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Evidence Case Digests

I. Rule 128
CASE NO. Rule 128
1 Sugar Regulatory Administration v. Tormon
G.R. No. 195640. December 4, Ponente: Peralta, J.
2012
DOCTRINE The general rule is that administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of
evidence. It can accept documents which cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding
where the Rules of Court are strictly observed.

Considering that private respondents had introduced evidence that they had refunded
their retirement and incentive benefits through salary deduction, the burden of going
forward with the evidence — as distinct from the general burden of proof — shifts to
the petitioner, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show
non-payment.
FACTS
Private respondents, Encarnacion B. Tormon et. al, were former employees of Philippine
Sugar Institute (PHILSUGIN) and the Sugar Quota Administration (SQA).Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 388 was issued creating the Philippine Sugar Commission
(PHILSUCOM). Under the said decree, PHILSUGIN and SQA shall be abolished upon the
organization of PHILSUCOM.

PHILSUGIN and SQA were abolished and private respondents were separated from the
service; thus, they were paid their retirement/gratuity and incentive benefits. In the
same year, private respondents were reinstated by PHILSUCOM subject to the condition
that the former would refund in full the retirement/gratuity and incentive benefits
they received from PHILSUGIN or SQA.

Executive Order (E.O.) No. 18, series of 1986 was issued wherein the Sugar Regulatory
Administration (petitioner SRA) replaced PHILSUCOM. PHILSUCOM's assets and records
were all transferred to petitioner SRA which also retained some of the former's
personnel which included the private respondents.

E.O. No. 339 was issued, otherwise known as Mandating the Rationalization of the
Operations and Organization of the SRA. Under the SRA Rationalization Program,
petitioner computed its employees' incentives and terminal leave benefits based on
their creditable years of service contained in their respective service records on file
with petitioner and validated by the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS).
The computation was then submitted to the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) for approval and request of funds.

However, in the course of the implementation of its rationalization plan, petitioner SRA
found out that there was no showing that private respondents had refunded their
gratuity benefits received from PHILSUGIN or SQA. Hence, petitioner considered private
respondents' length of service as having been interrupted which commenced only at the
time they were re-employed by PHILSUCOM in 1977. Petitioner SRA then recomputed
private respondents' retirement and incentive benefits and paid only the 75% equivalent
of the originally computed benefits and withheld the remaining 25% in view of the
latter's inability to prove the refund.
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Private respondents Tormon wrote a letter addressed to then Commission on Audit

(COA) Chairman, Guillermo N. Carague, asking the COA to order petitioner to pay the
balance representing the 25% of their retirement and incentive benefits withheld by
petitioner

the COA rendered a Decision ruling that the affidavits presented by claimants were
insufficient proofs that they have refunded to PHILSUCOM the gratuity/incentive
benefits they received from PHILSUGIN/SQA

Private respondents filed their motion for reconsideration, the COA rendered a
Decision granting private respondents' motion for reconsideration. The COA ruled that
the affidavits submitted were not secondary evidence within the context of Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, hence, admissible in evidence, since technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings

ISSUE/S whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in directing petitioner to pay the 25% balance of private respondents' incentive and
terminal leave benefits withheld from the submitted computation of petitioner and
duly funded by the DBM

RULING No, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in directing petitioner to pay the 25% balance of private respondents' incentive and
terminal leave benefits withheld from the submitted computation of petitioner and
duly funded by the DBM.

In Monfort v. Aguinaldo, the receipts of payment, although not exclusive, were deemed
to be the best evidence. Private respondents, however, could not present any receipt
since they alleged that their payments were made through salary deductions and the
payrolls which supposedly contained such deductions were in petitioner's possession
which had not been produced. In order to prove their allegations of refund, private
respondents submitted the affidavits of Messrs. Cordova and Meneses, Jr.,

Mr. Cordova - Administrative Officer II of the defunct Philippine Sugar Institute when it
was abolished in 1977.

Mr. Meneses Jr. - was the Chief Internal Auditor of the defunct Philippine Sugar Institute
when it was abolished in 1977

Messrs. Cordova, being petitioner's head of the Personnel Department, and Meneses,
Jr., as petitioner's Chief of Budget Division, and later Manager of the Administrative and
Finance Department, were in the best positions to attest to the fact of private
respondents' refund through salary deductions of the amounts of retirement and
incentive benefits previously received.

CASE NO. Castillo v. Prudential Plans Inc.

2 G.R. No. 196142. March 26, 2014 Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE In a labor case, the written statements of co-employees admitting their participation in
a scheme to defraud the employer are admissible in evidence.

The argument by an employee that the said statements constitute hearsay because the
authors thereof were not presented for their cross examination does not persuade,
because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before the
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National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which are summary in nature and
decisions may be made on the basis of position papers.

FACTS
Individual petitioners Venus B. Castillo (Castillo) et.al. were regular employees of
respondent Prudentialife Plans, Inc. (Prudentialife).

Prudential Plans Employees Union-FFW (PPEU-FFW), on the other hand, is a local

chapter of the Federation of Free Workers and is the authorized Prudential Plans
Employees Union-FFW (PPEU-FFW), on the other hand, is a local chapter of the
Federation of Free Workers and is the authorized bargaining agent of Prudentialife's
rank-and-file employees. The individual petitioners are members of PPEU-FFW.

Respondent Prudentialife is an insurance company.

Under Section 4, Article X of the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),

Prudentialife employees were granted an optical benefit allowance of P2,500.00 to
subsidize prescription eyeglasses for those who have developed vision problems in the
course of employment.

Many Prudentialife employees — petitioners included — availed thereof and

Prudentialife was flooded with requests for reimbursement for eyeglasses the
employees supposedly purchased from a single outfit/supplier, Alavera Optical.
Suspecting fraud, Prudentialife began an investigation into the matter.

Prudentialife sent individual written Notices to Explain to petitioners and other

employees who availed of the benefit. The notices revealed its initial findings — that
the given address and telephone number of Alavera Optical were fictitious; that the
official receipts and prescriptions issued by Alavera Optical appear to have been
forged; that the eyeglasses were grossly overpriced; and that Prudentialife was being
required to pay for the eyeglasses even though they have not been released as yet.

The two optical shops found that Dolendo and Sy's eyeglasses had no grade, while the
grade on Evangelista's eyeglasses did not match the prescription issued to her. It was
likewise discovered that the cost of petitioners' eyeglasses, as declared in their
respective official receipts and reimbursement requests, was excessive compared to
similar frames and lenses being sold by Sure Vision and Sarabia Optical.

In her written explanation, Castillo claimed that she acted in good faith in availing of
the optical benefit allowance; that she did not conspire with Alavera Optical in the
overpricing of her eyeglasses; that she was made to believe that her transaction with
Alavera Optical — whereby the latter would issue an official receipt for the eyeglasses
even without actual payment thereof, which Castillo would then claim from
Prudentialife — was regular

Other Prudentialife employees admitted that the eyeglasses they obtained cost only so
much, yet were overpriced for purposes of reimbursement. that the true cost of their
respective eyeglasses ranged from only P1,200.00-P1,800.00, and yet Alavera Optical
issued official receipts for a greater amount ranging from P2,500.00-P2,600.00 with
their full knowledge and consent, which latter amounts were actually reimbursed to
them by Prudentialife even before the eyeglasses were released or paid for; that the
fraudulent scheme was spearheaded by a certain "Elvie of Head Office.
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Prudentialife issued individual Notices of Termination to petitioners and other

employees. The petitioners Catillo filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, money claims
and damages (illegal dismissal case) against respondents, Another case was filed for
unfair labor practice, In their Position Paper, petitioners Catillo et. al. mainly
contended that they were illegally dismissed based on a charge of dishonesty that was
not proved, but was mainly founded on suspicion, conjecture and suppositions.

The Labor Arbiter issued a Decision dismissing the complaint. The NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiter. The NLRC believed that the admissions of the other employees do not
prove petitioners' complicity and participation in the scheme. It declared that
respondents failed to submit independent evidence to show the petitioners' guilt.

The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC. the CA found that there was indeed cause to
dismiss petitioners, the evidence indicating that petitioners and the other employees
knew, assented and took part in the scheme to profit by pocketing the difference
between the declared cost and actual cost of the eyeglasses; that based on the written
statements of the other participants to the scheme, petitioners are guilty of serious
misconduct, dishonesty, fraud and breach of trust, which rendered them unfit to
continue working for Prudentialife

ISSUE/S Whether written statements of petitioners' co-employees admitting their participation

in the scheme are admissible to establish the plan or scheme to defraud Prudentialife?

RULING Yes, such written statements of petitioners' co-employees admitting their participation
in the scheme are admissible to establish the plan or scheme to defraud Prudentialife.

The argument that the said statements are hearsay because the authors thereof were
not presented for cross-examination does not persuade; the rules of evidence are not
strictly observed in proceedings before the NLRC, which are summary in nature and
decisions may be made on the basis of position papers.

Petitioners' reliance on Garcia v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. is misplaced, the Court
held therein that the affidavit of the co-employee cannot serve as basis for the finding
that said petitioner conspired in the theft because it was so lacking in crucial details.
The opposite is thus true: the affidavit or statement of a co-employee in a labor case
may prove an employee's guilt or wrongdoing if it recites crucial details of his
involvement.

The truth or falsity of this fact or allegation is readily ascertainable by the petitioners
themselves; the answer is literally right before their very eyes. If their eyeglasses
indeed had a grade, then they would have said so outright — and not relegate the
matter to a mere due process issue.

CASE NO. Atienza v. Board of Medicine and Editha Sison

3 G.R. No. 177407. February 9, Ponente: Nachura, J.
2011
DOCTRINE
Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the
structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case,
we may take judicial notice that Editha's kidneys before, and at the time of, her
operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
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FACTS
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical
Center (RMC) for check-up in 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she
was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic
laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained,
however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she
underwent kidney operation.

5 months after the operation private respondent's husband, Romeo Sioson (as
complainant), filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the
[BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation,
namely; petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.

It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence
committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of the
private respondent's fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning
and non-visualizing kidney.

After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent Editha
Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary
evidence.

"EXHIBIT 'A' — the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12,
1996

"EXHIBIT 'B' — the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated January 30,
1997, which is also marked as Annex '3'

EXHIBIT 'C' — the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996

"EXHIBIT 'D' — the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999,
which is also marked as Annex '16,'

Petitioner Atienza filed his comments/objections to private respondent's [Editha

Sioson's] formal offer of exhibits. Atienza alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible
because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated,
and intended to establish matters which are hearsay.

The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was
admitted by the [BOM]. It concluded that it should first admit the evidence being
offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case. According
to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a
look at it through the process of admission.

Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

ISSUE/S Whether the admitted exhibits by respondent Editha can be considered hearsay?
RULING No, such exhibits admitted are not hearsay. To begin with, it is well-settled that the
rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies
such as the BOM. The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha's
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exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time"
of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.

CASE NO. Estipona v. Lobrigo

4 G.R. No. 226679. August 15, Ponente: Peralta, J.
2017.
DOCTRINE The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court

FACTS
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the constitutionality of
Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002," which provides:

SEC. 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. — Any person charged under any provision of this
Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586
for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs).
(0.084 grams of shabu)

Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement
praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for
violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation
in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous
drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates the
rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution,

In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the
denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to
be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea
bargaining.

Respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi
City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion

ISSUE/S Whether Sec. 23 of R.A.9165 is unconstitutional for allegedly encroaching on the power
of the judiciary to promulgate rules of procedure (i.e. plea-bargaining)?
RULING Yes, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
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administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them, here the Court
deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug
cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

CASE NO. People v. Montierro

5 G.R. No. 254564. July 26, 2022 Ponente: Caguioa, J.
DOCTRINE Courts are not bound by any resolution or administrative issuance that the Secretary of
Justice may promulgate. It is within the sole ambit of the Court's discretion to impose
rules governing the proceedings — including the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs
Cases. Thus, courts may overrule the objection of the prosecution when the objection
has no valid basis, or is not supported by evidence, or if the objection solely tends to
undermine the Court's plea bargaining framework, or that the objection is solely to the
effect that it will weaken the drugs campaign of the government.

FACTS
An Information was filed against respondent Erick Montierro y Ventocilla (Montierro)
with the RTC, charging him with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165
(possession of illegal drugs total weight of 0.721 grams of shabu. During arraignment,
Baldadera and Montierro separately pleaded not guilty. After the termination of the
pre-trial, the prosecution in each of the cases presented and formally offered its
respective evidence

During the pendency of the above criminal cases, the Court En Banc, on August 15,
2017, promulgated its Decision in Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo (Estipona) where it declared
Section 23 of RA No. 9165 as unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. This declaration meant that plea-bargaining was permitted in drugs cases.

On November 21, 2017, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued Department Circular
No. 061-17 (DOJ Circular No. 61), prohibiting plea bargaining for violations of Section 5
of RA No. 9165 or in cases of illegal sale of dangerous drugs regardless of its quantity.

On April 10, 2018, pursuant to its rule-making power under the 1987 Constitution, the
Court promulgated A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC or the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs
Cases. According to the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, an accused charged
with violation of Section 5 of RA No. 9165 is allowed to plea bargain only when the
quantity involved is 0.01 gram to 0.99 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, and for which, the acceptable plea bargain is Section 12 of RA No. 9165 or illegal
possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs.

Montierro filed with the RTC a proposal for plea bargaining offering to enter a guilty
plea to the lesser offense under Section 12 of RA No. 9165 pursuant to the terms of the
Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases since the total weight of the shabu seized
from him was only 0.721 gram.

The prosecution objected to the offer, citing Regional Order No. 027-E-18 dated May 17,
2018 mandating prosecutors to ensure conformity of plea bargaining agreements with
the guidelines set under DOJ Circular No. 61 which, in turn, categorically bars plea
bargaining for Section 5 offenses.
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The RTC granted Montierro's plea bargaining proposal, finding that the prosecution's
opposition thereto has no valid factual and legal basis. The RTC also declared DOJ
Circular No. 61 and Regional Order 027-E-18 as contrary to the Rules of Court and an
encroachment on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S Whether the RTC erred in approving Montierro and Baldadera's plea bargaining
applications despite the continuing objection of the prosecution on the ground that DOJ
Circular No. 27 prohibits plea bargaining for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5 to the lesser offense of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia under Section
12 of RA No. 9165.

RULING Yes, At the very outset, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of DOJ Department
Circular No. 18 73 dated May 10, 2022 (DOJ Circular No. 18), which took effect on the
same date. It appears that DOJ Circular No. 18 amended DOJ Circular No. 27 to conform
to the Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases.

The RTC should not have hastily approved his plea bargaining proposal. Instead, the RTC
should have determined (1) whether the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) whether
Baldadera is a recidivist, habitual offender, is known in the community as a drug addict
and a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, or has been
charged many times.

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case. If the accused moved to plead guilty to a
lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the
rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged

If the objection to the plea bargaining is solely to the effect that it will weaken the
drug campaign of the government, then the judges may overrule such objection
because they are constitutionally bound to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable. However, if objections to the plea
bargaining are valid and supported by evidence to the effect that the offender is a
(1) [recidivist],
(2) a habitual offender, or
(3) known in the community as a drug addict and a troublemaker, or
(4) one who has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse, or has been charged many
times, or
(5) when the evidence of guilt of the charge is strong,

courts should not allow plea bargaining.

The consent of the parties is necessary but the approval of the accused's plea of guilty
to a lesser offense is ultimately subject to the sound discretion of the court
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CASE NO. Planteras jr. v. People

6 G.R. No. 238889. October 3, 2018 Ponente: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE It must be remembered that, "[n]o general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and
with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt."

FACTS
P/S Int. Audie Villacin directed the elements of the Regional Investigation Detective
Management Division (RIDM) to conduct surveillance operations at a Lodge after
receiving reports of alleged trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation being
committed at the said place. reports came in that pimps were indeed offering the
sexual services of young girls to various customers at the entrance/exit door of the
Lodge, owned by petitioner and his wife, Christina Planteras.

An entrapment operation was conducted by members of the Regional Special

Investigation Unit, At the Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes were approached by
Marichu Tawi who offered girls for sexual favors for the price of P300.00 each. PO3
Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, along with three (3) girls, namely, BBB, CCC, DDD, then went
upstairs. PO3 Dumaguit requested the services of one more girl from Tawi. At that time,
Buhisan arrived and joined the on-going negotiation.

Tawi left and when she returned, she brought with her a young girl, AAA. Petitioner was
behind the reception counter when the said negotiation took place and appeared to be
listening to the said transaction. PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes chose three (3) girls,
one of whom was AAA, and then handed over the marked money (P900.00) to Buhisan.
PO3 Dumaguit announced that they are police officers and immediately thereafter,
Buhisan, Tawi, petitioner and his wife, Christina, were arrested

As a result, two (2) Informations were filed against Buhisan, Tawi,Christina and
petitioner. On arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused all pleaded "not guilty" to
their respective charges. The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Dumaguit
(poseur-customer) and PO2 Almohallas (evidence custodian). The prosecution also
presented the testimony of AAA to corroborate the testimonies of the said police
officers.

The RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, par. (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208 or
promoting trafficking in persons.

Petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi, after their motion for reconsideration was denied by the
RTC, elevated the case to the CA. Eventually, the CA denied their appeals and affirmed
their convictions,

According to petitioner Planteras jr., there was no evidence that he was engaged in the
trafficking of women or that his acts would amount to the promotion of the trafficking
of women. He further argues that to be convicted of the charge against him, the
offender must not just be conscious of the fact that he or she is leasing the premises
but that this consciousness must extend to being aware that such acts promote the
trafficking in persons.
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ISSUE/S Whether the circumstantial evidence and the credibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented by the prosecution was enough to prove the guilt of Planteras jr.
beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING Yes, The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor
superior to circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without
drawing any inference. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves
a fact in issue, such that the fact-finder must draw an inference or reason from
circumstantial evidence."

Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should be
established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt

It is indisputable that the petitioner owns and manages the _____________ Lodge.
Evidence was also presented to establish that the pimps, customers and prostitutes
who hang out near the said place utilize the same place for their illegal activities.
Petitioner's knowledge about the activities that are happening inside his establishment
was also properly established by the prosecution, most notably, through the testimony
of AAA.

CASE NO. Ang v. Court of Appeals

7 G.R. No. 182835. April 20, 2010 Ponente: Abad, J.
DOCTRINE Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes
an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic
signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M.
01-7-01-SC). The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of
the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.

FACTS
The evidence for the prosecution showed that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and
accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan
courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When
Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom
he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and
sent her text messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave
her alone. Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with spread legs and with Irish's face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit
A).

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He
boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And
he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
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Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police.
Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used
in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the
Lorentess Resort, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked
towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They
searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards

Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as

an expert in information technology and computer graphics.

Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct
irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter
color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the
picture of Irish in Exhibit B

After trial, the RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience,
prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and
anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart.
The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her
charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience.

On Rustan's appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision 8
affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan's motion for reconsideration. Thus,
Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari

Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the
offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a
sexual act. He cites Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which
provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e.,
"to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her.

Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him
without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed
inadmissible.

ISSUE/S Whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her
face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress,
and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262

RULING Yes, The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of
violence against women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress
to her.

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women . . . refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman . . . with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship."
 12

Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3 (e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3 (f) defines
"sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result
in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates
can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those
involved.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence.

Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be
deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati"
meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan's messages, he
would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month
romantic relation as continuous

The fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the
SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The
prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was
but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which
cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.

The bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish's testimony that she received the
obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender's cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to
prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such
numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did

CASE NO. People v. Enojas

8 G.R. No. 204894. March 10, 2014 Ponente: Abad, J.
DOCTRINE circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt

FACTS
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio) testified that, he and PO2 Francisco
Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM
Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila
Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The
officers approached the taxi and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas,
for his documents. Enojas complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the
veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to come with them to the police
station in their mobile car for further questioning.

Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On
reaching the 7-11 convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they
stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the
store's door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them.
 13

PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape.
But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.

On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he
saw running towards Pilar Village. Gregorio returned fire but the men were able to
take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On
returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had
with them, had fled.

The police searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas
apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor
its incoming messages.

The police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-up
operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body of one of the suspects,
Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite

PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused
Enojas' mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The
police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused
Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused
Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text
messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused

Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in
the case, the accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum. They pointed out that
they were entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the
evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.

The RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by
evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearms. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and
affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused. The CA, however, found the absence of
evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to prove that the several accused
planned the crime before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to the
Supreme Court.

The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the
accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.

ISSUE/S Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to
prove the guilt of Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or Jalandoni?
RULING Yes,

1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain
3. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged PO2
Pangilinan in the shootout
4. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas
clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of "Kua
Justin," one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.
5. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an
organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
 14

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with
the Court's earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal
actions.

Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused
Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to
testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But,
assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime
charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an
unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue
here. At any rate, a crime had been committed — the killing of PO2 Pangilinan — and
the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
persons they were to arrest had committed it.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the CA's ruling that the aggravating
circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the
killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices
only.

CASE NO. Bartolome v. Maranan

9 A.M. No. P-11-2979. November Per Curiam
18, 2014
DOCTRINE Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video
evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown,
presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated
by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on
the accuracy thereof.

FACTS
This administrative matter started through the sworn affidavit complaint that Ella M.
Bartolome (complainant) filed against Rosalie B. Maranan [respondent, Court
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite], charging her with
extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court
employee.

The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of
P200,000.00, which was later reduced to P160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her
case for annulment of marriage. She further alleged that the respondent undertook to
have the case decided in her favor without the need of court appearances during the
proceedings of the case.

To put an end to the respondent's extortion activities, the complainant decided to

report the matter to the police authorities. During the entrapment operation conducted
by police officers of Imus Police Station, the respondent was apprehended inside the
premises of the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, in the act of receiving the money from
the complainant.
 15

In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit complaint:

1. the transcribed electronic communications (text messages) between her and

the respondent with her sim card
2. a copy of the Imus Police Station Blotter showing that the respondent was
apprehended during the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of
Imus Police Station
3. and a versatile compact disc (VCD) containing the video taken during the
entrapment operation conducted against the respondent.

In respondent Maranan’s comment she claimed that the lapse of six (6) months from the
time of the alleged incident indicates that the complaint is pure and simple harassment
orchestrated by a lawyer or litigant who has a grudge against her and who wants to
publicly besmirch her reputation. In support of her defense, the respondent mentioned
that even Judge Fernando L. Felicen (Judge Felicen), Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch
20, Imus, Cavite interceded for her release from detention.

Based on the complainant's pleadings and evidence, the OCA, (through then Deputy
Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches and OCA Chief of Legal Office Wilhelmina D.
Geronga) submitted its Report to the Supreme Court

In the SC’s Internal Resolution the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

The OCA responded through its Memorandum finding that the pieces of evidence on
record establish the guilt of the respondent on the charges of Gross Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service filed against her.

ISSUE/S Whether the electronic evidence on record was sufficient to establish the guilt of
respondent Maranan?
RULING Yes, The respondent's bare denial cannot overcome the evidence supporting the
complainant's accusation that she demanded money on the promise that she would
facilitate the annulment of her (complainant's) marriage. The respondent Maranan’s
actions from the time the complainant started communicating with complainant
Bartolome and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, until
the entrapment operation showed that the complaint is indeed meritorious. The
respondent's text messages sent to the complainant corroborate that she promised to
expedite — in exchange for a monetary consideration of P160,000.00 and that she
would provide the lawyer who would file the annulment case — the complainant's
annulment case once it is filed.

CASE NO. Steel Corporation of the Phils. vs. BOC

10 G.R. No. 220502. February 12, Ponente: Peralta, J.
2018
DOCTRINE With the enactment of R.A. No. 1125, the CTA was granted the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal all cases involving disputed assessments of internal
revenue taxes, customs duties, and real property taxes.

FACTS
Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. initiated a petition for rehabilitation of Steel Corporation of
the Philippines (STEELCORP), a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of cold-rolled, galvanized and pre-painted steel sheets and coils and
fabrication of metal building products before the RTC. The RTC issued an Order which
 16

directed, among others, the "[stay] [of] all claims against [STEELCORP], by all other
corporations, persons or entities insofar as they may be affected by the present
proceedings, until further notice from the RTC.

While the rehabilitation proceedings were pending, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10142, or
the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act (FRIA) of 2010 was enacted, which
provided for a Waiver of Taxes and Fees Due to the National Government and to Local
Government Units (LGUs). — Upon issuance of the Commencement Order by the court,
and until the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan or dismissal of the petition.

