Ulrich Ranke

Natural
Disaster Risk
Management
Geosciences and Social Responsibility
Natural Disaster Risk Management
Ulrich Ranke

Natural Disaster Risk

Management
Geosciences and Social Responsibility

13
Ulrich Ranke
Burgdorf
Germany

ISBN 978-3-319-20674-5 ISBN 978-3-319-20675-2 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2015945566

Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

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Contents

1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2 Natural Disaster and Society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.1 Major Natural Disasters and Their Socioeconomic Impact. . . . . . 13
2.1.1 Natural Disaster Triggered Nuclear Accident . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.2 World Food Price Increase Due to Drought. . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.3 Sea-Level Rise and the Survival of Small Island States. . . 16
2.1.4 Respiratory Hazards from Ash Clouds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.5 Failure of State (Hurricane Katrina, United States). . . . . 20
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.1 Population Dynamics and Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.2 Benefit and Risk—A Cause–Effect Relationship. . . . . . . 25
2.2.3 Population at Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.4 Gender Relation to Natural Disasters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2.5 Traumatization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2.6 Social Connotation of Disaster Impact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3 Risk to Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.1 Eyjafjallajökull, Iceland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.2 International Impact of Local Events
(Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Failure). . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.3 The Great Flood of 1993 (United States). . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

3.1 Natural Disaster Classification: General Aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2.1 Geotectonic Hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2.2 Hydrological Hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.2.3 Natural Disasters Versus “Extreme Events”. . . . . . . . . . . 147

v
vi Contents

3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

3.3.1 Type of Disaster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.3.2 Regional Distribution (Hotspots). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3.4 Database and Data Reliability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

4 Institutional and Organizational Framework

for a Disaster Risk Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.1 General Aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.2 The United Nations System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.2.1 United Nations Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
4.2.2 United Nations (UNISDR). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.2.3 The Yokohama Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.2.4 Hyogo Framework of Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4.2.5 United Nations Office of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
4.2.6 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). . . . . . 194
4.2.7 United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
4.2.8 The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction
and Recovery (World Bank—GFDRR). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
4.2.9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) . . . 198
4.2.10 ISO (International Organization for Standardization). . . 201
4.3 The European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
4.3.1 Eurocode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
4.3.2 European Water Framework Directive (EWFD) . . . . . . . 206
4.3.3 Natura 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
4.4 German Regulations of Natural Disaster Management. . . . . . . . . 210
4.4.1 German National Law to Increase Flood Prevention. . . . 210
4.4.2 German Advisory Council
on Global Change (WBGU). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
4.4.3 German Strategy for Adaptation
to Climate Change (DAS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
4.5 The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC). . . . . . . . . . . 219
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

5 Hazard Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

5.1 General Aspects of Data Monitoring and Measuring. . . . . . . . . . . 225
5.2 International Classification Scales of Hazard Intensity. . . . . . . . . 228
5.2.1 Earthquake Magnitude and Intensity Scale . . . . . . . . . . . 229
5.2.2 Volcano Explosivity Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
5.2.3 Examples of Volcanic Alert Levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
5.2.4 Volcano Alert Levels for International Air Traffic
(Aviation Color Code) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
5.2.5 Beaufort Wind Scale (United Kingdom, Royal Navy). . . . 234
Contents vii

5.2.6 The Saffir–Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale. . . . . . . . . . . 234

5.2.7 Tsunami Watches and Warnings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
5.2.8 European Snow Avalanche Danger Scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
5.3 Hazard Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
5.3.1 Single Hazard Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
5.3.2 The Hazard Cascade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
5.3.3 Multiple Hazard Distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
5.4 Example of a Multiple Hazard Assessment (Ende, Flores). . . . . . 259
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

6 Vulnerability Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

6.1 General Aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
6.2 Methods and Instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
6.3 Vulnerability Indicators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
6.4 Vulnerability Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

7 Risk Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

7.1 General Aspects—Definition and Explanations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
7.2 Valuing Statistical Life (VSL). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
7.3 Deterministic Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
7.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Computer-Based
Hazard and Risk Assessment) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
7.5 Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Practice “HAZUS-MH”. . . . . . 304
7.6 Risk Assessment (Disaster Risk Index). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
7.6.1 Disaster Risk Index (DRI–UNDP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
7.6.2 Global Disaster Risk Analysis (World Bank). . . . . . . . . . 315
7.6.3 Indicators of Disaster Risk and Risk
Management (Inter-American Development Bank). . . . . 317
7.6.4 Global Climate Risk Index (Germanwatch). . . . . . . . . . . 319
7.6.5 WorldRiskIndex (German Alliance
Development Works) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
7.6.6 Earthquake Disaster Risk Index (EDRI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
7.6.7 Natural Disasters Risk Index (Maplecroft) . . . . . . . . . . . 323
7.7 Final Remarks on Disaster Risk Indexes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

8.1 General Aspects: The Concept of Risk Governance . . . . . . . . . . . 333
8.2 Institutional Framework for Risk-Based Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
8.3 The Risk Mitigation Cycle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
8.4 Definition of National Goals on Disaster Risk Management. . . . . 351
8.5 Society’s Decision on Acceptable and Unacceptable Risk . . . . . . 353
8.6 Risk Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
8.7 Risk Perception: “Gender Equality” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
8.8 Risk Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
viii Contents

8.8.1 Communication Processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368

8.8.2 Risk Communication as a Responsibility
of Science and Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
8.8.3 Communication from the Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
8.8.4 Pre- and Post-disaster Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
8.9 Risk Financing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
8.9.1 Insurance (Self-Insurance). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
8.9.2 Microfinancing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
8.9.3 Risk Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
8.9.4 Risk Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
8.9.5 Catastrophic Bonds (Cat Bonds,
Cat Swaps, Risk Swaps). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
8.9.6 National Risk Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
8.9.7 Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP) . . . . . . . . . . 397
8.9.8 National Agricultural Insurance, India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
8.9.9 General Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
8.10 Critical Infrastructure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404

9 Community Awareness and Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409

9.1 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM). . . . . . 409
9.2 Risk Reduction Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
9.3 Examples of Community Disaster Risk Management. . . . . . . . . . 424
9.3.1 Indonesia: Banda Aceh an Example
for a Peaceful Settling of Dispute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
9.4 Community and Volunteers in Disaster Risk Management. . . . . . 428
9.5 Early Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
9.5.1 The German-Indonesian Tsunami Early
Warning System (GITEWS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438
9.5.2 Katwarn “Use of Early Warning Systems”. . . . . . . . . . . . 440
9.5.3 Hurricane Early Warning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
9.5.4 Warning Chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446

10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster

Risk Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
10.1 Science and Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
10.1.1 The Role of Science and Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
10.1.2 International Framework for Science and Technology. . . 455
10.1.3 Technological Innovation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
10.1.4 Acceptance of Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
10.1.5 Code of Conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
10.2 Geoscientists in Disaster Risk Reduction Management. . . . . . . . . 466
10.3 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
Contents ix

Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard,Vulnerability, and Risk. . . . 483

Annex B: International Disaster and EmergencyManagement

Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
List of Figures

Figure 2.1 World map of megacities “2015” (Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Figure 2.2 Benefit—risk relationship of power generation
from nuclear energy (Based on Weinberg 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 2.3 Comparison of the number of disaster events,
killed and exposed people (1975–2008)
(Courtesy Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Figure 2.4 People exposed per year to risk from different
natural hazards (Courtesy Nadim et al. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 2.5 World overview from 1975–2000 of number of people
affected, categorized by income classes and disaster
type (Compiled from Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 2013) . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 2.6 Economic losses versus persons killed from natural
disasters 1970–2010 (Compiled from UNISDR 2007,
Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 2013; Munich Re 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 2.7 Disaster losses according to country income
levels (Courtesy Guha-Sapir et al. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 2.8 The 10 biggest losses from natural disaster events
compared to the losses from internationally
best known disasters (tsunami, World Trade Center). . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 2.9 Casualties versus economic losses of the 40 biggest
disaster events since 1980 (Compiled
from MunichRe 2012, 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Figure 2.10 World natural disaster events attributed
to specific events, 1975–2000 (Compiled
from Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 2.11 Country risk exposure for the year 2013
(Based on UNU-EHS World Risk Index 2012
and Human Development Index, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

xi
xii List of Figures

Figure 2.12 Death toll and economic losses distinguished

between industrialized and developing countries
(Compiled from Guha-Sapir et al. 2011;
MunichRe 2012, 2013; UNU-EHS 2012; UNISDR 2009). . . . . 46
Figure 3.1 Disaster type classification proposed by CRED
and Munich Re. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Figure 3.2 Structure of the Earth and respective seismic velocity
and density distribution (Compiled from USGS
2008a; Berckhemer 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Figure 3.3 Magnetic striping pattern of the oceanic crust
as a result of the reversing of the Earth’s magnetic
field (Courtesy USGS 2008a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Figure 3.4 Pattern of global lithosphere plates (Courtesy USGS, ibid). . . . 61
Figure 3.5 Divergent plate margin of Iceland, exhibiting that Europe
and America are drifting apart (Courtesy USGS, ibid). . . . . . . . 62
Figure 3.6 Oceanic–continental plate convergence
(Courtesy USGS, ibid) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 3.7 Oceanic–oceanic plate convergence (Courtesy USGS, ibid) . . . 62
Figure 3.8 Continental plate–continental plate collision
(Courtesy USGS, ibid) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Figure 3.9 Transform fault (Courtesy USGS, ibid) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Figure 3.10 San Andreas Fault zone, California and its impact
on the Earth surface (Source Wikipedia, file:
kluft-photo-Carrizo-Plain-Nov-2007-Img 0327.
jpg; accessed: 24 May 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Figure 3.11 Seismic ray paths through Earth‘s
interior (Courtesy USGS, ibid). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Figure 3.12 Model of the first earthquake identification
instrument (Han Dynasty), China, about 132 AD
(Source file: EastHanSeismograph.JPG, Wikipedia;
“Zhang Heng”; access: 20 May 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Figure 3.13 Vulnerability classes according to building/construction
type (Based on EMS-98). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Figure 3.14 Liquefaction of the subsurface strata from
the earthquake event in 1999 made this
masonry structure collapse (Adapazari; Turkey) . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Figure 3.15 Collapse of the MacArthur Maze (Cypress Viaduct)
in Oakland from the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake . . . . . . . . . . 88
Figure 3.16 Earthquake hazard of the Niederrheinische Bucht
based on maximal horizontal acceleration exceeding
one in 500 years (Courtesy Geological Survey
of North Rhine-Westphalia; Germany). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
List of Figures xiii

Figure 3.17 Earthquake Map of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland

(D-A-CH), based on earthquake intensities that will
not exceed 90 % probability in the next 50 years
(Courtesy Helmholtz Centre Potsdam—GFZ German
Research Centre for Geosciences, Annual Report 2011). . . . . . 95
Figure 3.18 Seismic risk zones of Germany (Courtesy
Tyagunov et al. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Figure 3.19 The 2004 tsunami moved a ship onto a house
in Banda Aceh. Today the ship serves as
a tourist spot (Own photo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Figure 3.20 Tsunami travel speed, wave height, and amplitude
(Courtesy Franzius Institute, University of Hannover). . . . . . . . 98
Figure 3.21 Model of a tsunami wave train. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Figure 3.22 Relation between run-up height and inundation
distance (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Figure 3.23 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami travel times
(Courtesy Kowalik et al. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Figure 3.24 Active volcanoes of the Indonesian archipelago
are lined up like the pearls of a necklace
(Courtesy BG/Georisk 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Figure 3.25 Basaltic lava streams from Mauna Loa, Hawaii,
reaching the Pacific Ocean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Figure 3.26 Drop in atmospheric temperature due to volcanic
ash emissions from volcanoes Gunung Agung (Bal),
El Chichon (Mexico), and Pinatubo (Philippines)
(Based on: IPCC 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Figure 3.27 Autosiphon degassing carbon dioxide from
Lake Nyos, Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Figure 3.28 Simplified sketch of typical hazards from
strato volcanoes (Courtesy USGS 2008b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Figure 3.29 Mount St. Helens, Washington State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Figure 3.30 Hotspots in the South Atlantic and their travel
paths (Graph based: Duncan and Richards 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Figure 3.31 The Island of Santorini and the position
of the former volcano. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Figure 3.32 Flood level increase due to subsequent
or simultaneous flood arrival (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Figure 3.33 Statistical evidence on worldwide flood risk
(Compiled from MunichRe 2012; Guha-Sapir
et al. 2013; UNISDR 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Figure 3.34 Generalized overview of landslide types
(Courtesy USGS 2008c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
xiv List of Figures

Figure 3.35 NOAA/USGS empirical “rainfall intensity–duration

threshold” for the San Francisco Bay area
(Redrawn from USGS 2005c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Figure 3.36 Decision tree for the occurrence of landslides
(Generalized after Hamberger 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Figure 3.37 Percentage of landslide areas following the 2008
Wenchuan earthquake (Redrawn from Tang et al. 2011). . . . . . 136
Figure 3.38 Probability distribution function on frequency
and severity of natural disasters in general is
well approximated by log-normal Gaussian
distribution (Redrawn from: IPCC 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Figure 3.39 Change in probability distribution function due
to shift in the shape of the log-normal distribution:
a shifting the mean, b broadening probability,
c shift in skewness (Courtesy IPCC 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Figure 3.40 Definition of extreme event threshold value based
on a random sampling, or b from normal
distribution function (Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Figure 3.41 World Map of Natural Hazards; excerpt (Courtesy
Munich Re, NATHAN, 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Figure 3.42 Synoptic Hazard Map of Germany; example
of a synoptic hazard map using symbols for indicating type
and regional distribution of natural hazards (Own graph) . . . . . 158
Figure 3.43 Spatial distribution of risk mortality classes assessed by the
Disaster Risk Index (DRI) of the UNDP-GRAVITY
Programme (Courtesy Peduzzi et al. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Figure 3.44 World Risk Index Map showing the “Deficit
in Risk Coping Capacity” (Courtesy UNU-EHS, Bonn) . . . . . . 161
Figure 3.45 Risk of mortality from earthquakes (Courtesy
Dilley et al. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Figure 3.46 Risk of mortality from landslides (Courtesy
Dilley et al. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Figure 3.47 Risk of mortality from floods (Courtesy Dilley et al. 2005). . . . 164
Figure 3.48 Risk of mortality from cyclones
(Courtesy Dilley et al. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Figure 3.49 Risk of mortality from droughts
(Courtesy Dilley et al. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Figure 3.50 World Climate Risk Distribution
(Courtesy GermanWatch 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Figure 3.51 World Map of Natural Catastrophes 2011
(Courtesy MunichRe, NatCatSERVICE;
online access: 30 July 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Figure 3.52 Historic development of natural disaster events
from 1980 until 2010 according to type
of disaster (Courtesy Munich Re, Topics Geo Online, 2013). . . 167
List of Figures xv

Figure 3.53 Generalized trend in type of natural disasters

from 1980 until 2010 (Courtesy Munich Re,
Topics, Geo Online, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Figure 3.54 Historic development of overall and insured
economic losses “1980 to 2013” (MunichRe 2012). . . . . . . . . . 168
Figure 3.55 Mortality risk of selected disaster affected countries
(based on: UNISDR 2007, 2009a, b, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Figure 5.1 Comparison of different hazard types by probability,
regional distribution, lead time, and duration (A snow
avalanche, E earthquake, D drought, H hurricane,
S storm, T tsunami, and V volcanic eruption; Own graph). . . . . 227
Figure 5.2 The type of hazard defines the map scale (Own graph). . . . . . . 243
Figure 5.3 Regional distribution of Germany on risk from storm surges
and hailstorms (Courtesy: Gesamtverband der Deutschen
Versicherungswirtschaft, Berlin). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Figure 5.4 Regional distribution of disaster events of Indonesia
at provincial level (Courtesy Badan Geology/Gitews
2005, Indonesia). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Figure 5.5 Generalized overview of disaster impact severity indicated
by circles: comparison of insured losses per continent
(Courtesy MunichRe 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Figure 5.6 Landslide hazard map of the village of Ende, Flores Island,
Indonesia (Courtesy BG/Georisk 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Figure 5.7 Snow avalanche hazard map; village Hinterrhein,
Switzerland (Courtesy Amt für Wald, Gemeinde Hinterrhein,
Mittelbünden/Moesano, Switzerland). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Figure 5.8 Hazard assessment matrix for desk study purpose example:
“snow avalanche” (Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Figure 5.9 Hazard assessment pentagon “fictitious” (Own graph) . . . . . . . 250
Figure 5.10 “Decision support system” for identifying the tsunami
hazard potential from a volcano eruption “fictitious”
(Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
Figure 5.11 Volcano-lahar multihazard cause-effect relationship
(Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Figure 5.12 Generalized cause-effect relationship of natural hazards
(Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Figure 5.13 Synoptic map of risks from natural hazards
in Asia-Pacific (Courtesy UN-OCHA 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Figure 5.14 Multiple hazard assessment based on peak ground
acceleration and landslide susceptibility (“fictitious”):
dark green 1; lush green 2; yellow 3; pink 4; red 5
(Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Figure 5.15 Grid-based synoptic multihazard assessment (Own graph). . . . 257
Figure 5.16 Assessment of the “average hazard” level (50 %)
of an area (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
xvi List of Figures

Figure 5.17 Identified natural disaster occurrences in Ende District

(Flores, Indonesia) L landslide; A volcanic ashes; LB
volcanic bombs and lapilli; T tsunami; EL earthquake/
liquefaction. (Google Earth, city of Ende, Flores,
Indonesia; access March 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Figure 5.18 Multihazard assessment of Ende district (Courtesy BG/GEORISK
2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Figure 5.19 Bridge destroyed from a landslide/debris flow
N’ of Aemuta, Flores (Google Earth, City
of Ende, access: March 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Figure 5.20 Critical infrastructure locations direct at the shoreline; city of Ende
Flores, Indonesia; Google Earth, access, March 2014) . . . . . . . 262
Figure 6.1 Direct and indirect social and economic
vulnerability (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Figure 6.2 Relationship between different elements at risk
(direct and indirect, tangible and intangible; Own graph) . . . . . 269
Figure 6.3 Comparison of vulnerability of different countries
(A) to (E) based on indicators given in Table 6.2. . . . . . . . . . . . 278
Figure 6.4 Water level record of a river over a one-year
period (fictitious). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Figure 6.5 Cumulative curve on probability of exceedance
of flood levels (fictitious) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Figure 6.6 Idealized mathematical relationship between
probability and frequency (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
Figure 6.7 Hail-size distribution as an example of a loss damage
frequency curve (Courtesy Gesamtverband der
Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft, Berlin). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Figure 6.8 Probability of flood-level distribution (fictitious). . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Figure 6.9 Probability estimate of possible earthquake
occurrence from historical magnitude
and frequency distribution (fictitious). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Figure 6.10 Mean damage grade based on vulnerability curves
from relating to vulnerability indices of the
Manjil earthquake 1990 (Courtesy Omnidar et al. 2011). . . . . . 284
Figure 6.11 Assessing the overall vulnerability of country
“A” based on the respective vulnerabilities of earthquakes,
landslides, floods, and tsunamis (Courtesy Kammel 2012). . . . 285
Figure 7.1 Range of statistical life assessments
(Based on Viscusi and Aldy 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Figure 7.2 Example of deterministic risk assessment (earthquake
risk of Germany, California, Indonesia, Japan (fictitious) . . . . . 299
Figure 7.3 Linear regression analysis to predict probable future
flood levels based on historic flood-level
time series analysis (fictitious). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Figure 7.4 Risk assessment matrix (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
List of Figures xvii

