MANU/SC/0877/2023

Equivalent/Neutral Citation: 2023(250)AIC 118, AIR2023SC 3857, 2023 (125) AC C 659, 2023 (3) ALT (C rl.) 93 (A.P.), 2023C riLJ4388,
2024(1)C riminalC C 245, 2023 INSC 705, 2024(2)JKJ77[SC ], 2023(3)JLJ485, 2024(1)N.C .C .306, 2023(11)SC ALE20, [2023]11SC R246

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1030/2023 and 1458/2023
Decided On: 11.08.2023
Manoj Kumar Soni Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh
and
Kallu Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Ravindra Bhat and Dipankar Datta, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Harmeet Singh Ruprah, AOR, Nikhil Tyagi, Adv., Ritika
Sethi, AOR and Vishal Prasad, Adv.
For Respondents/Defendant: Sunny Choudhary, AOR, Manoj Kumar and Karan Bishnoi,
Advs.
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL MATTERS IN WHICH SENTENCE AWARDED IS UPTO
FIVE YEARS
Case Note:
Criminal - Acquittal - Recovery of articles - Sections 120B, 394 and 411 of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - F.I.R.
was registered against four unknown persons under Section 394 of Code and
all of them were subsequently arrested - Upon completion of investigation,
chargesheet was filed before concerned court against Accused persons
including Appellants - After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence
on record, Trial Court convicted and sentenced all five Accused persons
including Appellants under Section 411 and 120B of Code - In appeal, Single
Judge of High Court was of view that findings of Trial Court did not warrant
any interference and that appeals were devoid of any merit - Hence, present
appeal - Whether prosecution prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts:
An F.I.R. was registered against four unknown persons under Section 394,
Indian Penal Code and all of them were subsequently arrested. Upon
completio of investigation, a chargesheet was filed before the concerned court
against the Accused persons including Manoj and Kallu. After appreciating the
oral and documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court convicted and
sentenced all the five Accused persons including Appellants under Sections
411 and 120B of Code. The said judgment having been challenged, Single
Judge of the High Court was of the view that the findings of the Trial Court
did not warrant any interference and that the appeals were devoid of any

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 merit hence, the same were dismissed. In confirming appellant's conviction
and sentence, the High Court relied on the finding that most of the stolen
articles were recovered from his possession and some of them were melted by
him. Considering that the articles were duly identified by the complainant,
the High Court was of the view that appellant, knowing that the articles were
stolen property, dishonestly retained them. While affirming the conviction and
sentence of another appellant, the Judge referred to the fact that the
complainant was known to said appellant and he was working as her driver
and that amount was recovered from his house based on the disclosure
statement.
Held, while allowing the appeal:
(i) There was not a single iota of evidence except the disclosure statements
of accused and the co-Accused, which supposedly led the I.O. to the recovery
of the stolen articles from accused and co accused. At this stage, it was held
that admissibility and credibility are two distinct aspects and the latter is
really a matter of evaluation of other available evidence. The statements of
police witnesses would have been acceptable, had they supported the
prosecution case, and if any other credible evidence were brought on record.
While the recoveries made by the I.O. under Section 27, Evidence Act upon
the disclosure statements by accused persons and the other co-Accused could
be held to have led to discovery of facts and may be admissible, the same
could not be held to be credible in view of the other evidence available on
record. [25]
(ii) The testimony of the seizure witnesses, was the only thread in the
present case that could tie together the loose garland, and without it, the
very seizure of stolen property stands falsified. This court could not overlook
the significance of the circumstance that all four independent seizure
witnesses, who were allegedly present during the seizure/recovery of the
stolen articles from accused's house, having turned hostile and not support
the prosecution case, the standalone evidence of the I.O. on seizure could not
be deemed either conclusive or convincing the recoveries made by him under
Section 27, Evidence Act must, therefore, be rejected. [28]
(iii) It was clear as crystal that the sole connecting evidence against accused
persons was the recovery based on their disclosure statements, along with
those of the other co-Accused but this evidence, was not sufficient to qualify
as fact discovered within the meaning of Section 27. Having regard to such
nature of evidence, this court view the same as wholly untrustworthy. [30]
(iv) Even if assume the veracity of the claim that the items sold to Manoj
were indeed stolen articles, it would not be sufficient to attract Section 411,
Indian Penal Code; what was further necessary to be proved is continued
retention of such articles with a dishonest intent and knowledge or belief that
the items were stolen. No evidence worthy of consideration was adduced by
the prosecution to prove that accused had retained the articles either with
dishonest intent and with knowledge or belief of the same being stolen
property. [37]
(v) The conviction of accused under Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code stands

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 completely vitiated because of the simple reason that one could not alone
conspire. There was no evidence to even remotely suggest that there existed
any agreement between accused and the co-Accused while none of the
others, except accused, had been convicted for criminal conspiracy. [41]
JUDGMENT
Dipankar Datta, J.
