defectibility only finally, or by reason of end and terminus.
Therefore, two things are implied by this very fact: 1. A certain defectibility of being, namely
by reason of beginning. 2. A certain indefectibility of being, as regards terminus. That aevum
can indeed have a beginning, but by no means can have an end; or as the Scholastics say,
that aevum is defectible a parte ante [from before], indefectible a parte post [from after].
Therefore, aevum is distinguished both from eternity, which is in neither way defectible, and
from time, which can fail in both ways. For to eternity beginning and end are simply
repugnant; to time beginning and end are due by nature. Aevum consists in a middle place;
because it can indeed have a beginning, but cannot have an end, namely from itself and its
own nature. Hence it is said that aevum participates something of eternity and something of
time. Although they are durations essentially diverse, nor can they ever coincide, as was
clear above from the contradictory opposition. Indeed, as the essences of things are
invariable, so also their durations, since duration does not differ from essence in reality.
Which is also the reason that the description of aevum was not derived from actual

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beginning or from the lack of actual ending, but from the potency to lack an end, to have a
beginning – not absolved, but from the nature of the thing. That aevum consists in actual
indefectibility a parte post [from after] and in the actual possession of a beginning does not
complete the concept of aevum; but [what does is] not being able by nature to end, and
being able to have a beginning. See Scheibler in the cited book, chapter, number 63. It is
clear from these things that aevum is the duration of finite spirits, of angels and of rational
souls as their being, as by nature they are indefectible and immortal. For in them there is no
intrinsic principle of corruption, by reason of which they at last cease to be.

V. Time is total defectibility in being.

Or it is duration implying by nature complete defectibility; or [it is duration] everywhere

defectible by force of its own nature, both by reason of beginning and by reason of end. It is
not here taken improperly, either generally for all duration, as by the Ramists; or specially for
any duration, as when from eternity it exhausts all duration; but adequately and properly, as
it is contradistinguished no less from aevum than from eternity. Moreover, duration of this
kind is taken one way in metaphysics, another way in physics; there it is the duration of a
thing defectible by nature; here it is the extrinsic enumeration of motion. There [it is] an
affection of any being which acknowledges beginning and end; here a circumstance and
condition only of a natural thing. The former is identified with essence, and varies as it
[essence] varies; the latter has its differences not from the thing which is said to be in time,
but from the diverse motion of the heavenly bodies, which it enumerates. Therefore, it is
defined [as] number, the number of motion according to before and after (Physics, Book 4,
Chapter 11). Concerning the formal concept of time taken metaphysically, there is not one
opinion of all. Some want its [concept] to consist in succession. But although succession is
given in motion, and consequently in physical time, yet it by no means belongs to every
being defectible by nature, nor does it affect the very being of all corruptible things, nor can
it be restricted only to successive being or motion. No less are the natures of things said to
endure in time than [are] motions; therefore, time is more rightly defined by total
defectibility. It is defectible, because it is contradistinguished from eternity, which alone is
indefectible. And [it is defectible] totally, since it can have an end no less than a beginning:
by which way it differs from aevum, which can at least have a beginning, but not indeed an
end. I say notably, that time can have a beginning and an end. For supposing that it is not
repugnant for things corruptible by their own nature to be produced which have persevered
and been preserved from perishing by a superior power, indeed which have existed from
eternity to eternity – nothing less are [these things] to be denominated from the duration of
time, since by their own nature they can have both beginning and end. From these things it
is not obscure to what temporal duration belongs, namely not only to all motion of natural

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things, but also to the very essence of corruptible things, and to the acts of angels defectible
by their own nature.

Corollaries.

I. Duration is not distinguished in reality from existence.

Because it makes no composition with the entity. Therefore, it is 1. Inseparable from the
thing. 2. Indivisible, nor does it admit of grades or more and less, as essence itself [does
not]: although it may be conceived under diverse moments. 3. Of the same dignity as the
thing itself, since a transcendental affection is not inferior to the subject. 4. Immutable
insofar as the essence [is] immutable. Therefore, different essence, different duration. And
therefore an indefectible duration cannot be attributed to a corruptible nature, or a
defectible duration to an incorruptible nature. Hence eternity does not befall a corruptible
nature, even if perchance it has neither beginning nor end, about which now [it is] the
following [corollary].

II. Nothing besides God is eternal.

It is one thing to be from eternity and remain unto eternity; another to be eternal. The
former imports at least perpetuity of duration; the latter imports complete indefectibility of
duration. The former is said also of a thing defectible by nature, which has neither beginning
nor end, if any such thing can be produced; the latter [is said] of a nature simply indefectible,
to which created being is absolutely repugnant, [and] to have beginning and end. Therefore,
nothing besides God is eternal, nor can be; although perhaps it is not ἄτοπον [absurd], that
something destitute of beginning and end could have been founded. What is truly,
absolutely, and properly eternal, it is required that it be simply immutable. But not
everything which is destitute of beginning and end is simply and necessarily immutable.
Some therefore distinguish between intrinsic or essential eternity, and extrinsic [eternity],
which is of dependence. Those who teach that creation from eternity is possible, or that
creation in general prescinds from creation from eternity and from creation in time, also
dispute from this principle that it cannot be proven by natural reason that the world was
created in time, although it is demonstrated that the world was created – whence perhaps
[came] the error of Aristotle that the world is eternal, although others want that to have
been said by Aristotle only for the sake of example. And thus in a twofold way something
could be produced from nothing: in one way, so that it previously lay hidden under non-

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being, and afterwards emerges through newness of essence; in the other way, so that it is
not produced from matter, whether it was at some time a non-being, or was from eternity.
But Ambrose says the latter mode is unfitting, Basil even blasphemous. To whom some
philosophers subscribe by this argument: Whatever has been made, it necessarily at some
time has been made, and has some beginning in which it received its being, which it does
not have before its effection, because natural cogitation dictates that those things which
have been made were made in some determinate instant. Whatever the case may be, it is
certain from the sacred [writings] not only that God alone is eternal, but also that besides
God nothing is from eternity; whence in the Scriptures the phrases “to be from eternity” and
“to be before creatures” or “before the foundations of the world were laid” are equivalent –
because all things whatsoever [are] created have a beginning of being. And as between God
the creator and creatures there is no middle, so between eternity and time (which began
with the creation of the world) there is de facto no middle. Which the theologians observe
against Vorstius and Moscorovius, of whom the former thinks it not improbable that the
angels were created long before the world; the latter doubts whether first matter is eternal
or not. But indeed truth superior to all doubt stands forth clearly not from probable
reasonings but from the infallible word of God.

III. Eternity does not admit the differences of time.

What absurdity is it, if we say that eternity is present, past, and future duration? Is this,
therefore, not the very distinction of time in eternity? Says Gosławski, Part 2, [Chapter 8],
against Keckermann. But indeed that is most absurd, O Photinian, to find in a duration
indefectible by nature a duration defectible by nature! ἀντίκειται ἐν προσκειμένῳ [it is
opposed in what is added]: for eternity is contradistinguished from time. Is it not yet absurd
enough to call eternity past or future? Past duration is that which was and is no longer.
Future [duration] is that which is not yet, but will be thereafter. You are absolutely right, my
apologies for the confusion. The corollary continues as follows:

Thus, eternity now will not be, because it has passed; and because it is future, [it will be]. Is
it not monstrous enough to call the same thing past and present and future? Let it be
applied to God, who is without doubt eternal – indeed, the eternity of God is the very
essence of God. Therefore in God, and God himself, there is before and after. Therefore in
God there is change and God is mutable. For before and after of time cannot even be
thought without change. But the essence of God is indivisible, interminable, immutable,
existing all at once, excluding all succession of time.

Therefore, when the differences of time are assigned to God in the sacred [writings], the rule
of St. Thomas (Part I, Question 10, Article 2) is to be noted: The words of different times are
attributed to God, inasmuch as his eternity includes all times – not that he himself varies

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through present, past and future. Therefore, eternity is said to coexist with all differences,
not in the conjunct sense, that all coexist to eternity simultaneously and at once, but in the
divided sense, that the whole eternity coexists with the diverse, and mutually succeeding,
parts of times. Therefore, it is one thing for God to coexist with time, another for God to be
in time. Thus, God is said αἰωνοπαθῶς [figuratively] to be yesterday, today – not because he
was in yesterday and today, but because he was when yesterday and today were; nor did
God endure more today than yesterday, but only more of time endured with God today than
yesterday. Whence the Most Illustrious Dn. Clotz observes that when the words denoting
succession of time are said of God, they ought to be attributed to him only under the aspect
of affirmation (not truly of negation, which they otherwise are found to involve, as in a
creature). Disputation 5 on Pneumatics, Section 20. Arnisaeus from Jerome, Epitome of
Physics, page 67: “God was,” that is, he never was lacking; “God is,” that is, he always is;
“God will be,” that is, he will never be lacking. Therefore, eternity contains in itself every
difference of time, at least eminently. For the duration which time has imperfectly with
perpetual succession of past, present, and future, eternity has in the most perfect way, that
is, all at once without any innovation. For eternity is mere uniformity, because there [is] no
succession there, no variety; although uniformity and eternity are not precisely the same.
The former expresses the identity of the same in relation to itself; the latter, the negation of
boundaries. The former implies complete identity, which does not seem to be said formally
of the latter.

IV. In eternity there is nothing prior, nothing posterior.

Distinguish the prior of time and of order. The former cannot consist with eternity as such;
the latter is not repugnant to it. Both are clear – the former from the preceding corollary,
that namely the differences of time do not have place in eternity; and it is confirmed:
because finite duration is not to be confused with infinite, time with eternity; but as
impossible as it is for an infinite duration to become finite, so impossible is it for time to fall
into eternity. And since it is of the concept of a thing simply eternal, that within it there be
no variation or succession, how can the before and after of time be thought or imagined in
it? Therefore, when before and after are attributed to it by reason of the coexistence of
time, that happens at least through an extrinsic denomination from the creature existing in
time, the foundation of which is not in God, but in the temporal thing – and therefore
according to a relation of reason. But this denomination and mode of conceiving infers
nothing in the thing itself. For example, I conceive the same wall now as right, now as left,
although it is not diverse from itself – and so in every extrinsic denomination and relation of
reason. Moreover, since in any creature there is a twofold succession, one by reason of
substantial being, insofar as it can not-be, either by nature or by divine power; the other by
reason of accidental being, insofar as in accidents or actions or in local motion it can have

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successive duration on account of its mutability – then each is most alien to God on account
of his simple immutability. Vorstius is inept, who finds a difference of time between the
essence of God and the divine decrees: for the reason that an action depends on the agent
and therefore is posterior to it. But the divine acts, eternal and internal, infer neither
dependence properly so called, nor a certain posteriority of time, since there is nothing in
God which is not God himself. But what else are the decrees of God than the eternal acts of
the divine mind knowing [and] of the will decreeing about those things which he wishes
either to do or to permit? Just as the divine cognition and volition do not infer differences of
time, so neither [do] the divine decrees: since the latter are defined by the former. As for the
fact that before and after of order are not repugnant to eternity, and therefore that eternity
does not deny all priority, the personal and essential acts in God teach, as well as the divine
attributes. For that an order of origin and of natural enumeration is given here the
theologians prove, which can well consist with essential identity. Thus, truth is prior to
goodness, which nevertheless by reason of entity are one thing. Indeed, that even a
transient act can be given coeval with the divine essence, those concede who dispute
creation from eternity [to be] possible – which having been admitted, even the splendor
which is begotten from the sun would be coeternal with the sun, etc.

V. What is eternal cannot be limited by temporals.

Limit this from the antecedent: It is true by reason of measurement, not simply by reason of
order and condition. Most Illustrious: The eternal cannot be measured by temporals, since
to determine the infinite simply through a finite measure is impossible, and in eternity
properly nothing can be given measurable. But it is not absurd for the eternal to be ordered
κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν [notionally] or to those things which exist in time, or to suppose a prior
temporal condition not indeed by reason of preexistence (i.e., of actual being constituted in
nature, for this is again impossible – namely, that something really be prior to eternity itself),
but by reason of prescience and of possible or foreseen being, which infers no ἀντιπάθειαν
[contradiction]. That the eternal prescience of a future thing precedes in order the likewise
eternal decree about that which is to follow the thing – there is no contradiction. Indeed,
those things which in time follow one another by reason of actual existence are so ordered
from eternity by reason of divine prescience or omniscience. Therefore, if they are
considered under that aspect also in the eternal decree, as is altogether fitting, the eternal
decree can truly be said to be ordered or limited by temporals. For that order of prevision
does not expel eternity – unless perhaps it is also judged ἄτοπον [absurd] to say that the
decree of the will presupposes the cognition of the mind on account of the highest identity
of the divine mind and will.

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 VI. Aevum is of created spiritual things.

Let the same be understood definitely about the being of spirits, not truly about the
operation of the spiritual essence. For as it is certain that a created spirit is essentially
indefectible in a certain respect [secundum quid] and by its nature cannot have an end, so it
is no less certain that the actions of a finite spirit can even by their nature be terminated and
acknowledge an end – and for this reason they do not endure for an aevum, but for time,
which they call spiritual. 2. Exclusively, but κατὰ τι [in a certain respect], as to bodily things
alone, with first matter and the heavens excepted, according to Aristotle. But about these
things and about time now more [discussion] is not permitted.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON UBIETY

Here we will note 1. The formal concept – what it is; 2. The distinction of modes – what are
its modes, and what each one imports.

I. Ubiety is that by which a being is denominated to be present in a where or space.

It is clear here that ubiety is not taken specially, as it signifies μερικὸν [particular] where, and
determinate [where], in which sense Augustine denies that God is anywhere, but generally
for every mode of presence – as in Physics, Book 4 – which belongs to every being, created
and uncreated, substance and accident. If someone perchance doubts about accidents, they
require their own where at least analogically, since according to Cicero (Tusculan
Disputations, Book 1), if something is, it cannot be nowhere, and if it is nowhere, it is not at
all. See Dn. Scheibler’s Introduction to Logic, Chapter 1, Number 13.

It is explained: 1. Negatively, that it is such a mode of being by which it is said not to be

nowhere, which is equivalent to being present in a where or space. But this is to be
understood in general concerning any space whatsoever, whether it be imaginary and
fictitious, or real and true, and concerning any mode of being present whatsoever, in
whatever way it is understood to be present there. I call imaginary space that which is
conceived outside the world, although it is not something. For nothing uncreated is besides
God. But creatures are contained within the boundaries of this universe; yet space must be
conceived as something, and thus, although it has no entity in itself, nevertheless some

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entity is attributed to it by the intellect. It is not enough, as the Coimbrans think (Physics,
Book 8, Last Chapter, Question 2, Article 4), and Fonseca (Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 15,
Question 1), that something can be created by God in such spaces, for the being of spaces
either real or more than imaginary; since the spaces which are conceived before the
establishment of the world do not imply anything beyond a being of reason. Thus, if God
were to annihilate everything which now is between heaven and earth, then there would
still remain the intervening space between heaven and earth possible to be filled, and yet all
beings would have been annihilated. But the same reason is of them and of others, since
even today we likewise conceive by a fiction of the mind infinite spaces outside the world, to
which God is present, for this end only, lest we suppose that the divine ubiety is bounded by
the limits of the universe. Moreover, it is one thing to be present in space or where, which is
a true and real affection of being; another thing to be in space itself or where, which, as was
said, is also imaginary. For a transcendental relation does not always require a real and
positive term. But in what the former consists is not agreed upon among the doctors. Briefly,
ubiety does not consist formally either in a merely extrinsic denomination, which are usually
taken partly from act, partly from the coexistence of another thing; neither is admitted here.
Acts of reason are not the cause of ubiety, since the thing truly is somewhere outside the
operation of the mind; nor [is] the coexistence of another, since, with every extrinsic thing
removed, its own ubiety still intrinsically agrees with the thing, as an internal attribute, as
with God from eternity, with a body first established, and with the outermost heaven. Or in a
transient operation, as some seem to speak of the presence of angels or of the divine
[presence]. Scaliger proves (Exercitation 359, Section 5), both that operation is not a
necessary concomitant of being, as [is] where, and that where is not necessarily varied when
the operation is varied. And certainly a transient operation is not, by the nature of the thing
[a parte rei], the essence itself, as ubiety is, and therefore it cannot formally constitute
ubiety. For that ubiety is not distinguished really from the being which it denominates is
required by the nature of the transcendental affections of being.

How the Scholastics, stating differently, can be explained, see Dn. Jacob Martini in the cited
place, Question 5. This remains, that it should be said to consist in a relation to space, as the
description implies. For it does not occur [to me] how the formal concept of ubiety should
be explained otherwise.

II. Ubiety is either indefinite or definite; the former is simply interminable, and is
called ubiquity, and is proper to the infinite being. The latter is determinable, and
can be called alicubity [being-somewhere-ness], which belongs to any finite being
whatsoever.

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It pleases [me] to propose the modes of ubiety by division, so that their opposition may be
conspicuous. Therefore, in general there is a twofold ubiety emanating from the nature of
being, indefinite and definite, interminable and determinable. It is not to be supposed with
Scaliger in the cited place that where [ubi] is only a necessary affection of finite being, or
with others, that it does not belong to finite being except accidentally, to whom Dn.
Scheibler seems to accede in his General Metaphysics, Chapter 18, Number 18. Both confuse
predicamental where with transcendental [where]. And to the infinite belongs its own
whereness equally infinite, and to finite things whereness is to be attributed not only
accidentally, so to speak (for the sake of which a certain special predicament is constituted),
but also essentially. For let there be something finite, destitute of every accident, but
absolute in its essentials; that certainly will have its own whereness, since to be somewhere
is a property of every actual being, as Dn. Scheibler has it in the cited place, Number 7.
Indeed, the predicamental where itself, because [it is] truly a being, cannot not be
somewhere; otherwise, if it were nowhere, neither would it be at all. Therefore, to it also
belongs transcendental where. But if indefinite ubiety is said [to be] interminable, [it is]
because it is such that it is simply impossible for it to be terminated or defined by
boundaries. It is called ubiquity, because by reason of it something is said to be ubique
[everywhere], i.e., in all wheres, and indeed in such a way that it cannot not be everywhere
by its own nature and essentially. Therefore, it belongs to God alone and is incommunicable.
For although it is not repugnant that some creature be everywhere, yet for that reason
ubiquity does not yet belong to it, since to be everywhere and not to be able not to be
everywhere are most diverse, as will be clear next.

The other ubiety is called definite and determinable, which belongs to finite nature as such,
and is inseparable from it. Therefore, a finite being does not lose its whereness even when it
is made present everywhere by the power of an infinite being, since it is one thing to be
determinable in being present or in presence, another to actually obtain a determinate
mode of being present – i.e., that finite being can indeed be everywhere by the most
powerful and most perfect divine power, yet it does not thereby cease to be finite. Then we
call that determinable presence alicubity [being-somewhere-ness], considering the
etymology of the word. For “somewhere” [alicubi] is said as if “some where” [aliquod ubi],
and therefore by force of the name it implies a μερικὸν [particular] and partial where.
Although we do not deny that it is often taken more generally and equivalently to
whereness. Other words fail us by which to express the thing; therefore, we will easily obtain
pardon.

III. Ubiquity is simple interminability of being present.

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The name ubiquity [Latin: ubiquitas] was first used by clandestine Sacramentarians to
designate expansion and local inclusion; here we do not hesitate to employ it, purged of all
imperfection. The philosophical use and the sophistic abuse are to be distinguished,
although the latter is often prior to the former, as is clear even from this example. Therefore,
let expansion and local inclusion be removed, and let simple presence in all wheres be
conceived, absolutely interminable. But while something is conceived to be everywhere, it is
indeed supposed to be present in all places, but not so as to be comprehended, but so as to
comprehend all places – not σωματικῶς [bodily] and περιγραπτῶς [circumscriptively], but
περιεκτικῶς [containing], by an illocal presence, not a local one – that is, what the ancients
say: God is everywhere, and God is nowhere; everywhere inasmuch as he contains all things
by his presence, nowhere inasmuch as he is contained by nothing. God is within all things,
not included; he is outside all things, not excluded. The Scholastics call it repletive presence
– not indeed in a physical sense, by which he fills all things in a crass, corporeal way, but in a
hyperphysical sense, by which in a divine way, by filling, he contains all things, from Jeremiah
23:24. Therefore, Thales says that God is πλήρη θεοῦ εἶναι [full of divinity], as the
Philosopher has it in On the Soul, Book 1, Chapter 5, Text 85. Moreover, ubiquity, as it is
taken here, is also called immensity, because it cannot be measured by any space.

Although otherwise being immense and being everywhere κυρίως [strictly] are to be
distinguished – not what is everywhere, but what cannot not be everywhere, that finally is
truly immense. Some explain immensity by the negation of the possibility of existing in finite
space and the aptitude of existing in infinite spaces; but in truth [it expresses] not so much
the aptitude of being present as the actuality of being present. There seem to be others of
this opinion who suppose that God can indeed exist in infinite spaces, although he actually
exists only in this universe – that which we by no means approve. We more simply define
ubiquity as simple interminability of being present, just as in the preceding chapter eternity
was defined as simple interminability of remaining. For eternity and immensity are two, as it
were, offshoots of infinity, which mutually explain each other, because the latter expresses
in whereness what the former [expresses] in duration. There the boundaries of permanence
are denied; here the boundaries of presence. Each is an essential attribute of the infinite
being, and therefore not distinct from its essence in reality; each is ἀνενέργητος [not-
energetic], i.e., formally of itself and precisely; neither infers operation, but simply negation.
But as eternity said not only the negation of boundaries in existing, but besides that, the
complete negation of terminability, so also ubiquity denies not only the boundaries in being
present, but simply all terminability of being present, so that what is everywhere essentially
cannot not be in infinite spaces, or ἁπλῶς [simply] cannot be terminated by finite spaces.

It is not to be supposed that ubiquity is enclosed by the ambit of this universe, or that the
concept of immensity is completed in this: that the immense is so in this world and all its
parts that it can also be in many others, indeed in infinite worlds, if they were possible. But
because immensity can in no way be defined by any spaces whatsoever, it must be said that
the immense actually exists by that very act in infinite spaces outside this universe. For

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ubiquity contains every creature within itself like a point, as one of the Fathers says. The
whole world is before you as the turning of a balance, and as a drop of dew descending in
the morning upon the earth, Wisdom 11:23. Compare Isaiah 40:12. But what immensity is
that which is bounded by the minutest little point? It is equally absurd to define the
immense by the spaces of the world as it is absurd to measure the eternal by the moments
of time or of the duration of the universe. Moreover, it cannot be denied that God, if he
wills, can also operate outside the world by creating or producing something; but wherever
he can operate, there he must be present. Therefore, either he would then begin to be
present there, or he is always present there. Since the former is absurd – that God, namely,
through motion or in whatever way you may imagine, acquires another where from which
he was previously absent – this is necessarily required: that God is most truly never not
present to those spaces outside the world which we call imaginary. Again, if God were to
annihilate whatever lies between heaven and earth, with both extremes preserved, what
would have to be said: would the divine presence also extend to that intervening empty and
imaginary space? Just as it undoubtedly [extends] to the extremes, inasmuch as they would
not even remain without the most present sustentation of God. If you deny it, you must
conceive of God as divided from himself, as being present to the earth, present to the
heaven, but not filling the intervening space. If you affirm it, by that very fact you say not
only that there are imaginary spaces, but also that God is present in imaginary spaces – that
is, you now contradict yourself. I pass over the arguments which Sacred Scripture supplies:
that the heaven of heavens do not contain God, 1 Kings 8:27; that God is higher than the
heavens, Job 11:8. God is not concluded in any definite space, says Ambrose on Ephesians 3.
For God does not only fill all things, but also exceeds them; for he is not enclosed, but has all
things in himself, so that he alone may be considered ineffable and infinite. From these
things it is inferred: ubiquity does not consist formally in operation, much less in a transient
operation, since no such operation occurs in imaginary spaces. And surely anyone will hardly
deny that he can conceive the divine ubiquity or immensity precisely as simple presence in
no way terminable, so that operation itself is not involved in its concept. Indeed, God was
immense and everywhere from eternity, although no extrinsic and transient operation can
be attributed to God from eternity.

Omnipresence is akin to whereness. They are often used promiscuously, but more accurately
they are distinguished. For omnipresence is not properly immensity, but a consequent of
immensity. For immensity is an essential, eternal, and absolute attribute; omnipresence [is]
extrinsic, relative, which began in time – because it can neither be understood nor defined
without respect to creatures actually present. The former is ἀνενέργητος [not-energetic];
the latter is ἐνεργητική [energetic]. For omnipresence, as the theologians demonstrate from
Scripture, is not an idle presence, but a busy, active, and commanding one, since the
definition of divine omnipresence according to the style of Scripture contains two things: 1.
The nearness of the divine essence in all places where any creature dwells; 2. The
sustentation and governance of all creatures, as Mr. Schröder has it in his Scepter of Christ

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the King. But omnipresence is not properly called either immense or eternal. Not immense,
since neither creatures nor their places or wheres are immense, whether in magnitude or in
number. Not eternal, since before creation there were neither places nor creatures with
respect to which God would have been omnipresent, nor any creatures which he would have
governed or sustained. This is [the reason] that immensity or ubiquity and omnipresence are
said to differ as the prior and posterior, the absolute and the relative, the eternal and the
temporal, the quiescent and the active. Therefore, they are distinguished chiefly in a
threefold way. 1. As principle and subject. Immensity seems to be, as it were, the root and
principle of omnipresence, so that omnipresence results from immensity; surely what is
omnipresent is of an immense subsistence, or at least is made present to all by the immense
power of God. For we ought to have no doubt that God, by his absolute omnipotence, can
bring it about that any creature whatsoever, whether angel or man or body, be
simultaneously present in heaven and on earth, even if no hypostatic union intervenes, as
the most learned Schröder says in Book 6. Therefore, in this way they differ as immensity
results from infinity; but omnipresence [results] from immensity, but not adequately – since
not whatever is in any way omnipresent must therefore be either immense or infinite. 2. As
terminus and respect. Immensity extends itself to infinite spaces and refuses every
terminus; but omnipresence refers itself to every created thing, and thus seems to respect a
certain terminus. By reason of the former, the infinite being cannot not be everywhere; by
reason of the latter, a thing is at least said to be present in all wheres or spaces of this
universe. 3. As formal concept and proper concept. Immensity is completed by
interminability of being present. But omnipresence expresses both ἀδιαστασία [indistance]
and lack of distance from any where of created things, and ἐνέργεια [activity] and operation
towards things constituted in where, so that here there is given not only an approximation
of essence, but also an operation of present essence, or a presence both of supposit and of
power, as they say.

IV. Alicubity [being-somewhere-ness] is twofold: either without occupation of space,

or with occupation of space. The former is called definitive presence; the latter,
circumscriptive.

Hence, joined with immensity, there is a threefold mode of being present: repletive, which is
of ubiquity; definitive, which is of spiritual presence; circumscriptive, which is of local
presence. We say that each of these modes of whereness is intrinsic and essential (a
posteriori) to the being to which they belong, as regards the emanation from its nature; or
as regards first act, although as regards second act a doubt may remain. Certainly I would
hardly say that the repletive mode of presence is given precisely, and by reason only of first
act, so that second act does not follow but is suspended – since by repletive presence a
thing is said so to fill all wheres, that it cannot not be present in act to all wheres by that

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very [act]. But there is another reason for the other modes of ubiety, which here now it is
not permitted to touch on further. Moreover, it is clear from these things that the
determinable modes of presence, or of alicubity, do not properly constitute or complete the
predicamental where, inasmuch as the latter is a peculiar accident, and is distinguished from
the located thing really, and therefore makes a real composition with it – which does not
seem that it ought to be stated concerning the modes of ubiety, since ubiety is not
distinguished really, but only formally from the being which it denominates, equally as the
other transcendental affections of being. The same also must be said concerning the modes
of ubiety, so that to each being its proper ubiety is intrinsic and essential, without real
composition with it. In a similar way I saw myself in the preceding theorem. From these
things, moreover, the modes of ubiety are easily distinguished from each other. Ubiquity or
the repletive mode of being present is that by which a being cannot not be present
indivisibly and interminably to infinite wheres, and therefore is not only whole in every
created thing, but also whole in any part of it, both as regards essence and as regards
presence; nor can it be otherwise through the impossible. As God is the true immense, and
cannot not be immense. And as such, God not only is everywhere, but also nowhere;
everywhere inasmuch as he contains all things by his presence, nowhere inasmuch as he is
contained by nothing. God is within all things, not included; he is outside all things, not
excluded. Thus, in this way both his essence and his presence (so to speak) are not only
whole in this whole universe, but also whole besides in the minutest and most abject parts
of it, and that by absolute necessity, the concept of immensity so requiring.

Definitive alicubity, although it infers the whole essence in any part of space, yet it does not
posit also the whole presence in any part, but each part of space demands proportionately a
certain part of the presence; and thus the thing is constituted somewhere, so that it is
defined by a certain space, yet without its occupation and local circumscription; yet outside
which it is not simultaneously and at once present to another space, much less can it be
present to all or infinite wheres, nor ought it by force of its own nature.

Circumscriptive [alicubity] finally, as such, both requires a definite space, and brings in
underneath the occupation of the same, by which the whole thing cannot by its own nature
be both in the whole space and in the individual parts of space, but rather occupies space in
such a way that it by nature postulates that it be commensurated to the individual parts of
space by its own parts, as is now to be explained more broadly.

V. Definitive alicubity is that by which a finite being is somewhere by its own nature
in such a way that it is whole in a determinate space, and whole in any part of the
same space, without occupation or circumscription.

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To be somewhere definitively is otherwise sometimes taken generally, for any mode of
determinable presence, in which signification it is said of any created thing whatsoever, as
when Damascene (Orthodox Faith, Book 2, Chapter 3) [says], every creature is defined and
determined by its very creator – but here it is taken specially and properly, as it is
constituted in a middle place between being present circumscriptively and repletively, since
these three modes of being present exhaust every whereness, so that to be present
repletively is in every way interminable; to be present circumscriptively is in every way
determinable; but definitive alicubity is neither simply determinable, nor simply
interminable, according to which a thing is said to be somewhere in such a way that it is not
present in infinite wheres, nor is circumscribed by a finite where, so that it cannot be
outside that, or designate for itself a further where. Therefore, it is called definitive
presence, not in a passive sense, as if it were defined by a certain space, but in an active
sense, because it is of that which can define a where or space for itself, in which it may be at
will, yet stopping within finite limits. Hence Scaliger (Exercitation 359, Section 5): An angel is
said to be there by definition; by definition, I say, in this way: it is here, it is not there. And
afterwards he concludes: Therefore, they (angels) are said to be in place equivocally, and
even more than equivocally, because they are in their own where, not by circumscription, as
my hand in the air, but by designation. Further, in Section 6: That angels are contracted and
diffused (I understand by reason of where) from a magnitude (of any space whatsoever)
designated by themselves, but a certain and finite one, is true. I say a certain [magnitude],
for it will not promote itself into the infinite, nor will it contract itself to a devoted point. And
indeed the whole essence is in any part without matter. So he. Which things, rightly
understood, make for the declaration of our definition, in which both the subject is implied,
finite being – since a finite affection is not of an infinite subject; and the nature of this
affection is declared from the formal effect, which is to posit a finite being 1. In a
determinate space, by which it is discerned from ubiquity, [which is] defined by no spaces.
But that determination depends on the freedom of that which defines for itself a space, with
whatever amplitude it pleases. For nature can only define for itself a finite space. 2. Without
occupation of space, so that it may be distinguished from circumscriptive presence, by which
a thing is circumscribed by a determinate where, and therefore occupies a space
commensurable to itself; but to occupy space is said of that which so fills all the dimensions
of space that it cannot bear another of its genus next to itself. Thus a body so occupies the
place in which it is that no other body, even the most subtle, can dwell there at the same
time, on account of the impossibility of the penetration of dimensions. It is otherwise with
those things which require definitive presence; thus the soul defines for itself the same
where in which the body itself is placed, with which it is united. An angel is somewhere in
such a way that from the same where are not excluded either a thousand other angels, or a
certain physical body, since their presence does not infer extension κατ’ ἔκτασιν [by
extension] and penetration, on account of immateriality. 3. So that it is whole in the whole,
and whole in any part of the space.

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Here a distinction must be made between essence and presence; by reason of essence it
seeks by nature to be both in the whole space which it has defined for itself, and in any part
of it; but not by reason of presence, but this is so definite that indeed the whole presence
requires the whole definite where, but the individual parts of the where by no means
require its whole presence, since that which is apt to be present definitively is in itself an
indivisible essence, but not a presence simply indivisible, as regards, namely, its actual
designation. The Metaphysicians seem to have this in view when they consider the totality
of a thing existing somewhere in a twofold way, essentially or by reason of essence and
perfection, and accidentally or by reason of quantity and parts, and concerning the former
totality they admit, for example, that the soul is whole in any part of the body by totality of
essence and of its perfections; concerning the latter they deny [it], since a part of the soul
(so they are accustomed to speak) which is in the head is not in the foot.

But this is explained more conveniently in the way which has been said, or [in such a way]
that in place of totality of quantity, or imaginary extension, there may be substituted totality
of presence and application proportioned to the diverse parts of space. For the name of
quantity and of quantitative part is incongruously applied to spiritual things. By this τρόπῳ
[mode], therefore, definitive whereness is again distinguished partly from repletive
[whereness], which is whole both by reason of essence and by reason of presence in any
where whatsoever, or as they say is everywhere essentially and presently; partly from
circumscriptive [whereness], which can be said to be whole neither by reason of essence nor
by reason of presence in any part of space, since the individual parts of the circumscribed
thing are commensurated to the individual parts of the occupied space; for the concept of it
is a middle one, because it postulates to be whole through essence, wherever it may be, or
in a point of space, although by its presence it is not whole in any partial where.

It must be noted, moreover, that whatever things have thus far been said concerning the
formal effect of definitive whereness, represent its nature as such, but do not deny that the
actual emanation of the same can be impeded by divine power, and therefore in another
way, which is analogous to the other modes of being present, the being-in-act somewhere
can be claimed for it, the proper whereness, or native potency to the definitive where, not
having been taken away, inasmuch as it is the same as the essence itself, and therefore
inseparable and immutable. Hence the doctors dispute that there is no repugnance by
which, for example, the whereness of an angel may be assimilated to the repletive mode of
being, although it is impossible for ubiquity or immensity to be claimed for it, since by its
nature it is not unlimited in being present. That is, an angel can be made present to itself in
many wheres by the power of the first agent, yet with its native and essential definitive
whereness retained. Two things are thus said, which we affirm: 1. That definitive whereness
can be preserved without the definitive mode of being present actually following it. Nature
indeed necessarily results in the latter from the former, but he who is above nature can
bring it about that it does not result. For since without his actual concurrence the natural
causes avail nothing, and nothing is except by his giving and granting, who would doubt that

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if God by his influx conserves the angelic essence, and the definitive whereness which is not
distinguished from it really, and therefore does not concur with the definitive being present
of the angel, as to second act, that the definitive whereness is most certainly left without the
actual definitive mode of presence? 2. That God can place an angel in many wheres, or
everywhere, Dn. Cornelius Martini shows in his Analysis by this argument: that no
contradiction is involved, whether you consider the divine power or the angelic essence; for
the former, since it is immense and infinite, also knows how to accomplish those things
which we cannot attain even by understanding. Whence the Scholastics remove from the
divine power, not aptly enough, things which are unintelligible, since the divine power
exceeds our intelligence by far, and this involves nothing repugnant, but can obey the will
and operation of the first cause. There are three things which seem to stand in the way, and
are thought to infer a certain repugnance: the unity, the finitude, and the alicubity of an
angel – but they do not at all obstruct. Not unity, since it, as such, does not overturn
ubiquity, much less the actual mode of being present everywhere; otherwise not even God,
who is supremely one, would be everywhere. For καθ’ αὑτὸ [in itself] presupposes κατὰ
παντός [of all], and from as such to of all is optimally collected; nor can the finite or limited
unity be objected, since being finite by nature or essentially and having an unlimited mode
of being present, or being everywhere, do not overturn each other. The boundaries of
essence are one thing, [the boundaries] of presence another; let him who can show a true
ἀντίφασιν [contradiction], not a fictitious one – I will acknowledge [it]. Finally, the definite
alicubity of the angelic nature does not seem to stand in the way – for it is not taken away by
this hypothesis, by which the angel is placed everywhere, as was demonstrated in the
preceding point.

They are not contradictory terms: to be able by its own nature to be present in a certain
definite where, and not to be in act in a definite where, by the power of a supernatural
principle. Opposition must be made ὡς ἄλλως [as otherwise], κατὰ τὸ αὐτό [according to the
same thing], πρὸς αὐτό [in relation to it]. Therefore, for a legitimate contradiction of such
terms, a habitude of this kind is required: to be able per se and naturally to be present
somewhere or in a definite space, and not to be able per se and naturally to be present in a
definite space. Likewise, not to be in act in a definite where, and not to be able not to be in
act in a definite where. Since, therefore, no repugnance is inferred, it is indubitable that it
can come about by divine power that an angel be everywhere, although to it belongs ubiety.
But to other things. This one thing seems to remain to be considered: to whom ubiety
belongs definitively by nature and essentially; I will absolve myself in a few words. It seems
that it ought to be attributed to finite spirits alone from the class of substances. For such
whereness is finite; there is no doubt, therefore, that it affects and denominates finite being
– but not [finite being] material, since this by its nature is apt to be commensurated to
space, or to be present somewhere with occupation of space, for the reason that it has parts
outside parts; hence to it does not belong, nor can belong, whereness of this kind, which by
its nature postulates being present somewhere without occupation of space and

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circumscription. Concerning the substantial forms of material things there is a doubt,
whether definitive whereness belongs to them or not. For there are those who state that
they are per accidens in circumscriptive where, because they are received in the quantum,
and extend themselves to the individual quantitative parts, and therefore posit one of their
parts outside the other; but others assign to them definitive where, as can be seen in
Fonseca, Metaphysics, Book 5, Question 15, Section 9, Subsection 6. In a doubtful matter I
do not have what to determine; let the nature of forms first be set in the open, and about
the affection the judgment will not be difficult; yet it seems that definitive whereness ought
to be ascribed, by nature at least, to things immaterial and devoid of quantity – I mean, to
spiritual substances: angels, the rational soul, whether it be in the state of conjunction or in
the state of separation. Δευτέρως [Secondarily] to immaterial qualities, knowledge, wisdom,
etc., which follow the disposition of their subject.

VI. Circumscriptive alicubity is that by which a finite thing postulates by nature that
its whole be in the whole space, and that its individual parts occupy the
individual parts of space.

The matter is evident from the preceding; for the rest, this whereness agrees with the
definitive [whereness] in this one [point], that it formally differs from it [only] in this, that by
nature it postulates the occupation of space, so that it is commensurated to the individual
parts of space by its individual parts; therefore, it is called circumscriptive from the mode of
being present which it infers: so that the thing is in where by circumscription – understand
not internal, but external. For circumscription is twofold, of essence, which is internal; and
of presence, which is external. The former is either defined generally by the boundaries of
essence, so that it belongs to every finite thing, and whatever is finite is said to be
circumscribed by the limits of essence; or specially, as it is defined by the termination of
parts extended quantitatively, in which sense it belongs only to material quanta, having part
outside part, and it is still distinct from the circumscription of presence – I say, they are
diverse: to be terminated and circumscribed by its parts intrinsically, and to be present
somewhere by the mode of circumscription; the former is absolute, the latter relative;
without the former the material [thing] is not; but the latter is not required for it, and it
would be very absurd to say that something is somewhere by internal circumscription, as if I
were to say, a natural body is in a place (which is extrinsic and circumstantial to it) while it
has parts outside parts intrinsically and essentially; internal circumscription of parts is
indeed presupposed, so that the thing may be circumscribed by the extrinsic ambient or
containing, yet that must not be thought to be the formal concept of this; nor, finally, does
the former describe whereness, but only the latter does.

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Moreover, a further distinction must be made between external circumscription aptitudinal
and actual, likewise between commensurability and the commensuration itself of the thing
present to the where – aptitudinal circumscription and commensurability are here
understood, partly because attributes are to be described from potency, not from act; partly
because whereness does not formally import the coexistence of another, and actual
presence to it; partly, finally, because circumscriptive alicubity does not differ in reality from
the circumscriptible finite essence, and therefore is inseparable from it – but otherwise
concerning actual circumscription, which can entirely be absent from the thing, and
therefore is distinguished really; let the first created body and the outermost heaven be an
example, for here there is no external circumscription, although they can be circumscribed;
for there is no doubt that both the πρωτόκτιστον [first-created] body and the outermost
heaven can admit external circumscription. For although it must necessarily be conceded
that there is some extreme, which insofar as it is extreme, cannot be circumscribed, yet by
its nature it is such that circumscription is not repugnant to it – indeed, by reason of quantity
it rather postulates to be circumscribed; it is therefore clear that actual circumscription is
per accidens to this alicubity.

But as concerns the commensuration of a thing to the space in which it is, I do not deny that
a greater difficulty remains concerning it; in the meantime, I judge that commensuration is
not required absolutely for circumscriptive alicubity, but that commensurability suffices; and
therefore I do not doubt that a finite thing, apt to be commensurated by its individual parts
to space, [is so] by nature and essentially – [but] by another it can in fact enjoy a different
mode of being present, as without occupation of space and actual commensuration it may
be placed in where, at least by the power of a superior agent, or through the absolute power
of God, since it implies no contradiction: to be commensurable to the space in which it exists
of itself and naturally, and not to be actually commensurated to the same space extrinsically
and supernaturally; it is added that actual commensuration and circumscriptive presence is a
mode of the thing distinct really from the thing, and therefore entirely separable, since the
ability to be present in a circumscriptive mode, as well as commensurability, seems to be a
certain affection of the thing inseparable from it; finally, who would doubt that a second act,
which is not essentially the same as the first act, can be absent from it? Therefore, I notably
added in the definition that it postulates by nature such a mode of being present, so that it
occupies space, and therefore is in a place – by which at least the natural aptitude and
habitude would be implied, which it is certain is preserved, even if it is not conjoined with
the actual occupation of space and commensuration, as has now been explained, in a similar
way as I saw myself in the preceding theorem. But from these things it is manifest that
circumscriptive alicubity belongs to every, and to it alone, material and quantitative thing
having parts outside parts, and therefore is a proper affection of body – not physical, as
place is (if place is to be numbered here among affections, since it is rather an external
circumstance), but metaphysical, although I do not deny that not inconsiderable difficulties
remain, in which I do not satisfy myself.

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 Corollaries.

I. Whereness is identified with essence.

For it is a transcendental affection, and does not make a real composition with being, nor
can anything really distinct from the essence be said, which whereness adds to it; add that,
every extrinsic and accidental thing having been removed, whereness belongs to the thing
intrinsically and essentially – although the concept of actual presence is different; for they
seem to differ as the affection and mode of the thing, as the prior and posterior, and
μακρολογικῶς [speaking loosely], as potency and act. Beware, therefore, lest you infer that
being somewhere is also identified with the thing, [or] is essential to it, and simply
inseparable from it; otherwise, with the masters of the heretics you will hurl yourself
headlong into a whirlpool of errors.

II. Real presence cannot be without indistance.

That ἀδιαστασία [indistance] is required for real presence, which is of the supposit, although
for presence (which it is thus permitted to call) habitudinal, which is of power, indistance is
not required, is manifest both from the theorems and can be clear from the very word and
description of presence; it is called presence, as if pre-existence, because the thing which
must be called present must be before [prae] the thing to which it is called present, or must
be as close to it as possible – and therefore by force of the name presence or being-present
is called the existence of a thing with nearness to another, so that presence is nothing other
than such a coexistence of things, at least, that one can easily reach the other, lest, of
course, the interposition of a solid body, or the distance of place, impede their actual and
real conjunction, which are said to be mutually present to each other.

Therefore, Zanchius is mistaken when (in On the Nature of God, Book 2, Chapter 6, Question
1) he says: Distance or nearness is not the proper cause why some thing is said and is
present or absent, but the συνύπαρξις [coexistence] of the thing. Likewise Tympler, when
(Metaphysics, Book 2, Chapter 5, Question 10) he asserts that those things are present to us
which are before our senses, either interior or exterior, [and] are known and perceived by
them, although they are remote from us by an interval of places – indeed, that the sun,
when it is observed by our eyes, is corporally present to us, even though it is separated from
us all by a very long interval of places. They themselves deceive when with these fig leaves
they cover the nakedness of their opinion about the real absence of the body of Christ from

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the Eucharist, since they think that the body of Christ is as far away from the Eucharistic
bread as heaven [is] from earth, as Ursinus [says] with Beza in Part 2 of his Theological
Works, page 650, and in his First German Response (Basel edition), page 38, Bergius in
Stereoma of the Word of Christ, etc. But they wish to seem to affirm a real presence – but
they are mere μορμολύκεια [bugbears], as is clear even from this principle.

For real presence an imaginary conjunction does not suffice, or φαντασία or intuition,
sensory and αἰσθητική, or virtual influx, and conjunction κοινωνική and ἐνεργητική
[communicative and operative]; but a real, actual, substantial nearness and indistance is
entirely required – whether it be φυσική [natural] or ὑπερφυσική [supernatural]. For
φανταστική [imaginary] conjunction is not a real presence, since that occurs even of non-
existing things and depends on the operation of the mind – which ceasing, it is nothing, and
therefore does not infer a real coexistence. The force of imagination and fiction of the
intellect is not so great that by itself it can make things really absent to be truly and really
present – and not only intentionally present, indeed not even to faith can more than
omnipotence be ascribed so that it can make things truly and really absent, while they are
still absent, to be truly and really present, as Sadeel imagines in Volume 1 of his Theological
Works, page 300, since this is not even contained under the object of potency – as it is
openly contradictory.

Hence Dn. Gravenarius [says] accurately: If the body of Christ is present to faith only, it
follows that the body itself is not truly present, but only the image and species of the body
of Christ – for just as real color is not in the eye, so not the body itself, but only the ὁμοίωμα
[likeness] of the body, is presented to the mind, which is not the true and real presence of
the body, but of the species – objective and intentional. For our mind does not receive the
object itself, but only ὁμοιώματα [likenesses], as Sadeel admits; see Scaliger, Exercitation
307, Section 21. And faith is not the cause of τοῦ πράγματος [the thing], of course its object,
just as knowledge is not the cause of the thing known; not because we believe, therefore it
is, but because it is, therefore we believe, about which elsewhere.

Moreover, presence does not consist in an external turning towards the senses, since this is
merely per accidens to the presence of things; certainly many things are present which do
not turn towards the senses, such as both insensible things and not infrequently sensible
things, which can coexist, although they are not sensed [to be] present; many things also are
observed extrinsically by the senses, which nevertheless for that reason are not present, as
is proved by the testimony even of the stars; for I do not think that anyone is found today,
even among the moderately learned absurdly Reformed, [to be] a patron of the absurdity of
Tympler, which is that the sun is corporally present to us.

Finally, κοινωνικῶς [communicatively] and by influx of power, things which are disjoined by
an interval and distance of places are by no means made really present – unless perhaps

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again the heaven should be said to be really present to the lands on which it acts through its
influences, namely, according to that [saying] of Jehovah, Isaiah 55:9: “As the heavens are
higher than the earth, so are my wayshigher than your ways.” And why do you not state,
Zanchius, that the heaven is omnipresent, or why do you doubt that the heaven is
everywhere truly and really present, when nothing is more certain than that the heaven as a
universal cause is nowhere absent by its κοινωνία [communication] and virtual influx?

III. Whereness does not infer operation.

Surely operation presupposes and requires presence, whether substantial or virtual, since
without contact no action occurs; but operation does not follow upon every presence, since
many things are somewhere, even when they do not operate; certainly a thing can be, even
if it does not operate to the greatest degree. Therefore, also [it can] be present to another;
even the ubiquity of God does not infer an operation – to wit, a certain transient [operation]
to the outside – not only because outside this world there is no external operation of God
(since nevertheless God is substantially present in infinite spaces outside the world), but also
because, stopping within this universe, God is omnipresent and remains [so], although he is
said to approach and recede by operating – which is an argument that the being-present of
God does not consist in operation.

Although it is certain that divine omnipresence in the sacred [writings] is described not only
by presence, but also by operation, just as also the special gracious, glorious, hypostatic
presence of God is usually defined by operation, about which the theologians [speak]. But it
is to be observed that it is argued viciously from universal presence to special operation,
since the former respects all created things, but the latter [respects] only some. Therefore,
there is no force in the Calvinistic argument: Whatever is everywhere, there it acts what it
acts; or if it acts something only here or there, it is present only here or there. Therefore, if
the body of Christ was always everywhere, it must be said that it was born everywhere,
suffered everywhere, was crucified everywhere, etc.; or if this must not be said, it will be a
consequence that neither was it everywhere. Egregious consequence! From omnipresence
to special action or passion? Equally I would gather: If God is everywhere, he revealed
himself everywhere to the Patriarchs, promulgated the law everywhere, etc. If the λόγος
[Word] is everywhere, he assumed flesh everywhere and not only in the womb of Mary. If
the Holy Spirit is everywhere, therefore he was seen everywhere in the form of a dove, etc.
Absurdities most absurd!

IV. To the multiplication of the where the multiplication of that which is in the where
does not follow.

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Sadeel (On the Sacramental Eating, Volume of Theological Works, page 318): The accident of
presence and of place in the body cannot be multiplied without a multiplied body – to which
tends that general principle, that to the multiplication either of place, or of the where itself,
that also is multiplied which is in the place, or in the where. See Scaliger, Exercitation 5. For
Dn. Cornelius Martini thinks (in Chapter 6 of his Analysis of Matter) that this is the chief
argument of the Reformed by which they deny that the body can be present everywhere or
in many wheres – whom by all means see on page 224ff. We say in a word: God is
everywhere, the soul is whole in the individual parts of the body, yet the unity of the divine
essence or of the human soul is not endangered. Dr. Luther urges that nearly the same
sound is perceived by innumerable people, that light diffuses itself through the whole
hemisphere, that a visible body radiates to infinity, etc. Concerning the presence of the body
thereafter.

V. That a finite thing be everywhere is not impossible.

But I affirm thus: By no force can it come about that a created thing be everywhere, says
Peter Martyr in his Dialogue on the Two Natures of Christ, page 6. But for a finite thing to be
everywhere involves no contradiction. Not therefore [is it] simply impossible. I prove the
antecedent: For the predicate does not overturn the nature of the subject. The creature
remains finite, even if it is placed everywhere, and in no way becomes infinite. For the
infinite as regards presence and the immense is that which by its own nature cannot not be
everywhere. But the finite in being present is that which by its own nature postulates a finite
where – which if it be placed everywhere by divine power, will by no means cease to be
finite, and will by no means become infinite.

That it is everywhere does not cause a finite thing to cease being finite.

It does not cease to be finite, since even now it retains its own whereness, that is, it still
postulates by its own nature a definite where, although in very act it does not enjoy the
definite mode of being present. For although in fact through the power of a superior
principle and from the outside it is unlimited in being present, and lacks actual boundaries of
being present, yet it does not at all lose that essential and native habitude by which it can be
present in a definite where, and by nature demands boundaries of being present. For that
natural act is impeded by a supernatural power coming from outside, [but] it does not
entirely take away the internal potency; rather, it perfects it – in such a way, indeed, that
that subject which by a weaker power was only in one where, now by the most powerful

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and most perfect divine power is in many or all [wheres]. On the other hand, the potency of
finite being, and its being able (to be present in a definite where), cannot take away or
exclude the act of a superior power, namely the divine [power] – that it be everywhere.

Then, the finite does not become infinite by this actual indefinite presence. For that finally is
infinite which cannot not be everywhere; but it is one thing not to be able not to be
everywhere by nature and essentially, another to be everywhere by extrinsic power, and by
dependence on another, as was set forth in the theorem – or, as others say, to be
everywhere ἁπλῶς [simply] or absolutely, and to be everywhere κατὰ συμβεβηκός
[accidentally] or κατ’ ἄλλο [relatively]. See Dn. Jacob Martini, Treatise on Place, Book 2,
Chapter 36.

VI. What has parts outside parts is somewhere circumscriptively.

It is true concerning the act and state of a natural thing; but it is argued most viciously from
this that God cannot by all his power bring it about that what has parts outside parts be
somewhere otherwise than circumscriptively – for instance, that it be in many wheres, or
even everywhere, without actual occupation of space. Peter Martyr (against Selnecker, page
119): We conclude, therefore, that Christ not only does not will, but also cannot will, to
place that true and integral body of his simultaneously in many places. Beza has similar
things in the Montbéliard Colloquy, page 33, and in his First German Response (Basel
edition), page 38, Bergius in Stereoma of the Word of Christ, etc. We, certain of the will of
Christ from Scripture, at least claim the faculty for the parts. But parts outside parts are said
to be held in two ways: 1. Essentially and intrinsically, when one part is outside the other
entitatively, so that one is not the other, but each has its own essence – as, for example, the
head is outside the neck, the neck outside the belly, etc., i.e., the head is not the neck, the
neck is not the belly. 2. Accidentally or extrinsically, by which one part is situated and located
outside the other, and part outside part occupies space – as where the head is, there the
neck or belly is not, etc. Which again can be understood either of first act, or of second act.

This, therefore, is what I say: Although that which has parts outside parts intrinsically,
postulates by its own nature also to posit parts outside parts extrinsically, by reason of site
and location, yet actual situation of this kind, and location of parts outside parts, can be
separated by infinite power; for there is no essential nexus between such actual situation,
and a material thing having parts outside parts, but rather there intercedes that distinction
which [is] between accident and subject. Moreover, the position of part outside part in
relation to space is an act of quantity; but who would doubt that natural acts can be entirely
taken away by the causes from which they emanate – as combustion is taken away from fire,
actual gravitation from a heavy [body]? Finally, the philosophers dispute that quantity can be
separated from a natural body, at least by the absolute power of God, since they are

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distinguished essentially; much more must it be asserted that the act of quantity can be
taken away from quantity itself by the same power. For it is known that these three follow
one another in nature: essence, property, and operation – and that a proper affection
coheres with the very quiddity of the thing far more closely than a proper operation
[coheres] with the very property.

To these is added that in Matthew 19:24 it is said: A camel, that huge animal of great size,
can pass through the eye of a needle. For it is readily clear that the locution is not either
hyperbolical or hypothetical, but ῥητή [literal] and proper, since it is immediately subjoined:
With God no word is impossible. Whence a porism: Whatever the mind can conceive
notionally (the word of the mind), that God can accomplish really; therefore, if it is possible
for a camel to enter through the eye of a needle, it will be possible for actual
commensuration to place to be separated from a quantitative thing, etc. But here πέρας θεῷ
[let there be an end to God].

THE SECOND CLASS

OF TRANSCENDENTAL AFFECTIONS

Exhibiting

THE DISJUNCTS

We shall treat of these with an equal thread and style; and therefore lest we be accused of
disorder, we shall adhere to the received order: 1. Speaking Generally about the Nature and
variety of disjunct Affections. 2. Specially treating of each one.

SUBSECTION I

Treating Generally

ON DISJUNCT AFFECTIONS

CHAPTER IX.

On the nature of disjunct affections.

Explaining, what they are, and how they are to be divided in general?

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 I. Disjunct affections are most general attributes which reciprocally denominate
being with the illation of an opposite.

For the rest they agree with the united [affections], with this exception, that the former
include a certain opposition, otherwise than the simple [affections]. Therefore here there is
given a reciprocal denomination of being, but through opposite members or under
disjunction; as being is called cause or caused, etc. But these members, equally as the united
affections, do not infer something really diverse from being, or simply fabricated by the
mind, but what truly and really belongs to being itself; but only under a formal diversity
from being. Although the opposite members differ from each other really. Therefore, there is
given in the modes a twofold respect: one to the subject, from which they do not differ
more than formally; the other to the opposite member, from which the other member
scarcely differs less than really. The reason for the former is that affections do not infer a real
composition with being, as such, since they are also attributed to the most simple being.
[The reason] for the latter [is] that opposite relations, being mutually incommunicable, really
differ from each other. Therefore, the modes, as such, do not import a real diversity, but as
opposites, [they are] certainly mutually incommunicable.

Note two things here; first, How the members of these attributes are to be defined in actu
exercito [in concrete], namely: 1. They ought not to be judged simply from the relation to
their opposite, but they are to be examined chiefly from the relation to the subject or being
itself, and how they affect it, it is to be attended to. For the formal [concept] of an affection
is gathered from the σχέσις [relation] which it has to the subject, from which it flows, the
respect of opposition, if it be disjunct, not being passed over. Add that one member is no
less obscure than the other. Therefore, even for this reason such definitions are rejected.
Principle is that on which the principiated depends. Sign is that which represents the
signified. 2. They are not to be defined most broadly, insofar as they extend themselves to all
things, which are called such only equivocally, but the nominal distinctions having been
considered first, and the equivocations having been removed, they are to be represented in
an adequate and proper concept. This having been observed, let us accurately discern
nominal distinctions and equivocal denominations from the analogical divisions of
affections. 3. [Those affections] which are also properly attributed to mystical things, are to
be described in such a way that the formal concept can be attributed κατ’ ἀναλογίαν
[analogically] both to transcendentals and to predicamentals.

Second, How they differ from the divisions of being. What I have admonished once and
again, here is to be recalled in memory and well observed concerning the number of disjunct
affections: lest, of course, affections be posited, which in inferiors express the very essence

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of the thing, or formally designate that which is of the essence of the thing, but only those
which denominate being, and thus are to come to be enunciated not synonymously, but
paronymously of this or that being. Hence I recognize that finite and infinite, dependent and
independent, etc. Ought to be referred to the attributes of being, not to the modes as it
were contracting [being]. Because finitude and dependence is not of the essence of anything
a priori. It is different concerning subsistence and inherence.

II. Disjunct affections are principal or less principal; and the latter [are] immediately
or mediately [disjunct]. Immediate, which flow proximately and immediately
from the essence; Mediate, which [flow] by means of the united [affections], and
denominate it.

They call the principal affections Essential, of course a posteriori. The rest [they call]
accidental. It is certain that most universal and most common attributes are given, which can
be said disjunctively of every being, and transcend all genera of being, but they do not
inhere in being so intrinsically and result from the nature of being, as others, which are
attributed κυρίως [properly] to being. Therefore also those are dismissed by some, with only
these being retained. Hence arose that division, e.g., the denomination of subject and
adjunct does not seem to belong to being through itself, as [do the denominations of] cause
and caused, etc. But that some of the principal [affections] denominate being immediately,
others mediately, a special exposition will teach.

Corollaries.

I. Opposite modes differ really.

It is certain concerning the opposite members of disjunct affections, that in being they are
one; because transcendental affections do not differ really from the subject. But whether in
opposition, i.e., in mutual σχέσις [relation], one member differs from the other really, does
not seem equally certain. For although it is not so much to be doubted concerning the
principal disjunct affections, yet a doubt could arise concerning some less principal disjuncts;
since certain denominations depend on the disposition of the mind. An example is absolute
and respective, subject and adjunct, etc. Whatever may be [the case] about that,
nevertheless this [is] beyond all controversy: that there are given opposite modes, which in
being are indeed really one quid, yet are distinguished really from each other, as cause and
caused do not differ really from being, although they differ from each other [as] cause [and]

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caused. From this principle are refuted both Keckermann, who thinks that only a modal
distinction can intervene between opposite modes, and the Photinians, when they hold as
opposites, the identity of essence, and the real diversity of personal modes in the same
essence. But there is no contradiction: that the modes of essence are not distinguished
really from the essence; and that the modes are distinguished really from each other. For the
former is, that the modes are identified with the essence; the latter, that they are opposites,
and mutually incommunicable. But it is not absurd that opposite incommunicable modes are
given in a common essence, although the same in number.

II. Disjunct affections exhaust the latitude of being.

For every adequate affection ought to be [adequate] to its subject; and therefore a disjunct
affection by its disjunct members necessarily exhausts the whole latitude of being. But it is
to be observed that it is not necessary, 1. That they be applied to any state of being; they
modify and denominate the essence, but not any state of being whatsoever. Thus to being in
the state of universality I cannot attribute the denomination of cause or caused, etc. Nearly
the same is the observation of Mr. Gutke; when he wants the members of disjunct affections
to be restricted only to the present object; whence he infers: cause and caused are well
posited [as] an affection, although God from eternity was neither cause, nor caused, since
cause and caused are adequate to being, as being, as being is first exhibited, that is, the
most general concept abstracted from God and creatures. Although in this matter it seems
rather that a distinction ought to be made between cause and actual causality (the power to
cause and to be caused in act). 2. To any mode of being they may be attributed; since an
affection is not of a mode of a thing but of the thing itself. Thus you collect in vain
concerning the modes, e.g., of infinite being subsisting: they are either finite or infinite. For
they are really only that one infinite thing and do not differ formally from it, as some other
infinite thing, or distinct infinite beings; but as subsisting modes of the same infinite being.

Similarly I would gather: Unity, Truth, Goodness, are either something finite or infinite – very
badly. For they are united modes of being, which prescinds from finite and infinite, etc.

SUBSECTION II.

Specially proposing

Disjunct Affections.

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I shall distribute the class of disjunct affections into three series or orders: according to the
division just now proposed. The first series will propose the principal Immediate disjunct
affections. The second, the Mediate. The third, the Less principal Affections. Therefore, let
there be:

FIRST SERIES

Of disjunct affections

In which are

The principal immediate [affections].

These are twofold. For some result immediately from the nature of being, as it is considered
absolutely, as act and actuality; others insofar as the same [being] is considered relatively.
There are modes both of actuality, from which being is denominated: 1. Necessary or
contingent. 2. Independent or dependent. 3. Uncreated or created; and of activity, insofar as
it is called: 4. Act or potency. Here are the denominations: 5. Of principle and principiated. 6.
Of cause and caused. For since actual being is the object of Metaphysics, it is clear that
essence considered absolutely is affected in a twofold way: both by reason of its own actual
being, which it has in diverse ways; and by reason of operation, insofar as it operates, or is
subjected to operation. The former expresses the actuality of a thing, insofar as it is either
supremely actual, or conducts itself otherwise; therefore it is called necessary or contingent;
and what things are cognate to these denominations. The latter [expresses] activity; by
reason of which being is called act or potency. Moreover, essence considered respectively
infers a relation of origin and emanation; hence principle and principiated, cause and
caused, concerning which [we shall treat] in order.