Figure 7.5 Comparison of risk levels of selected countries

(Based on: Dilley et al. 2005; Table 7.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Figure 7.6 Methodological approach for a risk assessment
combining “people exposure” and “vulnerability”
(Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Figure 7.7 Weight of risk factors according to the severity
of the disasters recorded: EDRI (Courtesy
Davidson and Shah 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Figure 7.8 Natural disaster risk index 2010 (Courtesy
Maplecroft, London). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Figure 7.9 Comparison of world risk indices of different
organizations for selected countries (Based
on UNU-EHS, Worldbank, Maplecroft, Germanwatch). . . . . . . 327
Figure 8.1 Trinity concept of risk (Based on Böschen et al. 2002). . . . . . . 334
Figure 8.2 Disaster risk mitigation planning structure
(light brown scientific sector; Red-brown state
levels; light green local implementation) (Own graph) . . . . . . . 339
Figure 8.3 Benefit–cost relationship of risk reduction
measures (Courtesy Bründl 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
Figure 8.4 The Chinese character “crisis” (Courtesy UNISDR 2004). . . . . 346
Figure 8.5 Natural disaster risk management cycle (Own graph) . . . . . . . . 347
Figure 8.6 Emergency management spiral (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
Figure 8.7 Definition of acceptable and unacceptable risk:
ALARP (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Figure 8.8 Example of risk class definition (based on BUWAL 1996) . . . . 358
Figure 8.9 Definition of risk acceptance on Swiss nuclear
power generation plants (v. Piechowski, cited
in WBGU, Report 1999; Courtesy Springer). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Figure 8.10 Definition of tolerable and intolerable risk
to the natural environment (Courtesy WBGU 1999) . . . . . . . . . 360
Figure 8.11 Judged frequency of lethal events
(Based on Lichtenstein et al. 1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
Figure 8.12 Cascade of amplification of risk perception
of socioeconomic marginalized populations
due to limited information (based on SAMSHA 2002) . . . . . . . 371
Figure 9.1 Ladder of participation (Based on Arnstein 1969). . . . . . . . . . . 410
Figure 9.2 Padang people’s reasons not to evacuate
(Based on: GITEWS 2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
Figure 9.3 Decision support system for a probability
assessment of a “volcanic eruption” (Based on Day 1970) . . . . 435
Figure 9.4 Assumed damage reduction factors due to successful
early warning for Asian countries
(Based on Subbiah et al. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
Figure 9.5 Concept of the GITEWS tsunami early warning
communication system (Courtesy Rudloff et al. 2009) . . . . . . . 439
xviii List of Figures

Figure 10.1 General acceptance in Germany on radiation

exposure dose from nuclear power plants
and Xray diagnostics (Based on: Sigrist 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
Figure 10.2 Perception of inhabitants of the cities of Hamburg
and Bremen on flood risk reduction measures
(Based on: ARTEC 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
Figure 10.3 Stakeholder interest in disaster risk management
(Example: risk insurance; own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
Figure 10.4 Triangular diagram describing the position where
different stakeholders in disaster risk management
are positioned (Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
Figure 10.5 Development path indicating how the scientific sector
contributes to socioeconomic development
decisions (Own graph) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
Figure 10.6 The role of the scientist in intermediation
of scientific knowledge in disaster
risk management (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
Figure 10.7 Disaster-related mortality risk and human
development (Based on Mutter 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
Figure 10.8 Natural science and development
decision-making cycle (Own graph). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
List of Tables

Table 2.1 World Risk Index (WRI) of selected countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Table 3.1 European macroseismic scale (EMS-98) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Table 3.2 Macroseismic intensity assessment questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Table 3.3 Volcanic materials that may be emitted during
an eruption (Own compilation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Table 5.1 Volcanic explosive index (summarized from Newhall
and Self 1982; Walker 1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Table 5.2 Volcano alert levels of the United States
of America (USGS 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Table 5.3 Volcano alert levels of the Mt. Taal Volcano, the Philippines
(PHIVOLCS 2014a, b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Table 5.4 ICAO Volcanic alert color code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
Table 5.5 Beaufort scale (Wikipedia; online access, 20.7.2014) . . . . . . . . . . 235
Table 5.6 Saffir–Simpson hurricane wind scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Table 5.7 Tsunami watch and alert system of Australia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Table 5.8 Philippines tsunami alert scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Table 5.9 European snow avalanche danger scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Table 5.10 Enhanced Tornado Fujita scale introduced in 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Table 5.11 Indicators of rainfall Intensity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Table 6.1 Factors used by the Gravity Project to compare
socioeconomic status of countries under investigation. . . . . . . . . . 276
Table 6.2 Example of vulnerability indicators for country
“A” (fictitious). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Table 6.3 Assessment of potential consequences
from natural disaster (fictitious). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Table 6.4 Flood levels categorized according to severity
and frequency (fictitious) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

xix
xx List of Tables

Table 7.1 Example of definition of severity categories

of an identified hazard (fictitious). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Table 7.2 Deterministic risk matrix to outline the
likelihood/consequence relationship to which
an individual hazard can be assigned (fictitious) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Table 7.3 Relevant hazard types of the area of interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Table 7.4 Characteristics of the identified hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Table 7.5 Prioritization of identified hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Table 7.6 Ranking on hazard based on evidence
and experience (qualifier). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
Table 7.7 Categorization of assets according
to their “arbitrarily assessed” level of hazard exposure . . . . . . . . . 309
Table 7.8 Factors used for assessing the earthquake disaster risk index . . . . 324
Table 8.1 Administrative and societal sectors
affecting activities disaster risk management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
Table 8.2 Administrative and societal sector’s relation
to disaster risk management procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
Table 8.3 Selection of international catastrophic bonds executed
by Munich Re Insurance (Courtesy Municn Re) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Table 9.1 Assessment matrix to forecast probability of a disaster
event according to time and location (Based on Feruzzi ibid). . . . 434
Table 9.2 Australian alert communication system (Courtesy
Australian emergency agency manual no. 38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
Chapter 1
Introduction

Natural disasters occur every day and can occur at almost at any place on the
globe. Nevertheless the geological situation and the geomorphological implica-
tion make the occurrence at specific places more probable than at others. Even
very rare disasters occur, such as the meteorite impact in Siberia in 2012, an event
that according to statistics only happens less than once a year. But if it had been a
meteorite of just several centimeters in diameter, it would have created an impact
crater able to eradicate a mid-size town from the landscape.
On August 22nd, 2003 a renowned group of international tsunami experts
gathered in the small town of Angera on the west coast of Java island to com-
memorate the 125th anniversary of the Krakatau eruption which caused that era’s
largest tsunami. Krakatau was the second biggest volcano eruption in history and
its eruption caused a pyroclastic surge and triggered a tsunami that killed 36,000
people. Today there are only three minor islands to be seen as the whole caldera
is drowned. But since then one larger island, the Anak Krakatau, has constantly
been building up by about 7 m/year showing that the history of Krakatau is far
beyond being finished. In that meeting the 150 tsunami experts discussed the pre-
sent status of international tsunami knowledge, on how tsunamis are generated,
what casualties have thus far been experienced worldwide, what a possible early
warning system could look like, and what kind of disaster prevention should
be established. Among the experts was the director of the world famous Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC), Laura Kong, who started her presentation with
the words: “Tsunami is not a question if, it is a question when.” One year later the
biggest tsunami ever recorded in modern history hit the northern tip of the island
of Sumatra killing 170,000 people in the Aceh province alone and causing a death
toll of a total of more than 230,000 people all around the Indian Ocean. Another
question is why it took another 7 years until Indonesia got a functioning early
warning system at its disposal that already proved its reliability, successfully fore-
casting a tsunami in 2009 offshore Yogyakarta. The answer is, although so many
experts were gathered in Angera, early warning was given no priority in the politi-
cal agenda of the country. The expert meeting was just seen as a gathering of tech-
nical people. It took another earthquake cum tsunami in the year 2006—offshore

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 1

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_1
2 1 Introduction

Yogyakarta—until the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudiyono declared

the matter top of the political agenda. The political will, together with broad inter-
national support, especially from the German government, finally succeeded in
realizing this ambitious target. Today the Indonesian islands are much better pro-
tected from the impacts of a tsunami; although a tsunami will neither today nor in
future be hindered from occurring.
In Italy six geologists and the representative of the local emergency manage-
ment bureau were recently sentenced to six years in prison on involuntary man-
slaughter, for not having rendered the right information regarding the earthquake
of April 6th, 2009, killing 309 people and leaving 80,000 homeless in the small
town of L’Aquila in central Italy. Although the city of L’Aquila is centered at
the highest earthquake risk area of Italy and has experienced many earthquakes
in its history, the judges justified their verdict that the local emergency manage-
ment commission had gathered a week before the quake and came up with the
finding that there would be no higher risk, although the area experienced increased
seismic activity the days before. The commission’s findings were found to be “un-
precise, useless, incomplete and contradictory.” Based on a disaster-preparedness
report (EU-Microdis 2007) it turned out that the Italian government showed only
little interest in evaluating the post-disaster situation. For several months follow-
ing the disaster, the 67,500 homeless quake survivors lived in one of 170 tent
camps or in public buildings. According to the post-disaster damage assessment
the affected area of the city can be sectioned into three parts. In one sector, where
buildings were better maintained relative to the rest of the central city, no one died.
In another section of the city a few people died, mostly due to collapse of “exter-
nal architectural details” or the falling of roof tiles from buildings. The greatest
concentration of deaths came in the section of the city where reinforced concrete
buildings collapsed partly or completely. The well-known risk expert David
Alexander of the University of Firenze, said in an interview (Forbes Magazine:
22.10.2012) that instead of sentencing scientists (“you cannot predict an earth-
quake accurately”) it would have been better had the Italian officials responded
to the previous disasters and based their judgment on scientific evidence; at least
with “common sense for not to replicate errors made during the earthquakes that
occurred decades ago and to address compliance to national building codes.” He
pointed out that the “Governments have neglected to take steps to improve infra-
structure” and argued that “It is not the responsibility of the scientists to control
building stability or even to reinforce the structures.” Furthermore he fears, that
the “threat of prosecution will lead to silence scientific voices.” Different from
the L’Aquila sentence, the many earthquakes along the San Andreas Fault (such
as the Northridge earthquake of 1994 that claimed 57 lives, or that of 1989 in
San Francisco with 67 dead) never in history have the disaster-monitoring sci-
entists and the local emergency managers been accused. More than 5000 natural
scientists in Italy addressed the president of Italy to reconsider the verdict but
with no reaction thus far. The scientists claim that although building codes were
established for Italy, most of the houses that collapsed did not comply with the
building code, not even the local hospital. The rigidity of the L’Aquila verdict is
1 Introduction 3

therefore unique. As a reaction many scientists are considering withdrawing from

risk ­management and will refrain from commenting on risk situations any more.
Especially in Italy, a country that is exposed to more natural hazards than most of
the other European countries and that has with Naples a city with more than 3 mil-
lion people living at the foot of the Vesuvius volcano, many scientists are deeply
worried about ending up in court.
The catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina flooding New Orleans is another exam-
ple of natural disasters affecting societies. But other than the tsunami where the
impact overthrew the people around the Indian Ocean without prior warning or at
L’Aquila where the city is known to be earthquake-prone, the Hurricane Katrina
flood can be seen as a more or less man-made disaster. Hurricane Katrina is seen
today as the worst natural disaster to ever happen in the United States. The hur-
ricane windspeed exceeded 280 km/h and was accompanied with torrential rains
and resulted in flooding the city of New Orleans up to a level of 7.6 m. Eighty
percent of the city area was flooded, 1800 people lost their lives, and the eco-
nomic damages were estimated to have reached US$125 billion, making this
catastrophe the biggest economic disaster prior to Fukushima. The victims were
not equally distributed among the social classes of the local population. Altogether
the impact was primarily on the socially underprivileged, black, poor, and older
Afro-Americans (Beaudoin 2007). The evacuation of the city caused the great-
est displacement of American citizens and further amplified the already existing
social inadequacy. Large riots and tremendous turmoil followed, showing many
Americans the previously unbelievable social disparity within American society,
pointed out by many people as an example of the failure of state (Pirsching 2006).
On May 12th, 2008 a highly destructive earthquake struck Central China. The
Wenchuan earthquake had a magnitude of M 8.0 and its epicenter was located
on the western flank of the Chengdu basin in Sichuan province (Huang and Li
2009). The earthquake originated at the Longmenshan Fault zone that follows the
southern flanks of the Tibetan Massif. The rupture zone was more than 300 km
long and was a result of the convergence of the Tibetan Plateau with the north-
ward propagating Eurasian plate. The earthquake was the most destructive event in
China’s recent history and led to 70,000 fatalities, almost 20,000 persons missing,
and 350,000 people injured. More than 20 million houses were badly damaged,
and more than five million people were made homeless. Confusing numbers were
given on the death toll of the schoolchildren; some releases quoted 10,000 dead
children whereas others gave a number up to 20,000, making children and teach-
ers 25 % of all victims. The high percentage of this particularly high death toll
alarmed the Chinese government and launched an investigation of the situation.
The quake struck in the early afternoon when most of the younger children were
taking a rest. Almost 7000 public school buildings were completely destroyed,
even in areas more than a 100 km away from the epicenter, whereas most of
the other official buildings were able to withstand the impact. Also astonishing,
most of the schools for elite pupils and communist cadre claimed a death toll of
only a few children. The government investigation revealed that the normally
two- to three-storied public schools were really of poor quality, mainly made up
4 1 Introduction

of unreinforced bricks, with thin iron rods and low-grade cement “that crumbled
like charcoal.” The government explained the poor construction quality with the
fact that in years before, the rapidly increasing population forced the authorities to
“rush to build schools.” Local civil engineers blamed the authorities for not com-
plying with the 1976 national building code outlawing unreinforced brick build-
ings for schools. Furthermore they pointed out that many of the school buildings
were located at places that were not suitable for housing: places close to rivers and
in areas of unstable soils and quicksands, prone to liquefaction. The private dam-
aged houses were in most places located in steep-sided valleys, with soils predom-
inantly made up of a mixture of large boulders, sand, and gravel, not at all suitable
for construction sites. Most of these houses were also made of unreinforced bricks.
According to a study carried out by Tang et al. (2011) the earthquake induced
more than 56,000 landslides in steep mountainous areas that additionally caused
more than 2000 fatalities. The earthquake-induced landslides also produced exten-
sive damage to housing settlements, irrigation channels, and rivers. Highways
and bridges were blocked or destroyed, and the city of Wenchuan and many other
towns became isolated. Many aftershocks of magnitude 6.0 (Richter scale) of the
main earthquake triggered a series of mass movements that clogged a nearby river,
forming a series of 35 different size lakes. The water levels in the lakes rose stead-
ily, threatening more than 700,000 people downstream. To prevent a flash flood the
Chinese military services blasted the debris to allow a controlled water run-off.
The emergency response to the earthquake by local and national authorities was
immediate and very decisive. The central government within hours established
an Earthquake Rescue and Relief Headquarters that provided comprehensive
technical, medical, and food assistance for restoring livelihoods and the physi-
cal environment for the 20 million residents who were stricken. The government
established an “impressive number of temporary camp[s]” (EERI 2008) equipped
with hospitals, pharmacies, and schools and provided food, water, sanitation, elec-
tricity, communication, and safety. The camps offered training programs and job
searches for residents, and residents even took or created jobs within the camp
itself. Also as in many emergency situations in the developing world many sur-
vivors preferred to stay in small tent camps near their former homes. These peo-
ple reasoned that they have to take care of crops, cattle, and poultry. Overnight
the government mobilized 130,000 soldiers for rescue and provision of livelihood
of the survivors and to maintain law and order. In addition, many private indi-
viduals and social groups from all over the country came to Sichuan province to
help. The Wenchuan earthquake was one of the very few cases where the Chinese
government accepted foreign aid and aid personnel, a political decision seen by
many observers to be related to the Olympic Games to start some months later in
Beijing. As in most emergency cases worldwide the biggest workload had been
carried out by the survivors themselves. With the help of local nongovernmental
organizations, community groups, and volunteers, search and rescue activities
were initiated before formal assistance arrived. Observers realized a very high
level of nongovernmental involvement which is not usually normal within the
Chinese political and cultural context (EERI ibid). The media played an important
1 Introduction 5

role in all the rescue operations. As relief and recovery efforts became more
­effective, the role of many of the civil society groups became smaller.
Just a month later the Chinese government passed the “Wenchuan Earthquake
Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction Act” that provided the legal basis for dis-
aster mitigation activities: damage assessment, temporary housing schemes,
reconstruction planning, financing, recovery, and rehabilitation. A special team
for reconstruction planning was established and a general reconstruction plan
was developed for the three affected provinces comprising detailed plans on
“rural development, urban–rural housing, infrastructure, public service facilities,
productivity distribution and industrial restructuring, market service system, dis-
aster prevention and mitigation, ecological rehabilitation, and land utilization”
(EERI ibid). The central element of China’s post-disaster management concept
was to pair affected regions with unaffected regions across China. For example,
the city of Chengdu was sponsored by the city of Shanghai. The contributions
included provision of human resources, “in kind” support from planning insti-
tutes and other agencies within the sponsor region, provision of temporary housing
units, and donations and financial support. As of August 25th, 2008 the govern-
ment announced that almost 1.5 million disaster-affected people had been relo-
cated; about 180,000 had been organized to work outside the disaster zone, and
about 680,000 people had found jobs in their hometowns (Xinhua News Agency
2008). About 90 % of the 140,000 damaged business outlets had been reopened.
Almost 663,000 temporary houses had been constructed and another 2500 were
being installed. Nearly all of the 50,000 km of roads damaged by the earthquake
have been restored. According to Watts (2008), the reconstruction is estimated to
have cost about US$150 billion, an amount that was equivalent to one-fifth of the
entire tax revenue of China for a single year. This included providing new homes
for 4 million refugees, replacing schools, and creating jobs for 1 million people.
Rebuilding the infrastructure of the mountain areas will be a challenge in respect
to the tectonically and climatic unstable conditions. One of the most pressing
challenges is to ensure higher seismic standards and construction quality in the
rebuilding. The reconstruction plan calls for higher earthquake resistance levels of
infrastructure construction in the quake-hit regions, especially for schools and hos-
pitals. In rural areas, reconstruction planners recommend that technicians advise
residents on safe rebuilding, but many villagers are moving ahead and reconstruct-
ing with a variety of traditional and recycled materials, particularly reclaimed
bricks (EERI, ibid).
2010 was a year that struck Pakistan with a heavy flood. Although the coun-
try is subject to yearly flooding during monsoon and had already been devastated
along the river Indus in the years 2007, 2009, and was later in 2011 subject to
another flood, the flood of 2010 was by far the worst of the last decades. The 2010
monsoon rainfall almost doubled the amount of water compared to a “normal”
monsoon season; it was the highest since 1994 and ranked second highest of the
last 50 years. The United Nations has rated the floods in Pakistan as the great-
est humanitarian crisis in recent history. In fact more people have been affected in
Pakistan from the disaster than the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami and the recent
6 1 Introduction