The representatives of STEELCORP and the Municipality of Balayan, Batangas met to

discuss the effects of the aforequoted provision. As agreed, the municipal government
waived the taxes and other fees that may be due from STEELCORP starting the year
2011 and until a final rehabilitation plan is approved by the court.

In a letter addressed to Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Angelito A. Alvarez,

STEELCORP manifested its intent to avail of the privileges granted by FRIA stressing that
the import duties and fees/VAT which the BOC wanted to impose on and collect cannot
be made without violating the aforesaid provision. It appears that STEELCORP had
imported raw materials for use in its manufacture of steel products, which the BOC
assessed with taxes in the sum of P41,206,120.00.

In a Memorandum Commissioner Alvarez, upon the recommendation of the BOC Director

of Legal Service and the concurrence of the Deputy Commissioner of the BOC Revenue
Collection Management Group, approved the waiver of all taxes and fees which are due
to STEELCORP.

Subsequently, DOF Undersecretary Carlo A. Carag issued 2nd Indorsement which

disapproved the recommendation of Commissioner Alvarez based on two grounds:

(1) the Stay Order relied upon by STEELCORP is not the same as the Commencement
Order required by law to consider the taxes and customs duties waived; and

(2) assuming that the Stay Order is the same as the Commencement Order, the waiver
contemplated under Section 19 does not include taxes and customs duties due on
importations or shipments that were made by STEELCORP after the issuance of the
Commencement Order.

STEELCORP elevated the matter to the Office of the President (OP). Undersecretary
Carag moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. He noted that it is the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) which has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review the
decision of the Secretary of Finance pursuant to Section 7, Republic Act No. 1125 as
amended.

STEELCORP filed a Complaint against the respondents for injunction with application for
immediate issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) before the RTC, the RTC issued a Status Quo Order.

On the same day, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), acting for and in behalf of
the BIR, BOC, DOF, and OP, filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) argued that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint because, under Section 602 (g) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1464 or the TCCP, the BOC acquires exclusive jurisdiction
over imported goods for purposes of enforcement of the customs laws from the moment
 17

the goods are actually in its possession or control; thus, the Status Quo Order is null and
void.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the trial court erred when it allowed and gave due course to the
separate motions of the BOC and the BIR despite their procedural and jurisdictional
infirmities;

Whether or not the trial court erred in lifting the preliminary injunction and ordering
the dismissal of the complaint.

RULING No, even if the Motion may be defective for failure to address the notice of hearing of
said motion to the parties concerned, the defect was cured by the court's taking
cognizance thereof and the fact that the adverse party was otherwise notified of the
existence of said pleading. There is substantial compliance with the foregoing rules if a
copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of herein
private respondents.

No, With the enactment of R.A. No. 1125, the CTA was granted the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal all cases involving disputed assessments of internal
revenue taxes, customs duties, and real property taxes.

CASE NO. People vs. Bio

11 G.R. No. 195850. February 16, Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
2015
DOCTRINE It must be stressed that non-compliance with Sec. 21 of [R.A.] 9165 does not render an
accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. The
requirements under [R.A.] 9165 and its implementing rules are not inflexible. What is
essential is 'the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.'

FACTS
The evidence for the prosecution established that an asset reported to Police
Superintendent Nilo Wong (P/Supt. Wong), Chief of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Unit (SAID-SOTU) the alleged illegal drugs activities of appellant Bio.

P/Supt. Wong immediately formed a team, which then proceeded to the designated
area Upon arrival thereat an hour later, the asset introduced PO2 Salonga to the
appellant as a buyer of shabu. After a brief conversation, appellant agreed to the sale.
PO2 Salonga handed to appellant the two 100 peso bills and, in turn, the latter gave the
former a plastic sachet.

PO2 Salonga then introduced himself to appellant; Bio as a police officer and
apprehended him. However, before he could handcuff appellant, a woman later
identified as appellant's wife, suddenly grabbed appellant such that the latter was able
to run away. PO2 Salonga gave a chase and caught appellant, who, when searched, was
found possessing another plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu

1. Appellant, together with the buy-bust money previously marked with PO2
Salonga's initials "FAS" and the two plastic sachets, were then brought to the
Novaliches Police Station, while the sachet recovered from appellant's
possession with "FAS-1.
 18

2. They were thereafter turned over to the duty desk officer for booking and later,
to PO1 Oliver Estrelles (PO1 Estrelles), the police investigator on duty
3. Afterwards, appellant and the above-mentioned pieces of evidence were
brought by PO2 Salonga and PO1 Estrelles to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory
4. A qualitative examination conducted by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Leonard
Arban showed that each sachet contained a net weight of 0.15 gram of white
crystalline substance that tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu

For his part, appellant interposed the defenses of denial and extortion. He claimed that
he was just buying charcoal when arrested. One of the policemen who is not familiar to
him demanded P80,000.00 for settlement.

The RTC rendered a finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Sections 5 and 11,Article II of R.A. 9165. It ruled that the elements for the prosecution
of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established. The CA
found a confluence of the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs to justify appellant's conviction for the said offenses. It likewise noted that the
prosecution was able to establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu
seized from appellant. Ultimately, the CA affirmed appellant's conviction

Appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of
corpus delicti of the crime. He maintains that the prosecution failed to show that the
police officers complied with the requirements of R.A. 9165 in handling the seized
evidence, particularly with respect to the immediate marking, physical inventory and
taking of photographs of the items confiscated

ISSUE/S
Whether the prosecution was able to preserve the identity and integrity of the
confiscated drugs in order to establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu
seized from the accused appellant.

RULING Yes, To sustain a conviction under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, all that is needed
for the prosecution to establish are
(1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, it is necessary to prove

that:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and,
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

In the recent case of People vs. Jakar Mapan Le, the Supreme Court clarified that there
are links that must be established in the chain of custody in the buy-bust situation:

first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;

second, the turnover of illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
 19

third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and

fourth, the turnover and submission of marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.

In the present case, the links in the chain have been duly proven. During conduct of the
buy-bust operation, PO2 SALONGA, the poseur buyer, was able to confiscate two (2)
plastic sachets of shabu from accused-appellant:

He thereafter gave the plastic sachets to SPO3 CONCEPCION, who kept the same in
his custody until they reached the police station,

where SPO3 CONCEPCION, in turn, surrendered them to the desk officer who placed the
appropriate markings thereon.

Subsequently, the seized items were turned over to PO1 ESTRELLES, the police officer
on duty, who prepared the request for laboratory examination on the specimens, which
he delivered, together with the seized plastic sachets, to the PNP Crime Laboratory.

[Thereupon], forensic chemist P/INSP ARBAN duly received the request for laboratory
examination and the confiscated items and conducted the qualitative examination
thereon, which yielded positive results

CASE NO. People v. Lignes

12 G.R. No. 229087. June 17, 2020 Ponente:Peralta, C.J.
DOCTRINE The Rules of Court itself recognizes that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction, under certain circumstances. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for conviction if:

(1) There is more than one circumstance;

(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt.

FACTS
The prosecution established that Raul Jayson (Jayson), Ryan Libo-on (Libo-on), and
Jonathan Verdadero (Verdadero) were having a conversation in their house when two
(2) persons asked them where the house of Kagawad Joven Laurora (Laurora) was
located. They pointed to the house of Laurora, who was their neighbor. Thereafter, they
closed the gate of their house and had a drinking spree.

The following day Jayson, Libo-on, and Verdadero heard someone shouting and
moaning inside the house of Laurora. Verdadero went out of the house and saw
somebody waving a flashlight inside Laurora's house, as if looking for something. This
prompted him to call Jayson and Libo-on. They immediately went out of their house
and was joined by Francisco Villamor, Jr. (Villamor), another neighbor who was also
 20

stirred up from his sleep when he heard the shouting and moaning coming from
Laurora's house. Verdadero then left to get help from the barangay.

While waiting if somebody would come out of the house of Laurora, Villamar, Jayson,
and Libo-on heard someone washing inside the house, and they noticed that the water
coming out therefrom was red in color. A few minutes later, a man wearing a black
t-shirt and carrying a backpack, followed by another man wearing a green shirt and
carrying a pair of shoes, came out of the house of Laurora. Libo-on and Jayson
immediately ran after them unto the basketball court, and saw that the two were
already on board a black Yamaha motorcycle. Luckily, Verdadero arrived with the
barangay tanod and immediately accosted the two men.

Recovered from their possession was a Jansport backpack containing several personal
items owned by Laurora

The trial court rendered judgment against the accused-appellant and CICL (Child in
conflict with the law)XXX. The trial court held that the prosecution was able to prove
the guilt of the accused Lignes and CICL XXX of the offense charged beyond reasonable
doubt through circumstantial evidence. Aggrieved, accused Lignes filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals. the CA denied Lignes's appeal and affirmed with
modification the ruling of the trial court

Essentially, accused-appellant Lignes maintains that the prosecution's evidence failed to

prove that he took Laurora's personal properties with violence or intimidation against a
person and to establish with moral certainty that the killing was by reason of or on the
occasion of the Robbery.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting him of Robbery with
Homicide based on circumstantial evidence;

RULING No, the CA did not err in convicting the accused-appellant based on circumstantial
evidence.

In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish

a. the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against
a person
b. the property belongs to another;
c. the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi or with intent to gain
d. On the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, which is
used, in the generic sense, was committed.

Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which "goes to prove a fact or series
of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to
establish a fact in issue."

The Supreme Court also noted that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into
account dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the
Information contains sufficient allegation to that effect.
 21

CASE NO. People v. Meneses

13 G.R. No. 233533. June 30, 2020 Ponente: Peralta, C.J.
DOCTRINE
The defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing
evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the
regular performance of their official duties.

The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed can only be overcome
through clear and convincing evidence showing either of two things:

(1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or

(2) that they were inspired by any improper motive.

FACTS
A confidential informant(CI) approached PO2 Dela Cruz, a member of the City
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Group (CAIDSOG), to report a drug trade being
conducted by an unidentified male driver of an Elf Truck, a day after, the same CI
personally reported to the Intelligence Office of the Urdaneta City Police Station that
the said driver made a call to him and had one (1) pack of marijuana worth Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00).

PO2 Dela Cruz and the CI rushed to the place, but failed to put on blotter the
transaction and the serial numbers of the three (3) One Thousand-Peso (P1,000.00) bills

Meneses asked PO2 Dela Cruz to give the money to his companion as the other male
person served as a lookout. Right after, Meneses brought out one (1) pack of
tape-sealed suspected marijuana from his shirt and handed the same to PO2 Dela Cruz

At the particular exchange, PO2 Dela Cruz wanted to immediately arrest Meneses and
his companions but for security reasons, he aborted his plan. Instead, he negotiated
with Meneses if he could make another delivery for a pack of marijuana, as well as
"shabu." Thereafter, PO2 Dela Cruz marked the pack of tape-sealed marijuana as "TEST
BUY 28 NOV. 2013 UCPS" and submitted it to the Crime Laboratory Office in Lingayen,
Pangasinan for laboratory examination. The examination yielded a positive result for
the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drug.

The CI came to PO2 Dela Cruz to inform him that Meneses was looking for him and they
could meet in front of the CB Mall Public Transport Terminal.

Meneses then approached the CI and PO2 Dela Cruz, and then positioned himself on the
left side of the Elf Truck. Thereafter, Meneses brought out from his shirt a marijuana
brick and a sachet of "shabu" from his left side pocket, then asking PO2 Dela Cruz if he
was going to buy them. PO2 Dela Cruz responded positively and Meneses instructed the
former to hand over the money to his companion who was subsequently identified as
Balila, thereafter Meneses was arrested.

Later on, the inventory and taking of photographs were conducted at the place of
arrest, witnessed by Ramos, Hing and Barcolta. The Request for Laboratory Examination
from PO2 Dela Cruz was received by Police Chief Inspector Emelda Roderos for the
conduct of laboratory examination of the subject specimen. The examinations yielded a
positive result for marijuana and shabu, respectively. The said specimen was then
turned over to the evidence custodian, PO3 Elmer Manuel, for safekeeping.
 22

The RTC handed a guilty verdict on Meneses for illegal possession and sale of dangerous
drugs. However the RTC acquitted Camilo Balila For failure of the prosecution to prove
the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. The appellate court emphasized that the
idea to sell illegal drugs emanated from Meneses himself, and was not instigated by the
operatives as Meneses was the one who requested the CI to relay his offer to PO2 Dela
Cruz who had earlier purchased marijuana from him. The CA was not convinced with
the assertion of Meneses that the sale transaction between him and PO2 Dela Cruz was
not consummated on the ground that the price or consideration for the illegal drugs was
not established.

ISSUE/S
Whether the defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases can overcome thee
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed?

RULING
No, the bare denial of Meneses was insufficient. Meneses failed to overcome such
presumption. The bare denial of Meneses cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
the prosecution witnesses that he was the person who sold "shabu." As correctly pointed
out by the CA, no evidence was presented by Meneses to show that he was coerced and
threatened by the CAIDSOG's operatives into admitting the ownership of the seized
illegal drugs. In the same vein, no evidence of malice or ill-motive on the part of the
said operatives was adduced to discredit their testimonies.

CASE NO. Franco v. People

14 G.R. No. 191185. February 1, Ponente: Reyes, J.
2016
DOCTRINE If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations,
one of which being consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or
others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus
insufficient to support a conviction

FACTS
Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto (Nakamoto) went to work out at the Body Shape Gym. After
he finished working out, he placed his Nokia 3660 cell phone worth P18,500.00 on the
altar where gym users usually put their valuables and proceeded to the comfort room to
change his clothes. After ten minutes, he returned to get his cell phone, but it was
already missing.

Arnie Rosario (Rosario), who was also working out, informed him that he saw Franco get
a cap and a cell phone from the altar. Nakamoto requested everyone not to leave the
gym, but upon verification from the logbook, he found out that Franco had left within
the time that he was in the shower.

The gym's caretaker, Virgilio Ramos (Ramos), testified that he saw Franco in the gym
but he was not working out and was just going around the area he put an asterisk
opposite the name of Franco in the logbook to indicate that he was the only one who
left the gym after the cell phone was declared lost.
 23

Nakamoto, together with Jeoffrey Masangkay, a police officer who was also working
out at the gym, tried to locate Franco within the gym's vicinity but they failed to find
him.

They went to Coral Street but he was already gone. A vendor told them that he saw a
person who was holding a cell phone, which was then ringing and that the person was
trying to shut it off. When they went to Franco's house, they were initially not allowed
to come in but were eventually let in by Franco's mother. They talked to Franco who
denied having taken the cell phone.

Nakamoto then filed a complaint with the barangay but no settlement was arrived
thereat; hence, a criminal complaint for theft was filed against Franco before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Manila.

In his defense, Franco denied the charge, alleging that if Nakamoto had indeed lost his
cell phone at around 1:00 p.m., he and his witnesses could have confronted him as at
that time, he was still at the gym, having left only at around 2:45 p.m. He also
admitted to have taken a cap and cell phone from the altar but claimed these to be his.

The RTC convicted Franco of theft, The RTC did not find Franco's defense credible and
ruled that his denial cannot be given evidentiary value over the positive testimony of
Rosario. Franco then appealed to the CA. In affirming the RTC decision, the CA found
the elements of theft to have been duly established. It relied heavily on the "positive
testimony" of Rosario who declared to have seen Franco take a cap and a cell phone
from the altar.

ISSUE/S Whether the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish the
corpus delicti of the crime of theft.

RULING No, the prosecution had failed to present proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish
the corpus delicti of the crime of theft.

Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of
the crime of theft are:
1. the taking of personal property
2. the property belongs to another
3. the taking away was done with intent to gain
4. the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and
5. the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person
or force upon things

The corpus delicti in theft has two elements, to wit

1. that the property was lost by the owner; and
2. that it was lost by felonious taking.

A perusal of their testimonies, however, had shown that certain facts have been
overlooked by both courts. For one, it was only Rosario who saw Franco get a cap and a
cell phone from the altar. His lone testimony, however, cannot be considered a positive
identification of Franco as the perpetrator.

While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from the altar, it
does not establish with certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming that he
did, was Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell
phone."
 24

The prosecution's evidence does not rule out the following possibilities: one, that what
Franco took was his own cell phone; two, even on the assumption that Franco stole a
cell phone from the altar, that what he feloniously took was Nakamoto's cell phone,
considering the fact that at the time Nakamoto was inside the changing room, other
people may have placed their cell phone on the same spot; and three, that some other
person may have taken Nakamoto's cell phone

II. Rule 128

CASE NO. Republic v. Science Park of the Philippines

1 G.R. No. 237714. November 12, Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
2018
DOCTRINE "As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are
actually pending before the same Judge.

However, this rule is subject to the exception that in the absence of objection and as a
matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case
pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to
it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated.

FACTS
SPPI filed with the MCTC an Application for original registration of a 7,691-square
meter (sq. m.) parcel of land located in Batangas.

SPPI claimed that:

a. the subject land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain
b. it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership
prior to June 12, 1945
c. the subject land is not mortgaged or encumbered, nor claimed or possessed by
any person other than itself
d. it bought the land from Cenen D. Torizo (Cenen) as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale

SPPI presented a certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources (DENR)-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Batangas
City (CENRO) stating that the land is within the alienable and disposable zone under a
Land Classification (LC) Map based on a DENR Administrative Order ) issued by then
DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, as well as certified copies of the LC map and
administrative order.

On the other hand, to support its claim of possession in the concept of owner prior to
June 12, 1945, it presented documentary and testimonial evidence that the subject
land was previously owned by Gervacio Lat who held a 1955 tax declaration in his name
which eventually after a series of transfers, Ernesto Linatoc subsequently sold the same
 25

land to Cenen on March 13, 2012 by virtue of a "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan; the
subject land is now owned by SPPI which purchased the same from Cenen.

The MCTC granted SPPI's application for original registration. The MCTC took judicial
notice of the authenticity of DAO 97-37 on the basis of a stipulation in LRC No. N-127
(a land registration case filed by SPPI involving a different parcel of land previously
heard and decided by the same MCTC) between the same handling Government
Prosecutor and the same counsel for the applicant, to dispense with the presentation of
Ms. Bautista.

Petitioner the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (petitioner), moved for reconsideration but was denied in an Order Hence, it
appealed to the CA.

The CA affirmed the MCTC Ruling. The CA declared that the land is alienable and
disposable, and held that the MCTC properly took judicial notice of DAO 97-37 in view
of the acquiescence of the handling Government Prosecutor after the trial judge
announced that the parties in LRC No. N-127 had already stipulated on dispensing with
the presentation of Ms. Bautista, and after satisfying himself that the copy of DAO
97-37 presented was certified.

ISSUE/S
Whether the MCTC should not have taken judicial notice of the record of other cases
even when the said other cases have been heard or pending in the same court?

RULING Yes, As correctly ruled by the CA, the conditions necessary for the exception to be
applicable were established in this case. Notably, the handling Government Prosecutor

a. did not object to the dispensation of the testimony of the DENR legal custodian
of official records, Ms. Bautista, in view of the similar stipulation between him
and the same counsel of SPPI in LRC No. N-127 previously heard and decided by
the MCTC and
b. satisfied himself that the copy of DAO 97-37 presented was duly certified by Ms.
Bautista. Only then was the photocopy of the certified copy duly marked as
exhibit.

However, notwithstanding the alienability and disposability of the subject land, the
Supreme Court found that SPPI failed to present convincing evidence that its alleged
possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law.

The earliest tax declaration in Gervacio's name presented by SPPI, i.e., Tax Declaration
(TD) No. 6243, dates back to 1955 only, short of the requirement that possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
 26

CASE NO. Lopez v. Sandiganbayan

2 G.R. No. 103911. October 13, Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J.
1995
DOCTRINE
Judicial notice may be taken of petitioner's oath taking before the Regional Trial Court
Judge of Mati, Davao Oriental, the Hon. Roque A. Agton, as evidenced by a certification
from the Records Officer of the office of the Provincial Governor. The oath taking
partakes of an official act, while the certification is an official act of an official of the
Executive Department of the government.

FACTS
The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), represented by its General Manager,
Fernando O. Carrascoso, executed a Deed of Donation of one (1) cream-white Mitsubishi
L-300 van, for use as an ambulance, in favor of the Municipality of Mati, Province of
Davao Oriental. The municipality was represented by Provincial Governor Leopoldo N.
Lopez, now deceased. The donation was accepted by the said Governor Lopez in the
very Deed of Donation itself.

Immediately after the acceptance of the donation, the ambulance was shipped to
Davao Oriental via Davao City. The Freight charges were paid for by Governor Leopoldo
Lopez. The Delivery Cargo Receipt indicated that the consignee of the ambulance was
Governor Leopoldo Lopez.

Hon. Salvador R. Gutierrez was then acting as Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the
Mayor of the Municipality of Mati. When turning over the Office of the Mayor to
Petitioner Edgardo E. Lopez, who was elected as Mayor in the 1988 elections, Acting
Mayor Gutierrez "forgot all about the ambulance" and in effect failed to inform
Petitioner Edgardo Lopez that an ambulance was donated to the Municipality of Mati.

Days after the donation was effected, Governor Leopoldo N. Lopez was purged and
Atty. Teodoro Palma Gil was installed as OIC of the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Davao Oriental. Mayoralty OIC Gutierrez was made to understand by Acting Governor
Palma Gil that the Mitsubishi van, to be converted to an ambulance, was for the use of
the Davao Provincial Hospital, but, since the hospital was located in Mati, the Acting
Governor asked that the municipality shoulder the expenses for:

1. shipping the ambulance to Mati and

2. its conversion from a simple L-300 van into an ambulance

The vehicle was insured and registered in the name of the Province of Davao Oriental
by the late Governor Lopez. Consequently, it was never turned over to the Municipality
of Mati.

Whereupon, the political adversaries of Governor Lopez, making an issue of it, filed a
complaint with the Ombudsman, charging Gov. Leopoldo N. Lopez, the newly-elected
Mayor Edgardo E. Lopez, Isedronio G. Espadero, and Agustin F. Montefalcon with the
offense of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft &
Corrupt Practices Act.

Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, a regularly deputized Ombudsman prosecutor, was

made to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case. He issued a Resolution
ordering the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
 27

The Ombudsman for some reason reopened the preliminary investigation and
designated Graft Investigating Officer Gay Maggie Balajadia as investigator. Investigator
Balajadia recommended the filing of an Information for the Violation of R.A. 3019
against Gov. Leopoldo N. Lopez and Mayor Edgardo E. Lopez

Prosecutor Mario Lopez, reinstituted the case by filing the following Amended
Information against Mayor Edgardo E. Lopez alone, because, by then, Gov. Leopoldo N.
Lopez had already passed away: alleging that petitioner Edgardo Lopez "on or about the
10th day of December, 1987 failed to deliver the same to the said municipality and
instead registered it in the name of the Province of Davao Oriental and used it as a
service vehicle of the Province of Davao Oriental

Petitioner Mayor Edgardo E. Lopez, as sole defendant in the case, moved to quash the
Amended Information arguing that The criminal liability for the offense charged has
been extinguished, the Petitioner contending that, at the time the donation of the
ambulance was effected, he was only a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mati, that
was elected as Municipal Mayor of Mati in the 1988 local elections.

The Sandiganbayan gave no merit to the motion and, thus, denied it.

ISSUE/S Whether judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Petitioner Mayor Edgardo E.
Lopez took his oath as Municipal Mayor of Mati, Davao Oriental, and assumed the
position of Municipal Mayor only on February 2, 1988, in the face of the allegation in
the Information that the accused was already the Mayor of Mati on December 10, 1987,
and, as such Mayor, he connived with Gov. Leopoldo N. Lopez in accepting, receiving
and using the ambulance in question.

RULING Yes, and since the prosecution had admitted the fact in their comment that petitioner
was not yet the Municipal Mayor on or about December 10, 1987 and that Petitioner
Mayor Lopez became the Municipal Mayor only after the date of the commission of the
offense charged, such an admission constitutes as a judicial admission which is binding
upon the prosecution.

The accusation indeed avers that the accused Edgardo E. Lopez was the Municipal
Mayor of Mati, Davao Oriental, on December 10, 1987; that, on said date, he connived
with Provincial Governor Leopoldo N. Lopez.

Considering the admitted fact that, on December 10, 1987, the accused Edgardo E.
Lopez was not yet the Municipal Mayor of Mati; that the acceptance of the donation and
the receipt of the vehicle in question were acts perpetrated by Governor Leopoldo N.
Lopez alone, the accusation of Edgardo E. Lopez has been falsely made.