CHAPTER X.

On the necessary and the contingent.

The root of necessity is supreme actuality; but of contingency, potentiality. Each is given in
things; so that whatever is, is either supremely actual and necessary, or acknowledges
something of potentiality, and is contingent. But I explain here the necessary: 1. Distinctively.
2. Definitively. 3. Divisively; hence what contingent is and how manifold it is, is easily made
known.

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 I. Necessity designates either indigence or calamity; or violence or coaction; or
invariable agreement or immutability; or expediency or utility.

I premise above all, in how many ways necessary is said. But I pass over the distinction of the
necessary into the complex and the incomplex: of which the former is either of connection,
in necessary propositions, whether formally, as in modal [propositions], or materially, as in
enunciations of essential constituents and also of transcendental affections, and also of
proper accidents, which have necessity by reason of agreement, although not by reason of
actual existence – to which pertains the threefold grade of necessity, παντὸς [of all], καθ’
αὐτὸ [per se], and καθ’ ὅλου [of the whole]. And of consequence, as in argumentations. But
the latter [incomplex necessity is] in simple things, which have necessity either in the
concept of being, while they exist necessarily; or in affecting, which affect a subject; or in
operating, which are determined necessarily to a certain operation. For it is clear that the
former genus of necessity pertains to Logic, and the latter is of this place [in Metaphysics]
only.

Moreover, necessity is taken κυρίως [properly]: 1. It denotes indigence or calamity, which is

such that in relieving it one must not cease; whence some deduce the name from ceasing
[Latin: cessando]. The Greeks call this necessity χρείαν [need]. 2. It signifies violence and
infers coaction. Thus he necessarily goes to the gallows, who is dragged there. In this
signification the necessity of violence is usually opposed to the necessity of nature; the
cause of the latter is natural and intrinsic; as fire necessarily burns; [the cause] of the former
[is] an extrinsic force against the natural propensity. For violence infers a resistance of the
patient. For this [resistance] having been desired, the concept of the violent expires; as the
state of the separated soul, although it belongs to it from the outside, is nevertheless not
called violent on account of the denied resistance of the soul. And specifically violence is
called coaction, when it infers displeasure of that which suffers. 3. It designates immutability
of agreement, where necessary signifies that which cannot be otherwise. And that either
ἁπλῶς [simply], in which way God alone [is] a necessary being and simply immutable; or
δευτέρως [secondarily], as necessity of immutability also extends itself to created things, as
necessity is taken in this place. Thus man is called necessarily rational by a necessity of
immutability; where [there is] no coaction. 4. It denotes utility, which is called necessity of
expediency. Thus Logic is necessary for learning other disciplines. See Aristotle, Metaphysics,
Book 3, Chapter 5. Of this place also is the distinction of the necessary by reason of
existence and by reason of efficiency. Thus good works are said to be necessary to salvation
by reason of existing, not of causing – as presence, not efficiency; because they necessarily
accompany faith, although they do not promote salvation together with faith. Concerning
which, see by all means the appendix added below to this chapter.

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 II. Necessary is that which cannot be otherwise.

Thus the Philosopher [Aristotle] in the cited place [says]: ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον
ἄλλως ἔχειν [the necessary is that which cannot be otherwise]. Therefore it is said to be
necessary, which indeed cannot be otherwise in any way. Zabarella, On the Nature of Logic,
Book 1, Chapter 2, [says]: I call necessary those things which exist through themselves
always, and never become; then those which indeed become, yet not by our will but by
nature operating through certain causes. Mr. Scheibler constitutes immutability [as] the
formal [concept] of necessity. Mr. Scharff urges to the contrary, not everything necessary is
immutable, because not everything contingent immediately becomes mutable! As the
contingent actions of God are, although God is not changed. But Scheibler had already
resolved this, by explaining what mutability imperfection contingency infers, and that both
can be said without inconvenience concerning the transient operations of God; namely, the
divine essence in itself is immutable, although the transient actions are mutable, i.e., they
could not be, if God willed. But a greater difficulty seems to be as regards the immanent
essential acts of God (which the theologians call), as are the divine decrees; for first of all it
is certain that the decrees considered ἀπολελυμένως [absolutely] are free, and therefore
contingent; but it seems rather harsh to attribute mutability to them. Therefore we
acquiesce in the explication of Aristotle: that the necessary is that which cannot be
otherwise – not urging precisely either immutability or invariability.

III. Necessary is either absolutely necessary, or hypothetically. The former [is

necessary] both simply by complete necessity, as God alone; or in a certain
respect, by physical necessity, which is judged from the cohesion of the effect and
cause. The latter is necessary both on account of the act of being or existence,
and on account of some extrinsic cause.

I explain: Absolute necessary is invariable in itself, which belongs κυρίως [properly] to God;
since he alone is supremely necessary and invariable by nature, and as he could not have not
been, because [he is] the first being; so he cannot fail to be, because [he is] omnipotent.
Thus also the personal acts of God are supremely necessary, nor can they be otherwise,
since they are not really diverse from the divine essence; and also the essential acts or
decrees considered by reason of the principle and ἀπολελυμένως [absolutely]; since there is
nothing in God which is not God himself. Δευτέρως [Secondarily] invariable necessity is
obtained in creatures, which cohere with their causes immutably by physical necessity.
Physical necessity, I say, not absolute [necessity], which ought not to be confused with

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[necessity] simply absolute, since this [absolute necessity] is exempt from all laws. But that
[physical necessity] can and ought to yield to a superior agent, if it wills something; and
therefore it is limited. Thus fire necessarily burns by physical necessity; which nevertheless
has a mode from the will of the supreme agent, and therefore sometimes did not burn in
the Babylonian furnace; although nature left to itself always acts in the same way, nor can it
act otherwise. Whence that physical necessity? To which refer also the necessity which is by
reason of the infallible divine prescience; or from the hypothesis of the act of existing;
because all things are most present to God, and therefore as they are, so they are known to
God, so that they cannot not be, in the way in which God foresees. But as the causes vary, so
also the necessity is diverse. [It is] external or by reason of the efficient, when the effect
coheres with the efficient by an indissoluble nexus, as the elevation of the sun above the
horizon necessarily effects day. By reason of the end, necessity is not given, except only
hypothetical. Therefore it is to be passed over here. Internal [necessity] is partly with respect
to matter, from which that which is called necessary infallibly results - thus quantity is
necessary to body by reason of matter; partly with respect to form - whence the twofold
necessity of constitution or definition and of consequence, or synecdochically of
demonstration. According to the former, whatever pertains to definition or constitution
belongs to the thing immutably; according to the latter, proper [attributes] following the
form, or whatever make the essence a posteriori, are called necessary. Everyone sees that
the former necessity is greater than the latter, who knows to discern the impulses of nature,
constitution [and] consequence. But hypothetical necessity (which in itself altogether has
contingency at least admixed, [and] is so called) [is necessity] on account of some mutable
condition; which is taken either from existence, as commonly, everything which is, by that
very fact while it is, necessarily is. For it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be
at the same time; thus if Aristotle disputes, when he disputes, he cannot not dispute. Or
from some external cause: for instance, either from a non-natural efficient cause (for a
natural [cause] infers physically absolute necessity), whether supernatural, which all things
obey - thus, God commanding the sun to stand still, the sun necessarily stands still, from the
hypothesis of the divine will; or preternatural, which is of coaction, when we are compelled
to act against the will by an external force; or of violence, when natural things, against their
native propensity, are impelled from without, so that what they suffer, from the hypothesis
of that concurrence they suffer necessarily; or simply at least of consequence - thus it is
necessary that scandals come from the supposition of the human condition, because men
are prone to crimes. Or from the end. Hence again a twofold hypothetical necessity results:
one from the supposition of the end, simply or by reason of sufficiency - thus respiration is
necessary to life, sacred Scripture to the Christian religion. The other by reason of
expediency - not so much to being, as to well-being; thus it is necessary for man to strive for
good diet; for theology the organical habits are necessary. It is also called necessary
dispositive and instrumental, and indeed either by positive disposition, in which way it is
necessary for the farmer to dispose the field well for crops; or by privative disposition, which
is through the removal of impediments - thus it is necessary to take away the tares. Akin to

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this is the distinction of necessity of the consequent and of the consequence. Since the
former is absolute necessity, but the latter hypothetical. Others call the former antecedent
and simple [necessity], the latter consequent and conditional [necessity]. The logicians call
necessary of the consequent the conclusion considered absolutely and in itself by force of
the perpetually necessary connection of predicate and subject. They call necessity of
consequence [that] by which the conclusion is inferred necessarily from the premises,
whether they are necessary or contingent - which [conclusion] indeed can be, and very often
is, contingent of itself, but by force of the syllogistic illation arises necessarily from the
posited premises. Hence for the metaphysicians the necessity of the consequent is the
absolute immutability of a thing, whether independent or dependent on the immutable
nexus of causes. The necessity of the consequence is conditional immutability, by which, the
condition having been posited, the thing cannot be otherwise. Thus, every connection
having been removed, the thing considered precisely in itself is necessary; by this [necessity
of consequence] [the thing is necessary] only through connection with other things. The
former takes away contingency and has place only in necessary things, as God is necessarily
immortal, man [necessarily] rational, etc. The latter does not take away contingency, since it
is in the contingent things themselves, as he necessarily learns, who wants to become
learned. Hence we say: Whatever God has foreseen, that is necessary by necessity of the
consequence, but not of the consequent. For just as it is necessary that he whom I see
writing necessarily writes, although he writes contingently, since he can write and not write -
so because God sees all things in one now and presentially, as Scotus says, in [his
commentary on the Sentences], Book 1, Distinction 39, 40 - what things he thus sees,
happen by necessity of the consequence, but nevertheless contingently, because they both
were not, before they were made, and partly will not be thereafter; says Mr. Arnis[æus] in
Epitome of Metaphysics, page 241. God's prescience does not bring immutability to things a
priori, but a posteriori - that is, when God sees a thing to be, it is necessary for it to be;
meanwhile in its own nature and with respect to its own causes it could be otherwise, and
then God would have foreknown otherwise. Not from knowledge do things [depend], but
from things [depends] knowledge. Just as sight brings no necessity to things, although while
they are seen, they cannot be otherwise - so also God by his providence beholds and
conserves all things, as they are created, but he does not confer on them a new necessity,
says Eusebius, On the Preparation of the Gospel, Book 6.

IV. Contingent is that which can be otherwise.

Contingent is said thus either by reason of inherence; and to which something happens to
be in, when it is rarely in - or by reason of the cause of origin and dependence, which so
happens, that no necessary cause of it is given. Thus by reason of cause it is contingent for a
fisherman to find a golden tripod; by reason of subject it is contingent for the moon to suffer

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eclipse, although by reason of cause it is necessary. Then contingency is given in being of
that which could have been otherwise; in affecting - in which way common accidents
contingently affect the subject; in operating - thus the actions of men are contingent.
Contingency in general says nothing other than δύναμιν ἀντιφάσεως [potency of
contradiction], and of that which can be or not be. Others describe contingency [as] that
cohesion of cause with effect, that the cause having been posited it is not necessary for the
effect to be posited. But contingent is best described from the nature of the necessary. For
as the necessary is that which cannot be otherwise; so contingent in general is that which
can be otherwise. But contingent things do not relate themselves in the same way to being
and not-being; but some equally, ἐπίσης [in like manner] - which can as much be as not be,
as free acts; some unequally, either so that they are more than they are not - [these] are
said [to be] contingent ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ [for the most part], as for a man to be born with two
feet; or so that they are not more - [these] are said rarely to be contingent, namely which
happen per accidens; as for a man to be born with one foot; concerning which it is said: of
contingents there is no knowledge - such are chance and fortuitous things.

V. Contingency is either external by reason of an external principle, by which something can

be changed by an external principle; or internal by reason of an internal principle, which can
act and not act.

There are causes which from their own nature are not determined to producing a certain
effect; others which act in a definite way, but sometimes recede from the prescribed order
on account of an external impediment. Hence they say [that] intrinsic [contingency is
opposed] to the necessity of coaction; extrinsic [contingency is opposed] to the necessity of
immutability. But there is given not only extrinsic contingency in natural causes and [causes]
determined to a certain effect and mode of acting, but also in free [causes], as whose
actions also could be impeded. Thus it is clear concerning the actions of the will, which are
of two kinds: elicited [and] commanded. The former cannot be impeded; but the latter can
be impeded in every way by external obstacles. Yet a distinction must be made among these
actions: some are accomplished by the will alone and by its nod and command, and these
because they are rarely and with difficulty impeded, therefore the good man is called
ἀήττητος [unconquerable] by the pagans. Some need external aids, before they are brought
to effect - as those which proceed from the arts. See Mr. Jacob Martini, Metaphysical
Exercises, Exercise 5, Theorem 11. Hence therefore I infer that intrinsic contingency is found
only in free agents; but extrinsic [contingency] ought to be defined not only by reason of
natural agents, but also of free will; indeed rather to be ascribed to this than to those; since
natural actions are not so easily impeded, as voluntary [actions] are usually impeded. For
although man by the freedom of [his] will can either suspend action or act, nevertheless
very often innumerable obstacles are cast before him.

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Corollaries.

Here's the translation with the requested handling of Greek words:

I. Whatever exists, is necessarily or contingently so.

The Stoics wished to remove all contingency from things, as Cicero reports in his
work on divination, whereas the Epicureans, on the contrary, claimed that all
events are the result of chance, deviating from the truth in both directions. The
condition of natural phenomena and our actions refutes not only the Stoics'
denial of contingency—if indeed they hold to the power of contradiction,
enabling things to be and not to be; originating freely from a principle of choice,
which is called εξουσία (exousia) [authority], προαίρεσις (proairesis) [choice] and
αντεξουσία (antexousia) [resistance] in Greek, freedom and the power of will in
Latin. Those who desire, what else do they do but attempt to remove all
deliberation and consultation, all virtue and vice, as well as the promises of
rewards and the stipulations of punishments, as much as possible, thereby
introducing fatal necessity, making God the author of sin, which are all
absurdities and blasphemies; but it also convicts them through sensory
observation itself: when we see many things in nature being such that they could
be otherwise, not be or be; the most evident testimony of the senses denies this,
not so much to be refuted by arguments, as to be exposed to torture and
tormented until they admit that they can be tortured: But the Stoics themselves,
convinced by the evidence of reality, if we are to believe Augustine in 'The City of
God', Chapter 10, accepted from the necessity of fate, which they otherwise
claimed in natural things, human will. Nor does divine foreknowledge eliminate
the contingency of things; for it is not the cause of a thing either proximally or
remotely: otherwise, all foreknown things would be necessary, and even sin
would have God as its author; not because something happens because God
knows it, but because it is going to happen, God knows it. This can be illustrated
by the example of an astrologer and a physician: the former predicts storms, the
latter the outcome of a disease, yet neither imposes necessity on the foreseen
events. Divine foreknowledge is the effect, not that things happen in such a way,
but to see that things happen in such a way. The existence of a thing is from the
will and power of God: not that He wills and produces all things He sees
happening, nor are all things He wills and produces such that they have an
absolutely necessary connection with their causes. Therefore, He knows things as

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 they are in themselves: and so, when things are contingent, they are also
foreseen by God as such. The Epicureans are refuted with the most beautiful
order of things and the natural connection of effects with their causes, then by
the admission of all who usually call such an error a monstrosity of nature. For
who could be said to deviate, if all its effects were accidental and erroneous? If all
necessity is removed, no knowledge remains, Pyrrhonism is introduced, and
Academic uncertainty is recalled, today it is difficult for anyone to stand with
Epicurus. Therefore, be assured and firm. Whatever exists, is either necessary or
contingent. For these two are directly opposed and distinguished by complete
essences, as Scaliger discusses, that something cannot not be, and can not be,
whatever is according to the opinion of the Jesuits of Coimbra, who try to
introduce something intermediate between necessity and contingency, saying
that it is the free acts of God which indeed derive constancy from necessity, but
possibility of being otherwise from contingency. Moreover, the acts of God are
either internal or external: and these are either personal or essential, as
theologians speak. Personal acts are necessary, as well noted by Coimbra, when
they note that something acts in two ways out of necessity: one way because the
agent is driven solely by the impulse of nature, without any act of intellect or will,
as fire when it heats; another because, even though it acts through intellect and
will, it does not operate out of choice or freedom, but in such a way that it
cannot suspend or inhibit its action. Thus, in the divine, the Father generates the
Son through the act of understanding, and the Father and Son breathe forth the
Holy Spirit through the act of loving. Essential acts are called acts of the divine
intellect and will, which terminate in the essence, such as the divine decrees,
which are of freedom, not necessity; and eternal acts, which are carried out
according to what God has decreed. In both, freedom argues for contingency. For
what is of free will, can fail to happen. Therefore, although they may have a
certain constancy and do not introduce any change, they are not exempted from
being contingent. For it is precisely enough

for contingency that things could be otherwise. Certainly, contingency external to the
actions of God should not be attributed, but neither denied intrinsically: for this, on the part
of the agent, does not imply imperfection, but perfection, because freedom is entirely of
perfection, although on the part of the actions some imperfection is implied, namely that it
could possibly not be or be; yet it is not absurd that the action of God is of such perfection
as God Himself is. For here exists from the necessity of immutability, so that it cannot not
be, that, however, can also not be; for God is a necessary being, not merely a necessary
agent; but it should be noted that necessity in acting is twofold: absolute, whose action
cannot suffer impediment either conditionally or simply; and determined, which acts in one
and the same way necessarily. The former necessity arises from perfection, the latter from

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the determination of cause to effect in one and the same way of producing, the former is
opposed to external contingency and denies coercion: the latter denies internal contingency
and freedom. The former can be attributed to divine actions; but the latter is utterly foreign
to God: since everything is created by God freely and contingently, with intrinsic
contingency, and is still preserved. But this necessity is not uniform. It is attributed
differently to creation and to the conservation of things. For without external obstacle, as
soon as God willed, everything existed with immutable necessity; because no one can resist
the absolute will of God; in conservation, however, because God operates not absolutely but
with ordered power, immutable necessity does not simply apply, but such order as is in
secondary causes, such coherence with effect, should also be judged such necessity and
contingency.

II. There is only one being that is absolutely necessary.

Necessary being is either complex or incomplex; here we understand the latter, and indeed
that which is absolutely necessary κατ’ ἐξοχήν [par excellence], or which through its essence
cannot not be, and to which it is simply repugnant not to be. We say that such a being is
given, and indeed that there can be only one. For there is given some first being, which
cannot not always have been, and yet cannot not be – namely God ἁπλῶς [simply]
immutable. See Dn. Scheibler, Metaphysics, Book 1, Chapter 17, Number 41. Nor besides
God can anything be so absolutely necessary. For whatever is besides God, that could have
not been, and at some time can not be, since none of them is absolutely immutable. What
can be objected here concerning angels and rational souls, concerning the celestial bodies,
concerning prime matter, concerning universals, etc., you may see dispatched in Dn.
Scheibler, Most Learned, Book 1, Number 47 and following. As for complex necessity, which
is of propositions, I likewise think that only those propositions which are about God and the
divine attributes are first simply, immutably, independently, absolutely necessary; although I
would also admit secondarily a simple absolute necessity concerning other propositions,
both negative, in which there is manifest repugnance or opposition of terms, and
affirmative, in which the identity of the extremes and the greatest kinship is beheld; as when
the predicate either is repugnant to the subject, and therefore is necessarily denied of the
same, or does not differ really from the subject, and therefore is necessarily enunciated
affirmatively of it – as happens perpetually in the first mode of per se predication and
sometimes in the second, where of course the transcendental affections are predicated of
the subject, since they are identified with the essence. But the rest, which differ really from
the subject, by no means generate absolutely necessary propositions.

Dn. Philip, in [his] Dialectic, makes a twofold grade of necessity; the first, he says, is this:
Necessary by absolute necessity or simply necessary are said [to be] those things whose

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opposites are simply impossible; such are the propositions concerning the essence and
virtues of God – God is; God is an intelligent, truthful, beneficent, just, chaste, most free
essence. The second grade is, Necessary are [those which are] necessary by necessity of
definitions [and] demonstrations, where if the opposite is supposed a contradiction is made
– as if a Triangle does not have three angles, it is not a triangle; if virtue is not a certain
congruence with the rule of the divine mind, it is not virtue. The grades of necessity are
most rightly discerned. For it is certain that there is not given a necessity which is plainly
similar to the independent necessity of God, and therefore any other necessity is inferior to
the most absolute necessity of God, to which alone absolute necessity belongs. For the
necessity of things, of whatever kind it may be, depends on God, and therefore is not
absolute to that degree to which the necessity of those things which are of God [is] simply
impossible [for] it to be that God is otherwise than he is. But the necessity of creatures,
although they necessarily are so, as God has willed them to be, so that after they have been
founded by God, they cannot not be such without implication of contradiction, yet their
essential predicates do not attain that grade of necessity which belongs to the divine
attributes; nor can it be given that the necessity of their coherence is independent, but it
altogether depends on God, although by the vigor of his goodness and wisdom he cannot
change it; since God cannot contradict himself; and it is of error and malice to feign
contradictions. But that the necessity of definition and of demonstration is not altogether
the same, although I am not ignorant that some make these synonyms for this reason, that
accidents are demonstrated of the subject through the proper and simply proximate cause
or definition. But they are discerned more accurately, and constitute diverse grades of
necessity. For without those things which pertain to definition, the thing simply cannot be;
but it can altogether be without these which are demonstrated of itself, as are proper
affections, which are really distinguished from the subject. Of these, therefore, the necessity
of definition is said to be greater than [that] of demonstration. For there is no doubt that
God can inflow the act of form by which it is form and informs matter, even if he does not
inflow to the same [form] the force of effecting, by which it produces affections in the
composite. And what things differ essentially from each other certainly can be separated
from each other by the power of God; and therefore so great cognation and cohesion does
not intercede for them as is the necessity of those things which mutually define and
constitute each other, and do not differ from each other really; therefore greater necessity
intercedes for the former than for the latter, which is to be observed against the Calvinists.

III. Physical necessity is not absolute.

For as the whole nature of things depends on the first cause, so also the order of effects and
physically necessary natural causes. God is not bound to second causes, but when he wills,
he transgresses the boundaries of nature, and accomplishes what things are above nature.

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Whatever therefore is the necessity of natural causes, it is subject to the divine power,
depends on the same, and obeys its nod. He commanding, the Sun subsists, Joshua 10:13,
and returns, Isaiah 38:8; fire does not burn, Daniel 3:25; air like a column, water like a wall
consists, Exodus 14:22; the Earth gapes open, Numbers 16:31; iron floats on the waters, 2
Kings 6:6; and therefore the heaven, the elements and all other natural things are subjected
to his powerful command.

IV. Hypothetical necessity does not deny contingency.

Mr. Philip declares this most excellently in [his] Dialectic, where he says those things are
necessary by necessity of the consequence, which indeed are mutable in the thing itself, but
are not changed, either because they have been so decreed by God, or because they follow
from causes which are not changed, although they could have been changed – or because
when they happen, contradictories cannot be true at the same time; as the resurrection of
the dead is necessary, because God has published the decree. It is necessary for the human
race to be punished with great calamities, because the causes are not changed, that is,
because the crimes of many provoke the anger of God; finally all things, when they are,
therefore are then necessary, because contradictories cannot be true at the same time – as,
when Plato sits, the contradictory is false, Plato does not sit. By which words a threefold
Hypothesis is constituted, from which hypothetical necessity results: first, of the decree
[and] prescience of God; second, the supposition of contingent causes; third, the existence
of the thing done. None of these infers simple necessity, but is very consistent with
contingency. Concerning the prescience of God it has been seen before. And contingent
things so happen as they are foreknown by God. Contingent causes by reason of existence,
not of causality, if they are posited in act, indeed necessarily produce an effect, but one
which in itself is contingent, as the causes themselves. Finally, the existence of an act does
not make contingent things cease to be such and become necessary; for contingent things
remain in their nature (namely whatever could have been otherwise), although as they are
determined to this time, now they cannot not exist. Therefore that πολυθρύλητον [oft-
repeated saying] is to be understood only of hypothetical necessity: Everything which is,
when it is, necessarily is – namely as to the act of existence, not by reason of dependence
necessarily on causes.

V. Contingency is to be estimated only from proximate causes.

Remote causes do not give per se necessity and contingency, because something can be
contingent if the influx of the remote cause is most necessary. Thus it is contingent for a man

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to laugh, to be learned, although the concourse of the first cause is necessarily required. And
the reason is manifest; whatever does not proximately inflow into being, that cannot be a
cause so that this is such or not such, so that it can be otherwise or not otherwise; or
whatever is indeterminate to producing anything whatsoever, that cannot determine this or
that to this nature, or this ratio of existing – for instance, [determine] that it be contingent or
necessary. And whence something proximately obtains its nature, thence it has that it is
either immutable in its nature, or also mutable. Rightly therefore Thomas [Aquinas says]:
Although the supreme cause is necessary, yet the effect can be contingent on account of the
contingent proximate cause. The illation of the superior cause is modified in the second
cause according to the mode of the second cause itself, so that the remote cause always
concurs necessarily with necessary things, [and] contingently with contingent things. Just as
light proceeds uniformly from the sun, and yet on account of the diversity of clouds passes
into various colors, so there is always one influx, but it is determined by the receiving causes,
as Dn. Scharff says well in [his] Transcendent Philosophy, pages 711, 712. Therefore what
Alsted has, with the Encyclopedic Metaphysics, Chapter 41, Rule 7, cannot be approved: The
root, he says, of necessity and contingency in created things is the will of the first cause.

VI. Intrinsic contingency does not take away all necessity.

Or liberty can stand with a certain necessity. For it takes away at least only the necessity of
coaction, not of hypothesis. Thus good works are both necessary and contingent or free.
Free indeed by reason of the free cause, from which they come – so far [are they] not
necessary by necessity of coaction; yet necessary from hypothesis – not indeed by reason of
merit, or for the sake of procreating or conserving salvation, but of order, conscience and
debt.

APPENDIX.

TO

CHAPTER X.

BENEVOLENT READER

What things having been brought forth at the end of Theorem 1 for the sake of example
concerning good works – certain Innovators, having been carried away by παραλογισμός
[fallacious reasoning] to the prejudice of orthodox truth, have wanted [to use] against our

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mind – which has been done not only in the University of Königsberg by the Author of the
Censure of the Censures published against Latermann by the Orthodox (whom they call Dr.
Michael Behm), but also among the Altdorfers – concerning which these things have
recently been related to us from certain letters written on the 12th of January, 1649. As for
the Majoristic controversy, I also cannot be silent about this, that that N. N. Of ours, another
badly substituted Innovator after Latermann, has tried to draw Dn. Dr. Calovius, our
venerable Preceptor, into his opinion – as if he himself in his Metaphysics had written that it
is rightly said: Good works are necessary to salvation. After he had most badly perverted
certain sayings of B. Meisner, Frantzius, Schröder and other most celebrated Theologians,
indeed of Luther himself, he at last adds that Calovius agrees with him in [his] Metaphysics,
when somewhere for the sake of example he wrote: thus it is said that good works are
necessary to salvation. Thus he himself as it were betrays the mouse-trap by fallacy, when he
quotes approvingly those things which D. Calovius has relatively. A copy of the Calovian
Metaphysics could not be had at Altdorf. We have therefore consulted his Commentary or
oracles on the Epistle to the Romans dictated in the year 41 and 42, and excerpted by me –
in which writing we find not one, but many testimonies διὰ πασῶν [in all respects] contrary
to the Majoristic opinion, which also Dn. Weinmann has opposed in his judgment to the
exploded vain speech. If it could happen, I believe this would be unknown to D. Calovius
even through a dream, [namely] that it had come to [his] mind to συλλογίζεσθαι [syllogize]
with the Innovators. Since therefore they desire to drag me plainly unwilling into the mouse-
trap of the Majoristic error – [they] who from all sides scrape together the testimonies of
the Orthodox for the sake of cloaking their own παραδιδασκαλίαι [false teachings] –
necessity itself demands that I explain my opinion here and vindicate [it] from iniquitous
corruptions, lest either the βασανισταί [torturers] further abuse the same hereafter, or
some ἀδοξία [ill repute] be attached to me among the unskilled of things.

But I shall not bring here another Apology than that which, having been confirmed also by
the vote of the Venerable Ministry of Danzig, was transmitted by public name to the
Reverend Collegium of Theologians of the University of Königsberg, together with the
Apologetic letters of our Ministry prepared against the Censure of the Censures. Which
[Apology] was indeed published by the Venerable Tripolis Ministry of Königsberg together
with the Censures of the Orthodox Theologians against the errors of Dr. Johann Latermann
in the year 1648 under number XXXII, letter A, page 177. But since these censures turn in
the hands of few, it had to be repeated here in that very place whence the interpolators of
the Majoristic sect seek a bulwark of their opinion, lest the Metaphysics, which we have
wanted [to be] consecrated to the truth of heavenly doctrine against the abuses of first-
philosophical terms and principles, provide to anyone an occasion of erring or persisting in
error. Thus therefore read our APOLOGY.

It pleased the Censor of the Censures to commit a παραλογισμόν [fallacy] of mine with the
Formula of Concord: and therefore a certain necessity is imposed on me of explaining my
opinion. Good works, he says, are to be said to be necessary to salvation in no way – nearly

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all of ours teach from the same Formula of Concord. Yet D. Calovius, still a young student,
used it freely in [his] ὁμολογία [confession] page 427, yet noted by no one on that account
of error. I respond:

I. I have not said, good works are necessary to salvation. This is falsely imputed to
me.

II. My words read thus: Of this place also is the distinction of the necessary by
reason of existence, and by reason of efficiency. Thus good works are said to be
necessary to salvation by reason of existing, not of causing – as presence, not
efficiency. Where I would have it observed: (1) that I do not speak assertively,
that it must be said thus, but recitatively, that it is said thus by certain ones; (2)
that I do not use that form of speaking (which I have never made my own), but
explain [it] having been used by others; (3) that it has been adduced only for the
sake of example, but not praised or simply approved; (4) it has been shown in
what way they who use it want that phrase, having been brought back to a sound
sense, to be examined the more accurately by public disputation – namely,
whether it is to be admitted or not. But in no way has it been said that that
phrase must be used. It is one thing to relate, good works are said [to be]
necessary to salvation; another to assert, good works can be said [to be]
necessary to salvation; another finally to pronounce or profess, good works are
necessary to salvation. Now I have not even defined that it can be said thus,
much less that it ought to be said thus – I have only indicated that it is said thus.
For I could not have been ignorant that sometimes it is more advisable to abstain
even from those things which can be said in a certain convenient sense, which I
had diligently admonished and inculcated around that same youthful age
concerning another phrase of the Innovators, by which GOD is said to be the
cause of sin per accidens, in Disputation XXIV on the Augsburg Confession,
Section 8 – both because according to Nicetas, to labor in this, that you enunciate
in a new form of oration what things have once been said most rightly, is
unseasonable oration; and because perpetual effort must be given by all sincerely
Christian, that they speak from prescription; Augustine admonishing, On the City
of God, Book 10, Chapter 13; and especially that, as far as it may be allowed, they
abstain from suspect phrases, under which the heretics hide their errors. These
things I said there, which I have also always studiously observed. (5) But there
was also added along the way a declaration of those who use this phrase, whose
names however I thought should be spared; that they do not say good works [to
be] necessary to salvation absolutely and without προσδιορισμός [qualification],
but with an expressed limitation, under the concept of existing, not of effecting,

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 etc. (6) The sense of these authors is far removed from the mind of the
Innovators γνήσιων [legitimately], whose phrases are both less usual, and
[whose] sense [is] less sound, as is to be seen from the ναυσιαία [confusion] and
treatment of the Latermannic disputation concerning faith and good works.

III. There have not been wanting [those] who have moved controversy concerning
that formula adduced in the ὁμολογία [confession], and have judged that it can in
no way be employed, or admit a right explication – especially indeed a certain
Superintendent of Mecklenburg ἀνώνυμος [anonymous], who has treated with
me concerning this by letter. But because I had adduced the same only for the
sake of Example and outside its proper seat, in a Philosophical writing, but had by
no means defined that it must be employed – for that reason I have not
undertaken its defense, but have left it to be defended by its authors. For it is also
better to ἴδια ἀναιρεῖν [destroy one’s own things], than to supply a cause for
contentions in the Church.

IV.

V. IV. As for my own opinion concerning this phrase, I have already expounded it
clearly enough five years ago in [my] Sacred Criticism; where I am so far from
teaching that that form of speaking must be employed, that (1) I mark with a
black coal the vitiated copy of the Augsburg Confession with Dn. Dr. Wigand in
History of the Augsburg Confession, folio 46, on that account – because it
supports the Majorists, since to Article VI, to this sentence that the righteousness
of good works must necessarily follow, it has added these things: As also Christ
has commanded: If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments. I add in
the same place: which was also the reason why the Electoral Saxon Theologians,
infected with the venom of the Majoristic error, in the Altenburg Colloquy in the
year 1569, fought for the varied Confession, labored to defend its authority. See
the epilogue of the acts of that Colloquy, Collation folio 499. How alien these
things are from the sense of the Latermannic Disputation, is clear even from this,
that Latermann in the alleged disputation has undertaken to defend that very
thing, Theorem XIV, which I have reproved with Dn. Wigand as offering support to
the Majoristic error. (2) Among the corruptions of greatest moment, by which the
depraved Confession has been diverted from Orthodoxy, I reckon on page 179,
number 4, the Majoristic error concerning the necessity of good works to
salvation. (3) While I show that Philip (whom the Innovators today follow too
much) [was] liable to the gravest errors, among them I also refer in express words
to the error of the Majorists concerning the necessity of good works to salvation.
The words read thus, Sacred Criticism, page 167: But Philip (the author of the

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vitiated Confession) was liable to certain most grave errors, which show
themselves in the corrupted Augsburg Confession – both of the Semipelagians
and of the Pontificians concerning the Synergy of human powers in the first
conversion, and of the Antinomians concerning the Gospel arguing sins, and of
the Majorists concerning the necessity of good works to salvation, as the Synodal
Acts testify concerning the Counsel and opinion of Philip and [his] Colleagues
brought forth in the year 1559. Whence it is, that he has also incrusted, publicly
spread the same ERRORS in his other writings after the vitiated Augsburg
Confession. (4) Again I accuse Philip at length on page 171, Section 54, that he
approved by his vote this error concerning the necessity of good works to
salvation; that the Most Illustrious Duke of Mecklenburg, Johann Albrecht,
attributed the same error to Philip in the year 57; that the Pastors of Lower
Saxony under the same time requested from Philip, that he might want to attest
by some public writing his opinion concerning the necessity of good works to
salvation, to be conjoined with the Confession of the external Churches,
Theological Counsel of Philip, page 162; that when Georg Major was defending
this Papistic error at Wittenberg, Philip did not testify his dissent; that Philip
approved the Metaxic Buskin [a kind of boot worn by both men and women]
nearly through all things, from which Major had drawn that error, in which it is
asserted concerning good works, that they are necessary to our justification
before God; that finally Philip approved by his censure the spurious Ecclesiastical
Agenda of the Duchy of Prussia in the year 58, in which it is expressly proposed
that good works are necessary to our conservation in the grace of GOD and the
righteousness of faith. (5) Moreover, I have reproved in the cited place, page 174,
among other things the Emblems in the Synodal Acts published by order of the
Wittenberg Theologians in the year 1559, with Dn. Dr. Hutter – the opinion
concerning good works: Good works are necessary to salvation, and it is most
true that these virtues, Faith, love, hope, and others are necessary to salvation.
(6) I point out the improper end of the undertaken variation of the Augsburg
Confession, Sacred Criticism, page 199 – the admission of certain erring ones into
the communion of our faith and confession, especially indeed of the Zwinglians,
and of Islebius [Agricola], and also the coalition with the Pontificians in certain
articles concerning the necessity of good works to salvation. Which I thus explain
on page 200: Philip wanted to institute a variation for the sake of the Pontificians,
to whom he did not hesitate to yield in the article concerning the powers of free
choice, as to the act of conversion, and also concerning the necessity of good
works to salvation – doubtless following his private custom and Counsel,
concerning which he himself testifies in the preface to the Apology: This has
always been my custom in these controversies, that as much as I could at all, I
retained the form of the customary doctrine, so that at some time a concord
could more easily come together. Which nevertheless had to be done so, lest by

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 bending himself to the form of the doctrine of the adversaries he would deflect
from the path of truth, and yield to the enemies of truth to the prejudice of more
sincere doctrine, which indeed here has been done, is not undeservedly to be
lamented. Whence unhappy dissensions have arisen among the associates of the
Augsburg Confession themselves, with the sect of the Synergists and Majorists
breaking forth, as has been expounded before. I do not adduce more things said
to this opinion, since these abundantly testify how greatly I have abhorred from
that error of the Majorists, that good works are necessary to salvation, where my
own opinion had to be explained, or judgment had to be passed concerning that
phrase.
VI.
VII. V. I have never opposed myself to the declaration of the Formula of Concord, as
to the form of speaking, nor have I undertaken anything in prejudice of the same.
Indeed on that account I have exceedingly extolled the golden book of Concord,
Sacred Criticism, pages 227, 228, because it has delivered a solid, plain and
perspicuous decision of those things which were proposed less sincerely in the
depravation of the Augsburg Confession [and] were agitated among the
Theologians addicted to the Augsburg Confession, or certainly appealing to it –
among which is also that concerning good works, etc.
VIII.
IX. VI. Nor was my mind other, when I published the ὁμολογία [confession] – those
things teach, which I wrote at that very time, namely in the year 1635, on the
Augsburg Confession, Disputation XIV, on Article VI, Theorem 14, where I
expounded the necessity of good works in these words: But this hypothetical
necessity of good works is not either to obtaining salvation, or to conserving
faith, but on account of the divine command [and] prescribed order, [and] our
debt, Luke 17:10, John 13:17, Romans 8:10, 1 John 4 to the end. The
controversies which concerning the necessity of good works either absolutely
with the Antinomians, or under the hypothesis of salvation with the Pontificians
and other Fanatics intercede with us – will have their place below. These things
there. But also in [my] Divine Metaphysics, Corollary VI of Chapter X, the
necessity of good works to salvation is expressly exploded by me, when
expounding my own opinion in these words: Good works are necessary from
hypothesis – not indeed by reason of merit, or for the sake of procreating or
conserving salvation, but of order, conscience and debt. Which as they radiate by
their own light, so I have thought all those things to be repeated here for this
end, that it might be clear that not without the highest injury does the Censure of
the Censures impute to me that I have defined against the Formula of Concord:
Good works are necessary to salvation. But if he now desires more concerning
this controversy resuscitated by the Helmstedians, he will be able to consult the

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 General Part of [my] Theological Institutes, Chapter IV, pages 323 and 487, where
it has been treated ex professo concerning the same.

CHAPTER XI

On the Independent and the Dependent.

First, what each is. And how many types of dependence there are. Then, what independent
is, is declared.

I. Dependence is a mode denominating a Being, which is essentially posterior to

another, from which it flows. Those terms – dependent on another, through
participation, finite, created, potential, contingent – are usually taken as
equivalent. But they are better distinguished, for although they coincide
materially and explain each other, they still generate diverse formal concepts.
Contingent: that which can hold itself otherwise. Potential: that which has
something of potency mixed in, and is not pure act. Created: that which is
produced out of nothing. Finite: that which is defined by the limits of its essence.
On this, see the preceding chapter, on those in the following. Through
participation and by another, is opposed to that which is through itself and from
itself. But it is taken in two ways. 1. Specially, that is said to be by another
through participation, which depends on another effectively. 2. Generally, that
which is by another through a communication of essence, whether dependence
and efficiency intervene or not – in which sense the Son of God is denied to be
from himself, because he is not without emanation from the Father; he is
accordingly said to be from the Father through participation of the same divine
essence, yet without effection, so that origin may be indicated, but not inferiority
inferred. But dependent is that which requires another in the order of
presupposing. There are two requirements of dependence. 1. The preexistence of
another presupposed thing, whether a respect and order of the posterior to the
prior.

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But that posteriority is of nature and essence; whence it is inferred that no dependence is
given in the mystery of the most Holy Trinity, and thus the Son does not depend on the
Father, and the Holy Spirit [S.S.] does not depend on the Father and the Son, if we wish to
theologize; on which more in our disputation on dependence, held at Königsberg, Prussia in
the year 1633 under singular problems. 2. The influence of the presupposed thing on the
being of the dependent, or of the prior into the posterior. Insofar as influence generally
denotes a communication or concurrence to the being of another, without which the
dependent cannot be, just as Being simultaneously includes becoming [fieri] and the
conservation of things. From this we deduced that the related does not properly depend on
the correlate, against Combach and those who follow him. We do not wish to argue about
words.

II. Dependence is real, or intellectual. Real dependence is that by which a thing

depends in being. Intellectual dependence is that by which a thing depends in
being known. Real dependence is again twofold: effective and inhesive, or causal
and subjective – to which modes whatever is properly said to depend can be
referred. I know that by others, dependence is made threefold: effective,
subjective, objective, and fundamental or relative. But since the last is not
properly dependence, and the rest can be suitably traced back to the
aforementioned members, it pleased me to make it twofold. Fundamental
dependence is usually called that by which relations depend on their proximate
foundation, as paternity depends on generation. But since everything dependent
must be essentially distinguished from that on which it depends, but a relation is
not really distinguished from its foundation, it is agreed that this cannot properly
be called dependence. Real effective dependence is that by which the caused
requires something on whose influx it depends, as a creature depends on God,
and any effect on its cause, especially the efficient cause. Inhesive dependence is
the relation of an accident to its subject, without Which it can in no way be. And
so all accidents depend on substances. Intellectual dependence, by others called
objective, is that according to which our cognition depends on things – in which
way all disciplines depend on their objects, likewise all knowledge on principles
of knowing; as the articles of faith depend on divine revelation in the Scriptures,
our natural cognition on the connection of things. So also subalternate disciplines
are said to depend on their subalternating disciplines; the measured on the
measure by which it is known.

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 III. Independent is that which does not need another thing essentially prior to itself
for its being, by which it is. Thus God alone is independent simply and absolutely.
On him all things depend, partly for being and conservation, partly for the
application, direction, or determination of secondary causes. But God himself
depends on nothing, and needs nothing at all for his being. Moreover, substance
can also be called independent, but definitely – namely inhesively, because it is
independent of a subject. Thus an angel is also said to be independent, but with
an addition – independent of a body.

Corollaries.

I. Whatever is, is either dependent or independent.

This is to be understood of beings themselves, not of modes of being, since the affections of
being are affections of beings, not of modes of being. The existence of the independent is
shown by the series of causes, in which it is permitted to apprehend that all things obey a
superior power from which they draw their origin. This, then, either ascribes its origin to
another more divine power, or obtains being through itself. If the former, it is again
dependent, and so will require something still superior, and so on to infinity. Therefore, to
avoid this progression, we must stop at something which is made by nothing, but exists of
and through itself, which is itself independent.

II. Whatever is dependent, that is from another, finite, created, a being through
participation, potential, and contingent.

For it is easily agreed from what was said in Thesis 1 that these are the same materially. But
this must be taken of the dependent properly so called, which is denominated from real
dependence. For since real dependence either infers or certainly presupposes efficiency, and
this not only argues that something is from another through participation, but also that it is
finite, created, and therefore potential and contingent, it is manifest that all these are the
same as dependent.

Dependence is therefore a name of manifold imperfection in its proper acceptation.

III. Nothing is from itself.

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“From itself” is said in two ways. Negatively, that which is not from another through positive
influx or efficiency. Thus God is said to be from himself, and the Fathers say that God is the
origin of himself, and the cause of his own substance. Positively, that which effectively
produces itself – which is simply impossible, for if it produced itself from non-being to being,
it would act before it was, which is impossible.

IV. Whatever depends on another in being also depends on it in operating.

For operation follows the nature of essence. Therefore, no created thing can operate
independently, because it depends in being on the creator. Hence the necessity of divine
concurrence is established for every action of secondary causes, so that they can do not
even the least thing independently of the first cause, although by their own effort they can
fail in acting; it does not take away the influx of secondary causes. For the dependence of all
things on the first cause does not exclude the principal efficiency of causes; otherwise Alsted
seems to think, who doubts denies attributing generation to man as a principal cause, for
this reason, that every creature depends on God by reason of essence and conservation, in
Encyclop. Met. C. 16. § 1. Although without doubt these respect the creation of souls, a
Calvinistic hypothesis.

V. Whatever is dependent must have an essence at least numerically diverse from

that on which it depends.

Thus Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 12, Section 2, nn. 5-6. Understand this of that which
is properly called dependent, that which needs another for its being, to which it is essentially
posterior. And therefore it is necessary that the dependent be one thing, and that on which
it depends another. Hence although the Son of God is from the Father by reason of origin,
since he has the same essence with the Father, he cannot be called dependent. For one
divine person is not essentially divided from another, but the Son is so generated by the
Father that he receives from him not something other, but the very same numerical being
which is the Father’s – namely, independent being. For although a person is really
distinguished from a person, yet the real distinction revolves in the one most simple divine
essence, which it is contradictory to call both dependent and independent. I know that some
distinguish between hypostatic and effective dependence. But this is what I deny – that
hypostatic dependence should be conceded. For dependence is properly of essence, not of
mode of subsisting, or hypostasis. For that which is communicated, and which is called
dependent, is first and per se not relative being as such, but absolute being. Hence also it

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takes its denomination from this, not from that. Thus the generation of Christ the man is not
called divine, although his personality is divine, but human, on account of his truly human
nature. But how can the divine essence, absolutely independent, be called dependent?
Moreover, the dependent is by nature posterior to that on which it depends. But the Son of
God is not by order of nature, or essentially, posterior to the Father, although with respect to
origin he is from the Father. The Son and Father are relations, and indeed in divine things
subsistent relations; they are therefore simultaneous by nature. Therefore, that origin infers
no dependence or effection but is of a far more eminent sort, inexplicable to us. Cf. The
disputation cited.

APPENDIX.

To

CHAPTER XI.

Since it seemed that the disputation on DEPENDENCE, which we publicly held at the
Academy of Königsberg in December 1633, with Nicolaus Ridemann of Kiel in Holstein as
respondent, could contribute to a fuller cognition of this doctrine of independent and
dependent being, I judged it worthwhile to subjoin it here, which I trust will not be
unwelcome to the benevolent reader. With God’s help

CONSIDERATION OF DEPENDENCE.

Thesis 1.

Whatever is in the universe of things is either dependent or independent. He who denies

that the latter is given is convinced by his own example. But the existence of the former is
demonstrated partly by the affinity and connection of things, partly by the series and
subordination of causes.

III. Intuiting the connection of things, we observe the most common principle: It is
impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time. Let us suppose

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 that nothing is simply independent. The consequence is that all things depend.
But if all things depend, the BEING of all things will be principled and
participated, which, since they will not have it from another independent thing,
they will have from themselves; and thus all things will be before they are, and
the same thing will be and not be at the same time, which is simply impossible.

IV. Contemplating the series of causes, we apprehend, indeed we palpate, that all
things obey a superior power by which all things are made. This, then, either
ascribes its origin to another more divine power, or obtains being through itself. If
the former, then not all things are made by it; rather, it will itself be made by
another. And unless we wish to say again that this is made by another, it exists
through itself, which Scaliger beautifully calls, with a new word, “authypostaton”
[αὐθυπόστατον]. This itself is the Being independent in every way.

V. The unfolding of the dependent is set before us, in which we will obtain the aid
and supreme direction of the Independent. We obtain it. Let us proceed.

VI. A difficult and rather intricate matter is subjected to disputation, in the

unraveling of which, if we do not in all things accurately attain the goal of truth,
we will deserve pardon, when at least we will aim at the target and will not
altogether wander from it. For “it is possible for those wishing to be well supplied
also to go through the difficulties well” (Metaphysics 2.1).

VII. The dependent is considered by metaphysicians not in one way, nor in one place.
For some make these synonymous as to the thing signified: that which is from
another, through participation, finite, created, potential, contingent, etc., and
dependent. Hence they understand and think that all the aforementioned are to
be expounded in the same way. Others distinguish them and declare each one
according to its proper formality.

VIII. There are those who refer the consideration of the dependent and independent
to the general part of first philosophy, namely to the catalogue of affections
which they call two-membered or disjunct. Nor are there lacking those who, in
the first section of the special part (which alone has thus far been more

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 accurately expounded; the other, which we not without reason call “diacritic”
[διακριτική] from the determination of objects, or “exegetic” [ἐξηγητική] from
the execution of its proper function, foreseen by more accurate philosophers,
promised rather than set forth and accomplished, concerning the arrangement of
which, God willing, we will treat explicitly on another occasion), undertake the
treatment of the dependent as a mode contracting being adequately with its
opposite, the independent. Let us briefly see which are more correct.

IX. To inquire distinctly into the quiddity of the dependent and of the rest of those
related to it – namely, the created, the finite, etc. – is more suitable to
transcendental philosophy; to ponder the formal notion of each one (which are
peculiar scrutinies of itself) in itself, not to pursue some kinship, is the part of
metaphysics, which for that reason deserves to be called by Aristotle “more
suited for teaching and more accurate” (Metaphysics 2.2). Wherefore, if they will
participate in the notion of dependence, they will also convert adequately when
conjoined with it.

X. Nor can we altogether approve of those who refer the dependent and
independent to the contracting modes of being, and think that in this place also
the dependent and independent, by a first division as it were, cut being into the
infinite and the finite. That these do not pertain to the division or contraction of
being, we demonstrate by these reasons. 1. Because dependence is not essential
to any particular being a priori, or does not constitute any being in particular, but
is posterior to the essence either of substance or of accident, and therefore
cannot be the reason essentially contracting or restricting the most common
nature of being to inferiors. 2. Because dependence and independence concur in
one and the same particular being in a certain respect, which cannot be said of
the modes contracting being, since these, as altogether opposites, never concur;
as is seen in substance and accident.

XI. Therefore, let it be defined: Dependence is not a mode contracting or

determining being, or at least determining a more explicit reason of being to a
restricted entity. With this constituted, it is now easier to inquire into its ratio.
What is the ratio of the dependent? It remains that we say dependence is either
a mode affecting and denominating being, or an attribute of being, or a mode
specially so called, the ratio of which Suárez says consists in this, that it does not

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 of itself suffice to constitute a being or entity in the nature of things, but
intrinsically demands that it actually effect some entity without which it can in no
way be (Disputation 7, Section 1, n. 18).

XII. That dependence is more correctly considered a mode specially so called than an
attribute of being could be gathered from this: that of such modes being
modified by them is not directly predicated in the nominative case. For I do not
say “presence is a present being.” But affections of being are rightly said in the
abstract in this way: “Being is unity, truth, goodness, potency,” as the most
illustrious Mr. M. Wolderus, honored patron and friend, observes (Metaphysical
Disputations 5, Thesis 43). Whence Mr. Keckermann seeks the reason for
distinguishing a mode from the attributes of being (Disputation on Mode
Specially So-Called, Section 2, Thesis 12). But it does not seem that it should be
said, “Dependence is a created being,” which is rendered clearer by an example:
thus the dependence of light on the sun is not light itself, although it cannot be
conceived by the mind that this dependence is an entity altogether distinct from
light itself, as Suárez says and proves (Cited Place).

XIII. Let us settle this matter, if it is permitted, by a twofold distinction. 1. Between the
formal aspect of the dependent, which intimately includes in its essential ratio
the being or essence itself, and dependence considered radically, which is a ratio
superadded to being, by which the ultimate ratio of the dependent is completed.
See the foundation of a distinction of this kind (Disputation 8, Metaphysics,
Thesis 22, of the aforementioned most illustrious Mr. M. Wolderus). 2. A twofold
comparison of dependence can be made: one to being most generally taken,
which prescind from the dependent and independent; the other to created
being, which implies dependence. I say: 1. Dependence is a mode of created
being, on account of the imperfection belonging to it, which is not itself the
essence of the creature, nor yet some new entity besides the same, or something
affecting the created essence. Suárez calls dependence which tends to substance
as a term a “substantial mode” (Disputation 32, Section 1, nn. 11, 17). 2. The
dependent, formally considered in relation to being most generally, is a member
of a disjunct affection, according to which being is denominated dependent or
independent. But I leave these things to others to discuss, freely acknowledging
that an exact distinction does not altogether occur between the individual
attributes and modes of being specially so called.

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XIII. Let us come closer to the matter, about to consider, as far as the constraint of time
permits, the formal truth of dependence, as well as its material variety; to which we premise
a distinction of the term. But dependence is used either properly or improperly. Improperly
it is taken chiefly in five ways: 1. For potential dependence, which Castellanus describes from
Scotus as the non-repugnance of terms, which is a notable misuse of words. 2. For internal
essential and formal dependence, which we likewise call such only by analogy. For formally
and essentially no being is dependent on another, but through its own form and quiddity
from itself, nor is it intrinsically constituted by any other. 3. For any reason of order of some
posterior to a prior, which is too broad and common a signification, since in this way every
posterior is said to depend on a prior, even when there does not occur an influx of one to
another. Thus day depends on dawn, the way on the end. 4. For any consequence of one
thing to another, in which way generation depends on corruption, because the corruption of
one thing is the generation of another, not formally but consecutively. Thus a conclusion
depends on premises, divine omnipresence on infinity. 5. It denotes the convertibility of one
thing with another; in which sense the common dictum should be taken: “Of relatives there
is mutual dependence,” i.e., relatives are said to convert. To this pertains the distinction of
dependence into mutual and non-mutual, of which they say the former is given in relatives,
but the latter they distinguish into causal and subjective. Relative dependence they again
make twofold: absolute and contracted. The former they describe as that by which a thing is
absolved from an accidental term, but not a personal one, so that in this way the Son of God
is said to depend on the Father, and the Holy Spirit on the Father and the Son; the latter they
call that by which a thing depends on an accidental term, as a soldier is said to depend on a
commander. Concerning which distinction judgment can be formed from what follows.

XIV.

XIV. The abstract and formal ratio of dependence is exhibited by a description, which various
authors give variously. To some, dependence is nothing other than a respect of one thing to
another with a relation and respect of order of posterior things to a prior, and dependent is
that which looks to another as to a prior. Others make dependent that which is effectively
from another, and so needs another for its being, to which it is posterior by nature. Neither
describes dependence adequately – the former too broadly, the latter too narrowly. For not
every posterior depends on a prior, although every dependent is posterior to that on which
it depends. Nor does the effect alone depend on the cause, but also accidents on subjects,
and relatives on terms.

XV. We therefore try to express it in this way: Dependence is a mode denominating a being
posterior to another essentially, from which it flows. With which definition the descriptions
of others either coincide or further explain the same; those who from Scotus say that
dependence is an essential order of a thing naturally presupposing to its presupposed,

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without which it cannot be; and dependent is that which needs a prior for its being, to which
it is essentially posterior.

XVI. Those who think that dependence is described too generally, too broadly and
improperly, when its abstract and absolute ratio is assigned, but more properly the same is
restricted to the mode which they call contracted dependence: they should know that
dependence in the abstract should be so described that it is suitable to the individual modes
of dependence and further that it is altogether exhausted by them. For a superior ought to
be suitable to its inferiors, and the contracting inferiors ought to exhaust the absolute and
abstract. If, therefore, they will participate in the ratio of dependence, they will also convert
adequately when conjoined with it.

XVII. Let the given description therefore remain abstract and adequate, in which is
contained: (1) A common and determinable concept, that dependence is a mode
denominating being, which is known from the preceding; from which we derive this
corollary: Where a mode specially so called does not have place, there dependence also
cannot be given. 2. A restricted and determinate concept, which is completed by two
requirements that are required for dependence properly so called. The first is the
preexigency of another presupposed thing, or a respect and order of the posterior to the
prior. On this all agree, that such preexistence is required for dependence. The same thing
also the first imposition and most frequent usage suggest. Indeed, when the name
“dependent” is heard, the intellect immediately conceives something which is from another,
and therefore also that which is posterior to another.

XVIII. But what posteriority is required, there is not so much agreement among
metaphysicians. There is one who thinks it sufficient to be posterior in order and origination,
who distinguishes between depending originally and effectively; presuming that although in
the former there is not a posteriority of nature, but only of order, such a dependence is
given in the divine persons. More accurate philosophers, all to a man, require a posteriority
of nature and essence, so that the dependent requires another preexistent thing on which it
depends – not indeed necessarily a preexistence of time, but of essence, which is called a
priority of nature or essential priority. Which, consenting among themselves, is favored not
only by the use of the term and the advertence of our mind to dependence, but also by this,
that dependent being, to speak accurately, ought to have an essence at least numerically
diverse from that on which it depends. For one and the same being in number cannot
depend on itself without contradiction, and nothing acts on itself through positive influx by
actuating itself. See Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 12.2.5-6. Hence it is said that every
dependent presupposes something else on which it depends. And in strictness “something

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else” infers an otherness in essence, whence they are distinguished in Greek: ἄλλος and
ἄλλο. Moreover, through dependence a principle is restricted to a cause or causal principle,
so that a cause is called a principle on which another depends. See Scheiblerus, Metaphysics
Book 1, Chapter 22, n. 10, and the authors cited. But nothing is the cause of itself or
effectively produces itself, for thus it would act before it was, which is impossible. Hence I
conclude: Every dependent is essentially posterior to that on which it depends. From which
the dependence in the mystery of the Trinity falls away, which will be expounded more fully
in a special question.

XIX. The second requirement of dependence is the influence of the presupposed thing on
the being of the dependent, or of the prior into the posterior. But understand influence not
as specially and strictly said, in which way it is usually attributed to an efficient cause, but
generally, as it denotes a communication or concurrence to the being of another without
which the dependent cannot be. “Being” also ought to be amplified, so that it comprehends
at once becoming [fieri], being conserved, and operating. Thus form depends on matter in
becoming, the life of man on food and drink in being conserved, a house on a foundation in
being sustained, sublunary bodies on the heavenly bodies in operating, a creature on the
Creator in all these. From which it is clear that some things depend in existing, as any effect
on producing causes; others in operating, as particular causes on universal causes; others
further both in existing and in operating, as all second causes on the first cause. This, then, is
what is usually said: a dependent requires another in the order of presupposing; or, it so
demands another that it can in no way become or be or operate of itself, unless that other is
presupposed in a certain order on which it depends. Fonseca distinguishes (Metaphysics
1.1.3.3) between supposing something and depending on something. For not everything
which supposes something is immediately said to depend; but for this it is required that
there be such a presupposition of the prior without which the posterior cannot be, or that
from this it have participated being, and being in some way flowing from the being of that.

XX. From the requirements of dependence we draw this corollary: A relative does not
properly depend on its correlative. For both requirements are lacking in relatives. For 1. One
of two relatives is not prior to the other essentially or by a priority of nature, but they are
simultaneous by nature (Aristotle, Categories 7.6). And 2. One of two relatives does not flow
into the being of the other, nor can it be called the principle of the other, but only has a
necessary simultaneity or convertibility, so that they posit each other. For although a relative
cannot exist unless its correlative also exists (Zabarella, On Prime Matter 1.5), and for this
reason one is said to depend on the other (ibid., 1.9), neither however is the cause of the
other (Toledo, On the Categories 7), nor does one properly depend on the other, because
one relation does not cause the other formally, but both result from the coexistence of
foundation and term. Hence interpreters commonly explain the simultaneity of nature

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(which is in relatives) so that they require not only reciprocation in the consequence of
subsisting, but also determine that the dependence of one on the other is excluded by the
same.

XXI. We cannot therefore altogether approve the opinion of Combach and those who follow
him: that there is given a certain mode of dependence which they call relative, also objective
dependence, because something depends on another terminatively, as filiation [depends] on
paternity. For the preceding thesis maintained that a mutual respect of relatives does not
argue for but rather destroys mutual dependence; which can be further shown by an
example. Thus a wall, on account of whiteness, is called similar, on account of quantity equal
or unequal to another, where a mutual dependence cannot even be thought; but there is
only a termination of one to the other, as Mr. M. Scharff observes from the Metaphysics of
Mr. Jacob Martini (Transcendental Philosophy, Disputation 13, Thesis 26). Similarly in other
relatives as such. I say “as such,” for materially one of two relatives truly depends on the
other. But this is a dependence in the category of effectiveness, not a special relative mode
of dependence.

XXII. The variety of dependence comes to be considered. This is usually set forth variously.
We make dependence twofold: real and intellectual. Real is said to be that by which a thing
depends in existing; intellectual, that by which a thing depends in being known.

XXIII. Real dependence is usually made threefold: effective, inhesive, and relative; of which
the first is called dependence simply and absolutely, in the most customary way. Relative
dependence presupposes inhesive and effective dependence.

XXIV. Effective dependence (which is also called causal) is that by which the caused requires
something on whose influx it depends; thus a creature depends on God, and any effect on its
cause, especially the efficient cause. Suárez holds that such a dependence is found in every
genus of cause, and from this teaches that since that being which the cause per se primarily
flows into the effect is caused, since that being is from the cause itself, and consequently
distinct from the proper being which it also has in itself: that properly depends in its being
on another which has a being distinct from that and participated, or in some way flowing
from the being of that. Thus matter and form flow into the being of the composite, which
has a being distinct both from matter and from form, yet dependent on them. In the genus
of efficient cause, a produced thing is then properly called dependent when the very being
which it has from another is received flowing per se primarily from the being of the other,

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and cannot be without such an influx (Disputation 12.2.6). Finally, means depend on the
end.

XXV. But most customarily an effect is said to depend on an efficient cause; to which refers
ideal dependence, by which created things depend on the divine ideas. Hence whatever is
absolved from an efficient cause simply is called absolutely independent.

XXVI. Creatures depend on the Creator effectively, and every effect on the efficient cause. All
and each creature depends on GOD both in being, as he is the exemplary, efficient, and final
cause of all things which obtain their being dependently on GOD either mediately or
immediately, both as to species and as to number and individuals. Hence an uncreated being
is called the principle of all created things by reason of virtual containment, actual efficiency,
and final concupiscence, and in operating as first cause, partly acting, partly directing
actions, on whose concurrence how all things depend, see Suárez, Disputation 22; and in
being known, since no one can understand human things who is ignorant of divine things,
which is a saying of a certain Indian to Socrates. Hence it pleases to note just two corollaries:
1. The dependence of all things on the first cause does not exclude the principal efficiency of
secondary causes. Therefore, some fear without cause to attribute the generation of man to
man as a principal cause, etc. 2. The necessity of natural causes holds itself dependently on
the supreme cause. Take away, therefore, the concurrence of the first cause, and not even a
proper affection will flow from its subject.

