INTRODUCTION

Ever since the revival of the scientific study of jurisprudence the connection of law
andmorality has much discussed, but the question is not yet, and perhaps never will be
settled.Every variety of opinion has been entertained, from the extreme doctrine held by
Austin thatfor the purpose of the jurist, law is absolutely independent of morality, almost to
the
opposite positions, held by every Oriental cadi, that morality and law are one. The question is
animportant one, and upon the answer which is given to it depends upon the answer which
isconsequences. The problem is an intensely practical one.The popular conception of the
connection between law and morality is that in some way thelaw exists to promote morality,
to preserve those conditions which make the moral life possible,and than to enable men to
lead sober and industrious lives. The average man regards law as justice systematized, and
justice itself as a somewhat chaotic mass of moral principles. On thisview, the positive law is
conceived of as a code of rules, corresponding to the code of morallaws, deriving its authority
from the obligatory character of those moral laws, and being just orunjust according as it
agrees with, or differs from them. This, like all other popular conceptions,is inadequate for
scientific purposes, and the jurist, so for at least as he is also a scientist, is
compelled to abandon it. For it is contradicted by the fact’s. positive laws do not rest upon
moral laws and common notions of justice furnish no court of appeal from the decrees of
theState. The average man confounds law and morality, and identifies the rules of law with
the principles of abstract justice. No Distinction in Ancient Times In the earlier stages of the
societythere was no distinction between law and morals. In Hindu law, the prime source of
which arethe Vedas and the Smritis, we do not find such distinction in the beginning.
However, later on,Mimansa laid down certain principles to distinguish obligatory from
recommendatoryinjunctions. In the West also the position was similar. The Greeks in the
name of the doctrine
of ‘natural right’ formulated a theoretical moral foundation of law. The roman jurist in
thename of ‘natural law’ recognized certain moral principles as the basis of law. In the
Middle
Ages, the Church become dominant in Europe. The ‘natural law’ was given a theological
basis
and Christian morals were considered as the basis of law.

MORAL AS PART OF LAW

There are some who assert that even if law and morals are distinguishable it remains true
thatmorality is in some way an integral part of law or of legal development, that morality
is"secreted in the interstices" of the legal system, and to that extent is inseparable from
it.Thus it has been said that law in action is not a mere system of rules, but involves the use
ofcertain principles, such as that of the equitable and the good (aequum et bonum). By the
skilledapplication of these principles to legal rules the judicial process distills a moral content
out ofthe legal order, though it is admitted that this does not permit the rules themselves to be
rejectedon the general found of their immorality.Another approach would go much further
and confer upon the legal process an inherent powerto reject immoral rules as essentially non-
legal; this seems to resemble the classical natural lawmode of thought, but it is urged, the
difference is that according to the presentdoctrine it is a matter of the internal structure of the
legal system, which treats immoral rulesas inadmissible rather than as being annulled by an
external law of nature.If value judgments such as moral factors, form an inevitable feature of
the climate of legaldevelopment, as in generally admitted, it is difficult to see the justification
for this exclusiveattitude.Value judgment which enter into law will require consideration of
what would be a just rule ordecision, even though not objective in the sense of being based on
absolute truth, may,nevertheless, be relatively true, in the sense of corresponding to the
existing moral standardsof the community.Whether it is convenient or not to define law
without reference to subjective factors, when wecome to observe the phenomena with which
law is concerned and to analyze the meaning anduse of legal rules in relation to such
phenomena, it will be found impossible to disregard therole of value judgments in legal
activity, and we cannot exercise this functional role bystigmatizing such judgments as merely
subjective or unscientific.The Problem about the Nature of Law J.Raz (1982)The theory of
knowledge attempts to clarify the nature of knowledge, the philosophy of logicexamines the
definition of logic, moral philosophy reflects on the nature and boundaries ofmorality and so
on.One finds philosophers who took the enquiry concerning the nature of law to be an
attempt todefine the meaning of the word "law". Traditionally those who adopted the
linguistic approachconcentrated on the word "law". However, it encountered the
overwhelming problem that that