earthquakes in Kashmir and Haiti combined. The 2010 Pakistan flood began in
late July resulting from heavy monsoon rains in mountain ranges of the northern
provinces that a couple of days later affected the entire Indus River basin. The
rainfall was supposed by NASA to be most probably a result of the global La Niña
effect. According to meteorologists the so-called jet stream—a seasonal wind sys-
tem normally flowing at an altitude between 7 and 12 km from west to east—was
seen as the central cause of this weather phenomenon. At that time the jet stream
was what meteorologists call “frozen-in,” with the result that the weather condi-
tions remained unchanged causing rising temperatures and extreme rainfall. Such
a “frozen” jet stream was also seen as the root cause for the heat wave in Russia
and the flooding in the United Kingdom in 2007. Rainfall of 200 mm/day was
recorded in most parts of the country, with a maximum of almost 300 mm/day.
By mid-August in total 1800 people had been killed by the flood and about
20 million people displaced from their homes in 36 districts. A reported 3.5 mil-
lion children were at risk from waterborne diseases, and 6 million people were
in need of food. Twenty percent of Pakistan’s total land area was under water,
and 20 million people were affected by destruction of their property, their ara-
ble land, and infrastructure. Two million houses were destroyed beyond repair
and 30,000 km2 of land were washed away. In the aftermath of the catastrophe
malaria, dengue fever, and cholera spread in the most affected regions. Ten mil-
lion people were reported to have no access to clean drinking water. The Pakistani
economy faced a considerable loss of more than US$40 billion due to heavy dam-
age to infrastructure and crops. The wheat crop damage alone was estimated to
be over US$500 million. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the
gross domestic product to drop to 10 % and the inflation rate to increase to 25 %,
mostly as the main export product, cotton, experienced a loss in production of
25 %. The flood destroyed almost the entire harvest of sugarcane, rice, and wheat,
worth US$3 billion. According to Pakistan cotton industry information the flood
destroyed two million bales of cotton, by far the biggest export sector of the coun-
try, with the result that cotton prices worldwide promptly started to rise. As a reac-
tion to the catastrophe, there was a great deal of universal willingness to help. In
total the European Union and the United States contributed about half a billion US
dollars for reconstruction and recovery. But it turned out that the contribution by
the country itself was only small. Former US Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton
therefore demanded that the Pakistani government significantly increase the coun-
try’s aid budgets by increasing the tax base.
As a reaction of the 2004 tsunami-induced economic crisis, the former govern-
ment of the Republic of Maldives made an announcement that the government
intended to create a “Sovereign Wealth Fund” with money earned from tourism to
be used to purchase land elsewhere for the Maldives. The those days acting-Presi-
dent Rasheed’s statement on the “Future of the Flood Threatened Maldive Islands”
was the first political leader’s address to the world that there were places on Earth
where the climate-induced sea-level rise had shown the first serious signs. The
water level is rising steadily and beginning to threaten existence on the islands,
the same as many other small states’ islands such as Tuvalu, Tonga, Fiji, Samoa,
1 Introduction 7

Vanuatu, Funafuti, and others. There is furthermore the well-known example of

the island of South Talpati offshore Bangladesh, as the first island that vanished
from the earth map; the same will happen with the Tegua Atoll of Vanuatu. The
same thing happened in Papua New Guinea where the government evacuated the
980 inhabitants of Carteret Island in 2005 (Jacobeit and Methmann 2007).
The more than 1000 islands forming the State of Maldives lie less than 1 m
above sea level, making the 380,000 inhabitants—and by the way the capital Male
with its 36,000 inhabitants is the most densely populated area of the world—most
vulnerable from flooding. But not only is the land size diminishing every day, also
the ingress of sea water is destroying the island’s fresh water reservoirs. So the
prime minister addressed his people that in the long term, “The Maldives will not
survive as an island state.” He urged his country that they have to face one day
leaving the islands and seeking new homes somewhere. He therefore started to
negotiate to buy land in the Indian Union, in Sri Lanka, as well as in Australia.
The government of the Tuvalu Islands did the same. It negotiated with Australia
and New Zealand to get shelter in these countries. But the Australian government
will only accept up to 90 Tuvaluans every year, as it claims that there is no real
risk from sea level rise to Tuvalu and the Tuvaluans are coming as “economic
refugeesˮ and not for climate reasons.
For Maldivians, India and Sri Lanka pose the first choice for evacuation, as they
share the same language, culture, and ethnic heritage, especially with the Indian
Federal States of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. The money for land acquisition would be
taken from the income from the more than 600,000 tourists every year that made
up to about 30 % of the gross domestic product of 2008. But the Maldivian popu-
lation did not accept these “visions” and were afraid of being forced to leave the
country. So after heavy riots and political turmoil and following the opposition’s
charge that the Nasheed administration was no longer able to govern the country in
the way Islam was demanding, Nasheed resigned in February 2012 and was later
arrested.
The Maldive example shows impressively what can happen when a reasonably
founded and seriously thought over and meaningful oriented strategy fails, most
probably due to not incorporating the population at risk in the decision-making
process. Instead they were just presented a government’s decision. Those who
were deeply affected by the political decision were not given the chance to express
their views and especially in that sector overwhelmingly dealing with their every-
day life. A broad and extensive discussion should have been institutionalized, giv-
ing everyone the feeling his or her fears, experiences, and “vision on livelihood”
were properly taken up by the authorities. Next to the individual, representatives
of all social groups (religious leaders, the political opposition, representatives
from industry and science, etc.) should have been gathered and given ample time
to express their views at a national roundtable. It is clear that such a discussion
would have taken much effort and much time, but the time problem was then,
and is still today, not threatening the island’s existence overnight. The govern-
ment should have given such a socially comprehensive discussion enough space
although respecting the fact that the rising sea level allows no way out other than
8 1 Introduction

a change in policy. Thus the fears of the population were neither focused on the
technical matters of the sea-level rise nor on the financial aspects, but found its
expression in the field of emotions and feelings; in the last consequence it was for-
mulated on behalf of Islamic beliefs and traditions.
But the “Maldive Vision” of resettling in other places has simultaneously an
international dimension. A question that immediately arose regarded the kind
of political status such persons would be attributed after resettling. Are they still
Maldivians, who are now living in India or will they be given Indian nationality
or will they be treated just as emigrants or ethnic minorities? The International
Law on Refugees as it is laid down in the Charter of the United Nations distin-
guishes only between “Refugees” and “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDP), who
are forced to leave their country or parts due to military, racial, or ethnic conflicts.
Sometimes such refugees were forced to leave their country for decades, such as
the many Afghanis settling in Pakistan in the 1980s, during which time the people
have no internationally accepted political representation. In such cases the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) takes over representing these
peoples. A similar representation exists for IPDs. The basic legal definition on what
forms a nation requires, according to international law, a nation’s territory and a
nation’s population. But when territory is flooded due to the rise in sea level and
no territory exists anymore, the basic definition of what constitutes a nation is no
longer valid. Although the United Nations Environmental Program (El-Hinnawi
1985) introduced the term “climate refugee” into the public debate, there is no
internationally accepted legal authorization for the UNHCR to take over care of the
climate refugees. The question for UNHCR is whether the refugees left their home
deliberately or whether they were forced to do so. In the case of the Maldives the
idea was to seek shelter in another country. The decision was supposed to be defini-
tively taken voluntarily and not a subject of “forced migration.” The United Nations
since then has put the notion on the agenda of the United Nation Security Council
several times, but the five permanent members nor the industrialized nations, as
well as many advanced countries were not inclined to take up the matter, although
it was stated that already in 1990 the amount of climate refugees was estimated to
be about 25 million more than those refugees of wars and conflicts (Myers 2001).
The IPCC stated in 1990 that next to climate-induced sea-level rise desertification,
soil erosion, and heat waves will also make climate refugees a substantial problem
of the future. In the Rio UNCED Agenda in Chap. 12 the notion of climate refu-
gees was already made (see also Stern 2007). In order to object to the reluctance
of the industrialized states the governments of the affected island states formed the
Alliance of the Small Island States (AOSIS) to raise their voices in order to fight
for a worldwide reduction of greenhouse gases. They argue that they release almost
no CO2 into the atmosphere but are the ones who suffer first.
On January 12th, 2010 at an early hour an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 struck the
Caribbean nation of Haiti. The quake’s epicenter hit just 15 km west of Port-au-Prince
and its two million inhabitants. According to the USGS the plate movement produced
the biggest earthquake since 1751. Haiti and its eastern neighbor the Dominican
Republic lie on the northern edge of the Caribbean tectonic plate, where the Caribbean
1 Introduction 9

plate moves along the North America plate by a left-lateral strike-slip motion and
compression at a speed of about 20 mm/year. There are two major faults defining
this plate boundary: the septentrional fault system, which runs through northern
Haiti, and in the south the Enriquillo–Plantain Garden fault system. And it is this
fault system which moves at a speed of 7 mm/year thus making it responsible for
nearly half of the overall movement between the Caribbean and North American
plates. Here along the Enriquillo–Plaintain Garden fault system the earthquake
seemed to have been triggered. According to assessments made by the Global
Seismic Monitor at the German Research Centre for Geosciences (GFZ) the focal
point of the earthquake was at a depth of 17 km. Thus far the Enriquillo–Plantain
Garden fault system had not produced any major earthquake but is nevertheless
supposed to be the source of the large earthquakes in 1860, 1770, and 1751. For
some years there has been a fault monitoring carried out by the University of
Texas and in 2008 it showed seismic models with slip rates of around 8 mm/year.
And due to the fact that the last known major earthquake near Haiti was in 1751,
Texas A&M warned that this could add up to yield of about 2 m of accumulated
strain deficit, leading to an earthquake of magnitude 7.2 if all were released in a
single event. The January 12th main shock did not produce observable surface dis-
placement but apparently caused a significant uplift of the Léogâne delta. Thirty-
three aftershocks have also been recorded, ranging from magnitude 5.9 to 4.2. As
the earthquake took place on land, there were serious concerns that it would gen-
erate a larger tsunami. Therefore a local tsunami warning was issued for Haitian
coasts within 100 km of the epicenter. The PTWC (Hawaii) recorded a 12-m high
wave at Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic and decided that there was no
threat to coastal areas away from the epicenter and resulted in a subsequent can-
cellation of the tsunami warning. Another reason for the devastating impact of the
quake is that Haiti does not have any real construction standards and that in many
of the quarters there were even more squatters than livable homes. According to an
estimate by the mayor of Port-au-Prince, about 60 % of buildings were shoddily
built and unsafe in normal circumstances.
But the earthquake had not only that extreme salience normal for earth-
quakes of this magnitude but also it struck a nation that is characterized by a
highly vulnerable society. Haiti has a population of nearly 10 million people of
whom 80 % live under the poverty line. Most Haitians live on less than US$2
a day making the country the poorest country in the western hemisphere. More
than two thirds of the labor force do not have formal jobs. Haiti’s deep and wide-
spread poverty results from a long history of state failure to establish an idea of
a functioning nation. As are other fragile states, Haiti is characterized by wide-
spread poverty and inequality, economic decline and unemployment, institutional
weakness, corruption, violence, and conflicts (Verner and Heinemann 2006). The
country’s “conflict–poverty trap” results from two main factors: a socioeconomic
factor characterized by a rapidly increasing population, by no jobs and no income
which forces the people to leave rural areas and to migrate into the bigger cit-
ies, no education, and no social security; and second by failure of the states that
have not been able to provide the least necessary public goods (water, electricity,
10 1 Introduction

transportation, etc.) but have also failed to establish law and order, security, and
powerful state institutions. Still today the state provision of infrastructure and
basic services is limited to the capital, Port-au-Prince, and some other urban
centers.
Haiti’s income distribution is among the world’s most inequitable with a Gini coefficient
of 0.66. Nearly half of Haiti’s households are trapped in absolute poverty and live on less
than a dollar a day. Social indicators such as literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality, and
child malnutrition show that poverty is extensive. About 40 % of people cannot read and
write; some 20 % of children suffer from malnutrition; nearly half the population has no
access to healthcare; and more than four-fifths have no clean drinking water (Verner and
Heinemann ibid)

Two years after the devastating earthquake half a million people of out of the for-
mer 1.5 million are still living in tents according to information from the . But many
of those who have been given shelter in the refugee camps have not found secure
living conditions. Many displaced persons have been victims of forced eviction from
the camps; some of them have now been displaced two or three times. The problem
is that many of the refugees have never been formally registered and have neither
passport nor identification cards and are thus not eligible for national and interna-
tional support. UNHCR has therefore focused its efforts not only in providing emer-
gency relief items but also in providing quake victims with civil documents. Many
of the IDP were handed birth certificates to give them a legal existence. The Haitian
Government is internationally under severe pressure to finally update their civil reg-
istry system and to make it accessible to people all over Haiti.
After a heavy rainfall in the summer of 2013 from thunderstorm Cleopatra
large-scale flooding occurred in many parts of Italy. Streets were flooded, bridges
collapsed, and trees overturned. Sixteen people died in Sardinia; in the southern
Italian city of Catanzaro the losses were calculated up to €10 million. In Venice it
was already the fifth flood in that year. The water level rose by about 45 cm. There
was a great uproar in the population claiming that the national weather service had
given the warning about the thunderstorm far too late. The government immedi-
ately allocated €20 million and reiterated that it has, “Done all what it can do.”
The head of the Civil Protection Authority stated, “that there was a warning 12 h
before the event broadcasted to all districts and communities.” He added that “[T]
he population shall ask their respective communities, why the authorities haven’t
reacted upon this warning,” and added “[E]arly warning is one thing, but early
action cannot be compelled by central government.”

References

Beaudoin, C.E. (2007): Media effects on public safety following a Natural Disaster: Testing
Lagged dependent variable models. - Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly Vol.84,
No. 4, p. 695-714, Sage Journals (online: http://intl-jmq.sagepub.com)
EERI (2008): Learning from Earthquakes - The Wenchuan, Sichuan Province, China, Earthquake
of May 12, 2008.- Special Earthquake Report, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute,
Oakland CA
References 11

EU-Microdis (2007): European Commission 6th Framework Programme, Global Change and
Ecosystems, GOCE-CT-2007-036877
El-Hinnawi , E. (1985): Environmental refugees. – UNEP, Nairobi
Huang, R., & Li, W. (2009): Analysis of the geo-hazards triggered by the 12 May 2008 Wenchuan
Earthquake, China. Bulletin of Engineering Geology and the Environment, Vol.68, p. 363-371,
Springer – online
Jacobeit, C. & Methmann, C. (2007): Klimaflüchtlinge – Die verleugnete Katastrophe. –
Greenpeace, Universität Hamburg
Myers, N. (2001): Environmental refugees - A global phenomenon of the 21st Century. – Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, Vol. 357, p.167-182, London
Pirsching, M. (2006): Good Bye New Orleans - Der Hurrikan Katrina und die amerikanische
Gesellschaft.- Leykam, Graz
Stern, N. (2007): The economy of climate change - The Stern Review.- Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge MD
Tang, C., Zhu, J., Qi, X. & Ding, J. (2011): Landslides induced by the Wenchuan earthquake
and the subsequent strong rainfall event: A case study in the Beichuan area of China.-
Engineering Geology, Elsevier B.V. (online: doi:10.1016/j.enggeo.2011.03.013)
Verner, D. & Heinemann, A. (2006): Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti - Breaking the
Conflict-Poverty Trap. – The World Bank, “en breve”, No. 94 (online: http://www.worldban
k.org/lac)
Watts, J. (2008). Sichuan quake: China’s earthquake reconstruction to cost $150bn, The Guardian,
August 15th 2008. (online: www.guardian.co.uk)
Xinhua News Agency (2008). “China Quake Death Toll Remains Unchanged at 69 226,” . – Xinhua
News Agency (online: www.chinaview)
Chapter 2
Natural Disaster and Society

2.1 Major Natural Disasters and Their Socioeconomic

Impact

2.1.1 Natural Disaster Triggered Nuclear Accident

On March 11th, 2011 at 2 o’clock in the afternoon local time an earthquake of

9.0 on the Richter scale occurred in the Japan trench almost 200 km away from
the coast. The earthquake that is known as Tohoku event triggered a tsunami that
piled up waves up to 30 m. Automatically the four nuclear power plants along
the east coast were shut down and the systems were switched over to emergency
power supply. But the earthquake generated a massive tsunami that ran ashore and
with its up to 14-m high waves destroyed most of the technical and emergency
infrastructure of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant. Due to this impact
the emergency cooling system failed and the heat inside the reactor blocks rose
continuously, triggering a series of hydrogen explosions destroying four of the
five power-generating blocks, although the reactor containments remained sta-
ble. Nevertheless it came to a core melting in the aftermath of the destruction.
The accident set free massive radioactive fallout and released extremely contam-
inated fluids into the Pacific Ocean. Only the prevailing northward and seaward
winds prevented a nationwide catastrophe. The reactor blocks were destroyed
although nuclear engineers worldwide claim that it is possible to construct nuclear
power plants that resist every earthquake magnitude. The engineers further claim
that the Fukushima disaster was not originated by the earthquake but by the tsu-
nami. Macfarlane (2012), newly appointed head of the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, stated the difference in understanding between geoscientists and
engineers is that thus far it is not an established fact that “Nuclear engineers can
and do integrate knowledge of Earth processes adequately.” Undoubtedly one of
the reasons for the tsunami to hit the area that strongly, was the fact that for con-
structing the plant, the steep cliff at Daiichi was dug out to place the reactor blocks
just at sea level; thus requiring less energy for the cooling system. The natural
topography about a 100 m behind the power plant area shows an increase to an

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 13

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_2
14 2 Natural Disaster and Society

average level of about 30 m whereas the tsunami waves were about 14 m high.
A TEPCO manager was cited to have confessed that choosing this particular spot
for the power plant was “not a good decision.”
The authorities promptly evacuated an area of 20 km around the power plant, a
radius that was later extended to more than 30 km. More than 90 % of the 400,000
people originally living in the area were successfully evacuated within a couple of
days and sheltered in provisional camps. The radioactive fallout of locally more
than 3000 Bq/m2, Cesium 134, and Cesium 137 was measured in the topsoil cov-
ering a small corridor of 30 km length from the plant site towards the northwest in
the direction of the city of Fukushima. In all, 16,000 people lost their lives; 90 %
of them drowned in the cold water of the Japan Sea. Still 4500 are missing. It is
anticipated that the area will be off-limits for at least the next 20–30 years to let
the radiation level decay naturally (it takes 10 years to reduce the radiation by
100 mSv).
Following this, the Japanese government resigned and the new government
declared a moratorium in nuclear energy production (that was already watered
down in late 2012), a drastic turnaround, as all governments before Fukushima
were inclined to double energy production from nuclear energy. Together with the
Japanese government the Italian Government declared that it would refrain from
starting nuclear energy production, and the United States, Russia, France, India,
China, and Brasil reiterated they would not deviate from their original nuclear-
based energy path. By law Japan limited the runtime of its 54 nuclear power plants
to maximum 40 years and shut down almost all the plants in the months to come.
Many critics in the country, mostly from the production sector, raised massive
fears of an energy deficiency to come with enormous consequences for economic
growth. In fact that did not materialize as it was possible to balance the energy
demand by bringing additional coal- and gas-fired plants on the network and by
importing much energy from abroad. In 2012 Japan imported 25 % more energy
than before. But the direct socioeconomic consequences were even much more
dramatic. One of the many outcomes of the accident in the Fukushima district was
due to energy failure and, due to the fact that the area had to be evacuated com-
pletely, was no longer able to produce. The result was that, for instance, the car
manufacturer Toyota was forced to reduce production by 30 %, which in contrast,
for a couple of months made the German car maker Volkswagen the biggest car
manufacturer in the world.
Furthermore within 48 h in Germany the government declared a radical turna-
round in its energy policy, banning nuclear power generation in the country and
shutting down 9 of its 27 nuclear power plants immediately. Although it had,
months before, decided to extend the runtimes for more than 15 years, toppling
a decision of the former German government that decided—in accordance with
national and international energy producers—gradually to step out of nuclear
energy. The European Commission estimates that power generation costs in
Europe will double in the next years. The German government is now prioritizing
the use of renewable energy especially wind and solar. But such a supply scenario
requires massive investments to improve the power grid capability to transport
2.1 Major Natural Disasters and Their Socioeconomic Impact 15

the power from the North Sea to the consumer in the south. According to a press
release by the German Ministry of Environment (BMU) of February 2013 the
costs for a higher share of renewable energy in national energy production might
amount up to €1 billion.