1 . These criminal appeals, by special leave, assail the common judgment and order
dated 12th October, 2022 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Jabalpur
("High Court", hereafter) whereby Criminal Appeal No. 10474 of 2019 and Criminal
Appeal No. 10549 of 2019 [appeals Under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure ("Cr. PC", hereafter)] carried by Manoj Kumar Soni ("Manoj", hereafter) and
Kallu @ Habib ("Kallu", hereafter), respectively, were dismissed. While Manoj assailed
his conviction for the offence punishable Under Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 ("IPC", hereafter) and sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three years with a
fine of Rs. 5,000.00 and a default sentence of three months, Kallu assailed his
conviction for the offence punishable Under Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code and
sentence of rigorous imprisonment of ten years with a fine of Rs. 5,000.00 and a default
sentence of three months.
2 . In all, five Accused persons were convicted and sentenced for different offences
punishable under the Indian Penal Code vide the common judgment of the Additional
Sessions Judge ("Trial Court", hereafter) dated 28th November, 2019. The aforesaid
judgment having been confirmed by the High Court, all the Accused persons preferred
Special Leave Petitions ("SLPs", hereafter) before this Court challenging the common
judgment dated 12th October, 2022. The SLPs of the three Accused, namely, Suleman,
Arif and Jaihind, were dismissed and the judgment and order of the High Court
affirming their conviction and sentence left undisturbed. However, notice was issued on
the SLPs preferred by the remaining two Accused, Manoj and Kallu, on 06th April, 2023
and 11th April, 2023, respectively.
3 . These two appeals were heard on different dates. However, a common judgment
being under assail, this Court proposes to dispose of both these appeals vide this
common judgment.
4. The case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that a complaint was registered by PW-
18 ("complainant", hereafter) to the effect that on 14th April, 2010, at around 1:30 pm,
while the complainant was in her house, four persons rang the doorbell. When her
servant, PW-8, answered the door, all four persons armed with a pistol forcefully
entered the house. They tied up the hands and legs of the complainant and her servant,
threatened to kill them, and proceeded to rob the complainant of silver and gold
jewellery, cash, and other valuables by taking the keys to the locker. The Accused
persons remained at the complainant's residence till 2:30 pm before fleeing. Based on
the complaint, an F.I.R. was registered at around 4:30 pm against four unknown
persons Under Section 394, Indian Penal Code and all of them were subsequently
arrested.
5 . Investigation of the F.I.R. was carried out by the Investigating Officer ("I.O.",
hereafter). The specific allegations against Manoj are that the stolen jewellery
("articles", hereafter) had allegedly been sold to him and, despite being aware that the
co-Accused had sold him stolen goods, he still chose to receive and possess the same
dishonestly. Consequently, he was arrested on 9th May, 2010. Thereafter, these articles

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 were recovered by the I.O. on two different days - 9th May, 2010 and 21st May, 2010.