XXVII. Inhesive dependence (otherwise subjective) is a relation or respect of an accident to

its subject, without which it plainly cannot be. Wherefore all accidents depend on
substances; or as Scaliger has it (Exercitations 10), every accident flows from a certain
substance; I add, and inheres in a substance, and is cognized through a substance.

XXVIII. Others add relative or fundamental dependence, by which relations depend on their
proximate foundation. But these same will urge that every dependent must be essentially
distinguished from that on which it depends; but they concede that a relation is not really
distinguished from its foundation.

XXIX. Intellectual dependence is that according to which our cognition depends on things; in
which way all disciplines depend on their objects (whence it is also called objective); likewise
all knowledge depends on principles of knowing; as the articles of faith depend on divine
revelation in the Scriptures, our natural cognition on the connection of things. So also

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subalternate disciplines are said to depend on their subalternating disciplines; the measured
on the measure by which it is cognized.

XXX. Indeed, every measured thing is cognized from a measure, as that which makes known
to the cognitive faculty its quantity; “by which it is measured and how much it is known”
(Metaphysics). And so in this way the measured depends on the measure in any genus of
measure, whether it be of extension, of perfection, or of cognition. Enough!

PROBLEM:

Can the Son of God be said to depend on the Father?

The blasphemous Neo-Samosatenian tritheists accuse the orthodox doctrine of the eternal
generation of the Son of God, among other cavils, of this: that it makes God dependent. For
whatever (these are the quibbles of Photinus) is from another as from a principle, that
depends. But the Son of God is from the Father as a principle from a principle, as the Nicene
Creed has it. Therefore it is necessary that he be dependent. To this some respond one way,
others another. More accurate theologian-philosophers deny that everything which is from
another, which acknowledges a principle, is dependent or principiated. Wherefore they
teach that principle does not infer simply and formally a relation to the principiated, for a
disjunct affection of being is not to be described simply through an opposition to its
opposite, but rather is to be examined from the relation to its subject; which is taught by the
example of infinity, which is even when the finite is not yet given. From which it is inferred
that a principle can be given without the inference of a principiated; since a principiated
does not answer to every principle, but only to a principle of nature and dependence. For a
principle of order, or of natural enumeration, can be given without respect to a principiated,
as can be taught by examples sought from common usage, such as are the principle of life,
the terminus from which [terminus a quo], the principle of a speech, the exordium. Much
less does that which is such through a principle, by dependence, since “to be from another”
or as from a principle infers nothing other than a relation of order and emanation, by which
something is said to have proceeded or emanated from another in any way, when
dependence further infers “to be posterior by nature,” as well as influx by another
essentially diverse from itself. There are some who do not hesitate to say that the Son of
God depends on the Father, and to call him principiated. Wherefore they define principle
simply as that on which the principiated depends; among whose number are Timpler,
Goclenius, Alsted. But that they may maintain this without inconvenience, some distinguish
“to depend” into effectively, essentially, and hypostatically or personally; they also make

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dependence twofold: perfect and absolute, and imperfect or contracted; so that they say the
latter does not designate some imperfection, but only a preexigence or bare priority, and an
order of the presupposing to its presupposed, which however is not conjoined with a
diminished being, as Alsted thinks. Let these satisfy the Photinians; but not an accurate
inquiry in all things, although we grant that many things can be said which it is not expedient
to say. For we give as proved that the Son is from the Father without the intervention of
dependence, and that he cannot even be said, much less ought, to depend. (1) From the
generic ratio of dependent. It was asserted (Thesis 11) that dependence is a mode specially
so called; but all mode for things, except due to their imperfection, is shown to be
unfit by philosophers, therefore from GOD due to infinite perfection, all mode is
excluded. Moreover, dependency is an inherent essence, but to think this in divine
matters is to conceive an independent essence as dependent. The antecedent is
clear: What is communicated to the dependent first and per se is not relative being
as such, but absolute being, from which the reason for production is primarily
estimated; just as the generation of Christ as man was truly human because of the
true human nature, even if the personality was of another order. Now in divine
generation, no other dependent being is communicated to another: therefore, no
dependency intervenes here, no effectuation; but the origin is of a far more eminent
sort, completely inexplicable to us. If, therefore, the Son of God depends on the
Father, it would follow that the essence depends by reason, since it is said, according
to that which is most intimately communicated, which is the very divine essence,
which we revere as utterly independent Add, that the Persons of the Trinity are not
some dependent beings, but relations of one simplest essence. From the denial of
the requirements of dependency in divine matters. For in the mystery of the Most
Holy Trinity neither order nor essential distinction in any way is to be admitted,
because both are required for dependency. Nor is the Son of God later than the
Father by order of nature or essentially, since the Son and the Father in divine
matters are subsisting relations: but of all relations, it is natural to be simultaneous,
hence it is proven that no proper dependency intervenes among relatives. This is no
less true of subsisting divine relations than of accidental created relations. Moreover,
if dependency is posited among relations compared with each other, it must also be
mutual in mutual relations. But no one would say that the Father, in turn, depends on
the Son in divine matters. Nor is one Person essentially different from another, but
the Son is generated by the Father (which exceeds all capacity of reason) so that he is
not something other than Him, but the very same and being by number, which is in
the Father; indeed, entirely independent. Although the Person is really distinguished
from the Person, yet that real distinction involves one simplest divine Essence, which
to call dependent and independent implies a contradiction. I conclude that the Son

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of God is not dependent in terms of absolute being or as it relates to relative being.
But neither can be said. Not the former; for the absolute itself is the independent
essence. Nor the latter: for besides that the Son is not primarily communicated with
relative being, according to which He is distinguished from the Father; It also includes
the whole divine being, which is essentially independent. From the imperfection of
the dependent. Everything that depends is an effect. Although besides effective,
there is also another dependency; however, that presupposes the former. But the Son
of God can in no way be called the Effect of the Father, for what is effected, is also
made. Everything that depends is finite, since it requires another, from which it is and
depends, and possesses all perfection, and therefore recognizes both the end of
essence and of perfections, which to say of the Son of God is blasphemous.
Whatever depends in being, also depends in acting from the same. But the Son of
God to act dependently from the Father is against Orthodox faith. From the most
common usage, whenever dependency is mentioned, the dependency of the effect is
usually indicated, which is such by nature. Hence, there is nothing more solemn than
to use “dependent” in the sense of being finite, created. But it is not easy to depart
from the common usage of philosophers and the meaning of terms; in which we still
rest. Thus much about dependency.

CHAPTER XII. On the Created and Uncreated.

I. That which is created is what has been produced from nothing.

Creation, according to Lord Gutkium, is the production of something from nothing into
being. In this creation, all concurrence of material is excluded, as well as all process of
succession, through which way and terminus, such as is found in other movements, is
detected. Therefore, by this very fact, it is distinguished from generation, which is from pre-
existing material, and from other physical movements, which require succession. In creation,
no material is presupposed: hence it is said to be from nothing, not designating a material
cause, but in a physical order, at least, as Thomas notes. Nor does the objective potentiality
imply anything real, otherwise creation would not properly be the production of Being from
nothing, taken in a negative and substantive sense: but a translation from objective being to
actual real being. No succession is required, and hence creation is not movement, nor
accompanied by movement. Movement is an imperfect act conjoined with potentiality, as it
always happens in becoming and through continuous succession, while it proceeds from
term to term, and is divisible, but creation is a perfect act without succession and terminus

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from which it is not indivisible. What kind of action then is creation? It is rightly doubted. It
is certain that it does not belong to the category of common actions, which commonly occur
in nature, but is unusual, extraordinary, and quite unique. Some think that the action of
creation is a certain intermediary between remaining within and passing beyond: because
although it is an action passing through emanation and as such is considered remaining
within due to its proceeding directly from the divine Essence, not from any intermediate
power; it is passing beyond in that it is not received in the agent, but terminates in the
created thing. However, no inconvenience arises if we most say that creation is a passing
action, not a common one, but singular. For the essence of a passing action is not formally
that it proceeds from the agent through some accidental power, but that it goes outwards.
Thus, there is no doubt in constituting singular immanent actions in divine matters.
Moreover, what Lord Gutk adds in the definition, that creation is the production of
something from nothing into effect, to distinguish creation from the generation of the Son of
God, I do not consider necessary. For the distinction is already clear enough when creation is
said to be from nothing, whereas that generation is from the divine essence. More about
creation, and related topics, conservation, cooperation, and the concurrence of God can be
found, among others, in disp.7. Pneumatics by the Reverend and Most Illustrious Lord D.
Clotzy, an honored patron.

II. What is uncreated? The uncreated is that which has not been produced by another from
nothing. Others say: The uncreated being is that which has in itself the negation of all
dependence, ordered in such a way that all things outside of it depend on it. Although the
uncreated and independent are materially the same, formally they do not coincide, but are
distinguished by different concepts. Nor is the aspect of dependence on others, which are
outside of it, included in the formal reason of the uncreated; rather, it is entirely extrinsic to
it. For in the case of uncreated being, the being of the Creator is prior, and it is absolute,
while the latter is relative; the former denotes a simple negation, the latter involves a
relational aspect.

Corollaries:

I. Everything that exists is either created or uncreated. To be created and uncreated are
opposed to each other contradictorily. Therefore, they do not admit a middle ground. The
argument that creation is possible from the divine, as in being, so in acting, by
independence from the concurrence of a material cause is independent, and also by infinite
power, since it can do all things that do not involve contradiction. And since it is not difficult
for God, by at least suspending his influx, to reduce everything from nothing to nothing, why
could he not lead everything from nothing to not nothing? For it is no less a power to
annihilate than to create.

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II.All created things are from the uncreated; if they were from themselves, it would be
necessary. That which is created is produced from nothing, not by itself, but by another, and
therefore by the uncreated; for everything created is finite, and therefore finite power, an
infinite power is required for creation, since finite power cannot traverse an infinite distance,
such as is between Non-Being and Being, where there is no proportion, no analogy.
Conversely, that which is uncreated is created by no one, therefore it exists by itself and
exists through itself.

III. Only God is uncreated, all else is created. For the uncreated is uniquely applicable to God
alone. All other things, whatever they are, are immediately from God through creation,
material and corruptible at least in species, as for the number and individuals through
generation (for we understand that power (dynamis) is from God in the first creation,
through divine blessing, and the same act through the conservation of created things, which
is a kind of continuous creation, and immediate both in terms of power and as to the subject
to generation concurrence), but immaterial things, as well as the celestial bodies are
incorruptible both in species and in number. This refutes the error, which it shares with the
Hermogenians or Materialists, when it denies that the world was created from nothing, see
refuted at Pn. Meisn. in Phil. subr."

CHAPTER XIII. On Potency and Act.

In the consideration of both, the discussion first addresses the terminology according to
equivocal distinctions, and secondly, the nature of the subject according to definitions and
divisions.

I. Potency is described either positively, as it is the potency for acting or being

acted upon; or negatively, insofar as it is at least the negation of impossibility: of
which there are two kinds: Objective, by which something can be produced by a
natural agent; and Obediential, by which something can be produced by an
intellectual agent.

These are distinct: Being in potency, and being in the power of a cause; and the potency or
rationale for acting or suffering. A thing is said to be in potency when it truly is not yet, or to

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be such does not entail a contradiction: Therefore, Being in potency in this sense is truly
opposed to actual Being, when at least that which is real is what is in act, as discussed
previously concerning the nominal distinctions of Being.

However, potency is truly an attribute that denominates an actually existing thing, insofar as
it can act or be acted upon. And this is the proper acceptance of potency: when it is
considered positively. Otherwise, it is often understood negatively, not as some real thing in
the subject, or intrinsically affecting, but merely the negation of impossibility attributed to
the object by a purely extrinsic denomination, when it is not so much in the possible subject,
as in the agent capable of producing something, and hence does not merit being called an
affection of Being. For what else is it, than the relation of a possible thing to its agent, by
which it can be produced, conceived only by reason? For if Being is not yet, how can it
contain any real potency? This potency receives a double denomination in relation to the
principle by which it is actuated.

Objective is said, when that principle is a natural agent. Thus, it can be attributed to every
generable thing objective potency, which is not yet in act but can be generated, i.e., through
nature. Objective potency can be understood in three ways: 1. For the non-contradiction to
be produced, as a rose to be generated is said to be in potency to generating: And this
potency exists before all things to be generated: because what exists, could, before it
existed, be without entailing a contradiction. 2. For a certain aspect superimposed on both
passive and active potency, through which they relate to the object, as far as it is possible to
exist: in this sense, perhaps the opinion of Scotus in 2 Sent., dist. 12 & 16, q. 1, is to be
understood. 3. For real potency distinguished from passive and active potencies. And thus, it
is merely a fiction: for it is neither something produced nor unproduced. For if it were the
latter, it would be God. If the former, it would exist before it exists.

Obediential is named, when the principle is an intellectual agent. This can be God, an angel,
or a human. By the reason of God, anything has the potency for anything, and from anything
can be made anything, as long as it does not involve a contradiction. Therefore, this potency
is often called non-contradiction. Thus, from water can be made wine: from a rock can be
brought forth water, from stones can be produced the children of Abraham. In this manner,
the winds and the sea are said to obey Christ in Matthew 8:27 and Luke 17:6, and trees obey
believers. This obedience is not positive, but negative or non-contradictory, from which
rightly this obediential potency receives its denomination, according to which a thing is apt
to obey a superior power. It should be noted that obediential potency can be compared
either to a higher agent, to which it obeys, and then it is passive, or to the act to which it is
related, and then it is active: as the donkey to speaking, the prophet to predicting the future,

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others are passive, like stone to bread, etc. However, it should not be referred to active or
passive potency, as it is potency in an equivocal sense.

By reason of angels, obediential potency is attributed to things that can be done by angels:
as bodies can obey the angelic nature, to be assumed, variously shaped, moved, etc., which
likewise is merely potential obedience. By reason of humans, there is also a certain
obediential potency both as to the Artificial Object, in which there is non-contradiction to
receiving an artificial form: such as natural things have by reason of art, iron to a sword, clay
to a pot. And as to the Notional Object, in which there is non-contradiction to receiving an
intentional form, as primary notions are said to have potency by reason of secondary
notions. Thus, notions of Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic can be imposed on things. Also, quantity
has the disposition for a certain figure, which is akin to that potency. Thus, in Mathematics, a
line is said to be in potency to a square, not as something positive is noted, but as a certain
imaginary power, through which the line is naturally able to be multiplied. Thus, the second
book of Euclid discusses the potency of a line, etc. To the evolution of the term also belongs
a distinction not entirely dissimilar: into Subjective, Objective, and Resistant potencies.
Subjective or Physical is in the receptive subject of forms, as matter is said to have the
potency to receiving a form: and this potency is either Universal and undefined, as in prime
matter to all forms whatsoever; or particular and defined, as that which second matter has
to a certain form. The former potency is eternal, never exhausted, and allows matter to shed
the most noble form and take on the most vile: because it desires all forms indifferently. The
latter, however, changes with the form, and has as many varieties as forms are introduced
into the matter. And in this respect, potency is truly an attribute of the thing, whereas
Objective or Logical is not so: since it is merely by non-contradiction; and it is not in the
things themselves that this is considered, but in the connection of terms, between which
there is no contradiction: as Angel, Resistant is taken either formally for immediate
contradiction, as far as the subject is prevented, lest another form or action be introduced
into it: As in a brute there is resistance to virtues; or radically for the diminution of another
power, and this more properly, as the heat of fire resists cold water. The former is not a
potency but an impotency; the latter is reduced to active potency.

II. Potency is, which either receives or bestows act. It is active or passive. This is the
power of being acted upon by another; that, the power of acting upon another,
insofar as another. Thus, potency is defined and divided positively, and it is not
categorical, which is a certain kind of quality, but transcendental, which alone is a
true and real attribute of Being. However, it cannot be adequately described
except under disjunction, which is customary in such affections, which due to
their generality are broadly applicable and difficult to reduce to a single formal
concept. Others indeed describe potency, as it can be actual

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Ized. But since this must be applied to the potency, which is from non-being, it becomes very
equivocal to explain. Therefore, it pleases to describe potency under a disjunction, which
has the dual aspect of bestowing or receiving act. We have an example of the former in God;
of the latter in the potency of matter. Thus, potency is distinguished into active and passive.
A third is not given. Active potency is defined by Aristotle as the principle of change in
another, as far as another is; passive, the principle of change by another, as far as another is.
But since change cannot so comfortably be attributed to potencies, which are towards
immanent acts: much less to divine potency, which creates and infuses gifts of grace,
without change, acts: I simply describe active potency from action: that it is the power of
acting upon another, as far as another. It is called a power or faculty of acting, not as if it
were an accident superadded to the thing, but as a radical power, which is the very Being,
from which it is denominated by potency. For potency is not really distinguished from the
essence of the thing: nor only to accidents, but especially to substances; because they are
principles, as Which, accidents are principles, as By Which. Thus, when it is said from
potency and act a substance is made one, it cannot be understood of accidental potency,
because from it and substantial act not a substance, nor a per se one is made. Therefore,
understand by active potency that, which primarily and formally, immediately is the principle
of acting, not however efficiently. For efficiently acts that, which has the potency: formally,
however, the potency itself. 2. In another, which is to be understood. 1. Broadly, as it extends
itself even to the negative: thus the potency of creating acts in another; as it acts in non-
being. 2. Reduplicatively, insofar as another: this reduplication does not imply either a
foreign supposit divided from the agent, or at least a part of the supposit other, and
essentially different from that, to which potency is attributed: it is enough, if there is a
different respect of agent and patient: as happens in immanent actions e.g., willing, and is
produced by the will, and received in the will. Thus also, fire moves itself, yet its respect as it
moves, is different from as it is moved. Therefore, although there can be in itself one
potency acting and being acted upon, yet the respect of each is different: because it receives
passion formally, action however it effects eminently or virtually. From which it is readily
understood, what passive potency is. Furthermore, active potency is either supreme, or
below supreme. The former is the infinite of God alone: the latter finite, and of creatures.
Divine potency is absolute or ordered. Absolute extends itself to all possibilities; ordered,
however, includes simultaneously God’s will. Therefore, it is defined, by which God can do all
things; which do not involve contradiction. Not however that God can do all things, which He
wills; although indeed God can do all things, which He wills, He can however also those,
which He does not will. For God’s will, as it relates to things, which are outside Him, always
implies to be true and real, potency however at least possible. Its object is every possible.
However, possible can be understood in two ways, according to St. Thomas in the Summa
Theologica, q. 25, a. 3: 1. Relatively, by order to some potency: in such a way if it is said, that
God is omnipotent, because He can do all things, which are possible by His potency, it will be

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a circle in the demonstration of potency, for this will be no other, than to say, that God is
omnipotent, because He can do all things, which He can do. 2. Absolutely, of that, which
does not have in itself contradiction to be able to be: which he thinks to be estimated from
the relation of terms: when the predicate does not contradict the subject. This absolute
divine potency is proven thus: The divine being, on which the reason of divine potency is
founded, is infinite being, not limited to any genus, but presenting in itself the total being of
perfections, whence whatever can have the reason of Being, is contained under the absolute
possibilities, in respect to which God is said to be omnipotent. Nothing is opposed to the
reason of Being, except non-being, therefore this contradicts the reason of the absolute
possible, which is subject to divine omnipotence, which implies in itself to be and not to be
simultaneously: for this is not subject to omnipotence, not because of a defect of divine
potency, but because it cannot have the reason of being made nor of possible. Hence, it is
said more fittingly, that they cannot be made, than that God cannot make them. Ordered
divine potency, however, is that, by which, God now has obligated Himself to the creature
and does not wish to act otherwise, than He has disposed the creatures. Many things,
therefore, He can do by absolute potency, which by ordered potency cannot be done. Finite
potencies are divided by the Philosopher in Metaphysics, bk. 9, text 21, as he says: Some are
rational, others irrational. Rational is also called voluntary and free, and is indeterminate to
either part of a contradiction, as in angels and humans endowed with the freedom of acting.
The denomination of rational potency is attributed formally and radically to the intellect and
will, which are rational faculties by essence; consequently and by accompaniment, and
participation to the motive, sensitive, and appetitive faculty in man. Irrational potency,
which is also called natural, is that which is determined to one mode of acting in things
lacking reason.

III. Act is distinguished in various ways: 1. Specified and Exercised. 2. First Act and Second
Act. 3. Entitative and Formal. 4. Act of Essence and of Subsistence.

1. Specified Act refers to how a thing is represented in the universal. Exercised

Act, according to which a thing is multiplied in individuals. Thus, we say
something is considered either in specified act or universally, when it is
defined and divided; or in exercised act or individually, as it exists in particular
instances. For contingents, knowledge in exercised act is not given; however,
in specified act, it is, when defined and divided in Metaphysics.

2. The First Act is formative or potential, whether substantial, as the soul is the
first act of the body, or accidental, as habits, knowledge, intelligence, etc., are
first acts. The Second Act is the operation arising from the form of the thing
or its potential, as reasoning is said to be the second act of the rational soul,

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 laughing of laughability, etc. Both can also be attributed to passive
potentiality and the corresponding act, where the first act is the potential to
be heated, the second act is being heated. Therefore, the distinctions
between potentiality and act, and between the first and second acts, are
synonymous. Although Aristotle in “On the Soul” text 5, appropriates the
distinction differently; by first act he understood the form as operating, and
by second act, the form as not operating.

3. Entitative Act is by which a thing is placed out of nothing, hence it belongs to

every being; and is the very entity of the thing. It cannot be opposed to any
potentiality, which is also the reason it is referred to among the distinctions of
the term. For every potentiality is placed out of nothing. The Formal Act is
what actualizes a corporeal thing, specifically by any form. Thus, it is said that
Prime Matter obtains the entitative but not the formal act.

4. The Act of Essence is by which something is constituted in its actual being, or

is its very existence. The Act of Subsistence is according to which a thing
subsists. The former is common to all things; the latter is proper to
substances.

IV. Act is by which Being is denominated from the beginning and completes
potentiality. It is pure, which has nothing of passive potentiality mixed in; or
impure, which involves some potentiality. Act is described by Aristotle in
“Metaphysics” not differently, except that it is to exist in a manner not as we say
by potentiality. Therefore, it should be recognized from the opposing potentiality,
that it indeed denominates Being as the completion of potentiality. And as many
types of potentiality there are, so many acts will there be. The potentiality of
non-contradiction corresponds to the act of essence. Passive potentiality
corresponds to the form itself as the ultimate term: Active, then, to operation.
Moreover, the first or Entitative Act is dual: purest, which is devoid of all passive
potentiality, therefore most perfect, as in GOD alone. Although, to some extent,
angels and rational souls are said to be pure acts due to immateriality. Mixed and
impure, which has some confused potentiality due to some adherent matter,
such as is found in forms leaning towards matter.

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 Corollaries

I. There is no Objective Potency. Anything can be made from anything. I speak of

Objective Potency in general, as it encompasses Obediential Potency, and is
nothing other than the negation of impossibility. Thus, I say it is null: Not because
I deny outright that such non-contradiction before things are produced does not
exist, but because I deny it to be something real and positive. How can a negation
be a positive thing? See more on this sentiment in treatise 1, chapter §.

II. Anything can be made from anything. Not indeed by Physical & Positive Potency,
but merely Logical & Negative, by an agent of infinite virtue. For to an infinite
active potency must correspond a passive potency, or at least non-contradiction.
Hence, the sense is that the first & independent principle can produce anything
from anything, provided there is no contradiction involved. This is made very
evident by many examples in the sacred scripture.

III. Active Potency does not necessarily imply change in the agent, but in the subject.
Namely, neither in exercise, i.e., when it exerts itself into action, nor in the
subject, i.e., insofar as it emanates from the nature of the thing and is considered
internally. For it can also belong to the subject, without its change or
improvement, and be led into action without movement & transformation, even
if it extends externally: Thus, potency in GOD is GOD himself, & His action outside
GOD changes nothing in GOD, but in the Object. Therefore, by no new act is He
ever made changeable, unlike in the actions of creatures. Conf. Chapter 2 of
Perfection. Corollary 2.

IV. Whatever does not involve contradiction, can be done. Say, by an infinite
principle, through its absolute power. For what by its intrinsic nature can be, can
also be by God’s power, and thus if it is the object of the same, otherwise there
would be a defect, not in the reproducible but in the producer, or the acting
potency, which cannot produce it. There is no defect in infinite potency. But
everything that does not involve a contradiction to being, can intrinsically be by
its own nature. Therefore, all such can be done by God’s power. Hence, infinite
power is to be understood as being able to do things that are above Nature, both
in terms of becoming & being simultaneously, or just in the mode of producing.
Hence Plato: what are impossible by nature, are possible to God. If some would

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 ponder this, they would not so frequently call God’s power into question, and
assault the mysteries of faith. Well does Aretius in part 1, problem 2, “What
arrogance it is to make divine mysteries subject to common natural laws, which,
being beyond all human reason, should rather be adored than debated.” And
Goclenius, in advers. P. 48, curses those who deny God is a principle above nature
and set a limit to God’s omnipotence by physical, I add also logical, rules.

V. To be able to do the impossible is to not be able to. For impossibilities are those
things that simply by no potency can be done due to intrinsic contradiction.
Therefore, to be able to do the impossible suits no potency at all, because it is a
manifest contradiction. Hence, it is of the utmost impotence. To this point,
Augustine against Faustus says: Whoever says: If God is omnipotent, let Him
make things that have been made as not having been made, does not see that he
says: If God is omnipotent, let Him make things that are true, by the very fact that
they are true, false. But care must be taken not to immediately judge as
impossible; what our intellect cannot apprehend, which is entirely
disproportionate for adequately knowing the infinite omnipotence. And our
intellect is not the measure measuring the impossible, but rather is measured by
it. For it is not because the intellect knows the impossible, therefore it is such,
but because otherwise it is impossible to be. Passive potency is presupposed by
it, even so it is known. Not by our intellect, but the intellect depends on the
Object. Notably, Polanus in Syntag. Theol, c. 29, p. 187: Divine power should not
be constrained to the narrowness of our intellect. Many things God can do, which
human reason cannot grasp, such as the incarnation of Christ and other mysteries
of faith.

VI. Passive Potency is a kind of impotence. For by it, a thing can suffer from another,
Therefore it is not omnipotent, but manifestly impotent. Contrary to what Pliny
asserts, who impiously denies GOD can do all things in lib. 2 of Natural History,
c.2, because passive potency, such as dying or lying, does not fall upon God.
Contrary, whatever is immune from all passive potency, is pure act, & nothing but
active potency. Therefore, simply omnipotent.

VII. Act follows the form’s rationale. Or as much as anything has Essence, so much it
has potency. And Operations follow the condition of Essence: For to each Essence
corresponds its own proper Object, by reason of that act on which active potency
is founded, just as potency is related to its proper Object, e.g., combustible.

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 Therefore, as God is perfect in Essence, so also in potency. And finite acts have at
least finite operations. For the rationale of divine potency is founded upon the
divine being, which possesses all perfection. Finite potency is based on finite
being, which has mixed in some imperfection. Thus, it is impossible for any
creature to move the earth; (As Archimedes, relying on the strength of
demonstration, said before Hiero, “Give me a place to stand, and I will move the
earth”), but for God, this is very easy.

VIII. The First Act precedes the Second Act. For it is as the principle of the second, and
relates to it as potency to act. But all potency is prior to act. Hence corollaries: 1.
Given the first act, the second does not necessarily follow. For potency can be
hindered from exerting itself into action: either due to the Object, or due to a
higher principle. Thus, the second act of gravity was removed from iron when
iron floated. The act of burning by fire, when fire in the Babylonian furnace did
not burn: whether because the Object was protected against the force of fire, or
because the act of burning was inhibited through the withdrawal of the
concurrence of the first agent, etc. 2. Denying the second act does not always
deny the first act. For the first is as form, the second as operation: There can be
form, even if it does not open up, provided it is the principle of possible
operation. The first act of motion was not removed from the Sun, even when it
did not move in the second act. Peter walking on water was not evidence of
denied natural inclination to place. Thus, those who infer, because Christ’s Body
in the Eucharist is not palpable, not visible, then it is not truly in the Sacrament.
The denial of the second act does not lead to the denial of the first act. Although
another paralogism is committed here. It concludes from a certain extrinsic
denomination to Denying the very essence of the thing, but more on this
elsewhere. 3. Given the second act, the first act necessarily presupposes. For
every act presupposes potency. Hence most correctly from the actions of Christ’s
human nature often inferred in sacred attributes, human nature cannot deny
omnipotence, therefore from this, I infer... 4. Denying the first act cannot but
deny the second. Thus, denying omniscience to Christ’s humanity cannot then be
compatible with scrutinizing hearts and kidneys. Therefore, nor the universal
judgment. Likewise, denying the first act of Deity and divine omnipotence
necessarily leads to denying that man in the second act is God or omnipotent.
IX. "IX. The first act of one thing is simply incommunicable to another. Thus, I assert
against Alsted, who in 'Metaphysical Encyclopedia', chapter 15, part 1, no. 8,
fabricated this canon: 'The first act is never of another thing, but intrinsic to its
subject.' Why? No divination is needed. For he immediately infers from this that
neither the first nor the second act of Christ's human nature is the divine nature,

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as men of such predisposition typically lay a preconceived error as a foundation
upon which they construct principles, and once these are built, they claim them
as immutable to establish their predetermined positions, thus meticulously
committing a circular argument and sophistically begging the question. See the
vain opposition in this pseudo-theorem. For to be of another thing and to be
intrinsic to its subject are opposed, when being intrinsic to its subject does not
immediately define being, nor does it necessarily correspond at the same time
that it is communicated to another closely united, as life from the soul does not
cease to be intrinsic to the soul when it is communicated to the body. For one
communication is 'according to nature,' and another 'according to order.'
2. There is no proof. For the hypothesis that form and properties are
incommunicable is laid as a foundation but is entirely ruinous. For whoever
denies that form communicates itself to matter overturns all of Physics. I will
discuss the communication of properties in their proper place.
3. A Nestorian application. The divine essence and omnipotence can never
become the first or second act of any created thing. If understood simply, this is
entirely Nestorian and false. I argue thus: No first act is intrinsic to a thing
different from itself. Some first act is intrinsic to a thing different from itself.
Hence, some first act is not a first act. The conclusion is absurd and contradictory.
Hence, either the major or minor premise is false. Not the minor, which I prove:
Subsistence and logos (word) is a first act. Subsistence and logos are intrinsic to
Christ's humanity, different but not separate. Hence, some first act is intrinsic to a
thing different from itself. Which here will be denied? That subsistence and logos
is a first act? But nothing is more certain than that subsistence is the act of the
thing subsisting. Nor is it a second act, since it is not an operation. Hence, it must
be the first. Add that logos' subsistence does not differ from its essence. Or
indeed, that subsistence and logos are intrinsic to Christ's humanity; but this is
easily proved. For whatever subsists, that to which it subsists is intrinsic. For the
act of subsistence cannot but be intrinsic to the subsistent, whether through
Essence or by the grace of Union. But Christ's human nature subsists by the
subsistence of logos. Deny this, Alfred, and I will say, you have crossed into the
camp of Nestorius. It is intrinsic to Him. Therefore, since the minor premise is
true, the major is shown to be most absurd. I, therefore, correct Alsted's
assertion that the divine essence can never become the first act of any created
thing, distinguishing between essential union and personal union. For as it is
certain, a created essence can never become the divine essence, and thus can
never pertain to it through essential participation as the first act of God Himself;
so it is utterly false that the divine essence can never become the first act of a
created thing through personal union. For why could not the divine essence
communicatively share itself with a created entity, since it has been able to share

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its subsistence with it? For what else is subsistence, if not the essence itself
determined by a hypostatic character?

X. It does not contradict that in one Being, multiple first acts can exist. A first act
is either Substantial or accidental. Regarding the accidentals, there is no doubt
that the most diverse can exist in the same Being: since the most diverse faculties
are attributed to the same Subject. These are nothing else but the principles of
their operations, and thus, first acts. However, there seems to be a greater
difficulty with substantial first acts. But one must distinguish between acts that
are distinct by a real distinction, and those that differ at least by reason. With the
latter, the response is clear: even in the simplest Being, it is permissible to
conceive of different substantial acts, e.g., the act of Essence and of Subsistence.
On the others, opinions differ. Zwinglians deny that multiple really distinct first
acts can exist in one Being, to eliminate the distinction between the natural act
and the personal act in the article on the Union of Christ. Thus, Sadeel in his
works, Th. p. 179, states that what some say about Christ's body having a double
first act: one natural, the other personal, unless a suitable interpretation is
adopted, cannot stand. Because it has never been heard, even unthinkably, that
one and the same entity has two first acts simultaneously, and what is more
serious, that are opposed to each other. We first distinguish between Essential
and Personal Unity. For as essential unity can be preserved in multiple
hypostases, so conversely, personal unity does not conflict with the plurality of
essences or natures. This is certain from the article on the Triune God; that from
the article on the Union in Christ. No one doubts about personal unity, that it can
coexist with the diversity of substantial first acts: indeed, we say: If the person is
hypostatic and consists of different natures, it cannot not have multiple really
distinct substantial first acts. For each nature is a first act of its properties and
operations. Therefore, in the union, there are two natures; thus, necessarily, two
first acts must be conceded, and this is beyond all controversy. But the question is
about Essential Unity; whether to one nature can pertain and be attributed
multiple substantial first acts. Here again, a distinction is necessary. A nature's
mode can be such that it either terminates in its own proper subsistence as due
to its nature: or, deprived of its proper hypostasis, it needs another's to subsist. In
the former state, it is called connatural, and in the latter, it is termed
preternatural, which I now presuppose as given, to be proven even in the special
part of our discourse. Nor can the more sound among the adversaries deny that
Christ's human nature is deprived of its proper hypostasis, terminated however
by a hypostasis, see especially Alsted. Encyclopedia, l.1.p, c. 3, Rule. Thus, in its
natural state, enjoying its proper hypostasis, nature can have a twofold
substantial first act. One of Essence, another of Subsistence. Hence, diverse
attributes, both natural and personal or singular. It is evident from the fact that

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 nature and its emanating subsistence can be really distinct. For they are not
inseparable, as taught by the mystery of incarnation. Where, therefore, nature
and its proper subsistence are really distinguished, there are distinct substantial
first acts. As for the nature that enjoys another's subsistence (as Christ's human
nature does), about which there is primarily controversy, we assert; it necessarily
consists of two really distinct substantial first acts. Note that when speaking of
nature, I do not mean abstractly but concretely, as considered in union. The truth
is evident. For in nature, there necessarily exists firstly, the act of Essence. For
nature is the principle of its properties and operations. And that is nothing other
than a first act. Secondly, in the same nature exists the first act of Subsistence:
because it subsists. Although it does not have its own and connatural act of
subsisting, it nevertheless has it, so as not to be entirely without subsistence,
which is preternatural to it. What, then, is subsistence, if not the first act of the
subsisting entity? Therefore, two substantial first acts are given in the same
nature. One Natural; the other Personal. If Sadeel still denies this, he can be
forced to concede, and be convicted of absurdity; Whatever only has the act of
being, by no means has the ultimate act of subsisting, therefore it is nothing,
which is evident from the terms themselves. Some substance has only the act of
being, as Sadeel is compelled to concede: If he continues to deny that Christ's
human Nature has any other first act besides the act of Being. Therefore, some
substance by no means has the ultimate act of subsisting, therefore it is nothing;
which is manifestly contradictory. That these acts are really distinct, no one will
easily deny, since the first act of subsistence is already presupposed as
preternatural. Without which, the first act of Essence could exist, namely, if
considered in its natural state and obtaining its proper Subsistence. Clearly,
therefore, it is proven, not merely that multiple substantial first acts really distinct
can exist in the same nature, but that in nature, two first acts are necessarily to
be conceded.

CHAPTER XIV.

On the Principle and that of which it is the Principle.

There were the immediate absolute affections; there follow the related ones: by which a
Being is called a principle or a principiate, a cause or a caused: which most rightly take up
the act and potency, since the concept of principle and principiate seems to arise from act

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and potency. However, the former is prior: because a principle by its generality exceeds a
cause. Here it must be explained 1. a principle both nominally and really, as to the formal
concept and the analogical restriction. 2. that which is from a principle.

I. A principle is either complex or incomplex. A complex one is a proposition, from which,

being known through itself, conclusions depend. But an incomplex Being is called of such a
kind, from which something either is, or is known. Although this distinction may be accepted
in diverse ways: nevertheless, its use is more customary according to the given explanation.
Therefore, a complex principle is not a simple thing, but an enunciation known through
itself, which virtually contains very many conclusions; of which the distinguishing marks are
priority, truth, necessity. Thus it is said, it behooves the disputants to agree on certain
principles: against one denying principles there must be no disputation: concerning these
principles Basil says in Q. 116. Ἀναγκηεκάτης μαθήσεως ανεξετάσεις είναι δέχας τοῖς
μανθάνεσι [It is necessary for the principles of each discipline to be so certain to the
learners], that they ought not to be called into examination. The word principle is accepted a
little differently when Sacred Theology is called a principle of revelation, or Sacred Scripture:
that is, all the first theological truths are collectively designated, from which as from a
principle whatever is theological is known: moreover, complex principles are either first; or
not only πρῶτα [first], but also ἄμεσα [immediate], ἀληθῆ [true], ανυπεύθυνα
[irresponsible], αὐτόπισα [self-credible], αναντίρρητα [incontrovertible] and αναπόδεικτα
[indemonstrable]. And they are Theoretical, Practical and Instrumental. Concerning which,
God willing, someday expressly in that most noble habit of Noology or intelligence. These
are either concerning the most common Being, such as here in first philosophy: or
concerning a Being of a determined quiddity; as are the principles in the inferior disciplines
and other parts of Philosophy. But generally principles are said to be either assertive, or
petitive. Assertive ones are either definitive or Axiomatic. Petitive ones are either postulates
or hypotheses. The former can be called ἀξιώματα [axioms], because they are known
through themselves: the latter ζητούμενα [sought], because they are assumed for making
known the conclusions. And indeed the definitions πρώτως [primarily] and principally, the
axioms ἑτέρως [secondarily] and consequently deserve to be called principles. For in
definitions most greatly shines forth the affinity and kinship of things or subtlety, which
argues for the highest and unexceptionable certitude, and procures evidence, so that once it
has been noticed the intellect cannot but give assent. And would that we were not blind
here! surely errors would not be so fruitful. For the other axioms are nothing else than
ἀξιώματα [axioms], which result from and are elicited out of definitions. Therefore, it has
pleased to call them in this treatise so. But concerning these more accurately in the
aforesaid discipline. But it is clear that a complex principle does not properly pertain to the
affections of Being: nor is it referred here otherwise, except that the word principle may be
explained, since indeed an affection of Being ought to be incomplex. And therefore we will
treat uniquely of an incomplex principle.

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 II. A principle is, which is the origin of the procession of another. What a principle adds to
Being, and in what consists its formal concept, is the relation of Origin and emanation of
another, in whatever way the same may hold itself. Whence Mr. Gutke defines a principle
[as] that, from which something proceeds or emanates in any way, whether by reason of
origin; whether it be a sensible or intelligible procession, or it may happen in any other way.
Aristotle describes a principle disjunctively, as it is often necessary in these transcendentals;
as is gathered from Metaphysics IV.1: πασων εν αρχων, το πρωτον ειναι, οθεν εστιν η
γινεται, η γινωσκεται [It is common to all principles to be the first from which a thing either
is or comes to be or is known]. From which others gather a general description of this sort: A
principle is that from which another is; which if rightly explained is not rejected. But it may
be noted. I. the term from which, indicated by the little word, whence. which intimates both
the priority of a principle in order to that, which is from a principle, and the Consecution of
the latter to the former. For what is from another and by another, that in some way at least
presupposes the other; since the term from which is prior, and indeed so, that some
connection may intervene: Therefore let it be observed 2. the procession, which the verb is
intimates: which ought to be accepted generally, so that it may comprehend both real being,
evidently a known Object; and becoming, and thus designate not only to be, but also to be
known. Thus in whatever way one may be from another, the denomination of principle
results; or as the Philosopher [says]. Whence something is, that is intrinsically both consists
and is constituted: or comes to be, either by which it is produced, or is known, i.e. on which
the knowledge of a thing depends. Hence principles of Being, of Becoming, of Knowing. 3.
The term to which: The word Another is to be amplified; lest it import precisely otherness in
Essence: since a principle and a principiate do not differ necessarily essentially: but any
otherness, which suffices for the concept of principle, if the other requisites be present.
Therefore, I most rightly say a principle formally expresses the origin of the procession of
another: so that there may be two distinguishing marks of the same. 1. Priority. For a
principle ought to be something first. But any priority is to be understood, which is either of
order or of time, or of nature. The priority of order is estimated either from origin, whereby
the Father is prior to the Son, or from position; when diverse things are either enumerated,
or located, or explained, and proposed in order. Hence there is an order of enumeration, in
which way whoever is enumerated first is prior: of location: thus what is nearer by reason of
place is prior; of teaching; in this way easier things are prior to more difficult things, as to
knowledge; of speaking: thus the exordium is prior to the narration in an oration etc. or it
may be estimated from dignity either by value or by human arrangement, in which way gold
is said to be prior to tin and a King prior to subjects. Then the priority of nature: according to
which something precedes in the natural order of being, in which way a cause is prior to the
caused. But this prior is twofold: Reciprocal, when the posterior is converted with it, as the
Sun by reason of light; rational and risible: or not reciprocal; Thus the universal is said to be
more known than, prior to the particular, a Genus to a Species, a species to an Individual, a

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more remote cause, or one that is only sufficient to its effects. The priority finally of time or
of duration is attributed to that, which precedes another in time, and in inanimate things is
called παλαιότερον [older], but in animate things πρεσβύτερον [elder]. To this is also
customarily reduced the priority, which is in eternity by reason of time. Thus the decree
concerning the creation of the world is eternal prior to the execution of the same: but in
eternity itself no priority of time finds place. But only of order: Thus one decree can be said
to be in order prior to another, it ought not to be said prior in time. 2. Consecution: or
relation to that, which proceeds. The priority does not suffice for the concept of principle,
since many things antecede by a certain priority, which nevertheless are not properly
principles, as a principle is here assumed relatively. Thus things that are prior enumerated or
located; or have been produced and exist, are not immediately principles by reason of
others; but it is necessary, that there intervene a relation of consecution, procession or
emanation, which consecution is not necessarily effective or causal; it suffices, if it be such,
that one truly proceeds from another, as will be clear from the division. The former requisite
some call into doubt: [those] who evidently from Thomas grant a principle in the mystery of
the Most Holy Trinity, but deny a priority, both on account of the identity of Essence, and on
account of the property of the relations, which are by nature simultaneous. Thus Damascene
book 3 on the Orthodox Faith chapter 4 [says] if we say the Father is the principle of the Son,
nevertheless we do not show Him to be prior to Him. Others acknowledge even here a
certain priority at least of reason or of the intellect, or of origin and enumeration, as can be
read in Mr. Scheibl., which priority does not precisely depend on our reason, but is
transferred from nature itself, in this sense, that the Son is from the Father through
procession. Whence Augustine book 3 against Maximin 4 says that an order of nature is
given among the divine persons: Which however must not be accepted, as if the nature of
the Son were posterior to the nature of the Father, since it is one undivided nature, but that
in the divine nature the Father is the first person and prior to the Son, as to origin, since the
Son is from the Father through eternal generation. Where it must be observed what Schwarz
has [in] disp. 12. Met. s. 1. n. 10. It is not a wonder, that just as the concept of principle in
those persons is singular, so also the mode of priority may be peculiar, and of a far different
concept, from all, which are found in creation. The latter requisite Goclenius does not attend
to chap. 10. p. 3. refut. Keckerm. when he asserts whatever has itself prior [to] something,
does not lack a principle. But from priority to the concept of principle the consequence does
not hold, There are given many things prior to others, which nevertheless on that account
are not principles of them, because the concept of consecution or procession is lacking; as,
he who was born yesterday, is prior in time to him, who is born today, nevertheless [is] not
his principle, etc.

III. A principle is either without dependence and inference of the principiate; or with
dependence and inference of the principiate, and that either in knowing or in being. A
principle of knowing is, whence another is known. Of being from which something comes to

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be, or has, that it may be. It is certain, that not every principle infers the dependence of the
principiate, otherwise than Alsted, Goclenius, Timpler think. For the term most broadly
extends, and of itself does not import except a consecution or emanation of another,
whether that emanation is accompanied by a dependence properly so called or not; and this
which emanates whether it be a principiate, or only respect a principle, as that which is from
a principle. For indeed a principiate seems to express a certain dependence, which is not of
the formal concept of that, which is from a principle. Moreover, principles without inference
of dependence, and of a principiate, are so called only and by analogy. But absolutely and
simply the others [are called principles]. And these are, in which the concept of principle is
given Commonly as to dignity in which way a Rector is called a principle of the Academy, or
as to location, whether natural, or arbitrary, of which sort are principles of speaking or of
teaching: as the Principles of disciplines. Thus an Exordium is said to be the principle of an
oration: In this way a foundation is a principle of a house, etc. or as to reason, so a principle
is indicated [as] that, from which something is moved: as are the principles of magnitude, of
motion and of time: to which refer the principle of transmutation, a Physical privation. For
this is called a principle by no other concept, except inasmuch as it antecedes generation
etc, but in the least does it import a real influx to the being of a natural body; As negative
nothing is said to be a principle of creation, because creation is a production of a thing from
nothing: Thus privative nothing is a principle or term from which of generation, because
generation is a production of a natural thing from privative nothing or a progression from
non-being to being. 1 Physic. concerning which elsewhere. 2. Eminently a principle is said
but without a principiate and dependence: by reason of simple origin in the same Essence:
by which analogical eminence God the Father is saluted the principle of the Son and the Son
(a principle from a principle) together with the Father of the Holy Spirit. Although Thomas 1.
Sect. q. 33. art. 1. ad 2. mentions, the Greeks say the Son and the Holy Spirit [are] a
principiate: Thus Damascene 1. O. f. c. 13, ἀναίτιον [uncaused] befits the Father, αἰτιατὸν
[caused] truly befits the Son and the Holy Spirit. And Eusebius 4 Demonstr. Evang. [says] the
Son is said to be αἴτιον τόδος [from a cause]: but it is better not to imitate this manner of
speaking. A principle, which infers dependence and a principiate, is twofold, of knowing and
of being. A principle of knowing is, from which something depends in being known.
Therefore, its correlate is not a thing but the knowledge of a thing. Thus not of God but of
divine knowledge evidently of Theology is a principle given. for example immortality is
known from eternity, eternity from infinity etc, therefore eternity is a principle not of
immortality, but of knowing or notifying immortality, and here concerning the others. But
principles of knowing are not only demonstrative causes, but also any inferring reasons,
from which other things are inferred as more known; thus not only a cause is a principle of
knowing an effect, but very often an effect is a principle of knowing a cause. A principle of
being is, from which something comes to be, or has being: And it is both causal, whether
which is also principal, and by which is a means: concerning which the following chapter;
and not causal, to which refer the concept of emanating, as Being is the concept of the

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emanation of its affections. But here a Physical privation is falsely called a not causal
principle, since it infers utterly no dependence, as is manifest from the preceding.

IV. That, of which a principle is, is, what proceeds from another in any way. Since not to
every principle does a principiate correspond, more rightly to it is contradistinguished that of
which a principle is. Which can be divided in as many ways: in as many ways a principle has
been distributed. But most customarily it expresses a relation to a principle of knowing and
of Being. And it finds place not only in natural things, but also in mystical things: in which
way the Son of God is that person in the Godhead, of which God the Father is a principle, the
Holy Spirit is that person, of which God the Father and God the Son is a principle. But of
natural things a certain one is created, as the First parents: a certain one [is] generated, as
posterity, a certain one [is] made by art, as artificial things: for all these acknowledge their
own principles. The rest are sufficiently clear from the preceding,

Corollaries.

I.Let principles be above all exception. This one thing at least it has pleased to skim off
concerning complex principles. For this doctrine is properly Noological, not of this place. But
the Corollary speaks of first principles, not of second ones. For those are truly ἄπτωτα
[infallible], so that against one denying first principles there must be no disputation. For
whether the same may be clear by sense itself and induction, which Zabarella disputes 2
post. t. 106. and following. or by the light of the intellect alone, with an apprehension of the
terms having gone before, as Thomas 1. Sect. q. 51. art. 1., Soncinas etc. have more rightly
established, the truth of them is so manifest, that by a simple intelligence our mind is borne
into the same. Therefore, it cannot deny assent to them. But if it may happen, that someone
of insolent brow denies first principles, how must one deal with the same? Surely from a
prior and directly he will not be able to be convicted, since to first principles nothing can be
prior: nevertheless, he will be able to be driven to that from a posterior and indirectly, by
which he may know the truth. There is a twofold mode of disputing, one κατ᾽ ἔλεγχον [by
refutation], of which you have examples even in Sacred Scripture, see Matthew 19 verse 17,
Titus 1 v. 12. The other ἀπαγωγικῶς [reductio ad absurdum], or as the Philosopher
distinguishes: One is προβολή [setting out], and the other ἔλεγχος [refutation], See book 2
on Heaven chapter 12 text 80. If therefore according to that you may obtain nothing against
a pertinacious antagonist, it is necessary to tread another way, and from things conceded,
whatever they may at length be, whether true or false, you will convict him. Concerning
which elsewhere.

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II. A principle is prior to that, which is from a principle.

For the latter has itself as second, the former as first. But every first is prior to second.
However, it must be understood proportionally thus: A principle evidently by nature through
dependence is prior by nature: A principle of time, is prior in time; of order: of simple origin
by origin etc. But it must not be thought, that a principle formally infers a priority of nature
or of time. For a principle, and that which is from a principle, can be simultaneous in time,
nay in nature. Thus the rays of the sun are coeval with the sun: And they are simultaneous in
nature, or more rightly of the same nature [are] the Father and the Son in divine things,
although by reason of personality properly an order is not denied. The same can be declared
by the example of attributes in God. For one is said to be prior to another, and a principle of
the same in a sound sense: when nevertheless they are simultaneous in nature, nay are the
same divine nature.

III. A principle infers the procession of another.

For it has itself as a first, this as following. They speak badly, who say a principle of itself
does not infer except a respect of a prior to a posterior; and judge in this to consist the
formal concept of principles. In the same way Goclenius, whom we heard above. To the
contrary, there can altogether be given something, which has itself prior, so that
nevertheless for that reason it does not have a principle, evidently so that that prior is not
immediately its principle. For besides priority to the concept of principle is required a
procession or consecution of another, as has been expounded in the same place. If priority
suffices for the nature of a principle, the remaining creatures [created] on the six days by
God would be principles of the first man, because [they are] prior. But that [is] absurd.
Hence thus: Every principle has some connection with that, which is from a principle. A
certain what is prior to another has a connection of this kind with the same, as can be
taught by examples. Therefore, A certain what is prior to another, is not a principle of the
same.

IV. No prior is constituted by a posterior.

Distinguish 1. the priority of time, of nature, of doctrine and of excellence. Concerning [the
priority] of nature and time it is true: not concerning [the priority] of doctrine and
excellence. 2. Posterior is said in two ways. In a certain respect and absolutely. What is
posterior absolutely, never constitutes that, which is prior: But what is posterior in a certain

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respect, can constitute another essentially prior to itself. For the integral parts are far prior
and greater after a living thing grows, than before growth: and nevertheless by the same a
living thing is constituted. The use is against Sadelius: who wishes quantity to constitute a
human body. And yet he himself is not able to deny a human body to be by nature prior to
quantity, But he confesses If the reason of Essence itself be considered, quantity is posterior
to substance itself by essence Which book on the Sacred changing of the body of Christ
chapter 4 Objection 14.

V.A first principle depends on no other.

It is most true concerning dependence properly so called, since it implies, to be first and to
have itself prior. Which is required for dependence; But Keckermann most wickedly thence
collects, that divine election can in no way be said to depend on foreseen faith, since God is
the first principle. For that God respects faith in Predestination, does not overthrow His
independence. For the independence of God is the Essence of God Himself. But the
prevision of faith does not take away the Essence of God. For who would say God not to be
God, because He elects to life only those, whom He foreknows [as] going to believe! And it
must be noted, that they are most distinct, [for] God, in being absolutely to be independent
from the Creature, and [for] God in acting to be able in no way to be said to depend on a
creature. For since God binds Himself to a certain order in acting, and to the nature of
means, why not in this way can He be said to depend in a certain way on the order, which He
Himself has prescribed to Himself in acting?

Chapter XV. Of Cause and Effect.

We will discuss cause both generally and specifically. Generally, we will explain the
distinction of the word and the concept of cause. Specifically, we will consider both the most
common modes and the quasi-species of causes themselves. Finally, we will teach what an
effect is, and how many kinds there are.

I. Cause is either properly called, or [causa] sine qua non. The latter is only a certain
prerequisite condition. But the former truly exercises causality.

[Causa] sine qua non is said to be that which does not have its own nature of acting, nor
does it contribute anything to the work, nor does it pertain to its constitution, yet it is so
required beforehand that, if absent, it is impeded. Thus in the healing of a wound, the
[causa] sine qua non is the removal of pus. The opening of books is the [causa] sine qua non

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of reading, the opening of doors is the [causa] sine qua non of illuminating a room. It is more
correctly called a condition sine qua non. For properly it does not exercise causality.
Therefore, it had to be referred to equivocal distinctions.

II. A cause is that which influences the being of the effect.

Three things occur concerning a cause: 1. The entity to which the designation of cause is
fitting. 2. The influence or actual causality, which is the following of the effect from the
cause. 3. The relation by which the cause is referred to the effect; or the subject, foundation,
and respect. The subject is the thing which is called the cause. The respect follows the cause.
And so the formal concept of cause consists only in causality. It is also called the reason of
causing: which is completed by the influence on the being of the effect: by which each cause
in its own genus actually influences being in the effect; and communicates being to the
same, either by reason of production or by reason of constitution. Others define cause as
the principle on which something else depends. For principle and cause differ as the broader
and narrower: since every cause is a principle, but not every principle is a cause. Thus a
point is the principle of a line, privation is the principle of a natural body, the terminus a quo
[the starting point] is the principle of motion, etc., in which, however, the concept of cause
does not have a place. Therefore, dependence restricts, as it were, the indeterminacy of the
principle to the being of the cause, so that the principle is the cause which implies the
following of dependence. Therefore, they forbid calling the Father in the divine [Trinity] the
cause of the Son, although he is the principle, because here no dependence intervenes. Cf.
Scheibl. And others.

III. Cause, 1. According to the order of acting, is distributed into universal and
particular; and the former is either simply universal or relatively so; the latter is
either remote or proximate. 2. By reason of the end, into ordinary or
extraordinary. 3. By reason of the power of acting, into adequate and inadequate.

1. A universal cause is one which is not determined of itself to a certain effect:

and it is either simply universal, as God, the most universal cause of all things;
or relatively so, as the heavens. For it does not concur with all the acts of
sublunary things, although it concurs in producing very many things, and so
with respect to generation it can be called a universal cause in its own genus.
Thus affections emanate from the subject apart from the influence of the
heavens. A particular cause is one which is determined to a certain effect.
And it is either remote or proximate. The former concurs with the effect by

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 the intervention of others, the latter coheres proximately with the effect. And
it is either simply proximate or proximate in its own genus. Examples occur in
any genera of causes. Of nearly the same kind is the division of cause into first
and second. The first is said either by the primacy of causing, which is also
called the supreme cause, and acts first, and the rest, if there are any, are
subordinated to it. And it is either simply first, which is in no respect second,
as God; or relatively first, which is first only in a certain order, as the heavens
in the order of physical causes. Or by the proximity of causing, which is also
called proximate, because it first and immediately attains the effect. The
former is called first when we descend from causes to effects; the latter, when
we ascend from effect to causes. A second cause is one which depends on the
first. 2. An ordinary cause is one which acts according to the usual order of
nature. An extraordinary cause is one which does not observe the order of
nature in acting. Moreover, this distinction is derived from the end, and does
not so much attend to the mode of acting. For this varies according to the
difference of objects and effects themselves, so that between the cause and
the effect there sometimes intervene many intermediate causes, sometimes
fewer, sometimes none at all, which is not considered in this distinction. 3. An
adequate cause is one which is convertible with its effect; so that, given the
cause, the effect must also be given, and vice versa; as rationality with
respect to risibility. An inadequate cause is one which is not convertible, and
given which it is not necessary that the effect be given. Thus, given a tailor, a
garment is not immediately given.

V. Causes are specifically distinguished into internal and external. The internal ones
are matter and form. It should be noted, however, that here internal and external
are taken not with respect to the subject, namely the entity which is
denominated by the cause, but with respect to the effect, namely that which is
from the cause. For to this the cause concurs either by reason of production, and
from without, so that it may be made; or by reason of constitution, and from
within, so that it may be. Therefore, internal causes are those which enter into
the essence of the effect. External causes are those which produce the effect
extrinsically, but do not enter into the essence itself. Moreover, there are two
kinds of internal cause. For it either conducts itself as potency receiving act, and
thus is matter; or as act informing potency, and thus is form.

VI. Matter is that out of which something is made, such that it inheres in it.

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Matter is taken: 1. Subjectively, for matter in which, as subjectively, the soul is said to be
matter in which, or the subject of faculties, substance of its accidents. 2. Objectively, for
matter about which, namely that which is the object of a power or science. Thus the
sensitive power, the visual power, etc. Have their object; likewise the intellective power has
its own, which in general is called τὸ νοητόν [the intelligible]; finally, each discipline and
science also have their objects. Note here that what is simply the object of the intellect,
whether theoretical or practical or poetic, and the object of a discipline are not the same.
For these are not ἀργονοητὰ [arguable/disputable], although they are ἀναπόδεικτα
[indemonstrable]. Every object of disciplines is an intellectual object; but not vice versa,
since for the former a real concept suffices; but for the latter it is required in addition that in
any discipline this concept be either an affection, or a principle, or a contracting mode. Thus
man is an object of the intellect, but does not absolutely constitute the object of a discipline.
Or certainly a distinction will have to be made between the general and special object of a
discipline; so that it may be said of any concept that it is the object of some discipline,
namely in general; for it must be considered somewhere; but not a special object, because it
is not immediately the foundation of a discipline. But concerning these things in Gnostology.
3. Constitutively, for matter out of which, namely, a thing is constituted.

Thus matter is an internal principle and part of the constituted thing, which can be
considered in different ways: in becoming or by reason of generation, hence matter out of
which the material thing is made or generated, as out of seed the body is made; and in
having become or by reason of constitution, whence matter out of which the material thing
consists. Thus creatures made out of nothing had no matter by reason of production; but
those of them which were material, by all means had matter by reason of constitution.
Suárez explains this distinction differently, and attributes different appellations to the
material cause according to its different roles. So that it may be called “out of which” in
relation to the composite which is constituted out of it, “in which” in relation to the form
which is received in it, and “about which” in relation to the efficient cause which is occupied
in disposing it. Moreover, the causality of matter consists in this, that out of it something is
made, and indeed in such a way that it intrinsically composes that thing. And it is said to
actually cause especially by receiving formal act and composing the whole with form.

VII. Matter is primary or secondary.

Although this distinction is properly physical, yet it must be foreknown here in metaphysics.
For since physics does not prove its own principles to itself, nor can it prove them, and

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therefore presupposes them as things to be foreknown, certainly the primary matter must
be established here in metaphysics, if nowhere else. For this is the principle of physical
things. Of primary matter, I say. Not so much secondary matter; as that which is already a
principiate, and consists of the primary as a principle. For it is called secondary matter for
this reason, because it has a prior; and therefore is a certain composite. Moreover, two
things pertain to this foreknowledge. To explain what the name means, and to prove what
the thing is. The former is understood without difficulty, what primary matter is called;
namely that matter which is primary in becoming, although afterwards it is ultimate in
resolution: namely that first thing out of which, existing within, natural things are made, and
into which they are ultimately resolved. The latter is not without difficulties, since there are
those who think that primary matter exists only by knowledge of the mind, among whom
Keckermann professes his name. But a distinction must be made between primary matter
existing separately, and inhering in a composite, or which exists jointly with form and under
form; in the former way primary matter is not given, but in the latter way it is. Nevertheless,
it can by no means be inferred from this that it is no longer primary matter. For it is one
thing to be under form, another to be formless per se: primary matter itself is formless per
se, although it is never without forms. Thus a created substance is never without accidents,
and yet on account of this a substance does not per se imply standing under an accident,
even a created one, except aptitudinally. But two principles militate for primary matter. 1.
Because nature cannot act on nothing. For it is finite. Therefore, things are made not out of
nothing, but out of matter, just as they are resolved not into nothing, but into matter. 2.
Because the process cannot go on to infinity in subordinate causes. Therefore, we must stop
at some matter, which is primary in generation and ultimate in resolution.

VIII. Form is that through which material things are what they are.

By reason of the name, form is variously distinguished. 1. Into substantial and accidental,
which can be understood either absolutely, so that substantial forms are only of substances,
accidental forms are accidents themselves; or relatively in relation to a subject, in which way
form is that which constitutes anything whatsoever, whether substance or accident; but
accidental form is that which does not pertain to the constitution of a thing. 2. Into physical
and metaphysical. The latter is the very quiddity of a thing, the former is the other part of a
natural body. The one is appropriate also to immaterial being, and implies matter itself as
well; the other is appropriate only to material things, and is contradistinguished from matter.
3. Into the form of the whole and of the part, which distinction is taken in two ways. 1. So
that the form of the whole is metaphysical, the form of the part physical. 2. So that the form
of the whole is the form of the total composite; but the form of the part is called the partial
form, or that which is of some part. 4. Into assisting and informing. The former is that which
assists a thing extrinsically, directs its motion and operation, but does not enter into its

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essence, as the pilot is said to be the assisting form of a ship, [and] according to Aristotle,
intelligence [is the assisting form] of the celestial orbs. The latter is that through which a
thing is constituted in its being, and is again divided into generic and specific. The generic
form gives imperfect act, and joined with potency, or common potential being; it is called
subordinate, and is not properly a form. For distinction is sought from form. But a common
concept does not distinguish; and therefore corresponds more to matter than to form. The
specific form gives the ultimate act of being, or proper and specific being; therefore, it is
called ultimate. And this is defined in theory. The Arabs, according to Pererius, define form
as a participation of the first act impressed on things; the Platonists, as an image of the
divine exemplar expressed in matter. More clearly, form is that through which natural things
are what they are, or which gives ultimate being to natural things, not efficiently, not
substantially, but formally, that is, by actuating matter, constituting the composite in a
certain species, and producing specific operations. For the form is to inform matter and the
composite. Matter at least by accidental information. For it does not bestow on it the first
entitative act. But the composite by substantial information, because it has form per se, and
is intrinsically constituted by it. And so this principle is sufficiently foreknown as to the
question, what is it? But that form is, must now be proven. However, it is proven both
directly, because a principle of operations must be assigned in the composite; but this
cannot be matter, as it is merely passive. Therefore, it will be something, which is called
form. And indirectly, because it is impossible for corruption to be given, if form is denied;
since corruption happens through the separation of matter from form, and matter per se is
ingenerable and incorruptible. But enough about these things.