It is obvious that, while the Mitsubishi L-300 van was on paper donated to the
Municipality of Mati, the vehicle was in spirit and in actuality intended for the use of
the Davao Oriental Provincial Hospital. Mati has no use for an ambulance because it has
no hospital or health clinic of its own. Had the vehicle in question been delivered to the
Municipality of Mati, the vehicle was sure to wind up as a service vehicle for the
Municipal Mayor because the municipal government could not have used it as an
ambulance.
 28

CASE NO. Herrera v. Bollos

3 G.R. No. 138258. January 18, Ponente: Pardo, J.
2002
DOCTRINE A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may
take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be
heard thereon." Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the
premises in question without supporting evidence

FACTS
A complaint for forcible entry was filed by respondent Teodora Bollos against petitioner
Eddie Herrera. Bollos alleged that Herrera, through stealth and strategy, entered and
occupied her sugarland. Petitioner, in his answer, claimed that he entered the property
by virtue of a lease contract executed by the owner, Alfonso, respondent's uncle.

The complaint was twice amended to include the two other petitioners. The trial court,
after due proceedings, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction since the second
amended complaint was filed beyond one year from dispossession. This was, however,
reversed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court wherein respondent was ordered to be
restored in possession of the lot. Petitioners were ordered ejected from the premises
and to pay actual damages, moral damages and attorneys fees, as well as the
reasonable monthly rent of P2,000.00. On review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision except as to the award of damages.

ISSUE/S May the regional trial court award moral and exemplary damages against defendants in
an appeal from a dismissal of the case for forcible entry by the lower court?

RULING No, In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded to the municipal trial court for
further proceedings. The regional trial court in reversing an appealed case dismissing
the action cannot decree the eviction of the defendants and award damages. A court
cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take
judicial
notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties
to be heard thereon." Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value
of the premises in question without supporting evidence.

CASE NO. Bitong v. Court of Appeals

4 G.R. No. 123553. July 13, 1998. Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
DOCTRINE A party whose pleading is admitted as an admission against interest is entitled to
overcome by evidence of the apparent inconsistency, and it is competent for the party
against whom the pleading is offered to show that the statements were inadvertently
made or were made under a mistake of fact. In addition, a party against whom a single
clause or paragraph of a pleading is offered may have the right to introduce other
paragraphs which tend to destroy the admission in the paragraph offered by the
adversary.
 29

The reason for this is, where part of a statement of a party is used against him as an
admission, the court should weigh any other portion connected with the statement,
which tends to neutralize or explain the portion which is against interest.

FACTS
This case originated from a derivative suit filed by petitioner Nora A. Bitong before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC hereafter) allegedly for the benefit of private
respondent Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc. (Mr. & Ms. hereafter), among others, to hold
respondent spouses Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose A. Apostol liable for fraud,
misrepresentation, disloyalty, evident bad faith, conflict of interest and
mismanagement in directing the affairs of Mr. & Ms. to the damage and prejudice of Mr.
& Ms. and its stockholders, including petitioner.

Bitong alleged before the SEC that she had been the Treasurer and a Member of the
Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms. from the time it was incorporated and was the
registered owner of 1,000 shares of stock out of the 4,088 total outstanding shares,
petitioner complained of irregularities committed by Eugenia D. Apostol, President and
Chairperson of the Board of Directors.

Petitioner Bitong claimed that except for the sale of the name Philippine Inquirer to
Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI hereafter) all other transactions and agreements entered
into by Mr. & Ms. with PDI were not supported by any bond and/or stockholders'
resolution. And, upon instructions of Eugenia D. Apostol, Mr. & Ms. made several cash
advances to PDI on various occasions amounting to P3.276 million. Petitioner further
alleged that respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol were stockholders, directors and
officers in both Mr. & Ms. and PDI

Private respondents Apostol spouses, Magsanoc, Nuyda, and Mr. & Ms.,on the other
hand, refuted the allegations of petitioner. Respondents sps. Apostol et al. recounted
that Ex Libris Publishing Co., Inc. (Ex Libris hereafter) was incorporated for the
purpose of publishing a weekly magazine. Its original principal stockholders were
spouses Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (then Minister of National Defense) and Cristina
Ponce Enrile through Jaka Investments Corporation (JAKA hereafter), and respondents
Eugenia and Jose Apostol. When Ex Libris suffered financial difficulties, JAKA and the
Apostols, together with new investors Luis Villafuerte and Ramon Siy, restructured Ex
Libris by organizing a new corporation known as Mr. & Ms

Thereafter it was agreed among them that, they being close friends, Mr. & Ms. would
be operated as a partnership or a close corporation; respondent Eugenia D. Apostol
would manage the affairs of Mr. & Ms.; and, no shares of stock would be sold to third
parties without first offering the shares to the other stockholders so that transfers
would be limited to and only among the original stockholders.

Private respondents further contended that petitioner, being merely a holder-in-trust of

JAKA shares, only represented and continued to represent JAKA in the board

The SEC Hearing Panel issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining private
respondents from disbursing any money except for the payment of salaries and other
similar expenses in the regular course of business. The SEC hearing panel found that the
respondents' Amended Answer, specifically paragraph V, No. 8 on Affirmative
Allegations/Defenses states that 'The petitioner being herself a minor stockholder and
holder-in-trust of JAKA shares represented and continues to represent JAKA in the
Board.
 30

Respondents argued that since the Stock and Transfer Book which petitioner presented
in evidence was not registered with the SEC, the entries therein including Certificate of
Stock No. 008 were fraudulent. Respondent Eugenia D. Apostol claimed that she had not
seen the Stock and Transfer Book at any time until 21 March 1989 when it was delivered
by petitioner Bitong herself to the office of Mr. & Ms., and that petitioner repeatedly
referred to Senator Enrile as "my principal" during the Mr. & Ms. board meeting

After trial on the merits, the SEC Hearing Panel dismissed the derivative suit filed by
petitioner and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction barring private respondents
from disposing of their PDI shares and any of Mr. & Ms. assets. The SEC En Banc reversed
the decision of the Hearing Panel.

The CA rendered a decision reversing the SEC En Banc and held that from the evidence
on record petitioner was not the owner of any share of stock in Mr. & Ms. and
thereforenot the real party-in-interest to prosecute the complaint she had instituted
against private respondents. Accordingly, petitioner alone and by herself as an agent
could not file a derivative suit in behalf of her principal. For not being the real
party-in-interest, petitioner's complaint did not state a cause of action, a defense
which was never waived;

ISSUE/S Whether petitioner is the real party-in-interest had been tried by express or implied
consent of the parties through the admission of documentary exhibits presented by
private respondents proving that the real party-in-interest was JAKA, not petitioner
Bitong

RULING No, The answer of private respondents had shown that there was no judicial admission
that petitioner was a stockholder of Mr. & Ms. to entitle her to file a derivative suit on
behalf of the corporation. Where the statements of the private respondents were
qualified with phrases such as, "insofar as they are limited, qualified and/or expanded
by," "the truth being as stated in the Affirmative Allegations/Defenses of this Answer"
they cannot be considered definite and certain enough, cannot be construed as judicial
admissions.

CASE NO. Atillo III v. Court of Appeals

5 G.R. No. 119053. January 23, Ponente: Francisco, J.
1997
DOCTRINE As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a
judicial. admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof
admits of two exceptions:

1. When it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake,
2. When it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. ( This may be
interpreted as to mean 'not in the sense in which the admission is made to
appear.' That is the reason for the modifier 'such.)

FACTS
Respondent Amancor, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as AMANCOR for brevity), a
corporation then owned and controlled by petitioner Florentino L. Atillo III, contracted
a loan in the amount P1,000,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, secured
by real estate properties owned by the petitioner.
 31

Before the said loan could be paid, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with respondent Michell Lhuillier (hereinafter referred to as LHUILLIER for
brevity) whereby the LHUILLIER bought shares of stock in AMANCOR.

As a consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner Atillo III and LHUILLIER each
became owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of stock of AMANCOR while the officers
of the corporation owned the remaining 6%.

Relevant to the case at bar is a stipulation in the said Supplemental Memorandum of

Agreement which provides that F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties in F.L.
Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties Cebu City which may involve pre-payment
of AMANCOR'S mortgage loan to the bank estimated at 300,000.00 and while AMANCOR
may not yet be in the position to re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay the interests to
him equivalent to prevailing bank rate.

Pursuant to this stipulation, petitioner Atillo III assumed AMANCOR's outstanding loan
balance of P300,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. After offsetting the
amount of P300,000.00 with some of the accounts that petitioner Atillo had with
AMANCOR, the amount which remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89. Because
of the failure of AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay Atillo.

Atillo III filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against AMANCOR and
LHUILLIER before the RTC. petitioner, AMANCOR and LHUILLIER,

assisted by their respective counsels, stipulated on the following

1. That the parties admit the due execution and genuineness of the Memorandum
of Agreement dated 14 June 1988 (Annex A), the Memorandum of Agreement
dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B) and Supplemental Agreement dated 11 March
1989 (Annex C)
2. That the defendants admit that the claim of the plaintiff amounted to
P199,888.89 as of October 1, 1990

and submitted the following issues to be resolved by the trial court:

1. From the aforesaid Annexes A, B and C is Michell J. Lhuillier personally liable

to the plaintiff?

On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the written arguments of the parties, the
trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, ordering AMANCOR to pay
petitioner the amount of P199,888.89

It is from the trial court's conclusion of non-liability that petitioner appealed to

respondent court, arguing therein that as LHUILLIER signed the

Memorandum of Agreement without the official participation nor ratification of

AMANCOR, LHUILLIER should have been declared jointly and severally liable with
AMANCOR.

Petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal liability in
his Answer wherein he stated that:

"3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally
without the official participation of Amancor Inc.
 32

petitioner contends that the decision of the respondent court absolving LHUILLIER of
personal liability is manifest error for being contrary to law, particularly Section 4 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S
Whether a judicial admission was in fact made by Luhillier and is therefore conclusive
against said respondent?

RULING No, Petitioner was seemingly misleading the Supreme Court by isolating paragraph 3.11
of the said Answer from the preceding paragraphs. A careful scrutiny of the Answer in
its entirety will show that paragraph 3.11 is part of the affirmative allegations
recounting how LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in AMANCOR which was previously
owned and managed by petitioner.

Paragraph 3.11 has reference to the fact that in all investments made with AMANCOR
through stock purchases, only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each other.

Furthermore, petitioner was well aware that LHUILLIER had never admitted personal
liability for the said obligation. In fact, in delineating the issues to be resolved by the
trial court, both parties submitted for the determination of the court, the question of
whether or not LHUILLIER is personally liable for the obligation of AMANCOR to
petitioner.

III. Object v. Documentary Evidence

CASE NO. Object v. Documentary Evidence

1 Chua v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88383. February 19, Ponente: Medialdea, J.
1992
DOCTRINE Our rule on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence
before the court, as follows:

firstly, the document should be authenticated and proved in the manner provided in the
rules of court;

secondly, the document should be identified and marked for identification; and

thirdly, it should be formally offered in evidence to the court and shown to the
opposing party so that the latter may have an opportunity to object thereon.

Despite the fact that a copy of the written offer of exhibits was furnished to petitioner
Chua, thus giving the latter the opportunity to object thereon and to present rebutting
evidence, the latter failed to do so on the date set for the presentation of evidence for
his defense. Because of this, the trial court considered him as having waived this right
and deemed the case submitted for decision.
 33

FACTS
Respondent State Financing Center, Inc. (State Inc. for brevity) filed a complaint for a
sum of money with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against AsiaPhil Timber
Corporation, and petitioner Harris Sy Chua based upon documents attached to the
complaint. These documents are the following:

1. Term Loan Agreement

2. Promissory note
3. Comprehensive Surety Agreement
4. Demand letters
5. Statement of outstanding past due account as of August 15, 1983.

After respondent State Inc. had presented its evidence ex parte against all the
defendants including petitioner, the trial court issued an order declaring that with the
admission of the evidence adduced by respondent, the case against all the defendants
is considered submitted for decision.

Respondent State Inc. filed a formal offer of exhibits in writing, attaching thereto the
documents enumerated therein. Petitioner Chua filed a written opposition thereto
alleging that the documents offered in evidence have not been properly presented and
identified by any witness during any proceeding before the trial court and considering
that the ex parte presentation of evidence against him had already been set aside,
there is no more document or testimony that could be taken into account against him.

On March 6, 1985, for failure of petitioner Chua to appear for the presentation of his
evidence, the trial court issued an order considering petitioner as having waived his
right to present evidence. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision based on
the evidence on record.

The trial court rendered judgment holding four of the defendants liable to pay
respondent State Inc. but dismissing the complaint against petitioner Chua. The
respondent appellate court rendered a decision which reversed the ruling of the trial
court, which held Chua liable and ordered herein petitioner to pay unto the
plaintiff-appellant, jointly and severally with his co-defendants Asiaphil Timber
Corporation

Petitioner Chua contends that the documentary evidence which were formally offered
by private respondent in a written offer of exhibits but which were not properly
identified by any witness during the trial cannot be considered as evidence against
petitioner in order to hold the latter liable to private respondent.

ISSUE/S Whether the presentation or written offer of documentary exhibits by the respondent
to the court was properly made and could be considered as basis by the court for
holding petitioner liable under the contracts, set forth in the documents presented.

RULING Yes, the presentation or written offer of documentary exhibits by the respondent to the
court was properly made and could be considered as basis by the court for holding
petitioner liable under the contracts, set forth in the documents presented.

In his answer to the complaint, petitioner Chua admitted the allegations in the
complaint with respect to the existence and due execution of the Term Loan Agreement
and Comprehensive Surety Agreement to which he is one of the signatories, while
pleading certain affirmative defenses.
 34

Because of this judicial admission, the due execution of the Term Loan Agreement and
Comprehensive Surety Agreement are already admitted by the petitioner and there is
no more need for the respondent State Inc. to present witnesses to testify on the
genuineness of the documents. Further, records show that the aforementioned
documents are all notarial instruments, the due execution of which is already presumed
and need not be proven.

CASE NO. Rodriguez v. Your Own Home Development Corporation

2 G.R. No. 199451. August 15, 2018 Ponente: Leonen, J.
DOCTRINE A notarized document is presumed valid, regular, and genuine. It carries evidentiary
weight with respect to its due execution. As such, it need not be proven authentic
before it is admitted into evidence. On its face, it is entitled to full faith and credit,
and is deemed to be in full force and effect.

To nullify a notarized document on account of flaws and defects, there must be a

strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity. The required quantum of proof is a
clear, strong, and convincing evidence

The general rule is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
previously given in court. . . . The reason is because affidavits of retraction can easily
be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or for
monetary consideration.

FACTS
This case originated from a low-cost housing project in Occidental Mindoro, which
YOHDC entered into with its partner, Archangel Corporation. Iris' husband, Tarcisius
Rodriguez (Tarcisius), was hired as the project coordinator/manager.

Tasked to find land suited for the project, Tarcisius found a property owned by Rosa
Rosillas (Rosillas) and proceeded to negotiate with her. According to YOHDC, Rosillas
agreed to sell the land for P1,200,000.00. However, Tarcisius misrepresented to the
partner corporations that Rosillas had asked for P4,000,000.00 instead.

Rosillas was paid P1,200,000.00 in two (2) installments. Despite this, Tarcisius still
requested for two (2) more checks in Rosillas' name, each for P500,000.00, insisting
that the land was acquired for P4,000,000.00. Thus, YOHDC issued Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company (Metrobank) (Rosillas Checks)

Aside from this, Tarcisius also requested for two (2) more checks to pay the surveyor of
Rosillas' property, Engineer Senen Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), in the amount of
P254,400.00 each. For this, YOHDC issued Metrobank Checks (Delos Reyes’ Checks).

Tarcisius received all four (4) checks. However, instead of delivering them to Rosillas
and Delos Reyes, Tarcisius and his wife, Iris, (collectively, the Rodriguez Spouses),
deposited two (2) checks — one of Rosillas' Checks and one of Delos Reyes' Checks in
their personal Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Account and The other two (2) checks
were deposited in the Rodriguez Spouses' other personal bank account, also a BPI
Account.
 35

YOHDC eventually discovered the irregularities on Rosillas' and Delos YOHDC eventually
discovered the irregularities on Rosillas' and Delos Reyes' checks after it received
reports of project anomalies, such as padding of expenses and overpricing.

It must be noted that during this time, Iris worked as a bank teller at BPI. This
prompted YOHDC to contact Rosillas and Delos Reyes regarding the checks. Both
confirmed that they never received, endorsed, encashed, or deposited any of the four
(4) checks.

YOHDC submitted Rosillas' and Delos Reyes' Checks and affidavits to Metrobank, which,
in turn, forwarded them to BPI. BPI then advised the Rodriguez Spouses to deposit the
amount of P1,508,800.00 in their BPI bank account so that it could respond to YOHDC's
complaint. The Rodriguez Spouses complied and deposited the amount of P1,508,800.00
in their BPI Account. Thereafter, Metrobank credited the amount to YOHDC.

These events prompted the Rodriguez Spouses to file a Complaint for Damages against
YOHDC, BPI, Metrobank, Rosillas, and Delos Reyes, among others

The Rodriguez Spouses claimed that Rosillas' Checks were received by Rosillas' agent,
Godofredo Syquioco (Syquioco). As for Delos Reyes' Checks, the Rodriguez Spouses
asserted that Delos Reyes received P424,000.00 from the proceeds of Metrobank Checks

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case against Rosillas, Delos Reyes, Metrobank,
and BPI. However, it noted that in Delos Reyes' Answer he admitted receiving portions
of the proceeds of his Checks in the amount of P424,000.00. Thus, based on the
principle against unjust enrichment, it ordered YOHDC to reimburse the Rodriguez
Spouses P424,000.00, representing the amount that Delos Reyes had received.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the Regional Trial Court Decision It found
that the principle against unjust enrichment did not apply. It did not lend credence to
Delos Reyes' admission in his Answer regarding an Acknowledgement which he allegedly
signed (Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement). It found that the document is a private
document, the execution and authenticity of which were not proven as required by the
rules of evidence

The Court of Appeals further noted that assuming that P424,000.00 was given to Delos
Reyes, it could not have been from Delos Reyes' Checks because the total value of Delos
Reyes' Checks was P508,800.00. It also noted that the numbers of the checks claimed to
have been encashed by the Rodriguez Spouses for Delos Reyes and Rosillas were
different from Delos Reyes' and Rosillas' Checks. Thus, the Court of Appeals found that
YOHDC was not liable to the Rodriguez Spouses for P424,000.00 as well as attorney's
fees

Meanwhile, Iris alleged that Tarcisius passed away during the course of the proceedings

ISSUE/S Whether, Delos Reyes' Answer filed with the Regional Trial Court, admitted the
existence of his Acknowledgment and receipt of the amount of P424,000.00.

And whether the subsequent execution of his Answer and of his Acknowledgment
constitutes an abandonment of his Affidavit, where he denied the receipt or
encashment of his Checks.
RULING No, his Answer did not expressly admit the allegations in his Acknowledgment or the
truth of its contents, the Court of Appeals rightfully lent more credence to Delos Reyes'
Affidavit.
 36

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and gives more credence
to Delos Reyes' Affidavit, which is a public document. A notarized document is
presumed valid, regular, and genuine. It carries evidentiary weight with respect to its
due execution. As such, it need not be proven authentic before it is admitted into
evidence.

In the case at bar, Delos Reyes' Acknowledgement is a private document. Thus, for Iris
to rely on it, she must have first proven its genuineness and authenticity by presenting
the best proof available. As such, she should have presented Delos Reyes to testify on
its genuineness and due execution. However, Iris merely relied on Delos Reyes' Answer
and Acknowledgement on their faces. Delos Reyes neither appeared in court to attest
to the allegations of his Acknowledgement or to explain his Answer, nor presented as
Iris' witness.

Moreover, this Court notes that Delos Reyes never denied his notarized Affidavit's
allegations even though his Acknowledgement's allegations are inconsistent with them.
Hence, the Supreme Court assumed that the Acknowledgement is in the nature of a
retraction. This Court has consistently held that retractions are looked upon with
disfavor because of its unreliable nature and the likely probability that it may again be
repudiated.

The only logical explanation that could reconcile the two (2) documents is if the
Supreme Court assumed that the Rodriguez Spouses paid Delos Reyes the amount of
P424,000.00 sometime after he executed his Affidavit. However, if this is the case, that
payment on behalf of YOHDC is not authorized since the Rodriguez Spouses did not
represent YOHDC in any manner.

CASE NO. Zambales v. Zambales

3 G.R. No. 216878. April 3, 2019 Ponente: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE Where the evidence of the plaintiff together with such inferences and conclusions as
may reasonably be drawn from it does not warrant recovery from the defendant, a
demurrer to evidence should be sustained.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an action,

to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of
law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.

FACTS
Plaintiffs-appellants (now petitioners Joaquina Zambales, Estelita Zambales Narvasa,
Enrico Zambales, et al.) are the surviving children of Enrique Zambales, the sole heir of
Blas Zambales, who died intestate in 1942.

Blas Zambales is the registered owner of a parcel of land with Original Certificate of
Title No. G-132, of the Registry of Deeds of Puerto Princesa City

In 1979, a document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver of Rights and

Sale was executed by Joaquina Zambales, the surviving wife of Enrique Zambales,
together with Estelita, Miguela, Domingo, Castulo, Enrico, and Adelina, all surnamed
Zambales, wherein they (Joaquina, Miguela, Castulo, Enrico, Adelina and Estelita)
waived, renounced, ceded, transferredand conveyed all their rights, interest and shares
over their 1/7 undivided interest over the land covered by OCT No. G-132 in favor of
 37

Domingo Zambales, who, in turn, accepted the waiver and transfer made by his
co-heirs and expressed his appreciation and gratitude to them in the same document.

Subsequently, OCT No. G-132 was canceled and TCT No. 6892 was issued in the name of
Domingo Zambales. Thereafter, it was subdivided resulting in the issuance of ten titles
all under the name of Domingo Zambales.

After more than two decades, plaintiffs-appellants filed a complaint to cancel the
document denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver of Rights and Sale" and
the subsequent titles derived from OCT No. G-132

In their complaint, plaintiffs-appellants alleged that they are the heirs of Enrique
Zambales and the grandchildren of Blas Zambales, the original owner of a parcel of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. G-132.

On the other hand, defendant-appellee Salvacion Villon Zambales (now respondent, as

substituted by her heirs, namely: Jocelyn V. Zambales, et al.) was the wife of Domingo
Zambales.

However, no formal offer of exhibits was presented in view of the Certification issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Puerto Princesa City, to the effect that the Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver of Rights executed by the heirs of the late Enrique Zambales
involving a parcel of land covered by OCT No. G-132, in the name of Blas Zambales
cannot be located from the existing and available records of the registry.

The RTC held that while the petitioners submitted testimonial evidence to show that
the subject extrajudicial settlement was allegedly forged, which would thus render the
subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto void, herein petitioners did not offer the said
document nor the titles sought to be cancelled during trial. The CA issued its assailed
Decision affirming the trial court's dismissal of the case, denying petitioners' appeal for
lack of merit.

While the Court in the Mato Vda. De Oñate case relaxed the application of Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as regards offer of evidence and allowed evidence not
formally offered to be considered by the trial court, the same was subject to the
presence of the following requirements:

1. that the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded;
and
2. that the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case

In petitioners' case, the CA found that the questioned deed was not duly identified by
witnesses, with one purported signatory thereto, Miguela Zambales-Cayao, even
admitting that she did not remember having signed the said document,

The CA stressed that documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits
during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any
manner be treated as evidence.

ISSUE/S Whether the CA erred when it upheld the dismissal of the instant case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence
RULING No, the CA did not err when it upheld the dismissal of the instant case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
In this case, the records show that apart from the fact that the Extrajudicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights and Sale sought to be annulled and the
 38

titles sought to be cancelled were not offered in evidence, the Extrajudicial Settlement
itself alluded to in the testimonial evidence presented was not offered in order to allow
the trial court to determine the veracity of the claims of the witnesses.

CASE NO. Mato Vda de Onate vs. CA

4 G.R. No. 116149, November 23, Ponente: Kapunan, J.
1995
DOCTRINE For the evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the
mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.

a. Identification of documentary evidence - is done in the course of the trial and

is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit
b. Formal offer as an exhibit - done only when the party rests its case and not
before.