2.1.2 World Food Price Increase Due to Drought

In 2012 the United States of America was stricken by the largest drought in
25 years. There was no rain for weeks, resulting in a drying up of the maize,
wheat, corn, and soybean crops and in the death of thousands of cattle due to a
dramatic shortage of fodder. In 32 of the Midwestern states, especially the region
called the corn belt (consisting of up to two thirds of the territory of the United
States) a state of emergency had been declared. According to information from the
US Weather Agency NOAA, the 2012 summer experienced temperatures on aver-
age of 25 °C, thus lying 1.2 °C higher than the average of the whole twentieth
century, with the month of July showing the highest ever recorded monthly tem-
perature in the history of the United States. The temperatures even overstepped
the thus far peak temperatures of the year 1936, when that drought was called
the “Dust Bowl Year.” The prices for fodder immediately peaked to US$330 per
ton and thus doubled the 2011 price level. But the 2012 drought was not the only
one in recent US history. In 2000 and 2004 there had been severe droughts in the
Midwest, with serious impacts on food and agricultural production. The heat wave
that had stricken the country was seen as a reaction of ongoing climate change
and was, according to the US National Climatic Data Center, overlain by the La
Niña phenomenon that radically changed the wind and precipitation regime over
the United States. The 2012 drought resulted in a drop in agricultural production
in the United States of about 20 % for maize, and led to an increase in prices for
all agricultural commodities; for instance, the price for maize increased by 45 %.
Automatically the US drought food production situation had a deep impact on
world food prices. The Global Price Index for food that is yearly assessed by the
FAO, showing the high price levels that were reached since 2010 remained at a
very high level. And the experts of FAO, WFP, and IFAD see food price volatility
and high food prices to continue as a result of the anticipated climate projections
that will lead to more extreme weather events in the future. The result will be a
drop in crop yield and food supply, especially in the developing countries. Stern
(2007, p. 65ff.) reported that a 3 °C increase in world temperature will bring up
to 500 million people more to the brink of malnutrition. The FAO (2013) further-
more reiterated that only economic growth will lead to better nutritional status.
Today’s tense food security scenario is also an outcome of a number of other fac-
tors. First: as a reaction of the energy price increase in the last years many indus-
trialized nations (especially Brazil but also Germany) converted large parts of
their arable land to produce energy plants for biofuel. Second: the food base of
some Asian countries that thus far was dominated by a rice and cereal food basis
16 2 Natural Disaster and Society

is steadily changing towards a high energy diet (meat). But an animal-source food
base requires the provision of one unit food calorie, eight units of cereals (maize,
corn, soybeans, etc.) and thousands of liters of water. Third: the expected increase
in world population and even more the changing living standards especially in
countries such as China, India, and Brazil will lead to an increase in food demand
of 50–80 % (IPCC ibid), a demand that can only be settled if the size of irrigated
land is increased by 30 % to 60 million hectares and for rainfed land by 20 %
(20 million hectares), provided that the precipitation distribution does not change.
The WBGU (2007) instead estimates a drop in crop yield of up to 50 % in areas
where the precipitation distribution will alter because of climate change. The vola-
tility of the world food market furthermore brought many international investors to
the floor who discovered this macroeconomic sector and began speculating on the
rise or fall of food prices. Even Germany’s largest bank lately reiterated that it will
continue to provide agricultural-investment products after the German Bank con-
cluded that speculation is not the only reason for higher prices for farm commodi-
ties (Bloomberg News Agency of 13. Jan. 2913). Fourth: hydrometeorological
effects such as saltwater intrusion in coastal waters, mass movements, desertifica-
tion, soil erosion, hurricanes, and floods will further lead to a deterioration of food
production worldwide. The decrease of income from only desertification and salt-
ing of soil is according to the World Resources Institute (WRI 2007) estimated to
top about US$50 billion.
If food prices increase further this will definitively have serious repercussions
for the countries of the world. Those countries with a strong economy will most
probably be able to buffer the price increase by higher consumer prices and by
diversifying the food base. But even now in upcoming economies the price burden
might result in a deformation of the rental economy. Fragile states that are today at
the brink of poverty will be thrown back to the 1990s (FAO ibid.).

2.1.3 Sea-Level Rise and the Survival of Small Island States

The ongoing global temperature increase already resulted in a sea-level rise,

although this increase is admittedly still small when seen from a worldwide per-
spective. But there are regions on Earth that are becoming more and more vulner-
able even by this increase. The so-called small island states especially those in the
Pacific Ocean or other areas in the big river deltas where most of them lie just
2–3 m above sea level. The islands of Tuvalu, Samoa, Kiribati, Carteret Island,
the Maldives, and many others came into public focus when it became obvious
that many of them would disappear from global maps if climate change contin-
ued unaltered. There are already today two examples of islands that have vanished
and where the people have had to seek refuge at other places: the Carteret Islands
of Papua New Guinea, the small island of South Talpati in the Ganges Delta, and
some tiny islands on Tuvalu. But it is not the global temperature increase and with
it the melting of the arctic inland ice shield that is the dominant factor of the rising
2.1 Major Natural Disasters and Their Socioeconomic Impact 17

level. It is instead more an effect of a thermosteric increase in water volume due

to a temperature-induced decrease in density. And it is believed (IPCC 2007) that
this increase will continue for the decades to come. According to IPCC (ibid) the
global sea level has risen in the Pacific Islands from 2003–2008 by about 2.5 mm,
in comparison to an increase of 0.5 mm in the time span 1961–2003. The total
sea-level increase of the last 100 years is estimated at 20 cm and will result in a
sea level of about 90 cm in the next 100 years. Together with the rising sea level,
significant adverse effects (tropical storm surges, floods, salinization of fresh water
ponds) will strike that part of the Pacific region in the future. Already today the
number of victims due to weather-related disasters reached 20 % of the total popu-
lation (1.2 million in 1990).
Life hasn’t changed over the last thousand years on these islands; the peo-
ple still have a subsistence-based living. The economic basis is the sea: fish and
raw materials come from there. Small but nevertheless significant developments
in medical services and in the economy resulted in relatively high urban growth
rates; for instance, that of the Republic of Kiribati led to a current population of
100,000 people, an increase from several thousand after the Second World War.
The capital of Kiribati today amounts to more than 60,000 people with a popula-
tion density of 160 people/km2, making this place one of the most densely set-
tled places in the whole Pacific region. The lifestyle of the people on the small
island states did not change much over the last 2000 years, but the high population
growth rates brought along serious environmental degradation. Pollution of the
water resulted in lower fish catches and poorer water quality.
It is feared that further global warming will lead to two main changes: one is
the average temperature increase will lead to a continuously rising sea level. And
second, the change in climate conditions will result in more extreme weather
events including tropical cyclones, heavy storms, and flooding. Hotter days and
less rainfall will dry up the freshwater reservoirs on the islands. The warming of
the sea water will furthermore lead to acidization of the water with serious con-
sequences for the coral reefs, to coastal erosion, and salinization of the freshwater
resources. According to IPCC (2001),
[T]he high exposure to natural hazards (tropical cyclones, storm surge, droughts, tsuna-
mis, and volcanic eruptions), the limited physical sizes of the islands, their relative iso-
lation and simultaneously great distance to major markets, limited natural resources and
over exploitation by human activities leading to degradation of natural systems, their thin
water lenses and decreasing fresh water reservoirs, a strong import dependence and high
sensitivity to external markets, the generally rapid population growth and urbanization
together with specific industrial activity and the generally poorly developed infrastructure
by on the other hand an extensive tourism dependency.

This makes all the small island states in the Pacific Ocean economically,
socially, and physically highly vulnerable.
The problem of the rising sea level is that it is definitively generated by the
industrialized countries (the largest CO2 producers in the world are the United
States, China, and India) but those countries face only a minor risk from the sea-
level rise, whereas the population of the small island states are threatened with
18 2 Natural Disaster and Society

the loss of their countries forever and are responsible for only 0.03 % of the
world’s CO2 emissions (IPCC ibid), a fact that is internationally already accepted
but that didn’t really change the attitude of the international community. The risk
of vanishing from international maps has been on the international agenda for
many years. There has been a series of international conferences and resolutions,
but none of them really brought results. Meanwhile the small island states of the
Pacific joined in an organization called Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
and founded a regional Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) to better
address their matters in international discussions. Their main pleas are that the
industrialized nationals should finally start complying with the Kyoto CO2 emis-
sion targets and that the international society should define the legal status of what
is called a “climate refugee.” The president of Maldives Nasheed stated that “the
rising sea level is the fate of the country and over the long term the archipelago
would no longer exist as nation” and therefore he announced to start talks with Sri
Lanka and India to negotiate to “one day” resettle his people in one of the states.
But he also sees chances to resettle in Australia and New Zealand. The favorite
countries, however, will be India and Sri Lanka as both share their religious and
ethnic origins as well as the social and economic system. But the latter two coun-
tries already face big social and economic problems, poverty, overpopulation, and
an agriculture-dominated economy. Following his announcement there was a big
uproar in the country and his government was toppled soon after. Nevertheless he
initiated a huge discussion within the United Nations focusing on two different
aspects: why should the small islands states—that were contributing almost noth-
ing of the worldwide CO2 emissions—have to be the first victims of the sea-level
rise, and what kind of an internationally guaranteed legal status such emigrants
might be given.
The many different definitions the people were already given in the public
debate shows how complex it will be to solve this problem of climate refuges,
forced migrants, economic refugees, or climate refugees. Those who are affected
by the rising sea level argue that they are forced by nature, whereas those identi-
fied as probable destinations have already begun to discuss the multidimensional
effects of climate change, but only as it affects their own interests. It is mainly the
OECD countries that still refuse to take up the notion on the international agenda
of the United Nations. But resettling will most likely not be solved in a way the
asylum seekers have in mind. It is highly unlikely that one recipient nation will
grant asylum to an entire country. Instead they will most probably be divided up
with all the negative consequences; it is strongly feared by asylum seekers that it
will lead to the more or less disappearance of their social and cultural identity. To
create precedents one country in the region already has clarified its political stand-
point: Australia. The country fears to be overrun by refugees from all over Asia.
Consequently the government declared all refugees entering the country without
an official permit will be detained in special camps and returned to their coun-
tries. Recently, an article published in the Australian magazine, Security Solutions,
argued that forced migration due to climate change is a security threat for the
receiving nations (Soderblom 2008). The article used Tuvalu as a case study to
2.1 Major Natural Disasters and Their Socioeconomic Impact 19

suggest a link between forced migration and terrorism. The article claims that if
migrants such as Tuvalu’s 10,000 people migrate to Australia, then millions of
poor and unskilled regional neighbors will come begging for a new life. The New
Zealand government on the other hand will allow 75 Tuvaluans per year to set-
tle in the country in order to support the national labor scheme. Tuvalu is one of
five Pacific island states the country selected to be likely candidates for the per-
manent resettlement of the entire population. Therefore it has been discussed to
increase the amount of people to be allowed to enter to up to 500 Tuvaluans per
year. It is also expected that some residents may be relocated to the island state of
Niue, which is in free association with New Zealand, and was largely abandoned
after Cyclone Heta struck its shores in 2004. Such an immigration scheme will not
really solve the problem, as Tuvalu will not be emptied for over 100 years.
In 2013 Ioane Teitiota, a Kiribati citizen sought political asylum in New
Zealand claiming to be a climate refugee. The island of Kiribati, 4000 km north of
New Zealand, is threatened by the sea-level rise. He justified his application on the
Human Rights Charter of the United Nations Refugee Convention, although the
status of a climate refugee is not incorporated in the convention. The New Zealand
authorities have rejected his appeal at the court of first instance, but Ioane Teitiota
has appealed to the High Court. If his petition is accepted, it would be the first
time that the status of “climate refugee” has been jurisdicially acknowledged, a
judgment that would give hundreds of thousands of climate refugees in the Pacific
Ocean and Indian Ocean small island states a rationale for asylum seeking.

2.1.4 Respiratory Hazards from Ash Clouds

The vast amount of ashes emitted during the Mt. St. Helens volcanic eruption in
1980 triggered an intense debate on how the ashes are posing a respiratory risk
to the population. The ashes were then covering large parts of the densely popu-
lated midwestern United States. Similar discussions came up during the Soufriere
Hills eruption (Montserrat) in 1995 as well as after the Merapi eruption in 2006 in
Indonesia. Since Mt. St. Helens quite a number of investigations have been car-
ried out on this issue (Horwell and Baxter 2006). Although the volcanic event is
normally short in time, the ashes may remain in the air for several years like the
ashes of Krakatoa that traveled the globe for roughly a decade (Winchester 2003).
After the Mt. St. Helens eruption regional hospitals had an up to fivefold increase
in visits from normal.
Volcanic ashes are made up of hard, sharp-edged silica grains less than 2 mm
diameter. As they are emitted by the hot volcanic air high up into the stratosphere
the grains are able to disseminate over large parts of the globe, thus also affecting
regions that were not subject to the eruption. The epidemiological science mostly
deals with ash particles that are even smaller and occur in the range of 10 microns
and less. Although those of about 10 microns preferably affect human airways
(thorax, bronchi), ash particles of less than 4 microns pose a hazard to the lungs
20 2 Natural Disaster and Society

themselves and may cause silicosis and lung cancer. Freshly erupted ash parti-
cles are furthermore often covered with a not yet weathered and not yet oxidized
cover of acids, hydrocarbons, and trace metals, but also often have adsorbed sulfur
and other noxious elements from the gases. These elements are then breathed in
together with the sharp-edged particles leading to asthma-type diseases. Although
there is little toxicological and epidemiological evidence that a short duration of
one or two days of exposure to ash particles of 10 microns may cause a hazard, it
is nevertheless obvious that pre-existing respiratory diseases will be amplified by
exposure to these particles. Particles of sizes smaller than 4 microns are believed
to definitively cause chronic diseases, especially in children.