IX. The end is the cause for the sake of which a thing is.

It is otherwise taken for the end of privation, as death is the end of life; and for the end of
termination, as the terminus ad quem [endpoint] is the end of the way; but here for the end
of determination, for the sake of which a thing is. For the causality of the end is not only
with respect to the efficient cause, so that it may move it, but also with respect to the
means, so that it may make them lovable, and prescribe order to them, and as it were define
and determine the mode of acting; and with respect to the constituted thing; for it is the
perfection of it. The preposition “for the sake of” is usually indicative of the end, so that the
end is that for the sake of which a thing is. Just as the preposition “out of” indicates matter,
out of which a thing consists; “from,” the efficient cause, from which a thing is what it is;
“through,” the form, through which a thing is what it is.

X. The end is principal or less principal. The former is that which is intended
primarily, and for the sake of which a thing is first; the latter is that which is

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 intended for the sake of something else, and for the sake of which a thing is only
secondarily.

They again divide the principal end into the simply principal and ultimate end, and the
principal end in a certain genus. The former is that to which all things are referred, but which
itself does not have another to which it can be referred, but finally terminates the action of
the agent; as the glory of God is the principal end of our actions. The latter is that which can
be ordered to a further end. Thus the principal end of ethics is the highest good. Secondary
ends have the character of means leading to the ultimate end. Moreover, some means are
φύσει [by nature], others θέσει [by position]. From the former we proceed necessarily to the
end, so that he who wills the end also wills the means to the end. Not equally from the
latter. Thus sins are means to illustrating the glory of God, and yet God does not will them,
nor are they to be considered necessary. The end is also distinguished into the end for which
[finis cujus], or for the sake of which the efficient cause acts; and the end for whom [finis
cui], for whose advantages the acquisition of the end for which is serviceable. Thus health is
the end for which in medicine, man is the end for whom. Thus God is the end for whom of
all actions, but the end which we intend in acting is the end for which of actions.

XI. The efficient cause is either per se or per accidens.

Although the distinction of cause into cause per se and cause per accidens seems to be
referred to the most common modes of cause, since the designation of cause per accidens
can in some way be applied to all four genera of causes, as when, for example, gold is said to
be the matter of a cup per accidens, a table is said to be the form of wood per accidens,
corruption the end of nature per accidens, wine the efficient cause of homicide per
accidens; nevertheless, it seems to be appropriate to the efficient cause in particular.
Indeed, I would almost say that it is attributed to the others only equivocally. Moreover, the
explanation of this distinction is not the same. Some say that a cause per se is one which,
when posited in act, not impeded, and not struggling with a contrary, is followed by a
necessary effect. A cause per accidens is one which does not necessarily or by its own nature
concur in producing the effect. For these, therefore, a cause per accidens is analogously and
truly a cause, and really influences the production of the effect, whether this happens
through effecting or through defect in acting. Or a cause per accidens disposes the subject to
the effect, although not always proximately, yet remotely, and so (I quote their words) does
not deny influence, but opposes per se and so denies necessary connection and what is
appropriate to something in species. Thus wine making a man drunk is truly a cause of
homicide, because it badly disposes the subject; gold is truly the matter of a cup, although
not necessary matter. This explanation indeed seems to have some weight. Others define a

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cause per se as one which produces the effect by its own power; a cause per accidens as one
which is followed by the effect beyond its own power and intention on account of something
else intervening. But these descriptions are not accurate, because natural causes act per se,
even if beyond intention. And causes per accidens do not act beyond their power and virtue
of acting. Moreover, acting by the power of another, or by one’s own power, does not
determine a cause per se and per accidens, but rather a principal and an instrumental cause.
Finally, others explain a cause per accidens: 1. By reason of the effect, when something is
added to the effect intended per se, which happens contingently to it beyond intention.
Thus a fisherman is a cause per accidens of drawing out a tripod, and a digger of a vineyard
of finding a treasure. Therefore, it is required here: 1. That the cause effect something. 2.
That an unintended effect which does not have a necessary connection with that which is
produced per se adhere to that thing which it effects per se. 3. That it be added besides. 4.
That the agent not act according to its otherwise usual mode of acting. 2. By reason of the
cause, when some attribute is added to the cause acting per se, from which, however, the
effect is not; namely when that which happens to the cause per se is said to be the cause of
the effect, as a musician builds, yellow sweetens. And according to this explanation the
distinction of efficient cause seems to be nominal. But perhaps more about these things
elsewhere. Cf. Disput. XXIII, Aug. Confess. Art. Xix, th. 7.

XII. An efficient cause is one from which an action is first made. And it is either
principal or less principal. And the former is both the agent and the director of
the action. But the latter is either impulsive or organic.

Briefly concerning each. An efficient cause is the cause first acting among causes really
moving. Form indeed becomes the act of the effect, but through the efficient cause. Action
is considered either in the first instant and state of causality, by which the influence of the
efficient cause is denominated from it; or in the state of reception in the patient, or with the
patient. In the former way it expresses the causality of the efficient cause; but in the latter
way it coincides with the effect itself. But for action it is required that the agent act: 1. The
proportionate diversity of agent and patient, namely that the patient be diverse from the
agent. For the same does not act on itself as such. But the patient, just as it must not be
similar to the agent, so neither must it be entirely dissimilar, but proportionate. 2. The
contiguity of the patient to the agent, so that the patient be contiguous to the agent, and
within the sphere of its activity, as they say. A principal efficient cause is one from which the
first motion is made, and which acts by its own power; it differs from the others by the end
which it respects per se, and at the same time directs the means to the same; and by the
mode of acting, because it acts not by the power of another, but by its own power. A less
principal cause is one which concurs to the action of the principal, but secondarily, namely
by exciting or instrumentally assisting the form. The principal cause is either the agent or the

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director of the action. The latter is the exemplar cause; for this does nothing else than direct
and actuate or complete the practical intellect. See Scheibl. Ibid., c. 22, Metaph. 11, 35. The
former is either natural or voluntary. Natural, which by natural power, without deliberation,
and determined to a certain mode of acting and a certain effect. But how the action of
natural causes conducts itself, whether it be direct or reflex, or reaction and resistance, see
J. Martini, Metaph., part 1, book 5, § 27. Voluntary is with deliberation and indeterminate as
to the effect and mode of acting. 2. Transmutative or emanative. The latter is that which is
not separated from the patient, but to whose essence the effect follows spontaneously
without transmutation. The former is when the agent is distinct from the patient, and the
action is transient. 3. Univocal and formal, or equivocal and virtual. Univocal, which
produces an effect similar to itself in species. Equivocal, which produces an effect dissimilar
in species. In the former the effect is present both formally and virtually; in the latter not
according to a similarity of form, but only virtually. A less principal cause is an impulsive
cause or an organic cause. Impulsive, which excites, moves, and impels the principal cause,
which is either internal, which is also called προηγουμένη [proēgoumenē, “leading”],
moving from within; or external, namely κατηναγκασμένη [katēnankasmenē, “compelled”],
which moves the acting cause from without. Organic or instrument is that which is elevated
by the principal cause to producing an effect superior to its own power. Its conditions are
commonly enumerated as: 1. Not to be moved by the end, namely not to be sought per se,
nor to have its own utilities terminated in itself. 2. To terminate the action of the principal
cause with a certain ease, and 3. To act by the power of the principal cause, and therefore to
be elevated by it to an effect superior to its own power. Moreover, an instrument is: 1. Bare
or cooperating. A cooperating instrument is one which acts together, as chemical fire. A bare
instrument is one which does not move itself, but is moved by another, as an anvil, a table,
which, however, are badly called passive instruments; since every instrument is active. And
here action is altogether given, [namely, the action] of resistance. 2. Internal and external;
conjoined and separated. An external and separated instrument obtains operation only from
the form of which it is the organ. But an internal and conjoined instrument is a participant
not only of operation, but also of power or faculty; indeed, it receives at the same time the
very being of that form, as δύναμις [dunamis, “potentiality”] receives ἐντελέχεια
[entelecheia, “actuality”] and ἐνέργεια [energeia, “activity”]. Thus theologians say that the
flesh of Christ is the internal, united, and proper λόγου ὄργανον [logou organon,
“instrument of the Word”]; thus also the body is said to be the organ of the soul, by which it
is informed, to which it communicates its nature and faculty, and by which it exercises its
operations. Of this place also is the distinction of instrument into animate and inanimate; in
which way a slave is said to be an instrument, but an animate one, of the family. 3.
Necessary or arbitrary, and either simply or relatively so, etc.

Between an instrument and a means there is a difference; yet not simply the same as
between an instrument and a means. For sometimes a means is more worthy than an

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instrument, as the Word of God is said to be a means of salvation rather than an instrument;
nature in the production of man is a mediate cause with respect to God, [but] ought not to
be called an instrumental [cause]. But sometimes it falls short of the power of an
instrument. As the staff of Moses is said to be a means used in miracles, not so much an
instrument. Spittle is applied by Christ to restoring sight as a means, not as an instrument,
etc. But these things are of a higher investigation. To these distinctions of efficient cause are
added others, such as into total and partial cause, or solitary and associate [cause]. A solitary
total cause is one from which the effect is produced totally in a certain order. For it excludes
not all causes, but only the causes of its own order; as the merit of Christ does not exclude
faith. An associate cause is one which influences partially. For it, it is required: 1. Diversity of
causality in the same genus and common work. For there must be given one cause and
another. 2. Partiality of influence, which implies finitude and division. From which it is clear
how absurd is the opinion of Goclenius, book 1, Instit. Log., p. 68, Alsted, Encycl., book 1,
part 1, ch. 36, and others, who say that the three persons in the Deity are associate causes
of creation. But where there are many causes, there are many beings. Hence polytheism.
And where there are associate causes, there is partial influence. Where these are, there is
division. But the actions ad extra are undivided. And each person acts totally. Afterwards,
cause is divided into preparing, assisting, consummating. The first is called συνεργόν
[sunergon, “cooperating”], the second συναίτιον [sunation, “con-cause”], the third αἴτιον
[aition, “cause”], etc.

XIII. An effect is that which has its being from causes. And it is material, formal, finite,
effectuated.

This is easily established from the explanation of cause. Cf. Dn. Scheibl. In general, moreover,
an effect is operation and ἐνέργεια [energeia, “activity”], or work and συνέργημα
[sunergēma, “joint work”]. Work is what is left behind after action. In species, effect is said
either improperly, which is from a deficient or privative cause, or properly, which is from an
efficient and positive cause, etc.

Corollaries

I. Cause and effect are not the same.

For they are opposites. But are cause and effect always really distinguished? The end is a
cause and an effect, in another respect. Keckermann, System. Log., book 5, part 1, ch. 18,

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simpl. 3, Met. 2, q. 1. A building is the final cause and effect of the architect. Bodily exercise
is the efficient cause of health, and health is the end of exercise. Thus faith is the effect of
the Word, Rom. 10:17, [and] of the sacraments, and the cause that the Word be salutary and
[that there be] sacraments. Therefore, I limit [it thus]: An effect is not a cause formally; yet it
can be a cause materially, or in a different respect; this is, the term of the cause either
denotes an absolute being, and thus under another σχέσις [schesis, “relation”] can be an
effect; or formally [denotes] the related itself, which is referred to the effect, and then the
same cannot be cause and effect. Therefore, the argument of Beza collapses, when he
denies that foreseen faith can be called the cause of our election, because it is the effect of
it. But a different respect is given. Distinguish between the divine intuition of faith, which is
from eternity, and the very act of faith itself, which is in time. According to the former, faith
is the cause of election; with respect to the latter, it is said to be the effect, or more correctly
the consequent. Thus Calvin himself says that faith is the cause of the decree of salvation, of
which, nevertheless, it is rightly said to be the consequent.

II. The cause is prior to the effect.

1. If not by reason of time, at least by order of nature. The sun is the cause of
light, form of properties, although they are simultaneous in time. Why then
can faith not also be called the cause of justification, although it is not prior to
justification as to moments of time? 2. The cause is prior to the effect, either
by real existence or in the concept of causing, which is also intentional. Thus
the end moves the agent, as it is in intention, although it does not yet actually
exist. Thus foreseen faith and the merit of Christ are the cause of election,
although they do not exist from eternity, as to real existence. 3. Distinguish
absolute and relative being. Concerning the former the canon is true; but
according to the latter, that [saying] from Rhetoric 2:22 is understood: ἅμα
αἴτιον καὶ οὗ αἴτιον [hama aition kai hou aition, “simultaneously cause and
that of which it is cause”].

III. As the cause is, so is the effect.

1. Distinguish on the part of the cause between univocal and equivocal,

particular and universal, cause per se and per accidens. Concerning univocal,
particular, and per se cause the corollary is understood; not likewise
concerning the rest. 2. On the part of the attributes. It holds for real, both

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 essential and accidental but natural, attributes; but not for personal and
notional attributes.

IV. With the cause removed, the effect is removed.

Understand: 1. Concerning internal causes, and concerning external causes, at least in

duration and continued dependence on the cause; in which way rays depend on the sun. 2.
Concerning an adequate efficient [cause]. 3. Concerning the effect as to becoming or as
ἐνέργεια [energeia, “activity”], not as to having become and ἐνέργημα [energēma,
“product”]. Against the papists, who want original sin to be entirely removed in baptism, but
cannot deny that various actual sins bubble forth as effects of the same.

V. The cause of the cause is the cause of the effect.

It is true in causes that are essentially connected and subordinated per se; not in causes that
are accidentally connected and uncoordinated per accidens. Thus it does not [follow],
because God is the cause of the human will, and this is the deficient and exorbitant cause of
sin per accidens in acting, that God also ought to or can be accused of being the cause of sin.
Keckermann acknowledges this, Logic System, book 5, ch. 15, Alsted, Encycl., last part, book
1, ch. 25.

VI. Matter and form mutually posit each other.

The things which truly have matter, also truly have form; and the things which do not
properly have matter, also do not [have] form. The matter is manifest per se. For they are
principles existing simultaneously, not indeed by nature, but by time.

VII. The end for whom must be capable of the end for which.

Distinguish between positive and physical capacity, which infers a disposition proportioned
for receiving the end, and privative or logical [capacity], which is of non-repugnance, by
which a thing can obey the principle introducing the end. The latter suffices, if the former is
not present; lest the end for whom be repugnant to the end for which. Thus the artisan

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introduces form into the subject, the philosopher imposes second notions on first notions, a
positive capacity not having been presupposed, [but] at least they do not repugn, form to
matter, second notions to first notions. Therefore, Alsted badly concludes, Encycl., book 11,
part 1, ch. 37, that the reprobate cannot be the end of the passion of Christ, because they
are not capable of it. Thus it would be rightly concluded that there is no conversion of us, if
ἱκανότης [hikanotēs, “sufficiency”] were required, which is plainly none in us. And the
passion of Christ would pertain to none at all, since none are capable of its fruit, but all are
of the same lot insofar as they are left to themselves. But logical or obediential potency is
common to all.

VIII. Whoever wills the end, also wills the means leading to the end. This is true of agents
and means that are intrinsically or essentially such, not those that are such accidentally.
Therefore, it does not follow, as Calovius argues, that God wanted the end, the
manifestation of His glory, and thus the sins, which are like means. For sins are not
intrinsically means; they are evils, whereas the end is good. However, they become means
accidentally when they are directed by another principle towards a good end. The end is
prior in intention than the means.

XI.The end is prior in intention than the means. From this, Maccovius infers: the decree
about the end is prior to the decree about the means because the means are for the sake of
the end and not the end for the sake of the means. From this further inference in p. 1, Met.,
c. 14, p. 519, God chose us for eternal life, not because we would believe and persevere in
faith to the end, but because He chose us for eternal life, He also chose us for faith and
perseverance in faith. And the reason, he says, is on our side because the end is prior in
intention than the means, and we want the end before the means because we want the
means for the sake of the end. Now, faith and perseverance in faith are the means to
achieve eternal life. But as long as the end is set to be prior to the means, when the end is
chosen absolutely, not precisely where the end is intended under a certain condition or
hypothesis.

Furthermore (2), even if it is said that eternal life as an end is prior to the means designated
for it, it does not follow from this that this or that person was absolutely chosen for eternal
life before divine faith was foreseen, or that the election of this or that person to eternal life
is prior to their faith, in view of divine foreknowledge. (3) Therefore, in God’s eternal
purpose, different objects can be distinguished, both of persons and things: if you look at
things themselves, such as eternal life, as an end, and the means to eternal life, it could be

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admitted that the intention of conferring eternal life is prior, and the ordination of means is
subsequent by nature, not by time. But when persons are also considered, as they must be
considered since for man fallen into sin, satisfaction for sin was required, the Holy Spirit
testifies that man was not chosen for salvation absolutely, but the election was made in view
of Christ’s merit and only those were chosen whom God foresaw from eternity would
believe in Christ. For they were not chosen by God in anger, but appeased. And He was not
appeased except through the death and satisfaction of Christ; therefore, outside the
consideration and foreknowledge of Christ’s merit, there was no election; but the merit of
Christ, grasped in faith in divine power, was the motivating cause, which God attended to in
choosing, hence we are said to be chosen in Christ. Moreover (4), it is one thing to say the
end is prior to the means, eternal salvation to the means designated for salvation, another
to have chosen someone for an end before choosing them for the means, because where an
end is designated under a certain hypothesis of means, there, no one can be ordered or
chosen for the end unless they use those means by which the end is obtained. (5) It should
further be observed that Christ’s merit and faith are not properly the means of election, as
the Calvinists want. For God did not first absolutely choose some, thinking of these or those,
and then ordain the means: but on the contrary, He first ordained means for all: because
many would not accept them, He did not choose all. Thus, the decree of means is prior in
order to the decree of election: therefore, the merit of Christ, grasped in faith in divine
power, is not the means of the decree, but its cause. (6) Maccovius’ argument can be
refuted by an instance: Calvinists admit that God considered the sins, or at least the fall of
the first parents, in the decree of reprobation, and it was a motivating cause for reprobating:
And yet, reprobation is the end, and sin is the means established by them in this immutable
decree. Therefore, by this Canon, since the end is prior in intention than the means, and by
Maccovian consequences, it must be concluded that God did not reprobate to eternal
damnation because of sin; but therefore, because He had absolutely reprobated from
eternity, He also ordained men to sin. (7) What about the means of the decree of salvation
being, according to Calvinists, Christ’s merit: which was also truly the cause of that decree?
If Maccovian consequence is valid, it follows that God did not decree to save because of
Christ’s merit, grasped in faith (which yet Calvinists admit, who distinguish the decree of
salvation from the decree of election), but rather because He had absolutely decreed to save
some, He also decreed to give Christ and faith in Christ to some. (8) In short, God neither
chose nor decreed to save anyone from eternity other than as He justifies and saves in time.
But He justifies and saves men because they believe in Christ, or because of Christ’s merit,
grasped in faith. Therefore, God also chose and decreed from eternity to save men who
believe, or because of Christ’s merit, grasped in faith. The major premise is evident from the
harmony of the decree and its execution: and is confirmed by the Rule of John, Vol.2, Works,
in Exegesis A. C., article on predestination, p. 992. Whatever God decreed from eternity to
do in time, He does in time, executes: and as He decreed, so He executes: And conversely,
what He did not decree to do, He does not do, and as He did not decree to do, so He does
not do. Maccovius objects: This argument contains Ignorance of the Refutation because, he

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says, the question is not whether God decreed to confer eternal life on believers (we speak
of adults), but the question is whether God wanted eternal life because we would believe; or
rather wanted us to believe, because He was going to give eternal life: Then he adds. These
words (as God decreed from eternity to act, so He acts in time) can admit a double sense,
either this, by which order God decreed things from eternity, He does in time, or that this is
the sense, whatever God decreed to do, and how from eternity, He does and such does in
time, so the former phrase is taken about the order in which God wants certain things from
eternity, the latter about the nature of things, qualities, and circumstances. The former
sense cannot be: for it is most certain that rule of Philosophers: What is prior in intention,
that is later in execution. Therefore, it is necessary that the latter sense of this phrase, and if
such is, it does nothing against us. These are Maccovius’s words. C. Resp.1. Ignorance of the
Refutation cannot be committed: because it directly concludes that which is in question,
namely, God chose, decreed from eternity to save men because they would believe, or
because of Christ’s merit, grasped in faith, not that He absolutely chose for faith. And so, it is
equally concluded about all men who are saved, whether adults or infants. For God did not
decree salvation to be conferred only on believing adults, as Maccovius thinks; but to all
believers, whether infants or adults: nor can it be said that only adults are saved by faith,
infants are not saved by faith, but without faith: when the universal sentence is, who does
not believe, will not be saved, but will be condemned, and it is impossible to please God
without faith. (2) The question is subtly posed by Maccovius. For it is not absolutely inquired
about eternal life Whether God therefore wanted to give eternal life, because we would
believe, but the question is about the communication of salvation and eternal life with
respect to men: Whether God wanted to give and confer eternal life to men, and indeed of
the consequent will, which is considered in election: whether God chose some for eternal
life, because they would believe, or because of Christ’s merit, grasped in faith, foreseen from
eternity, or whether, from an absolute decree and good pleasure, He predestined them to
salvation? Our argument does not only prove that God decreed to give salvation to
believers; but also decreed to give salvation to them because of faith in Christ or because of
Christ, grasped in faith. (3) If whatever things God decreed to do from eternity, He does and
such does in time, so that from this the nature, qualities, and circumstances of things are
understood: and so decreed from eternity to save, as He saves in time, which sense
Maccovius admits to be necessary, it follows infallibly, God did not decree absolutely to save
from eternity, but because of Christ’s merit, grasped in faith, because the cause of
justification and salvation (which is conferred in time) is faith and Christ’s merit, or this as
grasped in faith. Since therefore such also ought to be the case in the decree from eternity
concerning the nature, qualities, circumstances, how it is in time, our argument is invincible:
for whatever reasons, by whatever circumstances God justifies, saves in time, by those same
reasons, those same circumstances He decreed from eternity to save, hence He chose
salvation: But God in time does not justify and save by absolute grace or absolute good
pleasure, but because of Christ, grasped in faith. Therefore, (4) If God acts in time, as He
decreed from eternity to act, regarding the circumstances of things, therefore also in that

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order from eternity He decreed to act: Because order also pertains to the circumstances of
things. (5) Nor does that rule obstruct: What is prior in intention, that is later in execution:
because salvation to be conferred to Peter or Paul is not prior in intention in the divine
decree, than the foresight of Peter’s or Paul’s faith, but the decree of salvation to be
conferred to them was made from the foresight of faith. Therefore, Maccovius presupposes
a false hypothesis, indeed shamefully begs the principle.

X. The end of a work is sometimes distinguished from the end of the agent. We admit this
scholastic distinction between the end of the work and the end of the agent: We also
concede that, in terms of the work, many things occur accidentally, but not in terms of the
agent. But Maccovius misapplies this in his book, Meth., chap. 9, p. 74, to the Gospel, which
becomes an odor of death in those who perish, accidentally in terms of the Gospel, but not
in terms of Him, whose work the Gospel is, because He wanted that end of the Gospel in
terms of the reprobate. Likewise, concerning Christ, that He becomes a stumbling stone
accidentally in terms of Himself as the Mediator, but intrinsically in terms of Him who
ordained Him for this, hence He is said to have been set for the fall of many. This application
is false, indeed, and impious. For if God is intrinsically the cause that the Gospel becomes an
odor of death to the impious, He is also intrinsically the cause that the Gospel is rejected by
them through unbelief: for this cause is why it becomes to them an odor of death, namely
unbelief, which is the cause of condemnation and thus of death. But the cause of the cause
is also the cause of the caused, which Calvinists are wont to say. Thus, God would
intrinsically be the cause of unbelief, the sin of all the gravest. Is not this to directly establish
God as the cause of sin! Similarly, if this happens intrinsically with respect to God, that many
stumble over Christ as a stone of stumbling through unbelief and disobedience because God
set Him as a stone of stumbling, who does not see that God is made intrinsically the cause of
many’s offense, unbelief, and disobedience of men? Nor indeed did God ordain Him for this,
that they would be offended, even if He is said to have been set for the fall of many, set, I
say, by the fault of men, not by divine designation. If this happens accidentally in terms of
Christ, as the Mediator, certainly also accidentally in terms of God, as He wanted Christ to be
the Mediator, because Christ is not the Mediator except as far as God wanted and ordained.
And as Christ is the Mediator for all, so no doubt, God also wanted Him to be the Mediator
for all, not however set and destined for many as a stumbling block: For if this, certainly also
in terms of Christ, not accidentally but intrinsically with respect to His office, it would
happen that many are offended and stumble in Him, since nothing fits God ordaining Christ
for this office intrinsically, but also intrinsically fits Christ in His office. But Maccovius argues:
If God were the accidental cause of something, it would necessarily follow that He interferes
in the effect unknowingly because in voluntary causes, what is the cause of something
accidentally is so in such a way that it occurs beyond the intention of the agent: But what
happens beyond intention, happens unknowingly. Response: Properly speaking, God is
neither intrinsically nor accidentally the cause of unbelief, offenses, and sins because in no

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way is He the cause of sin (as will be proven later), especially if the accidental cause is also
established as a true cause. Therefore, these should be attributed solely to men. Moreover,
it is false that whenever something happens in voluntary causes beyond the agent’s
intention, there the agent is the accidental cause of it because, as Maccovius himself warns,
many things can occur accidentally in terms of the work, but not in terms of the agent.
Therefore, although it happens to the work and occurs accidentally with respect to the work,
it should not be attributed to the agent as an accidental cause: since it is possible that the
agent has absolutely no causal influence on it, and therefore should not be considered an
accidental cause of it, which adheres accidentally to his work. Thus, we always urge that God
should not be said to be the accidental cause of sin, according to real influence towards it, or
so that sin proceeds from Him really, even accidentally, much less can He be considered the
cause of sin intrinsically. There is no collection from Maccovius: God is not the accidental
cause of sin. Therefore, He is the cause intrinsically. Because in no true and real way is God
the cause of sin, hence neither accidentally, much less intrinsically. As for whether sins
happen beyond God’s intention, if so, whether they happen without God’s knowledge: since
what happens beyond intention, happens unknowingly: Response: It is absolutely beyond
God’s intention that the Gospel is rejected through unbelief, and becomes an odor of death,
that Christ becomes a stumbling block, while God rather intended for Christ to be the
cornerstone of salvation for all, for the Gospel to be embraced by faith by all for salvation
and life, and He wanted this to be the end for both the office of the Mediator and the
Gospel. For He did not want a different end for Christ’s mediatorial office and the Gospel but
one and the same for all, hence He sent Christ for the salvation of all, wanted the Gospel to
be proclaimed, as Christ also redeemed all by His death, the Gospel is preached to all with
the intention that all convert, for which name the reprobate are said to repudiate God’s plan
for their salvation, and resist the Holy Spirit, etc. And how can the end of the Gospel on the
part of God be set and indeed intrinsically, that the Gospel becomes an odor of death to
those who perish, or that it is rejected by them because of unbelief, when every end has the
nature of good: but unbelief and sin do not have the nature of good: therefore, it cannot be
an end. To the axiom: Whatever happens beyond intention, happens unknowingly.
Response: It must be distinguished, with Armando de Bellovisu, tr. 2, c.266, between the
intention of the intellect, which is the act through which one tends by understanding to an
object, and of the will, which is the act of the will applying itself to the object: Sin indeed
cannot occur beyond God’s intention in terms of the intellect because, as He knows all
things, so He knows sinful actions, as nothing can escape His omniscience. In this way,
Augustine, Boethius, Thomas, deny that God is the cause of anything accidentally: because
nothing happens beyond God’s knowledge and intention, not even sins: For God foreknew
them from eternity and permits them when they occur, which should not be thought to
happen beyond the knowledge and intention of the divine intellect. Meanwhile, sins do not
occur with the intention in terms of the divine will, which cannot, as sin, desire sin, nor can it
desire it. For sin as sin is dissonant to God’s will. But for God to want something dissonant to
His will, this is, unwilling and unwillable, implies. But in rational causes, and those that

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operate by intellect and will, it is not enough for something to occur accidentally, as it
happens beyond intention, but also beyond the knowledge and opinion of the agent.
Although God permits sins, not only knowingly but also willingly, not unwillingly, yet the will
and permission concern different

Objects: The will is about permission, and permission is about sin. Hence, it is one thing to
permit willingly, another to will sin permissively. The former can be rightly said, the latter
wrongly. There, the will looks at the permission; here, at the evil and sin. Although God
permits it, He does not approve of it, since to permit is one thing, to approve is another.

XI. There is nothing in the effect that was not previously in its causes. What a cause does not
have, it cannot communicate to another. Understand this in terms of perfection, not
imperfection; in terms of containment, if not actual, at least potential; if not formally, at
least virtually and eminently. There is no perfection in the effect that is not in the cause,
either actually or potentially, formally or virtually, or eminently.

XII.The efficient cause does not enter the essence of its effect. Hence, it is argued against D.
Menz, page 69,87, that Christ is not part of the Sacrament, of which He is the author. Dn. D.
Anselm responds in the Examination of the Council of Rhuel, page 64, through εὐωδίαν
(fragrance), Christ offering Himself to God in a pleasing aroma, Ephesians 1:2, is not only the
material of the sacrifice or the sacrifice itself, Hebrews 7:27, but also the efficient cause of
the sacrifice, Hebrews 9:12, and the Priest, Hebrews 5:5. Augustine, in ‘De Fide ad Petrum
Diaconum’, chapter 2, volume 3, of the Works, page 288, says, “Christ is the one Priest,
through whom we are reconciled, the sacrifice by which we are reconciled, the temple in
which we are reconciled, the God to whom we are reconciled.” In Baptism, He is the author
(Luke 2:3), the heavenly matter (Matthew 28:9), and indeed the fruit of Baptism (Titus 3:6).
From these, it is easy to directly respond.

XIII.Every instrument possesses activity. Hence, Sadeel’s opposite claim is incorrect: An

instrument has no activity. Assumption: Creatures are instruments of God in sinning. Hence,
only God would sin. This minor is also a claim of some Calvinists. The conclusion is absurd
and blasphemous. This principle is fabricated by Sadeel to prove that no spiritual effect can
be attributed to the Sacraments, vol. Op., p. 383. Contrarily, to whom action is suitable, to
them the effect can rightly be attributed. An instrument is suitable for action, which is
twofold: one is adventitious, according to which it operates in the virtue of the principal
agent; the other is proper, which suits it according to its own dispositions. Therefore, indeed.

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XIV.A corporeal thing cannot be the cause of a spiritual effect. This principle is misused by
Photinians to undermine the sacrament of Baptism. But in what sense this is true, in what
false, and other principles of this kind, see in Kesl., in Met. Phot. Briefly: A corporeal and
material thing being elevated by the highest cause to produce spiritual effects
instrumentally, there is no contradiction. And how can Photinians simply deny this when
they themselves recognize Christ, as they believe, to be the cause of spiritual effects?

XV.The prime cause is moved by no one in acting. The prime cause is not moved by any
physically or effectively because this implies that the prime cause is so moved; but nothing
prevents it from being moved in acting by another morally or as by a moral cause. In this
way, it is said that the misery of the human race moves God to mercy, sin moves [God] to
punish sinners. But here Maccovius objects, saying such expressions are very improper
because with respect to God there is no cause. Because if there is a cause with respect to
God, then it must be a creature. Then by the same reasoning, some effect would also be in
God, a creature, and hence suffering from passive potentiality, dependent on others, p.1.
Met., c. 13, p. 127. But those conclusions are inept and frivolous because the impulsive
cause by which someone is moved to act does not make the agent itself or its effect become
a cause; for it is called a cause, not with respect to the agent, which it moves, but with
respect to the effect, which is produced by the agent moved by that impulsive cause.
Moreover, to move someone to act is not a physical action nor is what is moved by someone
to do this or that, the effect of the one by whom it is moved. Who would say that the Prince
is the effect of his subjects, or the misery of his subjects, when he is moved by it? This is
utterly absurd. It is equally absurd to say that God is a creature or the effect of men or
human misery, which moves Him to mercy, or to assign a cause with respect to God and
then become an effect when a certain impulsive cause of divine mercy is assigned. What’s
more, all imperfections must be removed, and the application must only be admitted under
this condition. However, Maccovius attacks these expressions (which he admits must be
tolerated, as we must stammer about God and man, and it is both allowed and necessary) to
ingrain his absolute decree, hence all the less here should we yield, as more dangerous
errors are introduced under the guise of metaphysical axioms. If indeed God is not moved
because He is the prime cause, it will have to be said that God is not moved by the
satisfaction and merit of Christ, which the Socinians want, by which means the merit of
Christ is utterly overturned, And no satisfaction is to be believed for the expiation and
forgiveness of sins, because God is moved by no external thing, being the prime cause,
which is not moved by the secondary. Moreover, Calvinists commonly confess that Christ’s
passion is the meritorious cause of salvation: and they distinguish between election and
salvation: asserting the former to be absolute, that is, according to God’s absolute good
pleasure, we are chosen: the latter not so, as they acknowledge that we are justified and
saved not by God’s absolute grace but because of Christ’s merit: although Piscator in
Commentary on Ephesians 1, p. 7, also admits Christ’s merit to be the effective cause of our

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Election. Thus, God will be moved, by the Confession of Adversaries, by Christ’s satisfaction
for our justification and salvation, as it is the meritorious and hence impulsive cause of our
justification and salvation.

XVI. God is the cause of all good, but can never be the cause of evil. For all things that exist
or occur are good. But sin, formally, is nothing but evil. Therefore, the one who is the cause
of the former cannot necessarily be deemed the author of the latter. The reason for this lies
in the difference between other things and sin. The former are positive and cannot but
recognize God as their cause because God is the first and supreme principle both of nature
and of all actions. Sin, however, is a deviation, adhering to nature and actions, and thus
consists in privation, which cannot have God as its author, for He is both the highest good
and most perfect. From the good, nothing but good can arise, and how could the perfect
itself fail! Hence, rightly did Euripides say, “Gods would not be gods if they did evil.” This
implies that in sin, a distinction must be made between the material and formal aspects.
These matters seem thorny, as our great Chemnitz mentions in L.L. C.G. on the Cause of Sin,
p.m. 387, seeming more fitting for dialectical quibblings than theological simplicity. But since
things created by God necessarily need to be distinguished from sin, which is a disruption of
the divine order, such teachings are correctly and usefully conveyed. Hence, the most
judicious theologians believe that the proposed difficulty can be most conveniently
explained by establishing a definition of what sin precisely is in its essence (formal reason),
namely that it is a defect or privation. Therefore, this rule is provided, which, when applied,
is believed to be able to illuminate many obscure matters and unravel complicated ones,
considering that in sin, two aspects need to be considered: 1. The subject in which sin exists,
whether it be nature or substance, or the very action, as far as it is a certain movement to
which the defect is attached. And it’s no doubt that created things are sustained and vivified
by God. 2. The disruption or confusion of the divine order, that is, the defect or privation,
whether it exists in substance or is attached to an action. And that defect is precisely sin and
is not from God but from the will of the Devil and man.

If you press the concurrence of the primary cause with secondary causes, which is so
necessary that the secondary cause cannot act alone but with the moving, aiding, and
cooperating primary cause. Response: (1) A distinction must be made between effect and
defect. A secondary cause can produce an effect without the primary: it cannot alone
produce something positive or act, but its effect is referred back to the primary cause.
However, the secondary cause can fail without the primary failing, and act alone, so to
speak, by deviating, wandering, or failing, so that defect does not revert to the primary
cause. Briefly: the secondary cause can indeed fail in actions without the primary, thus
leaving the defect by itself, but it cannot alone posit something positive. Thomas expounds
cleverly in p2. Q. 79. Art. 1. Ad. 3, saying, “The effect that falls under the order of the

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primary cause from a mediate cause, as it exits the order of the primary cause, is not
reduced to the primary cause.” Therefore, God is the cause of every action, as far as it is
action: but sin denotes being with a certain defect, which is in the created cause, namely, a
depraved will deviating from the order of the prime agent. Therefore, a distinction must be
made (2) between the subordination of the secondary and the primary cause and the
deviation of the secondary cause from the primary. It is true that the lower cause cannot act
without the higher, in terms of the subordination of causes. But in sins, no subordination of
causes is observed; but when sin is a deviation, and the secondary cause deviates from the
order prescribed by the primary cause, it cannot depend on the correct order of
subordinated causes. For two aspects can be considered in sin: the action and the disorder
of the action. From these, the action is from God, the disorder is not from God.

Moreover, it’s noted that three principles of action exist: 1. The universal principle, which is
God, the common principle, which is nature, and the proximate or particular nature. It’s
agreed among all, as Francis Junius states in De Prim. Peccat., C. 2, who discusses this topic
comprehensively and solidly refutes the blasphemous errors of others, that as in a chain,
only the proximate link is at fault when the chain breaks, so in our actions, the fault is
attributed to the proximate principle, the higher principles being blameless since a good
cause produces a good effect, a bad cause, a bad one. As God always acts, so nature by itself
never fails to produce good actions; when a man acts wickedly, the goodness of those
actions is marred in him. Just as monsters are attributed not to universal and common
causes but to specific and particular ones because error cannot fall on God or nature, so it is
with the monsters of the soul, which are sins, says Rivetus. Additionally, the common rule
should be observed: for good actions to occur, all principles must be good; for bad actions, it
suffices if the proximate principle is bad, it’s not necessary for the malice to revert to the
primary principle, as goodness comes from the first principle. Moreover, the difference in
actions should not be sought in the universal or common cause but in the specific cause. For
even in natural causes, whenever multiple causes concur to one effect, the ultimate effect
does not follow the supreme or intermediate causes but the proximate cause; much more so
in voluntary actions, it should be said that the determination of actions is not to be sought
from remote causes but rather from the proximate cause, as the acting principle should be
attributed. Certainly, if God used His absolute omnipotence in sustaining the rational
creature, no one could think, will, or act other than what God would effect. For one would
be carried away by the motion of immense power, and no one could escape that motion or
rush. But because God moves according to the order He has placed in nature, intellectual
creatures are left with the freedom to act, whatever they do, without being constrained by
any bond of necessity. Beza acknowledges this in Response to the Colloquy of Montpellier, p.
2, p. 179. The distinction between good and bad actions falls on those instruments endowed
with intelligence and reason, such as angels and men: for God administers everything He has
created in such a way that He even allows those things to exercise and perform their own

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movements. Therefore, the difference in actions is attributed to the instruments, which are
endowed with intelligence and reason, as God administers all He has created, allowing even
them to perform their movements. Hence, the difference, the quality of that difference
being malice and goodness in actions, should not be assigned to the remote and universal
cause but rather to the proximate cause. Finally, we concede that the primary cause concurs
in every action of secondary causes: but we deny that it concurs in the same manner in all
their actions. In good actions, it concurs not only as sustaining but also as aiding, effecting
the will and accomplishment. In bad

Actions, although it sustains nature, it does not aid the will falling against the divine order.
For it concurs in good actively and effectively since nothing good can exist without coming
from the highest good; but it cannot so concur in evil. For the primary cause moves the
secondary in such a way that it does nothing against itself; thus, it does not move evil. For
this is against the primary cause, which is God Himself. Yet it concurs, nevertheless, in its
own way with evil actions, namely, sustaining nature and permitting evil to occur; setting
limits to sins out of its wisdom, and ordaining and determining them for a good end. For a
good would not permit evil unless the omnipotent could bring good out of evil, says
Augustine in Enchiridion, c. 100, and Fulgentius in Ad Appianum, lib. I. Although God is not
the author of evil thoughts, He is their ordainer, turning the evil deed of any to His own good
work.

XVI. God must be said to be the cause of sin in no way, not even per accidens.

For (1) that God is not the cause of sin per se, physically speaking, is not difficult to prove.
For if he were to concur physically with sin, this would happen either immediately or
mediately. If immediately, God himself would be deficient in acting, and would act against
his own will, which conflicts with the immutability, perfection, [and] essential sanctity of
God. If mediately, this would happen either by cooperating, or by moving the will and
inspiring depraved motions. Neither can be said. Not the former, because cooperation and
coefficiency concern only the action, not the inordination of the action. Nor the latter,
because God cannot move the will to sin and inspire depraved motions, since he cannot
deny himself and be contrary to himself. For sin as such is opposed to the divine will. That (2)
God does not concur morally with sins, whether by commanding, persuading or approving,
or at least by not impeding when he can and ought to impede, will be easily evident. The
former indeed both from God’s hatred towards sins, and from punishment and torment. For
what God hates and detests, how can he approve? What he prohibits and punishes, how can
he persuade and command? But the latter: because God altogether impedes sin as much as
he ought, by the position of law and the threatening of punishment, although he does not

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always impede by efficacious retraction, to which he is also not obligated; indeed, in this the
first cause executes the law, as Gregory of Valentia says from Thomas, vol. 8 on Thomas,
disp. 6, q. 9, art. 1, that he permits the free creature to act by its own will.

But that (3) God must not be said to be the cause per accidens according to a real influx to
the very ἀνομία [anomia, “lawlessness”] itself, or in such a way that sin proceeds from him
really, is evident from this: because he who in this way is the cause of sin per accidens, is
truly and properly said to be the cause of sin. Since thus a cause per accidens is as it were a
species or a certain mode of efficient cause. But religion forbids saying truly and properly
that God is the cause of sin. Besides, if God concurs by real influx with ἀνομία [anomia,
“lawlessness”], so that sin formally proceeds from him, it follows that God truly sins and acts
badly or is deficient in acting. In this sense Plato, in Dialogue 2 of the Republic, says, “In no
way must God be said to be the cause of sin, since he is supremely good, and therefore is
goodness itself.” And Thomas, part 1, summa, q. 24, art. 3, “God does all things which do not
imply a contradiction. He in no way does those things which imply [a contradiction]. For
what is done must be in some part similar to that by which it is done.”

But that finally (4) God must not be said to be the cause of sin per accidens equivocally, we
teach thus: There are four modes of cause per accidens, which seem to be able to be
referred to equivocal cause. First, when that is said to do per accidens which is plainly not a
cause, even if it happens at the same time with that which is a cause, or when something
else proceeds from a cause, so that that conjunction is only by reason of time; as if you do
something, it can happen that that is attributed to you as a cause, which happens at the
same time, even if it has no other connection with your action; as if when you enter a house,
the father of the family, or his children suffer something adverse. Thus when someone is
walking and it thunders, the thunder is said to have itself per accidens to the walking.

But this mode of cause per accidens is most imperfect, and is not usually regarded. Secondly,
when that is said to be a cause per accidens, which removes an impediment or prohibition,
which having been done the effect follows necessarily or for the most part; according to this
mode Peter Martyr calls God the cause of sin, Common Places, p. 99: “If we want to speak
less properly, God will be able to be said in some way to be either the beginning or the cause
of sin, not indeed properly; but that cause which is called by the philosophers removing the
prohibition. To which pertains the example which he adduces: Thus it happens concerning a
house which is ruinous, [and] is sustained by a column; the stones fall, and the buildings,
from their highest place by weight, which have in themselves the cause of descent; yet he
who removes the column is said to cause each fall; for he removes the support which was
prohibiting the ruin; thus God, insofar as by nature he is good, insofar however as he is just

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[and] wants sinners punished, takes away grace in some way [as] a cause of those things
which are afterwards done badly, [but] he cannot be said [to be] the true cause. For this
properly is interior, namely their evil will.” The third mode is not much different from the
second, when that is said to be a cause per accidens at whose absence the effect follows,
which Martyr likewise intends, ibid., and confuses with the preceding mode, as the other
similar [example] which he adduces testifies, concerning the sun, which is the cause of
darkness per accidens. “The sun is wholly bright, its proper effect is to illuminate, yet in
some way it can be said to make darkness, not insofar as it shines, but insofar as it is moved
and departs from one place to another. If the sun recedes, no efficient cause [acting]; but
the shadows follow of their own accord. If a habit is removed, its privation is immediately
present of its own accord. If someone injures the eye so that sight is lost, blindness
immediately follows, nor is it necessary to seek another agent. When the grace and favor of
God is justly taken away from us, sin succeeds of its own accord, nor is there need of some
efficient cause; of no other cause, I say, is there need than our own irritated and corrupted
affections.” These things he [says]. In which we especially desire these things.

First, that he supposes that God so withdraws his grace from sinners that by this very thing
all things are removed and withdrawn from them which prohibit and impede sins. God
indeed justly withdraws his gracious inhabitation from sinners, yet he does not so withdraw
from them all grace that at the same time all means are withdrawn and snatched away from
them which can impede sin. For the divine law remains to man, both the implanted [law]
and the written [law], the means of regeneration and conversion are granted, the Word and
sacraments; which he could use, if he willed. As to what concerns indeed external sins, he is
recalled and prohibited from the same by the divine law, and even the unregenerate man
has those powers of will that he can avoid those external sins, such as are adultery,
homicide, etc. But as to unbelief and depraved affections and the internal inclinations of the
heart, man indeed cannot obtain faith and contribute anything to his own regeneration and
renovation apart from the grace of the Holy Spirit, yet all means have not been withdrawn
from him, either of averting the former or of obtaining the latter. For the Word and
sacraments are granted for this reason, that through the same he may receive faith and the
faculty of acting well; whence it follows that God does not withdraw absolutely all means of
avoiding sins, as Peter Martyr asserts.

Secondly, from the opinion of Martyr it follows not obscurely that God is the absolute and
perfect cause of sin, and as it were the only one. For Martyr teaches that the devil is not the
proper cause of sin, because however many evil things he sometimes suggests to the pious,
yet sins do not always follow; and he thinks that to be the proper and perfect cause of sin,
which having been posited, sin necessarily follows, and which so incites men to sin, that sin
necessarily follows, p. 102, Common Places. But now each can be said concerning God from

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the opinion of Martyr, both that God internally and efficaciously incites and impels men to
sins, Commentary on Rom. 1, pp. 38, 39, and that hence sin necessarily follows, since men
cannot resist God and efficaciously elude his operations, as the Calvinists commonly say. And
if similitudes are to be insisted upon, as shadows necessarily follow the departure of the
sun, privation [follows] the removal of a habit, so sin will necessarily follow the withdrawal
of divine grace. Therefore, from the opinion of Martyr, God is said to be the proper and
absolute cause of sin.

Maccovius indeed excepts, in Theol. Colleg., de prædest., disp. 9, that it does not
immediately follow that something is the effect of another if the same necessarily follows it,
as shadows follow the departure of the sun, although the sun is not the cause of shadows.
But because shadows follow not the sun, but the departure of the sun, therefore, if not the
sun itself, yet the departure of the sun must be said to be the cause of shadows. Similarly,
therefore, the withdrawal of divine grace will be the cause of sin; whence, according to that
κοινὸν δόγμα [“common doctrine”] of the Calvinists, “Whatever is the cause of the cause is
also the cause of the caused,” it will still follow that God, who is the cause of the withdrawal
of grace, is also the cause of sin, which follows the withdrawal of grace. Besides, if the sun
recedes, no efficient cause [acting]; but shadows follow of their own accord; if someone
injures the eye so that sight is lost, blindness immediately follows, nor is it necessary to seek
another agent, according to Martyr. What then? Is another agent not to be sought, or will
there be no other cause of sin than that withdrawal of divine grace? Does it not follow from
this very thing that God will be the only cause of sin, just as the cause of blindness is solely
he who injures the eye, so that sight is lost? For just as shadows are nothing other than the
privation of light, and blindness is nothing other than the privation of sight, must it not also
be said concerning sin, that it is nothing other than the withdrawal of divine grace? And
since God is the cause of this withdrawal, must it not be asserted that God is the cause of
sin, or of that which formally is sin? Finally, what is simply said, that sins follow the
withdrawal of divine grace, that no other cause is to be sought than from our own vitiated
and corrupted acts, this does not yet satisfy the question concerning the origin and cause of
sin. For what is to be said concerning the first sin? Will its cause also be the withdrawal of
divine grace? But God does not withdraw grace, except on account of sins.

But as to what Maccovius excepts, that God also withdraws his grace from the faithful, and
yet this is not done on account of sin, by the example of Hezekiah, whom God forsook by
trying him, that he might know all that was in his heart, 2 Chron. 32:31, this does nothing for
the present matter. A distinction must certainly be made between exploratory and
reprobatory desertion. The former does not necessarily induce sin; but the latter sin
necessarily follows. The former does not presuppose sin; the latter presupposes it. For he is
justly deserted by God, who deserts God, according to Fulgentius, book 1 to Monimus.

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Although, therefore, God sometimes tries the pious by allowing them to act from their own
affection, as Junius explains in his notes on this place, yet the pious do not thence
necessarily sin. But those from whom God withdraws his aid and grace, in that way which
Martyr and Maccovius intend, they cannot but sin. Because a fall necessarily follows the
withdrawal of aid, as Maccovius says. “With the aid of God having been withdrawn from
Adam,” says the same in the same place, “man will not be able to use those faculties well,
and so in this sense he was not able to stand in the state of integrity. For on account of the
lack of this aid, man, having abused those same faculties, was most justly deprived of them
by God.” In which way Pareus also speaks, adduced in the same place, ch. 4, de grat. Prim.
Hom., p. 42, “On account of the lack of special grace, directing [and] preserving the good will
of man, man fell.” Which, what else does it imply than that the only cause of the fall of man
was the withdrawal of divine aid, which having been withdrawn, man could not but abuse
his faculties? But God did not withdraw from Adam, when he was just about to fall, the
grace previously granted to him, which was a firm enough protection for him against sin,
since he was so constituted that if he trusted in the help of God, as Augustine says, book 24,
de Civitate Dei, he could avoid sin; but [God] did not bestow another special grace, to the
bestowing of which he was also bound by no right. Arminius rightly [says], disp. 6, th. 9, “The
divine permission intervened (as to the first sin), not insofar as it permitted that act to his
[man’s] right and power, so that he could commit it without sin (for that is contrary to
legislation), but insofar as it permitted it to the free will and power of man. But that
permission is not the negation or removal of the grace necessary and sufficient for
performing the law (for that would ascribe to God the efficiency of sin), but is the
suspension of some efficiency possible for God both according to right and according to
power, which, having been employed, would actually impede sin.” This impediment is
commonly called an efficacious impediment. For God was not bound to furnish this
impediment, inasmuch as, those impediments having been posited, which could and ought
to deter and dissuade man from sinning, namely by the communication of his image, by the
position of law, by the threatening of punishment, and by the promise of reward. Cf. Rivet,
disp. 2 on original sin, th. 19.

I conclude with the words of Gregory of Valentia, vol. 1 on Thomas, disp. 6, q. 9, art. 1,
where he speaks thus: “That not even indirectly is God the cause per accidens of the sins of
the free creature through this, that he does not impede them, is best proven by St. Thomas,
q. 19. Because God is not bound to impede sins of this kind; indeed, rather in this, that he
permits them, he executes the law of the first cause, which is that he permits the free
creature to act by its own will. Wherefore, since only that is said to be the indirect cause of
any sin, which can and ought to impede sin, God is not the indirect cause of sin. But if, only
because God can impede sin, and does not impede it, someone contends that God is in
some way the indirect cause of sin, it will be a question only about the name. For concerning
the thing, namely that God can impede sin, it is agreed among all. Yet it must not be so

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spoken, because commonly an indirect cause is said to be not only that which can, but also
that which ought to impede, as Thomas proves, ibid., by the example of the sinking of a ship,
which is not ascribed as a cause to the passenger, for example, who was being carried on it,
however much he could have impeded that sinking; but only to the pilot, who also ought [to
have impeded it]. Nor must words be misused, especially in so grave a matter.” And these
things concerning the third mode of cause per accidens, insofar as cause is said equivocally.

Fourthly, finally, a cause per accidens is defined simply as that from which the effect does
not proceed as such; and it is divided into that which is such either by reason of the cause,
when that which happens to the cause per se is said to be the cause of the effect; or by
reason of the effect, when with the effect per se is conjoined an effect per accidens. The
former is irrelevant here; but the latter some think can have a place, arguing thus: When
with the effect per se of an agent, another accident is conjoined, then the agent can be said
to be the cause per accidens of the latter. But indeed with that which God does per se, sin is
often conjoined per accidens. For human actions depend on God, because they are beings
by participation and dependence; to which sin often adheres per accidens. Whence some
conclude that God is the cause of sin per accidens; in which way Calixtus, in Epitome of
Theology, p. 133, says that God can be said to be the cause of sin indirectly, improperly, and
per accidens, in five ways: (1) by reason of permission; (2) by reason of desertion and
withdrawal of grace; (3) by reason of sustentation and delay of punishment; (4) by reason of
ordination and direction of wickedness; (5) by reason of ordination and prescription of limit
in sinning. But indeed, since, according to Nicetas, to labor to express in a new form of
speech what has once been most rightly said, is to speak unseasonably, it is better to say
with the old theologians that God is in no way the cause of sin, than by a new phrase to call
God the cause of sin per accidens; since perpetual care must be taken by all sincere
Christians to speak according to what is prescribed, as Augustine admonishes, book 10, de
Civitate Dei, ch. 13, 243, and to abstain from suspect phrases. Whence the gravest
theologians have deservedly prescribed and exploded this phrase from theology. Add, that
this signification of cause per accidens is not received by the common calculation of
philosophers, but is plainly rejected by some, and by others is deemed improper. It is
therefore better not to apply the term to theological matter, concerning the formal concept
of which there is not even agreement among the philosophers themselves, than by that
application to prejudge the theologians and to press the thumb for the heretics. Finally, a
cause per accidens in this explanation is said to be at least an equivocal cause, just as a wax
saw is called a saw, and a deflowered virgin is called a virgin. What then does it help to
employ this appellation of cause, so called equivocally, against the common opinion of
orthodox theologians, who piously decree that God is in no way the cause of sin; since by
this very thing, while cause is said equivocally, it is also implied that it is in no way truly a
cause, since "per accidens" denies, rather than affirms, according to that explanation?

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Let us here add the confession of Maccovius the Calvinist, who explains cause per accidens
in yet another way, but acknowledges that God is not the cause of sin per accidens; book 1,
Met., ch. 13, p. 130: "In voluntary [causes], a cause per accidens is this, when you produce
something for this end, that it may produce something other than what it afterwards
produces; and this very axiom is deduced from the definition, where it is said that a
voluntary cause per accidens acts beyond intention. But indeed Almighty God, what things
he produces, he produces them so that he wills to be the causes of those things which
follow them as effects; yet he himself is in no way the cause of sins, not even per accidens,
because they do not happen beyond his intention; for what things happen beyond intention,
happen beyond expectation and to those who by no means think [it] (which argues
ignorance); nor [is he the cause] per se, because God is not the author of evil, as he most
clearly shows in his word." These things [says] Maccovius. And so much concerning this
theorem. Dr. Jac. Martini has pursued it ex professo in a peculiar treatise on the cause of sin,
part 1.

SECOND SERIES

Of Disjunct Affections, in which are Principal, Mediate [affections].

It will hardly be more convenient to propose these Mediate affections than according to the
order of united affections, since by their benefit they are enunciated concerning Being. By
this method it will be permitted not only to investigate more successfully the formal concept
of the affections, but it will also be easier for the novice to comprehend by memory the
number, order, and nature of the disjunct affections, and finally their relation to the united
[affections]. Moreover, they mediate either from the primary or the secondary united
[affections]. And of the latter, both the absolute and the relative. As absolutes, by reason of
perfection, Being is called 1. Complete or Incomplete; by reason of Unity, if considered
ἁπλῶς [haplōs, “simply”], it is denominated 2. Simple or Composite Being; if συγκρητικῶς
[sugkrētikōs, “by comparison”], 3. The Same or Diverse. As relatives, by reason of Truth it is
denominated 4. Natural or Artificial Being; by reason of Goodness, 5. Finite or Infinite. When
the secondary united affections mediate, Being is denominated from Duration 6. Successive
or Permanent; but from Ubiety [location], 7. Circumscribed or Uncircumscribed.

CHAPTER XVI. Of the Complete and the Incomplete.

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We have said that from perfection results the denomination of Complete and Incomplete,
which those who have recognized that the perfection of things is either terminated in itself
or ordained to the complement of another will readily admit. Hence the denomination of
complete and incomplete.

I. Complete is that which has an essence terminated in itself by its own nature.

Here complete is taken not participially, for that which has been completed by another
completing [thing], whether effectively or constitutively, but nominally, for everything which
has a terminated being in itself, whether it be through itself, or has received the same from
another. Moreover, here complete is not the same as consummated or perfect or whole,
although elsewhere it may be equivalent to these. For not everything consummated and
perfect is complete; nor is every complete [thing] a part, as genera are complete, not parts,
since they are directly in a predicament, and are usually apprehended by the mode of a total
Being. But there are two requirements of the Complete. The prior is affirmative, or that it
have an essence terminated in itself, not indeed by the finitude of Essence, but by the
absolute concept of essence, which the latter negative [requirement] explains: that it not be
ordained to the perfection of another, namely essentially and per se. Hence God, although
he is ordained to constituting the θεάνθρωπον [theanthrōpon, “God-man”], ought not to
come under the name of incomplete Being, because he is both terminated in himself, and
does not lose the intrinsic terminus which he had before the union; nor does he obtain of
himself an essential habitude to human nature; indeed, he in no way depends on humanity,
either in being or in some mode of being. Cf. Suárez, disp. 33, sect. 1, n. 12. Thus every
species and every whole is a complete Being, namely in being. But what the Complete in
subsisting is, the special part will reveal.

II. Incomplete is that which does not have an Essence terminated in itself.

Therefore, it is essentially ordained to the complement of another, and so [is] every

integrating part actually such, and every essential part, whether in act or in aptitude. An
Incomplete is otherwise usually constituted in three ways: Hyperphysical, which is
incomplete in such a way that it can still exist separately, as is the rational soul; which is
called incomplete only relatively, yet truly. For by natural destination it completes human
being; which potency it retains even in the state of separation. This potency is not logical, or
non-repugnance (as water separated from a river has a potency to union with that
remaining mass, and yet on that account cannot be called incomplete), but positive and

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physical, of propensity and dependence. Which propensity indeed of the separated soul to
the body is from nature, but it cannot be completed through nature, but only by divine
power, as will happen in the future resurrection of the dead. Therefore, a distinction must be
made between appetite and its complement. We say the former is physical; the latter we
believe from Scripture to be plainly hyperphysical. 2. There is given a Physical Incomplete,
which likewise can exist separately, as are matter and material form. 3. Logical, as difference.
For since difference cannot be apprehended otherwise than by the mode of adjacency and
essentially completing another, it is truly called incomplete.

Corollaries

I. Incomplete is a name of imperfection.

For it implies dependence on another, and has the concept of Part. Hence, therefore, it is
not of as great perfection as Complete Being obtains, and so σχετικῶς [schetikōs,
“relatively”] it is called a name of imperfection.

II. Out of two completes one per se is not made.

1. Which are of diverse nature. For two completes of one nature (in a similar
whole) can constitute one. 2. Understand [this] of completes absolutely and
in subsisting, not of those complete only in being. For these can still conduct
themselves as act and potency.

CHAPTER XVII. Of the Simple and the Composite.

What the Simple is, what the Composite, and what are the distinctions of Composition, as
well as the consequent denomination of part (component) and whole (as composite), will
have to be explained.

I. Simple is that which has an indivisible Entity. Composite [is] that [which has a]
divisible [Entity].

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Simple is said as if without fold [plica] or complication of diverse things. For it is of indivisible
Entity; nor can it be resolved into many, namely which are essentially inferior, or as
incompletes absolve one complete, and taken separately are really distinguished from that
into which it is resolved. Therefore, composite will be that which consists of many, into
which it can be resolved. Moreover, Simplicity is either absolute or restricted. Absolute can
be understood either precisely or positively. The former expresses indivisibility of
abstraction, and is of those things which in themselves are not composite, yet can enter into
the constitution of others; of which sort Simplicity is in the Transcendentals. The latter is
indivisibility of perfection, which excludes all composition, nor can it come into the extrinsic
constitution of others; in which way God alone is most simple. Restricted Simplicity is that
which is in a certain genus of Being, in a genus of Being, I say; for that which in the genus of
bodies is defined by negation of mixture is rather a certain composition than simplicity. But
here distinct component things, or many parts really diverse concurring into one, are still
denied. And it is attributed to spiritual substances, and also to incomplete accidents, and to
ultimate differences. Scaliger makes a threefold Simple: Highest, Lowest, and Middle. The
Highest simple is that which is in need of nothing, as God. The Lowest, that which is in need
of all, as Matter. The Middle is of a middle nature, as Angels and the souls of Men, which
with respect to bodies are simple inferiorly, [but] with respect to God composite superiorly.

II. Composition is either properly so called, or improper.

Improper Composition is: 1. Accidental Composition, which is of Subject and Accident, or of

accident and accident. 2. Intellectual Composition, as that which [is] from being and
essence, from genus and difference.

Proper [Composition] is the union of distinct [things] mutually excluding each other. And it
is: in finite substances, from nature and suppositum; or specifically in corporeal
[substances]; and this either of the whole from matter and form, or of the part, namely of
matter from integrating parts.

Here composition does not designate an extrinsic act of the efficient [cause], but an intrinsic
[act] of the constituent terms; and it is, as it were, a simultaneous position or conjunction of
many [things] constituting one third [thing]. And therefore it is properly defined [as] the
union of distinct [things] mutually excluding each other. And accordingly these are the
requirements for real composition: 1. That the component terms be real. 2. [That they be]
really distinct. 3. Which regard each other as act and potency. Real, since of a non-Being
there is no affection. Really distinct: For if they were not really distinguished, the

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composition would not be real, but of reason. Composition is, as it were, a union of many
[things]. But if these many are not really distinguished, assuredly they will not be many
really. Finally, the concept of act and potency is required for union, as was said where we
dealt with union. Hence from act and potency there does not arise a certain special
composition, but it only diffuses itself through all the modes of composition, insofar as in all
[of them] something can be noted which is determining, and something determinable.