word is used in a multiplicity of non-legal contexts. We have laws of nature and scientific
laws,laws of God and thought, of logic and of language, etc. Clearly the explanation of "law"
has toaccount for its use in all these contexts and equally clearly any explanation which is so
wideand general can be of very little use to legal philosophers.Only one assumption can the
explanation of "law" hope to provide the answer to the legal philosopher's inquiry into
the nature of law. That assumption is that the use of "law" in all itscontexts but one is
analogical or metaphorical or in some other way parasitical on its coremeaning as displayed
in its use in one type of context and that that core meaning is the one thelegal philosopher has
at the centre of his enquiry. Unfortunately, the assumption is mistaken.Its implausibility is
best seen by examining the most thorough and systemic attempt to providean analysis of
"law" based on this assumption, that proposed by John Austin in The Provinceof
Jurisprudence Determined.The Lawyers' Perspective Many legal philosophers start from an
unstated basic intuition:"The law has to do with those considerations which it is appropriate
for the courts to rely uponin justifying their decisions."Most theorists tend to be by education
and profession lawyers and their audience often
consists primarily of law students. Quite naturally and imperceptibly they adopted the lawyer
s' perspective on the law. Lawyers' activities are dominated by litigation in court, actual or po
tential. They not only conduct litigation in the courts. They draft documents, conclude
legaltransactions, advise clients, etc., always with an eye to the likely outcome of possible
litigationin which the validity of the document or transaction or the legality of the client's
action may becalled into question. From the lawyer's point of view the law does indeed
consist of nothing but considerations appropriate for courts to rely upon.Hans Kelsen says he
follows a combination of the linguistic approach and the institutionalapproach: "Any attempt
to define a concept in question. In defining the concept of law we must begin by examining
the following questions:Do the social phenomena generally called law present a common
characteristic distinguishingthem from other social phenomena of a similar kind?The clue to
the methodological approach Kelsen was in fact pursuing is in his insistence thatlegal theory
must be a pure theory. Kelsen regarded it as doubly pure. It is pure of all moralargument and
it is pure of all sociological facts. Kelsen indicates his belief that the analysis oflegal concepts
and the determination of the content of any legal system depends in no way atall on the
effects the law has on the society or the economy, nor does it involve examination of people's
motivation in obeying the law or in breaking it.

For Kelsen, it is self-evident that legal theory is free of all moral considerations. The task
oflegal theory is clearly to study law. If law is such that it cannot be studied scientifically
thensurely the conclusion that if the law does involve moral considerations and therefore
cannot bestudied scientifically, then legal theory will study only those aspects of the law
which can bestudied scientifically.Since Kelsen has no good reason to insist that legal theory
should be free from moralconsideration, he has no good reason to delimit the law in the way
he does.
THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
It is the lawyer's perspective which delivers the verdict. Yet there is something
inherentlyimplausible in adopting the lawyer's perspective as one fundamental
methodological stance.There is no doubting the importance of the legal profession and of the
judicial system in society.It is however, unreasonable to study such institutions exclusively
from the lawyer's perspective.Institutional approach seems much superior to its rivals. The
institutional approach strives to present an analysis of a central political institution should
be accepted as the analysis of law.From the institutional point of view, the basic intuition is
the starting point for further criticalreflection. It is entirely plausible to regard the notion of
law as bound up with that of a judicialsystem but what are the essential characteristics of a
court and why are they important to the political organization of society? Three features
characterize courts of law:1. They deal with disputes with the aim of resolving them.2. They
issue authoritative rulings which decides these disputes.3. In their activities they are bound to
be guided, at least partly, by positivist authoritativeconsideration.At the highest level of
philosophical abstraction the doctrine of the nature of law can and should be concerned with
explaining law within the wider context of social and political institutions.It shows how the
inclination to identify the theory of law with a theory of adjudication andlegal considerations
with all those appropriate for courts is based on a short sighted doctrineoverlooking the
connection of law with the distinction between executive and deliberativeconclusion. Clearly,
a theory of adjudication is a moral theory. It concerns all the considerationsaffecting
reasoning in the courts, both legal and non-legal.

When the doctrine of the nature of law is identified with a theory of adjudication it
becomesitself a moral theory. The doctrine of the nature of law yields a test for identifying
law the useof which requires no resort to moral or any other evaluative argument. But it does
not followthat one can defend the doctrine of the nature of law itself without using evaluative
arguments.Its justification is tied to an evaluative judgment about the relative importance of
variousfeatures of social organizations and these reflect our moral and intellectual interest
andconcerns.
LAW AND MORALITY IN THE MODERN WORLD
Law and Morality In the modern world, morality and law are almost universally held to
beunrelated fields and, where the term "legal ethics" is used, it is taken to refer to the
professionalhonesty of lawyers or judges, but has nothing to do with the possible "rightness"
or"wrongness" of particular laws themselves.This is a consequence of the loss of the sense of
any "truth" about man, and of the banishmentof the idea of the natural law. It undermines any
sense of true human rights, leaves theindividual defenseless against unjust laws, and opens
the way to different forms oftotalitarianism. This should be easy enough to see for a person
open to the truth; but many people's minds have set into superficial ways of thinking,
and they will not react unless theyhave been led on, step by step, to deeper reflection and
awareness. Relationship between Lawand Morality or Ethics Law is an enactment made by
the state. It is backed by physical coercion.Its breach is punishable by the courts. It
represents the will of the state and realizes its purpose.Laws reflect the political, social and
economic relationships in the society. It determines rightsand duties of the citizens towards
one another and towards the state.It is through law that the government fulfils its promises to
the people. It reflects thesociological need of society.Law and morality are intimately related
to each other. Laws are generally based on the moral principles of society. Both regulate the
conduct of the individual in society.They influence each other to a great extent. Laws, to be
effective, must represent the moralideas of the people. But good laws sometimes serve to
rouse the moral conscience of the peopleand create and maintain such conditions as may
encourage the growth of morality.