2.1.5 Failure of State (Hurricane Katrina, United States)

On August 2005 Hurricane Katrina formed from a “normal” tropical storm

(Category 1; Saffir–Simpson Scale) to one of the biggest hurricanes to ever hit
United States coasts. Katrina was the twelfth tropical storm of that season having
its source in the central Atlantic Ocean. The storm first crossed Florida and then
entered the Gulf of Mexico. There it rapidly developed to a category 5 hurricane
that headed for the Mississippi Delta. Windspeeds of 280–350 km/h were recorded
and accompanied with torrential rains over the coastal region. The hurricane made
landfall on August 28th, just south of the city of New Orleans, and led to the
flooding of the city. New Orleans is located below sea level and at the time was
almost entirely surrounded by flood-protecting levees giving the city a so-called
bowl or bathtub morphology. This made New Orleans and the areas surrounding
the city highly vulnerable to floods from the Mississippi River and to storm surges
from the Gulf of Mexico. One dam protected the town towards the north against
Lake Pontchartrain and the other from the Gulf of Mexico. Several times in the
past New Orleans was hit by hurricanes; the last time was in 1965 by Hurricane
Betsy. That day 13,000 people had to be evacuated; 40 lost their lives. In the years
before Katrina there were quite a number of hazard scenarios all indicating the
high level of vulnerability. The last one was in the year 2004 and pinpointed that
about 1 million inhabitants were at risk of losing their homes, 400,000 from dis-
eases and illness, and 60,000 were thought to lose their lives. There were already
computer-aided scenarios at hand that defined how to handle a potential disaster.
The hurricane devastated the shoreline about 300 km along the Gulf Coast. The
water reached the deeper parts of the city two hours before (!) the hurricane itself
made landfall. The enormous windspeed and the torrential rain damaged the dam
north of the lake and one along the Central Industrial Canal passing through the
center of the town. The water rose quickly and immediately destroyed the levees
on both sides of the canal. The water flooded the central city parts of “Orleans
Bowl,” “Orleans East Bowl,” and “St. Bernhard,” where the later famous Ninth
Ward was located. But the levees in the north protecting the city against Lake
Ponchartrain also failed very soon. So the water entered the city mainly from the
2.1 Major Natural Disasters and Their Socioeconomic Impact 21

north. At the end an area of about 250 km2 was flooded, mostly by 4 m water. At
many places the water levels even reached heights of more than 7 m. After the
flood was over, it took about 40 days for the city to dry up again. Eighty percent of
the city area was flooded, 1800 people lost their lives, and the economic damages
were estimated to have reached US$125 billion, making this catastrophe the big-
gest economic disaster prior to Fukushima.
Right upon the first alerts that Katrina would make landfall at the mouth of the
Mississippi Delta and would strike New Orleans, the first evacuation orders were
given by the city‘s mayor, at first only for the coastal regions but shortly after also
for the entire city. By the time Katrina hit, almost 1 million inhabitants had left in
city in about 430,000 vehicles resulting in huge traffic congestion on the major
and suburban roads. It was estimated that only about 10 % (about 80–90,000) of
the inhabitants were still in the city. They were directed to several official shelters,
among them the famous Sports Arena (Super Dome). There about 15,000 people
were sheltered, with very poor service facilities (toilets, etc.) that led to massive
protests and a multitude of hardships for the evacuees. A total of 1464 deceased
victims were officially reported by the Louisiana state authorities, and 350 victims
lost their lives outside New Orleans (Jonkmann et al. 2009). The victims were not
equally distributed among the social classes of the local population. Although the
white part of the population had jobs, cars, and mobile phones at their disposal
and thus were able to follow the evacuation advice by local government, most of
the victims were black, poor, and unemployed. To them the warning did not come
in time. But even if informed in time, they wouldn’t have had the chance to act
accordingly. Furthermore as there is no registration of people living in US cities,
the New Orleans city government did not know that about 50,000 more people
lived in the city than expected. Altogether, this social group had to bear the big-
gest burden. And after having declared a national state of emergency the National
Guard cleared the flooded parts of the city. Large riots and tremendous turmoil
followed, showing a thus far unbelievable social disparity within American soci-
ety, that, as discussed before, is pointed out by many people as an example of the
failure of the state, the first one in an industrialized nation for decades (Pirsching
2006). As data were not available for all victims for post-disaster analysis, the
published figures on the victims concerned (only) totalled 829. Of these only 1 %
were under 1 year, but 60 % were older than 60. The age ratio of New Orleans
before Katrina was about 12 % older than 60. The explanation for this given by the
emergency managers was that this age group would have especially required help
on evacuation that they did not get. Also it is stated that many of the elders strictly
rejected the evacuation orders. The male–female ratio did not reveal any gender
preference on the casualties. On the race indicator it turned out that about 50 %
were black African Americans, 40 % white Caucasian, and the rest were mostly
Hispanics or of Asian origin. As the ratio of African Americans in New Orleans
before Hurricane Katrina was even higher, this fact is taken by Louisiana state
officials that the often-raised accusation that the flood mostly killed “poor blacks”
is not the fact. A statistical analysis revealed that the average percentage of victims
22 2 Natural Disaster and Society

from Katrina coincides with data from other flood events worldwide (Jonkmann
ibid.).
Today, more than eight years later New Orleans is not the city it was in 2005.
Immediately after Katrina the city invested US$8 billion to increase the dam
heights and to set up a citywide pumping system capable of pumping the water
from a (normal) hurricane out of the city bowl. These improvements turned out to
be very successful as the next Hurricane Isaac that hit New Orleans in September
2012 (the same day the Republican Party wanted to nominate Mitt Romney
for president) “only” resulted in smaller damages, although it has to be stated
that Hurricane Isaac was not as strong as Katrina (Saffir Simpson Scale 1–2).
Furthermore most of the houses have been reconstructed. Some areas that were at
high risk were completely evacuated and the people were resettled in lower-risk
areas. The proprietors were compensated for their losses not on the reconstruction
cost basis, but for the worth of their property before the hurricane, with the conse-
quence that those who suffered most were compensated least. In fact the popula-
tion of New Orleans became in the years after “more white”; even the proportion
of Hispanics was reduced by about 10 %. Today large areas of the lowlands near
Lake Pontchartrain that were formerly settled by many “underprivileged” are no
longer living quarters and the houses are becoming ruins. Many of those Katrina
evacuated did not came back in the following years as most of them did not have
any property to live on, and the number of inhabitants was reduced to about
200,000 in the years after Katrina; meanwhile about 350,000 are living in New
Orleans again (Pirsching ibid.).

2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk

2.2.1 Population Dynamics and Risk

Since 2011 the world’s population has exceeded 7 billion people, who are esti-
mated to comprise 6 % of the total population that has ever lived on our planet
(110 billion) since about the Stone Age according to information of the US
Population Reference Bureau (2011). China is the country that today hosts
the largest population (1.38 billion) followed by India (1.25 billion) and the
United States of America with 320 million. The population dynamic of the next
40–50 years will continue, but the increases will definitively slow down. The pop-
ulation dynamic will see India in 2050 with an additional 1.4 billion people as
the most populated country on Earth, and China will experience no net increase.
Another phenomenon in this regard that concerns population development experts
is the rapid increase of elderly persons worldwide, reaching ages that are (nor-
mally) not attributed to an “effective” production capacity. Today there are already
about 900 million people over the age of 60 worldwide and it is expected that by
the middle of this century that number will rise to 2.4 billion, most of them in
the high-income countries, whereas at the same time in some developing countries
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 23

the number of people under the age of 25 will increase from 40 to 60 %. But the
mere increase in population is no longer seen as the Earth’s most striking issue.
What population dynamics experts worry is that these people will then make use
of much more of the natural resources than today, an effect that can already be
seen in some Asian countries where the people changed from a cereal-based food
to a more meat-based food. And for each volume of meat about eight volumes of
grains must be invested (ecological footprint).
A third factor of concern in population development is the fact that the general
increase in population is superimposed by an extreme trend for migration into the
larger megaconurbations, like Calcutta, Tokyo, or Lagos. Although only five such
megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants existed in 1975, the number will
increase to 26 in the year 2015, most of them in Asia and Latin America. The pop-
ulation increase of the megacities will be about 60 million yearly. Today one in two
people lives in a city and in only about 35 years, two out of three will. Although
80 % of US Americans today live in cities, it is anticipated that such a popula-
tion development will also hold true for the densely populated nations in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America. So that in the year 2050 more than 50 % (4 billion) of
the entire world will be living in megacities. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America we
will experience a doubling of the city population in 30 years to about 2.6 billion.
Figure 2.1 shows that the majority of the megacities of the world will be mainly
located in Asia.
Another striking feature for the population at risk from natural disasters is the
changing climate. Scientific evidence presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC 2001, 2007; UNFCCC 2009) already overwhelmingly indi-
cated that “climate change is, without doubt, occurring and the Earth is warming”
(IPCC 2007). Furthermore the IPCC concluded that most probably global warming

Fig. 2.1  World map of megacities “2015” (Own graph)

24 2 Natural Disaster and Society

is caused by emissions of greenhouse gases from human activity mainly from

combustion of carbon and by the clearing of natural vegetation. The Earth’s sys-
tem consists of five major interacting components: the atmosphere, the hydro-
sphere, the cryosphere, the land surface, and the biosphere. The climate is largely
controlled by the flow of heat from the sun, 50 % in the form of the shortwave
part of the electromagnetic spectrum and the other half by the near-infrared
light spectrum. Radiation is about 30 % reflected by clouds, the atmosphere, or
the surface, and 60 % of the radiation enters the Earth’s system and is thereaf-
ter stored in oceans, land, the atmosphere, or the ice shield, warming the Earth’s
surface.
In order to balance the Earth’s energy system it would be necessary for the
amount of heat entering the system to be in equilibrium with the radiation. The
atmosphere contains several trace gases including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), together called “greenhouse gases” (GHG) or
“Kyoto-gases,” and also contains a considerable volume of water vapor that alto-
gether can absorb a good portion of the infrared radiation. Thus the greenhouse
gases hinder the heat leaving the Earth’s atmosphere, resulting in the retention of
more heat near the Earth’s surface, a phenomenon that was already assumed from
the famous “Keeling curve” that monitored the CO2 concentration in the atmos-
phere at the Mauna Loa volcano in Hawaii. The curve could prove that the CO2
concentration in the atmosphere increased from 310 ppm in year 1960 to more
than 380 ppm in 2010. Schellnhuber et al. (2006) reported that the earliest record
on CO2 was from 1750 indicating a CO2 level of 280 ppm and points out that
today the CO2 equivalent is already at 430 ppm. Similar increases were reported
also from nitrous oxide and methane concentrations over the last 30 years (Stern
2007). The “greenhouse effect” led to a significant increase in surface and air tem-
perature in recent decades. The increase resulted in a rise in the global sea level
since 1970 to the present of about up to 3–6 cm, largely due to the loss of ice from
Greenland and Antarctica. And if the rise is not stopped by the year 2100 the sea
level will increase according to new estimations by a meter or more. It is moreo-
ver projected that the global average surface temperature will hardly drop in the
first thousand years even if it were possible to cut greenhouse gas emissions to
zero. The role of clouds is not fully understood although they definitively play an
important part in the Earth’s energy balance. Clouds either absorb infrared radia-
tion from the Earth’s surface or thus contribute to the warming. On the other hand,
most clouds are reflectors of solar radiation that tend to cool the climate system.
The net average effect of the Earth’s cloud cover at present is a slight cooling.
However, this effect is highly variable, depending on the height, type, and optical
properties of clouds (IPCC 2001).
If the actual trend in temperature rise continues this would lead an increase in
Earth’s surface temperature of 2–4 °C. This would result in:
• A rise of the sea level of three to 4 m and will double the number of people
(400 million) exposed to coastal flooding and near coastal salt water intrusion.
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 25

Thus small islands (e.g., Maldives or Tuvalu) are already about to settle in other
countries handing over their national sovereignty into host countries’ hands.
• An increase in the number of “extreme” events of disasters with more heat
waves and less cold weather is expected.
• A change in water resource availability. Up to 30 % decrease in runoff in lower
latitudes is expected, leading to more droughts and more flood events in high
latitudes. This would result in an even more disproportional distribution of
water resources on the Earth than today. More social and economic conflicts are
assumed to develop when an additional one to four billion people suffer from
water shortages.
• A deficiency of irrigation water in lower latitudes will lead to a dramatic
decline in agricultural yield. Up to 3 million people, most of them in Africa, are
assumed to be exposed more to malnutrition than today.
• Melting of inland glaciers will have an extremely severe impact on the
Himalayas and the Andes. When the waters are not contained in snow and ice
and therefore drained off even during rainy seasons this would lead to flooding
and also to droughts in winter.
• An increase in vector-borne deceases (diarrhea, malaria, dengue, and others)
and a shift of such epidemics towards higher latitudes. The slum quarters of
developing countries especially will be extremely exposed to such diseases
due to lack of sanitation and clean water access. A strong increase in heat wave
fatalities is expected for the Indian Plain and Africa.
• An additional 40 % extinction of species will occur with a 2 °C increase. The
drying up of the Amazon region will reduce the tropical rainforest there, and
that again will have a strong influence on the world climate.
All the factors resulting from climate change will exaggerate the discrepancy
already existing between the high- and low-income countries. In this regard it
should be noted that the main emitters of CO2 are the high-income countries, but
the poorer nations will be “hit earliest and most severely” (Stern 2007, p. 99).

2.2.2 Benefit and Risk—A Cause–Effect Relationship

Modern risk management started in the 1980s when American sociologists began
asking how risky life was in the context of an increasing use of nuclear energy
for power generation in the United States. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident
of 1979, where a core melting was narrowly avoided, triggered a huge debate in
those days.
The discussions of how risky life is for all of us can be a summarized as
(Kaplan and Garrick 1981): “[R]isks are ubiquitous and there is no life without
a risk. The only choice we have is that we can choose between different kinds of
risk. Risk is never zero; risk can (in the best case) only be small.”
26 2 Natural Disaster and Society

Risk can occur in every sphere of human life as business risk, social risk,
political risk, safety risk, investment risk, military risk, and so on. Moreover they
pointed out that “risk is (entirely) depending on the standpoint of the affected or
an observer and is thus a ‘subjective thing’” and pose the question: “Why [do]
people expose themselves or are exposed in-voluntarily[sic] to a risk?”
The basics of risk are “that risk is has a component of uncertainty and of a kind
of loss and damage that might be received.” Societies normally do not enter into
a risk where they do not see a benefit. Mountain climbers seek the recognition of
the public or personal satisfaction by taking the risk to climb dangerous moun-
tains. Tightrope walkers even earn their living with walking on a high wire. But
also quite normal activities are in general based on a benefit orientation. A risk–
benefit assessment carried out in the United States at the end of the 1990s on the
acceptance of the public to site a hazardous waste disposal landfill site revealed
that the public was more inclined to accept the risk when compensated (benefited)
for the risk with free garbage collection for the community, although acceptance
for the installation of a waste incinerator was higher when compensation for medi-
cal costs, financial reimbursements, and property value guarantees were offered by
the implementing agency. In general risks are not taken without a rational justifi-
cation. Generating nuclear energy might serve as an example given by Weinberg
(1981). A nuclear power plant is erected because the energy consumer is asking
for a cheap and constantly available energy supply. The energy company reacts to
this by constructing nuclear power plants. The advantages and risks for the com-
pany and for the energy consumer are summarized in Fig. 2.2.
Although the benefit–risk relationship can be calculated by a mathematical
algorithm, the result will not lead to general acceptance by society. A decision on

Fig. 2.2  Benefit—risk relationship of power generation from nuclear energy (Based on

Weinberg 1981)
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 27

what risk we take for what benefit is basically a matter of a societal and common
understanding, on how much risk a society is willing to accept in order to gain a
profit, for example, of the supply of cheap energy by nuclear power plants. The
decision is not a question of “right or wrong,” but rather an outcome of all stake-
holders involved in the decision-making process. The moment we deny the use
of nuclear energy to generate power, we have to accept that the use of coal-fired
power plants is for many countries unavoidable as long as the technology does
not provide a cheap and sustainable way to store energy produced from renew-
able sources. Therefore the benefit–risk relationship is in practice not that simple
to understand. There are risks with a quite easily identifiable cause–effect rela-
tionship. Natural disasters in general follow such simple linear relationships (see
Sect. 5.3). But many risks have a very complex cause–effect relationship, origi-
nating in a multitude of potential causal agents resulting in multiple causes and
effects that often have no or low identifiable interdependencies. The Fukushima
earthquake cum tsunami nuclear accident caused Japanese car production to dete-
riorate and simultaneously led to high sales quantities for a German car manu-
facturer and an increase in the employment rate. Such complex relationships are
called by the stochastic mathematics “black swan logic.”
Shortly after the debate evolved in the United States a likewise discussion
started on the same aspects in Western Europe as a reaction to the Chernobyl
nuclear catastrophe when Europe, for the first time since the Second World War,
was exposed to never-before experienced threat. In 1986 the German sociologist
Beck (1986) published a book on how the individual and societies are nowadays
under the paradigm of strong technically oriented economies exposed to risk and
created the term “risk society.” Beck pointed out that in our advancing modern
economies societies steadily produce wealth and income but simultaneously that
increase is systematically combined with an increase in risk exposure. He further
pointed out that this increase results in an unequal distribution of risk among the
different societal groups, leading to what he describes as a “paradigm of a risk
society.” From his point of view the term “risk” is mostly used as “a risk someone
take[s] up voluntarily, demonstrating courage and automatically describing this
person to be someone that is taking the challenge.” The term is thus derived from
the technological paradigm. In this regard it is a quite new phenomenon that man-
made risks are different from natural ones in their outcome. Earthquakes can be
identified more or less as occurring along fault zones. Volcanic lava, lahars, and
ashfall can be located quite precisely, just the same as floods that will definitively
occur in the river basins and as landslides that will occur at the foot of steep hills.
In contrast, many of the man-made catastrophes can often not be seen, can’t be
smelled, or felt. Nuclear fallout will cover large parts of continents and chemi-
cal incidents may transport toxic substances into the oceans. Moreover the pop-
ulations at risk will be totally differently exposed to such impacts, leading to a
distinct disparity of risk in the society (Beck ibid), which means that in a soci-
ety different social groups were “so to speak unavoidably assigned to civil risks.”
At the end of the twentieth century, when social ranking was much more domi-
nated by social status, the saying, “Convictions are a result of the social status,”
28 2 Natural Disaster and Society

described the situation quite well. In today’s risk society however, Beck argues,
“[T]he convictions (understanding) are defining actions.” With this rationale, he
pointed out that in the course of technological progress, modern societies arrived
at a comprehensive understanding about the cause–effect relationship between the
natural or man-made origin of a catastrophe and its social, economic, or ecological
impacts. Only by understanding these dependencies will modern societies be able
to define, work out, and implement effective countermeasures to increase their dis-
aster resilience. Beck emphasized that “[K]nowledge, understanding and science
is thus getting a political dimension that has to be developed further in natural and
political sciences as well as in sociology.”
This book wants to go even a step further by broadening the “risk context.” In
industrialized countries but especially in developing countries, disaster risk man-
agement strategies are often set up and brought into being without the participa-
tion of those who are affected by catastrophes. It has now become evident that
without including the experience of the population at risk, no risk mitigation strat-
egy will be effective. Participation can only be achieved by an early and compre-
hensive inclusion of the often decades-long experiences of the affected ones. But
risk experience is not only the number one topic, but experiences worldwide have
clearly shown that any risk mitigation strategy cannot be implemented and will not
function against the will of the population. They are the ones who have to take up
the recommendations. But often the measures turn out to be too technical and thus
contradict their traditional beliefs. The root cause of this problem is that, accord-
ing to law and administration procedures, those who are mandated with risk miti-
gation come from national authorities and from the scientific sector, whereas those
who are affected have no functioning relationship with the institutions in charge.
The main and indispensable task to bridge this social and technical gap is an open
discussion forum such as a roundtable has to be established, giving the affected
population a fully respected mandate in the decision-making process at the same
eye-level sight. Once equal conditions are established it will be possible to reach
a much higher state of resilience. Beck indicated that this will only be achieved
when the society at risk succeeds in attributing the normally “un-political” natural
disaster a “political” dimension (Beck 2011; Rayner 2006) Thus far all respective
discussions and elaborations are still highly dominated by scientific and techni-
cal categories. This vision is also backed by Hans von Storch of the Max Planck
Institute for Meteorology who emphasized (Spiegel Magazin 25/2013) that “[M]
ore than generally perceived, natural sciences are a process highly affected by the
actual socio-economic environment.”
The upcoming awareness of social effects in the changing environment resulted
in a new scientific branch: environmental sociology that deals with the “man–
nature relationship” in the broadest sense (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2001).
But even in the early 1990s the integration of social elements of risk definition
gained more and more acceptance. Up to that time, risk was mainly seen as a tech-
nical, scientific, and operational paradigm “to predict physical consequences” for
the population of risk and its welfare systems “by extrapolating past experiences
to the future,” but the physical database for such extrapolations is permanently
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 29