While the Seizure Memo dated 9th May, 2010 bears the signature of seizure witnesses
PW-16 and PW-5, the Seizure Memo dated 21st May, 2010 bears the signature of
seizure witnesses PW-11 and PW-6. The process of identification was conducted by PW-
19, the Tehsildar, on 15th July, 2010. The specific allegations against Kallu, former
driver of the complainant, pertain to his involvement in a conspiracy with other co-
Accused persons. The allegation against him is that he shared information with them,
disclosing that the complainant had a substantial amount of money and valuable
jewellery in her residence, coupled with the knowledge that she lived alone; this,
allegedly led to the subsequent planning and execution of the robbery at the
complainant's house.
6. Upon completion of investigation, a chargesheet was filed before the concerned court
against the Accused persons including Manoj and Kallu. The offences with which all the
Accused were charged are shown as under:
Jaihind Sections 450, 394, 397, Indian Penal Code and
Section 25(1-B), Arms Act, 1959 ("Arms Act",
hereafter)
Arif Sections 450, 394, 397, Indian Penal Code and
Section 25(1-B), Arms Act
Suleman Sections 450, 394, 397, Indian Penal Code
Kallu Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code
Manoj Section 411, Indian Penal Code
Upon committal, charges were framed and the Accused including Manoj and Kallu
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
7. Based on the complainant's testimony, it is established that among the four Accused
present at the scene during the incident, Suleman, Arif, and Jaihind were duly identified
by the complainant, but the fourth Accused remained unidentified. During the
investigation, it was revealed that the fourth Accused was a minor and the case was
subsequently referred to the juvenile court for further proceedings. Insofar as Kallu and
Manoj are concerned, they were not present at the complainant's house during the
incident and were apprehended at a later stage of the investigation when it was
discovered that Manoj had purchased the stolen articles, and Kallu was involved in
hatching the conspiracy.
8 . After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court
convicted and sentenced all the five Accused persons as follows:
Jaihind S e c t i o n s 450, R.I. for 5 years with a fine of Rs 1,000 R.I. for
and Arif 397, Indian 10 years with a fine of Rs 5,000 R.I. for 1 year
Penal Code and with a fine of Rs 1,000 Default: 1 month, 3
Section 25(1-B), months, and 1 month respectively
Arms Act
Suleman Sections 450, R.I. for 5 years with a fine of Rs 1,000 R.I. for
397, Indian 10 years with a fine of Rs 5,000 Default: 1
Penal Code. month and 3 months, respectively
Kallu S e c t i o n 120-B, R.I. for 10 years with a fine of Rs 5,000 Default:
Indian Penal 3 months
Code
Manoj S e c t i o n 411, R.I. for 3 years with a fine of Rs 5,000 Default:

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 Manoj S e c t i o n 411, R.I. for 3 years with a fine of Rs 5,000 Default:
Indian Penal 3 months
Code
9. In convicting Manoj, the Trial Court primarily relied on two pieces of evidence: the
Seizure Memos, which were prepared upon recovery of the stolen articles from Manoj's
possession, and the Identification Memo, in which the complainant identified the articles
stolen. The Trial Court drew presumption Under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 ("Evidence Act", hereafter), to the extent it provides that "a man who is in
possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the
goods knowing them to be stolen unless he can account for his possession". According
to the Trial Court, the crucial corroborative evidence in Manoj's case was the fact that
the articles found in his possession belonged to the complainant and were accurately
identified by her. Additionally, Manoj failed to provide any explanation regarding how
the stolen articles came into his possession. These collective factors resulted in his
conviction Under Section 411, Indian Penal Code.
10. Insofar as Kallu is concerned, the Trial Court primarily based his conviction for
criminal conspiracy on two key factors: first, the information provided by co-Accused
Jaihind during interrogation in his memorandum statement dated 12th May, 2010,
stating that he had given Rs. 3,000.00 to Kallu from the stolen money and had kept one
country-made pistol along with three cartridges at his (Kallu) house/tapra; and
secondly, during interrogation, Kallu himself in his memorandum statement admitted to
keeping Rs. 3,000.00 in his room's cupboard, which was subsequently seized upon his
disclosure. Having held that Kallu had conspired with the other co- Accused, the Trial
Court convicted him of criminal conspiracy punishable Under Section 120-B, Indian
Penal Code.