Laws regarding prohibition and spread of primary education are examples of this
nature.Morality cannot, as a matter of fact, be divorced from politics. The ultimate end of a
state isthe promotion of general welfare and moral perfection of man.It is the duty of the state
to formulate such laws as will elevate the moral standard of the people.The laws of a state
thus conform to the prevailing standard of morality. Earlier writers onPolitical Science never
made any distinction between law and morality.Plato's Republic is as good a treatise on
politics as on ethics. In ancient India, the term Dharmaconnoted both law and morality. Law,
it is pointed out, is not merely the command of thesovereign, it represents the idea of right or
wrong based on the prevalent morality of the people.Moreover, obedience to law depends
upon the active support of the moral sentiments of
the people. Laws which are not supported by the moral conscience of the people are liable to
become dead letters.For example laws regarding Prohibition in India have not succeeded on
account of the fact thatfull moral conscience of the people has not been aroused in favor of
such laws.As Green put it, "In attempting to enforce an unpopular law, a government may be
doing moreharm than good by creating and spreading the habit of disobedience to law. The
total cost ofsuch an attempt may well be greater than the social gain."Although law and
morality arc interdependent yet they differ from each other in their content,definiteness and
sanction.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY
Some points of distinction between law and morality may be brought out as follows: Law:
TheOxford English Dictionary defines the law as:
‘the body of rules, whether proceeding from
formal enactment or from custom, which a
particular state or community recognizes as binding on its members or subjects.’
That this should be regarded as the definition of law for the English language is evidence
ofthe influence legal positivism has upon the philosophy of law in our culture. The central
themesof positivism are the contentions: firstly, that the existence of law rests upon
identifiable socialfacts and, secondly, that it is necessary to maintain a conceptual distinction
between law andmorality. In this essay I will examine the positivist assertion that law is
identifiableindependently of morality, with a particular focus on the theory of H.L.A Hart.

1. Law regulates and controls the external human conduct. It is not concerned with
innermotives. A person may be having an evil intention in his or her mind but law does
not care forit.Law will move into action only when this evil intention is translated into action
and some harmis actually done to another person. 2. Law is universal in a particular society.
All the individualsare equally subjected to it. It does not change from man to man.3. Political
laws are precise and definite as there is a regular organ in every state for theformulation
of laws. 4. Law is framed and enforced by a determinate political authority. Itenjoys the
sanction of the state. Disobedience of law is generally followed by physical punishment. The
fear of punishment acts as a deterrent to the breach of political law. 5. Law fallswithin the
purview of a subject known as Jurisprudence. Morality: 1. Morality regulates andcontrols
both the inner motives and the external actions. It is concerned with the whole life ofman.The
province of law is thus limited as compared with that of morality because law is
simplyconcerned with external actions and docs not take into its fold the inner
motives.Morality condemns a person if he or she has some evil intentions but laws are not
applicableunless these intentions are manifested externally.2. Morality is variable. It changes
from man to man and from age to age. Every man has hisown moral principles. 3. Moral laws
lack precision and definiteness as there is no authority tomake and enforce them. 4. Morality
is neither framed nor enforced by any political authority.It does not enjoy the support of the
state. Breach of moral principles is not accompanied by any physical punishment. The
only check against the breach of morality is social condemnation orindividual conscience.
'Moral actions are a matter of choice of inner conscience of theindividual, laws are a matter
of compulsion'.5. Morality is studied under a separate branch of knowledge known as
Ethics.We may conclude the discussion in the words of Gilchrist, "The individual moral life
manifestsitself in manifold ways. The state is the supreme condition of the individual moral
life, forwithout the state no moral life is possible.The state, therefore, regulates other
organizations in the common interest. The state, however,has a direct function in relation to
morality."Laws may be defined as external rules of human conduct backed by the sovereign
politicalauthority. Law and morality are intimately related to each other. Laws are generally
based onthe moral principles of a particular society. Some points of distinction may be
brought out as