changing, very often making it impossible to “draw meaningful statistical infer-

ences to predict future effects” (Zwick and Renn 2001). The way people perceive
a risk is more a question of their anxiety, their cultural values and traditions, and
their status in the societal hierarchy than their physical experience. Therefore only
when the social agenda is “internalized” into the risk analysis and made an inte-
gral (if not central) part of the risk assessment (Luhmann 1990), will the exposed
demand from the risk be covered comprehensively. The different way of perceiv-
ing a risk can go so far that a certain risk is seen by an individual or a societal
group as absolutely unacceptable. The discussion on the use of nuclear energy in
many countries is significant regarding this. The debate amplifies the risk percep-
tion that then is called “stigmatization” of certain risk and eclipses the (normally
acceptable) impacts thus “determining the perceived seriousness of risk.” And the
“more stigma relevant elements a person links with a specific risk source, the more
likely he will find this risk non-acceptable” (Renn 1989).
In the course of the climate change debate and the increasing world population
a discussion arises as to how losses and victims will develop from natural disas-
ters. It seems obvious that the population increase itself will not be the factor that
matters, but the trend of poverty migration into the big megacities will be getting
stronger. In the search for work and improved living conditions these migrants
wear down the already difficult living conditions. Being the last in the chain in
the search for living quarters they are forced to settle areas that are from their geo-
logical and geomorphological pattern not suitable for living, a behavior that just
increases the hazard exposure. A similar outcome is envisaged from the changing
climate. Holzer and Savage (2013) in a comprehensive study came to the conclu-
sion on the future risk from earthquakes for people and their living environment
that more people will die from earthquakes, even when the statistical occurrence
of earthquakes remained more or less constant over the centuries. The study ana-
lyzed earthquakes with death tolls of more than 50,000 in the time span since 1500
AD. Comparing those estimates of world population history, they found that the
number of catastrophic earthquakes has increased as the population has grown.
After statistically correlating the number of catastrophic earthquakes in each cen-
tury with world population, they predict that total deaths in the century to come
could more than double to approximately 3.5 million people if world population
grows to 10 billion by 2100 from 6 billion in 2000. The study underscores the
need to build residential and commercial structures that will not collapse and kill
people during earthquake shaking.
This example shows how much our daily life is governed by social and eco-
nomic factors that are superimposed by the natural conditions to which we are
exposed. Thus the general increase in disaster impacts that was experienced all
over the world made clear that the risks are increasing and in future will be even
higher. This finding alerted politicians and scientists and in May 1994 representa-
tives of all nations assembled in Yokohama at the World Conference on Natural
Disaster Reduction (UNIDNDR 1994) to adopt the “Yokohama Strategy for a
Safer World.” The strategy initiated Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention,
Preparedness and Mitigation, accompanied by the Hyogo Plan of Action to be
30 2 Natural Disaster and Society

endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations as an internationally

binding regulation. The Conference reacted to UN Resolution 44/236 to address
the increasing casualties and damages from natural disasters on a global scale.
Yokohama called for an integrated approach for disaster management in all its
aspects and to initiate a process towards a global culture of prevention. The strat-
egy aims to support efforts of national governments in the implementation of the
program although acknowledging that each country bears the primary responsi-
bility for protecting its own people, infrastructure, and other national assets from
the impact of all kinds of natural disasters and moreover emphasized that each
national government has the responsibility to enforce the law accordingly.
In the aftermath of the Yokohama Conference many states formulated national
programs and action plans in order to ensure a higher level of resilience (UNISDR
2004). The great advantage of the conference was that it initiated the inclusion of
all sectors of public life: the populations at risk, natural scientists, and engineers to
benefit from their experience. The decision making was no longer seen as an exclu-
sive task of the executive. Thus the discussion became broadly based on multiple
stakeholders and was opened for implementing polycentric mitigation strategies.
Germany already has reacted to the change by founding the German IDNDR-
Committee that later developed into the German Committee for Disaster Prevention.
Since Yokohama natural scientists have also been called to take their part in the
“formative actions” of the state, especially to initiate and organize a shift in para-
digm from a “culture of risk” to a “culture of prevention.” The inclusion of scien-
tists and social groups in risk management led to an integration of all stakeholders
involved in problem analysis, decision making, and implementation of mitigation
efforts as well as in the final evaluation of achievements. By this a “formative state”
in the best tradition of liberalism and democracy will increase its legitimation and
strengthen public acceptance (WBGU 2011). Also in the sector of natural disas-
ter management a state, when acting accordingly, can demonstrate that increas-
ing disaster resilience is not a rationale to curtail individual freedoms or a call for
abstaining from a self-nominated life, but is an opening chance for multistakeholder
cooperation to increase the security of society in general. The best experience was
made with such an inclusion approach when in Indonesia in 2006 the National Law
on Disaster Management was enacted. Since then national disaster management
has been nationwide and gives a robust mandate with well-defined responsibilities.
With the newly formulated law it became possible to initiate a risk mitigation cul-
ture with a socially equal reorganization of decision-making mandates and imple-
menting responsibilities, breaking the monopoly of science in the risk discussion.

2.2.3 Population at Risk

The daily impression of natural disasters makes us believe that disasters in gen-
eral increase in number and severity and that nobody will be excluded from the
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 31

impacts. The statistically proven reality on disaster from natural hazards according
to information by Guha-Sapir et al. (2011) is that:
• The number of disasters is increasing.
• But the death toll from the disasters is decreasing.
• The economic impact is vastly different between low-, middle-, and high-income
countries.
In order to assess how the populations in the different countries are really
exposed to natural hazards, a closer look at the global risk distribution pattern
is required. Only when the scope is widened to a larger than a local or regional
perspective on the frequency and severity of natural disasters can the overall
capacities of the people to withstand the risks be assessed and compared. Such a
fact-based insight will improve the understanding of the general risk patterns and
will lead to the identification of the root causes and their related threats. Based
on fact-based findings the necessary technical, social, and financial mitigation
measures can be identified and consequently implemented to reduce the risks.
Such a generalized insight will moreover offer the chance to transfer knowledge
and experience made in one part of the world to another, in order to increase
local resilience there. Identifying and communicating global risk patterns proved
to be the most appropriate approach to increase resilience, as the geotectonic set-
ting, as well as the world weather situation are global phenomena both defining
the risk patterns. In addition, changing climate conditions are posing a further
global moment to risk distribution, the same as the exponential urbanization that
results from a growing world population. For all areas at risk over the world a
most realistic reliable and robust prediction on likely losses, magnitudes, and fre-
quency of disaster events is indispensable. To be able to reduce disaster impacts
efficiently, the linkages between the geotectonic, hydrometeorological, and cli-
matic root causes and the social and economic development processes, such as
urbanization and environmental change must be understood in addition to “invis-
ible” risk factors such as gender bias, social inequity, sociopolitical conflict, and
poor governance (UNISDR 2007). Although investigating the overall risk pat-
terns enables us to understand the general distribution of risk, risk identification
for specific social groups or certain regions requires a specific insight to local
hazard conditions.
There are several international statistics on natural disaster occurrence, fre-
quency, and severity assembled and regularly assessed mainly by the NATCAT
Service, the download center for statistics on natural catastrophes of the Munich
ReInsurance Company (Munich), the Sigma of Swiss ReInsurance Company
(Zurich), by the UN organizations UNISDR, UNDP, and UNU-EHS, and also by
the US Foreign Office of Disaster Assistance (US-OFDA) and many others espe-
cially the International Federation of the Red Cross. The most comprehensive
database on natural and epidemic disasters has been collected by the Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Catholic University of Louvain
(CRED-EMDAT), Brussels, Belgium. The organization has been mandated by the
United Nations as the central organization to collect and assess data on natural
32 2 Natural Disaster and Society

Fig. 2.3  Comparison of the number of disaster events, killed and exposed people (1975–2008)
(Courtesy Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 2013)

disasters. CRED is strongly supported by all disaster/emergency management

organizations worldwide, especially by the USAID Office for Foreign Disaster
Assistance. In total 8900 disaster events have been listed for the time span 1975
until 2008 in the EMDAT-Natural Disaster Database (CRED). The data collection
could prove that there have been 600 disaster events yearly, that have killed in total
2.3 million people and have injured and made homeless more than a billion.
Today’s ratio of the number of events to the people affected, respectively,
killed by natural disasters has changed significantly in the last 35 years (Guha-
Sapir et al. 2011, 2013). A clear trend in the ratio has been proven by the CRED-
EMDAT database. For the analysis the number of disaster events was juxtaposed
to number of persons killed and affected by disasters (Fig. 2.3). In 1975 about
100 events claimed 120,000 lives and affected 70 million people. Since then
the number of yearly disaster events has risen to more than 600 disasters glob-
ally each year. But at the same time (only) 40,000 people lost their lives. Similar
to the number of events the number of persons affected has also risen to more
than 200 million. The graph clearly indicates that in the time under investiga-
tion although the number of events quadrupled, the number of people killed in
disasters has been lowered to 30 %. When in 1975, 100 events claimed 120,000
lives, then—when the trend just would have been extrapolated—this would give
a fourfold higher death toll. Instead the death toll in 2008 has been (only) 40,000
persons. This can be interpreted that by a preventive and effective disaster
emergency management it is possible to drop the number of people killed
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 33

Fig. 2.4  People exposed per year to risk from different natural hazards (Courtesy Nadim et al.
2006)

(statistically) to 1/10. This graph reveals a much better insight to the “real” risk
impact from natural disasters than when simply based on the number of people
killed alone. This graph is furthermore a pledge that societal perception and from
media coverage to political decision making on natural disaster severity should no
longer solely be linked with the number of killed persons alone, but rather should
take the number of those affected into consideration. The suffering of these soci-
etal groups has not been addressed properly in the past and the “fortunate” dimin-
ishing of the death toll ratio should not be taken as a justification to reduce the
efforts in disaster mitigation.
An information CRED-Emdat stated that reliable information on disasters at a
global level can (reproducibly) only be given for the times from 1985 onwards.
They were able to prove that for the time before 1985 the data delivered to them
were often very scarce, overrepresenting certain disaster hotspots, and were
mostly lacking well-monitored timelines. When regarding only the time span from
1990 until today, the world disaster risk exposure gives a similar outcome to that
previously stated. About 200 disaster events killed 60,000 people and exposed
250 million people. Compared with today’s figures on the death toll, number of
events, and exposed peoples, this would present the assumption that the impact of
the today’s disasters is (only) half of that in 1990. International statistics further-
more point out that most of the people worldwide are exposed to floods, followed
by cyclones, droughts, and earthquakes and indicate that for everyone killed by a
natural disaster about 3000 are exposed to hazards (Fig. 2.4).
Another striking feature from the CRED-EMDAT statistics highlights that
the risk from natural disasters on a world scale is not at all distributed ubiqui-
tously. Most disasters occurred in China with 35 events, followed by the United
States of America with 26, and Indonesia and the Philippines with 20 each. Next
come India (17), Afghanistan and Vietnam (14), Australia, Burundi, and Pakistan
34 2 Natural Disaster and Society

Fig. 2.5  World overview from 1975–2000 of number of people affected, categorized by income
classes and disaster type (Compiled from Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 2013)

(19 each), and Ethiopia, Germany, Mexico, and Romania (7); also Bangladesh,
Canada, Japan, Kenya, and Malaysia share one group (6) and Papua New Guinea,
Russia, and Somalia (5) another one. This compilation clearly shows that disas-
ters occur in high-income countries at almost the same frequency as in the least-
developed countries. But when the number of people affected by natural disasters
is regarded for the time span 1975–2000, categorized according to income classes,
it becomes obvious that low-income groups of societies worldwide are extremely
overrepresented as can be seen from Fig. 2.5, which shows that about 2 million
low-income people were hit compared to “only” 200,000 in high-income classes.
Of the 13 biggest disasters since 1970, the low- to middle-income countries have
claimed high death tolls, whereas disasters in high-income countries in general
caused the highest economic losses (Fig. 2.6).
Figure 2.7 from Cred-EMDAT in which the economic damages are plotted
according to the level of country income, further underline the above-given find-
ings. The earthquake of Kobe, Japan in 1995 with an economic loss of about
US$100 billion and Hurricane Katrina (United States) in 2005 with a loss of
US$130 billion, have been the world’s most costly disasters ever. Both disas-
ters occurred in high-income countries, and middle-income countries face a
much lower risk of economic damage. The maximum was reached in 1999 from
the earthquakes in Turkey (Kocaeli) and Taiwan and floods in China. The risk
of economic losses in low-income countries is comparably low with a ratio that
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 35

Fig. 2.6  Economic losses versus persons killed from natural disasters 1970–2010 (Compiled
from UNISDR 2007, Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 2013; Munich Re 2013)

Fig. 2.7  Disaster losses according to country income levels (Courtesy Guha-Sapir et al. 2013)

has not changed in the last decades, a fact indicating that the amount of valua-
ble assets accumulated is still very small. Nevertheless the biggest economic loss
thus far ever was caused by the earthquake/tsunami/nuclear power plant accident
of Fukushima (US$300 billion), but it is not possible to distinguish between the
losses from the natural disaster and the losses caused by the power plant failure
(Fig. 2.8).
36 2 Natural Disaster and Society

Fig. 2.8  The 10 biggest losses from natural disaster events compared to the losses from interna-
tionally best known disasters (tsunami, World Trade Center)

Regarding the economic losses from disasters since 1975, it seems that the
losses have increased significantly from about 1990. There are at least two reasons
for this impression: one is according to CRED information that the loss figures are
“somehow” distorted owing to scarce and unproven data reported for the times
before 1980, and second that because in the last 20 years, even in the least-devel-
oped countries, the accumulation of valuable assets (factories, office buildings, etc.)
has increased significantly, a fact that is also indicated in the Munich Re World
Map of Insured Losses (MunichRe 2013).
Moreover the impact of the different types of disaster is quite different
(Fig. 2.9; redrawn from MunichRe 2012). Although geotectonic disasters make
up more than 50 % of all fatalities, their share of loss is (“only”) about 30 %,
whereas weather-related events make up 70 % of all loss events; their fatality
ratio is much lower (about 50 %). That means the lesser occurring geotectonic
disasters claim comparably higher casualties whereas the many weather-related
disasters claim significantly few lives. The ratio of economic losses due to these
two disaster types shows another remarkable picture. The economic losses from
weather-related disasters make up 70 % compared to geotectonic disasters (30 %),
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 37

Fig. 2.9  Casualties versus economic losses of the 40 biggest disaster events since 1980 (Com-
piled from MunichRe 2012, 2013)

however, they are also responsible for more than 70 % of all economic losses
(geotectonic 30 %). Regarding the insured losses, the picture is even more differ-
ent. Although 90 % of all assets were insured against floods and wet mass move-
ments, only 10 % of the assets were insured against geotectonic disasters. That
means floods and wet mass movements occur mostly in regions where large vol-
umes of economic assets have been accumulated, and geotectonic disasters occur
mainly in regions with limited aggregated economic values, of which only some
assets were insured.
This picture at a first impression contradicts the findings of Munich Re (2012,
2013) according to which 60 % of the casualties were victims of disasters of cli-
mate and weather origin, and 40 % of geotectonic. This is because there is no cor-
relation between the number of events and the casualty ratio. Statistics revealed
that annually there are about 50 geotectonic events (earthquakes, volcano erup-
tions, tsunami, mass movements, etc.) that claim 0.8 million people (40 %), and
there are 300 hydrometeorological events that claim 1.2 million people (60 %).
From the analysis it becomes clear that it is inadvisable to draw the simple
assumption that the higher the frequency of a disaster type is, the higher will be
the number of victims. If just a one-to one equation were rational, the amount of
weather-derived disasters would claim about 5 million people.
The social dimension of natural disasters becomes even clearer when we com-
pare the fatality ratio of developing countries with that of industrialized countries.
According to data from SwissRe (2010) 95 % of the 1.8 million people killed
by the 40 biggest natural disasters occurred in developing countries, whereas
“only” 5 % in industrialized countries. The ratio of economic losses (here given
as the amount of insured losses), however, show the opposite: of the more than
US$300 billion losses, more than 90 % occur in industrialized countries, and
38 2 Natural Disaster and Society

Fig. 2.10  World natural disaster events attributed to specific events, 1975–2000 (Compiled from
Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 2013)

“only” 5 % occurred in developing countries. When adapting the findings of

SwissRe to the two biggest disasters of the last decade, Hurricane Katrina and the
Indian Ocean tsunami, exactly the same relationship appears.
Another remarkable fact becomes obvious from Fig. 2.10. Most of the death
toll in the time span from the years 1975 to 2000 derived from about 20 major
disasters.
The figure clearly proves that most of the victims are attributed to the many
severe droughts in the early 1980s that, for example, in the Sahel region killed about
400,000 just in the year 1983. In this context it should be noted that the statistical
evidence on drought victims is not without ambiguity. Therefore the data should be
treated with some caution. A similar death toll resulted from the large earthquake
that hit China in 1975 (>200,000) or by the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean that
also killed more than 200,000 people in one event alone. In recent years one of
the most disastrous events was the earthquake in Haiti that also claimed more than
200,000 lives. On all of these megadisasters as they were called by UNISDR (ibid;
see also: Sect. 3.2.3) about 1.8 million people were killed. When taking out the
megaevents from the statistics, a baseline of death toll risk of about 40,000 people
per year seems to be the actual yearly fatal risk from natural disasters worldwide.
When a natural disaster strikes the most vulnerable groups are the poor, disa-
bled, elderly, and the young. According to information from the World Health
Organization (WHO) older adults are that fraction of a vulnerable society who are
especially more likely to experience greater risks and adversity than others in any
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 39

disaster. Most elderly (>65 years of age), children under 15, women, and the disa-
bled experience the negative impacts of natural disasters the most, partly because
of age-related disabilities but also because of social circumstances, such as social
isolation. And WHO pointed out that worldwide the demographics are developing
so that the population all over the world is aging. The projections suggest that there
will be an almost threefold increase in the global population over 65 within the next
half century (Tuohy 2011). But not only are the elderly disproportionally affected,
the younger ones below 15 years of age are also. This group of society is mainly not
able to get realistic insight to the problems and (especially in developing countries)
moreover are often lacking technical and operational capacities to cope with accord-
ingly. For instance, investigations on age and gender impact of Hurricane Katrina
revealed the older adults were the fraction of the New Orleans population that faced
disproportionately high adverse impacts compared to other population groups. The
Indonesian tsunami of 2004 saw the highest death rates among the over-60 s and the
deaths during the 2003 Paris heat wave killed more people over 70 years of age than
any other group; and more than half of all casualties in the 1995 Kobe earthquake
were older adults, with 90 % of deaths in this group. The same holds true for the
mortality from the Tamil Nadu flood in India in 2006, where the under-10 years and
the over-50 s had a five to ten times higher death toll ratio than the group between
10 and 30, or the occurrence of leptospirosis epidemics that increased 20 times
in the days after the 2008 flood in Jakarta and that mostly affected the population
directly dwelling near the rivers and canals in the city (Guha-Sapir et al. 2006). A
disaster will amplify both personal and social challenges the older adults are facing
already and as a result, older adults become more vulnerable to negative outcomes
during disasters. Emergency preparedness planning must therefore take more care
than before on the special age-related needs of older adults.
The above-given data on how different societies react to natural disasters
clearly reveal that coping capacities differ highly: high-income countries have, due
to their financial, technical, and managerial capabilities, better chances to with-
stand a catastrophe than many of the developing countries that are often lack-
ing such ability. Their personal and social vulnerability hinders at all levels from
national political decision making down to the individual to prepare, respond to,
and recover from such events effectively.
Table 2.1 and Fig. 2.11 on the World Risk Index (WRI) compiled by the
United Nations University, Bonn (UNU-EHS 2012), highlight that risk exposure
is strongly dependent on the developing status of a country, In Fig. 2.11 the WRI
has been correlated with the Human Development Index (HDI) to give statistical
evidence of the correlation of social and economic living conditions and disaster
exposure (UNDP 2013) for a selected group of countries. The boundaries of low to
very high were set arbitrarily in order to make the indices comparable. The World
Risk Index is based on indices reflecting exposure to natural hazards (earthquakes,
floods, volcanic eruptions, etc.) as well as the vulnerability of a society by indica-
tors describing the frequency of disaster occurrence and the deficiencies in coping
with the impact and how a society has developed effective mitigation strategies.
40 2 Natural Disaster and Society