However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v. Mate, the Supreme Court relaxed the
foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and
considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.:

1. the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
2. the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

FACTS
The deceased Leonor Taguba bought the subject parcel of land from Elvira Mato Vda.
de Oñate sometime in 1976 for a consideration of P5,000.00 payable in four (4)
installments. After the full payment was made, the parties however failed to reduce
their contract in writing.

Leonor Taguba died. The instant complaint was filed when demand was made upon
Elvira MatoVda. de Oñate to execute a public document of sale in favor of the deceased
and her heirs and she refused.

The trial court rejected the petitioner's heirs of' Onate defense that Elvira Mato Vda. de
Oñate contracted a verbal loan from Leonor Taguba.Also disbelieved was the allegation
that two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. 5167 and TCT No. 5168 (the land in
dispute) were mortgaged by Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate to Leonor Taguba as security for
the payment of the loan and that only P5,000.00 of the P12,000.00 loan was given by
Taguba.

The trial court rendered judgment which declared the agreement between the late
Leonor Taguba and deceased defendant Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate entered into as a
contract of 'to sell'; and ordered the defendants to execute the proper document to
give effect to the contract within (30) days, and finally to issue another certificate of
title in the name of the Estate of Leonor Taguba.

Petitioner heirs of Onate appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals faulting the trial
court's factual findings. They contended that the trial court erred when ittook
cognizance of the plaintiff's evidence, particularly Exhibits "F," "F-1," "F-2" and "F-3,"
which had been marked but never formally submitted in evidence as required by the
Rules of Court.
 39

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. In sustaining the lower court, the
respondent court held that Exhibit "F," "F-1," "F-2" and "F-3" though not formally offered,
may still be admitted in evidence for having complied with the two (2) requisites for
admission enunciated in our jurisprudence, that is,

(1) evidence must be duly identified by testimony duly recorded and

(2) it must be incorporated in the records of the case.

ISSUE/S
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in considering documents marked as exhibits, but
not formally offered.

RULING No, the Court of Appeals did not err in considering documents marked as exhibits, but
not formally offered.

In People v. Napat-a citing People v. Mate, the Supreme Court relaxed the foregoing rule
and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial
court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have
been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.

In the case at bench, the Supreme Court found, as respondent court did, that these
requisites had been satisfied.

The evidence in question refers to exhibits "F," receipt for P2,250.00 dated January 20,
1976; "F-1," receipt for P750.00 dated February 23, 1976; "F-2," receipt for P1,000.00
dated March 20, 1976; and F-3," receipt for another P1,000.00 dated July 29, 1976,

All showing the varying amounts paid by Leonor Taguba to Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate.
These exhibits were marked at the pre-trial for the purpose of identifying them. In
fact, the payment of P5,000.00 was admitted by herein petitioners heirs of Onate in the
same pre-trial. On March 5, 1984, Eulalia Marcita Taguba identified the said exhibits in
her testimony which was duly recorded.

Also telling is petitioners' counsel vigorous cross examination of the said witness who
testified on the exhibits in question. Herein subject exhibits were also incorporated
and made part of the records of this case.

CASE NO. Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan

5 G.R. No. 140183. July 10, 2003 Ponente: Corona, J.
DOCTRINE
When a party offers a particular documentary instrument as evidence during trial, he
must specify the purpose for which the document or instrument is offered. He must also
describe and identify the document, and offer the same as an exhibit so that the other
party may have an opportunity of objecting to it.

The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the judge to rest his findings
of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at
the trial. Such offer may be made orally or in writing sufficient to show that the party
is ready and willing to submit the evidence to the court.
 40

FACTS
The National Housing Authority (NHA) entered into a contract for the land development
of the Pahanocoy Sites and Services, with Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction. After
the contract was confirmed by the NHA Board of Directors, the work commenced.

Before the project could be completed, however, the NHA rescinded the contract and
engaged the services of Jose Cruz of Triad Construction and Development Corporation
for the unfinished portion thereof.

Consequently, Arceo Cruz lodged a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. After
preliminary investigation, an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging the
petitioners and their co-accused with the crime of violation of Section 3, paragraph (e)
of RA 3019, as amended.

Specifically, the petitioners Katigbak and their co-accused (Board of Directors of the
NHA) were indicted for having allegedly conspired, through evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, in unilaterally rescinding the contract for land development with
the private complainant, Arceo Cruz, and subsequently awarding the same, without
public bidding and at an exorbitant rate, to private respondent, Jose Cruz, thereby
granting unwarranted benefits to said private respondent while causing damage and
undue injury to the government and the private respondent.

Upon arraignment, the petitioners and their co-accused, assisted by their counsels,
entered the plea of "not guilty" to the charge in the amended information.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued during which the prosecution presented four
witnesses, The prosecution rested its case after the admission of its Exhibits "A", "B",
"C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "H-1", "J", "K", "L", "M", "N", "O", "Q", "R" and "S" with
submarkings.

Exhibit "R" which was the letter of accused Balao to the private offended party Arceo C.
Cruz informing the Arceo that the NHA Board of Directors had approved the alleged
request of the latter for mutual termination of his contract with the NHA and that the
latter has as of date of the termination of his contract 'has still an acceptable
accomplishment work of P573,107.16.

The petitioners, through their respective counsels and with prior leave of court, jointly
filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the questioned
Resolution denying the demurrer to evidence of all the accused.

Teodoro Katigbak and Bienvenido Merelos filed the instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 and prohibition with the SC assailing the questioned resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners Katigbak et al. claim, in essence, that respondent court gravely abused its
discretion when it denied their motion to dismiss the case against them on demurrer to
evidence despite the fact that the prosecution failed to establish, either by testimonial
or documentary evidence, their participation in the alleged conspiracy to unilaterally
rescind the NHA contract for land development with private complainant Arceo Cruz.

ISSUE/S Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners' motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
 41

RULING Yes, Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners'
motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

On cross-examination, the private complainant admitted that he did not include the
petitioners and the other members of the NHA Board of Directors in his complaint at
the Office of the Ombudsman.

A careful scrutiny of the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution did not
support the charge of violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019, as amended, in
the instant information against the petitioners. Significantly, the said pieces of
documentary evidence were offered only for the purpose of establishing the
participation and liability of their co-accused, Robert Balao, as noted in the written
Formal Offer of Exhibits.

CASE NO. Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa

6 G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003 Ponente: Panganiban, J.
DOCTRINE The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just
because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively
proves the fact in dispute.

FACTS
"A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by Petitioners Heirs of
Sabanpan against respondents Comorposa before the Municipal Trial Court. The
Complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845,
he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.

Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his
job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being
a close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos
Saez's son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of
pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy
the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and
transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this case.

Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the
respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises
through petitioners' tolerance.

Three decades later a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the
legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises.

"Respondents Comorposa, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the

Complaint and alleged that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right
as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way back in
1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just and valid ownership and
possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the
Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the
land in question when it ruled that they [were] the rightful claimants and possessors
and [were], therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.
 42

"The Municipal Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the Heirs of Sabanpan but the
Regional Trial Court, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision.

The appellate court held that — although not yet final — the Order issued by the
regional executive director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) remained in full force and effect, unless declared null and void.

Certification issued by the DENR's community environment and natural resources (CENR)
officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still
alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. The appellate court deemed as
self-serving, and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano Saez,
Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.

Hence, the heirs appealed to the Supreme Court, Petitioners contend that the CENR
Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the signature of the
CENR officer is a mere facsimile. Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding
the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule on Summary Procedure
authorizes the use of affidavits.

ISSUE/S Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in sustaining the ruling
of the Regional Trial Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the
regional executive director?

RULING
No, the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued
by the regional executive director.

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact
copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining
whether they are genuine or authentic.

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the
signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as
that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile
signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but
recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses' respective

testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the
facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their
cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.

CASE NO. People v. Jose

7 G.R. No. L-28397. June 17, 1976 Ponente: Esguerra, J.
DOCTRINE
The failure of the defense to present available corroborating evidence raises the
presumption that had the same been presented, such evidence would have been
adverse.

Although a piece of evidence consisting of the duly authenticated birth certificate of

an accused was not formally offered in evidence during the trial, the same will be
 43

considered on appeal in the exercise of the Court's sound discretion disregarding sheer
technicality that may overcome its sense of justice in considering the merits of the case
where there exists no doubts as to its veracity.

FACTS
Appellants Jaime Jose and George Tillman were charged with two crimes — Robbery and
Forcible Abduction with Rape — before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Acquitted in
the case of Robbery they were convicted of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

The prosecution's version of what happened that early morning hour of July 4, 1966,
was that Zenaida de la Cruz, while riding a Golden Taxicab driven by Osmundo de la
Cruz, was forcibly taken by five armed men riding in a Mercedes Benz car; that Zenaida
was brought to the "Golden Gate" Motel, but there was no vacancy, so she was taken to
the "Queen's Court" Motel; that inside room no. 3 of said motel she was raped by four of
the accused, one at a time, when alone in the room; that during the time three of the
accused left the place and when they returned they brought with them Araceli Sy who
was also taken by force by three of the group from a Golden Taxi while on her way
home to Makati, Rizal

Araceli Sy was crying and vomiting at the time while she pretended to have a "heart
condition"; that the group did not further molest Araceli Sy. Zenaida and Araceli) were
subsequently taken by the five men to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue from the "Queen's
Court" Motel in the Mercedez car from where a taxi was hailed for them; the alleged
kidnapping was immediately reported to the Pasay City Police by the taxi driver,
Osmundo de la Cruz; that Zenaida de la Cruz and Araceli Sy immediately reported the
crime to the authorities after they were released by the accused.

But even on the hypothesis that George Tillman is guilty of the offense charged, the
death sentence was not imposed upon Tillman as there is in his favor the circumstance
of minority or being less than eighteen (18) years of age when he allegedly committed
the offense.

Although the Solicitor General objected to the consideration of this piece of evidence,
consisting of the duly authenticated birth certificate of George Tillman showing that he
was born on January 18, 1949, as it was not offered and formally presented in evidence
during the trial.

ISSUE/S
Whether it was proper for the Supreme Court to admit the birth certificate of Tillman
as evidence even though said birth certificate was never offered or presented during
trial?

RULING
Yes, it was proper for the Supreme Court to admit the birth certificate as documentary
evidence even though it was never formally offered or presented during trial. Although
a piece of evidence consisting of the duly authenticated birth certificate of an accused
was not formally offered in evidence during the trial, the same will be considered on
appeal in the exercise of the Supreme Court's sound discretion disregarding sheer
technicality that may overcome its sense of justice in considering the merits of the case
where there exists no doubts as to its veracity.
 44

CASE NO. Piotrowski v. Court of Appeals

8 G.R. No. 193140. January 11, Ponente: Brion, J.
2016
DOCTRINE
The excuse of Piotrowski's counsel that he had difficulty consulting with Piotrowski who
was abroad, allegedly old and sick, was not supported by proof or affidavit. We also
cannot grant an extension simply because the case involved "voluminous documents."
Otherwise, it would be easy for a litigant to engage in dilatory tactics by conveniently
claiming that he had to "secure certified true copies of voluminous documents" without
effort to prove the veracity of such claim.

These general and bare allegations sufficient to relax the application of the Rules.

FACTS
A complaint for annulment of documents with recovery of possession and damages
filed by respondent Gina Q. Dapliyan (Dapliyan) against her father Simeon Dapliyan
(Simeon) and petitioner Piotrowski before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

The dispute involved a parcel of land located at La Union. The land was allegedly
registered under the names of Simeon and his late wife Petra Ternate Dapliyan.

The RTC dismissed the re-amended complaint against Simeon because there was no
proof that the case passed through the barangay conciliation proceedings, a condition
precedent before judicial action. The RTC, however, declared Piotrowski in default and
found the re amended complaint meritorious as against her.

A writ of execution was issued to implement the RTC decision.

Almost four years after the promulgation of the August 31, 2004 RTC decision,
Piotrowski filed on July 14, 2008, an omnibus motion for new trial and to set aside the
decision, the order of default, and the writ of execution.

Piotrowski claimed that she learned of the judgment against her only on July 7, 2008,
when she went to the RTC to confirm the information she gathered about the case.

Pitrowski averred that the omnibus motion was timely filed on July 14, 2008, or within
the fifteen-day reglementary period counted from July 7, 2008, when she was made
aware of the decision.

The RTC issued an order partly granting Piotrowski's omnibus motion "to give her a
fighting chance to dispute the claim of [Dapliyan] by adducing her evidence, all in the
interest of justice.

Piotrowski asserted that the lot sold to her was a portion of a bigger land covered by
TCT No. RT-4511 registered under the name of Simeon. Simeon allegedly became the
exclusive owner of the land when he and his heirs, including Dapliyan, executed an
extrajudicial settlement dividing the property

On September 30, 2009, the RTC declared that its August 31, 2004 decision had become
final and executory and could not be assailed by a mere motion.
 45

Piotrowski moved but failed to obtain a reconsideration of the RTC order. Her counsel
then filed with the CA the motion for additional time to file a petition for certiorari, on
the ground, among others, of heavy workload.

The CA denied the motion for additional time to file a petition for certiorari. It held
that the ground invoked by the petitioner — i. e., Section 4 (3) of Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, which provides that "[n]o extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days" — had been
deleted on December 27, 2007

Piotrowski questioned the overly strict application of the Rules of Court and contended
that the CA disregarded issues of paramount importance. She argued that although the
provision on motion for extension had been deleted, a motion for extension of time is
not absolutely prohibited.

ISSUE/S whether the CA gravely abused its discretion when it denied Piotrowski's motion for
additional time to file a petition for certiorari.

RULING
No, the denial of Piotrowski's motion for additional time to file a petition for certiorari
was proper.

There should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
Heavy workload, standing alone, is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the sixty-day
rule.

More importantly, a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of
the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the motion would have no effect since
there would no longer be any period to extend and the assailed judgment or order
would have become final and executory.

CASE NO. Constantino v. Court of Appeals

9 G.R. No. 116018. November 13, Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
1996
DOCTRINE The admission of respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence
that there was as yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since private
respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the premises.

When respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since
petitioner who caused it to be prepared left several spaces blank, more particularly as
regards the dimensions of the property to be sold.

Another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of settlement and
conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly manifested that the number of the
subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B were merely handwritten
while all the rest of the statements therein were typewritten, which led the Court to
the conclusion that handwritten figures thereon were not available at the time the
document was formalized.

FACTS
Josefa died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan. The heirs of
 46

Josefa Torres, as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino, as vendee, entered into
a contract to sell a parcel of land with a total land area of two hundred and fifty (250)
square meters. The lot, owned in common by the Torres heirs, is being occupied by
petitioners' mother and sister.

Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner Constantino to prepare the
necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale. After having the
document drafted — with several spaces left blank including the specification as to the
metes and bounds of the land — petitioner asked the heirs to affix their signatures on
the document. The heirs signed the document with the understanding that respondent
Aurora S. Roque, one of the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek
permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.

However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was
subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by two (2) TCTs. Petitioner
Constantino did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the. subdivision plan and the certificates of title
the respondents Heirs of Torres learned that the area of the property purportedly sold
to petitioner was much bigger than that agreed upon by the parties.

Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for annulment of the deed
and cancellation of the certificates of title, with prayer for recovery of damages,
attorney's fees and costs of suit.

Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting the Deed of

Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale wherein respondents agreed to divide and
adjudicate among themselves the inherited property with an area of one thousand five
hundred and three (1,503) square meters.

In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document before
the land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no definite area to be
sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They also claimed
that they were not notified about the survey and the subdivision of the lot and
therefore they could not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to petitioner.

The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation and due
execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale taking into
account that:

a. While petitioner claimed that all the heirs signed before the notary public and
in her presence, she was not able to enumerate all the signatories to the
document;
b. While petitioner claimed that the document was signed only after the survey of
the land was completed, or on 10 October 1984, such fact was negated by her
own witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on 16 October
1984;
c. While petitioner alleged that the document was signed and notarized in Manila
no explanation was offered why the same could not have been signed and
notarized in Bulacan where notaries public abound which could have been less
inconvenient to the parties concerned

Thus on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court ruled in favor of the heirs of
Torres. respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court

ISSUE/S Whether respondents indeed appeared before the notary public and signed the deed.
 47

RULING No, the quantum of evidence shows that they did not. The trial court correctly
appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could have been
notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail casts doubt on the procedural regularity in
the preparation, execution and signing of the deed.

Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still
incomplete since the petitioner who caused it to be prepared left several spaces blank,
more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold. The heirs were
persuaded to sign the document only upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent
Roque, pursuant to their understanding, would be present when the property would be
surveyed after obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands

CASE NO. Magsino v. Magsino

10 G.R. No. 205333. February 18, Ponente: J.C. Reyes,Jr., J.
2019.
DOCTRINE In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be made
at the proper time, and the grounds specified. Grounds for objections not raised at the
proper time shall be considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some
other ground.

Objection to oral evidence must be raised at the earliest possible time, that is after
the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable
issue becomes apparent only after the answer was given.

In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party
making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being
offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the
documentary evidence may be made.

FACTS
The case stemmed from a Petition to Fix the Rights of the Father Pendente Lite with
Prayers for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order and Hold Departure Order
filed by Rolando N. Magsino (respondent) against his wife Ma. Melissa V. Magsino
(petitioner).

Respondent Rolando and petitioner Melissa were married their union was blessed with
two children. Sometime in 2005, Melissa started suspecting that Rolando was sexually
molesting his own children, then aged 3 years old and 2 years old, as she would often
see them playing with their genitalia. When she asked who taught them such activity,
the children would answer "Papa." Thus, to protect the minors from further abuse,
Melissa left the conjugal dwelling and took the children to their maternal grandparents.

Rolando filed a Petition to Fix the Rights of the Father Pendente Lite with Prayers for
the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order and Hold Departure Order Melissa filed
her Answer (to the petition) with Prayer for Protection Order.

During pre-trial, Rolando manifested that he would be presenting, among other

witnesses, Dr. Cristina Gates (Gates). Gates was presented as an expert witness. She
confirmed the technical qualifications and professional skill stated in her judicial
affidavit and curriculum vitae. Gates opined that Rolando could not have molested the
minors. As retrieved from Rolando's memory while under hypnotic trance, Gates
 48

narrated that the children have accidentally witnessed their parents in the act of
sexual intercourse on several occasions and explained that this experience caused them
to develop sexual hyperactivity.

Gates was then subjected to cross-examination. But before propounding any questions,
Melissa's counsel, in open court, moved to strike out the direct testimony of Gates on
grounds that her expertise had not been established and that any evidence derived
from hypnotically-induced recollection is inadmissible.

The RTC ruled to retain the testimony as part of the record subject to a continuing
objection on the qualification of the witness.

Melissa's counsel filed a Motion to Expunge the testimony of Gates reiterating the
doubts on her expertise and to suppress related evidence particularly the psychological
evaluation report by reason of inadmissibility of hypnotically-induced recollection.

The RTC denied the motion to expunge the testimony on the ground of waiver of
objection for failure to timely question the qualifications of the witness. On the motion
to suppress psychological evaluation report, the RTC ruled that the same is premature
considering that such documentary evidence has not yet been formally offered. Melissa
moved to reconsider but it was denied.

Hence, Melissa filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
dismissed the petition and ruled that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to suppress evidence and to expunge the testimony of a witness.
The CA ruled that petitioner's counsel failed to make a timely objection to the
presentation of Gates' testimonial evidence. It was observed that no objection was
raised during the course of Gates' direct testimony where she confirmed her
qualifications as an expert witness and explained the psychological examination
conducted on respondent.

ISSUE/S Whether Melissa Magsino made a timely objection to the documentary and testimonial
evidence raised by Rolando?
RULING
No, both oral and documentary evidence — were not timely made. Petitioner should
have objected during the course of Gates' direct testimony on her qualifications as an
expert witness and explaining the mechanics of the psychological examination which
she conducted on respondent. Petitioner should not have waited in ambush after the
expert witness had already finished testifying.

CASE NO. People v. Yatco

11 G.R. No. L-9181. November 28, Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
1955.
DOCTRINE Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if an accused's confession
may not be competent as against his co-accused, being hearsay as to the latter, or to
prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other
evidence, the confession is nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own
guilt.

Section 12 of Rule 123, providing that "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating
to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration," refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the
 49

unlawful enterprise ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to
a confession made long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.

The Court overlooked that the right to object is a privilege which the parties may
waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not seasonably made, the objection
is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the
evidence.

The court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the
attorney that the proof offered will be connected later." At any rate, in the final
determination and consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able to
distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of
evidence, should be excluded.

FACTS
In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of Quezon City; Juan Consunji,
Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity was still unknown, were charged with
having conspired together in the murder of one Jose Ramos.

During the progress of the trial while the prosecution was questioning one of its
witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection
with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by
defendant Juan Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other defendant Alfonso
Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the
ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused
Panganiban.

The trial court ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether
different ground: that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the
confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy
between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
conditions, and circumstances.

The prosecution then moved in writing for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion,
but again the motion was denied. Wherefore, a petition for certiorari was brought
before the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General, for the review and annulment of the
lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions
of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.

ISSUE/S Whether the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the
accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made.

RULING Yes, the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete
exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Juan
Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made.

Even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused

Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them
without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji
was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt.
 50

CASE NO. People v. Moralde

12 G.R. No. 131860. January 16, Ponente: Corona, J.
2003
DOCTRINE The evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is accorded the
highest respect on appeal because the court below had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is
binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached
arbitrarily or that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value
that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.

Having been positively and unmistakably identified by the complainant as her rapist,
the appellant's defense of alibi cannot prosper. Categorical and consistent positive
identification, absent any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying
thereon, prevails over the defenses of denial and alibi which, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, constitute self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law.

FACTS
Appellant questioned before the Supreme Court the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Maasin, Southern Leyte, finding him guilty of the crime of rape committed against
Salvacion Z. Hitomo and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
appellant contended that the trial court erred in relying solely on the version of the
victim and in rejecting his defenses of denial and alibi.

Complainant Salvacion Hitomo, an unwed mother, was sleeping in her house when she
was awakened by the voice of appellant, Marlon Moralde, who was calling her name.
The appellant who was completely naked stood in front of her. She recognized
appellant Moralde because of the illumination coming from the lamp inside her house.
She asked the appellant what he was doing but the latter told her not to make any
noise. Thereafter, the appellant pinned down her hands, gagged her mouth with a face
towel, pulled her dress upward, removed her panty before finally inserting his penis
into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her if she made any noise

Later on, complainant Salvacion heard the appellant calling somebody by the name of
"Sarge," saying it was the latter's turn. Appellant stayed in the room, holding
complainant's hands above her head and his other hand covering the latter's mouth,
while "Sarge" inserted his finger into her vagina. "Sarge" then told appellant to stay with
the complainant for a while and volunteered to go outside and serve as look out. Again,
appellant went on top of complainant and ravished her. Before leaving, appellant
warned Salvacion not to tell anybody about what happened, otherwise he would kill
her.

The following day, Salvacion went to her uncle, Pedro Zapanta, and told the latter of
her ordeal the night before. Losing no time, Zapanta accompanied his niece to their
barangay captain and then proceeded to the Police Station. Salvacion underwent a
physical examination conducted by Dr. Godofredo Espina, the Municipal Health Officer

An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court based, on the sworn complaint
of Salvacion Hitomo against Moralde, charging the latter with the crime of rape

During the trial, the prosecution presented as witness the complainant herself. It also
presented her uncle Pedro Zapanta, who testified that he knew the appellant for some
time as the latter used to go to his house. Two weeks before the rape incident,
 51

appellant Moralde came to his house and told him that he (appellant) had good
intentions for his niece but the complainant was indifferent.

Dr. Procioso Edillo, Jr., the new Municipal Health Officer testified on the contents of the
medico-legal examination report of Dr. Godofredo Espina.

On cross-examination, appellant Moralde declared that he came to know the

complainant when he and a friend had a drinking spree in the complainant's store which
also served as her house. He found the complainant attractive. They bore no ill-feelings
against each other.

The trial court rendered its decision, convicting appellant Marlon Moralde of rape,

ISSUE/S
Whether the trial court was correct in giving credence to the testimony of the
complainant Salvacion Hitomo.

RULING
Yes, the trial court was correct in giving credence to the testimony of the complainant
Salvacion Hitomo.

The evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is accorded the
highest respect on appeal because the court below had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is
binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that it was reached
arbitrarily or that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value
that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.