follows: (a) Laws regulate external human conduct whereas morality mainly regulates
internalconduct.(b) Laws are universal; morality is variable.(c) Laws are definite and precise
while morality is variable.(d) Laws are upheld by the coercive power of the state; morality
simply enjoys the support of public opinion or individual conscience.(e) Laws are studied
under Jurisprudence but morality is studied under Ethics. Law andfreedom Both law and
morality imply human freedom. Clearly, without freedom one cannotspeak of morality. But
the same holds for law, for if it were automatically and not freely obeyed,men would be mere
robots. Law is not a simple indication of what happens, such as the law of physics; it is an
admonition to free persons about what they are required to do if they wish tolive freely and
responsibly in society; and it normally carries with it a sanction or punishment to be imposed
on whoever is shown to have acted against given norms of conduct. Just law, properly
understood, appeals to
freedom. Nevertheless, one of the most generalized liberal ideas is that law is by nature the en
emy of freedom. Servais Pickers holds that Catholic moralists have gone through many
centuries under the influence of this mentality which has led, by reaction, to the anti-law
approach of much of contemporary moral theology. In this view, law and freedom were seen
as "two opposed poles, law having the effect of limitation and imposing itself on freedom
with the force of obligation. Freedom and law faced each other as two proprietors in dispute
over the field of human actions. The moralists commonly said, "Law governs this act,
freedom governs that one..." The moralists were traditionally the representatives of the moral
law, and their mission was to show to conscience how to apply it in a particular situation, in a
"case of conscience”. Today we witness a strong tendency to invert the roles; the moralists
now regard themselves as defenders of freedom and of personal conscience" [as against the
law].Law and justice Law cannot attempt to regulate the purely interior sphere of personal
conduct; morality can. Human or civil law is connected with external actions, precisely
insofar and because they impinge on the rights or lawful actions of others. Hence the
necessary connection of law with justice. For the regulation of interpersonal relations must
work from the basic principle of justice: "to each his due". Hence arises the fundamental
question of what is due teach one, and from this the further question of human rights. To each
his due. Something is due to each. This is the sense of equality before the law.
"The possibility of giving his or her due not only to a relative, friend, citizen or fellow
believer, but also to every human being simply because he is a person, simply because justice
requires it, is
the honour of law and of jurists. If there is an expression of the unity of the human race and
of equality between all human beings, this expression is rightly given by the law, which can
exclude no one from its horizon under pain of altering its specific identity”. Even for those
who see law and freedom in mutual opposition, the whole concept of law is essentially
connected with that of justice. The ancient principle Lex Iniesta non-Est Lex (an unjust law is
not a law), is at the basis of so many modern protests in the name of freedom. "This law
discriminatory, therefore it is not just". But justice is a moral concept; so, these protests bear
out the intrinsic connection between law and morality, "There is another crucial link between
the virtues and law, for knowing how to apply the law is itself possible only for someone
who possesses the virtue of justice”. ‘The law must respond to "living situations"...' Very
good, but not in the sense that it must take the situation as its norm. Justice must remain the
norm, and sometimes the law must regain ground for justice. Influence of Morals on Law and
Morals act and react upon and mould
each other. In the name of ‘justice’, ‘equity’, ‘good faith’, and ‘conscience’ morals have in
-filtered into the fabrics of law. In judicial law making, in the interpretation of legal precepts,
in exercising judicial discretion (as in awarding punishment) moral considerations play a very
important role. Morals work as a restraint upon the power of the legislature because the
legislature cannot venture to make a law which is completely against the morals of the
society. Secondly, all human conduct and social relations cannot be regulated and governed
by law alone. A considerable number of them are regulated by morals. A number of action
and relations in the life of the community go on very smoothly without any intervention by
law. Their observance is secured by morals. So far as the legal rules are concerned, it is not
the legal sanction alone that ensure their obedience but morals also help in it. Thus, morals
perfect the
law. ‘In marriage, so long as love persist, there is little need of law to rule the relations of the
husband and wife
–

but the solicitor comes in through the door, as love flies out of the window.’
Growing Importance of Morals Now, sociological approach has got its impact upon the
modern age. This approach is more concerned with the ends that law has to pursue. Thus,
recognized values, or, in other words, morals (of course the morals of the modern age) have
become a very important subject of study for good law making. On international law also,
morals are exercising great influence. The brutalities and inhuman acts in World Wars made
the people to turn back to morals and efforts are being made to establish standards and values
which the nations must follow. Perhaps there is no other so forceful ground to justify the
Nuremberg Trials as morals. If the law is to remain closer to the life of the people and
effective, it must not ignore morals.

CONCLUSION
Generally, legal rules are composite and are derived from heterogeneous source. In India, if
we examine all the legal perspective, we shall find that some of them have come from
personal laws and local custom, a good number of them are based on foreign rules and
principles (mainly
English), some are based on the logic or political ideology and so on. Secondly, ‘public
opinion’ which greatly influences law is made up of a number of things –
political ideas, economic theory, ethical philosophy etc. These directly and indirectly
influence law. Therefore, when so many elements work in shaping the legal precepts, the
matter cannot be put in such a
simple way as the ‘relation between law and morals’, because a number of factors join hands
in influencing law, and morals is only one of them. However, some observations can be made
about the relationship between law and morals.