Table 2.1  World Risk Index (WRI) of selected countries

Country Abbreviation WRI HDI Country Abbreviation WRI HDI
Afghanistan AFG 1 175 Congo CNG 23 142
Ethiopia ETH 2 173 Laos LAO 24 139
Australia AUS 3 2 Lesotho LES 25 158
Bangladesh BAN 4 146 Nepal NEP 26 157
Benin BEN 5 166 New Zealand NWZ 27 6
Bolivia BOL 6 108 Nicaragua NIC 28 129
Brazil BRA 7 85 Niger NIG 29 187
Burkina Faso BFA 8 183 Norway NOR 30 1
Chile CHI 9 40 Pakistan PAK 31 147
China CHN 10 101 Papua New PNG 32 156
Guinea
Germany GER 11 5 Peru PER 33 77
Dominican DOM 12 97 Philippines PHI 34 114
Republic
Finland FIN 13 21 Russia RUS 35 55
Haiti HAI 14 161 Samoa SAM 36 99
India IND 15 137 Switzerland SWI 37 9
Indonesia INO 16 121 Turkey TUR 38 90
Iran IRA 17 76 Hungary HUN 39 37
Island ISL 18 14 Vanuatu VAN 40 124
Italy ITA 19 25 Venezuela VEN 41 71
Japan JAP 20 10 United States USA 42 3
Cameroon CAM 21 150 United UK 43 27
Kingdom
Columbia COL 22 91
Courtesy UNU-EHS (2012)

Figure 2.11 shows that countries with a low risk exposure and a high HDI
are almost all located in Western Europe, but even countries such as the United
Kingdom (UK) and Germany both face regular floods. Although the flood
events are often perceived by the affected population as “extreme events” (see
Sect. 3.2.3) their death toll is normally very small and the impacts from the disas-
ters do not greatly affect the national economies. On the opposite side of the graph
countries such as Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Niger, and Haiti are located, all fac-
ing frequent and strong disasters and are low developed in status. Although having
achieved partly significant improvements in their disaster resilience the large pop-
ulations of these countries outnumber the achievements every time thus resulting
in the very high risk figures. Nevertheless there are exemptions to this finding. One
is Japan that on one hand has one of the highest HDI while its risk exposure due
to its geotectonical exposure is also very high. And another is the Pacific island of
Vanuatu that is according to UNU-EHS the most risk-prone country of the world.
There a comparatively small number of earthquakes and cyclones affect a country
that has due to its geographical situation almost no chance to develop effective
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 41

Fig. 2.11  Country risk exposure for the year 2013 (Based on UNU-EHS World Risk Index 2012
and Human Development Index, 2013)

countermeasures. This situation also holds true for many other small island states
including Tonga, Kiribati, Fiji, and Maldives, among others. Summarizing the
findings, it can be stated that there is a clear dependency between risk exposure
and social and economic development.
Both indicators follow an opposite trend. This emphasizes the often-discussed
finding that disaster risk management is more a matter of poverty alleviation than
technically oriented emergency management. Such an analysis on reported death
tolls and economic losses are of great importance to political decision making. In
order to make societies more resilient in general against any kind of disaster, a
political decision-making process has to answer the questions regarding the level
of security that should be achieved and for what kind of hazard, social group,
where, and to what extent it should be prepared. Or will society be safeguarded
against each and every risk and at the highest level possible and is a society then
willing to pay for such prevention.
42 2 Natural Disaster and Society

2.2.4 Gender Relation to Natural Disasters

The tsunami of December 26th, 2004 killed about 230,000 people all around the
Indian Ocean and claimed the lives of more than 170,000 alone in the Indonesian
city of Banda Aceh at the northern tip of the island of Sumatra. However, it was
not possible to count the death toll from the earthquake that triggered the tsu-
nami. According to information of the Indonesian Ministry for Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction (BRR 2007) six times more people were killed than injured in
the province, a ratio that was, for instance, in Sri Lanka less than 1.5:1 and that
dropped further towards the East African coast. And the tsunami killed more men
than women in Indonesia. The ratio of killed men to women was between 1.2:1.0
in the entire Aceh province, whereas in the city of Meulaboh (West Aceh district)
just opposite the earthquake epicenter the ratio was 2.1:1.0. Such a ratio is typical
for tsunami and storm surges as men have a higher physical ability to use rescue
opportunities, whereas on other hand the tsunami hit at eight o’clock on a Sunday
morning when many men had already left their houses for market business. And
the chance to survive the tsunami has been higher in the cities than in the rural
areas. The death toll was also higher for children under 15 years and adults over
50, resulting in a death ratio of about double the amount of children and elderly
than of adults.
This short description clearly shows the typical outcome of a natural disas-
ter in developing countries. The victims are different according to their age, sex,
and social status. It is the gender bias that creates the vulnerability. In general
women are poorer than men, and disproportionately employed. And if employed
they are mainly working in the informal sector, often unpaid or at least underpaid.
Inherited laws and social patterns such as arranged marriages or the male- domi-
nated banking system, superimpose women’s dependence on fathers, husbands,
and sons, thus limiting their access to resources and increasing their inability to
change things (Anderson 1994). Moreover, health dangers as a result of multiple
births also contribute to their low social status. Traditionally assigned responsibili-
ties to home-based duties limit women’s mobility and also hinder their chances for
education and access to information as well as participation in political decision
making. These factors push them deeper into the cycle of vulnerability. As women
in developing countries work mainly at subsistence farming, the global shift to
export-oriented agriculture undermines their economic base. This forces many of
them to migrate into the big conurbations thus exposing them to rather unsafe liv-
ing conditions on the fringes of the cities, moreover to urban environmental pollu-
tion but also to disasters such as flooding or landslides. As long as males dominate
traditionally organized societies and as long as ideological constraints still prevail
in many industrialized countries, women will still be more vulnerable to disasters.
Moreover demographic trends put women increasingly at risk.
According to many studies and investigations on the social dimension of risk
mainly by the United Nations (2000), IPCC (2001, 2007), UNIASC (2006),
Birkmann (2006), and others, the World Bank Group and international donor
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 43

agencies such as OXFAM (2000) have proved that gender vulnerability in general
is a matter of poverty, or as stated before, “a lack of opportunities and capacities.”
Therefore the Millennium Development Goals (MDG3) underline the necessity to
increase gender equality especially of the people at risk. Gender inequality is seen
as an archetype that again produces further inequalities with negative consequences
for women, their families, and their communities. MDG3 emphasizes that address-
ing gender disparities and empowering women is an important development objec-
tive. But the demand for gender equality does not necessarily mean equal outcomes
for males and females. Gender inequality occurs significantly in three domains:
the household, where it defines the distribution of household tasks, often limiting
women’s ability to work outside the home, as well as women’s control over fertility
decisions; in the market issue it reflects the unequal access to land, credit, and labor
markets; and concerning society, it expresses restrictions on women’s participation
in civic and political life. Using the definition in the World Development Report,
“Equity and Development” (World Bank 2006),
[G]ender equality means equal access to the opportunities that allow people to pursue a
life of their own choosing and to avoid extreme deprivations in outcomes that is, gender
equality in rights, resources, and voice, as it appears that economic growth and social sta-
bility is positively correlated with gender equality of a society.

2.2.5 Traumatization

Natural disasters and other catastrophic events, such as traffic accidents, plane
crashes, or a terrorist attack are extraordinarily stressful to the survivors. Although
such traumatization occurs with many disaster events such kind of psychological
impact is often not considered in emergency risk management practice. Stressful
situations can harm a human population in a way in which the adverse psycho-
logical exposure exceeds the coping capacity of the affected population especially
that of children, the disabled, or other socially deprived groups. Through the 2004
tsunami almost 10,000 children lost both parents according to information given
by the National Indonesian Planning Commission (BAPPENAS 2005). Such dis-
asters shatter one’s sense of security, making one feel helpless and vulnerable in
a dangerous emotional state and unable to rebuild a stable life. And such trauma-
tization can last many years, if it can be cured at all. There is a clear difference
between developing and industrialized countries in dealing with traumatization. In
industrialized countries curing such impact is generally seen as the task of institu-
tionalized medical services, whereas in traditional societies, for instance, Islamic
societies, numerous kinds of social networks exist, helping the victim to a cure.
There are also a number of programs that deal especially with orphans. Also in
these countries the International Red Cross and the International Crescent Moon
run specific programs that are oriented towards helping traumatized persons.
Another problem of many societies in developing countries originates from the
role of women in the society. According to tradition the men lead the household
44 2 Natural Disaster and Society

and represent the family. All legal contracts (house rent, plot documents, etc.) are
signed by the males. In the case where a disaster has killed the husband, the sur-
viving wife has few opportunities to claim her interest, as women still often do not
hold their own passports or ID cards, depriving them from appealing a law case.
A lack of coping capacity for such incidents is especially symptomatic in poor
countries and led to fact that more than 90 % of deaths due to natural disasters
occur in such countries. The poor residents of New Orleans had to bear the heavi-
est loss of life, health, and property due to Hurricane Katrina. But such an event
would have most likely caused a much higher death toll in a developing country.
The “disparity in disaster outcomes between rich and poor can be understood as a
function of both pre-event vulnerability and post-event response” (McCarroll et al.
2013). Socioeconomic factors such as individual technical and financial resources,
the social and communal infrastructure, and overall political stability all affect the
risk and consequences of natural disasters. Moreover, poverty is a well-known
determinant of poor physical health, and the poor may therefore be more vulner-
able to adverse physical health outcomes in the wake of a disaster. Malnourished,
nonimmunized, and chronically ill persons are from experience less able to with-
stand the physical and emotional stress of a disaster. The impact of such disas-
ters or traumatic events often goes far beyond physical damage. Injury is a leading
cause of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
People react in different ways to disasters and traumatic events called PTSD.
Most people who go through a trauma have some symptoms at the beginning,
whereas others develop them over time. They may also come and go over many
years. From medical experience it isn’t clear why some people develop PTSD and
others don’t. Whether a victim develops PTSD depends mainly on how intense the
trauma was, how long it lasted, and whether he or she received professional help
and support after the event. The emotional distress in the aftermath of a traumatic
event can result in a wide range of confusing and sometimes frightening emotions,
with shock and disbelief in accepting the reality of what has happened and in fear
that the same thing will happen again. Many people show symptoms of anxiety,
that one might lose control and break down or helplessness on the unpredictable
nature of a disaster. The symptoms usually start soon after the traumatic event, and
can cause great distress; PSTD symptoms generally concern the emotional sphere,
the cognitive situation of the patient, and his or her physical abilities. US-VA
(2014) identified four major types of stress symptoms:
• Reliving the event (also called re-experiencing symptoms, or flashback). This
becomes manifest in bad memories or nightmares that can come back at any
time. Other examples are feeling on alert and on the lookout for danger, having
trouble concentrating or sleeping, having a pounding heart, cold sweat, rapid
breathing, or stomach tightening.
• Avoiding situations that remind one of the event. This becomes manifest in
escaping stress-forming situations or crowds of people that can trigger memo-
ries and that can lead even to avoid talking or thinking about the event (e.g.,
avoiding driving after a car accident).
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 45

• Negative changes in beliefs and feelings. People may feel fear, sad, and depressive.
They show grief and anger, and feel guilty that they were not able to prevent the
situation. Moreover many are ashamed because they cannot control their feelings.
• Feeling keyed up (also called hyperarousal). This becomes manifest in always
being on the alert and on the lookout for danger. Even harmless situations may
arouse anger and irritation, like a sudden loud noise next door.
When mass casualties occur in a disaster, not only adults are affected. Children
are disproportionately put at risk of being injured and traumatized. When chil-
dren are exposed early to the death of parents, brothers, sisters, or close friends
they discover that even parents and close relatives are susceptible to harm. The
loss of important, care-giving relationships in their daily lives can generate long-
standing traumatic experiences. Children suffer not only from the premature loss
of a family member, but also from exposure to the cruel and violent nature of the
death which may create feelings of on-going insecurity and exposure to danger or
threat. Although children are generally exposed to the same spectrum of hazards
as adults, they are still maturing physically, emotionally, cognitively, and socially.
Thus, the “impact of perceived threat or physical harm must be put in relation
to the child’s developmental level and also within social context the child lives”
(Shaw et al. 2007). For children, individual factors such as age, gender, race, edu-
cational level, medical and psychiatric history, and the child’s level of function-
ing before and during the disaster are the main factors defining the trauma history.
Family cohesiveness, the parent–child communication patterns, how the parents
respond to the disaster impact, or post-disaster family functioning are powerful
factors helping the child to rehabilitate. Moreover, some definable groups of chil-
dren will require additional, specifically customized assistance for their protection
and to facilitate their recovery from the event. Children with special needs include
those who are developmentally disabled, children who are medically or psychiat-
rically ill, children living in poverty, foster care children, and children who have
suffered from repetitive exposure to violence or maltreatment. After a disaster has
occurred victims experience different kinds of stress reactions that may continue
for a significant period of time, for instance, grieving and mourning. After all dis-
asters, the experience of the loss of safety, security, and lack of predictability as to
how life will go on, makes a sense of uncertainty become a part of life.
Observations specialists (FEMA 2013) who assist survivors in the aftermath of
a disaster had successful and encouraging experiences with the following steps to
reduce stress symptoms and to promote post-disaster readjustment and to rebuild
emotional well-being and regain a sense of control following a disaster:
• Provide a “safe haven” that gives shelter, food and water, sanitation, allows privacy,
and open opportunities to mourn the losses and adjust to the adverse situation.
• Immediately establish direct personal and family contacts to regain a sense of
hope, purpose, and self-esteem.
• Establish a self-help group of victims under the guidance of medical assistance in
order to talk about the experiences (“tell the story”) and to share grief with others.
46 2 Natural Disaster and Society

• Identify key resources such as national or international organizations for debris

management, health services, shelter, and basic emergency assistance.
• Identify local cultural or community supports to help maintain or re-establish
normal activities such as attending religious services.
• Understand the root causes and consequences of disaster occurrences.
• Change social and health behaviors to enhance ability to cope with excessive stress.
• Establish daily living routines.

2.2.6 Social Connotation of Disaster Impact

There is no better indicator for the social connotation of natural disasters than the
fact that 90 % of all death casualties occur in developing countries, and 90 % of all
economic losses (most of them insured) occur in industrialized countries. Even more
it is anticipated that 90 % of all rescue operations are carried out by the affected peo-
ple themselves. Figure 2.12 delineates this distinct difference between income and
poverty, where 95 % of the death toll of the 40 biggest natural disasters found 95 %
of the deaths in developing countries, and 90 % of the economic losses occurred in
industrialized countries, 75 % in the United States of America alone. This is a ratio
that can be transferred directly to the situation of the catastrophes of Hurricane
Katrina and the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia, where the tsunami claimed 90 % of the
victims, and the hurricane was responsible for 90 % of the economic losses.
The international disaster statistics mainly from Guha-Sapir et al. (2011, 2013)
and UNISDR (2007) confirm this significant difference between developing

Fig. 2.12  Death toll and economic losses distinguished between industrialized and develop-
ing countries (Compiled from Guha-Sapir et al. 2011; MunichRe 2012, 2013; UNU-EHS 2012;
UNISDR 2009)
2.2 Natural Disaster and the Society of Risk 47

countries and industrialized countries. Although the numbers of casualties are

still regarded as unacceptably high, great strides were made in the last decades on
the “survival ratio” from natural disasters in developing countries. However, the
differences are still dramatic. To give an example: in 1980 there was a series of
drought events striking the Sahel Zone, claiming a death toll of more than 400,000.
Although the exact death toll figure is not confirmed, casualties were by far the
largest in history. Furthermore it should be noted that 1980 was not the only year
when Northern Africa was that badly hit by a drought. But the disaster initiated a
multitude of national and international help and assistance initiatives. In the after-
math considerable achievements have been made by many developing countries
and so-called “threshold countries” in order to safeguard their populations from
disasters. These initiatives are highly subsidized by international donor agencies,
resulting in a drop of the death toll figure especially from drought disasters from
about 30,000 per year to less than 5,000 today. But the achieved reduction should
not camouflage two other distinctive aspects in disaster exposure. The death toll
itself fortunately dropped considerably, however, the number of the people exposed
to a drought hazard has more than doubled, the same as the values of assets prone
to damage. This is mostly attributed to the fact that high birth rates and poverty
have driven migration into the large conurbations bringing more people to the brink
of disasters, thus undermining many of the mitigation achievements.

2.3 Risk to Economy

2.3.1 Eyjafjallajökull, Iceland

In April 2010 the Eyjafjallajökull, one of Iceland‘s mountain glacier volcanoes

erupted explosively. Although the impact from the eruption was quite a local phe-
nomenon and did not have a serious impact on Iceland itself (about US$3 mil-
lion in damage), the economic impact on international and European air traffic
was enormous. The volcano erupted twice after more than 100 years of rest
before the April 2010 eruption. But this time the eruption was 10–20 times more
powerful and caused the cancellation of thousands of flights across Europe and
to Iceland. At the time of the eruption the prevailing winds transported the ash
clouds first over the North Sea towards England and then turned east to Central
Russia and days later shifted south until it reached the Alps. Immediately upon
the eruption and as a consequence of the large amount of ashes that were ejected
into the atmosphere the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
European Air Control Agency ordered a complete stop of all flights over north-
ern and central European airspace for more than five days. Sixty percent of the
daily flight connections were cancelled and hundreds of thousands of passengers
were forced to stay on the ground. Even the German Chancellor Angela Merkel
on her way from the United States had to land in Italy and was forced to take a car
back to Germany. The Eyjafjallajökull eruption caused the biggest international
48 2 Natural Disaster and Society

air traffic disruption since the World Trade Center attack in 2001. The event
affected 10 million passengers and claimed economic losses of about US$2.0 bil-
lion according to information from the European Commission. The airline com-
panies complained that the disruption order was overexaggerated as the order was
based on recommendations of the Volcanic Ash Advisory Center (see Annex B)
but not on aircraft producers given a threshold value of ash concentrations. But the
European Commission reiterated putting the safety of passengers first and insisted
on the flight moratorium.