1 1 . The aforesaid judgment having been challenged by Manoj and Kallu, a learned
Single Judge of the High Court was of the view that the findings of the Trial Court did
not warrant any interference and that the appeals were devoid of any merit; hence, the
same were dismissed. In confirming Manoj's conviction and sentence, the High Court
relied on the finding that most of the stolen articles were recovered from his possession
and some of them were melted by him. Considering that the articles were duly identified
by the complainant, the High Court was of the view that Manoj, knowing that the
articles were stolen property, dishonestly retained them. While affirming the conviction
and sentence of Kallu, the learned Judge referred to the fact that the complainant was
known to Kallu and he was working as her driver and that Rs. 3,000.00 was recovered
from his house based on the disclosure statement.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
1 2 . Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Manoj submitted that the courts below
erred in recording the conviction Under Section 411, Indian Penal Code. The main
submissions advanced by him to have the conviction reversed are as follows:
a) All four independent witnesses (PW-5, PW-6, PW-11, and PW-16) who were
shown to be present during the seizure/recovery of the articles from Manoj's
house turned hostile and failed to support the prosecution's case of seizure.
Surprisingly, the courts below completely ignored this aspect of the matter.
b) There were serious procedural lapses in conducting the identification process
in respect of the articles. The prescribed procedure in respect of seizure of a
property was not followed, and a procedural flaw is established from the

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 testimonies of the complainant and PW 19. The recovery of the ornaments from
the possession of Manoj does not establish them to be that of the complainant.
Therefore, the presumption Under Section 114, Evidence Act was erroneously
drawn as the very identification process suffers from serious lapses.
c) The Trial Court recorded the statement of Manoj Under Section 313, Code of
Criminal Procedure in a very casual manner, as if it were completing a formality
in law. It miserably failed to put any adverse circumstance appearing in the
evidence against Manoj for eliciting his explanation. This is one other
procedural lapse, and a grave one, which has rendered the trial vitiated qua
Manoj.
d) Manoj has been framed in the case due to the animosity between him and
the police as the police used to "often harass [Manoj] for going here and there
and getting the jewellery weighed, identification etc.". This statement of Manoj,
given at the end of his examination Under Section 313, Code of Criminal
Procedure was brushed aside by the courts below without assigning any reason,
far less cogent reason.
e) Significant contradictions exist between the testimonies of police witnesses
and seizure witnesses. The Trial Court predominantly relied on the statements
of the police witnesses, overlooking the presence of additional testimonies of
independent seizure witnesses available in the records, who subsequently
turned hostile.
13. Finally, it was submitted that there was absolutely no material to convict Manoj
Under Section 411, Indian Penal Code. Hence, the conviction and sentence of Manoj
ought to be set aside and consequently, the appeal be allowed.
14. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent/State submitted that both the courts
below delved deep into the materials on record and, upon meticulous consideration of
evidence, did not find any material contradiction in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. The procedural flaws pointed out by his adversary did not result in any
failure of justice and, therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment and
order passed by the Trial Court, which has since been affirmed by the High Court.
Supporting the conviction and sentence of Manoj, the learned Counsel urged this Court
to dismiss the appeal.
1 5 . Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Kallu challenged the correctness of the
impugned judgment and advanced the following submissions:
a) No evidence was presented to substantiate the alleged conspiracy on the part
of Kallu to commit any crime as alleged by the complainant. In other words, the
necessary elements of the offence Under Section 120-A, Indian Penal Code,
punishable Under Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code were not established.
b) The Trial Court convicted the other Accused persons primarily relying on the
statements and information provided by the complainant. However, the
complainant did not make any statement or allegation against Kallu. His
conviction was based solely on two factual aspects: first, that Rs. 3,000.00 was
recovered from him during the investigation based on information provided by
the Accused Jaihind and, secondly, that Kallu used to be the complainant's
driver one year ago. Apart from these circumstances, the prosecution failed to
present any additional evidence to substantiate the charge Under Section 120-

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 B, Indian Penal Code; the conviction and sentence, therefore, cannot sustain
merely on these grounds.
c) Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0500/1994 : (1995) Supp
(1) SCC 80 was placed to support the contention that the essential elements of
an agreement between Kallu and the other co-Accused persons to commit the
offence are lacking, which is a necessary component to bring home the charge
of criminal conspiracy. Additionally, Ram Sharan Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya
Pradesh MANU/SC/1048/2022was relied upon to emphasize the requirement
for some kind of physical manifestation of agreement in order to establish the
offence of criminal conspiracy. Topandas v. State of Bombay
MANU/SC/0032/1955 : (1955) 2 SCR 881 was placed for supporting the
contention that one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal
conspiracy for the simple reason that one cannot conspire with oneself. It was
pointed out that in the present case, Kallu is the only person convicted Under
Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, while no other Accused has been convicted
under the same provision, inviting thereby serious doubts about the validity of
Kallu's conviction.
d) The courts below have overlooked significant material contradictions,
improvements, and omissions in the statements of prosecution witnesses.
16. It was, accordingly, prayed by the learned Counsel that the appeal be allowed, and
the conviction recorded and sentence imposed on Kallu be set aside.
1 7 . Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent/State supported the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court. It was submitted by him that the Trial
Court has carefully considered all the materials placed on record and arrived at a just
conclusion. No case for interference having been set up by Appellant Kallu, learned
Counsel prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
18. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for the parties
and have also perused the materials on record.
19. There can be no two opinions that the quality of evidence led by the prosecution in
the present case to nail Manoj and Kallu was wholly untrustworthy for convicting them
and the Trial Court as well as the High Court erred in not acquitting them.
Disclosure Statements
2 0 . The facts of the case reveal that all the Accused persons made disclosure
statements to the I.O. whereupon recovery of money, jewellery, etc. was effected.
Although it is quite unusual that all five Accused, after being arrested, would lead the
I.O. to the places for effecting recovery of the stolen articles, we do not propose to
disbelieve the prosecution plea only on this score. Manoj's involvement was primarily
based on the disclosure statements made by co-Accused Suleman and Jaihind where
they admitted to selling the stolen articles to him and a similar statement made by
Manoj himself which led to recovery Under Section 27, Evidence Act. Similarly, both the
courts below, in convicting Kallu, largely relied upon the disclosure statement made by
Kallu himself as well as co-Accused Jaihind, who confessed to giving Rs. 3,000.00 to
Kallu from the stolen money and storing a country-made pistol along with three
cartridges at his house/tapra.

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 2 1 . A doubt looms: can disclosure statements per se, unaccompanied by any
supporting evidence, be deemed adequate to secure a conviction? We find it
implausible. Although disclosure statements hold significance as a contributing factor in
unriddling a case, in our opinion, they are not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient
on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable
doubt.
2 2 . The law on the evidentiary value of disclosure statements Under Section 27,
Evidence Act made by the Accused himself seems to be well- established. The decision
of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya and Ors. v. King-Emperor
MANU/PR/0049/1946 : AIR 1947 PC 67 holds the field even today wherein it was held
that the provided information must be directly relevant to the discovered fact, including
details about the physical object, its place of origin, and the Accused person's
awareness of these aspects. The Privy Council observed:
The difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on information
supplied by the Accused is a relevant fact can afford no justification for reading
into Section 27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence a
confession barred by Section 26. Except in cases in which the possession, or
concealment, of an object constitutes the gist of the offence charged, it can
seldom happen that information relating to the discovery of a fact forms the
foundation of the prosecution case. It is only one link in the chain of proof, and
the other links must be forged in manner allowed by law.
23. The law on the evidentiary value of disclosure statements of co- Accused too is
settled; the courts have hesitated to place reliance solely on disclosure statements of
co-Accused and used them merely to support the conviction or, as Sir Lawrence Jenkins
observed in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty MANU/WB/0030/1911 : (1911) ILR
38 Cal 559, page 588, to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-Accused". In
Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0059/1964 : AIR 1964 SC 1184, this
Court, speaking through the Constitution Bench, elaborated upon the approach to be
adopted by courts when dealing with disclosure statements:
13. ...In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the
confession of one Accused person against another Accused person, the proper
approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an Accused
person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is
inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against
the said Accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure
itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is
right.