Therefore, improper are: 1. Accidental Composition, which is when many things are
conjoined into one per accidens, of which sort is the composition from subject and accident,
and the concourse of diverse accidents in the same subject. 2. Intentional or rational
composition, when the component terms are distinguished only by reason. By Mendoza it is
defined [as] a cognition composing and conjoining two objects distinguished by reason, from
which a third results. Accordingly, this composition does not require that things [be]
composed objectively, that is, of themselves and apart from the operation of the mind; but
[it is] concerning formal inadequate concepts, or concerning our cognition. And therefore
the component terms are called parts of the thing, not on the part of the object, but on the
part of our cognition, which, since it is too imperfect, cannot penetrate at the same time the
object and all its intrinsic predicates. Therefore, although those terms are real (for they are
truly and really predicated of real Beings), yet they must not differ really, and therefore
cannot be separated. Some call this composition real, not in the genus of composition, but in
the genus of Being, because such a composition is truly an act of the intellect; [but] it is
more appropriately called virtual. Of this sort is: 1. Composition from being and essence.
Insofar as in any things I distinctly conceive that by which they are, from that which they are;
or as others understand it, essence (as possible) from existence (or actual essence). Yet in
the thing itself they are one and the same. 2. From genus and difference, because every
species consists of a broader and an equal concept. For this composition belongs to a thing
at least on the part of the concept. For on the part of the thing nothing is contractible, since
everything that is, is singular. And therefore genus, as universal, is not in things. Hence it is
gathered that the potentiality which is attributed to genus in relation to difference does not
belong to it by reason of the thing, but in abstraction through the intellect. And it is
confirmed: Whatever things on the part of the thing are really one and the same, of them
one cannot be in potency to the other, nor can one contract the other. But genus and
difference on the part of the thing are really the same. Nor is there more perfection in one
than in the other, insofar as they are on the part of the object. But because the intellect
distinguishing even those things which are really distinct, one is prescinded from the other,
considering the thing as perfectible and contractible, and the same under another concept,
as it perfects and contracts. And therefore the difference is said to perfect the genus not
objectively, but through the intellect. Wherefore composition from genus and difference
does not argue imperfection in the Object, but only in our mode of conceiving. 3. From
nature and suppositum. This composition, as it is considered in abstraction, and generally

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likewise does not infer diversity on the part of the thing; since even in God we can consider
nature and suppositum or person; yet in created [things], and in species it absolves the
species of real composition, since the terms are really distinct, which is evident from
separability. For supposit-ness can be separated from nature, of which we have an example
in the mystery of the incarnation; since human nature is destituted of its proper personality.
But these things will be better understood from the special part of Metaphysics. 4. From
subject and attributes, which again is to be understood in abstraction. For where attributes
are accidents really distinct from the subject, accidental composition results. But when
transcendental and eminent attributes are compared with their subject, they are
distinguished only by the work of reason; and therefore, if composition is to be conceived, it
will have to be called merely intentional. Likewise, finally, 5. From attribute and attribute. For
when in an Essence I think diverse attributes, or represent the same essence by diverse
inadequate concepts, there is given a certain cognition composing and conjoining [things]
which are distinguished at least by a distinction of concepts. But all these modes are
improper. The proper modes of Composition are those noted in the previous Theorem, such
as are: in finite composite substances, from nature and suppositum, concerning which [we
have] already spoken. But specifically in corporeal [substances], both as they are considered
totally, and as partially; by reason of matter, there is composition from matter and form;
here from integrating parts. The former infers an Essential whole, the latter an integral
whole. But those things will be established from the nature of the whole as well. Concerning
which [we] must now treat.

III. A whole is that which has parts due to it. And it is either Common or Singular.
Common, both Essential and integral. Essential, which consists of parts
constituting the whole Essence. Integral, which consists of quantitative parts.
Singular is a personal and sacramental whole.

Composition infers component terms. These are also usually indicated [as] parts, just as the
composite itself [is indicated as] a whole. Moreover, whole is said in many ways. Therefore,
there is usually enumerated: 1. A perfectional whole, which [is] whole without parts, as God.
2. Potential, which contains many potencies in itself, as the soul by reason of its faculties. 3.
Universal, which contains inferiors under itself, by the mode of essential attribution, as
genus and species. 4. Numeral, which consists of many units, as number. But all these come
under the name of whole only equivocally. For the perfectional [whole] excludes parts. But
not the lack of parts, but the union of parts gives essence to the whole. For the individual
perfections only express the essence. Therefore, Plato was entirely unwilling to call God
something whole, because it seems to imply something of imperfection. The potential
[whole] implies many faculties, which likewise do not have the concept of parts. But if
something is denominated a whole by reason of diverse faculties, why is the soul not called

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a potential whole, by reason of diverse habits, which are the acts of the powers? And in
truth this whole is simple in itself, nor is it called a whole for any other reason than that,
since it produces many operations, we gather the first [acts] from the second acts, and
consequently in that thing truly simple in itself we conceive [parts]. Add that this
denomination is too material, which is derived from the powers. From the diversity of
materials the constitution of the whole ought not to be derived. The universal [whole]
actually includes no parts, nor is it distinguished from those which it virtually embraces both
as to all and to each really. But a whole properly so called differs really from any of its parts.
Moreover, species are said to be subjective parts by reason of genus, and Individuals by
reason of species, because they are subjected to them, and because they embrace these by
their scope. An Arithmetical or numeral whole is not a Being per se, but per accidens. And
therefore likewise it is called a whole improperly. Therefore, having removed those which
are said equivocally, the proper concept of whole is completed by these two [things]
according to Thomas: 1. That it be constituted by parts. 2. That the parts be united in the
whole, which [is] manifest from the preceding theorem. Moreover, a whole is in a twofold
difference: Singular and common. This, which we say is in nature, is: 1. Essential, which
consists of essential parts or principles completing the whole essence, so that with one part
removed the whole is removed. This is properly said of a natural body, which consists of
matter and form; they call it a Physical whole. But improperly also of a Metaphysical whole,
which they say consists of genus and difference, likewise of act and potency, as
predicamental species consist of genus and difference, an angel of act and potency. Since
there the concept of part does not have a place, I think that these are referred to an
essential whole only improperly. 2. Integral, which consists of quantitative parts, as was said
of a composite, which was of this kind. Others say that an integral whole is made either
through continuation, as in the human body; or through contiguity, as in the world; or
through contact, as in a house; or through order, as in an army; to which add that which is
through subordination, as in an integral analogous whole, which consists of intensive parts,
as they say, subordinate to each other, in which way Philosophy comes under the name of
whole. But since all the rest imply something per accidens, only the first is properly called a
whole, in which the parts are united by the mode of continuity. And this whole is either one
in genus or nature, ὁμιομερὲς [homiomeres] and ὁμοειδὲς [homoeides], which has the
same description of essence with its parts; therefore its parts are said to be similar, as any
part of water is and is called water; or ἀνομοιομερὲς [anomiomeres], as the parts of the
human body: Heart, Liver, Head. Scal., book 1, de Plant., p. 168, calls it a consimilar and
condissimilar whole; Arist., book 2, de gen. Animal., ch. 1, an inorganic and organic whole. A
singular whole is what is proposed to us in Scripture, where we especially observe a twofold
[whole]: Personal, which is Christ the θεάνθρωπος [theanthrōpos, “God-man”], and
Sacramental, as that whole which in the Sacrament consists of celestial and terrestrial
matter. Concerning which [things, see] the Theologians. Where nevertheless it must be
observed that these ought to be explained only by analogy from the nature of a whole, nor

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are all things to be applied which are found in other modes. But rather those things which
elsewhere are found [to be] imperfections must be prescinded.

IV. A part is what constitutes a whole.

Because relatives define each other mutually, from the nature of the whole it is easily
obvious to anyone what and of how many kinds a part is. Hence to a perfectional whole
perfections correspond; to a potential whole, faculties; to a universal whole, subjective
parts; to a numeral whole, units, which have the role of parts. But improperly. To an
essential whole, essential parts; to an integral whole, integral parts; to a proper [whole]
extensively, to an analogous [whole] intensive [parts] are attributed. But these things are
manifest.

Corollaries

I. Whatever is, is either simple or composite.

For everything that is, is one; but unity expresses indivision. But an undivided Entity is either
an indivisible undivided or a divisible undivided. The former is called absolutely simple, the
latter composite. Therefore, simplicity is the highest degree of unity. But composites do not
attain that degree of unity. Accordingly, unity is more sublime in the simple than in the
composite. And furthermore, the simple is more perfect than the composite. For united
power is nobler; and the more something approaches that highest unity, the more perfect it
is. Add that simple is said [of that] which is without fold [plica] of diverse things. But that is
most perfect which is by itself alone, and does not consist of others; as pure act, which lacks
all passive potency, is most perfect on account of that simplicity. On the contrary, composite
is a name of multiple imperfection; for it implies dependence, both extrinsic, on the efficient
[cause], since no composite is from itself; and intrinsic, both that which is mutually between
the parts, by which one of the parts depends on the other; and that which is of the whole
composite on the constituent or component parts. But this is to be understood absolutely
and in the genus of Being, not definitely, by reason of bodies. For composite bodies can be
more noble than simple [bodies], as mixed [bodies] than Elements. But a composite Being is
never of that perfection which is found in a simple Being.

II. The simple is prior to the composite.

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For the simple either enters into the constitution of the composite, or is its efficient cause.
Therefore, if not of time, at least it obtains a priority of nature. Thus the Elements are prior
by nature to the natural body, whose constitution they themselves enter into. God is prior to
created things, of which he is the efficient cause, etc.

III. The supremely simple is devoid of all composition, the rest are in their own way
composite.

I remove from the supremely simple Being Composition: 1. Real. 2. Of reason, if it imports
any imperfection; since on account of its perfection it excludes all composition and all
imperfection. Therefore, God is not composed of matter and form, or of quantitative parts,
since not even these modes of composition are appropriate to intelligences. Not of nature
and suppositum, insofar as these import a certain imperfection and real composition. For
whatever things truly compose a thing, it is not repugnant that they be separated from each
other. But in God there is nothing which can be separated from God. Wherefore, although
the denomination of nature is attributed to God, and in the Deity distinct persons are
asserted, yet no real composition from nature and suppositum is to be imagined in God.
Since a divine person is supremely simple, and in no way composite, partly because there
the property has passed into a perfect real identity of the divine essence; partly because the
divine essence of itself is simply in ultimate actuality. Much less is composition from subject
and accident, or from accident and accident, to be attributed to God. For an accident cannot
be appropriate to a thing apart from mutation. But God is immutable. An accident is of a
diverse essence from its subject. But nothing is in God which is of a diverse Essence from
God. Otherwise God would not be one, except per accidens. For every accident supervenes
on a thing constituted in its being; and therefore it infers an accidental and per accidens
unity. Moreover, as to the composition of reason, which of itself infers no imperfection, I do
not see why the same cannot fall upon a supremely simple Being. For what else is a
composition of reason than a representation of a thing one and simple in itself in diverse
concepts? Which assuredly argues imperfection not of the thing, but of our intellect. Thus
when our mind in a supremely simple Being, as it were, divides that which is of the
quidditative concept, and the rest, which do not pertain to the quidditative concept, just as
that division is not of the thing, but of reason, so also the composition is supposed not real,
but of reason. Our mind could not divide those things, unless they were conjoined in the
thing itself. But when they are conjoined in one most simple [thing], they cannot be really
distinct. Wherefore nothing prevents me from forming a quidditative and synonymous
concept of a supremely simple Being, and also an attributive and paronymous concept; and
by the former precisely representing the very quiddity, but by the latter [representing] what

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according to our mode of understanding is, as it were, consequent to the quiddity itself.
Furthermore, since one concept is not included in the other, it is necessary to conceive
distinctly even the attributes of a most simple Being; indeed, it is also permitted to represent
distinctly the quidditative concepts, common and proper, inadequate and adequate. For as
there one attribute is distinguished from another, so here the common quidditative concept
must be distinguished from the proper, on account of the distinct cognition. There, there is a
composition of concepts from attribute and attribute; here likewise there is a composition of
reason, which they call from genus and difference. For genus has a peculiar concept,
difference also a peculiar [concept]. The concept of difference is outside the concept and
nature of the genus; but from this no imperfection is inferred in the Object. For those things
which in the object are really the same, and of which one is not outside the nature of the
other, indeed it is necessary that they can be evolved by a distinct cognition. But a distinct
cognition of a thing does not import any imperfection in the object which is known.
Moreover, a composition of reason is only an extrinsic denomination. Therefore, of itself it
does not import any imperfection in the denominated object. The consequence is evident,
since extrinsic denominations infer no mutation in the object.

The antecedent is proved, because a composition of reason so denominates a thing that

nevertheless it is outside it, and therefore merely extrinsically. For the object on its own part
does not have a composition of reason, and therefore is not composed through the intellect.
For it implies that some composition or distinction is of reason, and yet is not in the thing
understood. For there formally is a composition of reason, where there is a distinction of
concepts. But that is only in the intellect. But more about these things elsewhere. But as to
what I say in the Corollary, that the rest, besides the supremely simple Being, are in their
own way composite, this is plain per se. For what is not supremely simple, is at least
relatively [secundum quid] simple; and therefore is in some way composite. Thus Spiritual
Substances, although they are absolved from matter and quantitative parts, yet not from all
composition; for they are composed from nature and suppositum, from act and potency.
Simple material Substances, although they are not composed of Elements, yet are composed
of matter and form, etc.

IV. Distinction does not argue composition.

For composition requires that one of the component parts be outside the other. But some
[things] distinct among themselves even by a real distinction do not have that condition,
that one of them is outside the other. Therefore, some [things] really distinct among
themselves can be given in one without composition. Furthermore, every real composition
consists of parts or divisible extremes; and vice versa, whatever cannot be separated from

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each other, these do not infer any composition. But there are given certain [things] really
distinct of one numerical essence, which are simply inseparable. Therefore, those imply no
composition. The truth of the assumption is established from the mystery of the Most Holy
Trinity. For there are given three persons really distinct from each other; but since one is in
the other through a mutual περιχώρησιν [perichōrēsin, “mutual indwelling”], nor can one be
outside the other, and therefore one is inseparable from the other, or the rest, on account of
the common undivided essence; since they are so many, and so really distinct, that that
plural and real distinction is rooted in a most simple essence, supremely one; indeed, so that
those many and distinct persons are not really distinguished from that most simple and most
united essence. Accordingly, just as a community of essence does not take away simplicity,
so a distinction and plurality of persons does not infer composition. Finally, if simplicity is not
overthrown by distinction, assuredly neither will distinction infer composition, ἀλλήλων
[allēlōn, “mutually”]. But the antecedent is true. For whatever of itself does not import an
Entitative division, this as such does not undermine the simplicity of a thing. For simplicity is
preserved, while an Entitative indivisibility is preserved. But a real distinction does not of
itself import an Entitative division, since it is also given between those things which are
mutually incommunicable to each other, however much they are of the same essence. But
those assuredly are really distinct. Therefore, a real distinction does not undermine the
simplicity of God; accordingly, neither does it infer composition.

V. The whole is not a part, and vice versa.

It is true of an essential, integral, or analogous and singular whole. For a whole is that which
consists of parts. But the same cannot enter into the composition of itself. But the concept
of a Universal whole is different. For a Universal whole communicates its essence to the
parts; and the subjective parts essentially imbibe the nature of the Universal whole. For
example, a genus communicates itself to the species; the species imbibe the generic nature.
The same genus is predicated of the species essentially. Hence it is clear that an essential
and integral part cannot be the genus of its whole. For a part of this kind is not the whole,
nor can it be predicated of the whole in the nominative case and essentially. Accordingly,
Bellarmine very badly defines a Sacrament [as] that which is a thing subjected to the senses,
as the visible element, which is at least the other part of the Sacrament; [and] occupies the
place of the genus, just as if I wanted to describe Christ [as] that he is human nature, since
human nature is only the other part. Let the same be the judgment concerning the
definition of the Zwinglians, by which they describe a Sacrament through a visible sign.

VI. What is not of any part, cannot be attributed to the whole.

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Distinguish predicates which belong to the whole formally and as such, insofar as it is
contradistinguished from the parts, from predicates which belong [to it] materially, insofar
as it consists of parts, and really does not differ from the parts taken together and united.
Predicates of the former kind, of a whole properly taken, pertain to its definition and
concept, and therefore cannot be attributed to the parts. Thus it is said of the whole, that it
consists of many parts, that it is greater than its part, etc., which cannot be said without
absurdity of any part of the whole. Predicates of the latter kind belong to the whole on
account of the parts, or some part, and therefore necessarily also belong to either or both
parts. For that on account of which each thing is such, is itself more such. Accordingly, the
Calvinists can be urged by this principle, when they assert that exaltation is appropriate to
Christ, to explain: to which nature does exaltation belong? They indeed equivocate, and stop
at the person. But since the person is not a third something really distinct from the natures,
it is necessary that we descend to the natures, and discern: whether by reason of both
natures, or by reason of one or the other nature, and if this, whether by reason of the divine
nature or by reason of the human nature, exaltation is ascribed to Christ.

VII. With an essential part removed, an essential whole cannot remain.

It is evident from the nature of an essential whole; whence the Calvinists falsely make the
breaking of bread an essential part of the Holy Supper, when they confess that with the
same omitted the Holy Eucharist remains entire. Maccovius, book 1, Met., ch. 5, p. 24, says
that the breaking of bread is an integral part of the Supper, insofar as it is taken broadly not
only for the signs and the thing signified, but also for the ceremonies which Christ instituted
and willed to be observed, because the integrity of the ceremonies consists in this, that
Christ gave thanks, that he broke the bread, that he distributed the broken bread; if,
therefore, something of these is omitted, the ceremony used and commanded by Christ will
not be entire. But that broad acceptance by which the name of the Supper embraces all the
ceremonies does not pertain to this; because the question is concerning the essence of the
Sacrament, whether the breaking of bread conduces to its integrity. What, therefore, do the
accidental ceremonies have to do with the matter, where the essence of the thing is inquired
into? In a similar way someone could say that the preceding benediction, or the instruction
concerning Christ, conduces to the integrity of Baptism, if the word baptism is taken broadly,
as it is accustomed to embrace the ceremonies applied; [or that] the accidents conduce to
the integrity of man, if the word man is taken broadly, as it comprehends not only the
essence, but also the accidents, and therefore the accidents are integral parts of man. Most
ineptly! But as to [the fact] that the breaking of bread pertains to the ceremonies
commanded by Christ, conducing to the integrity of the Holy Supper, this is a petitio principii

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[“begging the question”] which Maccovius supposes; who does not see [that he] shamefully
begs the question! And if it pertains to the integrity of the Supper, how will the same be
entire in the Calvinist churches, [which are] omitting it? If it was commanded by Christ, and
indeed as a Ceremony equally pertaining to the integrity of the Supper as the distribution
and eating, why is it omitted by them, and how will they have the entire Eucharist without
the same, which certainly, considered essentially, does not consist in the bare sign and
signified, but requires the sacramental acts instituted and commanded by Christ as
necessary?

VIII. Where the whole is, there all its parts must necessarily be.

Again, [this] is to be understood of an essential and integral whole, and indeed of the
principal integrating parts. Similarly, of a whole which we call singular, because it imitates
the nature of an essential whole. But not of a Universal whole. For a genus can be preserved
in one species, a species in one Individual. But an essential whole cannot be without the
parts constituting the essence. Indeed, it is of the concept of a whole properly so called, that
it is one through the union of parts. Where, therefore, there is no union of parts, there the
concept of the whole expires. But union cannot be preserved when one part is disjoined by
place from the other. For things which are separated and distinguished locally, cannot be
said to be united, since union is terminated at one undivided [thing]. But separated [things]
cannot constitute one undivided [thing]. And so neither [can they constitute] a whole.
Which is to be observed against the Zwinglians denying that the whole Christ is everywhere,
so that the human nature of Christ is not everywhere, but only the Deity. But certainly the
Deity alone is not the whole Christ; and wherever the Deity alone is, so that the humanity is
not present there, there certainly Christ cannot be present. For Christ is θεάνθρωπον
[theanthrōpon, “the God-man”], nor is Christ without his humanity. Where the Deity alone
is, there the λόγος [logos, “Word”] is, not ἔνσαρκος [ensarkos, “incarnate”], but ἄσαρκος
[asarkos, “without flesh”]. And so we will have an ἄσαρκον λόγον [asarkon logon, “fleshless
Word”] present, but not Christ θεάνθρωπον [theanthrōpon, “the God-man”]. Absurd!
Wherefore that [saying] of Alsted, Encycl., book 11, part 1, ch. 24, will also be absurd: “Not
the whole of Christ, but the whole Christ is everywhere.” He very badly misuses the
distinction of Damascene, which is found in book 3, Orthodox Faith, ch. 7, between ὅλον
[holon, “whole”] and πᾶν [pan, “all”]. For Damascene applies it to essence and essential
attributes, not to presence. I rightly say: “The whole man understands,” but not “the whole
of man”; but it is very badly said: “The whole man is present,” not “the whole of man.” For
where the whole man is, there all his parts must necessarily be present, for the reasons
adduced, which conclude so much the more efficaciously concerning Christ, as the personal
union is closer and more intimate than the natural [union], since it was made ἀδιαστάτως
[adiastatōs, “without interval”], ἀδιασπάστως [adiaspastōs, “without separation”],

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ἀδιαλύτως [adialutōs, “without dissolution”], ἀχωρίστως [achōristōs, “without division”],
and with a mutual and most intimate immanence and περιχώρησις [perichōrēsis,
“interpenetration”] of the natures. Nor can it be said that the union is only partial, since the
whole flesh is united to the λόγος [logos, “Word”], and the whole λόγος [logos, “Word”] is
united to the whole flesh totally. But it does not please Maccovius [to make] that distinction,
Theological Disputations, miscellaneous questions, year 1622, disp. 8, Coroll. 3: “The
expressions ‘the whole Christ’ and ‘the whole of Christ’ are plainly the same. Nor, therefore,
will that be true which some say: ‘This proposition, “The whole Christ is everywhere,” is
true. But this, “The whole of Christ is everywhere,” is not true.’ For both this and that are
false. For the whole Christ consists of divinity and humanity, and accordingly to say that the
whole Christ is everywhere is nothing other than to say that Christ, both according to
divinity and according to humanity, is everywhere.” And he cites Piscator, who says: “But to
this question it cannot be truly responded otherwise than thus: Christ is not whole
everywhere, but only in part of the Deity.” Which as all are compelled to confess, whoever
do not hesitate to set forth the opinions of [their] mind candidly from [among] the
Reformed, so anyone easily gathers from this what these men foster in [their] mind,
concerning the presence of Christ ἔνσαρκος [ensarkos, “incarnate”] in these lands, namely
that not θεάνθρωπον [theanthrōpon, “the God-man”], but λόγον ἄσαρκον [logon asarkon,
“the fleshless Word”] is present to us, with the flesh enclosed only within the celestial
gardens. For because Christ is present only in part of the Deity, the bare Deity will be
present, and accordingly ἄσαρκος [asarkos, “without flesh”]. For where [he] is not with the
divine nature human, but the divine nature alone is, there certainly the same is not
personally united to the humanity. Likewise, that figment of the Zwinglians is refuted by this,
which they invent, [namely] a Sacrament, of which one terrestrial part is here on earth,
where the Sacrament is administered, but the other celestial [part] in heaven. For in this way
the Sacrament here will not be whole, but only the terrestrial element. Accordingly, the
reception of the Eucharist will not so much be carried out on earth as in heaven; or if in both
places, it is necessary that those who enjoy the Sacrament be at the same time present on
earth and in heaven, and therefore be multipresent. Behold the multipresence of the
Reformed!

IX. That from a person and a nature diverse from that person a composite person
arises is not repugnant.

I add this for the sake of the Socinians. I say, a person (or being) in itself perfect, or its
nature determined by its own personality, together with another nature which, of itself and
naturally, exists beyond the rationale of that person, to constitute through some
composition or through the person itself, does not involve any contradiction. I prove it. 1. If a
person, perfect in itself, can elevate to its own subsistence a nature deprived of personality
without contradiction, certainly, there is no contradiction in a composite person being

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constituted from a person perfect in itself and a nature assumed by it. The reason for the
connection is that such an assumption implies a union: and union of different things implies
some composition. (At least the question remains: What will this composite be? I say a
composite person, because it no longer exists solely as an individual person outside of the
union, but because of the union, it engages with the assumed nature, and the whole
personal entity is constituted with it. There is no need to quarrel over names and terms
when the matter itself is clear.) But as we have proved, as noted in Cl.1.cap.4.th.9.pag.298.
Therefore, 2. A nature can bestow upon another nature of its own the subsistence and
existence. Therefore, it can with that other nature constitute a single entity. The
consequence is clear. For through this communication of subsistence, both natures subsist in
the same hypostasis, since there is a communication of the same subsistence through
participation. However, two natures cannot enjoy the same hypostasis unless they are
united: and by obtaining the same hypostasis they are reduced to one entity. The
antecedent is proven by some examples: Iron, in itself ἰδιοσόςατον (idiosyncratic), bestows
ἐνυποτάτῳ (substantial) existence to fire when it is ignited. Salt dissolved in water no longer
exists with its own subsistence but enjoys the subsistence of the water. I do not add more. If
you say that the nature of a person is different from the rest of the suppositions. I admit, as
far as the material is concerned. For a person is of a Jusar intellectual nature; however,
anything else is called idioso. But as far as the formal aspect is concerned, they completely
agree, since the incommunicability of existing is no less a formal reason for a suppositum as
it is for a person. Therefore, as far as the mode of existing is concerned, they agree, not
differ. And that is precisely what we are dealing with here. Crellius in his book "De uno Deo"
notes. Patr.f.2.cap.6. urges, On the essence of the suppositum and further on the person,
lest it becomes part of another. This would happen if, from nature and person, something
emerged. He thus argues: The person of the Son of God ceased to be a person when it
became part of Christ constituted from human and divine nature. Resp. denying the
consequence. Faith responds most simply: The hypostasis of the word became the
hypostasis of the flesh, so that the word remained what it was, and became what it was not;
that is: It is piously believed that the hypostasis, with the communication of the hypostasis,
as well as the immutability of the same, that the person ἐξ communicated itself to the
human nature, yet changed nothing, nor ceased to be a person, since it communicated the
hypostasis in such a way that it did not lose it. For this communication infers a common
participation in the same hypostasis by both natures in such a way: that one has this
hypostasis inherently and of itself, the other however by grace and because of the union.
When therefore the λόγος (logos) along with human nature constitutes a person, it does not
lose the nature of a person, or the incommunicability of existing, but rather makes it
common with the assumed nature. This is by no means contrary to the formal reason of a
person, incommunicability. For in such a communication, it does not end further in itself, but
rather, it ends in the nature to which it is communicated. How the separated soul, which in
this state is ἰδιος (unique), and properly called a person according to Crellius p. 37, in the
assumption of the body, communicates its own and with it completes a ύφιστάμενον

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σύνθετον (composite being), indeed one essence, yet Crellius would not say that the soul,
because of this communication, loses its incommunicability, and therefore subsistence,
because it does not end in itself further, but rather ends in the body, to which it is in turn
united. Therefore, it should be precisely noted: a suppositum is incommunicable, not with
respect to any nature to which it communicates itself, nothing prevents this, all things being
equal, but rather due to the reason of a certain existing being. The reason for this is clear,
because if it still communicated itself to other existing beings or persons, then certainly such
a communication would be to an end. But it contradicts that which is ultimately determined,
to be determined again, as such. However, we give this reason: Whatever communication
does not cause that which is communicated to be terminated by another and to receive the
ultimate substantial act from elsewhere, does not deny incommunicability, which is the
formal reason of a person. But the aforementioned communication does not do this. E. But
Crellius insists that through this communication, the person becomes a part of θεανθρώπου
(the God-man). This is contrary to the reason of a person; indeed, it should not be part of
another. Resp. A person is taken either for the λόγος (logos), which subsists with both the
divine and human nature of Christ; or for Christ himself, who consists of divine and human
nature. In the former sense, it cannot be said that the person of the λόγος is part of Christ's
hypostasis, which does not consist of the hypostasis of λόγος and the hypostasis of flesh;
both because such a composition, from two hypostases resulting in one hypostasis, is simply
impossible, and because the flesh does not have its own hypostasis distinct from the λόγος
hypostasis. But it is that very hypostasis of the λόγος, communicated really with the
assumed human nature. Nor is Christ something other from others, nor can the most perfect
hypostasis of the Father become part of another.

In the latter sense, it can be said, not precisely, but as a metaphor, that a part of the
θεανθρώπου or of the composite that consists of human and divine nature, is the person of
the λόγος or rather the divine nature itself: as the union is of natures. But it should be
observed: The term 'part' is used ambiguously. Firstly, it is taken properly, as what is
incomplete and constitutes part of the whole. Then, it can be analogically considered for
that which is complete in itself but because it constitutes some whole together with
another, without detriment to its own complete substantial existence, it is called a part, e.g.,
In the Republic or army, individual persons are parts of the whole body: yet a person does
not cease to be. A more illustrative example, and more suited to our present inquiry, is the
example of angels assuming some bodily form, resulting in some accidental unity: where it
certainly cannot be said that the angel ceases to be a person because of the assumption of
the body; even though it can analogically be called part of the whole that is constituted
accidentally. In this way and with this nuance of speaking, the person of the λόγος could be
said to be part of the composite; thus, it does not cease to be a person. Therefore, a person
cannot be part of another in such a way that it is terminated: as this is contrary to the nature
of a person. But neither is it terminated by the human nature, rather it terminates it.

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Therefore, if the λόγος is said to be a part, all imperfections must be excluded; such as: that
a part is something incomplete and by nature imperfect, which cannot at all be said of the
λόγος. Therefore, notably, Thomas in part.3.q.2. The composition of the person from natures
is not said due to the reason of parts, but rather due to the reason of number, as everything
that converges in two can be said to be composed from them, and thus the person is said to
be composite, inasmuch as one subsists in two. Here again, Crellius insists; such a personal
whole does not exist, because otherwise, there would be two persons in one person, one
part, the other whole; which vainly imagines a personal whole, which is not also essential.
True, it is not imagined, but observed; when another reason for the whole is observed,
which consists of two imperfect natures as essential parts of one complete nature and
essence; likewise, that which results from two complete and perfect natures; indeed, which
cannot be joined to the constitution of one essence, they constitute another person: This is
provided by Physics, that by Scripture, Both distinguish sound reason. A figment is not
needed. Furthermore, that a personal whole does not require the concurrence of two
persons in one person, which is simply contradictory and impossible, is clear from this; that
one can be the hypostasis of two natures, thus the whole person. Nor in such a person is
there another person, the whole itself, another part of the whole, which Crellius imagines,
but the λόγος who before the union subsisted, as a simple person, now by the union with
human nature has become a composite person. But the λόγος is not another person from
itself before and after: since the same hypostasis remains, even while it has become the
hypostasis of human nature. Then where there is the same substance, there in vain imagines
a double person, but we believe the same subsistence of both natures; that is, two natures
are united, and concur to the constitution of one through and for the common simple
identity of both. Moreover, it is absurd to distinguish a person from a person, as a person
and a person, just as if distinguishing between the suppositum of iron and the suppositum of
ignited iron; indeed, much more absurdly: because according to our opinion, there is not
some third thing resulting from two natures; not ἐξ ἑτέρων ἕτερον (something other from
others), but ἐξ ἑτέρων τα αυτά (the same from others). Furthermore, whether a person is
taken for the subsistence, which is common to both natures, or for the whole that consists
of two natures, in neither sense do we admit two persons; nor can it be deduced with strong
and clear consequence from our opinion. For in the former sense, we say: there is one
hypostasis, which is both the λόγος and the hypostasis of human nature. In the latter case, a
person is nothing other than two natures. Finally, if the opponent still insists, he achieves
nothing, unless perhaps, that the person of the word, as it is considered abstractly, differs
formally from the whole or composite, although such an abstract consideration is
completely futile, since the λόγος does not exist in isolation. But even granted such
consideration: does it immediately infer the diversity of persons? Further, in the same
chapter, Crellius disputes that the human nature is part of the person of Christ or the
composite. But no one among us denies this. But does it therefore follow that the λόγος is
not a person, because human nature is part of Christ? There is no consequence at all. That
is, we have from this Crellian discourse: that he does not yet understand what it means not

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to cease! Indeed; these men by understanding too much, make it so that Crellius
understands nothing! For firstly, he opposes himself that part is, and is predicated. Secondly,
the predicable accident is defined according to the Philosopher's intent (namely) that which
exists, not as a part, and can be absent from that in which it exists, joining part of the
definition of the predicamental accident, which opposes substance, with the particle of the
definition of the predicable accident, which also can be substance. From there, this is a
confused definition clearly clumsy and unskilled, as even known in the trivium. But to finally
reveal his acumen, he poses our similar question about ignited iron: h.m. Fire with iron
either constitutes one suppositum or not. If this, the example is used in vain. If that, the
absurd remains, iron without that fire is no longer a suppositum in itself: because otherwise,
the suppositum would be part of the suppositum. Resp. Even if iron and fire do not
constitute one suppositum, yet the similarity is not used in vain to explain the composite
person of θεανθρώπου. For a similarity is not the same. Therefore, it would be enough, that
some one thing, at least accidentally, resulted from iron and fire, and that fire does not
subsist of itself, but has its subsistence in iron. But indeed, Crellius's proof is not of such
weight as to demonstrate that iron with fire in no way constitutes one suppositum. For iron
without fire is a suppositum in itself, but simple: but ignited iron is a composite suppositum.
Simple suppositum being part of the composite suppositum, which is not absurd, from what
has been said, it is clear. We end here. See more on this in the examination of the book by
Joh. Crellius on the new Father p. 1834 ff.

CHAPTER XIII

On the Same and the Different.

First, the description and division of identity is set forth. Second, it is explained what are
different things? Finally, the modes of diversity and distinctions are unraveled.

I. Identity is a concurrence in something. And it is either extrinsic or intrinsic,

essential or suppositional.

In general, identity is described as a concurrence in something, whether it be essential, or

accidental, or it be a relation of reason at least, or real. Whence it comprehends not only
identity strictly so called, or essential, but also equality and similarity. Moreover, it
comprehends identity of reason, which they call absolute, by which the same is referred to
itself: and identity of thing or relative: by which many things have concurrence in some third

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thing. And this is further distributed into extrinsic and intrinsic. The extrinsic again into
causal, effective, subjective, and accidental. The extrinsic causal identity is that by which
many things concur in respect of the efficient or the end. The effective, by which they concur
by reason of the work or effect. Thus artists have identity by reason of the external work,
instruments by reason of the similar effect. They have identity, brothers by reason of
parents; students of the same faculty by reason of the end, etc. The subjective is the
concurrence in the same subject, as what exists among the accidents of the same subject,
thus the intellect and will are one subjectively. The accidental identity is the concurrence by
reason of quantity or quality. The former is called equality, the latter similarity. Thus a line is
said to be equal to a line, a color similar to a color.

The intrinsic identity, moreover, is either suppositional or essential. The suppositional is that
by which several natures concur by reason of the same suppositum or person, as in red-hot
iron, fire and iron are one suppositionally: In Christ, the divine and human natures are one
personally. The essential identity, then, is either by reason of the most simple Essence or by
reason of a composite Essence. In the most simple Essence, since there are not many things
except by essential identity, identity is said to be that by which many things are identified
with the same essence, as in transcendentals and mystics. There the many attributes are
identified with Being; Indeed, even the really distinct modes are the same in Being; as is
evident concerning the disjunct attributes or opposed modes; For cause and caused are
opposed modes, really distinct, yet they are essentially the same in Being. For the attributes
of Being are identified with Being itself.

Here, however, (in mystics) there is found also another singular identity, by which several
persons are identified with the same singular divine essence, as we demonstrate in
Theology. Therefore, those things which are essentially the same are not also really the
same, since a real distinction can be founded on essential identity.

By reason of a composite Essence, identity is that by which many things concur to constitute
intrinsically the essence of some composite thing: as rational and animal in man are
essentially the same. Others add a third mode of intrinsic identity: namely, real identity,
which they say belongs to those things one of which cannot be without the other without
contradiction, unless perhaps an external cause intervenes, nor is one in respect to the other
the originating and the other the originated, nor are they in really distinct things, see Gutk.

II. Diversity is the negation of concurrence.

We describe diversity negatively, since it does not occur how it can be described adequately
otherwise. For distinction is at least a certain mode of diversity. But if it is taken broadly, it
can be said that diversity is among those things which can be distinct or conceived as distinct

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without contradiction; or rather, which are distinct in themselves, or are conceived as
distinct. For diversity is taken here for any variety, by which also something is said to differ
from itself. Besides, diverse things in general are twofold: First, diverse and different. Those
are called which are distinguished entirely, as differences, also Individuals. For although
these agree in certain quidditative concepts, yet they lack that quidditative concept in which
they differ from each other, and therefore do not properly deserve to be called differences.

For speaking accurately, not only are those first diverse which do not agree in some essential
predicate by which they differ from others, but also those which indeed agree in some
predicate by which they differ from others, but lack the quidditative concept by which they
differ from each other, as Individuals of the same species. Differences, however, are those
which agree in something, in something differ quidditatively? As a natural body and an
angel, or other different species. Among species diverse, some are with conflict, others
without conflict: as will now be evident. For...

III. Diversity is either of distinction or of opposition; Distinction is that by which one

concept is not another. And it is either real or notional. The real is that by which
the objective concept is other than the objective concept. The notional, by which
the formal concept is other than the formal concept, although the objective
concept coincides.

Philosophers establish diversity not only among repugnant things, but also among those
which, by themselves and as such, do not imply a certain repugnance. And that these may
be better discerned, they call the former opposites, or rather repugnant, the latter distinct.

But if they propose any subject in Metaphysics intricately and perplexedly, certainly they
render this most intricate; so that I know not by what fate confusion reigns in the distinction;
and those things which seem to be unraveled are, as it were, studiously involved: Hence
some constitute two modes of distinction: that according to the thing, and that according to
reason; others three; real, of reason, and from the nature of the thing, or formal.

In the explanation, moreover, of the modes of distinction some regard the nature of the
extremes, whether they are real things, or things of reason? Others respect the relation and
affinity of the same. Whether they differ from each other by reason alone or really? Various
authors describe real distinction variously, almost every one devising a singular description.
Thus in the subdivision of real distinction you might count authors more easily than
opinions. Moreover, what is the distinction of reason? In what way are things distinct by
reason? How manifold is the distinction of reason? And many other things.

Concerning these, I say, Scholastic Doctors differ greatly.

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We dispatch the matter in fewest words. We therefore lay down that distinction, abstractly
and of itself, is that by which one concept is not another.

But since this is the foundation of the explanation, it is necessary to take up the matter more
deeply, and go back to the first principles. Now these, as is evident from Noology, so far as
the present purpose, are the primary and first principles.

1. It is impossible for the same thing in nature to be, and to be at the same time
confounded with others.

2. It is impossible for the same thing in our mind to be, and to be at the same
time confounded with others. For as God and nature, so also our mind abhors
all confusion. Wherefore all things whatsoever are in nature, are distinct from
one another; all things whatsoever are in the mind, are represented
distinctly: so that as the distinction of objects outside the intellect infers that
one is not the other, this is not that: So the distinction of notions and
noёmata [concepts] in the intellect likewise requires that one be not the
other.

Hence it is clear that to the formal reason of distinction in the abstract it pertains that one is
not the other either in nature or in the intellect. Wherefore since distinction extends so
widely, it is evident that the extremes of distinction ought to be designated by such a term
as comprehends under its extent whatever is anywhere given, or can be conceived: Such is
the term concept. For it is the common usage of Philosophers to express by the word
concept, both any object whatever, τὸ νοητὸν [the intelligible], and the Noёma [concept]
itself, or εἴδωλον νοητικὸν [intelligible image].

Hence they are accustomed to constitute a twofold concept, Objective and Formal. In
general, therefore, all distinction turns upon concept, and so it is rightly described: that one
concept is not another: whether objective or formal.

Whence I infer that the distinction of the reasoning reason, which they commonly call, is
said μυθικῶς [mythically]. For in such a distinction scarcely, if at all, are there diverse formal
concepts, e.g. when Synonyms (Grammar) are distinguished: Also the defined and the
definition, etc. It must therefore be said; that there are two modes of distinction, according
to the thing and according to reason: or real and notional or formal. The former, by which
objective concepts are distinguished, the latter at least holds between formal concepts,
although the objective concept is the same.

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For either the objects are distinguished, or not. If the objects are distinguished, they are said
to be really distinguished; but if the objects themselves are not distinguished, the question
can be asked concerning the noёmata [concepts] and formal concepts, whether those are
distinguished or not? Or whether the same object is presented to the intellect under diverse
inadequate concepts, or not? If the formal concepts concerning one and the same object are
diverse, it is called a formal notional distinction, commonly the distinction of reasoned
reason, Barbarously!

But if not, that is, if not even diverse concepts are given, properly the distinction has no
place: yet commonly either on account of diverse names, or on account of any other
respect, a distinction is constituted, which they call a distinction of feigned reason, or of the
reasoning [reason].

These things being thus set forth, it is no longer obscure, 1. Whether the reason of
distinction is to be sought from the nature of the extremes, or from their mutual relation?
For that regard is not to be had to the reality of the extremes, but to the cognition and
affinity of the extremes, is evident from this: that for real distinction it is sufficient if the
objects are distinguished, whether those objects are Beings of reason and feigned, or
positive or privative, provided only the distinction of the same depends on the formal
concept of the intellect. Likewise: for distinction of reason it makes no difference whether
the object, concerning which reason forms distinct concepts, is real, and has its being
outside the intellect, or intentional and dependent solely on the intellect, or is positive or
privative, provided only that the same object is represented to the intellect under diverse
concepts.

3. In what consists the reason of real distinction, and likewise of the distinction
of reason? Briefly, real distinction is that by which the objective concept
(whatever that may be) is other than another objective concept. The
distinction of reason is that by which the formal concept is other than the
formal concept, the same object (whatever that may be) being represented
under those diverse concepts.

4. What things are distinguished really? What formally? Namely, real distinction
is 1. Between thing and thing, or between several diverse things: and that
whether they are supposita of the same species, as Peter and Paul, or
supposita of diverse species, as Alexander and Bucephalus; or they are
diverse genera, or diverse species, or other diverse Individuals: as Spirit and
body: or diverse bodies, and diverse accidents, etc: or finally diverse parts,
which in fact indeed are not separated, yet can be separated without
contradiction, as matter and form, etc.

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 2. Between mode and mode, or diverse modes, or also opposite relations: as
between cause and caused, act and potency. Thus among the subsisting
divine relations there is given a real distinction.

3. Between thing and mode of thing: as between nature and suppositality in

created things.

4. Between privations or negations, whether compared with positive things, or

mutually compared among themselves. Thus darkness and air differ really:
blindness and deafness, etc.

5. Finally, between Beings of reason: whether those are compared among

themselves, or with a real Being. E.g. subject and predicate, Chimera and
golden mountain: Tragеlaphus [fabulous monster] and man, etc.

Formal distinction is between diverse forms or reasons for conceiving the same thing. 1. In
general, concerning any object: In any object the intellect can form distinct inadequate
concepts, under which the object itself is represented, namely the generic concept and the
differential; or at least the common and the proper. Likewise it can conceive diverse faculties
or virtues, where in the thing itself there are not diverse virtues.

2. In particular, concerning a real object, or what has being outside the fiction of the mind,
by whatever name it may come, diverse concepts can also be formed either as the thing
itself, or as the modes of the thing, although in the object itself there is given no diversity.

3. More especially concerning the most simple Being, distinct concepts can be formed, by
which, both the attributes from the essence, and one attribute from another, also a person
and personal acts from the divine essence are discerned, the utmost simplicity of the
Essence remaining: Thus e.g. the Justice of God differs from His infinity: And omniscience
from Justice: And likewise Paternity or Filiation from the Essence of God. Also generation
and spiration from divine being, etc.

Nothing also prevents us from distinguishing a generic and specific concept in the divine
Essence, as was set forth before. Hence in God a composition is attributed of subject and

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attribute; of attribute and attribute: of nature and suppositum: of genus and difference; but
formal, not real.

There is a doubt concerning the diverse reason of the same thing in diverse disciplines, and
likewise concerning the diverse states of the same thing. How, for instance, God is
considered in Theology, Physics, Pneumatics: The object is the same: The disciplines are
diverse. Thus there is given a diverse state of λόγος [Word] as it is simple from eternity to
eternity; perceiving or animating in time without change or diversity of itself: Likewise the
attributes of God are considered either within the simple complex of divinity, or as they put
themselves forth outwardly, although they are the same.

Thus also the divine omniscience as it is essentially, and as it is communicated to the

humanity, by no means differs from itself, although it is considered diversely. In this matter I
say, that such diverse consideration, and diverse state of the thing: neither varies the object
itself, which is self-evident; nor generates another species in the intellect, besides the
representation of the thing itself, since the concept of that object remains the same, nor
does the intellect as it were partition distinct things in the thing itself, which is required for
the formal distinction: but that by pure or reasoning reason the same is distinguished from
itself, under another and another state, in another and another disciplinary seat, which do
not introduce a certain diversity into the objective concept, nor into the formal, other things
being equal: because they are as it were established outside the thing and its noёmata
[concepts].

What are the genuine indications of real distinction? What of formal distinction?

Various indeed are commonly constituted: But we note the most certain at least.

There are some general indications of real distinction, some special. The general are:

1. Diversity of Essence. For those things which have diverse Essences, those without
controversy are really distinguished.

2. Separability. Whatever things can be separated from each other without repugnance,
in any way, whether ordinarily, or extraordinarily, those differ really. For when they
are separated, one is without the other. But where one is without the other, there
certainly one is not really the other.

3. Opposition. Whatever things are opposite or disparate, those must be really distinct,
because opposition infers not merely that this is not that, but also that this is
repugnant to that.

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The special indications are these. Concerning substances, where there is given the relation
of producing and produced, there is given a real distinction. For at least they must differ by
supposita, among which such a respect is given. For those things which differ by supposita,
those certainly differ really.

Concerning accidents. Whatever accidents are distinguished from subjects, those are
distinguished really. For one accident cannot inhere subjectively in several subjects by
number.

We now note these indications of formal distinction.

1. Whatever things in the same predicamental series are subordinated to each other,
those are at least formally distinguished, because they differ only according to
inadequate concepts, as substance, body; living body, animate; sentient, man.

2. Whatever things differ by definition, those are at least formally distinguished. To

differ by definition is not to be understood as to sound and words, but as to sense,
and that which is expressed by words. For who would doubt that the same thing
formally not diverse can be described by other and other words? But where there is
a diverse definition, there is another formal reason, because definition is the λόγος
τῆς οὐσίας [expression of the essence]. Where, therefore, these are diverse, there at
least a formal diversity must be granted. Thus Action and Passion differ by definition,
and so are rightly said to differ formally. Thus the attributes of Being differ by
definition both from Being and from each other, and therefore cannot be essentially
the same in particular.

3. Whatever things are conceived in Being concerning the most simple Being, those are
formally distinguished, in so far as they do not imply a real opposition. As Essence,
independence, omnipotence, paternity, active generation, and others, in divine
things, which are not opposite to each other, etc.

IV. Real distinction is either absolutely [real] or analogically [real]. The absolutely
real is that by which one thing is not another. The analogically real is that which
holds between diverse modes besides the fiction of the mind, or by which one
mode is not another.

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Hence real distinction is commonly defined disjunctively, [as existing] either between a thing
and a thing, or between opposed modes, or Relations mutually incommunicable.

I call absolutely real distinction that which is first so called, namely, that which holds
between several Beings, or diverse things, or distinct Essences, in the way that Peter, Paul,
the Sun, the Moon, Gabriel, Raph Here is the continuation of the translation:

I call the absolutely real distinction that which is first so called, namely, that which holds
between several Beings, or diverse things, or distinct Essences, in the way that Peter, Paul,
the Sun, the Moon, Gabriel, Raphael, God, etc. differ. Likewise diverse accidents, as qualities,
quantities, etc.

According to what, and analogically we call distinct those things which differ from each other
as diverse modes: because this distinction is not so perceptible, nor is it so easily recognized
to be a real distinction, or rather; because only by analogy is attributed to modes, what
properly belongs to things or Beings; since modes are not properly Beings, but something of
Being.

Therefore, just as other attributes are adapted to modes only by analogy; so also real
distinction. Moreover, since modes are not of one genus, the distinction also which holds
among modes will not be of the same reason; which I explain thus.

Above all, it is necessary to note the difference of modes, which are either distinct at least,
or at the same time opposed. Modes of that kind are distinguished only by reason or
formally, in the way, e.g. Unity and Truth are distinct modes of Being, yet distinct only
formally, and by the work of reason, since they also belong to the most simple Essence
without indication of real distinction.

But cause and caused, principle and principled are opposed modes, and therefore really
distinct. Although therefore diverse modes as such do not at once import real distinction,
yet it ought not to be denied to any modes whatever; but this only follows thence, that the
reason of the distinction of diverse modes does not argue real distinction, unless those
diverse modes are at the same time opposed.

Keckermann therefore concludes wrongly, that whatever things differ, as diverse modes,
those do not differ really, but only modally, as modal distinction is contained under
distinction of reason or formal. For this is true only limitedly concerning those modes which
are diverse only, not however opposed.

Whence Keckermann is wrong in saying that the Persons of the Holy Trinity differ modally,
whereas the Persons of the Trinity, are modes both diverse and opposed, and mutually
incommunicable to each other. But where there is opposition, and incommunicability by
reason of the objective concept, there certainly is given another and another objective
concept; and therefore real distinction must be granted. For this very incommunicability of
several is.

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 V. Moreover, the real distinction is either merely real, or essential. The merely real
distinction is of those things which are of the same numerical Essence, but are
mutually incommunicable to each other. The essential distinction is of those
which have different Essences.

This is another division of real distinction: which others present under a “dichotomy”, adding
the suppositional distinction. But our dichotomy is preferable. For the suppositional
distinction is sometimes merely real, therefore not a distinct mode.

The merely real distinction is called that which occurs between those whose Essence is
numerically the same: but in such a way that they are nevertheless mutually
incommunicable to each other. Such merely real distinction exists in the most sacred
mystery of the Most Holy [Trinity] (τῆς παναγίας [of the most holy]). For the Persons of the
Holy Trinity are of the same numerical and singular divine Essence: But insofar as they are
distinguished by a personal characteristic, they are mutually incommunicable, so that one
Person is not the other due to its own hypostatic character.

In this mystery, therefore, the suppositional distinction is a merely real distinction. Some
indeed broaden the merely real distinction, so that it applies to all those which are
distinguished really in such a way that they still have an Essence, whether it is numerically or
specifically the same: just as accidents of the same species, and in general all Individuals of
the same species, could be said to be merely really distinguished: but only because they are
of the same specific Essence, although they may be found either in different subjects or
completed in different supposita (individuals).

But truly Metaphysics does not permit this broadened state. For whatever things are
distinguished essentially, those are not merely really distinguished, by way of opposition. But
supposita or accidents numerically diverse are distinguished essentially. Therefore, not
merely really.

I prove the assumed point: Whatever things have actually separate Essences, those must be
distinguished essentially. For if separability is one mark of distinction, why not actual
separation? But indeed, supposita or accidents numerically diverse have actually separate
Essences, as is clear. Therefore, supposita or accidents numerically diverse are distinguished
essentially, and not merely really.

Moreover, the essential distinction is defined as that which occurs between those which
have different Essences, whether actually separated or only separable without contradiction.
This again is either Generic, or Specific, or Numeric. They differ in Genus which are either in
different predicaments, or under different species of one Category, as a line and a habit.
Likewise a human and a stone, etc. They differ in Species which agree in the generic concept,

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but are distinguished by the specific form, and are opposed to each other, as a human and a
brute animal. They differ in Number which are of the same species, but either are found in
different subjects, or complete different supposita (individuals).

Wherefore, it happens to differ in number in two ways. 1. When they differ in Subjects, so
that one exists without the other. Thus the whiteness in a wall differs in number from the
whiteness of milk, snow, paper: The erudition of Peter from the erudition of Paul, etc. 2.
When they agree in genus and specific essential form, but differ in the contracted form by
individuating conditions of “here” and “now”, as Peter and Paul, etc.

Some add a third mode of numeric distinction: of those which are in one and the same
subject, although their universal notions do not differ. In the way that “this one”, “this true”,
“this good” in Paul differ in number. But this mode is improper. For This one is not
distinguished essentially from This True, or This Good in the same subject: but rather
formally, or by reason alone, so that they cannot be said to be numerically distinct in any
other sense than all those things which are enumerated, whether really or rationally distinct,
the acceptance of which is most improper.

Thus are the modes of real distinction, namely merely real and essential. But whoever would
refer the other modes of distinction here, he could say with Lord Guthrie: Real distinction in
general comprises six modes under itself. 1. Essential; which is now defined. 2. Of the
Subject, which is of those which inhere in different subjects. 3. Accidental, which is the
distinction of subjects by accidents; as a human differs by erudition from a brute animal. 4.
Causal, of those which differ by internal or external causes. 5. Circumstantial, or of those
which are distinguished by things surrounding the entity, such as time, place, antecedents,
consequents. 6. Hypostatic or personal, which while preserving the identity of Essence are
distinguished by Persons, as the subsisting Relations in the divine [Trinity].

However, it should be observed that not any accidental or substantial diversity infers a real
distinction, but the immovable principles of real distinction must be respected, concerning
which [we have spoken] before.

VI. The notional distinction is usually constituted as threefold: Virtual, Formal,

Modal.

Thus some constitute three modes of the notional or rational distinction; so that to some
extent at least the diverse respects may be discerned, by reason of which some things are
said to differ notionally.

The Virtual distinction is of those which exert themselves diversely, as if they were other and
other powers of acting. Thus the power of hardening, liquefying, heating, rarefying,
condensing in the sun’s rays are distinguished by reason alone, virtually, because although it

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is perhaps the same power which achieves those diverse effects, a real distinction ought not
to be admitted. Similarly, the attributes of God, justice, mercy, etc. Are distinguished
virtually, since the divine Essence exerts itself in diverse ways, although the utmost simplicity
of the [divine] Essence does not admit diverse powers of acting.

The Modal distinction is that which occurs between a thing and the mode of the thing, or
reality, as they say; or even between mode and mode, by no means so opposed that they
cannot be predicated of each other, as between Being and Truth: likewise between One and
True, etc.

The Formal distinction is not entirely dissimilar, which is said to be of those which are
unitively contained: in what way 1. Are called essentially subordinated, as are human and
animal. 2. Passions/Properties. Thus the affections of Being unitively contained in Being are
formally distinguished from Being itself, as unity, truth, finitude, causing, etc.

VII. Opposition is the diversity with some repugnance. And it is either of two things,
or of more. The latter is called disparation, by which of course one [thing] is
opposed to more. But the former is called opposition in species, when one is
opposed to one.

Those diverse things are generally called opposed or repugnant with some conflict and
impossibility of being in the same subject, in the same respect. For it should be noted that
things are called opposed either generally, insofar as any repugnance is included: or
specially, insofar as they are distinguished from disparates, and those alone are called
opposed, of which one is opposed to one.

Moreover, disparates seem to be said as if separated (dis-parata), so that by reason of

etymology they are only those which are in fact separated from each other. But the usage of
the word has deviated from its original imposition, or rather from its origin. For when a more
suitable term was not available to express those of which one is opposed to more, the term
“disparates” began to be used, not considering whether they are in fact separated or not.

Although if we insist on the etymology, I think it would not be inconvenient to distinguish

between local separation, which is accidental; and substantial, whence also the name
signifies. For disparates, in whatever state they may be, perpetually retain their separate
Essences. Therefore they are called disparates, as if separated in being, or in respect of
Essence, and they are always thus; even if it happens that the same [disparates] are
(extrinsically) united and most conjoined. For the union does not remove the essential
diversity of the united entities.

In this way, soul and body are truly disparates, although they concur to constitute one
nature or Essence. Thus diverse accidents, e.g. Science and Prudence in the same mind,

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retain the character of disparates, although they are united and concur in the same subject.
This view is proved: 1. From the nature of Repugnants. For in whatever sense and mode any
repugnance is called opposed to itself; in that same general sense and mode must the
opposition of disparates also be understood. But it is certain that things are called opposed
by reason of an opposition not local but essential; not because they are locally and
diametrically opposed, but because their Essences are opposed and adverse. Therefore, the
same must be said of disparates: that their opposition does not imply local separation, but
essential [separation]. 2. From the contradistinction of opposites. For disparates must be so
regarded, that together with the opposites strictly so-called they exhaust the whole extent
of repugnants.

For there are indeed some repugnants which, strictly speaking, are not opposites (in the way
that one thing is said to be opposed to one) nor can they be referred to the modes of
opposites (namely, relative, or privative, or contrary, or contradictory, concerning which
below) and nevertheless they are truly diverse with some conflict, but in such a way that this
conflict occurs between them and more [than one thing], and so the same [disparates]
ought to be discriminated from opposites strictly so-called. Or certainly the description of
opposites must be broadened, and what others will scarcely admit, that common and
customary division of opposites must either be rejected as imperfect, or plainly reformed.

Furthermore, admitting this species of repugnants, which disparates complete; it must be

said that all things whatsoever which are truly repugnant, but yet cannot be referred to the
common genera of oppositions, pertain to the class of disparates. Whence it further appears
that even those things which are not separated from each other must be called disparates,
of which kind we gave examples before.

And although it may seem contrary to the nature of repugnants for disparates ever to concur
in the same subject, nevertheless just as strictly so-called opposites can in a certain respect,
and from a different respect, be attributed to the same [subject], so there is much less doubt
that disparates can concur in the same subject or suppositum, here [speaking] of accidents,
there of substances.

Concerning accidents indeed, there is not so much doubt, since very many disparate
accidents are found to be in the same subject, as ubiquitous examples sufficiently testify.
Thus several intellectual habits, several moral virtues, concur in the same mind, so that in
the concrete they are predicated of themselves: e.g. Philosophy and Theology in a
Philosopher Theologian: so that it is permissible to say “The Philosopher is a Theologian”
and so of innumerable others.

But as regards substances: a distinction must be made between complete and incomplete
[substances]: Concerning incomplete [substances], again it is manifest that they concur in
one suppositum, since by their nature they are coordinated for this. As matter and form
[concur] for any natural body, the organic body and the rational soul for constituting a

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human being. And on account of this union they are enunciated of themselves in the
concrete; as when I say: “Matter is informed”, “The body is animated.”

Therefore it is clear even from this that disparates are united, and on account of the union
they can be predicated of themselves. Truly complete substances which are disparate, can
neither be united among themselves, nor [can they] ordinarily be predicated of themselves.

But by faith it is established, and in Sacred Theology it is most firmly maintained, that the
divine nature and the human [nature] are conjoined by the hypostatic bond, and so
constitute one suppositum or true Christ, notwithstanding the diversity of the natures by
which they are disparated even in this most intimate union. Concerning which, in the
preceding disputation, some things have been said.

For although the reason of the union itself [“hypostatic union”] is not the disparation or
diversity of the natures, nevertheless in the very union or hypostatic union itself, the
essential distinction of the natures is kept safe and sound, by reason of which they ought to
be placed and must be placed in the category of disparates. Hence, on account of the union
also, the disparate natures are enunciated of themselves in the concrete, when the “God-
man” and the “man-God” are spoken of. For although here again the reason and cause of
the predications is not the diversity, but rather the union of the diverse and disparate
natures; nevertheless the extremes which are combined in the enunciation are truly diverse
and disparate; since in the union they do not put off their nature, nor do they cease to be
essentially diverse, nor finally are they confounded by the predication, but rather indicated
as united.

VIII. Opposites are either positive or negative. Positive opposites are either respective
or Relative, or absolute, as are contraries. Negative opposites are either opposed
privatively, or contradictorily.

This is usually discussed in [works on] Logic, but here [opposites] are considered insofar as
they affect the aptitude of predicating negatively, but here they are considered as modes of
diversity affecting and denominating the things themselves.

Relatively opposed things are those which mutually respect each other as opposed, yet in
such a way that one is not the other. For in relatives there is a certain agreement and a
certain discrepancy. The former by reason of the mutual respect: the latter by reason of the
opposition, which yet is very slight: since relatives are sometimes present per accidens, as
when a physician heals himself.

But contrariety is the opposition of positive absolute terms, which are so distant from each
other that they mutually expel [each other] from the common subject. Three requirements
of them are usually listed. 1. That contraries be under the same genus, [Topics] 3.6.7. 2. That

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they be most distant under the same genus, Met. 4 – not by distance of position or place,
but of essence and definition. 3. That they expel each other from the same subject, Physics
c. 9 S. 81. But under certain conditions: 1. If neither naturally inheres [in the subject]. 2. If
one is more powerful than the other, so that it can expel it.

Privatively opposed things are those which are opposed to each other as Being and non-
Being in the privative [sense], or as habit and privation.

Finally, contradictorily opposed things are those which are opposed to each other as Being
and non-Being in the negative [sense]. But the Logicians discuss these more fully. We [turn]
to...

Corollaries

I. Things which agree in one third [thing], agree with each other.

The agreement in one third can be understood either generally or specially. Generally,
concerning any agreement, and any relationship or affinity. Thus Albert [of Saxony] made
this saying the foundation of all Syllogisms: others [apply it to] expository Syllogisms or the
third Figure in particular, concerning which [we have treated] in Logic. But specially it is
understood either of equality, as in Mathematics: things which are the same or equal to one
third, those also are the same or equal among themselves; or of similitude: in this way,
those which are the same or similar to one third by a certain similitude, are also said to be
the same or similar among themselves in respect of that third; or of absolute identity. In this
sense it must not be accepted without limitation.

So Conring limits it thus: “Things which are the same as one third, specifically that it is an
individual thing, which is neither more things nor the same thing with that which is more
things.” Regius [limits it] thus: “Things which are the same as one third taken singularly and
univocally and retained, those also are the same among themselves.”

Commonly they distinguish between a third [thing] which is communicable and [a third]
incommunicable, and they restrict the corollary to the third incommunicable; so that those
alone are the same, which agree in one third incommunicable, as “The Apostle to the
Gentiles” and “Paul” agree in this one incommunicable individual. Thus “The Promised
Messiah”, and “Jesus of Nazareth”, etc.