Appellant tried to demonstrate that he was far from Barangay Pangi, when the rape
occurred on October 7, 1993. The defense even presented four of his long-time friends
and companions in the detachment who all testified that appellant was with them
during their operation. However, instead of corroborating his testimony, their
statements created serious doubts because of certain inconsistencies and lapses.

The four police officers also contradicted each other as to their exact location at a
certain time. At one point, appellant, together with SPO1 Antonino Dumaoal, asserted
that they arrived early morning of the next day at Sitio Banab-on from Barangay
Mahayahay where they had their breakfast. On the other hand, PO1 Arthur Arcilla
affirmed that it was already 12:00 noon of the following day when they reached Sitio
Banab-on where they ate lunch. These conflicting statements impaired the credibility
of the defense witnesses.
 52

IV. Rule 131

CASE NO. Tze Sun Wong v. Kenny Wong

1 G.R. No. 180364. December 3, Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J
2014.
DOCTRINE
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it
is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.

FACTS
Petitioner Tze Sun Wong is a Chinese citizen who immigrated to the Philippines and
subsequently acquired a permanent resident status in 1982, he studied, married, and
continued to reside in the country, and even owned a company called Happy Sun Travel
and Tours.

Respondent Kenny Wong (respondent), owner and proprietor of San Andres Construction
Supply, filed a Complaint-Affidavit against petitioner before the Bureau of Immigration
(BOI), alleging that the latter had misrepresented, in his driver's license application,
that he was a Filipino citizen.

Respondent Kenny Wong also averred that petitioner Tze Sun Wong and his business
partner, Tina Yu, issued post-dated checks in the amount of PhP886,922.00 which,
however, bounced to his damage and prejudice.

In his Counter-Affidavit Tze Sun Wong denied respondent's claim of misrepresentation,

stating that when he applied for a driver's license, it was another person who filled up
the application form for him. However, said person entered the wrong information,
particularly, on his name, birth year, and nationality.

the BOI Board of Commissioners ordered the deportation of petitioner on the grounds
of:

a. illegal use of alias, i.e., Joseph Wong, which was the name appearing in his
driver's license application
b. misrepresenting himself as a Filipino citizen in the same application, in
violation of Section 37 (a) (7) and (9) 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 613,
c. The BOI took judicial notice of the fact that driver's license applications
require the personal appearance of the applicant in order to prevent fraud.
Thus, by allowing someone to apply for him, he actively involved himself in the
preparation and issuance of a fraudulent driver's license. By the same account,
he cannot then aver that he was without any participation in the entry of his
supposed Philippine citizenship in his driver's license.

Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez affirmed the ruling of the BOI

Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez rendered a Resolution rejecting petitioner's

argument on the basis of Section 8 of the Immigration Act which simply requires that
"[i]n any case coming before the [BOI] Board of Commissioners, the decision of any two
members shall prevail[,]" as in this case. It was added that when petitioner sought to
 53

reconsider said Judgment, all four (4) commissioners decided in favor of his
deportation.

The CA denied Tze Sun Wong’s petition for certiorari.

ISSUE/S
Whether petitioner Tze Sun Wong had adduced clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts, when he alleged the nullity of
the BOI Board of Commissioners' Judgment due to the fact that it had been signed only
by two (2) commissioners, insisting that deliberation should still be made by all
commissioners as a collegial body.

RULING
No, unfortunately, however, petitioner has not shown any proof that deliberations were
not conducted by all commissioners before the questioned Judgment was made. The
rule is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence. Thus, once more, his self-serving assertion cannot be given
credence. This is especially so in light of the presumption of regularity, which herein
ought to prevail due to the absence of any clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.

In any event, the lack of any concurrence or dissension from the two (2) other
commissioners missing on the face of the October 2, 2002 Judgment had already been
placated by their eventual signing of full concurrence in the subsequent Resolution
dated December 4, 2002 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

CASE NO. NFF Industrial Corporation v. G & L Associated Brokerage

2 G.R. No. 178169. January 12, Ponente: Peralta, J.
2015
DOCTRINE
By preponderance of evidence it means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to that of the other side.

Essentially, preponderance of evidence refers to the comparative weight of the

evidence presented by the opposing parties. As such, it has been defined as "the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side," and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater
weight of the credible evidence. It is proof that is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

FACTS
Petitioner NFF Industrial Corporation is engaged in the business of manufacturing bulk
bags, while respondent G & L Associated Brokerage, Inc. was among its customers
Respondent Gerardo Trinidad is the general manager of respondent company

According to NFF Industrial Corporation, G & L Associated Brokerage, Inc. ordered one
thousand (1,000) pieces of bulk bags from petitioner, at Three Hundred Eighty Pesos
(P380.00) per piece, or a total purchase price of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P380,000.00), payable within thirty (30) days from delivery, covered by Purchase Order
No. 97-002.
 54

In the said Purchase Order, an instruction was made that the bulk bags were for
immediate delivery to "G & L Associated Brokerage, Inc., c/o Hi-Cement Corporation,
Norzagaray, Bulacan.

G & L Associated Brokerage, Inc. ordered an additional one thousand (1,000) pieces of
bulk bags, thus for a total of two thousand (2,000) pieces, at the same price per bag
and with the same terms of payment as well as the same instructions for delivery, as
evidenced by

a. Delivery receipts
b. Sales invoices

NFF Industrial Corporation alleged that the aforementioned deliveries were duly
acknowledged by representatives of respondent company. Petitioner also averred that
all the delivery receipts were rubber stamped, dated and signed by the security
guard-on-duty, as well as other representatives of respondent company.

According however to "G & L Associated Brokerage, Inc. the Purchase Order specifically
provided that the bulk bags were to be delivered at Hi-Cement Corporation to Mr. Raul
Ambrosio, respondent company's checker and authorized representative assigned
thereat. Subsequently, however, the ordered bulk bags were not delivered to
respondent company, the same not having been received by the authorized
representative in conformity with the terms of the Purchase Order.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. Aggrieved,
respondents appealed before the CA. As a result, the decision of the RTC was reversed
in the CA's Decision.

ISSUE/S
Whether, the evidence of petitioner NFF Industrial Corp. preponderantly established
that there was valid delivery of bulk bags, which gives rise to respondent company's
corresponding obligation to pay therefor.

RULING Yes, there was delivery. It was clear that NFF Industrial had actually delivered the bulk
bags to G. & L., albeit the same was not delivered to the person named in the Purchase
Order.

In addition, by allowing petitioner's employee to pass through the guard-on-duty, who

allowed the entry of delivery into the premises of Hi-Cement, which is the designated
delivery site, respondents had effectively abandoned whatever infirmities may have
attended the delivery of the bulk bags.

The Court found it bizarre that respondents failed in demanding the delivery of the bulk
bags despite its urgent need to procure the same, as admitted by respondents'
witnesses. Customarily, failure to deliver the goods could have prompted respondents
to follow up on the orders and ensure that the same is delivered at the earliest
opportunity.
 55

CASE NO. Flores v. People

3 G.R. No. 181354. February 27, Ponente: Mendoza, J.
2013
DOCTRINE
Generally, "the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent."

If the accused, however, admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden
of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. To escape
liability, it now becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing
evidence all the elements of that justifying circumstance

FACTS
Flores was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information filed before the
Sandiganbayan.

On the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque certain visitors, Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de
Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at the terrace of the house of Jesus.

They started drinking at 8:30 o'clock in the evening. Jesus, however, joined his visitors
only at around 11:00 o'clock after he and his wife arrived from Sta. Rosa, Laguna,
where they tried to settle a problem regarding a vehicular accident involving one of
their children. The drinking at the terrace was ongoing when Flores arrived with an
M-16 armalite rifle.

Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores who was heading
towards the terrace. After glancing at the two, who began talking to each other near
the terrace, Duran focused his attention back to the table. Suddenly, he heard several
gunshots prompting him to duck under the table. Right after the shooting, he looked
around and saw the bloodied body of Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores was no
longer in sight.

Dr. Ruben Escueta (Dr. Escueta) testified that he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver
of Jesus; it appeared that the victim suffered four gunshot wounds in the different
parts of his body.

To avoid criminal liability, Flores interposed self-defense.

Flores claimed that he, together with four members of the CAFGU and Civil Service Unit
(CSU) upon the instructions of Mayor Samuel Bueser conducted a ronda in Barangay San
Roque which was celebrating the eve of its fiesta.

At around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who had
earlier invited them for some "bisperas" snacks, when they heard gunshots seemingly
emanating from his house. Jesus, who appeared drunk, immediately stood up and
approached him as he was standing near the entrance of the terrace. Jesus abruptly
drew his magnum pistol and poked it directly at his chest and then fired it.

With fierce determination, however, Jesus again aimed his gun at Flores, but the latter
was able to instinctively take hold of Jesus' right hand, which was holding the gun. As
they wrestled, Jesus again fired his gun, hitting Flores' left hand.
 56

Flores, with his life and limb at great peril, instinctively swung with his right hand the
baby armalite dangling on his right shoulder towards Jesus and squeezed its trigger.
When he noticed Jesus already lying prostrate on the floor, he immediately withdrew
from the house.

After due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued a decision finding Flores guilty of the
offense charged. The Sandiganbayan rejected Flores' claim that the shooting was
justified for failure to prove self-defense.

ISSUE/S
Whether Flores had discharged the burden of evidence in order to prove the attendance
of the justifying circumstance of self-defense?

RULING No, In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden. The accused claimed that Jesus
Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a magnum handgun from a distance of about
one (1) meter. With such a powerful weapon, at such close range, and without hitting
any hard portion of his body, it is quite incredible that the bullet did not exit through
the accused's shoulder.

Simon Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he did not

mention anything about a bullet remaining on his shoulder. The accused surprisingly did
not bother to secure the x-ray plate or any medical records from the hospital.

The utter lack of interest of the accused in retrieving the alleged x-ray plate or any
medical record from the hospital militate against the veracity of his version of the
incident.

The foregoing circumstances tainted Flores' credibility and reliability, his story being
contrary to ordinary human experience.

"Settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence,
the test to determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether
the same is in conformity with common knowledge and is consistent with the
experience of mankind.

Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged by
Jesus, the same ceased to exist when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and fell to
the ground. The latter had no reason to pump more bullets on Jesus' abdomen and
buttocks.

CASE NO. Ison v. People

4 G.R. No. 131860. January 16, Ponente: Corona, J.
2003
DOCTRINE
"Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused while the
other may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the accused
because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty required for
conviction."
 57

FACTS
According to the prosecution, Ison offered to sell two (2) parcels of fishpond to Atty.
Hermenegildo Ramos, Jr. (Ramos) and Edgar Barroga (Barroga). The contract price for
said fishponds was Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php800,000.00).

Ison persuaded Ramos and Barroga to buy the fishponds after showing them Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) permits and receipts either in her name or in the
name of her husband.

Ramos and Barroga were convinced of [Ison's] ownership of the fishponds and agreed to
buy the same. After executing the Contract to Sell. Ramos and Barroga paid Ison One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) in cash as partial payment. Thereafter, Ramos
and Barroga took possession of the fishponds. Ramos and Barroga visited the fishponds
often, bought feeds and operated the same. Subsequently Ramos and Barroga paid
[Ison] an additional Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) representing two equal
installments

Ramos and Barroga received a call from a certain Ligaya Tupaz who told them that
Colonel Pedro Vergara (Vergara) was the real owner of the fishponds.

A meeting was set for Ramos, Barroga, [Ison] and Vergara. Vergara, however, left before
the meeting started. During the meeting, [Ison] admitted that she first sold the
fishponds to Vergara before she sold the same to Ramos and Barroga. Ramos and
Barroga then asked [Ison] to return their money plus interest and damages. [Ison]
promised to return the money but reneged on her promise.

Vergara and eight mamumukot entered the fishponds, harvested the fish and took
possession of the same.

Ison, on the other hand, claimed that she remains to be the registered owner of the
fishponds. She sold the same to Colonel Pedro Vergara (Col. Vergara), who designated
her as caretaker thereof. Within a year from the purchase, Col. Vergara did not earn
from the fishponds' operation. Thereafter, he authorized Ison to sell the property for
P850,000.00, out of which P150,000.00 shall be paid to the agents.

Ison alleges that she was introduced to Atty. Hermenegildo Ramos, Jr. (Atty. Ramos)
and Edgar Barroga (Edgar) by three agents, one of whom was Jess.

Jess is the father of Edgar. When Ison met with the private complainants in the
fishponds, the latter already brought a ready made Contract to Sell. Initially, Ison
wanted for cash to be outrightly paid. Hence, she refused to sign the contract, which
stipulated that the purchase would be on an installment basis.

Jess then assured Ison that Atty. Ramos can easily make the payments and that the
Contract to Sell would be a mere formality. Ison informed Col. Vergara of the
agreement. Col. Vergara admitted that he authorized Ison to sell the fishponds.
However, he claimed that he was unaware of the execution of the Contract to Sell
between Ison and the private complainants. Ison now alleges that Col. Vergara's denial
was made for him to evade criminal liability relative to the harvest of the fishes in the
ponds.

The RTC convicted Ison as charged in the Information, the CA denied Ison's appeal, but
modified the penalty imposed by the RTC pursuant to the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
 58

ISSUE/S
Whether the prosecution was able to prove the essential element of Estafa under
Article 315 (2) (a), that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must
be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud
beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING
No, As pointed out by the defense, Jess was among the three agents, who introduced
Ison to the private complainants. Jess is the father of private complainant Edgar. It is
thus more logical to infer that Jess informed his son about matters pertinent to the
status and ownership of the fishponds

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Ison
misrepresented herself as the owner of the fishponds and entered into the Contract to
Sell without authority from Col. Vergara. It was likewise not amply established that the
private complainants were completely unaware of the pertinent facts concerning the
fishponds' ownership. Hence, the essential element of reliance upon the
misrepresentation, which should have induced the private complainants to part with
their money, is wanting. Inevitably, the Court was constrained to uphold the
presumption of innocence in Ison's favor and acquit her

CASE NO. People v. Larry Mendoza y Estrada

5 G.R. No. 192432. June 23, 2014 Ponente: Bersamin, J.
DOCTRINE
The law enforcement agents who conduct buy-bust operations against persons
suspected of drug trafficking in violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA No. 9165),
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, should comply
with the statutory requirements for preserving the chain of custody of the seized
evidence.

Failing this, they are required to render sufficient reasons for their non-compliance
during the trial; otherwise, the presumption that they have regularly performed their
official duties cannot obtain, and the persons they charge should be acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt

FACTS
According to the prosecution, policemen Arnel Diocena and Alfredo DG Lim testified
that they received reports that an alias 'Larry' was selling shabu. They organized a
buy-bust operation where Diocena acted as the poseur buyer while Lim served as
back-up.

There Diocena and the asset waited in the corner on their motorcycle while Lim and the
other cops positioned themselves in the perimeter. The asset texted Larry and they
waited for him to arrive.

Larry took out two plastic sachets of shabu and gave it to Diocena who gave him a
marked P500 bill. Diocena lit the left signal light of his motorcycle to signal Lim and the
other cops that the deal was done. They then arrested Larry who turned out to be the
accused. After frisking him, they recovered another sachet of shabu from him. Diocena
marked the first two 'LEM-1' and LEM-2 while the one taken after the frisk he marked
 59

'LEM-3. the police crime lab for forensic testing where they tested positive for. for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.

For the defense witnesses' version of facts, on that day Estrada was minding his own
business, eating with his wife when his friend Rolly Lopez knocked on the door. Rolly
was wanted by the cops ('may atraso') and asked Mendoza for help to get them off his
back. Rolly texted somebody and after there was another knock. It was the police led
by one Dennis Gorospe who asked Mendoza for his identity. When he said yes, Gorospe
cuffed him after showing him sachets of shabu with his initials. Gorospe was then taken
to the police station where he was interrogated and asked how much protection money
he can cough up. When he refused, he was arrested and drug tested. He claims that he
was supposed to be a regalo to the new police chief.

ISSUE/S
Whether the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties can prosper
despite substantial lapses committed by the buy-bust team in the chain of custody?

RULING
No, the presumption of regularity cannot prosper over the presumption of innocence.

An examination of the records revealed that the buy-bust team did not observe the
statutory procedures on preserving the chain of custody. To start with, the State did not
show the presence during the seizure and confiscation of the contraband, as well as
during the physical inventory and photographing of the contraband, of the
representatives from the media or the Department of Justice, or of any elected public
official. Such presence was precisely necessary to insulate the apprehension and
incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity.

Also, the Prosecution did not tender any justification why no representatives from the
media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official had been present
during the seizure and confiscation of the shabu. In all, the buy-bust team had about 48
days — the period intervening between July 10, 2007, when the test buy was
conducted, and August 28, 2007, when the crimes charged were committed — within
which to have the media and the Department of Justice be represented during the
buy-bust operation, as well as to invite an elected public official of the place of
operation to witness the operation.

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no

reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of
official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of regularity will not be
stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere
rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed
innocent.

CASE NO. Spouses Manzanilla v. Waterfields Industries Corporation

6 G.R. No. 177484. July 18, 2014 Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE
Under the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the
prejudice of the other party who relied upon them
 60

FACTS
The spouses; Manzanilla are the owners of a parcel of land, they leased a 6,000-square
meter portion of the land to Waterfields, as represented by its President Aliza R. Ma
(Ma) through a contract of lease.

However, Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rental. Hence, Ma sent the spouses
Manzanilla a letter, stipulating that the rental deposit in the contract of lease shall be
used exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and other incidental
expenses only and applied at the termination of the lease, while promising to pay its
rental arrears from April 1997 to July 1997, Waterfields, in order to assuage the spouses
Manzanilla, likewise pledged to pay rent in advance starting August 1997. The letter
also expressly provided that it amended the Contract of Lease.

The spouses Manzanilla filed before the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against
Waterfields, for allegedly violating the lease agreement by not paying the rentals on
time. And in yet another violation, it failed to pay the P18,000.00 monthly rental for
the past six months prior to the filing of the Complaint, that is, from December 1997 to
May 1998 or in the total amount of P108,000.00. Demands upon Waterfields to pay the
accrued rentals and vacate the property were unheeded so the spouses Manzanilla
considered the contract terminated and/or rescinded.

The MTC found Ma's letter of July 9, 1997 to have amended the Contract of Lease. In
particular, Section 4 of the Contract of Lease which provides that the rental deposit
shall answer for any unpaid rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility charges was
superseded by the portion in Ma's July 9, 1997 letter which states that "the deposit
stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid
utilities, if any, and other incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of
the lease".

The RTC affirmed the MTC decision, the RTC noted in its Decision hat in its Answer,
Waterfields admitted paragraph 5 of the Complaint which states that the Contract of
Lease was amended on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997. Further, the very existence of
Ma's July 9, 1997 letter negated the applicability of the Statute of Frauds.

The CA, however, had a different take. The CA gave weight to the spouses Manzanilla's
allegation that they terminated the Contract of Lease. Upon such termination, it held
that the rental deposit should have been applied as payment for unpaid utilities and
other incidental expenses, if any.

ISSUE/S
Whether the contract of lease was amended by the letter of Waterfield industries
making the rental deposit chargeable exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities, if
any, and other incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of the lease,
and thus not applicable to the unpaid rentals?

RULING
Yes, the contract of lease was amended.

Waterfields admitted in its Answer the truth of the material allegation that the
Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997. "It is well-settled that judicial
admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party [itself] and binds
the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake (as in this case), no amount of rationalization can offset it.
 61

As aptly opined by the MTC, the intention of Waterfields in coming up with the July 9,
1997 letter is to repress its violation of the contract since at that time it was already in
default in the payment of rent since April 1997.

Hence, aside from promising to pay its rental arrears from April 1997 to July 1997,
Waterfields, in order to assuage the spouses Manzanilla, likewise pledged to pay rent in
advance starting August 1997.

CASE NO. Tan Jr. v. Hosana

7 G.R. No. 190846. February 3, Ponente: Brion, J.
2016
DOCTRINE It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it;
the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to
prove non-payment.

A mere allegation is not evidence, and the person who alleges has the burden of
proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil
cases is preponderance of evidence.

In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of
proving them by a preponderance of evidence.

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight
of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." 42 Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto.

Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. In the present case, the consideration
stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount paid by
Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name.

FACTS
Respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros), during their
marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot Milagros sold to the petitioner
Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale executed
by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor.

Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and

Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).

Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and
knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose's signature making
it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas.
 62

Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by Rosana Robles (Rosana),
his goddaughter. With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas
allegedly made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the
consideration written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired
why the written consideration was lower than the actual consideration paid. Milagros
explained that it was done to save on taxes.

The RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the subject property to
Tomas. Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling and
directed Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with
interest, under the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he
paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing
evidence that established this claim.

ISSUE/S
Whether Tomas had proved through preponderant evidence that he paid the sum of
P700,000.00 instead of P200,000.00

RULING
No, Tomas' bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to
be given weight and credence.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of
these rules. There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the
admissibility of a void document. Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence
because the purpose

The fact that the sale was declared null and void does not prevent the court from
relying on consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount paid
by the petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.

Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of the
sale is not necessary since it is necessarily included in determining the regular
execution of the sale.

CASE NO. Dr. Fernando P. Solidum v. People

8 G.R. No. 131860. January 16, Ponente: Corona, J.
2003
DOCTRINE Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites
must first be satisfied, to wit:
1. The accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
2. The instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged;
 63

3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.

FACTS
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born with an imperforate anus. Two days after his
birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large
intestine out through the abdominal wall.

Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through
operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team. The anesthesiologists
included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr.
Solidum).

During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma
lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. 10 He could no
longer see, hear or move.

Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries with the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila against the attending
physicians. Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an
information solely against Dr. Solidum.

The RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. The CA affirmed the
conviction of Dr. Solidum, pertinently stating and ruling that the case appears to be a
textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.

ISSUE/S
a. whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein;
b. whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.

RULING a. No, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable bradycardia, would not
ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the
administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove
that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury.

In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the
operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal
reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient

b. No, there was reasonable doubt as to whether Dr. Solidum was criminally
negligent in monitoring and properly regulating the level of anesthetic agent
administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane, as Dr. Vertido made a
significant turnaround. He wanted to correct one piece of information
regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He
declared that he made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that
based on the records it should have been 100% oxygen. The implication of Dr.
Vertido's admission is that there was no overdose of the anesthetic agent, and
the accused Dr. Solidum stakes his liberty and reputation on this conclusion.

In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against
unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the
physician to act in respect of the patient.
 64

The standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be determined from expert
testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the
standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly
possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances.

Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in

anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was
applicable.

Rule 130

CASE NO. Sison v. People

1 G.R. Nos. 108280-83/G.R. No. Ponente: Puno, J.
114931-33 . November 16, 1995
DOCTRINE
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be
identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies
in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the
crime

The Supreme Court noted that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part
of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their
admissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the accused presented
their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry
Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any of the
pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim.

FACTS
After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, tension and animosity between the two (2) groups
sometimes broke into violence. it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known
"Coryista."

A rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Led by Oliver
Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District,
arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel
Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for
thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said
"Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige
gulpihin ninyo!"

a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden. There, they saw Annie
Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos. They approached her
and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them. "Gulpihin
ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting
"Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang
mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was
arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti tayo ngayon!" A
 65

commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking
persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt.

Renato then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons
shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and
his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked
and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again
pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various
parts of his body

Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic."

The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both
local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became
front-page news the following day, capturing national and international attention. This
prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command and the Western
Police district to investigate the incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief

Several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos
loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo.

ISSUE/S
Whether the photographs of the mauling incident were admissible in evidence despite
the alleged lack of identification?

RULING Yes, the photographs are admissible. The photographs were adopted by appellant
Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this
hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their
respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who was absent. At subsequent hearings,
the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the
witness stand.

The use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged
non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof.
That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed
when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves
therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat.

There was no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward
announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever received such
reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang
reported the incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement immediately two
hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any reward.
 66

CASE NO. Gaw v. Chua

2 G.R. No. 160855. April 16, 2008 Ponente: Nachura, J.
DOCTRINE
The "best evidence rule" as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such a document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such a document was actually executed,
or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.

Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for
the original. Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
court's discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of
the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

FACTS
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises
namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood Industries.
The couple had seven children. Chua Sioc Huan and herein respondent Suy Ben Chua
were children of the spouses.