24. In yet another case of discrediting a flawed conviction Under Section 411, Indian
Penal Code, this Court, in Shiv Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/1114/2022
: (2022) 9 SCC 676 overturned the conviction Under Section 411, declined to place
undue reliance solely on the disclosure statements of the co-Accused, and held:
24. ..., the disclosure statement of one Accused cannot be accepted as a proof
of the Appellant having knowledge of utensils being stolen goods. The
prosecution has also failed to establish any basis for the Appellant to believe
that the utensils seized from him were stolen articles. The factum of selling
utensils at a lower price cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the
Appellant was aware of the theft of those articles. The essential ingredient of

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 mens rea is clearly not established for the charge Under Section 411 Indian
Penal Code. The prosecution's evidence on this aspect, as they would speak of
the character Gratiano in Merchant of Venice, can be appropriately described as,
"you speak an infinite deal of nothing." [William Shakespeare, Merchant of
Venice, Act 1 Scene 1.]
2 5 . Coming to the case at hand, there is not a single iota of evidence except the
disclosure statements of Manoj and the co-Accused, which supposedly led the I.O. to
the recovery of the stolen articles from Manoj and Rs. 3,000.00 from Kallu. At this
stage, we must hold that admissibility and credibility are two distinct aspects and the
latter is really a matter of evaluation of other available evidence. The statements of
police witnesses would have been acceptable, had they supported the prosecution case,
and if any other credible evidence were brought on record. While the recoveries made
by the I.O. Under Section 27, Evidence Act upon the disclosure statements by Manoj,
Kallu and the other co-Accused could be held to have led to discovery of facts and may
be admissible, the same cannot be held to be credible in view of the other evidence
available on record.
2 6 . While property seizure memos could have been a reliable piece of evidence in
support of Manoj's conviction, what has transpired is that the seizure witnesses turned
hostile right from the word 'go'. The common version of all the seizure witnesses, i.e.,
PWs 5, 6, 11 and 16, was that they were made to sign the seizure memos on the
insistence of the 'daroga' and that too, two of them had signed at the police station.
There is, thus, no scope to rely on a part of the depositions of the said PWs 5, 6, 11
and 16. Viewed thus, the seizure loses credibility.
27. This Court in Sanjeet Kumar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh MANU/SC/1077/2022
held:
18. But if the Court has - (i) to completely disregard the lack of corroboration
of the testimony of police witnesses by independent witnesses; and (ii) to turn
a Nelson's eye to the independent witnesses turning hostile, then the story of
the prosecution should be very convincing and the testimony of the official
witnesses notably trustworthy. If independent witnesses come up with a story
which creates a gaping hole in the prosecution theory, about the very search
and seizure, then the case of the prosecution should collapse like a pack of
cards. It is no doubt true that corroboration by independent witnesses is not
always necessary. But once the prosecution comes up with a story that the
search and seizure was conducted in the presence of independent witnesses and
they also choose to examine them before Court, then the Court has to see
whether the version of the independent witnesses who turned hostile is
unbelievable and whether there is a possibility that they have become
turncoats.
28. The testimony of the seizure witnesses, we are inclined to the view, is the only
thread in the present case that could tie together the loose garland, and without it, the
very seizure of stolen property stands falsified. We cannot overlook the significance of
the circumstance that all four independent seizure witnesses (PWs 5, 6, 11, and 16),
who were allegedly present during the seizure/recovery of the stolen articles from
Manoj's house, having turned hostile and not support the prosecution case, the
standalone evidence of the I.O. on seizure cannot be deemed either conclusive or
convincing; the recoveries made by him Under Section 27, Evidence Act must,
therefore, be rejected.