But by no means are all those which are the same as one third communicable also the same
among themselves; in the way that Peter and Paul agree in the third essential communicable
[reality] of human nature, and so Peter and Paul are not the same individual.

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The reason is obvious: because if that in which certain things agree is common to more, it is
clear by itself that the many are not one.

On the other hand, when some things agree in a third incommunicable, those must be the
same among themselves, because the third is incommunicable to more. Therefore the cause
of this thing is not the singularity itself, or that they agree in a singular third, but rather the
incommunicability, that that singular [third] in which they agree is incommunicable to more,
and so those necessarily are really the same which agree in that incommunicable [third].

In vain, therefore, against the mystery of the Holy Trinity, the Trinity-scourgers urge this
principle, while they object that it follows that the Son is the Father, and the Father and Son
are posited as of the same singular Essence. For the divine Essence is singular in such a way
that it is still communicable to more Supposita. Therefore the diverse Supposita are by no
means the same among themselves for the reason that they agree in the Essence, since the
identity of Essence does not remove the suppositional diversity. Crellius, bk. 2 ch. 4 sec. 4 p.
515, denies that this principle must be restricted, or suffer any instance or exception,
because its reason is absolutely universal. "Unless this is admitted," he says, "there follows
an open contradiction, namely that one and the same thing is simultaneously the same thing
and more things. For if some thing is conceived as communicable, which nevertheless is
really the same with three really distinct [things], as here the divine Essence, which is one
thing with the three Persons, that [one] thing will simultaneously be one thing and more
things. Therefore, such a communicable [thing] is not to be admitted, and if it is brought
forward as an instance to overturn that axiom in this our controversy, this will be a mere
petitio principii, since this communicable [thing] is refuted by this very reason."

Response: 1. Franc. Schvartz 1.4 on the Trin. myst. c.3 dist. 7, denies that the principle
"Things which..." is true, if it is taken in the abstraction and analogy of Being, abstracting
from created and uncreated Being, or finite and infinite, and [he] denies that it can be
directly demonstrated or proved, but at most can be shown inductively by us in creatures.
Thence also he denies that it can be rightly concluded about the whole universe of things,
because in strictness the argument proceeds from pure particulars, and because in creatures
this [principle] can arise from the limitation of things. Thus the adversaries could be pressed
to demonstrate the truth of this principle: and even if they induce all examples of finite
things, the induction would not yet be perfect, since it would still not be established
concerning the Infinite Being: which indeed we deny ought to be estimated from the
condition of created things; but unless they obtain the contrary in this by immovable
arguments, and nevertheless peddle this principle as universal, they will ineptly beg the
principle: and so they will prove nothing.

But leaving aside Schvartz's response, we say that this principle is true in the abstraction of
Being, insofar as the reason of the principle holds and its immovable foundation remains. 2.
The reason and foundation of this principle is the very incommunicability of the same thing
to more supposita. For therefore those things agree among themselves, which agree in one

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third, because that third is incommunicable to more supposita. For this incommunicability
being given, it cannot happen that those which are the same as that incommunicable thing,
or which are a part of that very incommunicable thing itself, are not also the same among
themselves, because it is impossible for the same thing to be simultaneously
incommunicable to more, and nevertheless for diverse (or non-same) [things] to be given
which equally participate in it, or to which it is common, by force of that first principle: it is
impossible for the same thing to be and not be simultaneously.

But where the formal reason expires and where that third in which some things agree is
common to more supposita, there identity cannot be inferred, but only a certain agreement
by reason of that common third. This could be taught by innumerable examples, if it were
not most manifest of itself, so that it is surprising that Crellius calls this into doubt.

Thus when accidents are common to more subjects, they agree on account of the common
participation of those accidents, but they do not infer the same subject, because those
accidents are not incommunicable, but common. Therefore they at least agree by reason of
those accidents. Thus diverse species under the same genus agree in the generic concept,
and so among them there is identity, but only generic, or by reason of that communicable
third, with their specific diversity still preserved. Since generic agreement does not remove
specific difference.

Similarly, supposita of the same Species agree in one third, namely the specific nature, but
they are not the same among themselves except only by reason of the specific nature,
because that third is not incommunicable to more supposita.

Here therefore it is not conceived, but an incommunicable thing itself (e.g. the specific
human nature) is certainly given besides conception, which is really the same with more
really distinct [things] (human supposita, e.g. Peter, Paul, Andrew, etc.) without contradiction
either explicit or implicit.

Moreover, when we teach from the Scriptures that the Essence numerically the same is also
common to more Supposita, is that begging the principle? For if it is sometimes permissible
in lack of something else to bring forward in disputation as an instance that very thing which
is controverted, which Aristotle himself in Topics 8 ch. 2 shows can be done, why can the
example proved from the Scriptures not be urged, where the universality of the principle has
already been shaken by other arguments?

That such a communicable [thing] involves a contradiction, specifically that the numerically
singular is common to more of the same name: "this is to be singular and not singular?
Singular because numerically one, not singular, because it can be so divided into more of the
same name that nevertheless the whole is in each" - but what is this except to beg the
principle? For it is asked precisely whether the plurality of Persons overturns the singularity
of Essence! Concerning which [we will treat] more fully in the special part, God willing.

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If more real things are understood, [it is] nothing against us: since we by no means posit that
the Persons in the Deity differ as things. That the numerically one is common to numerically
diverse [entities], is a contradiction, but by no means that the numerically one Essence is
common to more Persons, since numerical unity does not absolutely exclude hypostatic
distinction, but only entitative division.

Therefore, whatever communication does not infer entitative division and multiplication, by
no means absolutely repugnates to numerical unity. But such is the communication of the
divine Essence to more Supposita; since the divine Essence is in more Persons without its
own division or multiplication. Therefore the communication of the divine Essence to more
Supposita by no means absolutely repugnates to the numerical unity of the divine Essence.

The major premiss is evident from the nature of singular unity, which consists in entitative
indivision, and the negation of aptitude for inferiors in which it may be multiplied by
essential communication of itself. For this is the formal reason by which one singular is
constituted, and adequately distinguished from the universal.

Therefore, as long as the formal reason of numerical unity is still preserved, certainly there is
brought in no absolute repugnance and impossibility. The minor premiss is proved and
evinced from the adequate principle of Theology, the Sacred Scripture. Therefore the
Conclusion stands firm and unshaken.

II. The identity of a thing does not exclude real distinction.

The identity of a thing is that by which a thing or essence is the same, not diverse. But a real
distinction is not only of those things which differ as thing and thing, but of all things which
are truly distinguished apart from a fiction of the mind.

For, setting aside for now the other ways of real distinction by which things either differ in
subject, like accidents of diverse and separated subjects, or differ in essence, like any things
having diverse total essences, so that neither includes the other, or one enters into the
constitution of the other, and which are other stricter significations, a real distinction ought
to be understood in this place as opposed to a distinction of reason, namely by which one
objective concept is not another.

But such a distinction can altogether be given in one and the same thing or numerical
essence. For thus a mode and the Essence of which it is a mode can be one and the same
numerical essence. Likewise, distinct modes can be of the same singular essence. Indeed,
modes opposed to each other and incommunicable to each other can be of one and the
same numerical essence.

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But it is certain that both a mode from Essence, and mode from mode, and especially if they
are opposed to each other, are distinguished really, that is, apart from a fiction of the mind.
Therefore some things which differ really can be of the same singular and numerical
Essence. The truth of the Premises is demonstrated by examples.

Thus a certain union of form and form, personality and (finite) nature differ really, because
they can be separated from each other in reality, just as, for example, the union of the soul
with the body is separated from the soul itself in the state of separation, and human
personality in Christ is separated from the same human nature in the act of personal union.
But nevertheless the union of the soul and the soul, as well as human personality and The
human nature itself are of the same singular essence, and indeed in such a way that they are
that very essence. For the union of the soul does not obtain a peculiar Entity from the soul,
nor is personality a certain peculiar thing from nature, but the union of the soul and the
personality of nature intimately includes the Entity, so that the union of the soul and the
soul are one and the same thing, and personality and nature are one and the same thing;
namely the soul itself insofar as it is united to the body; the nature itself insofar as it is
[Greek: asylouent] {unsheltered}, and enjoys its own personality. Similarly, certain modes are
distinguished really from each other, for example, the personality of human nature and the
dependence of the same on the first cause differ really, because the former can be
separated from the latter, and in the mystery of the incarnation is actually separated. But
these modes are found in one singular essence, and indeed in such a way that they do not
obtain a singular and proper Entity, but as they intimately include the Entity of nature, and
thus together with nature absolve one singular essence, and both dependence and person
are the nature itself depending and [Greek: dos] {(unknown Greek word)}.

Finally, it is beyond controversy that opposed modes incommunicable to each other must be
distinguished really. But that it is not repugnant for opposed modes to be given in the same
singular essence, in such a way that they are that very singular essence, and consequently
are not only distinguished really by force of opposition, but are also of the same numerical
essence on account of the communicability of the same, is proven from this: that it is not
repugnant for several persons incommunicable to each other, and thus really distinct, to be
given in one and the same singular essence, as we will show in the special part.

But here the Socinians again imagine a contradiction, like Goslavius p. 1. Refut. Keckerman.
P. 4. Those things which are really distinguished cannot be of the same singular essence. To
be really distinguished and to be the same in number are oppositely contradictory. Crellius,
in order to show his acumen in imagining contradictions, strives to demonstrate this
contradiction lib. Cit. P. 517 ff. In this way: What is really the same is that which is one thing,
really distinct is that which is several things. Therefore those things which are really the
same cannot be really distinct, since it implies that the same thing really differs from itself.

Further, if the essence is really the same with three persons really distinct from each other, it
is necessary for it to be the same thing with three distinct things. But what is the same with

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three distinct things, it is necessary for it to be three things. Therefore the divine Essence
will be both one thing and three things at the same time, which is inconsistent with itself.

So he says. But the matter is safe. For the argument fails by the equivocation of the terms, to
be really the same, and to be really distinct. To be really the same is said either Of that which
is only one thing, not several; or in which there are not several diverse things which differ by
more than reason. Likewise, to be really distinct is called either strictly: which are several
things; or more broadly, which are distinct before a fiction of the mind.

Therefore those things which are really the same in the former sense certainly cannot be
really distinct strictly speaking; or those things which are only one thing cannot be several
things. In this sense, we grant that the divine persons, because they are of one essence, are
not distinguished really, or are not several things or several essences. And in this sense, not
in another, Damascene somewhere denies that the persons differ really.

Therefore it is a calumny, not our opinion, that the three persons are three distinct things.
But if the latter sense of real identity and real distinction is accepted, we deny that the
essence of God is really the same in such a way that there are not given in it several things
really distinct, that is, apart from the operation of the intellect. On the contrary, we say that
there are given several things in the one divine essence distinct really, that is, apart from the
fiction of the intellect.

More correctly, therefore, in this mystery it is said that identity of thing or essence obtains
with real distinction. For the same thing or essence is to the three really distinct supposita
[persons], but not as to distinct things, for this is [Greek: ainasoon] {nonsense}, but as to
diverse modes, without contradiction. For any diversity which does not multiply the essence
does not take away the identity of the thing. But this diversity of the three [Greek:
hypodoses] {substances} is such. Since the same essence is common to those distinct
hypostases without its multiplication. Therefore the same does not take away the identity of
the thing. This can be declared in some way by the example of distinct modes modifying the
same essence;

Just as, for example, the personality of human nature, dependence on God, and presence
are distinct modes, diverse before and apart from the operation of the mind, yet they
intimately imbibe the same essence, and are in the same singular essence. And thus in
others.

From which it is clear that the contradiction is fictitious, which Crellius pretends, as are all
the rest which he imputes to us.

III. Those things which can be separated differ really; but not vice versa.

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Understand 1. Concerning real separation, not mental. For our mind can conceive distinct
things in what is really the same. 2. Concerning the possibility of separation, whether natural
or supernatural, or by reason of divine power. For those things which can be separated from
each other at least by divine power, so that one is without the other, and outside the other,
one of them in reality is not the other, and therefore the same are distinguished really. For
one to be the other and yet to be able to be in reality without the other is for one to be able
to be not one, the same to be able to be diverse from itself, which implies [a contradiction].
3. Concerning separation both mutual, which is when each exists separately, and not mutual,
when one exists separately while the other does not exist. For since they can be separated
from each other really with the operation of the mind cut off, certainly one will not be the
other.

Therefore the manifest sense is that all things, whichever can be separated really, whether
by mutual separation or simple separation, whether by the ordinary way of nature or by the
extraordinary power of God—that all those things, I say, are distinguished really. But not vice
versa, whatever things differ really can be separated. For there are some things which are
distinguished really, in such a way that the whole perfection and quiddity of one is in the
other, and one is essentially the other, and cannot be outside the other, which certainly
cannot be separated really. Thus although there is given a real distinction of persons in the
Holy Trinity, nevertheless a real separation is not at all possible in any way. For The whole
perfection of one is in the other, and one cannot be outside the other, since they are
essentially one, and absolve one singular essence, and therefore can in no way be separated
from each other in essences. Indeed Goslavius, lib. Cit., argues for a certain separation of the
persons from the distinct symbols under which they manifested themselves in Matthew 3.
But this appearance indeed proves the real distinction of the persons, as the Theologians
demonstrate, but cannot prove or infer an essential separation. For these two things are to
be conjoined, not disjoined at all, as Dn. Jac. Mart. Reminds us in lib. 2. De T. Elob. Cap. 22:
The sensory observation and the judgment of the intellect, rightly informed from other
places of Scripture. Only external species—voice, dove, and human nature—are presented
to the senses, which are altogether separated, so that some real difference could be
observed even by the judgment of the senses; meanwhile, the intellect rightly instructed
from other places does not separate the thing itself, but distinguishes the substances really
according to the sensory and real distinction and appearance, but does not separate them,
since it knows very well that all three are God, and that God essentially one exists.
Moreover, it cannot be simply concluded from the condition of the symbols and species to
the state and nature of those things of which they are representative species and notifying
figures, since not all things which are fitting for visible species should be equally attributed
to those things which are shown and signified through them. For there can be certain things
agreeing with external signs which cannot be attributed to the things signified. Dn. Kesler
concludes this from Metaph. Phot. P. 1. S. 3. Pr. 3., since one and the same thing can
manifest itself in diverse subjects through diverse signs. For example, health manifests itself

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by diverse signs in diverse parts: by redness in the face, by pulse in the arteries, by gait in the
feet, by cheerfulness in the eyes, etc.; yet from this it cannot be concluded that health is not
one and the same in one body. Similarly, the vegetative faculty of the soul exerts itself in
augmentation, the sensitive faculty in the sight of the eyes, in the hearing of the ears, in the
smell of the nose, etc.; yet from this the distinguished Philosophers do not want it to be
concluded that those faculties are essentially distinct from each other and from each other
separated. And who will deny that one and the same invisible divine essence can manifest
itself in diverse places through distinct appearances and figures at one and the same point in
time, yet in such a way that a mutilation of the essences and a real separation of the same
does not follow from this?

IV. The producing [thing] and that which is produced are distinguished really.

For, with all operation of the mind cut off, the producing [thing] is other than that which is
produced, and vice versa; and therefore they are distinguished really, insofar as real
distinction is adequately opposed to distinction of reason. Moreover, where there are given
opposed relations incommunicable to each other, there a real distinction is given. But such a
relative opposition intervenes between the producing [thing] and that which is produced, as
is clear. Therefore a real distinction also ought to be conceded.

From which the orthodox Theologians rightly infer that a real difference intervenes between
God the Father and the Son of God, because he [the Father] produces the Son, and the latter
is produced by the Father in a mystical and ineffable way; similarly, they very well argue for
the real difference of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, since he [the Holy Spirit] is
produced by the Father and the Son in a certain mystical and ineffable way.

But when real distinction is accepted in a stricter sense for an essential [distinction], or that
which intervenes between thing and thing, it is not simply true that the producing [thing]
and that which is produced are distinguished really, that is, essentially. For the ratio
[relation] of producing and produced can be given in the same essence. Indeed concerning
essence the same in species there is no controversy at all, since it is altogether necessary in
a substantial production that the producing [thing] and the produced be of the same
essence as to species.

But concerning numerical identity, the same is established from Scripture: namely, that the
producing and produced persons can be of the same numerical essence, since God the
Father and the Son are of the same individual essence, because the latter is no Less God
than the former, and in the Scriptures is so called and described.

Crellius again dreams up a new contradiction, lib. 3, sect. 2, c. 1, p. 541, because it follows
from this assertion that the Son of God would be the Son of himself, since he is asserted to

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be begotten from his own essence. Since the essence of the Father, from which the Son is
begotten, is the very essence of the Son. The argument is such: He of whose essence
someone is generated is his father. But the Son of God is generated from his own essence.
Therefore the Son of God is the Son of himself, and thus the Father of himself, which
involves a manifest contradiction. He confirms the assumption from this: that if the essence
of the Father and the Son is the same in number, certainly if the Son is begotten from the
essence of the Father, he is begotten from his own essence. This will be the argument: The
essence of the Father is that from which the Son is begotten. The essence of the Son is the
essence of the Father. Therefore the essence of the Son is that from which the Son is
begotten.

I respond, distinguishing before all else between a singular essence communicable and
incommunicable, supposing as certain and demonstrated from the Scriptures that the divine
Essence is common from an equality to several persons. From which, with this hypothesis
standing, that the same divine essence in number is common from an equality to the Son
and the Father, anyone understands that when the Son is said to be begotten from the
essence, the essence is not implied insofar as it is really common to the Father and the Son,
nor the essence insofar as it is terminated in the hypostasis of the Son, but the same
essence insofar as it is determined to the hypostasis of the Father.

Just as when I say in human affairs that the Son is begotten from the essence of the begetter,
the essence ought to be understood either as the essence as terminated in the person of the
Father, but not either human essence in general, or the same essence as it is terminated in
the person of the Son. For as this human essence is common on account of universality, and
as the person of the Father is not the person of the Son, although they are of the same
specific essence—so in that mystery, the Divine essence is common to the Father and the
Son on account of reality;

The person of the Father is not the person of the Son, although each is of the same essence.

The Socinians will say that the principle is begged by this response. Let them say it. It is not
for us at present to demonstrate that the same essence is of the Father and the Son, which
pertains to Theology, but only to examine those metaphysical schemes proposed by the
adversaries, with the immovable certitude of faith supposed.

Now therefore to the argument. The Minor is false: that the Son of God is generated from
his own essence. To the prosyllogism I respond 1. Indirectly through an instance: The
essence of Abraham is that from which Isaac is begotten. The essence of Isaac is the essence
of Abraham. Therefore the essence of Isaac is that from which Isaac is begotten. The
arrangement is the same. The Conclusion is absurd. The Major is certain. Nor can the Minor
be denied, since Isaac and Abraham are of the same human essence, although they are
distinguished by persons. 2. Directly, I say that there are four terms in each Syllogism.

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Concerning this latter adduced place of [Greek: syllogismos] {syllogism}, it is clear from this:
that in the Major the essence of Abraham is spoken of numerically, insofar as human
essence is contracted to [unknown Greek word], and determined to the person of Abraham.
For Essence in general does not generate, nor is anyone begotten from it. But in the Minor
the essence of Abraham is understood specifically. For the essence of Isaac is specifically
only, not numerically, the same essence of Abraham.

Similarly, in the Photinian Argument. The Major speaks concerning the Essence of the Father
insofar as he is Father, and is distinguished personally from the Son; or concerning the divine
Essence characterized and terminated in the hypostasis of the Father, so to speak. For thus it
is true that the divine essence characterized by the property determined to the Person of
the Father, or insofar as it is under the [Greek: prosopou] {person, character} of the Father, is
that from which the Son is begotten. But the Minor subsumes concerning the essence of the
Father not insofar as he is Father, and is distinguished personally from the Son, or
concerning the essence under the hypostasis of the Father, but concerning the essence of
the Father in common as it is really common to the Father and the Son, which by reason of
essence neither generates nor is generated; and therefore in common it neither generates
nor is generated.

Thus the Crellian contradiction vanishes into the air.

V. Those things which inhere in diverse subjects are distinguished really.

To inhere in subjects designates either Paronymic attribution, in the way Aristotle in c. 5. Of

the Categories distinguishes [Greek: kath’ hypokeimenoy legetai] {to be said of a subject}
and [Greek: en hypokeimenoi einai] {to be in a subject}. By the former he describes
Synonyms, which attribute a definition to a subject, §.15, 16, but by the latter he denotes
Paronyms, which inhere in a subject, so that they are not said of the subject, that is, they do
not attribute a definition to it; or it denotes accidental inherence, as when the being of an
accident is said to inhere in a subject. Here any attributes are understood, whether they are
accidents, or above the lot of accidents, or below the condition of the same.

Furthermore, diverse subjects are understood either definitely, which are diversified by
those attributes; or indefinitely, any several subjects. In this sense, to differ by subjects is to
have several subjects; but in that sense, this is implied: that attributes of this kind are so
related that one is in this, the other is not in this, but in another subject.

If, therefore, attributes inhere in really distinct subjects, so that what inheres in one does not
inhere in the other, then it is necessary for those attributes to be distinguished really. For if
they were not distinguished really, the same remaining the same would both inhere and not
inhere, which is impossible.

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But when several attributes occupy subjects indefinitely, it is necessary to distinguish
between separated and united subjects, complete and incomplete [subjects]. To inhere in
separated subjects is to have separated essences. But for the same attribute to inhere in
diverse united subjects does not infer a multiplication or plurality of that which inheres. For
the same attribute can inhere in diverse but united subjects in different ways: in one [Greek:
protos] {primarily} and first, in the other [Greek: deuteros] {secondarily} and consequently,
on account of union with the other, just as the same power of burning inheres both in fire
and in iron, when iron is ignited, although fire and iron are distinct subjects.

Then, distinct complete subjects cannot participate in a really same attribute. But the ratio
of incomplete [subjects] is different. For one and the same accident or attribute can inhere
in two incomplete subjects or rather two parts of a complete subject, in one as in a first
susceptive, in the other as in one participating from that other. In this way, there is one life
of the soul and the body in the same suppositum [individual], which is [Greek: protos]
{primarily} of the soul, as of the first subject, [Greek: deuteros] {secondarily} the life of the
body, insofar as the body participates in the same, as the union of the soul and body for
constituting the animate composite requires.

Thus in general any form, because it communicates itself and its attributes to matter, so that
the same inhere participatively; yet in such a way that they do not go out from the form.
Similarly, the Theologians teach that the divine attributes inhere in the human nature
[Greek: logo] {by reason} participatively on account of the personal union, with the identity
of the same preserved, although the mode of inhering is diverse. For they belong to the
[Greek: logo] {Word} through himself essentially; to the human nature on account of union
with the [Greek: logo] {Word} and personally. But the diverse mode of having cannot vary
the thing itself.

VI. Those things which do not differ in number are the same.

To not differ in number is said either of those things which do not differ in number, nor by
another superior mode of difference, namely neither in species nor in genus; or of those
things which, although they are distinguished by another kind of difference, nevertheless are
not [distinguished] by this last degree of difference, namely numerical difference. The
former, not the latter, are understood [here]. For it is clear that universals differing in species
or genus do not differ in number, because they are universals, which nevertheless cannot be
the same in reality; rather they are distinct species or diverse genera; as man and beast do
not differ in number, yet they differ in species, and therefore are disparate things, not the
same in reality.

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From which it is manifest that to differ in number and to be the same in number are not
immediately opposed members, since a third is given, namely, neither to differ in number,
nor to be the same in number; as man and beast do not differ in number, because they are
not singulars, nor are they the same in number, because they are distinct species. But those
things which do not differ in number, so that they are the same in number, and are not
distinguished in genus or species, or which are both singular, and obtain numerical unity or
identity, those are the same; namely either so that they are of one essence, or so that they
are not distinguished.

Thus a mode specially so called and the thing modified are of one essence, and the same
modes specially so called considered among themselves, since they do not differ in number,
because a mode does not express a peculiar reality distinct from the modified thing; and
diverse modes in one modified thing require intimately one and the same numerical
essence.

But other things which do not differ in number are also the same in reality, or are not
distinguished in reality; in which nevertheless reason can constitute or discover a certain
distinction, as an affection of Being and Being, or distinct affections of Being, and modes
generally so called are the same in number, yet are distinguished by reason.

From this it is clear that this axiom is not universally and unqualifiedly true: Whatever things
are not distinguished in number, one of them is the other. For 1. Objective concepts can be
diverse in those things which are not distinguished in number, or even which are the same in
number; the union of the soul with the body does not differ in number from the soul, yet
the union is not the soul on the part of the thing, and the soul are the same; and in the same
heat, the degree of heat, the presence of heat, the dependence are not distinguished, but
are the same in number, although on the part of the thing they are not the same. 2. Diverse
formal concepts can be, with numerical identity preserved. Thus in Being unity, truth,
goodness, perfection are the same in number, as well as among themselves, yet neither is
unity or truth etc. Formally Being itself, or unity formally truth, etc. Whence they cannot be
predicated of themselves in the abstract, except with an added determination, so that unity
is truth, namely on the part of the thing, but not on the part of the concept. Thus the divine
omnipotence is omniscience on the part of the thing, or identically, not formally, etc.

VII. A distinction of reason does not infer separation.

A distinction of reason is twofold: one of the conceiving reason, or reasoned; the other of
the making reason, or reasoning. The former presupposes some foundation in the thing, but
the latter consists only in the operation of reason without a foundation in the thing itself.

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Separation is likewise understood in two ways: Actual, and aptitudinal. The former is that by
which they are separated by place, or have separated essences. The latter [is] insofar as a
certain repugnance is not involved, so that they are separated by place.

From this we say: A distinction of reason, whether of the conceiving [reason] or of the
making [reason], does not infer an aptitudinal separation, much less an actual [separation].
Or: those things which are distinguished by reason alone are not actually separated, indeed
they cannot even be separated from each other, whether ordinarily or extraordinarily.

The reason is: because those things which are distinguished by reason alone are really the
same. But those things which are really the same cannot be separated from each other in
reality. For if they were separated, then the same would be taken away from itself, and
therefore the same would not be the same, which manifestly implies a contradiction.

Therefore, not even by the absolute power of God can it happen that things distinguished
only by reason are separated from each other, and therefore the consequence from the
separation of reason to the possibility of separation by the absolute power of God is not
valid. For reason can altogether separate those things which are the same on the part of the
thing, and can by no power be separated in reality.

But it should be noted that it is one thing to separate by reason, or to distinguish mentally,
another thing to pass judgment concerning those things which differ only by reason and are
distinguished only mentally. Indeed, our reason can easily distinguish those things which in
reality are truly one, and separate them according to its own measure, and conceive them
distinctly. But indeed it is not equally easy to know or to judge which things are
distinguished only by reason, and can be separated only by the work of reason, and which
are distinguished in reality, and can be separated in reality, in which matter it is often
deceived, for example, when it judges that quantity is distinguished from body only by
reason, and cannot even be separated by the absolute power of God, and so concerning the
rest.

VIII. Those things which differ by definition, differ at least in reason.

Those things which differ by definition, differ at least in reason. For a definition is a
representation of a thing before the intellect. Therefore, where there is a different
definition, there are different formal concepts. But those things which are distinguished by
different formal concepts, differ in reason.

But it is not reciprocal, that whatever things are distinguished by reason, also differ by
definition. For there can be a certain difference of reason where there is not another and
another formal concept. Which is a difference of fictitious reason, or of reasoning. See Dn.
Kesler p. Met. Phot. F. 3. 2. Who has more on these things.

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 IX. Those things which differ by definition, by the dispensing cause, by ends
and effects, objects, subjects, adjuncts and finally by time, cannot be one.

The Reformed profess to believe that Baptism is one, yet they make it internal and external:
which differ according to their own explanation (1) by definition: because the external is only
a mere sprinkling, the internal is the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit by which the
baptized is regenerated: (2) by the dispensing cause: and indeed without subordination.
Thus Beza resp. Alter, to Colloq. Mompel. P. 114 says that the ministry of external sprinkling
is of men, but the internal sprinkling is made by the Holy Spirit. (3) By end and effects:
External baptism brings a bare [significatio] signification: internal baptism brings real
regeneration according to them. (4) By objects: The former washes the body, the latter
washes the soul. (5) By subjects: The former happens to all, who are initiated, the latter only
to the elect: (6) By adjuncts: the latter is necessary for regeneration: the former not so: (7)
by time. The external in infancy, but the internal sometimes only at the last moment of life.
In what way therefore will the Calvinists be able to save the unity of Baptism? For a different
definition, as is commonly said, [is] a different essence: but actions, which are made by
diverse non-subordinated causes, are necessarily diverse: nor can one [enérgeia] activity or
action generate diverse [energḗmata] effects, other things being equal, namely where there
is the same reason and disposition of the object. And those things of which one can be
without the other, certainly are not one. What actions are done at a different time, those
surely do not constitute one thing, since indivision is required for unity, and for the unity of
influx (in action) its continuation [is required]. If you say that baptism taken [synéchōs]
continuously remains one, although [kata mérē] according to parts it is twofold, as a man is
one, although he is composed of soul and body. Resp. But in this way baptism ought not to
be called one and another, internal and external. But baptism materially indeed is a mystical
sacramental integral whole, but formally, as it is a sacred action, it does not infer a twofold
and diverse action of God and the minister, or a composite one, because it is one action, by
which God washes us through the minister, since the instrumental cause ought to be
subordinated to the principal. But those who deny subordination, and separate the actions
in time, are unable to defend one act. But neither are the essential parts of Baptism internal
and external; otherwise hypocrites would not receive the whole baptism, because they do
not perceive the internal, and would have to be rebaptized; indeed most absurdly the
instrumental cause, the baptism of water, and the effect, the washing from sins, are said to
be the essential parts of the whole.

X. Equal is not the same.

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This axiom rightly understood is true. For equality is of many: and indeed by the first
imposition of the word it designates the agreement or identity of many, by reason of
quantity, understand quantity of mass. For when there is only one, and of so great a mass,
how great, or of what great mass the other is, they are said to be equal to each other. But
then the use of the word was transferred to indicate the identity of the same quantity of
perfection, as they call it, namely of power and operation, in which way those are called
equals, who are equally able, or who work equally. Therefore two things are required for
equality. 1. Agreement or identity in quantity of mass, or of perfection and power, and 2.
Plurality of those which agree. Whence those things which are simply the same, cannot be
called equal. For it implies a contradiction: since the same, insofar as it is the same, is not
diverse from itself. But indeed the name of equality is further amplified to indicate the
identity of many by reason of essence. Hence summarily something is said to be equal either
by reason of essence or by reason of power or by reason of operation, or by reason of
quantity. But when it is certain from faith, that there are many persons of the same singular
essence, of the same power, of the same operation, nothing hinders, that one of them may
be called equal to another, since with the identity of essence remaining there is given a
certain plurality (of persons) and identity of many, and consequently broadly speaking, true
equality. Just as elsewhere the equality of many persons with respect to a specific essence is
rightly called. Thus for example, Isaac is equal to Abraham by reason of human essence.
Wherefore the assertion of the Orthodox is firm. He who is equal to God, is God, when
equality of Essence, power, operation in the subject are designated: so that the sense may
be, He who is of the same Essence with God the Father, of the same power, of the same
operation, is true God. But Crellius objects lib. 1. Sect. 2. Cap. 36. Pag. 342. “The equal
always has another Essence from that to which it is equal. Otherwise the same would be
equal to itself, although equals are related, and further opposed.” Resp. Equality in
abstraction, and as such does not infer an essential plurality of those, who are said to be
equal to each other, but only in general some real plurality. Therefore wherever many really
agree in essence, there is given an essential equality. The reason is: because equality, since it
is a transcendent term, ought to be described in the abstract, so that it can apply to all, to
whom equality belongs, insofar as they are equal. Therefore all things must be examined
which are denominated equal, and the common concept must be abstracted from all, in
which all agree, insofar as they are equal. Therefore since the equality of essence must be
established in the abstract, it is necessary to consider all things, which obtain the equality of
essence. Do not consider only those things which are beheld in Nature; but also those things
which Scripture proposes, from which the common notion of the equality of essence may be
prescinded, which certainly will import nothing other, than the essential identity of many. If
you further determine this, partly, so that a plurality is inferred not only by reason of
subsistence, but also by reason of essence, or not only real, but essential, partly, so that
identity is understood not indefinitely as to essence, whether the essence is the same in
number, or in species; but definitely, as to a specific essence; then now the laws of
abstraction will have been violated; since such an equality of essence is only given in finite

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Nature, in which many agree in numerical essence in the same specific essence; but in
infinite Nature such an equality is not given, in which nevertheless Scripture testifies that an
equality of essence is given. Wherefore from the comparison and relation of the equality,
which is observed in finite Nature, and also of the equality in infinite Nature, which Scripture
proposes to us, the abstract notion of equality must be drawn out. But the equality, which
Scripture maintains in infinite Nature, ought not to be impugned from the common notion
of that equality, which is uniquely given in finite Nature. Therefore there is no consequence
“The equal in finite nature always has another essence; from that to which it is equal.
Therefore also the Son of God obtains another essence from the Father; when he is said to
be equal to him.” For infinite nature is not to be estimated from the condition of finite
nature. But if the adversaries say, that the antecedent is absolutely and simply true: We
respond, the principle is begged. For it must be proved, that for equality in the abstract, and
as such, diverse singular essences are required, but that diverse subsistences, which import
a real distinction, and are mutually incommunicable to each other, do not suffice. Indeed
where it shall have been established that there are persons really distinct among
themselves, which are of the same essence, power and operation, as is altogether
established from Scripture, it must not be denied, that equality belongs to the persons
themselves. But as for Crellius’ proof: “equals are opposites, not the same”, we say that both
are required for the equality of essence, both some opposition, on account of which those
which are denominated equal, are incommunicable, and obtain a real distinction from each
other: and an essential identity, for the sake of which they are said to be equal in essence, in
which way the supposita of the same finite nature are both opposites, as to the
incommunicability of subsisting, and the same, as to the identity of nature: Similarly in
divine things, there is given a relative opposition of the supposita, and incommunicability, on
which the real distinction depends; there is also given an identity of essence, or an essential
indivision, and consequently equality cannot be denied. Therefore when the same is denied
to be equal to itself, it is necessary to distinguish the identity of subsistence from the
identity of essence. The same person is not equal to itself, because the identity of
subsistence excludes all plurality. But how will it be denied that diverse persons of the same
essence are equal to each other, since the identity of essence does not exclude all plurality.
Wherefore an equal is not the same, (in the masculine gender) or is not he, to whom he is
equal, who is also equal to him: yet an equal can be the same (in the neuter gender) which is
he, to whom he is equal, according to essence either specific, as happens in human persons,
or numerical, as in divine persons.

XI. Where an actual distinction is given, there a real distinction must be

conceded.

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Thus Crellius, who thence collects that the divine essence and persons are distinguished
really: since the divine essence can be actually communicated (according to our opinion) to
many persons, and was communicable, before all operation of our intellect, but on the
contrary a person is incommunicable to many persons, and so actually also a difference must
be between the essence and the person 1.c.l. f. 3. P. 606. Resp. Actually distinguished can be
understood in two ways, either by reason of an act of the intellect, which observing a virtual
difference in the thing discriminates the formal concepts: or by reason of an act of the
object, which is not only virtually distinct, but in reality, and actually. In the former sense it is
clear that a real difference is not inferred. For an act of the mind having supposed some
foundation reasons, as the Scholastics barbarously say in the thing itself it cannot make a
difference. But in the latter sense it is certain, that those things which are distinct actually,
not only virtually, those are really distinct. But as for the person and essence of God we
deny, that in the latter sense, and that most properly they are distinguished from each other
actually. For the highest simplicity of God stands in the way, that the person and essence
may be distinguished actually: For if an actual difference were given here, a certain actual
composition in the most simple Being from a mode and a thing modified would have to be
admitted. For wherever a mode is actually distinguished from a thing modified, there an
actual and real composition is inferred. But those contradicting predicates communicable
and incommunicable do not infer more than a difference of reason between the essence and
the persons in divine things. For it is not simply true: Whatever things admit contradicting
predicates, those are distinct before the operation of the intellect. For those things also
admit contradicting predicates, which are only formally distinguished, as animal and man.
Thus to be able to sleep and to be awake is said primarily and per se of animal, but it is not
said primarily and per se of man. But they are certain contradicting predicates, to be
predicated primarily and per se, and not to be predicated primarily per se. Thus Being and
Unity are only formally distinguished, yet they admit contradicting predicates: For Being is
the object of first Philosophy; it is first known, it is the subject of transcendent attributes:
But v. Unity is not the object of first Philosophy, is not first known, is not the subject of
transcendent attributes, &c. Thus truth and perfection differ formally, and contradicting
things can be predicated of them, and so of the rest. But v. The reason of this thing is at
hand: because although these contradictory predicates may be attributed to the same thing
not to the same, not in the same respect; but a diverse respect makes it so that
contradicting attributes can apply to the same thing. Thus it cannot be denied that by reason
of mercy and justice contradicting predicates are attributed to God, although only a formal
difference intervenes between the mercy and justice of God. In what way for example the
divine justice is to punish the reprobate: the divine mercy is not to punish the reprobate, &c.
Now specifically to the person and essence. This matter having been declared by the
example of individuality, so to speak and the nature of the individual, which are not
distinguished except formally: although its nature is communicable, individuality is
incommunicable for example, In Abraham the same thing is his nature and individuality; yet
nature is communicable, since it is communicated to his son Isaac, individuality not having

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been communicated, as it is incommunicable. Therefore since it is certain from faith both
that the divine Essence and person do not infer an actual composition, and that the divine
essence is common to many incommunicable persons, it is by no means right to oppose the
one to the other, but it is necessary to firmly hold both: although it may be permitted to
declare it in a certain way, not to fully know it. But neither is a lie committed, when a formal
difference is established by the intellect between those things, which are not actually
distinct. For the abstraction is not a lie. And therefore it must be noted: it is one thing a
simple and precisive abstraction, by which our mind as it were effects a distinction of this
kind, another thing a negative abstraction, by which it denies that the same things are in the
thing, which it so conceives. The former is, by which it simply apprehends the same thing by
distinct and inadequate concepts, by which it by no means affirms that those things which it
so apprehends distinctly according to its own mode are distinct in the thing itself, but simply
and without composition or affirmation or negation it conceives them as distinct, which if
Crellius denies ought to be done, it is necessary that he has never used a reflex act;
otherwise he would have entirely noticed that the mind often distinctly conceives, and sets
before itself by distinct concepts, things which in reality are the same for example, by a
generic and differential concept, the same essence; by an individual difference, and essence
one individual, &c. But the latter is, by which the intellect judges that whatever things it
conceives distinctly, are distinct in reality, where a lie can entirely be committed, as the same
things may not be distinct in reality. For the concept then is not conformed to the thing
itself. Furthermore that distinct abstractive apprehension is not lacking in all foundation in
the thing: Not indeed because it may be actually and formally in things; otherwise it would
be a true and real distinction, and reason would only be required to know it, not v. To make
it, but because it is not entirely from the mere work of reason, but from the occasion, which
the thing itself provides, about which the mind reasons. Whence it is greeted as a distinction
of reasoned reason. Wherefore the foundation, which ought to be in the thing for this
distinction, is not truly an actual distinction between those things, which are said to be so
distinguished: otherwise not the foundation of the distinction, but the distinction itself
would precede; but it ought to be either the eminence of the thing itself, which the mind so
distinguishes, which by many is usually called a virtual distinction, or certainly some relation
to those things truly and in reality distinct, according to which such a distinction is conceived
or devised, as Schvarius has t. 1. D. V.11.f.1. n. 4. Which things having been noted they will
be able to dispatch, whatever things the ignorance of the formal distinction of nature has
suggested to Crellius in the cited place, Having noted these things they will be able to
explain whatever ignorance of the formal distinction of nature suggested to Crellius in the
cited place.

XII. Whatever things are really the same, when one of them is communicated
the other is also communicated.

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Both the orthodox and the Calvinists, Jesuits, and Photinians partly use this axiom. And
therefore there is need for an accurate unfolding of the same. The orthodox use that axiom
against the Jesuits and Calvinists, when they argue from the communication of the
subsistence of the [logos] {word} made to the human nature to the communication of the
Nature and properties of the [logos] {word}; since indeed the subsistence, nature, divine
properties of the [logos] {word} are not distinguished, but are really the same. Where it
must be observed, that that principle can be urged in disputations partly absolutely [kata
anthropon] {according to man} against the aforesaid adversaries: since they themselves also
use that principle absolutely, or rather abuse it against our [theodolian] {divine gift} in the
communication of properties; when they gather that with one of the divine attributes or
properties having been communicated the others are also communicated on account of the
real identity of all the attributes of God, as can be seen in Grabius against D. Hunnius on the
person of Christ and Sohnius Exeg. 4. C. Loc. On Christ and Becan. Opusc. Theol. T. 2. Opusc.
5. P. 252. Although he acknowledges elsewhere that this reason is ineffective, if nothing is
added, or if the axiom is not limited; on account of the abuse which it suffers in the mystery
of the Trinity: partly limitedly [kath hekaston] {according to each one} if it is so restricted and
explained, that it can in no way stand against the truth. For since besides the Calvinists and
Jesuits the Photinians also abuse this principle, it behooves to use it cautiously. Therefore it
must be distinguished 1. To be really the same. For either a simple and complete identity is
denoted, so that they are simply the same, and are distinguished in no way, not even by
formal concepts, or only an essential identity is denoted, or of a thing, so that there are not
multiple things, or Entities, or finally only a real identity, so that they are not distinguished
on the part of the thing, but are the same before every operation of the mind. 2. Those
things which are really the same, if they are not simply the same, acknowledge a diversity,
either which they have among themselves, or which they obtain in relation to a term, either
by reason of operation, or finally by reason of a subject, as a cause, so that they are not
simply the same. Thus there is a certain diversity among those things which are really the
same, when they do not respect each other equally and mutually, but unequally, or not
mutually, such that indeed one is receptive with respect to the other, the Essence is the
cause, The other is receptible, in the way animal and man are really the same, so that animal
indeed is something [metekton] {participable} and is received and participated in and by
man, and man is a participant or partaker of the animality by reason of essence, but does
not communicate itself (reciprocally) to animal. Thus nature and suppositum (in abstraction)
do not differ really, the suppositum is [metochon] {participant}: or participative of nature:
But Nature is [methekton] {participable}, and is participated by the suppositum, since
indeed the suppositum imbibes the Nature itself intimately: but not reciprocally does nature
[participate] the suppositum. Thus furthermore by reason of a term there is given a diversity
of those which are distinguished really. For certain of them acknowledge some common
term as a certain third thing, and agree with the same; but certain others are related to a

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certain third thing in such a way, that one of them can agree with the term, but the other is
repugnant to it. In the way the Nature of an individual, and its individuality, and personality
e.g. in the Father are really the same, or one and the same thing; but if you consider a third
thing, namely the Son, it is permitted to observe, that the Nature of the Father can agree,
and does agree with the Son, since they are of the same nature, but the singularity of the
Father or his proper individuality personality can in no way agree with the Son, but it implies
a contradiction, for the singularity and personality of one suppositum to be attributed to
another suppositum. Thus besides, with respect to operation, even those things which are
not actually and really distinct obtain a certain disparity. For certain of them can operate,
certain cannot: therefore those are called [energetika] {active}, these [anergeta] {inactive}
and of those which operate, certain respect this object, certain another. In the way in God
infinity and all power are really the same: The latter however is [anergetos] {inactive}, the
former [energetikos] {active}. But justice and mercy are distinguished by reason of object,
although each is [energetikos] {active}. Thus according to some the immortality in the
rational soul and its life are really the same: But the former rests, the latter is active. The
faculties of the soul according to the opinion of certain people are the same really, although
they are distinguished by objects and operations. Finally, a certain diversity arises by reason
of subject among those things which do not differ really. For they can unequally respect a
subject, so that one is more intimate, proximate and more necessary to it than the other. In
the way in a soul united to a body, its essence and union with the body, and also its
dependence on the first cause, and the union itself are not distinguished really (namely as
thing and thing, or multiple Entities); But they are distinguished only as mode and essence,
or as diverse modes: but nevertheless they affect the subject in different ways. For the
essence of the soul is supremely intimate, and no less is dependence necessary to it, the
union is not so.

For the essence and dependence cannot be separated from the soul itself, but the union is
separable, when the soul exists in the state of separation. 3. Essential communication can be
understood either [kata methexin] {according to participation} essential, or [kata syndyasin]
{according to union} extra-essential;

Thus [kat’ ousian] {according to essence} the genus is communicated to the species, the
species to the individual, and in divine things the divine nature to the supposita. Thus [kata
syndyasin] {according to union} the soul is communicated to the body, the power of burning
to iron and in divine things, the divine personality of the [logos] {word} to the human nature
of CHRIST.

With these things having been noted, it must be held concerning the aforesaid principle
thus. Those things which are really the same, and are related in the same way, either among
themselves, or by reason of some third thing, or in relation to a subject, or by reason of
object and operation, and to say it in one word, those things which are simply the same,
with one of them having been communicated in any way whatsoever, the other is also

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communicated. The reason is at hand. For where there is a complete identity, there is no
diversity. Where there is plainly the same nature, there is no disparity. And vice versa If
some diversity is granted, and a disparate nature; now a simple and complete identity will
expire.

Furthermore, those things which are really the same, so that they are not distinguished as
thing and thing or diverse Entities, although they are distinguished on the part of the thing,
apart from an operation of the mind, can be such that with one of them having been
communicated, the other is not communicated. They can, I say, for they are not precisely
such. But certain of them can be related in such a way, 1. When one of them is receiving, the
other receptible by reason of essence or quiddity. Thus human nature and its personality are
not distinguished really as thing and thing, although they differ precisely from an operation
of the mind, as thing and mode distinct on the part of the thing: but the nature is
communicable, the person incommunicable, since the Father communicates his being to the
Son, but not his personality. But it is clear, that person and nature are related in such a way,
that one of them is [metechon] {participant}, the other [metochon] {participable}. The
person is receiving; which includes the nature: the nature is receptible, which is included in
the person. 2. When one of them is agreeing with and receptible by a certain third thing, by
reason of which the communication happens; or disagreeing, and repugnant to its nature.
Thus spirituality and life of the soul are not distinguished according to the mind of certain
people modally only, but with life having been communicated to the body, the spirituality of
the soul is not communicated, namely as to its exercise and denomination. For the body
indeed lives, and is called living, but it does not become spiritual, nor can it be called
spiritual. Thus therefore it is clear.

That both [kata methexin] {according to participation} by force of the first example, and
[kata syndyasin] {according to union} by force of the second example one can be
communicated with the other not having been communicated, although they are not at all
distinguished as thing and thing. 3. When one of them is [energeton] {active}, the other
[anergeton] {inactive}. The immortality and life of the soul can again be an example. 4. When
one is more necessary and more intimate to the subject, to which the communication
happens, than the other. Thus if the soul, which is united to its body here in Rostock, is also
outside the body in Königsberg, which the Philosophers assert can happen through the
absolute power of God; Surely the essence of the soul is communicated to its body here, yet
that presence is not communicated, by which the soul is present in Königsberg.

Finally: Those things which are the same really more strictly, so that they are not
distinguished on the part of the thing before an operation of the mind, those can still differ
in such a way, that with one of them having been communicated, the other is not
immediately communicated. And that partly as to the communication [kata methexin]
{according to participation}: partly as to the communication [kata syndyasin] {according to
union}. Let the example of the former be the common and singular nature, which are not

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distinguished on the part of the thing. For an individual has no other essence than the
essence of the species, which is limited by actual existence, so that it is an individual. For the
act which makes the individual an individual, does not differ from the essence of the species,
but it is the same act, which constitutes the species, differing from itself only in the degree
of determination. Insofar as it gives the act of essence it begets the species, but insofar as it
gives to the constituted species the act of essence of this, from which the numerical unity, it
makes the individual. But nevertheless the common nature is communicated with the
singular nature not having been communicated. To which is analogous, what our faith
professes about the mystery of the Trinity, since the divine essence is really common to
multiple persons, but the personality is incommunicable, although the divine essence and
personality are not distinguished actually before an operation of the mind. The reason is:
because even in this singular, most real identity of essence and person as yet a certain
disparity, or reason of diversity is discerned, both because the essence is [methekton]
{participable} but the person is [methechousa] {participant}, by reason of essence, and
because therefore they do not have themselves equally, nor is the nature of each mutual.
Namely the divine nature is participated by the person and the person is a partaker of the
divine essence. Therefore with the person having been communicated, if it can be
communicated, indeed the essence must be communicated: but not reciprocally; with the
divine essence having been communicated the person also must be communicated, nay
although that third thing, to which the Essence is communicated, is a person, as the Son of
God is altogether a person, God the Father communicates the essence, then the
communication of the person is plainly impossible. Since the essence, as such does not
import incommunicability: but the formal nature of the person is this very
incommunicability.

From which it is clear; that the Photinians indeed wrongly conclude from the communication
of the essence to the communication of the person, in the mystery of the Trinity against our
[theodolian] {divine gift}: but the orthodox rightly gather from the communication of the
divine person to the communication of the divine nature in the mystery of the incarnation
against the Zwingli-Jesuit [theodolian] {divine gift}. Since those proceed from the
communication of that which is participated, to the communication of that which
participates; from the communication of that, which is not simply incommunicable, to the
communication of that, which is incommunicable; But we argue from the communication of
that, which participates, to the communication of that, which is participated; and indeed
where such communication is repugnant to neither, as we will teach in the special part.

Wherefore so that the adversaries may be constrained so much more strongly, we form our
argument thus with the Most Erudite Mr. Schröder, a most practiced Theologian and
Philosopher: Of those of which one does not differ from the other [revas] {by a thing} but
only [toi logoi] {in concept} and indeed in such a way, that one is [methekton ti ousias
heneka] {something participable by reason of essence}, the other [metochon] {participant},
if the latter is communicated, [anagkes] {necessarily} the former also will be communicated:

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on the contrary, to whom the former is denied, to the same the latter also will be denied.
But the [hypostasis tou logou] {hypostasis of the word} does not differ from the divine
essence and the essential properties [revas] {by a thing} but only [toi logoi] {in concept} in
such a way indeed, that the latter is something [methekton ousias heneka] {participable by
reason of essence}, the former [methechousa] {participant}, understand [tou logou] {of the
word}. Therefore if the [hypostasis tou logou] {hypostasis of the word} was really
communicated to the flesh, both [anagkes] {necessarily} the essence of the [logou] {word}
and his essential properties were really communicated to the same. And on the other hand:
If it is denied that the essence and essential properties were communicated to it, to the
same the [hyparxis tou logou] {existence of the word} will also be denied. The assumption is
clear from those things which have been said: But the proposition will be further confirmed
thus.

Whatever is communicated to another, which is not itself, is not communicated without its
essence. For thus it would not be communicated. For of that of which there is no essence, or
is not, neither is it itself, or is it something. From which what is communicated, so that not
even the essence is communicated, is not communicated. But now those things which differ
[toi logoi] {in concept}, in the way we have said, of those one is essential to the other and
the other is predicated of the other [ousias heneka] {by reason of essence}. Wherefore if
one is communicated, the other also is communicated. The same is declared also by the
example of the soul by Mr. Schröder, which is one in number or essence, in multiple
individuals: and is only formally distinct from its faculties: as the formal difference is called
by the Scholastics that by which those things differ, which differ [toi logoi] {in concept}, in
such a way that one of them can be predicated [ousias heneka] {by reason of essence} and
per se of the other, but nevertheless contradictory predicates can be enunciated of each. For
the essence of the faculty of the soul is no other than the essence of the soul, and [ousias
heneka] {by reason of essence} the soul is predicated of each faculty. But because the
essence of the soul is designated by the faculty, as determined and restricted to the peculiar
operation, to which another faculty, which has for itself the same essence of the soul, is not
directed, contradictory things also can be predicated of the faculty and of the soul, as the
soul is communicable to three faculties: The faculty is not. But we acquiesce in those things
which have been said; since the formal distinction of the soul and the faculties is called into
great doubt. But the mystery of the [ensarkoseos tou logou] {incarnation of the word}
supplies an example of the communication [kata syndyasin] {according to union}, by which
with one of those having been communicated which are distinguished only formally, the
other is not communicated. For the Theologians teach, that to the human Nature of Christ
divine attributes, and [dynameis] {powers} have been communicated, certain others
differing from the same only formally not having been communicated, namely unto exercise
and denomination.

The reason is, because the divine attributes ad extra are not of the same nature: certain are
[energetika] {active} but certain [anergeta] {inactive}: certain can agree with human nature,

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but certain are plainly repugnant to human nature, therefore it is not inconsistent for the
[energetika] {active} to be communicated to common exercise, with the [anergeta] {inactive}
not having been communicated for this reason: and those, which agree with human nature,
to be communicated to common denomination, with those, which are repugnant to human
nature, not having been communicated for this reason. I say, that it is not inconsistent, or
adverse to right reason. For that the matter truly is related thus, is for the Theologians to
demonstrate. It is sufficient for us to have vindicated the Philosophical axioms.

XVII. There is an incompossibility of opposites being in the same thing.

Namely by reason of the same part, or in the same, insofar as it is the same. Which is clear
from the definition of opposites. So that we may speak specifically. 1. concerning disparates:
It is certain, that disparates cannot be in the same, as disparates (understand the
reduplication [katholou] {universally}, not [haplos] {simply}) since indeed the reason, that
disparates are never in the same, is disparation; since the reason of union and conjunction is
not dissension, but consensus, not disparation but a certain conspiration. otherwise all
disparates, all dissentaneous things would be united and conjoined. But from the precepts it
is clear, that disparates, insofar as they remain disparates, can altogether concur in the same
either subject or suppositum, as disparates are accepted from common use; of which any
one is repugnant to the rest indifferently without a definite mode of repugnance. 2.
Concerning opposites specially so called: It is clear, that they cannot be in the same subject
in the same respect and time.

Here we wish to touch on two things, which the Socinians object to us by force of this axiom.
One is concerning relatives; the other concerning contradictories. Relatives, they say, are
opposites. But it is the Nature of opposites, that they destroy each other mutually in the
same subject, at the same time and in the same respect according to the same part. From
which they gather, that the same cannot be at once Father and Son. Not badly, if it is
understood concerning the identity of person; Since the same person is not begetting and
begotten: But whether they understand it thus concerning the identity of Essence, as they
altogether understand it. For it is certain from Scripture, that opposite relations of the same
individual essence can be mutually incommunicable to each other. Therefore it must be
held, that it involves no repugnance for relatively opposites to be given in the same essence.
The Philosophers are accustomed for the sake of declaration to add disjunct affections,
which are relatively opposed to each other as principle and principiate, cause and caused,
although in a Being they are simply the same; but the faith responds most simply; whatever
things have been proposed in the scriptures, those must be accepted without any suspicion
of repugnance.

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Furthermore the Socinians are accustomed similarly to insist: That it cannot happen, that
contradictory predicates are verified of the same subject: and therefore since the divine
essence and divine person are the same, contradictory predicates cannot have a place here,
communicable and incommunicable. But whoever oppose thus, seem to be ignorant of the
nature of formal distinction. Since indeed a formal distinction, such as intervenes between
essence and person reconciles the repugnance of predicates; since it takes away the identity
of respect, in the way animal and man, man and Peter are distinguished only formally, yet
they admit contradictory predicates, to be watchful first and per se, and not to be watchful
first and per se: to be risible first and per se, and not to be risible first and per se. But
concerning this before. Now it behooves to proceed.

CHAPTER XIX.

Concerning the Natural and the Artificial

We will unfold in very few words 1. The Natural, 2. The Artificial.

I. The Natural is that whose truth depends on the divine intellect

The natural is taken either absolutely; or respectively, or indefinitely by the imposition of a

name, definitely. In the latter sense still in two ways. 1. Intrinsically and essentially, as the
natural is essential either a priori or a posteriori. Hence the Natural constitutively, which
constitutes some thing. Thus it is natural to man, to have an organic body and a rational
soul: and the Natural consecutively; which flows from the form immediately: in which way
properties are called natural to a subject. 2. Extrinsically accidentally. Thus it is still
accustomed to be called Natural in a threefold way. 1. Subjectively, for that which is
intimately fixed in nature. 2. Perfectively, which eminently perfects nature. 3. Transitively,
which can be propagated with nature: Thus the Theologians say that the image of God was
natural to man in the first state: namely in those three ways, because it was both most
deeply fixed in nature, intimately perfected the same, and was to be propagated to posterity
in a natural way.

But in the former sense the Natural is taken. 1. Generally, for that, which is in nature, nor
depends on the operation of artisans. Therefore it is contradistinguished from the artificial.
2. Specially, for that, which has a principle of motion and rest, or which consists of matter
and form. That acceptance is Metaphysical and of this place; this is Physical, and is not
attended to at present. For here everything, which pertains to the universe, provided it is
not from art, is called natural: therefore it comprises, both the nature naturing, which has
natured all things, as they say; that is, has placed them in the proper order of nature, in
which way God alone is nature: and the nature natured, which is universal or particular.

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The universal is the connection of causes, and is called Physical fate. The particular is that
which obtains its being from the naturing nature, and exists as the principle of certain
operations, in which way not only all things, concerning which Physics treats, but also angels
are called natural Beings. Therefore the Natural in general is described, whose truth (namely
essential) depends on the divine intellect. Where dependence properly so called or
efficiency must not be understood; but more loosely, dependence of agreement. For God
Himself also is a natural Being. But it cannot be said concerning Him, that He depends
efficiently. Cf. The doctrine concerning Truth. The other things which are said concerning
Nature and natural things, pertain to Physics.

II. The Artificial is that whose truth depends on the human intellect.

It is to be observed, that the artificial is taken in two ways. 1. Materially and concretely;
insofar as it brings in matter, on which a form has been induced by the artisan. 2. Formally
and abstractly, for the artificial form itself, which agrees with the idea in the mind of the
artisan. In the former acceptance the artificial is a Being per accidens: And therefore it is
referred to the distinctions of name. But in the latter it is a Being per se, and is not
inconveniently referred with the natural to the affections, which denominate a Being by
means of truth.

For truth expresses the conformity of a thing with the divine intellect, whereby it is natural;
or with the intellect of the artisan, and that proximately, as in things made by art. For
although these also agree with the divine intellect whereby they are true, that is however
only remotely. But as to the rest, how the natural differs from the artificial know from
Pererius lib. 7. Phys. Cap. 2. Pag. 425.

Corollaries

I. Art and Nature do nothing in vain.

For every True thing is Good; and no Good thing is in vain. For what does not have an end,
that cannot be good. But understand, as much as pertains to the intention and counsel of
nature. For whatever is done by nature, according to its counsel, that can never be in vain.
See Zab. Lib. De part. Anim. Cap. 15. & lib. De react. C. 8. P. 450. 451.

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 II. Art imitates Nature.

The Philosopher [says this] 2. Phys. T. 23. C. 8. & 22.

Philip declares it l. 2. Phys. P. 214. Art, he says, is often an imitator of nature, as beer rightly
coerced is an imitator of wine, because the juice expressed from barley nourishes, thinly
warms, but hops are added both for the sake of increasing the heat, and against
putrefaction. But art emulates nature, by reason of intention, because it intends some
perfection, and by reason of production, or rather of the fashioning of things, insofar as it
affects and endeavors to express the works of nature. The reason is; because the human
intellect strives to be assimilated to the divine. From which also human effects correspond
to divine effects to some extent. But then art imitates nature more happily, when it has
nature more for a foundation. For although in any work art prerequires some foundation of
nature at least remotely, nevertheless when art aids nature, art and nature seem to operate
as if with joined forces. Therefore the effect, which proceeds, is esteemed more excellent.

CHAPTER XX.

Concerning the Infinite and the Finite

I. The Infinite is that to which it is repugnant to have terms of essence.

Know the equivocal acceptations of this word from the Physics 3. Phys. C. 4. See also
Armand. Bellovif. Tract. 2. C. 64. Where also the things which are disputed concerning
infinite power. For they are alien to our treatment; For which it may be enough to hand
down, what the Infinite is and of how many kinds! But that is called infinite, which is outside
of being limited by another, and which simply does not admit terms of essence: or, which
not only lacks the ends or terms of essence, but to which it is [haplos] repugnant to have the
same, in which way God alone is an infinite Being. But by the scope of essence I comprise
not only the quiddity itself of the thing, but also the attributes, which are identified with the
Essence. Therefore, what is infinite in Essence, that is infinite in all attributes, by reason of
power, knowledge, goodness, perfection, so that it is of infinite power, infinite knowledge,
infinite goodness, infinite perfection. But there are especially two modes of infinity by
reason of duration and of whereabouts, The former is eternity, the latter ubiquity.

II. The Finite is that which of itself has terms, by which it is limited.

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Namely in Essence, power, operation, duration, presence. For the finite in Essence, or what
is of a restricted Essence and limited by certain terms, and therefore does not contain in
itself all being, is also finite in all attributes; in virtue and power, because it is not
omnipotent; in operation, because it is held to subsist within certain terms of its object in
operating; in duration, because by nature it has beginning and end; in presence, for by
nature it requires a definite space.

Corollaries

I. Between the finite and the infinite there is not given a mean.

I exclude a mean both by negation, and by participation. The reason is, because they are
opposites contradictorily. For these admit no mean. Against those from among the
Zwinglians, who feign a certain mean power between the finite and the infinite, which has
been communicated to the humanity of Christ, equally absurd as the Photinians, while they
dare to say that the Holy Spirit is neither created nor uncreated.

II. Whatever things are other than the first Being, are finite.

For if they were infinite in Essence, they would not be other than the first infinite Being,
which is first of all. But a distinction must be made between infinity of essence and of
subsistence. For something is given which has an infinite subsistence, although it itself is of
finite essence. Therefore also a further distinction must be made between essence and
power. For if a finite Nature can have an infinite mode of subsisting without repugnance, and
with its finitude preserved, why can it not also be of infinite power! For here a diverse
respect is given, which takes away the contradiction, while a finite Nature [kath’ auto]
{according to itself} and by reason of a natural act is said to be of only finite power but [kath’
allo] {according to another} and by reason of a personal act it is said to be of infinite power.