Subsequently, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children as his
only surviving heirs. At the time of Chua Chin's death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber
was P415,487.20. Chua Chin’s surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir in said document, Chan Chi
and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over
Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.

Petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked respondent, Suy
Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will use for the construction of their
house in Marilao, Bulacan. Later Suy Ben Chua issued in favor spouses Gaw a China
Banking Corporation Check for P200,000.00 which he delivered to the couple's house in
Marilao, Bulacan. Antonio later encashed the check.

Subsequently, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights
and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration of P255,000.00 in favor of Suy Ben
Chua

Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from Suy Ben
Chua within the designated period. Failing to heed his demand, Suy Ben Xhua filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the RTC.

In their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw contended that the
P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioner's share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber, one
of her family's businesses. According to the spouses, when they transferred residence
to Marilao, Bulacan, Suy Ben Chua asked spouses Gaw for an accounting, and payment
of her share in the profits, of Capital Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries
Corporation, and Hagonoy Lumber

In his Reply, Suy Ben Chua averred that the spouses Gaw did not demand from him an
accounting of Capitol Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries, and Hagonoy
Lumber. He asserted that the spouses Gaw, in fact, had no right whatsoever in these
businesses that would entitle them to an accounting thereof. Suy Ben Chua insisted that
 67

the P200,000.00 was given to and accepted by them as a loan and not as their share in
Hagonoy Lumber

With leave of court, the spouses Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended Compulsory
Counterclaim) wherein they insisted that Chua Gaw, as one of the compulsory heirs,
was entitled to one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy Lumber, which the Suy Ben Chua had
arrogated to himself.

In his Answer to Amended Counterclaim, Suy Ben Chua explained that his sister, Chua
Sioc Huan, became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when the heirs executed a Deed
of Partition In turn, he became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought it
from Chua Sioc Huan, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.

ISSUE/S
Whether the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary rights in
favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan, and the subsequent Deed of Sale over all her
rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration of P255,000.00 executed by
Chua Sioc Huan in favor of Suy Ben Chua is admissible in evidence despite not being
originals?

RULING Yes, the documents are admissible despite not being originals. The best evidence rule is
not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either
deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds.

The petitioner never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the
Deed of Partition. As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its
genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner
required by the rules. The petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not
express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only
provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.

Apparently, the petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that
there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua
Sioc Huan was only temporary. An agreement or the contract between the parties is the
formal expression of the parties' rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of
the intention of the parties. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.

CASE NO. Republic v. Mupas

3 G.R. No. 181892. September 8, Ponente: Brion, J.
2015
DOCTRINE As exceptions to the best evidence rule, Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that non-original documents may be produced in court in the following cases:

a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror
b. When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
 68

c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which

cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to
be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.

FACTS
The Republic through the Department of Transportation and Communications executed
a concession agreement with PIATCO for the construction, development, and operation
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III) under a
build-operate-transfer scheme. The parties subsequently amended their concession
agreement and entered into several supplemental agreements (collectively referred to
as the PIATCO contracts).

PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka for the construction of the NAIA-IPT III under
an Onshore Construction Contract. On the same date, PIATCO also entered into an
Offshore Procurement Contract with Asahikosan for the design, manufacture, purchase,
test and delivery of the Plant in the NAIA-IPT III. Both contracts were supplemented by
succeeding agreements.

PIATCO failed to pay for the services rendered by Takenaka and Asahikosan

The Supreme Court nullified the PIATCO contracts in Agan v. PIATCO on the grounds
that: (a) the Paircargo Consortium (that later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a duly
pre-qualified bidder; and (b) the PIATCO contracts contained provisions that
substantially departed from the draft Concession Agreement

The Court issued a resolution that the Republic should first pay PIATCO before it could
take over the NAIA-IPT III. The issue stems from computing the attendant costs of
construction in determining just compensation.

In the present case, PIATCO attached to its Compliance dated December 14, 2010, the
photocopies of numerous documents, and the validation of PIATCO's computation of
attendant costs prepared by Reyes Tacandong & Co., among others. PIATCO justifies the
non-presentment of original documents pursuant to Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.

PIATCO argued that its non-submission of original documents before the trial court is
justified under Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It points out that a party
need not submit the original when it consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole. PIATCO insists that the
lower courts erred in not giving probative value to the report prepared by Reyes
Tacandong & Co., an auditing firm, validating PIATCO's computation of attendant costs

ISSUE/S
Whether the Court should have considered the photocopies of PIATCO's documents
supporting attendant costs?

RULING No, these photocopies are hearsay. Section 3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does
away with the item-by-item court identification and authentication of voluminous
exhibits which would only be burdensome and tedious for the parties and the court.
 69

However, as a condition precedent to the admission of a summary of numerous

documents, the proponent must lay a proper foundation for the admission of the
original documents on which the summary is based. The proponent must prove that the
source documents being summarized are also admissible if presented in court.

In concrete terms, the source documents must be shown to be original, and not
secondary. Furthermore, the source documents must likewise be accessible to the
opposing party so that the correctness of the summary of the voluminous records may
be tested on cross examination and/or may be refuted in pleadings. In ordinary
trial-type proceedings, a proper foundation for the introduction of a summary may be
established through the "testimony of the person who is responsible for the summary's
preparation, or the person who supervised the preparation of the summary.

Whenever a party seeks an exemption under the best evidence rule pursuant to Section
3 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he asks permission from the trial court to produce
a summary of numerous documents, whose originals are available to the adverse party
for inspection. He does not ask permission from the trial court to present in evidence
the numerous non-original documents. Otherwise, the very purpose of Section 3 (c),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court would be defeated. In that case, every exhibit of
non-original documents would be identified, authenticated, and cross-examined,
leading to a tedious and protracted litigation

Thus, if a party desires to present photocopies of the original documents, he must first
establish that the presentation of photocopies is justified under Section 3 (a), (b),
and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. He must establish the presence of all the
elements under these provisions.

In the case of lost or destroyed documents, the offeror of non-original documents must
first prove the following elements before secondary evidence is admitted before the
court:
a. the existence or due execution of the original;
b. the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in
court; and
c. the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability
of the original can be attributed.

PIATCO cannot rely on the affidavit of Atty. Tolentino who allegedly identified the
photocopied documents supporting attendant costs. The Court observed that the
alleged affidavit of Atty. Tolentino does not have any signature above his name as the
affiant

The Supreme Court likewise did not give weight to the summary prepared by Reyes
Tacandong & Co. for being double hearsay. Reyes Tacandong & Co., whose letter was
addressed to PIATCO and not to the trial court, did not state in its report that it
examined the original documents allegedly proving attendant costs. Moreover, in a
letter dated December 14, 2010, Reyes Tacandong & Co stated it does not "express any
assurance on the attendant costs.

CASE NO. Filipina Y. Sy. v. Court of Appeals

4 G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000 Ponente: Quisimbing, J.
DOCTRINE
Their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these
 70

documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows
that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections
having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection
was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date
of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973

FACTS
Filipina Sy filed a petition for legal separation. The action was later amended to a
petition for separation of property on the ground that her husband, Fernando Sy,
abandoned her without just cause.

Judgment was rendered dissolving the conjugal partnership of gains and the court
approved a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the spouses. In May, 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted
parricide against her husband in which the Regional Trial Court convicted him of a lesser
crime of slight physical injuries. Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation
against private respondent.

The Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded
custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to
respondent.

In 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage
to her husband Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial
Court denied the petition. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent as cited by
petitioner do not constitute psychological incapacity, which may warrant the
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Appealing to the Supreme Court Sy., for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage
being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears
that according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date
of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous.

Petitioner Sy. states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the
marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion
that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these
critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court.

ISSUE/S
Whether the marriage license and marriage certificate are admissible as evidence
despite being mere photocopies?

RULING
Yes, the photocopies of the marriage license and marriage certificate are admissible as
evidence, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial
below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court,
with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution.
Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage.
 71

CASE NO. Skunac Corp. v. Sylianteng

5 G.R. No. 205879. April 23, 2014 Ponente: Peralta, J.
DOCTRINE It is settled that a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the
same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in
evidence without accounting for the non-production of the original. Moreover, Section 4
(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen a document is in two or more
copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are
equally regarded as originals."

FACTS
This case involved two (2) parcels of land; lot 1 and 2 both found in Block 2 of the
Pujalte Subdivision, San Juan City.

Plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng ("appellants") base

their claim of ownership over the subject lots on a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
their favor by their mother, Emerenciana Sylianteng ("Emerenciana"), on June 27, 1983.
Sylianteng further allege that Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late Luis Pujalte
[Luis] through a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1958.

Skunac Corporation ("Skunac") and Alfonso F. Enriquez ("Enriquez"), on the other hand,
claim that a certain Romeo Pujalte who was declared by the RTC of Pasig City in a
special proceeding as the sole heir of Luis Pujalte, Romeo Pujalte then allegedly sold
the lots to Skunac and Enriquez in 1992.

Skunac Corporation or their part, maintain that Sylianteng acquired the lots under
questionable circumstances it appearing that there was no copy of the Deed of Sale,
between Emerenciana and Luis Pujalte, on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds.

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig (RTC) rendered judgment in favor of Skunac Corp. the
CA promulgated its assailed Decision, which reversed the decision of the RTC and
thereby ruling in favor of Sylianteng upon finding that Emerenciana's acquisition of the
subject lots from Luis and her subsequent sale of the same to Sylianteng were valid and
lawful.

ISSUE/S
a. Whether Sylianteng’s presentation of the "duplicate/carbon" original of the
Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1958 was in violation of the best evidence rule
under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

b. Whether there is doubt as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, because of

the fact that only one copy of such deed was prepared as only one document
number was assigned by the notary to the said deed, despite the claim of
Sylianteng that the said deed of sale was prepared, executed and notarized in
several copies.

RULING a. No, the presentation of the carbon copy was not in violation of the original
document rule.

It is settled that a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at

the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and may be
introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the
original. In addition, evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the
subject deed is the fact that it was notarized. The notarization of a private
document converts it into a public document. Moreover, a notarized instrument
 72

is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution, is

conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity.

b. No, there is no doubt despite the fact that there are carbon copies of the deed
and only one document number was assigned by the notary to the said deed. It
is true that Section 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that "[t]he notary shall give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to
the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages
of his register on which the same is recorded." In this regard, the Court agrees
with respondents' contention that the "instrument" being referred to in the
above quoted provision is the deed or contract which is notarized. It does not
pertain to the number of copies of such deed or contract. Hence, one number is
assigned to a deed or contract regardless of the number of copies prepared and
notarized.

CASE NO. People v. Tandoy Y Lim

6 G.R. No. 80505. December 4, Ponente: Cruz, J.
1990.
DOCTRINE
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject
of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually
executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution,
the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.

FACTS
Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and
Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao
Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at ,
Barangay Singkamas, Makati.

Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher
to approach. The other members of the team strategically positioned themselves. Soon,
three men approached Singayan. One of them was the accused-appellant, who said
without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was
made then and there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00
bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit). The arresting officers brought Tandoy
to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for investigation by
Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after having
been informed of his constitutional right.

Mario Tandoy y Lim was convicted by the trial court of the crime of violation of Art. II,
Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, for selling eight
(8) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana
flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops,

The accused-appellant invoked the best evidence rule and questions the admission by
the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the xerox copy of the P10.00 bill used in the buy bust operation is
admissible in evidence?
 73

RULING
Yes, the xerox copy of the P10.00 bill used in the buy bust operation is admissible, since
the original document rule does not apply.

Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the
purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary
evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of
accounting for the original.

Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to
the conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been
adequately proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana
actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to
produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.

CASE NO. EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and Resort v. BF Corp

7 G.R. No. 145842. June 27, 2008 Ponente: Velasco,Jr. J.
DOCTRINE
The conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of
the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are:

1. there is proof of the original document's execution or existence;

2. there is proof of the cause of the original document's unavailability; and
3. the offeror is in good faith

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party
against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The
offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by
giving notice to the said party to produce the document.

a. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or
b. made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or
c. via a subpoena duces tecum

FACTS
Both petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for
the Execution of Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-La Hotel Project that ESHRI and
BF executed for the construction of the EDSA Shangri-La Hotel.

Among other things, the contract stipulated for the payment of the contract price on
the basis of the work accomplished as described in the monthly progress billings. Under
this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then
re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that
month's progress billing.

According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure
the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit
payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been
misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance
about the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.
 74

After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, before the RTC, a
suit for a sum of money and damages.

In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and,
by way of counterclaim with damages, asked that BF be ordered to refund the excess
payments. ESHRI also charged BF with incurring delay and turning up with inferior work
accomplishment

The RTC, rendered judgment for BF. The CA rendered a Decision in favor of BF finding
that BF had sufficiently established its case by preponderance of evidence. Part of what
it had sufficiently proven relates to ESHRI being remiss in its obligation to re-measure
BF's later work accomplishments and pay the same. On the other hand, ESHRI had failed
to prove the basis of its disclaimer from liability, such as its allegation on the defective
work accomplished by BF.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding issues of
law raised by petitioners in their appeal [particularly in admitting in evidence
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs].

RULING
No, the CA was correct in admitting n evidence photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14
to 19, PMIs and WVOs the witness testified that certain exhibits namely, the Progress
Payment Certificates and the Progress Billings the originals of these documents were
transmitted to ESHRI, all the originals are in the possession of ESHRI since these are
internal documents, ESHRI was given ample time to produce said documents, but failed
to do so.

CASE NO. Citibank v. Teodoro

8 G.R. No. 150905. September 23, Ponente: Panganiban, J.
2003
DOCTRINE
Before secondary evidence may be admitted to prove the contents of original
documents, the offeror must prove the due execution and the subsequent loss or
unavailability of the original.

Secondary evidence, like the subject photocopies, is inadmissible. It will be admissible

only if the offeror proves
a. any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 3 and
b. the conditions for its admissibility set forth in Section 5 of Rule 130.

For secondary evidence to be admissible, there must be satisfactory proof of

1. the due execution of the original;
2. the original's loss, destruction or unavailability that is not due to the offeror's
bad faith; and
3. reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the
original.

FACTS
Petitioner Citibank operates a credit card system through which it extends credit
accommodations to its cardholders for the purchase of goods and services from its
member establishments. The purchases are later on paid for by cardholders upon
 75

receipt of the billings or statements of account from the company. Respondent Efren S.
Teodoro was one such cardholder.

Under the terms and conditions governing the use of the Citibank credit card Charges
that remain unpaid within the period fixed in the monthly statement of account shall
earn interest at the rate of 3.5 percent per month plus a penalty fee equivalent to 5
percent of the amount due for every month or even a fraction of a month's delay

Teodoro made various purchases through his credit card. Accordingly, he was billed by
petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered various payments.

Citibank claimed that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent stood at
P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and service charges. Citibank made several demands
to Teodoro but he refused to pay, claiming that the amount demanded did not
correspond to his actual obligations.

During the trials in the MTC Citibank presented several sales invoices or charge slips,
which added up to only P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the originals, the
invoices were marked in evidence as Exhibits "F" to "F-4." Because all these copies
appeared to bear the signatures of Teodoro, the trial court deemed them sufficient
proof of his purchases with the use of the credit card. Accordingly, the MTC ordered
Teodoro to pay Citibank the amount of P24,388.36 plus interest and penalty fee.

The MTC noted in its decision that "While it was true that [petitioner] has offered the
Sales Invoices (Exhibits 'F', 'F-1', 'F-4') to show the purchases made by Teodoro, it was
equally true also that adding all the amount in said invoices, the sum of P191,693.95
which according to Citibank is the outstanding obligation of Teodoro, was hardly met.

RTC affirmed the MTC Decision in toto In reversing the trial courts, the CA ruled that
this evidence was insufficient to prove any liability on respondent's part.

ISSUE/S
Whether the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips, marked as Exhibits "F" to
"F-4," were competent proofs of the obligations of respondent.

RULING
Ruling, no the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips were inadmissible

Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

"SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated."

Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror
must prove the following:

1. The existence or due execution of the original;

2. The loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in
court; and
3. on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability
of the original can be attributed.
 76

The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At
the sound discretion of the court, this order may be changed if necessary.

In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the
photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that
the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable diligence
and good faith in searching for them.

Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have
been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be
given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other
originals. In the present case, triplicates were produced. Citibank failed to show that
all three original copies were unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in
the search for them.

CASE NO. Engr. Bayani Magdayao v. People

9 G.R. No. 152881. August 17, 2004 Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.
DOCTRINE If the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he must
have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of
its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented
as in the case of its loss. The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody
or control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of
secondary evidence.

The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by
giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form
of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of
the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum,

FACTS
An Information was filed charging Magdayao with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. When
arraigned, Magdayao, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. When the case
for trial was called for the prosecution to adduce its evidence, Magdayao and his
counsel were absent. On motion of the prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce
evidence.

The prosecution presented the private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct
examination that Magdayao drew and issued to him a Philippine National Bank (PNB)
Check in the amount of P600,000.00. The said check was drawn against the latter's
account with the PNB and issued in payment of Magdayao's obligation with Olvis. The
latter deposited the check on October 1, 1991 in his account with the BPI-Family Bank
but the drawee bank dishonored the check for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds" stamped on the dorsal portion of the check.

Olvis testified that when informed that his check was dishonored, Magdayao pleaded for
time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Olvis then filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22

Magdayao again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving the
dishonored check and replacing the same with two other checks: one for P400,000.00
and another for P200,000.00 payable to Olvis. Taking pity on Magdayao, he agreed.
 77

Olvis then returned the original copy of the check to Magdayao, but the latter again
failed to make good on his promise and failed to pay the P600,000.00.

The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify Magdayao as the drawer of the check, but
because of the latter's absence and that of his counsel, the direct examination of the
witness could not be terminated. The prosecution moved that such direct examination
of Olvis be continued on another date, and that Magdayao be ordered to appear before
the court so that he could be identified as the drawer of the subject check. The trial
court granted the motion and set the continuation of the trial on June 13, 1997. In the
meantime, the prosecution marked a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 as Exhibit "A,"
and the dorsal portion thereof as Exhibit "A-1."

The trial court rendered judgment convicting Magdayao of the crime charged. The CA
rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court. The appellate court also
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE/S
Whether a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 as Exhibit "A," and the dorsal portion
thereof as Exhibit "A-1." are admissible as evidence to prove the crime of a violation of
BP22 against Magdayao?

RULING Yes, In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the
petitioner upon the latter's offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and issuing
two checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00.

In his "Motion to Suspend Proceedings" in the trial court, Magdayao admitted that he
received the original copy of the dishonored check from the private complainant.
Magdayao had already been informed of such fact of dishonor and the reason therefor
when Olvis returned the original of the check to him. In fact, as shown by the testimony
of Olvis, the petitioner drew and issued two other separate checks, one for P400,000.00
and the other for P200,000.00, to replace the dishonored check.

CASE NO. Nenita Carganillo v. People

10 G.R. No. 182424. September 22, Ponente:Brion, J.
2014
DOCTRINE It is settled that the agreement or contract between the parties is the formal
expression of the parties' rights, duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of the
parties' intention. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.

However, this rule, known as the Parol Evidence Rule, admits of exceptions. Section 9,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a party to a written agreement may
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading the following:

a. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

b. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement
of the parties thereto
 78

c. The validity of the written agreement; or

d. The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.

FACTS
Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal gave Carganillo the amount of P132,000.00 for
the purpose of buying palay. Carganillo, who was alleged to be an "ahente" or agent in
the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying Station
on or before November 28, 1998.

According to the "Kasunduan" signed by Carganillo, the parties agreed that for every
kilo of palay bought Carganillo shall earn a commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But
if no palay is purchased and delivered on November 28, Carganillo must return the
P132,000.00 to Teresita within one (1) week after November 28.

After failing to receive any palay or the P132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1) week
thereafter, respectively, Teresita made oral and written demands to Carganillo for the
return of the P132,000.00 but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an
affidavit-complaint for estafa against the petitioner before the Fiscal's Office.
Thereafter, an Information for the crime of estafa was filed in court

Carganillo in her defense alleged that she was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that
reflected no written date and amount. She likewise denied personally receiving any
written demand letter from Teresita.

ISSUE/S
Whether Carganillo had proven that the subject "Kasunduan" failed to express the real
agreement between her and Teresita

RULING No, The documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Carganillo, however,
failed to support her claims. The RTC found that the receipts presented by the
petitioner to prove her loan obligation with Teresita were vague, undated and unsigned.
Also the RTC observed that the witnesses who testified that they saw Carganillo sign
the "Kasunduan" were not even certain of the real transaction between Carganillo and
Teresita

The court also found no merit in Carganillo’s claim that she had been the victim of a
fraud because Teresita deceived her into signing a blank document; that she signed the
"Kasunduan," even if it had no date and amount written on it, because Teresita led her
to believe that the document would be used merely for show purposes with the bank.

In Carganillo’s Memorandum to the Supreme Court, she narrated that after she signed
the "Kasunduan," Teresita subsequently made her execute a deed of sale over her
property, which she refused to sign. This statement negated the Carganillo's self serving
allegation that she was tricked by Teresita into signing a blank "Kasunduan," as she was
fully aware of the possible implications of the act of signing a document.
 79

V. Rule 132

CASE NO. Medina v. People

1 G.R. No. 255632. July 25, 2023 Ponente: Marquez, J.
DOCTRINE
It must be emphasized that these acknowledgment receipts are private documents.
Under Sec. 20, Rule, 132, Revised Rules of Evidence, before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution must be proved either:

a. by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

b. by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

FACTS
Petitioner Medina was charged with estafa in an Information

The accused Medina being then the Regional Office Staff assigned at Philippine Public
School Teachers Association (PPSTA) PPSTA CAR Regional Office had the express
obligation, to collect remittances from DepEd and deposit the amounts in a bank,
accept premium and membership fee payments from members and prepare report of
collections and disbursements of the region

Edgardo Dela Cruz Monforte, former Internal Auditor and now the Chief Accountant of
PPSTA (Monforte) testified that during petitioner Medina's employment, she failed to
deposit collections on time and to report the same.

According to Monforte, a Notice to Explain and Notice of Preventive Suspension were

served upon petitioner Medina

An Ad Hoc Committee was also created to conduct a special audit in the PPSTA-CAR
Sub-Office in Baguio City. The committee discovered that petitioner Medina did not
deposit and remit collections in the total amount of PHP88,452.00 received from
members and appropriated the same for her own personal use and benefit.

Petitioner Medina testified that the PPSTA never entrusted money to her.

The RTC rendered its Decision finding Medina Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code

The RTC gave weight to the acknowledgment receipts allegedly issued by petitioner
Medina and presented by the prosecution which established that accused Medina
received in trust monies consisting of payments for insurance premiums and
membership dues of teacher-members, and held that her failure to account for the
PPSTA members' payments constituted circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.

The CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC Decision with a modification as to the
penalty.

ISSUE/S
Whether the acknowledgment receipts allegedly issued by petitioner Medina to the
PPSTA members was duly authenticated?
 80

RULING
No, the acknowledgment receipts were not duly authenticated.

While Monforte enumerated the various acknowledgment receipts, payment slips, and
statements of account allegedly issued by petitioner Medina in his direct testimony, he
did not authenticate them. He did not claim to have seen the execution of the receipts,
nor did he explain why or how he became familiar with petitioner Medina's signature.

Pursuant to Section 20 of Rule 132, a private document may be authenticated by

a. the person who executed it,
b. the person before whom its execution was acknowledged,
c. any person who was present and saw it executed,
d. the person who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signature, being
familiar thereto or an expert, or
e. the person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed
execution thereof.

A witness may not testify on what he or she merely learned, read or heard from others
because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the
truth of what he or she has learned, read or heard. Hence, as a general rule, hearsay
evidence is inadmissible in courts of law

Here, only Tamondong and Dumbab appeared in court and testified on their respective
sworn statements. Thus, the sworn statements executed by PPSTA's other members are
hearsay evidence without probative value.

CASE NO. People v. Camacho

2 G.R. No. 182424. September 22, Ponente:Brion, J.
2014
DOCTRINE
The roll was not approved by him, as required by law, and was not signed or certified
by any of the officials whose signatures were necessary before the salaries were
necessary before the salaries covered by the roll could be paid.

Held: That under these circumstances the writing was not a document but merely a
draft of one and that its destruction by the official whose approval was necessary to
give it effect did not constitute a violation of article 360 of the Penal Code.