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 29. The material inconsistency in Kallu's case is the contradiction in the depositions of
the I.O. and the complainant. The I.O. deposed that he, upon the disclosure by co-
Accused Jaihind, successfully recovered a sum of Rs. 3,000.00 (comprised of three one-
thousand-rupee notes), seized the same in the presence of witnesses, and prepared a
seizure panchnama; however, when one looks at the complainant's version, it is wholly
inconsistent. She stated in her deposition that the Accused persons did not take away
any one-thousand-rupee note from her house. It does not escape our attention that the
conviction of Kallu entirely hinges on the alleged recovery of Rs. 3,000.00 and both the
courts below heavily relied on this aspect to convict him of criminal conspiracy.
However, it does not appear from a perusal of the Trial Court's judgment as to who
exactly the seizure witnesses were in whose presence Rs. 3,000.00 was recovered
although it does seem that none of the several prosecution witnesses, who were
witnesses of arrest and seizure, had supported the prosecution case. Although there
could be evidence aliunde to establish the guilt of the co-Accused Jaihind, Arif and
Suleman, there was absolutely no evidence worthy of consideration which could have
been relied on to convict Manoj and Kallu.
30. It is clear as crystal that the sole connecting evidence against Manoj and Kallu was
the recovery based on their disclosure statements, along with those of the other co-
Accused but this evidence, in our opinion, is not sufficient to qualify as "fact ...
discovered" within the meaning of Section 27. Having regard to such nature of
evidence, we view the same as wholly untrustworthy.
Statements Under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure.
31. Another glaring flaw in Manoj's case revolves around his examination Under Section
313, Code of Criminal Procedure. The manner in which the Trial Court framed questions
for answer by Manoj left a lot to be desired. We need not reiterate the exposition of law
by this Court in multiple decisions on Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein
trial courts have been cautioned against recording statements in a casual and cursory
manner. What holds importance is not the mere quantity of questions posed to the
Accused but rather the content and manner in which they are framed.
3 2 . Upon reading the questions put to Manoj Under Section 313, Code of Criminal
Procedure, it becomes evident that the Trial Court treated this process as an empty
formality. None of the material circumstances forming the basis of his conviction were
put to him. Astonishingly, not even a single question regarding the stolen articles was
posed to him. Instead, irrelevant and abstract questions about the main incident of
robbery that took place on 14th April, 2010 were asked, even though his alleged
involvement occurred much later when the robbed items were allegedly sold to him by
the co-Accused. The prosecution's entire case is premised on the disclosure statements
made by the co-Accused, but Manoj was never given the opportunity to explain the
circumstances.
Conviction of Manoj Under Section 411, Indian Penal Code
3 3 . Manoj has been convicted Under Section 411, Indian Penal Code which is
reproduced below:
Dishonestly receiving stolen property. -Whoever dishonestly receives or retains
any stolen property, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen
property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

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 34. The Trial Court convicted Manoj based on a presumption Under Section 114(a),
Evidence Act, asserting that his possession of stolen articles shortly after the theft, with
knowledge of its stolen nature, was adequate enough to hold him guilty Under Section
411, Indian Penal Code. As a result, he was held liable for the offence under the said
provision. Illustration (a) of Section 114, Evidence Act has been noted above but the
entire provision reads as follows:
114. Court may presume existence of certain facts. -The Court may presume
the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being
had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and
private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The Court
may presume-
(a) That a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the
theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be
stolen, unless he can account for his possession.
***
35. The Trial Court erred in drawing such a presumption of fact without considering
other factors. What could be those factors has been explained by this Court in A
Devendran v. State of Tamil Nadu MANU/SC/1851/1997 : (1997) 11 SCC 720 in the
following words:
2 0 . ... Whether a presumption Under Section 114, Illustration (a) of the
Evidence Act should be drawn in a given situation is a matter which depends on
the evidence and the circumstances of the cases. The nature of the stolen
articles, the nature of its identification by the owner, the place and the
circumstances of its recovery, the intervening period between the date of
occurrence and the date of recovery, the explanation of the persons concerned
from whom the recovery is made are all factors which are to be taken into
consideration in arriving at a decision.
3 6 . A presumption of fact Under Section 114(a), Evidence Act must be drawn
considering other evidence on record and without corroboration from other cogent
evidence, it must not be drawn in isolation. The present case serves as a perfect
example of why such a presumption should have been avoided by the Trial Court.