III. The finite is not capable of the infinite.

Namely 1. Actively, by acquiring infinity. For that implies a contradiction. But passively by
receiving the same it is not repugnant. For if the infinite can give itself to the finite, without

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repugnance, as it altogether can, why would the finite also not receive the infinite? Since to
every active power there corresponds a passive power, at minimum an obediential one; or a
distinction must be made between a capacity of comprehension and of reception: and
likewise between a Physical and a hyperphysical capacity. The former is impossible: but the
latter imports no contradiction. 2. [kata methexin] {according to participation}, so that the
finite becomes essentially infinite, which again implies a contradiction; but [kata syndyasin]
{according to union} so that the infinite is extraessentially conjoined and united to the finite,
expresses no repugnance. For by that very thing while the infinite nature unites to itself the
finite, the finite nature becomes a partaker of the infinite nature. 3. The infinite cannot
communicate itself to the finite [kath’ apopoiesin] {according to production}, or in such a
way, that the infinite effects some finite thing: but [kata metapoiesin] {according to
transference} it can altogether communicate itself to a finite nature, so that the same
becomes a partaker of infinite power, not indeed inhesively or as a subject of inhesion and
[proton dektikon] {first recipient}, but nevertheless denominatively, or as a subject of
denomination, and [dektikon] {recipient}. Concerning which the Theologians [speak].

IV. Of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion.

Understand 1. By reason of accidental inhesion. 2. By reason of Physical comprehension. 3.

By reason of Mathematical commensuration. Nevertheless a proportion is given, 1. By
reason of a common concept and analogical attribution. 2. By reason of indistance and
union. 3. By reason of dependence and subordination. 4. By reason of the agreement and
similitude of effects and attributes. The Theologians enumerate still other modes of
proportion. Especially by reason of the singular union and communication, which is mystical,
of the Word and human nature, sacramental, of the water and the Holy Trinity, Spiritual, of
God and the faithful, celestial, of the elect and the Holy Trinity, personal, [hypostatike]
{hypostatic} of the divine and human nature. See the Photinian abuse of this principle in Mr.
Kesler p. 1. Met. Phot. F. 3.25. Here we must stop.

CHAPTER XXI.

Concerning the Permanent and the Successive

I. The Permanent is that which has its whole being at once.

Or negatively, which does not have parts in flux of one passing away to another. Thus all
things which are, have a permanent being, motion and time alone excepted. For the

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permanent is taken here not [haplos] as it brings in complete indefectibility and is attributed
to God alone, nor [koinos], as it belongs to every Being; since duration is an adequate
affection of Being, but in the degree in which it distinguishes permanent Being from
successive Being, with which it exhausts the latitude of Being, therefore it is said to have its
whole being at once: or as others [say], to have all the parts of its being, who explain that
negatively, which does not have flowing parts, so that it can also be attributed to God, who
is devoid of parts. But that must be understood concerning a thing not in becoming, but in
being made. For while it is still in becoming, it does not yet have all the parts of its being.

II. The Successive is that which has the parts of its being in flux and continued
succession.

Succession is either imaginary and as it were extrinsic, or true and intrinsic. The former is
also conceived in eternity through coexistence with time. The latter is either positive, when
its terminus from which and to which is positive: or privative, which is between a positive
and a negative terminus: between being and non-being.

The privative belongs to every generable and corruptible thing. For generation is a certain
(Physical) succession from non-being to being: Corruption from being to non-being. But the
positive is either discrete between multiple total Beings, which therefore does not belong to
one Being: or continuous between the parts of that Being, which constitutes a successive
Being. For its parts are in flux, and in such a flux, outside of which its being is not: Therefore
it does not have its being at once, but it already had a part of it, now has a part, will have a
part hereafter: as motion, which cannot be without flux. For motion properly so called is not
in an instant. Therefore substantial motion generation and corruption is not understood
here. For that is in an instant: nor does it bring in positive succession. By reason of motion
time is also denominated a successive Being: namely not Metaphysical time, which is the
intrinsic and permanent duration of a thing: but Physical, which is defined by the motion of
the heaven. For its parts are in perpetual flux. Hence therefore it is understood, that a
successive Being is said to have parts: namely, in succeeding, but not at once in composing;
that is, to say it more clearly, the moments of succession are continuous, not by reason of
simultaneity in existing. For it is impossible, for the moments of time to be at once: past and
present, present and future: but by reason of consequence in succeeding: because they
mutually take each other’s place, and so taken at once constitute a successive Being.

Corollaries

I. A Being indefectible simply is permanent.

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For it so has its whole being at once, that it is impossible for anything successive to fall into
it. Which cannot be said concerning any finite and created thing. But they are inept, who do
not hesitate to ascribe a certain succession to an indefectible Being, while they bring in the
moments of time into eternity. An imaginary succession can be conceded. A true one ought
not to be conceded.

II. The Permanent is posited in the indivisible.

Because it has its whole being at once: if not absolutely, at least by equipollence. But a
distinction must be made between Entitative and quantitative division. The former belongs
no less to a successive Being than to a permanent one, because every essence is constituted
[en adiairetoi logoi] {in an indivisible concept}. But the latter is the reason for the distinction
of permanent and successive Being. For the successive consists in a continuous flux, which is
indeed divisible into certain moments. The permanent obtains its whole being at once, nor
does it admit that divisibility.

III. Where there is not a continuous flux, there is not a successive Being.

For with this continuity in succeeding having been denied the Essential individuality itself is
also denied, unity is denied, and consequently Entity is denied. Since each moment, so to
speak, in such a flux obtains its own, and separate essence.

CHAPTER XXII.

Concerning the Circumscribed and the Incircumscribable

I. The Circumscribed is that which is enclosed by the terms of a containing body.

Circumscription is either essential; whereby a thing is said to obtain a finite essence and
circumscribed by certain limits. And it is nothing other than the finitude of essence itself;
than the circumscription of essential terms, as in any created things whatsoever. Which
circumscription of essence necessarily follows the circumscription of power, so that what is
circumscribed in being, is also limited in acting.

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Another is extraessential; and that in turn is either internal or external. The internal is that
whereby a finite thing is circumscribed by its own quantity, and obtains parts outside of
parts; of which sort circumscription is a certain mode of quantity, necessary and intrinsic to
every corporeal thing, and inseparable: in the way the head is outside the neck, and the
neck outside the belly etc. And anything whatsoever enjoys its own internal circumscription,
which some call Entitative. The external is that whereby a thing is circumscribed by the
definite terms of a containing body, and so is said to be circumscribed by reason of location.
Which is understood in this place. For circumscription, which is of this place, is a certain
mode of whereabouts.

And that belongs neither to the Essential nor to the other internal [circumscription], but to
this one only. Where nevertheless a distinction must be made between actual and
aptitudinal circumscription, or between the actual and the native containment of terms. Not
the former, but the latter is understood. Therefore if it pleases, let circumscriptibility be said
for circumscription. For actual circumscription is accidental to the thing itself, and can be
separated from the thing itself, An Attribute ought to be essential a posteriori, and
inseparable from the thing itself having been made. Thus

Thus the extreme body of this universe is not circumscribed actually, yet it is not destitute of
its circumscriptibility, which can be denied to no body. Wherefore the definition of the
circumscribed must be so understood; the circumscribed is that which by its nature loves to
be circumscribed by external terms; although it is not always actually circumscribed by the
same.

II. The Incircumscribable is that which by its nature is not enclosed by the terms of a
containing body.

Such are spiritual things, devoid of all matter. For these do not have parts outside of parts,
and therefore cannot be circumscribed by the external terms of a containing thing. Which is
clear from the nature of circumscription. We proceed to the

Corollaries

I. Whatever is, is circumscribed or incircumscribable.

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The reason is the invincible immediate opposition of the terms. To demand by nature the
terms of a containing body and not to demand the same by nature. Thus whatever bodies
are, are circumscribed: and all spiritual things, as also accidents incircumscribable.

II. What is circumscribed by nature, can be made incircumscribable actually.

I prove 1. From the removal of Contradiction. For here the terms are not opposed [haplos]
{simply}. Circumscribed by nature, or by natural propensity, and aptitude, and
incircumscribable by act, or by actual location and containment. For that actual
incircumscribability can belong to the same extrinsically and per accidens, and consequently
will derogate nothing from the natural circumscriptibility itself. Indeed many things belong
to a thing per accidens, which otherwise could by no means belong to the thing by nature. In
the way it belongs to iron to float in water per accidens, when by its natural gravity it is
rather to be submerged. II. From the induction of certain examples. Thus the extreme body
of the world is not circumscribed by an actual containing body, extrinsically encompassing it
per accident, because otherwise it would not be the extreme body, meanwhile by its nature
it demands to be circumscribed. Similarly the body of Christ indeed is circumscribed by
nature, and requires an extreme circumscription, but through the union, and assumption of
the same in the [hypostasis] {person} of the [logos] {word} it is incircumscribable nor does it
enjoy the actual containment of terms, as much as pertains to external location and
situation. Otherwise it would have to be said, that it does not subsist in the [logos] {word}
but in a place, or that the [logos] {word} is a place, and circumscribes the body, in which as
[toioutoi] {such} it subsists. Thus glorified bodies in the other life beyond all doubt will lose
this actual circumscription in the conflagration of the whole universe, where God will be all
in all. Finally what must be said concerning the camel, which the Savior testifies can pass
through the eye of a needle. Will that huge and very large animal lose its actual
circumscription with this hypothesis having been granted. Or will the adequation of place
and thing placed be preserved! Say you Calvinist men, who do not hesitate to cast fetters on
the divine omnipotence. Theophylact indeed understands by the name of camel an anchor-
rope. But Calvin observes from the Talmudists, that it is a proverbial locution, and rightly
understands by the name of Camel the animal, since the Greek [kamelos] {camel} and the
Syriac Gamla abundantly confirm that it cannot be taken otherwise. Nor is there reason, that
you demand with Junius and Tremellius the speech of Christ of absurdity. For this ought to
be alien to Christians. But we remit these things to Theology. But it is clear from the said
examples concerning the possibility. For what reason and scripture teach to be given
actually, to call into doubt that that can be given is of either a weak or a profane mind.

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What the Calvinists object to the contrary especially Chamier in Panstrat. Cathol. Proceed
from the confusion of external and internal circumscription; as if by internal circumscription
also a thing is said to be somewhere; which things however we have taught must be
accurately discerned c. 8. Th.

For this confusion is the mother of that Keckermannian distinction praised by Chamier and
called into service, of place into external and internal, which nevertheless if it is admitted
especially (although it is said absurdly for a thing to be in an internal place, that is, to obtain
the End of its substance, as Chamier explains, since the finitude of essence is one thing,
location another, the former absolute, the latter relative, the former intrinsic to the thing
and inseparable, the latter extrinsic separable) it aids the Calvinists nothing. For what is this I
ask to the point, when it is asked concerning the omnipresence of the body of Christ, that
the body of Christ enjoys its own internal circumscription. There is no need to prove this; But
the question is: whether the body of Christ is extrinsically circumscribed by actual terms by
reason of situation and location! Here is Rhodes, here is the leap. Therefore all the things
which Chamier disputes Panstrat. Cath. T. 2. L. 6. C. 5. & 7. Are heterogeneous and only
prove this that every body obtains its somewhereity, and that that is not really distinct from
the body, nor can be separated, except in thought; Which was never denied. From which,
[apaideotos] {unlearnedly} and [aphilosophos] {unphilosophically} it is inferred that every
body is in a place, or occupies space, and is circumscribed by reason of situation and
location.

THIRD SERIES.

Of the disjunct less principal Affections.

To this last series I wanted to reserve the five following affections. Namely by which a Being
is denominated 1. Absolute and respective. 2. Subject and adjunct. 3. Sign and signified. 4.
Image and that of which it is the image. 5. Measure and measured. For these terms are most
general, and if perhaps any others are given more, and do not only transcend the
predicaments, but also denominate Being under disjunction, and are reciprocated with
Being, although not so [protos] {first} and primarily, as the rest, as will be clear from the
doctrine of each one.

Briefly. That the Absolute and the respective cannot be referred to the preceding classes, is
clear on both sides. But since nevertheless they generally denominate Being, and are
nowhere else contemplated, they seem deservedly to be recalled here. The denomination of
Subject and adjunct, because it does not belong to Being so much per se, as depends on the
free will, disposition and consideration of man, so that one and the same Being can now be

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called a subject now an adjunct in another and another respect, do not seem to constitute a
certain peculiar affection in the preceding classes. Therefore their [theoria] {theory} is not
inconveniently referred here. Sign and signified are almost of the same nature. Image and
imagined (let there be pardon for the word) or that of which it is the image, can be
considered in the act signified, and because it can, it ought in Metaphysics. For that general
treatment cannot be dismissed to the special disciplines, since the terms are most widely
extended and are transcendent, and prescind from created and uncreated, substance and
accident. Nor can they be explained elsewhere otherwise in the abstract. Finally measure
and measured is best subjoined to those, since likewise it is a general affection and cannot
be revoked to the other series.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Concerning the Absolute and the Respective

I. The Absolute is that which lacks respect to another.

The absolute is said by Bellovius as it were loosed from another, because it is free from
respect, if not in every way, at least in a certain respect.

Otherwise the absolute is also the same as the complete and consummated, to which the
inchoate is opposed: or what is simply, and unmixed with its opposite, and therefore is
contradistinguished from that which is said to be such secundum quid and [kata ti]
{according to something}. But notably I define the absolute by the lack of respect in general;
since indeed not less the transcendental than the predicamental respect ought to be
contradistinguished from the absolute or for that reason, because the former also draws the
thing elsewhere: For it belongs to respect to be in per accidens, and only materially by
reason of respect as predicamental: but when precisely and formally respect is considered, it
brings in nothing other than Being to, which certainly can also be said concerning those
things which transcend the predicaments.

But the absolute under that generality is said variously 1. By reason of cause, which does not
depend on a cause, as God is an absolute Being. 2. By reason of subject, which does not
inhere in some subject, on which it depends, as substance. 3. By reason of object, which
does not depend on an object, as quantities. 4. By reason of term, and that [pros ti] {relative
to something} is attended to here, whose being is not terminated to another, as all accidents
except relation.

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 II. The Respective is that which has being terminated elsewhere

Or which has respect to another, either as caused to cause, or as accident to subject, or as

potency to habit, or act to object, or finally as any relation whatsoever to a term. Which last
mode is properly of this place. For the rest also have an absolute being, and are not simply
respective. But Relation is threefold. Subsistent or substantial, Transcendental and
Predicamental. The former is singular and mystical in the sublime mystery of the Holy Trinity,
as Paternity, Filiation etc. The latter most general pervading all genera, thus matter and
form, Subject and Adjunct, sign and signified etc. Have a mutual transcendental relation or
respect to each other. The last is the common and accidental of the same things, which are
in the predicament of Relation.

Corollaries

I. Whatever is, is either absolute or Respective.

That this division is adequate is clear: because its terms are opposites contradictorily.
Nevertheless there seems to be a certain difficulty both concerning Being in precision, and
concerning respective Being. There how Being can be denominated absolute or respective
under distinction, when yet Being as it is the Object of Metaphysics is absolute. Here how
the respective brings in Essence, since relations express no perfection; But every Being is
perfect. To the former it must be said, that the absolute is taken either positively or
privatively. Positively whereby it is distinguished against that, which positively is respective:
And so Being in precision is not absolute, but a certain Being is absolute, a certain
respective. Privatively, when it is called absolute, which as such is not respective, in which
way Being in precision as such is not respective, and therefore can be called absolute.

To the latter I respond, that Relations are considered in two ways, either abstractly or
concretely. Abstractly relations do not express any perfection, which is added to the Essence;
in which way the divine relations import neither finite nor infinite perfection (for attributes
are not applied to any states whatsoever of Being, but as Being is in fact in the world outside
of all precision) and nevertheless they are truly relations, as will now be said. But concretely,
because relations imply essence, they also import perfection, in which respect also they will
have to be considered here. Because in fact they only exist concretely.

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 II. The Respective expresses nothing other than being to ( esse ad ).

For relatives are said [pros ti] {relative to something}, and those which are terminated
elsewhere, are respective. For even the very word Related indicates that, that it is related,
which is referred to another. But although in predicamentals that being to is conjoined with
being in, this nevertheless does not hinder, that relation, insofar as it is such, can be without
that being in.

Indeed a transcendent relation does not bring in accidental inherence but prescinds from
subsistence and inherence: much less must subsistent relation be confounded with inherent.
Of which sort is in the mystery of the most Holy Trinity. Goslavius indeed endeavors to
persuade that in God there is altogether no relation, to which some of the Ramists assent.
But they ought to have distinguished between the formal and the material of Relation.
Formally relation involves no imperfection, but only expresses respect to. But if some
imperfection is involved in relation, that must not be ascribed to relation as such and
formally, but to the material of predicamental relation. Real relatives are said to be those,
which with every thought of our mind having been removed have a certain respect and
order between themselves.

Which respect has no commerce with accidental inherence. What therefore would hinder,
that real relations be established in the Deity. But indeed it is clear that the same must be
conceded to be transcendentals. Wherever someone is given, who is really called Father, and
someone, who is called really Son, there also is real paternity and real filiation. Wherever
there is real paternity and real filiation, there are real relations. Furthermore: Wherever
there are processions from a principle of the same nature, there it is necessary, that the
proceeding and that from which it proceeds are of the same order and consequently, that
they have real respects to each other. That there are given in divine things, one who is really
called Father, and who Son, and also that there are given processions from a principle of the
same nature, Scripture does not permit to doubt. It is added, that all things, which are
required for relation, are found eminently in God according to our faith. The as it were
common subject of the divine relations is the divine nature itself. The foundation of
paternity is to beget, of filiation is to be begotten, of the Holy Spirit is to proceed. The relate
is the Father, the correlate is the Son, of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son at once.
The terms are the persons themselves taken at once and opposed: as the Father is indeed
referred to the Son and contrariwise, but nevertheless the Son is not, nor contrariwise: The
same is true concerning the Holy Spirit who is referred to both, namely the Father and the
Son, but is not the Father and the Son, These relations however are not predicated of God
according to the nature of inherence, as in creatures, which is of imperfection, but through
the mode of being related to another, just as also other Metaphysical relations e.g. of
Subject and adjunct, measure and measured etc. Do not bring in the nature of inherence,
but only respect to.

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 III. Relation as such does not make composition.

Otherwise every relation would make composition, which is opposed to [noein] {reason}. For
Transcendental relations express no composition in the thing itself, but only affect Being
extraessentially, and are only formally distinguished from Being, just as the other
transcendent affections. Indeed some even doubt concerning Predicamental relations,
whether they bring in composition or not, since it does not seem likely that paternity,
preceptorship, etc. Make a real composition with the subject, in which they are. But
concerning subsistent hypostatic relations the matter ought deservedly to be placed beyond
all hazard of doubt. Since relation in divine things is neither assisting or extrinsically affixed,
nor inhering in the divine essence as an accident in some subject, nor differs from the divine
essence really or in reality, but only [toi logoi] {in concept} or by reason. Thomas elegantly 1.
Part. Q. 28. Art. 2. Whatever is accidental in creatures, that transferred to God has
substantial being. But Vorstius is in vain, while he contends that there is some true
composition in God, because by the necessity of nature he contains diverse relations and
hypostases in himself. L. De Deo & attributis div. P.219 But if relation in God were an accident
and differed from the divine essence in reality, any divine person would be composed from
two things really distinct; and a certain quaternity would be introduced into God, so that the
fourth would be the divine essence really distinct from any person and personal relation,
which are absurd and destructive of the foundation of the faith.

IV. Relations are incommunicable.

Namely opposite relations; whence the axiom. As many as there are really opposite
subsistent relations, so many are the persons, the Theologians assume; There are Three
really opposite relations in divine things. Paternity, Filiation, Procession. To beget and to be
begotten, to spirate and to be spirated are not so much relations, as such acts, which signify
origin. Otherwise outside of that opposition relations are not precisely incommunicable.
Thus the Father in divine things communicates to the Son the power of spirating. But this
relation is not opposite to the Son. But the spiration, by which the Holy Spirit proceeds from
the Father and the Son, is one undivided, etc.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Concerning the Subject and the Adjunct

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 I. The Subject is that which receives something in itself, so that it is not drawn into
the communion of its being.

The name of subject is most widely extended, and if it ought to be described under such
amplitude, it will scarcely be able to be described otherwise than according to its etymology,
that it is that which is subjected to another. For a subject is either of attribution or of
occupation. This is otherwise indicated by the object, and in general is that which terminates
the action of those things which are occupied in it: Specifically it is the object either of
sense, or of intellect; and this again is said to be any [noema] {thought}, but properly the
object of a discipline, which is of contemplation or of operation, concerning which in
Gnostology. The subject of attribution is attended to here, whose nature will be clear from
the opposite. Here it may only be observed: what is it for something to be received, and
what to be drawn into the communion of its being? By which words Thomas 3. P. Q. 2. Art. 6.
Explains the subject. To receive must not be understood strictly, insofar as that which is
received is received [kath’ auto] {according to itself} and happens to the thing intrinsically:
otherwise adjuncts would be excluded, which adhere to the thing only extrinsically, but
loosely, whereby all those things are said to be received, which come upon the thing either
from without, or intrinsically. Those things are said to be drawn into the communion of
being, which concur to the constitution of the essence, and vice versa; Those things which
are outside the essence of the thing, those are not drawn into the communion of the
essence. Thus also the transcendental affections and the divine attributes, because they are
outside the essence, are said not to come into the communion of the essence.

II. The Adjunct is that which is received by another, so that it does not enter its
essence.

Scheibler thus [ex antithesi] {from the antithesis}. The Adjunct is that to which something is
subjected. He recounts two requisites of it. To be posterior to the subject; and to affect or
denominate the same extraessentially. But the adjunct (as it is commonly accepted) is either
common or proper.

The Common is that which belongs to many equally, or which does not belong to one
subject alone primarily. Thus Scaliger l. 1. De plantis p. 105. From Galen says [koinoteta]
{commonality} is [tautoteta en pleiosi] {sameness in many}. Thus whiteness is a common
adjunct of a Swan, a wall, paper, milk etc. But heat does not belong equally primarily to fire
and to mixed things. But an equality is understood not of degrees and proportion, but of
attribution. For whiteness does not belong to all subjects equally by reason of degrees, but

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equally in this way, so that the diversity of attribution is excluded, whereby it is to be
claimed for one [kath’ auto] {according to itself}, for another [kat’ allo] {according to
another}.

The Proper is that which belongs to every one alone always primarily and per se. Or, which
belongs to one alone, and adequately. 5. Top. C. 5. [idion esti ho monoi hyparchei, kai
antikatēgoreitai tou pragmatos] {the peculiar is what belongs to it alone and is
counterpredicated of the thing}, namely primarily and per se. Hence heat and the power of
burning are proper to fire, because they belong to it as to [kata propria dunata], to water,
iron, etc. Only secondarily. A proper thing is attributed to a subject adequately, either
[haplos] {simply}, and unitedly, or [symplektikos] {complexly}, and disjunctively. Therefore it
also always belongs to it, not so much by reason of act, as by reason of potency. Thus a man
does not always actually laugh, and Scaliger refers Exerc. 202. 3. That in Yucatan Cozumel
and other islands dogs are kept for eating, which do not give any barking. But for the rest
three things are required for propria.

1. That they are distinguished from the subject either really, or at minimum formally.
For if they are identified with the subject simply in the formal sense, how will they be
called adjuncts.

2. That they affect the subject extraessentially, and therefore denominate, and are said
[paronymikos] {paronymously} of the subject.

3. That they are reciprocated with the subject in the nature of a suppositum. Therefore
attributes are both Eminent, and Predicamental. The former do not differ really from
their subject, as are the Metaphysical or transcendent attributes and the
hyperphysical or divine. But the latter differ really from the subject, of which sort are
the proper accidents in Physics.

Besides these proper adjuncts common adjuncts, which are in the thing, and are commonly
so called, there are still other adjuncts, which indeed are not in the thing, yet are truly
adjoined to it, so that they do not come into the communion of its being. In which way form
is called the adjunct of matter, the soul of the body, although they cannot be referred to the
common class of adjuncts either common or proper. Thus also arms are the adjunct of a
soldier, a garment of a man, although they are not predicamental accidents. From which it is

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clear, that besides accidents, and eminent attributes there are given adjuncts, which are
adjoined to the thing either [kata schesin] {according to relation}, or [kata syndyasin]
{according to union}. Hence.

Corollaries

I. Whatever is outside the essence of a thing, while it truly belongs to the thing, can
be called an adjunct.

For the same is not the subject. Therefore it will be an adjunct: since those terms ought to
exhaust the latitude of Being. But observe, that the adjunct is outside the essence of that, of
whose adjunct it is, or of its subject. For these are said [pros ti] {relative to something}. Thus
it will not be doubted, that human nature can be said to be an adjunct of the [logos] {word}.
For a distinction must be made between the [logon haplon] {simple word} and [syntheton
logon] {composite word}: the [logos] {word} simply considered when it is compared with
human nature, nothing seems to hinder, that it itself can be called the subject, this the
adjunct, with those words having been taken transcendentally. Otherwise it is certain that
the composite person, the [theanthropos] {God-man}, respects human nature, not as
subject and adjunct, but as whole (mystical) and part: See Damasc. Lib. 3. De Orth. Fid. Cap.
4. Both can well consist. Human nature is a part ([kata analogian] {according to analogy}) of
the composite person, and is an adjunct of the simple [logos] {word}, or divine nature, just
as a graft is

The adjunct of a stem, and becomes a part of the tree. Mr. Scheibl. Lib. 1. Metaph. Cap. 23.
N. 26. & seqq. Argues that the [logos] {word} ought in no way to be called the subject of
human nature, nor human nature the adjunct of the [logos] {word}. And that chiefly for this
reason, that the flesh of Christ having been assumed has been assumed into the very
[hypostasin tou logou] {hypostasis of the word}. But, so that I may freely say what I think,
this reason does not seem to conclude. For it is one thing to receive into the personality and
subsistence of someone, another thing to come into the communion of the essence of
someone. And lest ambiguity deceive, I say, that to come into the communion of essence
here is understood concerning essential constitution, not concerning any participation of
essence. For as Mr. Scheibl. Himself observes; all those things are called adjuncts, which
either follow the essence of the thing, or come upon the same; num. 8. The divine attributes
are called adjuncts by him, n. 25. Which nevertheless it is certain participate in the divine
essence, as they are considered materially and concretely.

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But indeed just as it is clear, that flesh has come upon or been adjoined to the [logos] {word}
perfect and complete per se essentially, and that the [logos] {word} has received flesh into
its [hypostasin] {hypostasis}, and flesh by this reason has been made a partaker of the Deity,
and therefore has come into fellowship of the divine nature, so it is not yet certainly
concluded from thence, that flesh has so come into the communion of the essence of the
[logos] {word}, that it cannot be called its adjunct.

For surely flesh is not of the essential constitution of the [logos] {word}, although it has been
made a partaker of the essence of the [logos] {word} through the personal union, and also
constitutes one [hyphistamenon] {subsistent} with the [logos] {word}. But whatever is
adjoined to a thing perfect in being, and is predicated [paronymikos] {paronymously} of the
same, that altogether seems to be able to be called an adjunct:

To the exception: that the [logos] {word} is called man, not human, and that every adjunct
brings in either accidental inherence, or [parastasis] {adjacency} externally, I respond. First
that predication, the [logos] {word} is man, is indeed abstractive as to sound, yet not as to
sense. Indeed here a substantive is expressed of a substantive in the nominative case, but if
the nature and resolution of the predication is attended to, it cannot be said otherwise, than
that the predication happens in the

Concrete, and that it is Paronymic, not Synonymic. For no mean can be given between a
Synonymic and a Paronymic predication, because they are opposed contradictorily, as
essential and non-essential or extraessential, as is shown in Logic. The reason or foundation
is the identity of person, but not an essential unity. Therefore there is given a
communication not [kata methexin] {according to participation}, which is the foundation of
Synonymic predications, but [kata syndyasin] {according to union}, which is the foundation
of Paronymic predications. The Analysis cannot be instituted otherwise, than as Mr. D.
Mylius teaches in this way: The [logos] {word} is personally the same, who is man, which we
have demonstrated elsewhere. From which it is again clear that the predication is made not
in the abstract, but in the concrete, which certainly is so far from prejudicing our assertion,
that it rather confirms the same.

The divine attributes are truly adjuncts from the mind of Mr. Scheibler, although they seem
to be predicated in the abstract e.g. GOD is truth. Namely because they only seem to be. For
in reality such predications are made not in the abstract, but in the concrete, which besides
the relation of the extremes the analysis teaches. God is really the same as what is truth. For
as the Scholastics [say]; they are verified in an identical sense, not in a formal sense. But

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when GOD is called not man, but human, or humanized, or incarnate, it is another and
diverse predication, which both as to sense and as to sound is concretive and denotes that
for proximate foundation it has, not as the former, the identity of person, or the
communication of subsistence, but the communion of natures.

Furthermore that not every adjunct necessarily imports either accidental inherence or
external adherence or adjacency, the divine and transcendent attributes teach, which are
neither accidents, nor adjacent to or extrinsically adhere to the subject.

Form is the adjunct of matter, which therefore is most commonly accustomed to be called
the subject, the receptacle [docheon] {recipient}, the formed thing see Scalig. Exerc. 17. And
for the same reason matter is called place among the Platonists see Scalig. Exerc. 10.
Scheibler. Lib. Cap. N. 12. But form is not an accident inhering in matter, nor

Does it adhere to matter extrinsically [kata parastasis] {according to adjacency}, but rather
intrinsically perfects matter, and is united to the same [kath’ henosin] {according to union}.
But it seems by this reason that the [logos] {word} ought rather to be said to be the adjunct
of human nature, than human nature of the [logos] {word}, because the [logos] {word} is in
flesh, and because flesh is the [docheon] {receptacle} of the [logos] {word}, and
[theodochon] {God-receiver}. But it must be observed, that the denomination of subject and
adjunct depends on the diverse consideration, collation and disposition of things, and
therefore it is not absurd, in a diverse respect to attribute to the same, now the
denomination of subject, now of adjunct. Although in the present I would rather want flesh
to be called the adjunct of the [logos] {word}, than the [logos] {word} of flesh. For flesh has
acceded to the [logos] {word}: and the [logos] {word} has received flesh. For flesh is not
actively [deocheon] {receiving} but passively, insofar as it has been assumed by the [logos]
{word}, in personal conjunction and union. For the finite is not capable of the infinite except
passively.

II. The Subject is prior to the adjunct.

Namely, insofar as they respect each other, as subject and adjunct. Thus arms insofar as they
are adjoined to the soldier, are his adjuncts. But sometimes they are prior to the soldier, but
not insofar as they are adjoined. But priority must be understood amply, so that any Priority
can be subsumed. Otherwise the Corollary will deceive:

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 III. The Subject and the adjunct are not necessarily distinguished really.

The reason is: because properties are given, which are not really distinct from their subject.
Since for the nature of a property it is enough, if the nature of the subject is conceptibly
prior to the nature of the property, and if the latter follows per se the formal nature of its
subject. But to be distinguished really from the subject, so that the subject enters the
definition of the proper affection, as something added, and not as essential and intrinsic,
this is not of the formal of a property in the abstract, but is proper to predicamental propria.

But that it is altogether permitted to conceive the nature of the proper, where in reality the
attribute is the essence itself, or that it is permitted to distinguish the adjunct from the
subject, although it is identified with the subject, even the natural reason of understanding
sufficiently confirms. Since our intellect cannot conceive all things adequately and distinctly
with one concept

It forms inadequate concepts, and distinctly apprehends the essence in itself, distinctly
likewise the various respects in the same simple essence, which the same has and admits
either in [syneseia] {connection} to other things, or in [schesei] {relation} to diverse
operations. Therefore it forms the concept of subject and adjunct distinctly, yet in such a
way, that it does not overturn the real identity, while it conceives the formal difference.
Therefore that must be accepted with a grain of salt.

The formal concept ought to correspond to the objective concept. Namely as to the thing
and the truth, not as to the mode and abstraction, or by reason of truth, but not necessarily
by reason of adequation. The formal concept ought not to be false and disformed, but it
cannot always be adequate to the objective concept. But it is often necessary to represent
the same thing by other and other inadequate concepts. Thus Enjedi in Explic. Locor. 1. Cor.
12. 4. P. 288. 289. Says that God has so created our mind, that it thinks accidents (let
adjuncts be said) even in God, and unless it happens thus, we can understand nothing
concerning God. For our mode of understanding requires that. But if we consider this
impotence and power of God as it is, and with respect to God, the power and impotence will
be substance and something essential, because in God, whatever is, is substance. Thus God
is power itself, and in turn that power is God Himself. These things he [says]. Which can be
opposed to other Photinians, who feign in God a certain real composition from subject and
accident, Goslavius against Keckerm. P. 1. Refut. P. 9. A property, he says, is not the essence
itself. Intellect is a property of God. What therefore is his essence! And Vorstius in l. De Deo
& attribut. Divin. In God, he says, there is this and that, namely subject and accident. But I

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concede, that no adjunct is the very essence of the subject [noematikos] {notionally} on the
part of the concept and formally, but that the attributes of God are not the very essence of
God [pragmatikos] {in fact} on the part of the thing and materially, let Goslavius prove that.
We altogether think that that is opposed. 1. To the divine simplicity. For attributes really
distinct from the essence import a real composition from subject and accident. But multiple
extremes composing, which are actually distinguished between themselves, cannot be given
in God on account of the highest simplicity of God.

2. It is proved from the divine independence. For attributes really distinct from the divine
Essence are either dependent or independent, either are finite or infinite. If the former
Therefore something dependent and finite is given in the independent and infinite Essence.
If the latter. Therefore besides the divine essence multiple independent and infinite Beings
will have to be admitted, really distinct from that, that is, multiple Gods, which implies a
contradiction. 3. To the divine perfection. For if some accident really distinct from the divine
essence were found in God, either it would depend on some external cause, or it would
emanate from the divine essence itself. If the former, God would not be the supreme cause.
If the latter, in God there would be something by nature prior and posterior; and likewise an
effect properly so called and participated being, the divine essence with respect to those
accidents would be in passive and receptive potency, which conflicts with the perfection of
God. 4. To the divine immutability. For those accidents either perfect the essence of God, or
not: If the latter, they are in vain; nor are they Beings really distinct from the Essence of God;
because every Being expresses a certain perfection. If the former, God will be mutable, But
concerning these things in Pneumatics.

IV. The proper of one cannot be the proper of another.

For the proper is that which belongs to one alone primarily and per se. If therefore it
becomes the proper of another, that which belongs to one alone primarily and per se, will
also belong to the other primarily and per se, which implies a contradiction. Rightly
therefore Porphyry in Isagog. c. 15. §. 4. [Idion apan einai idion adynaton] {It is impossible
for the peculiar to be peculiar to everything}. But the Calvinists wrongly infer. That propria
can in no way be communicated. Timpler, there is a manifest implication of contradiction in
holding something to be proper, and yet communicated, Keckermann, If the proper is
communicated, the distinction between the common and the proper is taken away. To which
general and unlimited statements most certain examples [anantirretos] {uncontradictably}
are opposed, For what is proper to the genus, is communicated to the species; what is
proper to the species, is communicated to the Individual. The proper of an essential part is
communicated to the Essential whole, the proper of a member is communicated to the
integral: the proper of nature is communicated to the suppositum or person: The proper of

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the miscible is communicated to the mixed, the proper of an accident is communicated to
the subject, finally one proper accident is communicated to another beyond controversy. If
therefore these are truly propria, as they altogether are, and nevertheless are truly
communicated, how will it be universally true, that communicability takes away propriety.
And therefore it must be noted, that the Proper (which is here used generally, whether it is
[esiodes] {essential}, or [epesiōdes] {extra-essential}, or [hypostatikon] {hypostatic}, and
likewise whether it is proper [haplos] {simply}, [kata ti] {according to something} proper, or
proper [idion] {peculiar}: and again whether it is a proper [dynamis] {power} or a proper
[energeia] {act}) can be communicated in not one way, so that it does not cease to be
proper. Namely the proper can be communicated.

1. [kata chresin] {according to use}, in the way the proper goods of friends by reason of
[ousias] {essence}, are common by reason of [chreseos] {use}.

2. [kata mixin] {according to mixture}, as when the proper of one miscible is predicated of
the whole mixed.

3. [kata metekbasin] {according to transference}. Thus the splendor and image of light
having arisen from the light of the sun is communicated to the air, and is received by it
through [metekbasin] {transference}.

4. [kat' allopoiesin] {according to alteration}. In which way God communicates his goodness,
and justice to created things, fire communicates heat to cold water, while it heats it.

5. [kata methexin] {according to participation} according to essential participation, in which

way the propria of universal nature are communicated to particular nature, the propria of
the genus are communicated to the species, the propria of the species are communicated to
the individuals, not so that they enter their essence essentially, but because the species
participates the essence of the genus, the Individuals the essence of the species.

6. [kat' esiode antichorēsin] {according to essential interpenetration}. Of which sort is found

in the mystery of the most Holy Trinity, where the Father communicates to the Son his
essence, and all his essential attributes.

7. [kata syndyasin] {according to union}; which likewise is not of one kind. For either two
accidents are united between themselves, or accidents with their subject: from which
proceeds one per accidens, or diverse substances are united between themselves. Here also
there is given a certain communication, either under the nature of inherence, whereby that
which is proper to the accident, on account of inherence in the subject (the term of
inherence having been taken broadly, of whatever sort it is, so that it is adequate to the
accident) is communicated to the subject, as it is proper to humidity, to be contained with
difficulty by its own terms, which is communicated to the subject e.g. to wine, because wine
consists with difficulty, because it is humid, or under the nature of coexistence: when

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accidents coexist in one subject, for then they obtain between themselves a certain
communion by reason of the subject, by whose grace they can be predicated of each other,
as risibility and the capacity of discipline concur in the rational soul, so that they can be
predicated of each other in the concrete, the risible is capable of discipline, which
predication certainly presupposes a certain [koinonian] {communion}, since the foundation
of every predication is [koinonia] {communion} either [kat' ousian] {according to essence} or
[kata syndyasin] {according to union}: But here (when substances are united between
themselves) again there is given communication of principles by not one nature. One is
improper, the other proper. The improper [kata syndochen] {according to synecdoche},
whereby that which is proper to the part, is attributed to the whole either essential or
integral. Which alone the Cinglians admit in the article concerning Christ: when they speak
concerning the communication of properties. Thus Polanus:

The communication of properties is said with respect to the person, to whom each nature
makes its properties common, but by no means is it said with respect to the natures
between themselves lib. 6. cap. 26. p. 379. Syntagm. But if they sometimes seem to admit
also the communication of properties by reason of the natures, they imply only a verbal and
[onomastiken koinonian] {nominal communication}. And therefore Danæus against Mr.
Chemnitz contends, that those things, which are predicated of the flesh of Christ, must be
explained by no other than a nominal and titular [koinonia] {communion}. Hence they take
refuge either in [periphrasis] {circumlocution}, or in [tropos] {figure}, and accept the
predications of Scripture, which intimate that communication, only figuratively or as to title,
as is demonstrated by our Theologians. The proper communication of substances united
between themselves is either of union [kata parachorēsin] {according to interpenetration} or
of union [kat' emphysin] {according to implantation}. Examples of the former are given both
physical, and mystical; Thus often in nature two disparate substances are joined, between
which a certain real communication intervenes, but extrinsic. And in sacred things there is
sacramental, spiritual, celestial communication. The former happens by means of the
Sacramental union, and intercedes between the bread and the body of Christ, the wine and
the blood of Christ. The latter happens by means of the mystical and gracious union and is
defined by Varinus, [ten ton hagion mysterion metalepsin dia ten pros Christon hemin
charizomenēn henosin, kai koinonous hemas eautou basileias poiein] {the reception of the
divine mysteries on account of the union with Christ granted to us, and to make us partakers
of his kingdom}. The last by means of the celestial and glorious conjunction, which we
expect in the other life, where we will become much more [koinonoi theias physeos]
{partakers of the divine nature}, than in this imperfection of the present life. But all these
things [exo pases tes syrraxeos keimena] {lie outside of all the controversy}: nor is there
need to tarry longer on these things in the present. It is sufficient, that the generality of the
statements and axioms of the Cinglians concerning the denial of any communication of
propria has been shaken by so many examples. But the controversy is properly agitated
concerning the communication of properties, and of propria [kata physin] {according to

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nature} and that proper, and indeed [kata antilepsin] {according to exchange}. Which we
defend, the Cinglians judge impossible. Therefore let our thesis be.

The proper of one subject [kath' henosin] {according to union} can be really communicated
[kata antilepsin] {according to exchange} to another subject diverse by nature. I demonstrate
with examples. 1. of accidental union. I assume the union of iron and fire, and so conclude. If
fire in ignited iron really communicates to iron its light and heat [kata antilepsin] {according
to exchange}, it follows that the proper of one subject can be communicated really and [kata
antilepsin] {according to exchange} to another subject diverse by nature, but united. The
former is true. Therefore also the latter. The Connection is firm, because light and heat are
proper to fire, at least [kata ti] {according to something}, insofar as they belong only to fire
by nature, which is luminous and hot, but not to iron, which by nature is opaque and cold;
fire and iron are subjects diverse by nature, since they differ in genus, and one comes to the
other already actually constituted, and one can exist apart from the other. The Assumption is
confirmed, both because they are united [kata antilēpsin] {according to exchange}, and
because the proper light and heat of fire are communicated to iron really. The former
concerning [kath' holon] {according to the whole} or ignition may be certain, since that is at
last said to be ignited, which has fire in itself, as wine is said to be honeyed, which has honey
in itself. Indeed the splendor, heat and scintillation of fire [ophthalmophanōs] {eye-
revealingly} teach, that fire and iron are so united, that the substance of fire is contained
within iron. Conf. Scal. Exerc. 1. 3. Nor indeed is penetration of dimensions to be feared
here, since it is clear that a tenuous and subtle substance can permeate a rare and porous
substance without penetration of dimensions. But these things we prove thus. If ignited iron
truly and really shines, either it shines by a light implanted in itself, or by a light produced in
iron by fire, or by the light of fire really communicated to iron [kata antilepsin] {according to
exchange}. Not by an implanted light: for iron by its nature is opaque: nor by a light
produced in iron by fire. For that would have been produced in iron either through
emanation, or through transmutation. Neither can be said. Not the former, because from
light emanates not light but lumen; and in emanation the principle from which, and the
subject in which are the same; Nor the latter. For thus it would follow that ignited iron is
ignited by the fire, by which it is ignited, and is converted into fire, and therefore from a
crass dense substance becomes a tenuous and subtle substance. Which are absurd. But lest
anyone say, that lumen is produced by light in iron as lumen is produced in air by the Sun, it
stands in the way, that iron by its nature on account of its inborn blackness and opacity is
inept to receive lumen, since lumen is the act of the perspicuous, insofar as it is perspicuous
2. de an. § 69.

2. Of natural union. The proper life of the soul is communicated to the body really and [kata
antilepsin] {according to exchange}. Therefore a certain proper of one subject can be
communicated to another subject diverse by nature, but united really and [kata antilepsin]
{according to exchange}. The Antecedent is proved. Life is the faculty of operating vitally, or
the immediate principle of vital operation, and its formal cause is the soul, so that it is truly

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proper to the soul, and belongs to it alone [protos kai kath' auto] {primarily and according to
itself}; either [esiodos] {essentially}, or [epesiodos] {extra-essentially}, concerning which it is
still disputed. But the same life of the soul is communicated to the body, since the body lives
by no other life, but by the proper life of the soul, which certainly cannot happen without
communication. For that the body lives neither by a life [kath' auto] {according to itself}
proper to itself, nor by a life produced in it by the soul, is easily demonstrated. The former
indeed from thence, that life depends on the soul alone, nor can proceed from the form of
mixture, nor belongs to every body; and comes to the body only from elsewhere and is
inspired there, that finally with life having been extinguished the body does not immediately
perish. But the latter because it is absurd for the soul to generate a soul or vital faculties of
operating in the same body, and for the same body to be the [proton hypokeimenon] {first
subject} of that life, and the soul not to be that, by which we live and sense primarily, and
therefore the body does not live for that reason, because it has a soul, through which it can
exercise vital operations, as the Philosopher states 2. de an. § 10. & §. 6. when he defines
the soul, [prote entelecheia somatos physikou zoen dynamei echontos] {the first entelechy
of a physical body having life in potency}.

3. Of personal union. Concerning which the Theologians may be seen.

VII.With one proper having been communicated, the rest are not immediately
communicated.

For also those things, which are really the same, can sometimes be such, that with one of
them having been communicated the other is not immediately communicated, as we have
seen cap. 18. Porism. XI. Indeed it cannot be denied that there is a communion of propria,
whereby it happens, that insofar as the subject of one proper is in another subject [kata
ousian] {according to essence}, so far also all its propria are in and with the subject, in the
other subject: but from that it does not yet follow, that all are communicated to the other
subject, because besides inexistence and common possession common exercise is required
for communication. But it is clear, that not all propria are [energeta] {active}, nor is the
subject equally receptive to all, so that it can be denominated by them. Which propria
therefore are [anergēta] {inactive}, how can they be communicated to common exercise?
Furthermore since certain propria [haplos] {simply} are repugnant to the nature of the
subject, but others are not repugnant; certain confer to the end, on account of which the
union was made, certain do not so confer, it is manifest, that the subject is not receptive of
all in the same way, nor is there the same necessity of the communication of all.
Nevertheless separation of one proper from another must not be concluded from thence,
but only distinction, since the nature of possession is one thing, the nature of exercise and
denomination another, nor are those things, which are possessed at once, also exercised at

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once, and denominate the subject in the same way. But concerning these things others
[speak] more prolixly.

VIII. Proprties cannot be separated from the subject.

A distinction must be made. 1. between proprties really distinct from the subject, and
proper attributes, which are really identified with the essence of the subject. The latter can
in no way be separated really from the subject on account of the real identity with the
subject. But the former are only said to be inseparable from the subject secundum quid.
Therefore 2. a distinction must be made between proprties considered by reason of the first
Act and by reason of the second act. To say indiscriminately that proprties as to the second
act are inseparable, is plainly hasty, since there are

stand out in nature very many examples, by which it is demonstrated to the eye that the
second act of propria can be absent, and proper [energeiai] {acts} can be separated from the
subject. Whence those [polythryllēta] {much-repeated} [sayings]: act can cease with faculty
remaining: [energein] {act} can be impeded with habitude remaining: and by negation of
[energein] {act} on account of an extreme impediment [to echein] {to have} is not taken
away. So that it is a wonder the Calvinians deny so stubbornly, that a body can be present,
which is not actually seen, not touched, not located, because propria cannot be separated;
since not [energeiai] {acts}, but their potencies are propria of this sort, which cannot be
taken away from the subject. But also 3. concerning potencies a distinction must be made
between actual inexistence, and natural agreement. For it is one thing for man to be actually
risible. Another for man to be risible by nature. By reason of natural agreement proprties
seem to be [aphoristoi] {inseparable}, so that it is truly said [idiotēton arnēsis, he anairesis]
{the denial of properties is the negation and removal} of natures Theodor. Dial. 3. Vigil. 5.
Contr. Eutych. C. 2. And in Epist. Contra Monotheletas. For if agreement were denied, e.g.
that it does not even agree for man to be risible by nature, that would indeed be denied,
which can in no way be denied, since man is altogether risible by nature, but it is impossible
for the same thing to be and not be at once. But as much as pertains to actual existence they
are not so closely connected with the subject really distinct from the subject, that they
cannot be separated from the subject really by any power with the essence of the subject
preserved.

But a distinction ought to be made 4. Between the absolute power of God, and the power
defined by nature. For since nature has a definite mode of acting, it cannot pass beyond the
prescribed order. But the power of God is exempt from the laws of nature, and is precisely

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restricted to no order. Why therefore could not God again dissolve that nexus, which is
between the subject and the proper, which He Himself has tied!

Indeed naturally that, which depends on the essence as an [aporroia] {emanation} cause
cannot be absent, or an effect of a cause acting through emanation be separated from its
cause, yet it can supernaturally. But if anyone stubbornly denies it: we urge, 1. The condition
of possibility. All that is possible, which does not involve a certain contradiction. But for an
essence to be given without proper accidents says no contradiction, Therefore. 2. The divine
freedom in acting. For if God as the most free agent were to concur to the sustentation of
the subject, and suspend His influx and concurrence at least as much as pertains to the
natural emanation of the potency from the subject, then surely the essence of the subject
would be preserved, but the property would not emanate from its subject. But nothing
hinders, that God cannot so concur; e.g. so that He preserves human nature, but suspends
or retracts influx, as much as pertains to risibility, lest that emanate from rationality. For the
influx to rationality, or to the essence, and to risibility or to the proper affection is altogether
distinct. Since the essential moments of nature or the [tas physeos ousiopoious] {essence-
making of nature} or essentials a priori, and the [ta parepomena] {consequentials} or
essentials a posteriori are distinct. 3. The similitude of examples. For although examples of
the separation of properties from the subject are not had, whereby they are considered by
reason of the first act, nevertheless certain similar examples occur in sacred things, which
argue no less power e.g. that the act of gravity has been separated from iron, the act of
burning from fire. For if you consider the nature of things, it does not seem less impossible
for iron to float in water, for fire not to burn given a combustible subject, than for man not
to be risible, or for a subject to lack its proper affections. Even if it would seem most difficult,
yet will that which seems difficult in our eyes, also be difficult in the eyes of God!

IX. Those which have the same properties, have the same essence.

Namely as properties. Otherwise it deceives: as that of the Zwinglians: The Human and
divine natures have the same properties, there is [tautotēs] {sameness} of properties,
Therefore they are of the same essence. For human nature does not have the properties of
the divine as properties, so that they belong to it [kath’ auto] {according to itself} and
[protos] {primarily}, and emanate from its essence, but only by communication [kata
syndyasin] {according to union}. For it is certainly one thing, to have something, and another,
to have something as proper. Although also the consequence can be denied, that the divine
and human natures therefore have the same properties, because human nature has the
properties of the divine nature. For the antecedent only brings in the truth of attribution,
namely that the properties of the divine nature are in fact predicated of the human, but the
consequent imports the identity of attribution, as if the properties of the divine nature were

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the properties of human nature and were said in the same way both of human, and of divine
nature. Equally I would infer, man has the properties of animal. Therefore man and animal
have the same properties. But anyone sees the antecedent to be true, the consequent false.

X. Diverse natures obtain diverse properties.

Because between nature and properties there is given a certain essential connection and
necessary reciprocation. Thence against the Monothelites it is proved that in Christ there are
two wills, because in Christ there are two diverse intellectual natures, divine and human,
especially on the hypothesis of the most celebrated men, that the intellect is the same with
the intellectual soul.

XI. Properties belong primarily to universals, secondarily to singulars, but accidents

belong to individuals immediately, to universals mediately.

The reason of the former is, because proprties flow from the very essence, which as such
abstracts from singulars and is universal, therefore proprieties belong primarily to universals,
but to individuals only consequently or by reason of the species. But the cause of the latter
is, because accidents do not have a necessary connection with the essence, but belong to
things on account of other causes and on account of their actions. For actions are in
singulars; therefore they belong immediately to singulars, and through them to the species,
and other universals. Although the nature of accidental predicates is different which import
an extrinsic denomination from an act of the intellect, of which sort are genus, species, etc.
For the action of the intellect is not determined and restricted to singulars. Confer
Conimbric, in c. 6. Isag. Porph.

CHAPTER XXV.

Concerning the Sign and the Signified

I. A sign is that which represents something to the knowing power.

See the various acceptations of the word in others. We will be occupied in the thing, A sign is
said to be any mark arguing a thing; and it brings in a twofold respect; one to the knowing
power, sense or intellect, to which it represents something, the other to the signified, which

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it represents. But to represent is nothing other than to place before [one] what is present,
which presence (of the sign as such) is not real, but only intentional, insofar as the sense or
intellect perceives the signified from the sign, and places it before itself as present, not as to
the thing and material being, but as to the species, and ideal being. But there is given a great
variety of signs on account of the various connection with the signified and not one mode of
signifying. I. A sign is natural or arbitrary. The former coheres with the signified by nature, in
the way smoke is a sign of fire, but the latter on account of a divine or human institution,
which comes upon the thing already constituted in absolute being. For although every
natural Being is arbitrary with respect to God, that is nevertheless only called an arbitrary
sign, which has been ordained by God to signify something beyond being

What it is in itself. But an arbitrary sign either signifies from the imposition alone, or from
the custom also and use. The former, as a crown suspended is a sign of wine on sale: the
latter, as bending the knee is a sign of exhibiting honor to someone. But that the natural sign
represents, it has from the nature of the thing itself, or the natural connection, which it has
with the signified. Thus every effect is a sign of its cause, because it has a natural connection
with the cause; every cause is a sign of the effect for the same reason.

II. The Signified is that which is represented by the sign.

Not one is the relation of the signified to the sign and vice versa. The sign is referred to the
signified, as the measure to the measured: the signified to the sign, as the measured to the
measure. Whether however this relation is always real, may be doubted. When the measure
and the measured are something real, also the relation seems to be real. But when either
extremum is only a being of reason, as in the signs of the second imposition, which signify
only the modes of knowing, which are not in the things, but are only the works of reason, to
wit second notions, another nature of relation seems to be given. Concerning the signified
these things are to be noted. 1. It can be known and unknown. That indeed which altogether
lies hidden, nor is led to the knowledge of something else, nor deserves the name of sign.
But what in itself is unknown, as long as something else leads to the knowledge of it, truly
obtains the nature of the signified. An unknown disease is signified to the doctor by the sign
of the pulse or tongue. A letter closed and not yet read is signified by the seal. 2. The
signified can be equal to, broader than, or narrower than the sign. Equal to, as when the
things signified are equal in number to the signs: as if someone should use only proper
names of men, Peter, Paul, etc. Broader than, when the sign extends to fewer, as the sign
animal extends to fewer than the sign substance. Narrower than, when the sign extends to
more, as the sign of the Sacraments, which may signify either properly and [aplos] {simply}
the material and earthly thing, for example water: But by trope and analogy, besides the
analogue, that is, the spiritual gift of regeneration, which alone is the signified properly so

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called. 3. Not a few divide the signified into formal and objective. The formal is that which
the sign properly and proximately represents. So the dove and tongues of fire properly and
principally signified the Holy Spirit with its gifts. The objective is that to which the signified
has been ordered. Thus the Spirit with His gifts has been ordered to this, that it might testify
that Christ was the Messiah. Which may suffice for the Signified. From the sign and signified
arises the signification, concerning which a few things remain to be noted. It is either true or
false. True when there is conformity between the sign and the signified. Hence is the first
truth of speech, words are instituted for this, that they are conformed to the things and
conceptions of the mind. Which conformity is nothing other than signification. False when
there is not conformity between the sign and the signified. Hence there is the first falsity,
when speech is not conformed to things and the conceptions of the mind. Which
nonconformity is nothing other than erroneous signification.

Corollaries

I. The Sign is not the signified.

The distinction of Sign and Signified, whereby they are considered materially, and whereby
formally: Materially it is accepted for the underlying things to which those denominations
belong; Formally, for the relations themselves opposed to each other. And in this sense the
sign is not the signified. For what the word of sign formally imports, that the word of
signified does not signify. And thus far they are relatively opposed to each other. But in that
sense, or materially, the same can be the sign and the signified. For although according to
the first imposition of the word signs seem to be said only of those things, which are really
distinguished from the signified, nevertheless usage has obtained, that signs are also said of
those things, which are not distinguished really from the signified. Thus the specific
difference is an intelligible sign, through which the generic nature is known to be under it. 1
Rhet. Cap. 2. It is said to be a sign of sickness, if someone labors with fever. Indeed notes are
not always distinguished really from the noted thing; so that the Papists are in vain, when
from thence they deny that true doctrine and the legitimate use of the sacraments are notes
of the Church, because the Church is the multitude holding the true doctrine, and the
legitimate use of the Sacraments, although these also are not one and the same thing. For it
is one thing, the multitude of believing men, another are the Word and Sacraments, which
are had by them. And just as light is a note of those walking in the light, so that when it is
asked, who walk in the light, it can be rightly answered, that those walk in the light, whom
the light indicates, or who do the works of light; so the truth of doctrine is a note of the
Church and of true believers, so that when it is asked, which is the true Church, I may rightly
respond that it is the true Church, which the true doctrine indicates, or which holds the true

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doctrine. But nor is it absurd, to say that the definition is a note of its defined, since
[horismos] {definition} is [gnorismos] {making known} and [ousias] {of essence} and the
office of a definition is to represent the defined in the intellect, although the definition and
the defined do not differ really. For the same thing in diverse respect to be more known by
reason of itself, is not inconsistent, in the way the defined is less known than the definition:
which argument see explained more broadly against Gregor: de Valentia disp. 13. Of our
Collegium on the Augsburg Confession thes. 19.

II. Whatever represents something to the knowing power, is a sign.

Whether the representation happens to the sense, or to the intellect. For not every sign is
necessarily sensible, much less visible, as some of the Zwinglians want, but for the nature of
a sign it is enough, that it exhibits the signified to the intellectual power, in the way
intelligible species are not sensible, and visible, yet they are truly signs, by reason of the
object, which they place before the mind as signified. And what would hinder I ask, that an
invisible thing cannot be the sign of another thing, that is to represent something else to the
intellect? The word sign was indeed first imposed to signify sensible signs which can be seen
from August. Lib. 2. De doctr. Christi cap. 1. And that for this reason, that all our knowledge
takes its beginnings from the senses, but since also those things can be presented to the
intellect, which per se and directly do not fall into the senses, and the same in turn can
represent other things, hence to the same also the denomination of sign is attributed: and
therefore its definition must be amplified: so that a sign as such, is said to represent the
signified either to the sense or to the intellect. Specifically certain signs are visible, as the
Rainbow is a sign of the covenant, smoke of fire, the footprint of a hare etc. And other
instrumental signs of this kind, as also species from formal signs: certain are invisible,
[noemata] {thoughts}, intelligible signs: or concepts signifying things: Similarly the Holy Spirit
is called a sign and pledge of our inheritance Eph. 1, 13. The knowledge and love of God is a
seal and sign of election. 2. Tim. 2, 19. Etc: certain are mixed, as the Sacraments, which are
visible, and invisible. Visible by reason of the external senses, and administration: invisible,
by reason of celestial things, and the Sacramental union.

III. A sign purely significative places the thing only ideally.

And vice versa: Whatever does not exhibit the thing itself, truly really, but represents only
the same ideally, that is a bare sign, purely [semantikon] {significative}, but not an exhibitive
sign or [metadotikon] {communicative}. For a sign is called exhibited from thence, that it
exhibits the thing itself. Against the Zwinglians, who call the Sacramental Symbols exhibitive

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signs to us, and cry out that injury is done to them, when they are said to believe only bare
signs in the sacraments, purely semantic, but nevertheless deny the real and substantial
presence of the signified things, that is, they feign exhibitive signs, which do not exhibit the
signified thing, except ideally: and they deny that those are bare signs, because they are not
bare from respect of signifying and sealing the things ideally exhibited: Twice foolish indeed.
Once, because they confuse the ideal and real presence. For an exhibitive sign it is required,
that it place the thing present, of which it is the signified, not only ideally: or that it exhibit
the thing itself, not only the species of the thing. But if they say, that they profess the
presence of Celestial things, as of the body and blood of Christ in the Supper, they are
deceived by the word. For according to their Lexicon the real presence of the body of Christ
is not said as to the substance of the body of Christ exhibited in reality, but as to the idea
representing the substance, For they define this presence by the representation of faith. But
whence will they prove that faith has this power, that it can make absent things (really)
present, and exhibit (really) what is absent (really), since it is an open contradiction for an
absent thing to be really present. Things are said to be present to faith only by reason of
contemplation, and not by reason of real existence. If faith truly makes truly absent things
present, faith falsely apprehends things, because it apprehends things, not as they are, but
as they are not, for when it intuits an absent thing as present, it falsely intuits it, and not as it
is, but as it is not: For it is not present or absent. And further: if faith makes absent things
truly present, it will be the cause of being as of its object. Which is no less absurd, than for
knowledge to be the cause of the knowable thing etc. A distinction must be made between
the promise, and the thing itself promised. The promise is present to faith yet not always the
thing promised is present, unless perhaps this is said to be the nature and power of faith,
that it confuses all places and times. Again in this they are foolish: that they think a bare sign
is so called for that reason, that it is bare and void from respect of signifying. The most
judicious Theologian Mr. D. Menzer p.m. disp. 6. T. 2. Gieß. Th. 23. Refutes this [kephygma]
{chapter} sternly with these words, Those who object that bare or empty or vain signs are
not posited by them, because namely they signify and seal the signified things, they foolishly
trifle. For that bareness or emptiness is said not with respect to signification, without which
a sign can no more be or be thought than a dream without sleep, but with respect to the
celestial thing, as in the Lord’s Supper, if the bread is said to signify the absent body of
Christ, it is an empty vain sign: not empty of signification (for thus it cannot be a sign) but
empty of the body of Christ. Which those assert, who do not believe that the body of Christ
is present with the bread substantially and really: who, they say, the body of Christ is the
signified of the Holy Supper, by this very thing denying, that the body of Christ pertains to
the essence of the Holy Supper. Since no signified is an essential part of its sign. For if the
body of Christ is not really present, how can it be really exhibited there, where it is not
present: and if the body of Christ does not pertain to the essence of the Holy Supper, how
will the Sacrament of the Supper considered in its essence not be void and bare of the body
of Christ? Nor do they intend anything else by those similar things, which they are
accustomed to bring forth with the Zwinglians concerning a testament, as an exhibitive sign

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of a legacy, or an inheritance: concerning a crown, and a royal banner, as an exhibitive sign
of a kingdom or principality; concerning a ring, as an exhibitive sign of a bride etc.
Concerning which Bergius declaims according to his custom in german writing on the words
of the Supper, namely, what kind of exhibition is there, and what kind of presence of the
exhibited things, such also are those exhibitive signs. But who would be so absurd, as to say
that the legacy is really present to the testament, the kingdom to the crown, the groom to
the ring, and that by real exhibition the legacy is offered with the testament, the kingdom
with the crown, the bride with the ring? The presence is relative & respective: and the
offering is symbolic, but not a real presence and exhibition. Therefore improperly and
abusively are these signs called [prospheroumena] {offered} and [metadotika]
{communicative}: and, if in the same way the Sacramental Symbols are said to be
[prospheroumena] {offered} and [metadotika] {communicative} signs, now with only the
manner of speaking having been changed, and composed for deceiving nothing else will be
implied, than that the sacramental symbols, so that I may express it in proper and open
words, are bare signs purely [semantika] {significative} and empty Cinglians leave the Holy
Supper empty of the celestial thing or the body of Christ, as indeed it is absent in reality
from the Holy Supper, as far as heaven is distant from earth, as Beza and Ursinus claim.