FACTS
Eusebio C. Camacho, as municipal president, allegedly destroyed the municipal
payroll, which was not signed or certified to by any of the officials whose signatures
were required before payments of salaries could be legally made, but it appeared that
notwithstanding this fact the municipal treasurer had already paid the salary of the
municipal secretary when the roll was president to the president for approval.

The witnesses for the defense, among them the clerk who prepared the prepared

The payroll and brought it to the president for approval, testify that the president,
upon ascertaining that the municipal secretary had already been paid, notwithstanding
the fact that the payroll had not been approved and that no deduction had been made
for alleged absences, manifested his displeasure therewith and told the municipal
secretary that he would not approve the roll; that the secretary, who appeared to be
 81

intoxicated, then became incensed and attempted to take the payroll away from the
president, and that in the ensuing struggle the payroll was torn.

ISSUE/S
Whether mere blank form for an official document is in itself a public document

RULING
No, a mere blank form for an official document is not in itself a public document.

The writing here in question proves nothing and confirms nothing; it is not a document
but merely a draft of one. Until approved or certified to by one or more of the proper
officials, it would not be entitled to filing in any public office or archive and might be
disapproved or even destroyed by the official whose approval was necessary to give it
effect, without giving rise to criminal liability on his part.

CASE NO. Franco v. People

3 G.R. No. 191185. February 1, Ponente:Reyes, J.
2016
DOCTRINE Documents are either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall
under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Section 20 of the same Rule, in turn, provides that before any private document is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by
a. anyone who saw the document executed or written, or
b. by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

In this case, the foregoing rule was not followed. The testimony of Ramos shows that
the logbook, indeed, was not identified and authenticated during the course of Ramos'
testimony. At the time when Ramos was testifying, he merely referred to the log in and
log out time and the name of the person at page 104 of the logbook that appears on
line 22 of the entries for November 3, 2004. This was photocopied and marked as
Exhibit "C-1."

The logbook or the particular page referred to by Ramos was neither identified nor
confirmed by him as the same logbook which he used to log the ins and outs of the gym
users, or that the writing and notations on said logbook was his

FACTS
“Ramos also presented the logbook and affirmed having put an asterisk opposite the
name "ELMER," which was entered by the accused upon logging in.

The prosecution's evidence does not rule out the following possibilities:

1. that what Franco took was his own cell phone;

2. even on the assumption that Franco stole a cell phone from the altar, that what
he feloniously took was Nakamoto's cell phone, considering the fact that at the
time Nakamoto was inside the changing room, other people may have placed
their cell phone on the same spot; and
3. that some other person may have taken Nakamoto's cell phone.

Franco also asserts that the logbook from which his time in and time out at the gym was
based was not identified during the trial and was only produced after Ramos testified.
 82

CASE NO. Ten Shuy v. Sps. Maulawin

4 G.R. No. 190375. February 8, Ponente:Sereno, J.
2012
DOCTRINE According to Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, there are two ways of proving
the due execution and authenticity of a private document, to wit:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

FACTS
Petitioner Tan Shuy is engaged in the business of buying copra and corn. Vicente Tan
(Vicente), son of Tan Shuy, whenever they would buy copra or corn from crop sellers,
they would prepare and issue a pesada in their favor.

A pesada is a document containing details of the transaction, including the date of sale,
the weight of the crop delivered, the trucking cost, and the net price of the crop. He
then explained that when a pesada contained the annotation "pd" on the total amount
of the purchase price, it meant that the crop delivered had already been paid for by
Tan Shuy.

Guillermo Maulawin (Guillermo), respondent in this case, is a farmer-businessman

engaged in the buying and selling of copra and corn. Tan Shuy extended a loan to
Guillermo in the amount of P420,000. In consideration thereof, Guillermo obligated
himself to pay the loan and to sell lucad or copra to Tan Shuy.

Most of the transactions involving Tan Shuy and Guillermo were coursed through Elena
Tan, daughter of petitioner. She served as cashier in the business of Tan Shuy, who
primarily prepared and issued the pesada. In case of her absence, Vicente would issue
the pesada.

According to Vicente, part of their agreement with Guillermo was that they would put
the annotation "sulong" on the pesada when partial payment for the loan was made.

Tan Shuy alleged that despite repeated demands, Guillermo remitted only P23,000 in
August 1998 and P5,500 in October 1998, or a total of P28,500. He claimed that
respondent had an outstanding balance of P391,500.

When no settlement was reached, Tan Shuy filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).

Respondent Guillermo countered that he had already paid the subject loan in full, and
claimed that they had an oral arrangement that the net proceeds thereof shall be
applied as installment payments for the loan. He alleged that his deliveries amounted
to P420,537.68 worth of copra. To bolster his claim, he presented copies of pesadas
issued by Elena and Vicente. He pointed out that the pesadas did not contain the
notation "pd," which meant that actual payment of the net proceeds from copra
deliveries was not given to him, but was instead applied as loan payment.
 83

The trial court issued a Decision, ruling that the net proceeds from Guillermo's copra
deliveries — represented in the pesadas, which did not bear the notation "pd" — should
be applied as installment payments for the loan. It gave weight and credence to the
pesadas, as their due execution and authenticity was established by Elena and Vicente,
children of petitioner.

However, the court did not credit the net proceeds from 12 pesadas, as they were
deliveries for corn and not copra. According to the RTC, Guillermo himself testified that
it was the net proceeds from the copra deliveries that were to be applied as
installment payments for the loan.

The CA issued its assailed Decision, which affirmed the finding of the trial court.
According to the appellate court, petitioner could have easily belied the existence of
the pesadas and the purpose for which they were offered in evidence by presenting his
daughter Elena as witness; however, he failed to do so.

Tan Shuy then assailed the decision of the CA arguing that the pesadas require
authentication before they can be admitted in evidence,

ISSUE/S
Whether the pesadas require authentication before they can be admitted in evidence,
and if so, whether they were duly authenticated.

RULING
Yes, they require authentication before they can be admitted in evidence.

On cross-examination, [Vicente] reiterated that he and her [sic] sister Elena Tan who
acted as their cashier are helping their father in their business of buying copras and
mais. He also confirmed the penmanship and handwriting of his sister Ate Elena who
acted as a cashier in the pesada being shown to him. He was even made to compare the
xerox copies of the pesadas with the original copies presented to him and affirmed that
they are faithful reproduction of the originals.

The subsequent arrangement between Tan Shuy and Guillermo can thus be considered
as one in the nature of dation in payment. There was partial payment every time
Guillermo delivered copra to petitioner, chose not to collect the net proceeds of
hiscopra deliveries, and instead applied the collectible as installment payments for his
loan from Tan Shuy.

CASE NO. Cercado-Siga v. Cercado Jr.

5 G.R. No. 182424. September 22, Ponente:Brion, J.
2014
DOCTRINE Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that:
1. is more than 30 years old;
2. is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; any
3. is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.

Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances

of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is
found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place
must be satisfactorily accounted for.
 84

It is not necessary that they should be found in the best and most proper place of
deposit. If documents continued in such custody, there never would be any question as
to their authenticity; but it is when documents are found in other than their proper
place of deposit, that the investigation commences whether it was reasonable and
natural under the circumstances in the particular case, to expect that they should have
been in the place where they are actually found

FACTS
In their Complaint against respondents Vicente Cercado, Jr., Manuela C. Arabit, Lolita
Basco, Maria C. Aralar, Violeta C. Binadas and the Registrar of Deeds of Binangonan,
Rizal, petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya CercadoBelison (Ligaya)
claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo
(Benita), who were married in 1929.

Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga alleged that during the lifetime of their parents,
their father acquired by gratuitous title a parcel of land, and claimed that upon the
death of their father Vicente and by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the
subject land pertained to them as heirs; that upon the death of Benita, her share was
acquired by petitioners by operation of law

To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following
documents:

1. Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract;

2. Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia

Petitioners Cercado-Siga insisted that Vicente and Leonora were not married or if they
were so married, then said marriage was null and void by reason of the subsisting
marriage of their parents, Vicente and Benita

Petitioners Simplicia read from a newspaper a notice that the estate of Vicente and a
certain Leonora Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs, respondents
Cercado Jr.

Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and
void; for the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to correct the entry on the marital
status of Vicente

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and
Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. They averred that
petitioners are not the real-parties-interest to institute the case because they failed to
present their birth certificates to prove their filiation to Vicente; that the marriage
between Vicente and Benita was not valid;

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and nullified the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of the deceased Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita Ditablan

The appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a
private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence.
Moreover, the appellate court did not consider the baptismal certificate submitted by
petitioners as conclusive proof of filiation, the appellate court reversed and set aside
the Decision and Resolution of the RTC.
 85

ISSUE/S
Whether the marriage contract can be considered as an ancient document which should
be excluded from the requirement of authentication.

RULING No, the marriage contract cannot be considered an ancient document. In this case
however, the Court found that Simplicia also failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and
Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has long been held "as
evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her
kinsfolk.

"The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the
Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized the subject child, but it does not prove the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the
relationship of the person baptized." As such, Simplicia cannot be considered as an
heir, in whose custody the marriage contract is expected to be found.

CASE NO. Sps. Santos v. Alcazar

6 G.R. No. 183034. March 12, 2014 Ponente:Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies only to
parties to such instrument.

If a party to the instrument fails to deny specifically under oath the genuineness and
due execution of the instrument in their Answer.

The effect of this is that the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment is
deemed admitted. "By the admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such
document] is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or
that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed
it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it

FACTS
Respondent Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC), instituted through
her attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a Complaint for sum of money against the petitioners,
spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect the value of paint and construction
materials obtained by the latter from LCC amounting to P1,456,000.00, which remained
unpaid despite written demand.

In their Answer Sps. Santos sought the dismissal of the Complaint and alleged that the
document which Defendant Fernando T. Santos signed does not reflect the true contract
or intention of the parties, the actionable document is incorrect and has to be
reformed to reflect the real indebtedness of the defendants;

Alcazar presented her evidence and testified in court as the lone witness. she made a
formal offer of her evidence and rested her case

Sps. Santos filed a Demurrer to Evidence as they argued that Alcazar’s Exhibit "A" which
was presented in court — was not an original copy and thus inadmissible; petitioners'
receipt of the written demand was not proved; the alleged deliveries of paint and
construction materials were not covered by delivery receipts; and respondent's
testimony was merely hearsay and uncorroborated.
 86

The trial court essentially held that petitioners, in their Answer, admitted that they
entered into transactions with the respondent for the delivery of paint and construction
materials, which remained unpaid; that from the Acknowledgment, Exhibit "A," signed
by Fernando and duly presented, authenticated, and identified by respondent during
trial, petitioners admitted that their unpaid obligation — including interest — amounted
to P1,456,000.00; and that petitioners' plea for reformation has no basis.

The CA issued its Decision dismissing petitioners' certiorari petition and sustaining the
trial court's denial of their demurrer. The CA held that petitioners failed to deny
specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment;
consequently,

1. Its genuineness and due execution are deemed admitted,

2. there was thus no need to present the original thereof, and
3. petitioners' liability was sufficiently established.

ISSUE/S
Whether the petitioner having failed to deny specifically under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the Acknowledgement in their Answer had admitted.

RULING Yes, the failure to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of
the Acknowledgement was in effect an admission to the same, therefore the
Acknowledgment need no longer be authenticated

However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only Fernando may be held liable for the
judgment amount of P1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a signatory to the
Acknowledgment. She may be held liable only to the extent of P600,000.00, as
admitted by her and Fernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer; no case against her may
be proved over and beyond such amount, in the absence of her signature and an
acknowledgment of liability in the Acknowledgment.

CASE NO. Patula v. People

7 G.R. No. 164457. April 11, 2012 Ponente: Bersamin, J.
DOCTRINE The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically
a. when the document is an ancient one
b. when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not
been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party
c. genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted
d. when the document is not being offered as genuine

FACTS
Petitioner Patula was was an employee of Footlucker's, who started as a saleslady until
she became a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to
take orders from wholesale customers coming from different towns and to collect
payments from them; that she could issue and sign official receipts of Footlucker's for
the payments, which she would then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for
the payments for tallying and reconciliation;

At first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, prompting Lamberto
Go; the branch manager to confront Patula, but Patula simply reasoned that business
was slow
 87

The branch manager then summoned the accounting clerk to verify the collection
receipts, allegedly the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection
receipts. This led to the branch manager to subject Patula to an audit by company
auditor Karen Guivencan.

Subsequently Lamberto Go as branch manager allegedly learned from a customer of

petitioner's that the customer's outstanding balance had already been fully paid
although that balance appeared unpaid in Footlucker's records.

Which led to Patula being charged with estafa under an information filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)

During the trial n the course of Guivencan's direct-examination, Patula's counsel

interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B
to YY and their derivatives, inclusive (like the originals and duplicates of the receipts
supposedly executed and issued by petitioner Patula), were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.

The RTC rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa

ISSUE/S a. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioner's guilt for estafa as charged
despite their not being duly authenticated;

b. Whether or not Guivencan's testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to

YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner's misappropriation or
conversion was inadmissible for being hearsay.

RULING A. No, the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive)
were not admissible as evidence of petitioner's guilt for estafa.

There was no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private
documents because private individuals executed or generated them for private
or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under
any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as
evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their
authentication in the manner provided in Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court,

In her case, Guivencan's identification of petitioner's signature on two receipts

based alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible family name
of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the
documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan could not
honestly identify petitioner's signature on the receipts either because she
lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen petitioner
affix her signature on the receipts,

B. Yes, Guivencan's testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and
their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner's misappropriation or conversion
was inadmissible for being hearsay.

On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts

actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to
Footlucker's. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the
 88

entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate

and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as

Evidence of petitioner's misappropriation or conversion through

cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the
entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and
untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused

There was another grave error of the RTC. The terse yet sweeping manner of justifying
the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the
concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business could be
excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:

a. The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
b. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer;
c. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
d. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a
duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or religious
e. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty

VI. Rule 130 (Testimonial Evidence)

CASE NO. Llanto v. Alzona

1 G.R. No. 150730. January 31, Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
2005
DOCTRINE The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court that Ernesto and Dominador are
mortgagees in good faith. The trial court gave credence to Ernesto's testimony that he
conducted a credit investigation before he approved the loan sought and the property
mortgaged. Indeed, a perusal of the testimony of Ernesto proves that he exercised the
necessary precautions to ascertain the status of the property sought to be mortgaged
and the identity of the mortgagors

FACTS
Bernardo Sales and Maria Sales were husband and wife. They had twelve children,
eleven of whom were the petitioners while the remaining child, Estela Sales Pelongco,
is one of the respondents. Maria was the registered owner of a certain parcel of land
covered by an Original Certificate of title which Maria acquired under a free patent.

A real estate mortgage contract was purportedly executed by Maria, who was already
deceased at that time, and Bernardo in favor of herein respondent Dominador Alzona
Respondent Estela Sales Pelongco signed as an instrumental witness to the mortgage
contract. Respondent Ernesto Alzona admitted that while he was a co-mortgagee of his
brother, Dominador, his name does not appear in the mortgage contract. The mortgage
was subsequently foreclosed for alleged failure of Bernardo and Maria to settle their
obligation secured by the said mortgage. The property was thereafter sold in a
mortgage sale wherein Ernesto Alzona was the highest bidder. a certificate of sale was
awarded to Ernesto, he executed a Consolidation of Ownership over the property. A
 89

Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Ernesto while the OCT in the
name of Maria Sales was canceled.

The petitioners Llanto caused the inscription of an adverse claim on the title to the
property and filed before the RTC a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage and of
Auction Sale, with Reconveyance of Title and Damages. After trial, the RTC rendered
judgment, in favor of defendants Dominador Alzona and Ernesto Alzona and against
Estela Sales dismissing plaintiffs' complaint

The CA rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the RTC

Hence, petitioners Llanto appealed to the Supreme Court

ISSUE/S Whether Ernesto and Dominador were mortgagees in good faith?

RULING
Yes, Ernesto was a mortgagee in good faith.

It was Estela and the persons who represented themselves as Bernardo and Maria who
perpetrated the fraud. Hence, Ernesto can no longer be faulted if he was led into
believing that the old man and woman whom he met in November 1989 and January
1990 are Bernardo and Maria Sales when, in fact, they are not.

The testimonies of Francisco and Gloria Sales proved that during the period between
1989 and 1990, Estela, Yolanda, Gloria and Conrado were all living in the house built on
the subject property. The trial court also gave credence to Ernesto's testimony that
prior to the execution of the contract of mortgage, he was even shown a copy of the
OCT and the tax declaration in the name of Maria Sales.

CASE NO. People v. Solina

2 G.R. No. 196784. January 13, Ponente: Peralta, J.
2016
DOCTRINE
Accused-appellant's defense of denial cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the
witnesses presented by the prosecution. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater
weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the
crime.

FACTS
Complainants, averred that accused-appellant Solina had promised them employment
for a fee amounting to P20,000.00. Their testimonies corroborate each other on
material points, such as the amount exacted by appellant as placement fee, the
country of destination, the training that they had to undergo to qualify for employment
and the submission of documentary requirements needed for the same. The private
complainants were positive and categorical in testifying that they personally met the
appellant and that she asked for, among others, the payment of placement fees in
consideration for the promised employment in Japan, without any license or authority,
recruit for overseas employment and for a fee

Therefore, seven (7) separate informations for estafa under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the
RPC and another information charging her of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale under R.A. 8042 was filed against Solina.
 90

Accused-appellant Solina maintained her denial that she was engaged in the business
of recruiting possible workers for jobs abroad. She insisted that like all the private
complainants, she was also an applicant for a job as an overseas worker and that she
merely accompanied them to a recruitment agency. She alleged that private
complainant Dela Vega and Dela Cruz conspired together, used her name, and
represented themselves to the other applicants as being authorized to collect
documents and fees

Anent the acknowledgment receipt signed by her and presented by the prosecution as
evidence, accused-appellant argues that it does not prove that the money received by
her was the consideration for private complainant Garces' placement abroad.

Accused-appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that she employed
deceit to entice private complainants to part with their money because she did not
represent or pass herself off as a licensed recruiter.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged
except for one charge of estafa which was provisionally dismissed by the RTC, upon
motion of accused-appellant, without prejudice to reinstatement considering that the
subpoena sent to complainant Monica B. Himan had not been duly served upon her
person. Thereafter, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, thus elevating the cases
to the CA. the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC

ISSUE/S
Whether the testimonies of the six (6) victims established that Solina was guilty of
Estafa under paragraph 2(a), Art. 315 of the RPC and illegal recruitment in large scale
under R.A. 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995?

RULING
Yes, the testimonies of the victims were sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt

The combined and corroborative testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution show
that it was the appellant Solina herself who informed them of the existence of the job
vacancies in Japan and of the requirements needed for the processing of their
applications. It was properly established that it was the accused-appellant who
accompanied the private complainants to undergo training and seminar conducted by a
person who represented himself as connected with the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA). Evidence was also presented that the private
complainants, relying completely on the accused-appellant's representations, entrusted
their money to her.

Appellant Solina had no license to recruit or engage in placement activities and she
herself had admitted to her lack of authority to do so. The Certification dated 7 April
2006 issued by the POEA also undeniably established this fact.
 91

CASE NO. People v. Pateño y Dayapdapan

3 G.R. No. 209040. December 9, Ponente:Perez, J.
2015
DOCTRINE
Anent the element of minority, the prosecution presented a certification from the UCCP
Office in Ayungon, Negros Occidental stating that AAA was baptized according to the
rites and ceremonies of the UCCP.

A page of the UCCP Membership Book was submitted bearing the same information. It
was held that a birth certificate, baptismal certificate, school records or documents of
similar nature can be presented to prove the age of a victim. In this case, the
Membership Book, which is considered an entry in official records under Section 44,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, is admissible as prima facie of their contents and
corroborative of AAA's testimony as to her age.

FACTS
AAA related that she was only four years old when her parents left her to the care of
her aunt, BBB. AAA started living with accused-appellant only in 2000 in a two bedroom
house. Around 10:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, was awakened by accused-appellant
who removed her short pants and underwear. Accused-appellant likewise took off his
clothes. He threatened AAA with a scythe and ordered her to stay quiet. He then
mounted her and made pumping motions. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant
left without saying a word. He proceeded to perform this bestial act on AAA for the
four (4) succeeding nights

When AAA could no longer bear it, she left the house and stayed in the house of her
teacher where she intimated to the latter her harrowing experience in the hands of
accused-appellant.

AAA underwent a medical examination which found hymenal tears. A pastor of the
United Church of Christ of the Philippines (UCCP) testified on the contents of the
Membership Record Book which show that AAA was born on 10 September 1987 and was
baptized on 5 June 1988. Said document also listed accused-appellant as AAA's father.

ISSUE/S
Whether the victim's uniform testimony regarding the manner by which she was raped
diminishes her credibility

RULING
No, the victim's uniform testimony regarding the manner by which she was raped does
not diminish her credibility

AAA was only able to report the incident when she was away from the custody of
accused-appellant and when she felt safe. AAA's credibility was upheld by the trial
court, which was in a position to observe the candor, behavior and demeanor of the
witness. Findings of the lower courts with respect to credibility of the rape victim are
conclusive. The SC did not give credence to accused-appellant's claim that AAA was
taking revenge when she filed the rape charges against accused-appellant for allegedly
castigating her. No woman in her right mind, especially a young girl, would fabricate
charges of this nature and severity.
 92

CASE NO. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chiong

4 G.R. No. 155550. January 31, Ponente: Nachura, J.
2008
DOCTRINE
It is of no moment that Chiong's witnesses — who all corroborated his testimony on his
presence at the airport on, and flight details for, April 1, 1989, and that he was
subsequently bumped-off — are, likewise, employees of Philimare which may have an
interest in the outcome of this case.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a witness' relationship to the victim does
not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. While this principle is
often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this
case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness' relationship with a party does not ipso facto
render him a biased witness in criminal cases where the quantum of evidence required
is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the same principle should not
apply in civil cases where the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence.

FACTS
Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized
Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as
Third Engineer of TransOcean's vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego, California Port under
a service crew agreement.

Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOcean's

agent at the San Diego Port, confirming Chiong's arrival thereat in time to board the
M/V Elbia which was set to sail on April 1, 1989 (California, United States time). For
this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket for San Diego,
California with a departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila

Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport (MIA), at about 6:30 a.m., three (3)
hours before the scheduled time of departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimare's Liaison Officer,
met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG) Counter to present Chiong's seaman service record book for clearance.
Thereafter, Chiong's passport was duly stamped, after complying with government
requirements for departing seafarers.

Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest
check-in counter. When it was Chiong's turn, the Northwest personnel informed him
that his name did not appear in the computer's list of confirmed departing passengers.
Chiong was then directed to speak to a "man in barong" standing outside Northwest's
counters from whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong
approached the "man in barong" who demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefor.

Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for San
Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989
(California, U.S.A. time). It appeared that Chiong's name was crossed out and
substituted with "W. Costine" in Northwest's Air Passenger Manifest

Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before the RTC. Northwest
contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage with Chiong, reiterating
that Chiong had no cause of action against it because per its records, Chiong was a
"no-show" passenger for Northwest Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989.
 93

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of
Chiong, and holding Northwest liable for breach of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled
that the evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was
deliberately prevented from checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to
accommodate an American passenger by the name of W. Costine

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC Contrary to Northwest's claim
that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger, the CA likewise concluded, as the RTC did, that
Chiong was not allowed to check-in and was not issued a boarding pass at the Northwest
check-in counter to accommodate a certain W. Costine. As for Northwest's defense that
Chiong had left the country after April 1, 1989 and worked for M/V Elbia, the CA ruled
that Northwest's failure to raise this defense in its Answer or Motion to Dismiss is
equivalent to a waiver thereof.

ISSUE/S
Whether, Chiong's testimony is a complete fabrication supposedly demonstrated by the
following:

1. Chiong's seaman service record book reflects that he left the Philippines after
April 1, 1989, specifically on April 17, 1989, to board the M/V Elbia, and was
discharged therefrom upon his personal request
2. The Information filed against Chiong for False Testimony
3. the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name Record both indicate that he was a
"no show" passenger.

RULING
No, Chiong's testimony is not a fabrication.

The records revealed that Chiong, as plaintiff in the trial court, satisfied the burden of
proof required in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence. Section 1 of Rule 133

In addition to his testimony, Chiong's evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket for the
April 1, 1989 Flight No. 24, Chiong's passport and seaman service record book duly
stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez, and
Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified
the signature and stamp of the PCG on Chiong's passport.