Manoj's conviction, solely relying on the disclosure statements made by himself and the
other co-Accused, does not suffice to warrant a presumption Under Section 411, Indian
Penal Code. It would not be unreasonable to presume that a goldsmith, who has to deal
in ornaments and jewelleries on a day-to-day basis, would obviously be in possession
of a significant quantity of ornaments at his shop. Given the circumstances, such a
presumption drawn Under Section 114(a) stands vitiated.
37. At this juncture, even if we assume the veracity of the claim that the items sold to
Manoj were indeed stolen articles, it would not be sufficient to attract Section 411,
Indian Penal Code; what was further necessary to be proved is continued retention of
such articles with a dishonest intent and knowledge or belief that the items were stolen.
No evidence worthy of consideration was adduced by the prosecution to prove that
Manoj had retained the articles either with dishonest intent and with knowledge or
belief of the same being stolen property.
Conviction of Kallu Under Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code

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 38. It is intriguing that among all five Accused persons, only Kallu has been convicted
for criminal conspiracy Under Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code. At this stage, we
cannot help but wonder: can a single individual conspire with oneself? We cannot but
disagree. It logically follows that one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal
conspiracy because one cannot conspire with oneself. As per Black's Law Dictionary
(8th Edn), 'conspiracy' is an "agreement by two or more persons to commit an unlawful
act, coupled with an intent to achieve the agreement's objective, and action or conduct
that furthers the agreement". The wordings of Section 120-A, Indian Penal Code make it
abundantly clear-the offence of criminal conspiracy is committed only when two or
more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal act by illegal
means. The position in English law too is well- settled. In The King v. Plummer (1902)
2 KB 339, the King's Bench, speaking through Lord Justice Bruce, held:
It logically follows from the nature of the offence of conspiracy that, where two
or more persons are charged in the same indictment with conspiracy with one
another, and the indictment contains no charge of their conspiring with other
persons not named in the indictment, then, if all but one of the persons named
in the indictment are acquitted, no valid judgment can be passed upon the one
remaining person. (page 343)
39. In I.G. Singleton v. King-Emperor MANU/WB/0279/1924 : (1924-25) 29 CWN 260
: AIR 1925 Cal 501, the Calcutta High Court further clarified the law related to criminal
conspiracy:
The Rule of English law that is now well settled is that where two persons are
indicted for conspiring together and they are tried together, both must be
acquitted, or both convicted. (page 265)
40. The decision of this Court in Topandas (supra) affirmed the aforesaid position and
held:
14. ... on the charge as it was framed against the Accused 1, 2, 3 and 4 in this
case, the Accused 1 could not be convicted of the offence Under Section 120-B
of the Indian Penal Code when his alleged co-conspirators Accused 2, 3 and 4
were acquitted of that offence.
41. Having regard to the position of law as aforesaid, the conviction of Kallu Under
Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code stands completely vitiated because of the simple
reason that one cannot alone conspire. There is no evidence to even remotely suggest
that there existed any agreement between Kallu and the co-Accused while none of the
others, except Kallu, has been convicted for criminal conspiracy.
CONCLUSION
42. What could have more aptly summarise the entire prosecution case, especially the
flawed investigation in the matter at hand, than the words of Daniel J. Boorstin, the
American historian: "The greatest obstacle to true discovery is not ignorance, but rather
the illusion of knowledge".
43. Against this background, to say that the convictions of Manoj and Kallu can still
sustain, appears far-fetched; their convictions cannot be justified solely on the basis of
illusory knowledge regarding their involvement in the crime.
4 4 . For all the foregoing reasons, Manoj and Kallu are acquitted and set free.

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 Consequently, conviction of Manoj and Kallu as recorded by the Trial Court and the
sentence imposed upon them, since affirmed by the High Court, stand set aside. Manoj
and Kallu, reportedly, have been enlarged on bail pending decision on their respective
appeals; hence, they shall stand discharged of their bail bonds.
45. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed. No costs.
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