IV. The Signified is in no way predicated of the Sign in the nominative case.

In no way, I say, neither properly nor figuratively; because if the signified is predicated in the
nominative case of its sign, insofar as it is signified, it follows, that two relates are predicated
of each other in the nominative case, which is Contradictory. One relate is not the other
relate, but is the relate of the other relate. Therefore a sign is not a signified properly, but is
the sign of the signified, and the signified is the signified of the sign. Whence if the body of
Christ and the blessed bread are predicated of each other, insofar as they are related as sign
and signified, which the Calvinists want, it will have to be said, the bread is the bread of the
body of Christ, and the body of Christ is the body of the bread, They cannot take refuge in
Metonymy, because according to them in a Metonymic predication the signified is put.
Whence the body of Christ will have to be accepted for the sign of the body of Christ.
Wherefore not the signified in the signified, but the sign of the body will be predicated of
the bread in this sense: The bread is the body of Christ, that is, the bread is the sign of the
body of Christ, They certainly differ for the signified to be put for the sign, and for the
signified to be predicated of the sign: nay it is an open contradiction when once it is
affirmed, that the signified body of Christ is predicated of the bread as sign, afterwards for
the sign of the body to be predicated of the bread. See Graverus in absurd. C. 3. §. 26. And in
Anti-par. Propugn. N. 65.

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 V. The same thing can appear by diverse signs.

For signs are outside the essence of the signified; and therefore their essential diversity does
not bring in an essential diversity of the signified, and the separation of the former does not
import an essential separation of the signified; nay it can happen, that one and the same
thing, manifests its essence in diverse ways through diverse signs of itself, e.g. Health
manifests itself in diverse parts of the human body by diverse signs, by redness in the face,
by the pulse in the arteries, by the gait in the feet, by cheerfulness in the eyes etc. Why can
distinct hypostases of the same singular essence not also manifest themselves by distinct
external signs, so that they are discerned from each other by diverse modes of appearing?
That consequence of Goslavius is weak; In Math. 3. The Father and the Son appear in diverse
and separate figures. Therefore they are of diverse and separate essence. For it does not
follow from the condition of external figures to the state and nature of those of whom the
external figures are notificative.

VI. Notes ought to be infallible.

For notes ought to demonstrate certainly the noted thing. Therefore it is necessary for the
same to be infallible. But for this it is required, that 1. They belong to the noted thing alone
and always. For what does not belong to the thing, how can it indicate the thing? But what is
common to many, how can it infallibly note one thing? Finally what does not belong to the
noted thing perpetually, how can it certainly demonstrate the noted thing at all times? But
when a note is said to be proper to the noted thing, that must be understood, as much as
pertains to truth, but not precisely also to opinion, it is enough, if the note is proper to the
thing in reality, it is not necessary, that they are also proper in the opinion of men, as
Bellarmine foolishly says lib. 4. De not. Eccles. Cap. 2. For the propriety and note of a thing
does not depend on human opinion, but on the thing itself. Thus also those notes, which the
Papists assign to the Church, are not such, that they are had as proper to the Church by all.
Thus what they say to be a note of the Church among others is, that it depends on the
Roman Pontiff in all things, likewise the infallibility and immunity of the Church from
absolutely all errors, these are so far from being acknowledged by us as proper to the
Church, that we deny also that they belong to the Church, since neither that dependence
has any foundation in Scripture, nor can they bring forth any privilege of that infallibility. The
other notes, which are brought forth, are likewise such, that they are either not true or
certainly at least are common and improper, nor necessary or only probable, in our
judgment indeed, therefore they will not be truly notes by force of the Bellarminian
hypothesis since the notes also ought to be known by the opinion of men. 2. That it discern
the noted thing from any other whatsoever, and be inseparable from the same. For because

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they are proper and necessary, it behooves them not only to exhibit the noted thing
distinctly from the rest, but also to belong to the same inseparably: so that wherever the
note is, there the noted thing is certainly collected to be. Otherwise those notes would by
no means be infallible. From which it is permitted to conclude, that the Papistic or
Bellarminian, or Valentinian, or Pistorian notes of the Church etc. For the most part are not
notes, or certainly are not proper and infallible, as we have deduced disp. 14. In Aug. Conf.
Thes. 8.

VII. Notes ought to be more known than the noted thing.

Namely by reason of the knowing power; from thence the Papists infer that the notes of the
Church, which the Orthodox assign, are not genuine notes, because they are not more
known [kath’ hemas] {to us}, by reason of the knowing power, but only [physei] {by nature},
or by their nature more known than the noted thing. But a distinction must be made
between conjectural and infallible knowledge. Although the Church itself [kath’ hemas] {to
us} is more known, as much as pertains to conjectural knowledge, than the truth of heavenly
doctrine, yet it is not [kath’ hemas] {to us} more known by the same, as much as pertains to
infallible knowledge. Because the true Church cannot infallibly be established by us, except
insofar as its truth is known. But the true [Church] cannot be known, unless its truth is
apprehended from the Scriptures. Because its doctrine is not otherwise true, except insofar
as it agrees with Scripture. For the normed thing is known from the norm: A conclusion from
the principle. Therefore the knowledge of the Church, as true, is not of the senses but of
faith. But faith rests on the infallible Word of God. See again the disputation just cited
concerning these, and other things of this kind more extensively.

VIII. A memorative sign is of absent things.

Understand the absence of species. For the absence of the thing itself is not necessarily
required for remembrance. Thus with closed eyes we can recollect even of things present: so
that it is not simply inconsistent to recall the memory of those things, which are really at
hand, otherwise than the Zwinglians think, who deny the real presence of the body of Christ
in the Supper, for that reason that the Supper is celebrated in remembrance of Christ. Which
argument I have examined more broadly in the Stereoma of the Testament of Christ
opposed to D. Joh. Bergius p. 102. seqq. But Marckius objects libr. 1. Met. cap. 12. p. 119.
This argument. Memory is only of past things. Therefore memorative signs will not be,
except of past things: He proves the consequence, because memorative signs are means of
conserving memory. But that memory is of past things, is clear from the definition.

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Resp. Although memory is of the past, whereby it is taken for the repeated cognition of the
thing known, as it is known, and therefore it is presupposed that the thing was previously
known, which is recalled into memory: as Maccovius says it is received by all with
unanimous consent this definition. Memory is the repeated cognition of the thing known, as
it is known or a regression to the notion of that, which was previously apprehended, as it
was apprehended: nevertheless it is not necessary, that that thing be absent, or that it has
now passed away in real being; but that it has previously entered the mind, whereby
objective being, in which way the Fathers in the Old Testament recalled into memory the
previously known passion of Christ, the passion of Christ did not for that reason then pass
away: when we recall into memory the future life, this is not for that reason in the census of
past things: when we recall into memory some present thing, previously already known, it
by no means follows, that it is not present, then when it is recalled into memory. To pass
over, how diverse they are: for the passion and death of the Lord to be memorable: and for
there to be a memory of the body of Christ: Indeed the Sacramental eating has been
instituted for the remembrance and annunciation of the death of the Lord: but not for the
admonition or commemoration of the body of Christ.

IX. Signs from institution signify not only to those, who legitimately use them: but to all.

Maccovius feigns a canon of this sort. p. 1. Met. c. 2. p. 110. those which are signs from
institution, do not signify properly except to those, who legitimately use them, that is, who
in that way, in which they ought, and to that end, to which they ought. But what reason does
he give of it? None: And why would they not signify also to others, who do not use them in
that way and end, in which they ought? But he illustrates it by the example of the law
concerning the cities of refuge, namely that they did not obtain immunity from punishment,
who did not use that law: But what is this to the point? What sign from institution is there,
whether the law, or the city of refuge? He feigns that we object: that even those become
partakers of the thing signified in the Eucharist, who illegitimately use the sign, because
those who eat the bread unworthily, become guilty of the body of Christ: But we by no
means use this objection: because we do not admit that the bread is only a [semantikon]
{significative} sign, or only significative, but [metadotikon] {communicative}, with which the
signified thing is exhibited: and it is one thing to signify something to someone, another to
become a partaker of the signified thing! Meanwhile Marckius says it is false, that he cannot
be guilty of the body of Christ, except he, who eats the body of Christ, because he who has
treated the image, letters or seal of the Prince unworthily, is guilty of lese Majesty, although
he has never touched, nay never seen the person of the Prince itself, he adds that the
Apostle writes concerning profane men Heb. 10. 20. that they trample the Son of GOD, and
profane the blood of the covenant, and do despite to the Spirit of grace, although they have
never perceived either the Son of GOD, or the blood of the covenant, or the Spirit of grace:

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those who fall away, cap. 6. 6. are said to crucify Christ again, whom nevertheless they have
never seen.

But it must be observed, that that guilt, concerning which Paul [speaks] 1. Cor. 11. is
committed by the eating itself: but how can he sin in the body of Christ by eating, to whom
the body of Christ is not exhibited to be eaten, and who by no means perceives it? The
examples, which are brought forth, are diverse: because the image of the Prince is only a
[semantikon] {significative} sign, not [metadotikon] {communicative}, of which sort the
Eucharistic bread is taught to be in Theology: but in the other examples not even the respect
of a sign intervenes. What also is falsely supposed in this, that such profane persons have
never perceived the Spirit of grace, when Heb. 6. they are said to have both been
enlightened and to have tasted the heavenly gifts and been made partakers of the Holy Spirit
and to have tasted the good Word of GOD and the powers of the age to come. Finally how
does this pertain to the matter, that they are said to have crucified Christ, who have never
seen him! Do they crucify the image of Christ? If it is said, that that at least is proved, that
one becomes guilty of something or can offend against some object, which he himself does
not see, perceive or attain. Resp. that is [anhomoionymon] {equivocal}, because the
question is not simply concerning guilt, but which happens in a certain way: as in this place
concerning the guilt of the body of Christ, which is contracted by the eating itself in the Holy
Supper: where no one does not see, that the object is required to be present, the object also
to be perceived although not in that way, in which it was fitting, since the eating is
unworthy: because by the unworthy eating that guilt of the body of Christ is contracted.

CHAPTER XXVI.

On the Image and that of which it is the image, or the exemplar.

I. The image is that which proceeds to the likeness of another. That the image must
be dealt with in the designated act, I think is established beyond any dice of
doubt. For the ratio of the image can be defined in the abstract, and afterwards
divided, as in and from the opposite of the same, the Exemplar, declared, as well
as recognized in its affections, as will soon be evident from the treatment itself.

It is absurd, however, that something can be known and not need to be referred to any
knowledge. Moreover, without this cognition of the image in the designated act in
abstraction, it is not permitted to accurately define this or that image in the exercised act,
and in material application it can very easily be erred. Therefore, just as in the special
disciplines the image is dealt with in the exercised act, in the way Theology deals with the

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substantial λoγος [logos] image, with the image of God in man, Physics with the concepts of
the mind; Optics with the various representation of Images; so it is absolutely necessary to
expound the nature of the image in the designated act, so that the cognition may be more
certain: and that in first Philosophy.

On account of the commonality of the term, and transcendence, For the terms of the images
is the first real common notion, transcending the predicaments, since the image is given
uncreated: and hence the image abstracts from the created and uncreated. 2. On account of
the reciprocal denomination of Being: because the image with the exemplar denominate
Being reciprocally. So that whatever is; may be image or exemplar: and vice versa: Every
image and every exemplar may be Being. 3. On account of the agreement of principles;
because the image not only has an excellent agreement with the sign, but also the principles
which are handed down concerning the image are so arranged that they altogether claim a
place for themselves in transcendental theory. 4. Finally on account of the dependence of
the inferior disciplines. For since in no special discipline can the ratio of the image be
expounded in the abstract, and nevertheless in the same the term itself occurs not
infrequently, the inferior disciplines seem to require and by a certain right of their own to
demand from Metaphysics that it take upon itself this province of considering the image in
the abstract. Therefore, let there be the unfolding of the ὀνομασια [onomasia, naming] of
the image.

Image is said as if “imago”, because it is made by reason of the exemplar or its prototype.
Biel. 1. Sent. Dist. 3. Q. 9. 2. In sacred [scripture] it has various significations, yet in such a
way that most of them concur in kind, and signify a certain agreement or likeness of diverse
things. Sometimes it is taken intransitively, as Soncinas speaks similarly, for the thing itself,
as 1 Cor. 15:49, the image of the earthly and heavenly man for the thing itself and essence.
Such expressions are, when to be in the form of God or form of a servant Phil. 2:6-7, is truly
to exist as God or man: for the sign of the Son of man to appear is for the Son of man
himself to appear, Matt. 24:30, as Flacius explains in [his] Key. In this way also the sign of
circumcision is called circumcision itself, Rom. 4:11. But sometimes transitively; and that
either substantially or accidentally.

For although to the Latins from the nature of speech it seems only to denote a shadowy
picture, and what represents the thing itself at least in any kind of appearance, yet to the
Hebrews it also denotes a true and real existence or the form of the thing itself, and a living,
essential expression. Thus also it is necessarily taken essentially in Heb. 1:3 and elsewhere,
as Flacius shows at length. Briefly; when it is used substantially, it is taken either properly or
improperly.

Properly, as when it is attributed to the λογω [logo, Word], the Son of God, 2 Cor. 4:4, Heb.
1:3. To man, who was created in the image of God, Gen. 1:26-27. To sons with respect to

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parents in human generations, Gen. 5:3. To reborn man on account of supernatural gifts, 1
Cor. 15:49. Improperly, when it denotes someone’s vicar, in which way the man is called the
Image of God, 1 Cor. 11:7, as if in his stead he presides over the world.

Accidentally it is taken for a shadowy appearance of things, and that either properly, as
when it denotes visible images, Rom. 1:23, or figuratively, when it denotes the fleeting
condition of things, Ps. 39:6.

In Philosophy and common usage the word “image” occurs: 1. For statues, pictures, or
sculptures. 2. For living simulacra. 3. For an inconstant and fleeting thing. 4. For signs of
things in sense or intellect, in which way images are called sensible and intelligible species.
5. For that to which and according to which images are made.

For Goclenius notes, Lex. Phil. P. 215, that the image is either that to which or to whose
exemplar something else is made or is: or that which is made to another or according to
another. Thus Thomas rightly notes, p. 1, q. 37, art. 1, that the image is properly said to be
that which proceeds to the likeness of another, but that from which it proceeds is properly
called the exemplar, improperly the image.

Cognates of image are likeness, sign, vestige. Likeness (which seems to descend from Heb.
Mashal, with transposed letters) sometimes denotes that which is like something, 1 Cor.
14:7, Dan. 10:16, Hos. 12:10, sometimes the same as image, form or appearance of
something, 2 Sam. 16:12, Deut. 4:15-16, 2 Kings 16:10, sometimes the same as exemplar
and idea, or to which the image is formed, as Ex. 25:9, sometimes the agreement itself of
things, which is required for the ratio of image, Gen. 1:26, Dan. 1:10, Heb. 4:15, sometimes
the thing itself, Ps. 144:4, Rom. 5:14, 8:3, etc.

But properly speaking, the image is distinguished from likeness in this way, that the image is
what proceeds to the likeness of another: but likeness is the agreement of diverse things,
and indeed in the image the correspondence of the image and that of which it is the image.
Therefore, every image implies a certain likeness or agreement, namely with the exemplar,
but not every likeness immediately carries the ratio of image, unless it is especially the
likeness of the exemplar as such. For the ratio of likeness is completed in the agreement of
two or more. But the image further requires that it be expressed from elsewhere as if from
an exemplar. Hence we say an egg is like an egg. But we do not say an egg is the image of
another egg.

The sign agrees with the image in this, that as the sign represents the signified, so the image
represents the exemplar by reason of itself, as to the agreement and proportion which is
given between the sign and signified, as well as between the image and the imagined: not
truly by reason of us, and as to the cognitive power, and the special reason of
representation, so that just as the sign not only says a relation to the signified, but also

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carries a relation to the cognitive power, to which it represents the signified, so also the
image not only says a respect of agreement with the imagined, but also a relation in addition
to the sense or intellect.

For this relation does not seem to be carried in the formal ratio of the image, as will soon be
evident. Indeed many signs are images, as the concepts of things are called their images,
and other formal signs, etc. But there are also images which are not signs; and signs which
are not images. Thus the Son is called the image of his Father, not the sign. The rainbow is a
sign of grace, the towel a sign of the impending meal or supper, not an image, etc.

Besides, not every image says a respect to the cognitive power, and hence neither does the
image, as such, formally involve this respect, but a certain image only imports it materially,
as it is a sign, or by another reason. Light is the image of light, yet it does not on that
account say a respect either to the intellect or to the sense. In divine things the Son is the
image of the Father; but insofar as he is the image, he does not represent the Father to the
cognitive power. For although he who sees the Son also sees the Father, yet the Son, insofar
as he is the image, does not καθ ‘ημας [kath hēmas, according to us] represent the Father:
but insofar as he is ὁμοίος [homoios, like] to the Father, unless you wish the Son to be called
the image of the Father in this way, that the word “image” denotes that which is
representative of another, in which way Flacius takes it: in which case I will not object.

Vestige is described as an imperfect likeness imperfectly leading to the cognition of that of

which it is the likeness. Thomas 1. Dist. 3. Q. 3. Therefore, in the vestige there is given a
certain agreement with that of which it is the vestige, and a certain defect, namely an
imperfect and obscure notification of the same. In this way in all creatures certain vestiges of
the goodness, power, and wisdom of God are said to be discerned, and natural notions are
called certain vestiges of the divine image.

But the vestige is distinguished from the image in this way: The image manifestly represents
that of which it is the image, the vestige obscurely represents that of which it is the vestige,
Biel. 1. Sent. Dist. 3. Q. 9. More remote likenesses of the creature to God are called vestiges,
closer ones are called images. Hence man is said to be in one respect the image of God; in
another, the vestige of God. The image of the divine essence, his wisdom, goodness, etc. The
vestige of the Most Holy Trinity insofar as he has three faculties, rational, sensitive, and
vegetative.

The Scholastics add that there is also given in man a certain image of the Most Holy Trinity,
insofar as he both is, and knows that he is, and loves his being and knowing, Augustine thus
l. 4. De Trin. C. 8: “Behold, the mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself, if we
discern this, we discern the Trinity, not yet indeed God, but the image of God.”

But to the point. Wherefore, that a πραγματεια [pragmateia, systematic treatment] of the
image may succeed in unfolding, I repeat the description of Thomas: The image is that which
proceeds to the likeness of another, which implies two requirements of the image. 1.

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Likeness and agreement with another. 2. Origin and dependence, taking the term
“dependence” broadly, as Lechettus explains, l. 1. Dist. 3. Q. 9, in comment. On Scot.: “In
every image it is required that the image imitate the imagined, but imitation expresses an
essential dependence to the imagined either of the caused to the cause, or of the measured
to the measure, or as of the participated to the unparticipated.”

Cf. Ægid. Ibid. D. 4. Q. 2 & 3, and Durandus ibid. Q. 1. Thomas, l. 1. Sent. Dist. 28, speaks thus
on this matter: “If image is properly taken, by that name two things are understood,
imitability, and that according to which the imitation takes place, but this according to which
it is an imitation, is common to both, namely to the image and to the imagined.”

Likeness is required, because it belongs to the image to represent the thing of which it is the
image. But this cannot be done without likeness. But the origin or procession of the image
from the imagined is added, because without this it is not an image expressed by its
exemplar, and therefore is not an image. Therefore, bare likeness does not suffice: since
many things are like to each other, which nevertheless are not images of each other.
Irrational creatures are in some way similar to God, yet they are not his image. A man is
often similar to a man, as to lineament and temperament, yet he is not his image; unless it is
said so abusively.

But a picture is properly called the figure and image of a man, which by likeness refers to
him, and is referred to him as to that whence it is expressed for the sake of representation.
In these two requirements two others are included: likeness imports an adequation of
proportion, origin imports order.

Hence in general four requirements of the image are wont to be enumerated by others. 1.
Likeness. 2. Proportion. 3. Expressed and proximate sign of the species. 4. Order.

It should be noted, however, that the terms of expression, production, dependence should
be so explained that they infer no imperfection, since the image is also given in divine things
devoid of all weakness. The Scholastics, taking this into consideration, also distinguish
between being the image of someone, and being to the image of someone: since the latter
seems to import a certain imperfection, but the former is immune from all imperfection:
because it prescind from created and uncreated Being.

They say therefore that the image in the formal notes involves no imperfection, but since the
image as to material has variety, one is perfect, which is of the same nature with the
imagined, another imperfect, which is of another nature, therefore to designate the
imperfection of the latter, they assert that it is not only the image, but also to the image.

In this way man is the image of God and to the image of God. But the Son of God is the
image of the Father, but not to his image, since he is of the same nature with the Father, as
the most perfect image. See Thomas lib. 2. Dist. 16. Q. 1. And p. 1. Sum. Q. 35.

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But these things do not seem to be so accurately distinguished. For there is also given a
perfect image (which is of the same essence with the imagined) of which nevertheless it is
said that it is to the image of another. In this way the Son in human things with respect to
the Father is a perfect image; but nevertheless by the phrase of scripture he is said to be to
the image of the Father, Gen. 5:3.

It would be more correctly said that to be produced to the image of someone denotes an
essential distinction of the image and the imagined, which being the image does not carry:
and therefore the latter infers no imperfection, which however is inferred in that which is to
the image of another.

Hence the Son of GOD is indeed called the image of the Father, but because he is of the
same essence in number with the Father he should not be said to be begotten to the image
of the Father.

Moreover, the image is distinguished not in one way. First, by reason of the requirements
and more formally; and indeed as to the former requirement, likeness, in two ways.

Into perfect and imperfect image: of which I have just now said certain things. For the
perfect image it is required that it be an indifferent species of the thing to which it is
expressed, or a united and indiscrete likeness for equating the thing to the thing; which is
therefore said to be convertible. In the imperfect image, however, there is given no equality,
not by commensuration but by proportion. See Thom. Lib. 2. Sent. Dist. 16.

To others the perfect image is that which exactly refers to its πρωτότυπον [prōtotypon,
prototype] as to the species and sign of the species. Thus the image of a certain man is in his
son, who imitates him in human species and figure. They define the imperfect as that which
refers to its own as to the sign, not as to the truth of the species. Thus the image of a man is
in a stone or silver statue.

Castanosus in his distinctions constitutes three kinds of images. First is the image of equality,
most fully having whatever the exemplar has. Thus the Son is the image of the eternal
Father. Second, of imitation, thus man was made by creation to the image of GOD. 3. Of
representation, thus the world is called the mirror of creation, in which creatures may
examine him, as the architect in the work, and the cause in the effect.

Of this place also is the distinction of likeness handed down by Bonaventura, lib. 2. Sent.
Dist. 16. Art. 1. Q. 1, that it is: 1. By complete agreement in nature, as one person of the
Trinity is said to be similar to another. 2. By participation of some universal nature. Thus man
and brutes are assimilated in animal. 3. According to proportionability, as a sailor and a
charioteer agree according to comparison to those things which they rule. 4. By agreement
of order, as an image is assimilated to an exemplar; where he adds: “In the first and second
way no creature is similar to GOD, in the third and fourth every creature is assimilated, etc.:

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and that which is assimilated to the image from afar has the ratio of a vestige, but that which
is assimilated from near has the ratio of an image, as man.”

The image is essential and complete, which infers likeness in being, or quidditative
perfection: and that either κατ᾽ ὁμοουσίαν [kat’ homoousion, according to
consubstantiality], in which way the Son of God, or κατ᾽ ὁμοιουσίαν [kat’ homoiousian,
according to similarity of substance], in which way the son of man is said to be the image of
his Father; or μιμητική [mimētikē, imitative], accidental and incomplete, which infers
likeness only in referring or representing: either in the representative ratio: in which way
man is said to refer to GOD by some likeness, not to equal his lowliness.

As to the latter requirement, procession, the image is 1. By eternal generation, as the Son of
GOD, 2. By creation, as the image of God in the first parents. 3. By natural propagation, as in
Seth the image of Adam defiled by sin. 4. By artificial production, as are painted or sculpted
images. 5. By intentional operation, as the images of things in the mind or concept, for
which also agreement and a certain dependence are required.

Then by reason of the subjects and materially the image is divided into Substantial and
Accidental: which distinction is understood in two ways, as one image is a substance,
another an accident, since there are also given accidents which are images, as Sensible
species in the organs of the senses, concepts in the intellect; light in the air, or as the image
expresses a certain agreement in substance, a certain in accident, and the former indeed,
when the image and the imagined are of the same nature or essence, in which way the
essence of the Son of man and of the Father is the same, or numerical, in which way the
essence of the Son of God and of the Father is the same; but the latter either in quantity
conjoined with quality or in quality alone.

There the site, constitution, and external figure of quantity is noted, just as pictures and
colossi are called images of illustrious men: here the agreement of the quality of one or two
or three species, as when someone by likeness of natural disposition, or by imitation of
virtues and vices is called the image of another.

Into corporeal and incorporeal or material and immaterial. For concepts are immaterial
images of things in the intellect, sensible species also in the senses.

Into eternal and produced in time, which is evident from what has gone before.

III. The exemplar is that from which something is expressed, which has likeness with
the same. That from which the image is, is called the exemplar, idea, form,
ἀρχέτυπον [archetypon, archetype] and πρωτότυπον [prōtotypon, prototype],
barbarously the imagined.

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And there are likewise two requirements of it. 1. The expression of the image. 2. Agreement
with the expressed image. August. 12. De civ. Dei c. 25. Defines the exemplar as the form of
the mind, according to which an agent through the intellect acts, or which an agent through
the intellect imitates, others as the form imitable by the intellectual agent.

The Conimbricenses, l. 2. Phys. C. 7. Q. 4. Say that it is a certain external form, but very
ἀπόρως [aporōs, doubtfully]. For the formal external cause is the opposite in the opposite.
Nevertheless it can be called a form by reason of the exemplated thing, so to speak, not
because with respect to this it exercises formal causality, but because its image is made.

For the images of things are wont to be called the forms of things. See Suarez in Met. Disp.
25. S. 2. N. 15. And other Metaphysicians, who treat of the Exemplar more extensively.

Corollaries

I. Every image is similar to its exemplar. For similarity is included in the formal
concept of an image. However, similarity should be understood loosely or in
terms of attributes. Hence, it is not permissible to infer with the
Anthropomorphites that, since man is the image of God, God is corporeal. Nor is
it permissible to dream with Eugubinus in Cosmopœia, Oleaster in Gen. C. 1, that
God assumed human form in the creation of man, because there is a transition
from the non-distributed to the distributed, from image and likeness to likeness
in substance. The use of this corollary can also be against the Papists, who most
ineptly fabricate images in which there is no similarity at all to what they ought to
represent, as noted in every type (τύπος [typos], which is properly a kind of
prefigurative and representative image of its antitype). Something is required
which is the cause of why something is a type, namely the representation of the
antitype, and thus agreement with it. However, for a type as such, neither
specific identity of the antitype nor complete agreement in mode and
circumstances is required. For a type can prefigure a thing, yet not be of the same
essence as the thing, and there can be disagreement between the type and
antitype in many respects. It is not necessary that what is foreshadowed be found
in the type itself; it is sufficient if it is similar. Therefore, something can be in the
antitype properly, more universally and broadly, which is in the type improperly,
more particularly and narrowly, etc. For example, Jonah in the belly of the fish
was a type of Christ in the belly of the earth or sepulcher, although the former
did not lie dead in the belly of the fish, as the latter lay dead in the sepulcher. But
it is sufficient that there is something in Jonah similar to the dead Christ. Hence,
Socinus’ conclusion in his book on the Servant, p. 143 is invalid, when he
concludes: Since divine justice was not completely satisfied by the sacrifices of

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 the Old Testament, they did not prefigure Christ’s satisfaction, since every figure
and type, as an image, must correspond to the truth. For just as it is not
necessary for the nature of a type that what is in the antitype be held in itself
properly and in the same way as it is in the antitype, so also it is not necessary
that the satisfaction rendered to divine justice be found in the type or in the
sacrifices which are said to foreshadow Christ’s satisfaction. It is enough if there
is agreement in some other way, in which the nature of a type is preserved.
Although theologians also demonstrate that it is false to say that divine justice
was not at all satisfied by the sacrifices. For although the sacrifices of the Old
Testament did not satisfy divine justice ἐνεργετικῶς [energetikōs, effectively] of
themselves and by their own power, they did satisfy τυπικῶς [typikōs,
typologically] and exemplarily, by the power of the one sacrifice slain from the
foundation of the world.

II. Every image is expressed from something else. Namely from its archetype, and
therefore it also expresses or represents its archetype. For as Justin Martyr truly
defines in Questions and Responses to the Greeks, εἰκὼν ἐστιν ἧς ἡ γένεσις διὰ
μιμήσεως [eikōn estin hēs hē genesis dia mimēseōs, an image is that whose
origin is through imitation]. Which, besides Festus, Andreas Placus expresses in
Latin words in his Biblical Lexicon on Psalm 72: “An image is properly said to be
that whose generation is through imitation, just as a son is said to be the image
of his father.” Thomas [Aquinas], in the beginning of question 35, article 2, [says]
from Augustine, “It belongs to the nature of an image to be a likeness with [the
property of] being expressed.” Since, therefore, an image implies nothing more
than an expression from an exemplar and a representation of it, certainly
sculpted or painted images, as images, will not be blameworthy, just as concepts
or images of things in the mind are not blameworthy. For just as by the latter the
apprehension and knowledge of things is promoted and accomplished, so also by
the former the same is assisted to some extent, insofar as it represents the
πρωτότυπον [prōtotypon, prototype].

III. Whatever is expressed from something else through a likeness is an image. For
from the definition and essential requirements one rightly concludes to the thing
defined, not considering whether those things are present or absent which are
neither included in the definition nor contained in the essential requirements.
Wherefore an image can be any thing whatsoever, whether it is material or
immaterial, visible or invisible, and either of an intellectual nature or of that
which lacks intellect. For visibility is accidental to an image, and the nature of an

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 image can also be preserved in an intellectual nature. For the nature of an image
is fulfilled by likeness and origin. But these can belong even to those things which
are invisible, as well as to those which are of an intellectual nature. For neither
visibility nor intelligence is incompatible with agreement or likeness, or with
expression from an exemplar. Concepts are images of things in the mind, sensible
species in the senses. But concepts and sensible species are not visible, hence
Statorius wrongly denied that Christ according to his deity is an image, because
he is not visible. Indeed, we saw earlier that a relation to a cognizing power does
not belong to the nature of an image, but that an image as such is an image of
another. But that an image is also an image with respect to others who know the
exemplar through the image is accidental to the image as such. Similarly, human
souls and angels are intelligent, and nevertheless they are the image of God, just
as man is also said to be the image of God, although Smalcius denies this, but
without reason. But as for what Goslavius infers in his refutation of Keckermann,
part 1, chapter 1, page 3, that if an image is intelligent, there will be an image of
the image, which is absurd because of an infinite regress – this does not seem
absurd to us, to say nothing now about the consequence. For why could not that
which is an image with respect to one thing be an exemplar with respect to
another, being expressed by one as by an exemplar, and nevertheless being an
exemplar with respect to another, by which the same is expressed? The soul is an
image of God, and there is an image of the soul in the intellect. Man is an image
of God, and there is an image of man in a picture; but an infinite regress is not to
be feared, because not universally is there an image of every image, but
particularly of a certain one. Thus there is also a sign of a sign, a cause of a cause,
without an infinite regress. Concepts are signs of things, words are signs of
concepts, writing is a sign of words, etc. See Dn. Rester, part 1, Method of
Photius, section 3, principles 14, 15, 16.

IV. An image is not an exemplar. This can be understood in two ways: either in the
compound sense and formally, or in the divided sense and materially. In the
compound sense it is understood in this way, that the formal meaning of the
predicate is connected with the formal [meaning] of the subject, so that the
image is denied to be the exemplar itself. In this way it is true that an image is not
the very idea of which it is an image. Hence the Zwinglians are rightly rebuked
when they say that in the Holy Supper the very body of Christ is truly present,
and nevertheless affirm that the body of Christ is present only to faith. For it
follows from this that the very body of Christ is not truly present, but only an
image or species of the body of Christ. But an image is not the very body of Christ
of which it is an image. The reason for the consequence is irrefutable, because
whatever corporeal object is present only to the mind through faith is not really

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 present, but only objectively and intentionally. Faith is a kind of intellection or
cognition. But intellection is the reception of a species into the intellect, since it
does not occur by emission (for it is an internal act, not an external one), but by
reception – and indeed not of the thing itself existing outside the mind or even
very far away, but of the species which alone is present to it. Cognition occurs
with the object being especially absent. Sadeel, in his volume of Theological
Works, folio 278, acknowledges that the things themselves which affect only the
external senses do not reach our mind, but only their εἰδώματα [eidōmata,
images]. Therefore, if the body of Christ is present only to the mind and faith,
then also not the body of Christ itself, but only the είδωμα [eidōma, image] of
the body of Christ will be present to us. In the divided sense [the terms] are taken
when the formal meaning of the predicate coheres with the material meaning of
the subject, which is not absurd: that an image, or that which is an image, is an
exemplar – and this in two ways:

1. Respectively or according to a different respect, so that what with respect to

this is an image, with respect to another is an exemplar, as I indicated in the
preceding thesis.

2. Identically, or that an image and exemplar are of one and the same numerical
essence – and this not only subjectively, in the way an intellect and an image
of the intellect (in the reflexive intellect) are subjectively the same, but also
objectively, as in divine things. The Son, the image of the Father, and the
Father are essentially the same. Crellius denies this in book 1, section 2 of
True Divine Persons, chapter 20, page 279, saying, “No image is of the same
numerical essence as that of which it is an image; otherwise it would be an
image of itself.” Therefore, since Christ is the image of God, he cannot be of
the same numerical substance as God, and furthermore is not God, namely
the supreme one. And on page 291: “An image, insofar as it is an image,
differs in number from that of which it is an image. For these are related to
each other, and furthermore are posited opposites. But opposites as such
must differ at least in number.”

But we respond:

1. Crellius’ inference is perverse: “No image is of the same numerical essence as that of
which it is an image. Therefore, the Son of God will also not be of the same

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 numerical essence as the Father, of whom he is the image.” This manner of reasoning
is quite familiar to the Socinians, so that they may try to break the truth of Scripture
by means of a metaphysical pseudotheorem. On the contrary, metaphysical
pseudotheorems should be corrected based on the unshakable truth of Scripture.
Hence, on the contrary, it should be reasoned thus: Scripture clearly testifies that the
Son of God is both the image of God the Father and the same supreme God.
Therefore, there will be a certain image which is of the same numerical essence as
that of which it is an image. And accordingly this cannot be admitted as an ἁπλῶς
[haplōs, simply] universal principle: “No image is of the same numerical essence as
that of which it is an image” – since even if that perhaps does not suffer an exception
in nature, nevertheless it is undermined by an instance taken from Scripture, and its
universality is diminished.

2. Crellius’ supposition is false: that an image, insofar as it is an image, differs in number

from that of which it is an image, and a similar [thing] from a similar [thing]; and that
ἁπλῶς [haplōs, simply], none [i.e., no image] is of the same numerical essence as
that of which it is an image. Here we rightly deny both the antecedent and the
consequent. Indeed, [we deny] the antecedent. For an image, insofar as it is an
image, involves only 1. Agreement, 2. Origin and procession. But neither the
agreement nor the origin, which belongs to the formal nature of an image, implies a
numerically distinct essence of the image and the exemplar. And indeed [we deny]
the consequent, because that universal assertion is overturned by a single
counterexample – such as that which we bring forward from the Scriptures, that the
Son of God, the image of the Father, is of the same essence as the Father. This can be
demonstrated from clear passages.

3. Crellius’ proof is null. It relies on this principle: that an image and exemplar are
related, and therefore opposites. But opposites as such differ at least in number.
However, not all opposites and relatives differ numerically and essentially. Thus
subject and adjunct, note and thing noted, principle and thing principled, etc., are
relatively opposites, but they do not really differ in number, etc. Nor does the nature
of opposites require this, as is evident from chapter 18, corollary 11. Then he argues
thus: if an image and exemplar are the same, then the same will be an image of itself.

Response: If an image and exemplar are essentially the same, yet in such a way that the one
from whom the image is is not personally the same as the one who is the image, it does not
yet follow that the same will be an image of itself. Thus the Son is the image of the Father,

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from whom he is personally distinct, but he is not an image of himself. He is the same as the
Father with respect to essence, [but] the image of the Father with respect to person. Hence
he is called the character of the person of the Father, that is, the expressed and perfect
image. Augustine, book 7 of On the Trinity, chapter 1: “Image is a personal name, since an
image is not said with respect to itself but to another.” For an image is distinguished from
the exemplar as a produced thing from the producing.

He objects:

1. It is in vain to distinguish a person from his essence. Therefore, if the person of the
Son is the image of the person of the Father, the essence of the Son will also be the
image of the paternal essence.

Response: The distinction between person and essence must by all means be made.
Although essence and person do not differ in reality, they still admit contradictory
predicates, as proven elsewhere. It is true that each one is the same as his essence, but it
does not yet follow that a person is simply the same as the essence. A person is taken either
abstractly and formally for an incommunicable substance, or concretely and materially for an
incommunicably subsisting substance. In the latter sense a person involves the essence. In
the former it is contradistinguished from the essence as a mode of the thing. For the
incommunicable mode of subsisting is one thing, the thing itself which subsists in this way is
another.

He objects:

2. Our [theologians] admit that the Son, by reason of his essence, is most similar to the
Father, and furthermore is his image.

Response: A distinction must be made between the foundation and the correlate of an
image. An image is said ἀμέσως [amesōs, immediately], and therefore presupposes a
foundation and implies a correlate. Therefore, that of which an image is said ὁμοίως
[homoiōs, similarly] is the correlate; that on account of which [it is an image] is the
foundation. The correlate and exemplar of the Son as image is the Father, but the foundation
of this image is the origin of the Son from the Father or the communication of essence, by
which the image of the Father is impressed on the Son, as it were, because ἐν ἐαυτῷ ὅλον
δεικνύσιν τὸν γεννήσαντα [en heautō(i) holon deiknysin ton gennēsanta, he shows the
whole of the begetter in himself], Basil on John chapter 1. Therefore, both are true: that the
Son, by reason of his essence, is the image of the Father, and that the Son, by reason of his

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person, is the image of the Father. By reason of his essence, so that the communication of
the same essence may be indicated as the foundation; by reason of his person, so that the
correlate may be noted, by reason of which the image is distinct from the exemplar, since
the Son represents the Father most exactly, because he has all things in his own person
which the Father has in his own, John 16:15, 5:26.

There are two requirements of an image: origin and likeness. By reason of origin an image is
distinguished from the exemplar, by reason of likeness it agrees with the exemplar. But not
just any likeness expressed by another is, properly speaking, an image, but only that likeness
which is expressed from another either according to species or according to a proper
accident – or, as Thomas [Aquinas] has it, agreement in species and essence, or at least in
that which is the sign of a species, as figure especially is. But the Son is rightly called the
image of the Father, 1. Because there is an expressed likeness according to species. And
since in divine things the Son is an expressed likeness not only according to species but also
according to the same numerical essence, he is called the image of the Father in the most
perfect way.

A vestige [vestigium] represents only the causality of the cause, [showing] that it is; an image
also [represents] the form of the cause.

Thus Thomas [Aquinas] in [Sentences] book 1, distinction 3, question 2. From this he gathers
in [Summa Theologiae] part 1, question 45, article 7: “In rational creatures, in whom there
are intellect and will, a representation of the Trinity is found in the manner of an image,
inasmuch as a conceived word and a proceeding love are found in them. But in all creatures
a representation of the Trinity is found in the manner of a trace, inasmuch as in any creature
are found things which must be reduced to the divine Persons as to a cause.” Compare here
the famous theologian Dr. Gerhard, Exegesis, volume 1, page 937.

VIII. A type and antitype do not signify the same thing.

The reason is: because a type and antitype are formally opposed to each other. But things
which are opposed, as such, are not the same. A type signifies an antitype. But who would
also say that an antitype signifies an antitype? This should be noted against Maccovius, who
fabricates this kind of theorem in Metaphysics book 1, chapter 12, page 116: “A type and
antitype often signify the same thing.” He tries to prove this from 1 Peter 3:21, that the
baptism of water is called the antitype of the flood, and yet not only that water but also

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baptism itself is a figure. But in what way do the flood and baptism signify the same thing?
For the flood prefigured the baptism of water (as a type prefigures an antitype). And if
baptism signifies the same thing, it will be necessary that baptism signify or prefigure
baptism. But what mystery is this, Maccovius? Perhaps external water baptism will signify
internal baptism? But the flood is said to have been a sign and figure of water baptism, and
it is ascribed to it, not that it prefigures interior cleansing, but that it saves us and is not a
removal of the filth of the flesh, but an appeal to God for a good conscience.

IX. An antitype is not a type.

This is also evident from the opposition of type and antitype: because opposites are not the
same. Maccovius thinks that an antitype is not always substituted in place of a type, because
often an antitype is taken for a type. But this is a mere confusion of type and antitype. We
indeed admit that sometimes these words are interchanged, as when in Hebrews 9:24 the
tabernacle is called the antitype of the heavens, where “antitype” is taken for “type”. But
this is a different acceptance of the word. It is one thing for one word to be taken
συνωνύμως [synōnymōs, synonymously] for another; it is another thing for that which is
properly a type to become an antitype with respect to that type. Then that consequence is
invalid: The word “antitype” is sometimes taken for the word “type”, therefore an antitype is
not always substituted in place of a type, or that which succeeded in place of a type is not an
antitype. For who does not see that a fallacy of equivocation is thus committed? And even
from the mere definition of “antitype” properly accepted, it is clear that what was
prefigured by a type and succeeds in its place is an antitype – so that whoever denies this
seems not yet to understand the nature and opposition of type and antitype.

CHAPTER XXVII. And Final. On Measure and the Measured.

I. A measure is that by which the measured is known.

Μέτρον ἐστι ᾧ πόσον γινώσκονται [Metron esti hō(i) poson ginōskontai, A measure is that
by which quantities are known], Metaphysics book 10. By quantity, however, I understand
precisely that which abstracts from quantity of mass (extensive, categorial) and from
quantity of power (intensive and perfectional).

Moreover, measure is taken either actively, for that which measures (from which “the
measuring” [τὸ μετροῦν, to metroun] is named), or passively, [for] that which is measured
(whence from it “the measurable” [τὸ μετρητόν, to metrēton] or “the measured” [τὸ

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μεμετρημένον, to memetrēmenon] is named). Thus time is called the measure of motion,
that is, that which is measurable or enumerated by motion.

Further, measure is said either negatively (in which way God is the measure of himself, not
because he measures himself, but because there is nothing else by which he is measured –
although perhaps it is not absurdly said); or positively (by which a being is actively named
“measuring”).

It is also called a norm [norma], which word is of Greek origin, whose language it still bears
traces of, as Isidore says in [Etymologies] book 19, chapter 19, as if γνώμων [gnōmōn,
indicator], because it makes something known. And in its first imposition it denotes an
instrument for finding angles, and in general an instrument for measuring quantity, so that
under it are included a ruler [linea], plumb line [perpendiculum], and square [gnōmōn] –
which are otherwise distinguished in a special sense. Thus Vitruvius, book 7: “Let the lengths
be adjusted to the ruler and line, the heights to the plumb line, and the angles answering to
the square.” Then, by analogy, it was transferred to laws, which were called the norm of life,
and to the principles of disciplines, which are the norm of doctrines, and to Scripture in
theology, which is called the norm of what is to be believed and done.

This is a beautiful translation. The Church is a mystical building, whose cornerstone is Christ,
the architects are the Doctors, who need a certain norm according to which they may erect
the spiritual house and examine every doctrine. Hence in general a norm is that to which
something else is sufficiently examined, and which measures another of which it is the
norm.

Finally, it is called a rule [regula], by which name an architectonic instrument for measuring
lengths is first denoted, or a line used in building. But in a contrary sense, in Lamentations
2:8 and Isaiah 34:11, there is designated a line by which God measures cities and lands to lay
them waste, as if it were the pattern of devastation. Afterwards, metaphorically, it signifies
the norm of doctrine and pious action, Philippians 3:16. Finally, in general, [it signifies] that
to which something is adjusted and examined.

Varinus defines a rule thus: “κανών ἐστι μέτρον ἀδιάψευστον πᾶσαν πρόσθεσιν καὶ
ἀφαίρεσιν μηδαμῶς ἐνδεχόμενον” [kanōn esti metron adiapseuston pasan prosthesin kai
aphairesin mēdamōs endechomenon, A rule is an infallible measure admitting no addition or
subtraction at all].

The requirements of a norm or measure are:

1. The measure should be better known than the measured. For it should make known the
quantity of the measured. But that which leads us to the knowledge of another, as such, is
better known than that to whose knowledge it leads us.

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2. It should be homogeneous with the measured, Metaphysics book 10. Understand
“homogeneous” of any proportion and agreement. Otherwise God would be the measure of
nothing, and time would not be the measure of things. For the former is successive, the
latter are permanent.

3. It should infallibly and certainly measure. For as the norm is, so is the normed. Therefore,
if the certitude of the normed should be exactly established, the norm must be certain and
infallible.

4. It should be one and indivisible, such that nothing can be added to or taken away from it –
namely, under the aspect of measure. Otherwise, if it is considered as a quantity, it excludes
neither addition nor subtraction. Thus indeed something can be taken away from a yard as it
is a quantity, but not as it is this measure. For if something is taken away, it will not be a true
yard, but an adulterated one.

Measure is distinguished in various ways. Christian Matthiae, in Metaphysical Exercises,

makes measure sixfold:

1. Of perfection, on which imperfect things depend (in which way God is called the norm of
creatures).

2. Of direction, as when one thing depends on another relatively and imitatively (in which
way the measure of direction with respect to a painter is the exemplar, according to which
he expresses an image).

3. Of application, by which the continuity of a thing is measured (otherwise called an

exceeding measure, as a yard is with respect to cloth).

4. Of repetition, as the unit of number.

5. Of duration, as time is the measure of motion.

6. Of cognition, which is either primary a priori or secondary a posteriori.

We propose a twofold division. First, measure is either of quantity, or of perfection or

quality, or of cognition.

- The first is that which measures and makes known quantity properly speaking, and is either
of equality, when the measure and measured exactly agree in quantity, such that the
measured does not exceed [the measure]; or of repetition, which is inadequate, [and]
measures by repetition.

- The second is that according to which we judge concerning the perfection or power of
another. Thus the intellect assumes a measure of perfection, and by approximation to or

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recession from another, judges concerning greater or lesser perfection – in which way God is
the measure of perfection, for the reason that other things are judged perfect by
approximation to him, [and] imperfect by recession from him. Not indeed because some
approach more closely to God’s essence and infinity (since all are infinitely distant from God,
and so not by reason of proportion), but because they approach more to the divine
perfections according to distinct aspects, and thus by reason of attribution or greater
recession from the opposite non-being.

- The last is that to which our cognition is adjusted, in which way things are the measure of
our cognition. Our intellect is measured by things, it does not measure.

Next, one norm is γνωμική [gnōmikē, indicative] and architectonic, another θεωρητική
[theōrētikē, theoretical] and doctrinal, another πρακτική [praktikē, practical] and moral. A
square [gnōmōn] is called the norm of quantities, the principles of disciplines the norm of
what is to be taught, laws the norm of living, etc.

II. The measured is that whose quantity can be adjusted to some measure.

Whatever does not measure is not a norm.

For relatives define each other. And in as many ways as one of the relatives is said, in so
many ways is the other also said! Therefore I add nothing; I note only the fewest things.

Corollaries

I. Whatever does not measure the normed is not a norm.

Measurement is understood in general, namely that a norm ought to be such that all things
which are to be normed can be examined and adjusted according to the norm. Therefore,
what is insufficient and too narrow with respect to the things to be normed will not be a
norm. I subsume: According to the Papists, Holy Scripture does not contain all things which
ought to be believed, neither explicitly nor implicitly. From this follows the conclusion,
against Bellarmine and other Papists, that Scripture is not the norm of what is to be
believed.

II. Whatever is not better known than the normed cannot be a norm.

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[There is a] distinction between being better known by confused and by distinct knowledge.
For the normed thing can be better known than its norm in a confused way, but in order to
be known distinctly, it is necessary that it be examined and adjusted according to the norm.
Therefore, the norm must be better known with respect to accurate knowledge, so that it
may be like a principle leading us to the exact knowledge of the normed. From this it is
gathered that, according to the Papists, Holy Scripture again cannot be the norm of what is
to be believed, because they are so far from wanting it to be better known than the articles
of faith that they rather say it is obscure, involved, dark, perplexed, like a wax nose, a
Lesbian rule, etc.

III. A norm which is not homogeneous with the normed is no [norm] at all.

A certain pagan philosopher objects to this in Augustine, on Matthew 7: “With the measure
you use, it will be measured to you” – [saying] that eternal punishment is not rightly
commensurable with sins, since it is not homogeneous or proportional to them. But besides
the fact that not all things in parables can be taken so rigorously, it is certain that there is
definitely some proportion here. For sins are a violation of eternal Majesty; therefore, they
are justly punished with eternal punishment. We rightly urge this principle, however, both
against the Socinians and against the Romanists. [We urge] the former to demonstrate that
time is not the measure of eternity, because there is no proportion, no homogeneity
between time and eternity. [We urge] the latter to reject their adulterated measures with
respect to the articles of faith. Thus Becanus [proposes] traditions; the Bavarian Jesuits in
the Regensburg Colloquy, besides these same [traditions], also [propose] the definitions of
the Church and the consensus of orthodox Doctors. Gregory of Valentia, besides those
things, [proposes] the consensus of the faithful; others additionally establish the judgment
of reason informed by philosophical habit as norms of what is to be believed – most ineptly.
For, to pass over other things, what is to be believed is divine and the mysteries of faith, but
all those [proposed norms] are human. But it is absurd that divine mysteries should be
examined and adjusted to human understanding, when not even in common and natural
things is the intellect the norm of the things which are known; rather, the things themselves
are the norm of the intellect. That is, things themselves, as they are represented in nature,
are the norm of cognition – in no way is our cognition, or the received opinions of
philosophers, handed down from generation to generation, or the constant opinion of
doctors, or common votes the norm of things and of philosophical truth. Thus, the
Mysteries, as they are revealed in Scripture, are the norm of faith – and this should not be
inverted, so that the faith of the Church or the assent of doctors and other believers in the
Church is established as the norm of the mysteries or of what is to be believed.

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 IV. What is uncertain, fallible, and doubtful cannot be a norm.

I urge this against the Papists in two ways:

1. By reducing them to absurdity. For I subsume from the mind of the Papists:
Holy Scripture is uncertain, slippery, doubtful, and fallible. The conclusion will
emerge absurd even to the Papists themselves. Therefore, Holy Scripture is
not a norm – for they want it to be a norm together with unwritten traditions.

2. By refuting their norms. Traditions are uncertain, doubtful, and fallible. The
consensus of Doctors is also doubtful, and the judgment of human reason is
not infallible. Therefore, neither traditions, nor consensus, nor the judgment
of reason will be a norm.

V. Every norm lacks addition and diminution.

Namely, insofar as it is a norm. For in this way it is one and indivisible. Therefore, it suffers
neither addition nor subtraction. Hence Theophylact, on Philippians 2, says: “A rule and a
carpenter’s square have neither apposition nor removal.” Basil the Great, in Against
Eunomius book 1, page 209, gravely rebukes the heretic Eunomius because he calls the faith
of the Fathers a κανών [kanōn, rule] and at the same time says it needs a more accurate
addition – “γὰρ κανὼν καὶ γνώμων ἕως ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέῃ τοῦ κανὼν εἶναι καὶ γνώμων,
ἀδεμίαν προσθήκην εἰς ἀκρίβειαν ἐπιδέχεται, κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον ἡ πρόσθεσις, ἀπολλύει
δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον τὸς, ἀδὲ τῶν προσηγοριῶν τάτων υγιῶς ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοιεν” [gar kanōn kai
gnōmōn heōs an mēden endeē(i) tou kanōn einai kai gnōmōn, oudemian prosthēkēn eis
akribeian epidechetai, kata gar to elleipon hē prosthesis, apollyei de to hyparchon, oude tōn
prosēgoriōn toutōn hygiōs an epitynchenoien] – that is, “For a Rule and a square, as long as
they lack nothing to be a Rule and square, admit no addition by which they may become
more exact. For addition belongs to that which lacks something; but if they lack something,
they could not rightly obtain these appellations at all.” Similarly, Photius in Oecumenius on
Philippians 3: “σθεν κανόνος, κἂν ἀφέλῃς, κἄν προσθῇς, τὸ πᾶν ἐλυμήνω, ὅτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
πίστεως” [hōsper kanōn, kan aphelē(i)s, kan prosthē(i)s, to pan elymēnō, houtō kai epi tēs
pisteōs] – “Just as if you take away from or add to a Rule, you have corrupted the whole, so
also in the faith.” Hence the Papists can be refuted when they say that Holy Scripture is only

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a partial Rule of faith, since it is contradictory to call something a Rule and to deny that it is
total, since what does not totally measure the measured, what needs an addition, should
not be called a canon. For a Rule is a measure measuring all that of which it is a rule and
norm. But a partial rule is not a measure measuring all that of which it is a Rule. For this
reason Bellarmine says Scripture is a partial Rule, because it does not measure all the
articles of faith, since some are measured by unwritten traditions. Perhaps Bellarmine will
say that a total and partial Rule are nothing other than a whole Rule and a part of a Rule, so
that the Word of God is established as a total rule, the written and unwritten Word as partial
rules or parts of the whole Canon. But we urge against that total rule of the Canon the
requirements:

1. Καθ’ ἀντίφασιν [kath’ antiphasin, according to contradiction]. Bellarmine

requires that every Rule or norm be a continuous body. I will not say how
truly [he says this], since the nature of a norm altogether remains when the
continuity or even uniformity of a body is abstracted. At least, I argue from
this against the total norm: Every total norm of faith ought to be a
continuous, uniform body according to Bellarmine. Bellarmine’s total norm of
faith, which consists of the written and unwritten Word of God, is not a
continuous and uniform body. Therefore, the total norm of faith is not the
total norm of faith. The assumption is evident, partly from the opinion of
Bellarmine, by which he denies that the written Word is a continuous and
uniform body – if this [is so], then much less will the written Word with the
unwritten traditions sewn on be continuous and uniform; partly from the
truth of the matter. For how can traditions and Holy Scripture constitute a
continuous and uniform body, when the condition of the one is most different
from the others? Further, Bellarmine wants that what is the norm of what is
to be believed ought, from its principal end, to contain all and only what is to
be believed. But if the written Word does not propose only what is to be
believed, or what per se pertains to faith, much less does that total norm
consisting of the written and unwritten Word – not to mention that it is in
question whether the traditions propose what is to be believed or what per
se pertains to faith.

2. Κατ’ ἀλήθειαν [kat’ alētheian, according to truth]. The requirements of a

norm are that it be better known than the measured, homogeneous with it,
and also certain and infallible, as well as one and indivisible. But these do not
belong to that total norm, which:

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 1. Is not better known with respect to distinct knowledge and τὸ διότι [to dioti, the
reason why], as a principle of knowing. For the Papists pronounce the written Word
obscure. But whether the unwritten Word is a principle of knowing the mysteries of
faith is in controversy. Indeed, the properties of a principle of knowing mysteries do
not fit the unwritten Word. For the principles of knowing ought to be πρῶτα καὶ
ἄμεσα, αὐτόπιστα, ἀνυπεύθυνα καὶ ἀναντίρρητα [prōta kai amesa, autopista,
anypeuthyna kai anantirrēta, first and immediate, self-evident, unaccountable and
incontrovertible], which cannot be attributed to traditions, as theologians
demonstrate.

2. Is not homogeneous with the measured. For what proportion, what homogeneity
would there be between human traditions and the divine mysteries of faith?

3. Is not infallible and certain, both because the Papists themselves have not yet been
able to agree among themselves about traditions, and because they can in no way
demonstrate the infallibility of the same. For whatever is said without Scripture in
the articles of faith is doubtful and fallible.

4. Is not one and indivisible, because not only are different traditions added from time
to time, but also there is no unity between what is divine and what is human, as
between Scripture and human traditions. But more on these things in theology.

VI. The office of a norm is directive and corrective.

I speak especially of a norm of cognition, whose primary office is κανονικόν [kanonikon],

directive – that is, so to direct our cognition that it keeps itself within the boundaries of
truth; [its] secondary [office] is ἐπανορθωτικόν [epanorthōtikon], corrective – that is, to
correct and emend errors. Therefore, a norm measures things homogeneous with it, since
every heterogeneous or abnormal thing is known from and through the norm. Therefore, it
is also consequently judged by the same. Hence, the straight is said to be the index and
norm of the crooked – so Gretser’s argument is clearly inept: If Scripture is the norm of the
homogeneous, therefore it is not the norm of the heterogeneous; hence errors in doctrine
and the worship of God will not be able to be refuted from Scripture.

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 VII. The measured should not be extended beyond its measure.

This is to be taken both of the measure of cognition and the measure of perfection, but not
the measure of extension. For a measure of quantity is often exceeded by the measured,
since it is not only a quantitative measure of equality, but also of repetition. A measure of
perfection cannot be exceeded by the measured, because a measure of perfection
eminently contains all the perfections of the measured. Therefore, it indeed exceeds the
measured, but is not exceeded by it. A measure of cognition virtually contains whatever can
be known according to it. Therefore, the measured, or everything which can be known,
ought to be able to be examined according to that measure, and thus there will be nothing
in the measured which is not virtually in the measure. From this principle, all dogmas of any
heretics which are not contained in Scripture either explicitly or implicitly can be refuted,
since it is most absurd that the measured cannot be referred to its measure. Polanus, in his
Syntagma Theologiae, book 1, chapter 30, additionally requires that a norm be made equal
to the normed, and a rule made equal to the thing to which it is adapted – that is, that it not
only not be exceeded by the normed, but also not exceed the normed. But this is per
accidens to the nature of a norm, even a doctrinal one. For many things can be in a norm
which are not in the normed, as long as there is nothing in the normed which cannot be
examined according to the norm. For even if a norm contains more than pertains to the
thing to be normed, the office of a norm nonetheless remains – as although more things are
contained in civil law than those which precisely pertain to law, it can nevertheless be a
norm and standard of litigations. In the Apostles’ Creed, according to the Papists, mention is
made of Pilate, which is not per se and precisely necessary for salvation. Therefore, even a
rule of faith contains other things than what per se and precisely pertain to faith and are
necessary for salvation, as Polanus himself argues in the same chapter, section 40. But here
we must stop.

Therefore, we conclude this general part of the Metaphysical Elements thus:

GLORY be to the Father, GLORY to the Son,

GLORY to the Holy Spirit, to the Holy Trinity be GLORY.

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SYLLABUS OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE TREATISE

Introduction (Εἴσοδος [Eisodos]):

Proposing the necessary precognition or προγινωσκόμενα [proginōskomena, things to be

known beforehand] of Metaphysics concerning the Existence and Nomenclature of
Metaphysics.

Main Part

(Διέξοδος [Diexodos]): Presenting the consideration of Metaphysics itself.

SECTION I,

in which the proemial consideration of ontology (ὀντολογίας [ontologias]) [is divided into]:

- Part 1, on the constitution and adornment [of ontology],

- Part 2, on the division and order of treatment.

SECTION II,

in which the essential consideration of ontology,

first GENERAL part,

presenting Being in the highest abstraction, and what belongs to it per se.

FIRST TREATISE:

Simple Theory of Being.

- Article I. Precognition of Being.

- Subsection 1. On the explanation of the Name.

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 - Chapter 1. The origin and signification of the Name "Being".

- Chapter 2. The etymological cognates of "Being".

- Chapter 3. The synonymous cognates of "Being".

- Chapter 4. The nominal distinctions of "Being".

- Subsection 2. On the designation of the Object.

- Chapter 5. The adequate constitution of Being.

- Article II. Contemplation of Being.

- Chapter 6. Description of Being.

SECOND TREATISE: Doctrine of the Attributes of Being.

- Article I. The general (γενική [genikē]) doctrine of the transcendentals.

- Chapter 1. The nature and division of the attributes of Being.

- Article II. The special (εἰδική [eidikē]) doctrine of the transcendental affections of Being.

FIRST CLASS. Of the United Transcendental Affections.

- Subsection 1. Considering the united affections universally.

- Chapter 2. The nature of the united affections.

- Subsection 2. Considering the united affections individually.

- Chapter 3. On Perfection.

- Chapter 4. On Unity.

- Chapter 5. On Truth.

- Chapter 6. On Goodness.

- Chapter 7. On Duration.

- Chapter 8. On Ubiety [whereness].

SECOND CLASS. Of the Disjunct Transcendental Affections.

- Subsection 1. Generally considering the disjunct affections.

- Chapter 9. On the Nature of the disjunct affections.

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- Subsection 2. Specially proposing the disjunct affections.

FIRST SERIES. The immediately principal disjunct affections.

- Chapter 10. On the Necessary and the contingent.

- Chapter 11. On the independent and the dependent.

- Chapter 12. On the created and the uncreated.

- Chapter 13. On potency and act.

- Chapter 14. On the principle and that of which it is the principle.

- Chapter 15. On cause and the caused.

SECOND SERIES. The mediately principal disjunct affections.

- Chapter 16. On the complete and the incomplete.

- Chapter 17. On the simple and the composite, the whole and the part.

- Chapter 18. On the same and the diverse.

- Chapter 19. On the natural and the artificial.

- Chapter 20. On the finite and the infinite.

- Chapter 21. On the permanent and the successive.

- Chapter 22. On the uncircumscribed and the circumscribed.

THIRD SERIES. The less principal disjunct affections.

- Chapter 23. On the absolute and the respective.

- Chapter 24. On the subject and the adjunct.

- Chapter 25. On the sign and the signified.

- Chapter 26. On the image and the exemplar.

- Chapter 27 (and last). On measure and the measured.

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