Indeed, Chiong's Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, coupled with the
PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence that he was
present at MIA on said date as he intended to fly to the United States on board that
flight. As testified to by POEA personnel and officers, the PCG stamp indicates that a
departing seaman has passed through the PCG counter at the airport, surrendered the
exit pass, and complied with government requirements for departing seafarers.

Calvo further testified that she purposely stayed at the PCG counter to confirm that
Chiong was able to board the plane, as it was part of her duties as Philimare's liaison
officer, to confirm with their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the seafarer had
left the country and commenced travel to the designated port where the vessel is
docked. Thus, she had observed that Chiong was unable to check-in and board
Northwest Flight No. 24, and was actually being given the run-around by Northwest
personnel.

It is true that Chiong's passport and seaman service record book indicate that he had
left the country on April 17, 1989 and come back on October 5 of the same year.
However, this evidence fails to debunk the facts established to have transpired on April
 94

1, 1989, more particularly, Chiong's presence at the airport and his subsequent
bumping-off by Northwest despite a confirmed ticket.

Northwest, despite the declaration in its Pre-Trial Brief, did not present as a witness
their check-in agent on that contentious date. This omission was detrimental to
Northwest's case considering its claim that Chiong did not check-in at their counters on
said date.

CASE NO. Philippines Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

5 G.R. No. 127473. December 8, Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
2003
DOCTRINE
A witness' relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his or
her testimony. While this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the
same principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in nature. If a witness' relationship
with a party does not ipso facto render him a biased witness in criminal cases where
the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason
why the same principle should not apply in civil cases where the quantum of evidence is
only preponderance of evidence.

FACTS
Private respondent Judy Amor purchased three confirmed plane tickets for her and her
infant son, Gian Carlo Amor as well as her sister Jane Gamil for the May 8, 1988, 7:10
a.m. flight, PR 178, bound for Manila. Judy Amor, a dentist and a member of the Board
of Directors of the Sorsogon Dental Association, was scheduled to attend the National
Convention of the Philippine Dental Association at the Philippine International
Convention Center.

Judy with Gian, Jane and minor Carlo Benitez, nephew of Judy and Jane, arrived at the
airport at 6:20 a.m. for PR 178. Carlo Benitez was supposed to use the confirmed
ticket of a certain Dra. Emily Chua. They were accompanied by Atty. Owen Amor and
the latter's cousin, Salvador Gonzales who fell in line at the check-in counter while
plaintiff Judy went to the office of the station manager to request that minor plaintiff
Carlo Benitez be allowed to use the ticket of Dra. Chua. While waiting for his turn,
Gonzales was asked by Lloyd Fojas, the check-in clerk on duty, to approach the counter.
Fojas wrote something on the tickets which Gonzales later read as "late check in 7:05".
When Gonzales' turn came, Fojas gave him the tickets of private respondents Judy, Jane
and Gian and told him to proceed to the cashier to make arrangements.

Private respondents were not able to board said flight. The plane left at 7:30 a.m.,
twenty minutes behind the original schedule. Later, a PAL employee at the
check-incounter called out the name of private respondent minor Carlo Benitez.
Plaintiff Judy approached the counter and was told by the PAL personnel that they
cannot be accommodated. Fojas who was also at the counter then removed the
boarding passes inserted in private respondents' tickets as well as the tags from their
luggages.

Manuel Baltazar, a former Acting Manager of Philippine Airlines, Inc. testified that
based on his investigation, the private respondents, although confirmed passengers,
were not able to board PR 178 in the morning of May 8, 1988 because there were
"go-show" or "waitlisted" and non-revenue passengers who were accommodated in said
flight. He also noted that there was overbooking for PR 178.
 95

On the other hand, Philippine Airlines contended that private respondents were not
entitled to their claim for damages because they were late in checking-in for PR 178;
and that they were only chance or waitlisted passengers for PR 180 and were not
accommodated because all confirmed passengers of the flight had checked-in. In
support thereof, petitioner presented Lloyd Fojas, who testified that He was the one
who attended to the tickets of private respondents which were tendered by Salvador
Gonzales at 7:05 a.m. when the counter was already closed. The clock at the check-in
counter showed that it was already 7:05 and so he told Gonzales that they are already
late and wrote "late check-in, 7:05" on private respondents' tickets.The flight was
scheduled to leave at 7:10 a.m. and checking-in is allowed only until 30 minutes before
departure time.

Fojas testified that he did not know how many waitlisted or non-revenue passengers
were accommodated or issued boarding passes in the 7:00 a.m. and in the afternoon
flight of May 8, 1988

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity) which affirmed
the judgment of the trial court in toto and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Thus Philippine Airlines appealed to the SC.

ISSUE/S
Whether Baltazar was a credible witness for the private respondents?

RULING
Yes, Baltazar was a credible witness for the respondents.

If a witness' relationship with a party does not ipso facto render him a biased witness
in criminal cases where the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable
doubt, there is no reason why the same principle should not apply in civil cases where
the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence.

The CA likewise correctly concluded that there was overbooking in the morning flight
on the basis of the testimony of private respondents' witness Manuel Baltazar wherein
Baltazar testified that based on government regulations; overbooking is allowed by 10%
With the capacity of 109 the number of passengers should not exceed 120 passengers,
but a total of 126 passengers were confirmed in their flight.

While petitioner, through its lone witness Fojas, could only answer during his
examination on the witness stand that he is unable to recall the circumstances
recommending the issuances of boarding passes to waitlisted and that it is the
management which has the authority to issue boarding passes to non-revenue
passengers.

CASE NO. Alvarez v. Ramirez

6 G.R. No. 143439. October 14, Ponente: Sandoval-Gutirrez, J.
2005
DOCTRINE Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for
 96

a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants."

FACTS
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in a criminal case for
arson The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza
G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.

The private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first
witness against petitioner, her husband. For the purpose of proving that the accused
Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of

the crime being charged particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez poured gasoline in
the house owned by his sister-inlaw Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after
pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on
fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan
Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as
well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused as a consequence of the
accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said
house was burned and together with several articles of the house

Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. Ramirez, through counsel, filed a motion
to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

The trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further
testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. This prompted respondent
Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

The Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders
issued by the trial court.

ISSUE/S whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in a criminal case?

RULING
Yes, Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in a criminal case.

The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between
the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. For
instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life,
which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal
relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information
for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life It should be
stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were
separated de facto almost six months before the incident.
 97

CASE NO. People v. Quidato

7 G.R. No. 117401. October 1, 1998 Ponente: Romero, J.
DOCTRINE
The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver
of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is
inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements
to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the
presence of counsel the next day. admissions obtained during custodial interrogations
without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution

With regard to Gina Quidato's testimony, the same must also be disregarded,
accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification
rule

FACTS
Accused-appellant's case was tried jointly with the murder case filed against his
co-accused, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita who, however, withdrew their "not guilty"
plea during the trial and were accordingly sentenced. Thus, only accused-appellant's
case was tried on the merits.

Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and
Leo Quidato. Being a widower, Bernardo lived alone in his house. He owned sixteen
hectares of coconut land in the area. Bernardo, accompanied by his son, herein accused
appellant, and two hired hands, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City
to sell 41 sacks of copra.

According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the next day accused-appellant and the
Malita brothers were drinking tuba at their house. She overheard the trio planning to go
to her father-in-law's house to get money from the latter. She had no idea, however, as
to what later transpired because she had fallen asleep

Accused-appellant objected to Gina Quidato's testimony on the ground that the same
was prohibited by the marital disqualification rule found in Section 22 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. The judge, acknowledging the applicability of the so-called rule,
allowed said testimony only against accused appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and
Eddie.

The Malita brothers confessed to their participation in the crime, executing affidavits
detailing how Bernardo was killed, which alleged that the accused-appellant asked
Reynaldo to come to the former's house to discuss an important matter. Upon Reynaldo's
arrival at accusedappellant's house, he saw that his brother Eddie was already there.
They started drinking beer. The Malita brothers alleged that it was at this juncture that
accused appellant proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's
house only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo.

Upon reaching the house, accused-appellant knocked on the door, asking his father to
let them in. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man
down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Accused-appellant and
Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador looking for money but they found none; so, the
three of them left. The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by
accused-appellant's son, who had gone there to call his Lolo for breakfast. The cause of
 98

death, as stated in Bernardo's death certificate was "hypovolemic shock secondary to

fatal hacking wound on the posterior neck area.

In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the Malita brothers.

The trial court found Bernardo Quidato Jr. guilty of Parricide

The accused appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court

ISSUE/S Whether the testimony of Gina Quidato could be held against Bernardo Quidato Jr.?
RULING
No, the testimony of Gina Quidato could not be held against Bernardo Quidato Jr.

The marital disqualification rule does not preclude the wife from testifying when it
involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case
against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with the accused-appellant's case.
This testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through
the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without
violating the marital disqualification rule.

Accused-appellant must be acquitted. In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution

relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers
were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extrajudicial
confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of
hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness
stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from
the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay.

Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the
same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is
that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to
counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in
evidence.

CASE NO. Zulueta v. Court of Appeals

8 G.R. No. 107383. February 20, Ponente: Mendoza, J.
1996
DOCTRINE
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.

FACTS
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. Zulueta
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and

in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly

opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
 99

consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.

Dr. Martin brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against Zulueta in the RTC. the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described
in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person
acting on her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Zulueta’s only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr. , this Court ruled that
the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in
that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's
attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant
in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr.
committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial
court.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more
than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing
Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuineness and authenticity did not constitute a
violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in
that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.

ISSUE/S
Whether 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and
his alleged paramours taken by his wife is admissible against him?

RULING
No, the 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours taken by his wife is not admissible.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
 100

CASE NO. Lacurom v. Jacoba

9 G.R. No. 150730. January 31, Ponente: Carpio, J.
2005
DOCTRINE
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed
as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of
the 30 July 2001 motion.

FACTS
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion
("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico
Barrientos ("Barrientos"). The Municipal Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of
Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to
Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.

Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier judgments

rendered in favor of Veneracion Veneracion's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(with Request for Inhibition) which contained disrespectful, insulting and humiliating"
comments

Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she
should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.

In her Explanation, Comments and Answer, Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor
knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the
undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case."
Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and
integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is
rightfully due all courts of justice.

ISSUE/S
Whether respondent Jacoba is liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
despite not being the one who signed the July 30, 2001 motion?

RULING
Yes, Jacoba is liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility, despite not being the
one who signed the July 30, 2001 motion.

Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his
wife's account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating
that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be
gigantic and monumental." And his wife Velasco-Jacoba is also liable by signing the 30
July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to
be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature
supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of
paper to that of a court document.
 101

CASE NO. Senate of the Phils. V. Ermita

10 G.R. No. 169777 * . April 20, Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.
2006
DOCTRINE
The executive privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not
authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold
such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by
mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.

FACTS
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on
the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing
was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to
investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract
covering the North Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to
officials of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The President issued E.O. 464 which provided that “All public officials enumerated in
Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation
of powers”

Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464,
and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to
appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the
same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said
officials have not secured the required consent from the President."

Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga,
the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed
through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials
invited to attend. For defying President Arroyo's order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings.

Three petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed before the Supreme Court
challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

ISSUE/S
Whether E.O. 464 in allowing certain officials to determine whether certain information
is covered by “executive privilege” and therefore such withholding of information
violates the Constitution, in consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain
information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry,

RULING
Yes, E.O. 464 in allowing certain officials to determine whether certain information is
covered by “executive privilege” is unconstitutional
 102

Whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head
of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such
declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts
to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by
authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an
implied claim of privilege.

The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to
Senate President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege
authorized by E.O. 464.

The implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any
specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded
involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While
Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege
under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is
being referred to by the executive.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus
invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and
certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient
for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated Section 2(b) in
relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a
certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the
President's authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before
Congress, These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by
mere silence.

CASE NO. Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino

11 G.R. No. 170516. July 16, 2008. Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
DOCTRINE
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final
text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential — since there should be
"ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" — the offers exchanged
by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted
their offers with the understanding that "historic confidentiality" would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only
with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the

JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such
privilege is only presumptive. Only after a consideration of the context in which the
claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the
disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.
 103

FACTS
Petitioners Congressmen Lorenzo R. Tañada III and Mario Joyo Aguja filed House
Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being
negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA). The Resolution became the basis of an inquiry
subsequently conducted by the House Special Committee on Globalization (the House
Committee) into the negotiations of the JPEPA.

In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested herein respondent
Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino), Chairman of the Philippine Coordinating
Committee created under Executive Order No. 213 to study and negotiate the proposed
JPEPA, and to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec.
Aquino did not heed the request, however. Congressman Aguja later requested for the
same document, but Usec. Aquino, by letter replied that the Congressman shall be
provided with a copy thereof "once the negotiations are completed and as soon as a
thorough legal review of the proposed agreement has been conducted."

In a separate move, the House Committee, through Congressman Herminio G. Teves,

requested Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita to furnish it with "all documents on the
subject including the latest draft of the proposed agreement, the requests and offers
etc.

Acting on the request, Secretary Ermita, by letter wrote to Congressman Teves

expressing that the Committee's request to be furnished all documents on the JPEPA
may be difficult to accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has been a
work in progress for about three years. A copy of the draft JPEPA will however be
forwarded to the Committee as soon as the text thereof is settled and complete.

The House Committee resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft of the
JPEPA, but the same was not pursued because by Committee Chairman Congressman
Teves' information, then House Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested him to hold in
abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the President gives her consent to the
disclosure of the documents.

The agreement was to be later signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the public since
September 11, 2006, respondents do not dispute that, at the time the petition was filed
up to the filing of petitioners' Reply — when the JPEPA was still being negotiated — the
initial drafts thereof were kept from public view

Petitioners — non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers —

seek via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text
of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all
pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

ISSUE/S
Whether petitioners have shown the existence of a public interest sufficient to
overcome the privilege in this instance?

RULING
No, the petitioners have not shown the existence of a public interest sufficient to
overcome the privilege in this instance.
 104

There are at least two kinds of public interest that must be taken into account. One is
the presumed public interest in favor of keeping the subject information confidential,
which is the reason for the privilege in the first place, and the other is the public
interest in favor of disclosure, the existence of which must be shown by the party
asking for information.

The text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this
Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in
decision-making unless the initial offers are also published. It is of public knowledge
that various non-government sectors and private citizens have already publicly
expressed their views on the JPEPA, their comments not being limited to general
observations thereon but on its specific provisions. Numerous articles and statements
critical of the JPEPA have been posted on the Internet.

Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of
treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such
pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of
negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole
that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making
power of the President, but only the Senate. Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in
their capacity as private citizens

Petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a "sufficient

showing of need" that the information sought is critical to the performance of the
functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.

The Court's recognition that the Executive Secretary also bears the power to invoke the
privilege, provided he does so "by order of the President", is meant to avoid laying down
too rigid a rule, the Court being aware that it was laying down a new restriction on
executive privilege. It is with the same spirit that the Court should not be overly strict
with applying the same rule in this peculiar instance, where the claim of executive
privilege occurred before the judgment in Senate v. Ermita became final.

CASE NO. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

12 Investigation
G.R. No. 150730. January 31, Ponente: Carpio, J.
2005
DOCTRINE
"The contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really 'in aid of legislation'
because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim
of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than
of the Legislature."

FACTS
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri appeared before respondent Committees and testified for
about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the
"NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE").
Petitioner Neri disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman
 105

Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept
the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner's
discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege". To be specific, petitioner Neri refused to answer questions on:

a. whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

b. whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,
c. whether or not she directed him to approve it.

Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested

them to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The
letter of Executive Secretary Ermita pertinently stated that maintaining the
confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her
executive and policy decision making process and that the context in which executive
privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China.

Neri petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the
President invoking executive privilege. The respondent Committees issued the
show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. In
Neri’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to
ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those
he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to
appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He just requested that
he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify"

Respondent Committees found Neri’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to

his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued an
Order citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest
and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.

Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application
for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) the Supreme Court granted his petition for certiorari on
two grounds: first, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered
by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered the
subject communications as falling under the presidential communications privilege.

Respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE/S
1. whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications
privilege in our legal system.

2. whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege.

3. whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications

elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions.

RULING
Yes, There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege
 106

The aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in

Senate v. Ermita, which declared void Sections 2 (b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
464, Series of 2005. In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive
Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an
executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the
three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate
Committees' investigation.

Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold

information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. When Congress exercises its
power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive
privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a matter
clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same
be recognized and be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a
compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such presumption.

Yes, there Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege.

The President's claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized
interest in confidentiality. The Letter of Executive Secretary Ermita specified
presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations
with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Even in Senate v. Ermita, it
was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. The Supreme Court’s Decision merely excludes from the
scope of respondents' investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered
by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before
respondents to answer the said questions.

No, Respondent Committees have not shown That the Communications Elicited by the
Three Questions Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions.

The jurisprudential test laid down by the Supreme Court in past decisions on executive
privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of
compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege. The
presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent
Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need
for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions
subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply a
generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to
legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear
what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said
information sought by the three (3) questions.

Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent
Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still come up with legislations
even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words, the
information being elicited is not so critical after all.
 107

CASE NO. Air Philippines Corp v. Penswell, Inc.

13 G.R. No. 172835. December 13, Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
2007
DOCTRINE
It is unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of respondent's
products proceed from a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of
its lubricants, respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and resources. By and
large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear.. Our conclusion is that
the detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a commercial value to respondent.
Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the information grants it a competitive
advantage. That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The
protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade secrets is evident in our laws.

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known

only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The
definition also extends to a secret formula or process not patented, but known only to
certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a commercial
value.

A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of

information that:
1. is used in one's business; and
2. gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who
do not possess the information.

FACTS
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of air transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was
organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals,
solvents, and special lubricants.

On various dates, Penswell delivered and sold to petitioner Air Philippines sundry goods
in trade, covered by Sales Invoices which correspond to Purchase Orders. Under the
contracts, petitioner's total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98

For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts,
respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money with the RTC.

Air Philippines contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable
reasons. In particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of
P592,000.00 by respondent for its previous sale of four items, covered by Purchase
Order No. 6626. Said items were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new
line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had previously
purchased from respondent.

According to petitioner, respondent's products, namely Excellent Rust Corrosion,

Connector Grease, Electric Strength Protective Coating, and Anti-Seize Compound, are
identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid, Contact Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, and Dry
Lubricant, respectively.
 108

During the pendency of the trial, Air Philippines filed a Motion to Compel Penswell to
give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of its products

The RTC rendered an Order granting the Air Philippines’ motion

Penswell sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be

compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is
confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire upon constituted a
trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge. Respondent maintained
that its products are specialized lubricants,

The RTC gave credence to Penswell's reasoning, and reversed itself. It issued an Order
finding that the chemical components are respondent's trade secrets and are privileged
in character.

Air Philippines filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order of the RTC

Hence Air Philippines appealed to the SC

ISSUE/S
Whether the ingredients and chemical components of Penswells Inc.’s products are
within the meaning of trade secrets and is therefore privileged information.

RULING
Yes, the ingredients and chemical components of Penswells Inc.’s products are within
the meaning of trade secrets and are therefore privileged information.

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known

only to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.
Respondent was established to engage in the business of general manufacturing and
selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares,
merchandise, products, including but not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents,
lubricants, acids, alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar
preparations, among others. The detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a
commercial value to the respondent. Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the
information grants it a competitive advantage;

CASE NO. Ladiana v. People

14 [G.R. No. 144293. December 4, Ponente: Panganiban, J.
2002
DOCTRINE
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the
police from the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel
during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by
the accused during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance
of counsel, may be used as evidence against the affiant.

FACTS
Ladiana being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned
at the Lumban Police Station confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was
 109

removing the steel pipes which were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent
the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street when Francisco San Juan told the accused
that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a
firearm, with intent to kill then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack
and sho[o]t Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head
and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San
Juan."

"Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made
an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of
the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before
Cortez. In said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the
fatal shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as
Francisco was then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already
inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused Ladiana.

"However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary
investigation of the complaint which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally,
Cortez testified that he would not be able to anymore recognize the face of the affiant
in the said counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and
identified himself as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the
counter-affidavit.

"After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and
rested its case.

The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution admitting all the documentary evidence

submitted by the prosecution.

Accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence his
Court issued an Order of even date holding that the filing of a demurrer to evidence is
no longer appropriate considering that accused Ladiana received a copy of this Court's
resolution on the admission of the prosecution's documentary exhibits.

"Thereafter, this Court received by mail the Memorandum for the defense.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit, in
which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim's death,
may be used as evidence against him. It underscored the admission made by the
defense as to the authorship, the authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of
the Counter-Affidavit.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Counter-affidavit of the accused-petitioner which was considered
by the Sandiganbayan in its decision as similar to an extrajudicial confession may [be]
admitted against him as evidenc[e] of guilt beyond reasonable doubt even if he was not
assi[s]ted then by counsel and while he was under custodial investigation.

RULING Yes, the Counter-affidavit of the accused-petitioner which was considered by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision as similar to an extrajudicial confession may [be]
admitted against him as evidence.
 110

A person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be

considered as being under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally
declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under
custodial interrogation.

There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by
petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is
clear from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was
under custody or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under
custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
are not at issue in this case.

The Supreme Court however did not agree with the Sandiganbayan’s characterization of
petitioner's Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission.
Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from
the other. Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim — which
eventually led to the latter's death — but denies having done it with any criminal
intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized
as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him

CASE NO. Zabala v. People

15 G.R. No. 210760. January 26, Ponente: Velasco, Jr., J.
2015.
DOCTRINE
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one
to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the
others, as the guilty person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility
that some other person has committed the crime.

FACTS
The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish that Zabala is a jeepney driver,
while. Complainant Alas, meanwhile, works at the Manila City Hall. It is through this job
that he was able to save the Sixty-Eight Thousand Pesos (P68,000) Piñon, on the other
hand, had been the girlfriend of Zabala for about five months when the incident
pertinent to this case occurred. Alas testified that he and Zabala were neighbors. He
had treated Zabala as his kumpare and would often invite the latter to drinking sessions
inside his house.

Alas further testified that he left his house to go to work. When he returned from work,
at around 11:00 in the evening, he discovered that his money amounting to Sixty Eight
Thousand Pesos (P68,000), which he kept in an envelope inside his closet, was missing.

During that time, there were only five (5) persons living in their house: Alas, his
parents, his nine (9) year-old son, and his aunt. He asked his parents and aunt if they
knew where he kept his money, but they did not know.

Witness Piñon, on the other hand, testified that she saw Zabala climb the fence and
scale the tree in front of the complainant's house, and enter the house. When he
returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in his pocket, which she later found to be a
plentiful sum of money. Zabala then brought her home, and agreed to meet her again at
 111

about 10:00 in the morning. They then went to Greenhills, where Zabala bought two
Nokia mobile phones, which cost about Eight Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P8,500).

ISSUE/S
Whether The prosecution established, by circumstantial evidence, that petitioner is
guilty of theft?

RULING
No, The prosecution failed to establish, by circumstantial evidence, that petitioner is
guilty of theft.

The foregoing narration — based on the testimonies of the two witnesses of the
prosecution, even if given full faith and credit and considered as established facts —
failed to establish that the petitioner committed the crime of theft. If at all, it may
possibly constitute evidence that petitioner committed an offense, but not necessarily
theft.

Nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas, where the money amounting to P68,000
was allegedly kept and hidden. It is interesting to note that while Alas testified that
there were other persons living in that house, i.e., his family members, the prosecution
failed to put any of them on the witness stand, to testify that they saw or heard
something out of the ordinary at the time the incident allegedly took place

Piñon's testimony fails to establish that Alas' pocket indeed contained the stolen money,
as she never actually saw what was inside the pocket of Zabala. While she testified that
later that day, they went to buy 2 cellphones amounting to P8,500, she failed to testify
whether the money that Zabala used in paying for the cellphone was retrieved from the
very same bulging pocket which she saw earlier in the day, which would have led to the
conclusion that Zabala's pocket contained money.

The RTC rendered its Judgment convicting the petitioner of the offense charged. The
CA denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court, but with modification
as to the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner. Rejecting the defense of
petitioner, the CA ruled that he offered no evidence other than an alibi to exculpate
him from the crime charged.