2.3.2 International Impact of Local Events (Fukushima

Nuclear Power Plant Failure)

The devastating magnitude 9.1 earthquake of March 11th, 2011 along the north-
eastern Japanese coast was not anticipated to be of such great magnitude. From
seismic records, seismologists (Geller 2011) were of the opinion that such a strong
earthquake could not occur on this subduction zone. Earthquakes with a magni-
tude of 8 were expected and accordingly planned for, either for the nuclear power
plant of Fukushima at Sandai–Daiichi or for the tsunami protection facilities
along the east coast of Japan. The giant magnitude 9 earthquake, which released
30 times more energy than an 8 magnitude earthquake overtopped the 10-m sea-
walls, causing enormous damage to the coastline and destroying the four power
plants of Fukushima–Daiichi. Thus Fukushima is an example of a technically
intrinsic and well carried out natural disaster assessment that was toppled by
reality. The reason that the seismologists formerly, “did not see the possibility of
an earthquake of such a magnitude, was that the historic record on earthquakes
along plates boundaries was very scarce,” as pointed by Stein and Okal (2011).
Instead the record fostered the opinion that “[E]arthquakes with a magnitude of
nine and greater will only occur where the lithosphere is younger than 80 mil-
lion years old and that is moving with a speed of faster than 50 mm per year.”
This assumption made intuitive sense, as it seemed understandable that both, “[T]
he young age of the plate and its high speed favor strong mechanical coupling at
the interface between the two plates.” At the interface “The strong coupling was
therefore assumed, to give rise to larger earthquakes when the interface eventually
slipped in a great thrust fault earthquake.” Furthermore it was anticipated by Stein
and Okal (ibid) that the “rupture-process is performed in segments” as could be
demonstrated for the 2004 tsunami (over a length of 1100 km) and thus “the more
segments are generated the more energy is released.”
The Fukushima–Daiichi nuclear accident was a major catastrophe that had a
serious impact on the Japanese and world economy. It turned out that the earth-
quake itself and the damage from the tsunami could to be rated “quite” low,
although with undoubtedly serious impact on the people living in the area and on
the national economy. In Japan private houses are insured by a national insurance
2.3 Risk to Economy 49

pool that covers most of the losses against such kinds of disasters. The losses due
to evacuation, resettling in other regions, and medical costs are also borne by
the government. No private insurance is liable for events like this. If only these
two disaster aspects are considered, than Fukushima can be classified a “medium
class” catastrophe, which would have resulted only in a small impact on the world
economy. It is a fact that highly industrialized nations such as Japan or the United
States generally quickly recover from such disasters. Moreover very often the
money invested to recover from a catastrophe leads to modernizing the social and
economic infrastructure at a higher reliance level. In industrialized countries the
losses from disasters normally lower the gross domestic product (GDP) by only
about 1–2 %, allowing for a recovery within a year or two (Hurricane Katrina,
New Orleans), whereas such disasters in developing countries can have impacts
on the GDP of more than 15 %, according to information given by the World Bank
in 2004. The Fukushima catastrophe, however, had a great impact on international
economies as well as on global ecology. The release of much radioactive con-
taminated cooling water will result in an increased radionuclide exposition of the
offshore regions. Moreover the failure of the power plant led the Japanese govern-
ment to shut down all nuclear power plants temporarily, resulting in power supply
restrictions for the private and industrial sectors. This again resulted in a dramatic
drop in industrial productivity especially of the world’s leading car manufacturers.
For the first time in decades Japanese carmakers suffered high losses, while on the
other hand, the car manufacturers in Europe and America gained much profit.
Natural disasters such as the Eyjafjallajökull eruption not only strike people at
the location of the disaster, but can also severely affect the living conditions of
people far away. In this example the volcanic eruption affected the international air
traffic sector and hindered many people from running their businesses or to con-
necting with others. The eruption thus has an impact on conditions essential for
private as well as public sector life. Although the private sector (houses, house-
hold, family organization) is a matter of personal disposal, there are quite a num-
ber of technical, administrational, and managerial, physical, or virtual systems
that are indispensable to provide essential services to maintain the functioning of
a society, called critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure refers to technical
assets as well as to organizational systems that can be especially at risk from natu-
ral hazards, the consequences of climate change, or nowadays from terrorism that
are essential to sustain societal functioning during a catastrophic emergency.
Critical infrastructure disruptions thus can have direct impacts on social wel-
fare and business. Whereas in many societies, critical infrastructure comprises all
kinds of technical and social assets and their operational setups that can be at risk,
Norway distinguishes particularly between the challenges to enterprises that are
responsible for critical infrastructure and critical societal functions. They define
“critical infrastructure” as power generation and supply, electronic and satellite-
based communication, water supply and sewage, and the road/rail/air and water-
way traffic system; and critical societal functions are the banking and finance
sector, food supply, health services, social services and social security system, law
enforcement including the police and military services, as well as emergency and
50 2 Natural Disaster and Society

rescue services and crisis management (NOU 2006). The critical infrastructure
is diverse and complex. It includes distribution networks, highly varying organi-
zational structures and operating models, and interdependent functions and sys-
tems in both the physical space as well as in the recently increasing cyberspace.
It comprises governance constructs that involve authorities, responsibilities, and
regulations from the local up to the national and international levels. Critical infra-
structure can be at risk from various natural, man-made, and technological hazards
that can result in human casualties, property destruction, adverse economic stabil-
ity, and public health and safety, and that can consequently damage public morale
and confidence in the national problem-solving capability. The risks are height-
ened by the complex system of interdependencies, which can produce cascading
effects far beyond the initially affected sector and physical location of the inci-
dent. Securing critical infrastructure-related functioning is a national task whereas
the specific mandates, roles, and responsibilities at the national and the local lev-
els and among the public and private owners and operators must be clarified. In
Europe the national governments are responsible for the development of a situa-
tional awareness and mitigation capability during incidents, whereas in the United
States the Secretary of Homeland Security provides strategic guidance assigned in
the USDHS (2002).

2.3.3 The Great Flood of 1993 (United States)

Every year the United States sees an extraordinary impact from natural disas-
ters and atypical weather situations. The economic losses from these events have
been considerable. In only half a century (from 1989 to the mid-1990s) insurance
companies have paid out more than US$45 billion in damage claims stemming
from blizzards, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, droughts, mudslides,
wildfires, and other calamities. Altogether, these disasters have affected the econ-
omy deeply in terms of property damage, lost wages, utility disruptions, indus-
trial and agricultural production failure, in addition to claiming hundreds of lives.
The effect on the economy varies considerably. Some natural disasters, such as
tornadoes, hurricanes, and earthquakes are more or less short-term events, lasting
several or a few hours, but causing substantial destruction in a concentrated area,
whereas others, such as droughts or floods, tend to be of a longer duration, spread-
ing their damaging effects over a relatively larger expanse for days or weeks.
Any type of disaster, however, can leave an economic imprint that may persist for
years. A major flood has the capacity to affect numerous sectors of the economy
from agriculture to manufacturing to transportation. In addition to the obvious
damage to public and private structures, other damages are not so obvious, for
instance, a reduced fertility of farmland, weakened structural foundations of build-
ings, or waterlogged roads. There are other factors, such as transportation delays
and adversely affected crop and livestock markets.
2.3 Risk to Economy 51

The damage from the “Great Flood of 1993” in the United States, which pri-
marily hit the states along the upper and middle Mississippi River basin, were
so widespread that for more than 500 counties in nine states, including the
entire state of Iowa, a “state of emergency” was declared. In the St. Louis area,
the 1993 flood topped the previous record flood of 1973. The flood was in those
days ranked one of the costliest natural disasters of all time, just behind Hurricane
Andrew in 1992. The overall costs were estimated to be up to US$20 billion, with
a large percentage of uninsured losses (Kliesen 1994). According to the Insurance
Information Institute, insured nonagricultural losses were about US$800 million,
and insured crop losses were put at US$250 million. Although the flood affected
several important sectors of the economy, the disruptions to transportation were
the greatest, especially on railroad connections in the Midwest. Numerous disrup-
tions forced many railroads to lay emergency tracks to reach a sustained delivery
of the production, especially of the car manufacturers upstream. The Association
of American Railroads (AAR) at that time calculated direct losses of US$130 mil-
lion primarily on physical destruction of rail lines, bridges, and signalling equip-
ment, and another US$50 million as indirect losses from rerouting of trains. The
AAR believes that other indirect losses, for example, from business interruptions
and lost revenue could reach another US$100 million. As the Upper Mississippi
River is an important transportation lifeline, moving a significant percentage
of the nation’s grain, coal, chemicals, fertilizers, and other goods, the Maritime
Administration estimates that indirect flood losses totaled nearly US$280 million.
Agriculture also incurred significant losses, with US$530 million in disaster assis-
tance disbursed to nearly 150,000 farmers and another US$500 million in crop
insurance. Of this nearly US$1 billion disbursement, 50 % was received by the
farmers in Iowa and Minnesota alone. In total the US federal government spent
over US$2.5 billion, a financial injection that was intended to support the eco-
nomic recovery of the region.
As with flood impact everywhere, the largest effects from the great flood were
on physical damage, production, employment, wages, and the capital stock at the
local or regional level. The flood, moreover, resulted in multifold impacts across
the country especially as it came in addition to the big Northridge earthquake and
the winter storms in the South, Midwest, and East. Altogether, these events in
1993 affected about one half of the entire US population, disrupted construction
in the housing industry, and caused significant reductions in the output of automo-
tive, steel, and appliances, yet on the other hand the adverse weather conditions
boosted output of nation’s coal mines (Kliesen ibid). But economically the over-
all effect of these temporary disruptions did not really put the American economy
under serious pressure, an assessment that also was anticipated for the US east
coast that suffered from a series of blizzards and storms.
At the beginning of 1993, most economists were expecting the US economy
to grow at about 3 %. But the first quarter 1993 GDP was only at 0.8 %. This
significant drop was attributed by many economists to the adverse weather condi-
tions. But when the second-quarter real GDP growth rate was also below expec-
tations this made it apparent that the first quarter’s weakness was not entirely
52 2 Natural Disaster and Society

weather-related. As the economic effects of a disaster on a national economy are

often superimposed by other than natural factors, calculating the impact often may
result in misleading pictures of the economy’s overall performance. The many
experiences in the disaster–economy relationship tend to assume that a disaster
has often a less serious rather than a challenging impact on the economy than the
overall national or international economic situation itself. This is due mainly to
the fact that the disaster impact influences a multitude of economic sectors that
are highly intertwined in innumerable and unseen ways, making a calculation of
the real economic effect of a natural disaster a difficult task (Kliesen ibid). In a
paper on economic effects from natural disasters Chang (1984) confirms a finding
of Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) that “Although a society as a whole suffers from a
net economic loss, the recovery efforts in a disaster area may be more than suffi-
cient to replace old roads, bridges and other community assets. If so, disaster areas
may be said to benefit from disasters even if the benefit, if any, is a transfer benefit
from other areas.”

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Chapter 3
Natural Disasters: Definitions
and Classification

3.1 Natural Disaster Classification: General Aspects

Thinking of disasters and catastrophes that are threatening our daily life, auto-
matically impressions of volcanic eruptions, earthquake-destroyed houses, tsunami
devastating coastal villages, or pictures of starving children in tent camps of the
Sahel Zone come to mind. But the different manifestations of disasters are differ-
ent in their origin and differ enormously in their impacts. Moreover it has been
proved that certain disasters result in specific impacts. Although the term natural
disaster expressing “processes made by nature” (with no interference of human
beings) is quite in use, the term nevertheless only describes the outcome of the
natural processes, and does not include the origin/trigger level of the process. Thus
natural disasters are by definition the outcome of the process, and the triggering
elements of disasters are called “natural hazards.”
Therefore in order to better assess the cause–effect relationship, first of all a
systematic classification of natural hazards is needed. Second, as all natural haz-
ards pose a threat to human beings, natural disasters actually only occur when the
potential threats interfere with human life. At third there is quite a large group of
hazards existing that comprise all hazards derived from technical and human activ-
ity. And moreover we have to acknowledge that all three categories of hazards can
interact with each other resulting in disasters the origin of which sometimes can
hardly be identified (traced back) anymore.

3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth

Regarding natural hazards there are quite a lot of different classification schemes
in use worldwide that all have their advantages. As long as there is no one system
agreed upon worldwide, this book wants therefore to emphasize that a classifica-
tion scheme should be used that is simple enough to be understood everywhere

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 55

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_3
56 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

and that is transparent enough to open ways to harmonize with other systems.
Generally natural hazards are divided in these main categories:
1. Geotectonic hazards: Natural processes that have their origin in Earth’s crust
and mantle resulting in convectional movements that cause lithospheric plates
to be permanently in motion; this motion lets mountain ranges build up, oce-
anic plates subduct under continental plates, or oceanic ridges develop. These
movements are the triggering elements for earthquakes, volcanic eruptions,
mass movements, or the uplifting or subsidence of land.
2. Hydrometeorological hazards: Natural processes that have their origin in the
Earth’s atmosphere. They are responsible for climate variations that create flash
floods, droughts, storms, and/or extreme weather.
In order not to come up with just another system, this book wants to follow the
classification scheme that has been introduced by CRED and Munich Re (Fig. 3.1)
and that has proved its comprehensive applicability in many cases.

3.2.1 Geotectonic Hazards

3.2.1.1 The Earth Structure

The Earth is composed of three main layers that exhibit quite different chemical
and physical composition (Fig. 3.2).
The outermost layer is called the Earth’s crust and is comparatively thin, with
thickness ranging from 5 to more than 70 km. This layer can be described as the
outer shell of the Earth and is chemically composed of an upper layer made up
mainly of silicate and aluminum (SIAL) and a lower layer mainly made up of sili-
cate and magnesium (SIMA). The crust and the upper part of the lower lying earth
mantle form the hard and rigid outer layer of the Earth called the lithosphere. The
lithosphere is underlain by the asthenosphere constituting the weaker, hotter, and
deeper part of the upper mantle. Two types of lithosphere are distinguished:
• Oceanic lithosphere, which is associated with the oceanic crust and which exists
under the ocean basins (density of about 2.9 g/cbcm)
• Continental lithosphere, which is associated with the continental crust (density
of about 2.7 g/cbcm)
This division should not be confused with the chemical subdivision of these same
layers comprising both the asthenosphere and the mantle portion of the lithosphere
and the crust. A piece of mantle may be part of the lithosphere or the astheno-
sphere at different times depending on its temperature and pressure. The asthe-
nosphere is the ductile part of the Earth just below the lithosphere, including the
upper mantle. The asthenosphere is about 180 km thick.
The oceanic crust forms the ocean basins. This crust type is rich in silica, iron,
and magnesium. According to this chemical composition most of the volcanic
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 57

Natural Hazards

Disaster Group Disaster Main-Type Disaster Sub-Main Type Disaster Sub/Sub-Type

Geotectonical Earthquake Ground shaking

Tsunami

Volcano Volcanic eruption

Mass movement (dry) Rockfall

Avalanche Debris / Snow

Landslide Mudslide / Lahar / Debris flow

Sudden subsidence
Subsidence
Long-lasting subsidence

Natural Hazards

Disaster Group Disaster Main-Type Disaster Sub-Main Type Disaster Sub/Sub-Type

Hydrological Flood River flood

Flash flood

Storm surge

Mass movement (wet) Rockfall

Avalanche Debris / Snow

Landslide Debris flow

Sudden subsidence
Subsidence

Long-lasting subsidence

Fig. 3.1  Disaster type classification proposed by CRED and Munich Re

58 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Crust S P
Wave Wave
Upper Mantle

2900 km
Semi-plastic
Lower Mantle
Semi-plastic
Outer Core

2250 km
Liquid

1300 km
Inner Core
Solid 2 4 6 8 10 12 (km/s) 2 4 6 8 10 12 (kg)

Velocity depth function Density distribution

Fig. 3.2  Structure of the Earth and respective seismic velocity and density distribution (Com-
piled from USGS 2008a; Berckhemer 1990)

rocks of the ocean floor are basalts. The oceanic crust is much thinner than the
continental crust that is made up of igneous granitic, sedimentary, and metamor-
phic rocks. About 40 % of the Earth’s surface is covered by continental crust and it
makes up about 70 % of the volume of the earth crust.
The oceanic and continental lithospheres differ highly in their thickness. The
oceanic lithosphere is typically about 50–140 km thick, but only directly under the
mid-ocean ridges is its thickness almost equal to that of the oceanic crust there,
whereas the continental lithosphere has a range in thickness from about 40 km to
more than 250 km. The upper part of the continental lithosphere is defined as the
continental crust, typically from 30 to 50 km thick. The mantle part of the litho-
sphere consists largely of the mineral peridotite.
The boundary between the crust and the lower lying upper mantle is called
the Mohorovicic discontinuity (MOHO), although it lies mainly within the litho-
sphere. The discontinuity is characterized by a sudden increase in seismic veloci-
ties. Immediately above the MOHO, the velocities of primary seismic waves
(P-waves) are equal to those of basalt (6.7–7.2 km/s), whereas below it they
resemble the velocities of the minerals peridotite and dunite (7.6–8.6 km/s). The
boundary between the lithosphere and the underlying asthenosphere is defined
by how it responds to external stress. Whereas the lithosphere remains rigid and
only deforms elastically and through brittle failure, the asthenosphere deforms
viscously and accommodates strain through plastic deformation. The base of the
lithosphere is defined to be the temperature regime of about 1000 °C where the
mineral olivine begins to deform viscously. When the stress exceeds the elasticity
modulus of the lithosphere it breaks, forming the tectonic plates.
As the upper part of the Earth mantle, the asthenosphere is about 500 km wide
(the lower boundary of the mantle is defined at depths of 2900 km) and exhibits a
semi-plastic state that permits the above-lying lithosphere to “float” on the mantle
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 59

material. As the lithosphere has a highly variable composition and thickness, the
floating of the lithospheric plates is controlled by “isostasy”, a physical phenom-
enon that can be compared to buoyancy. The lithospheric plates are thus floating
on the asthenosphere like wooden logs in water. The thicker the continental crust
rises, the deeper the roots sink into the mantle. The roots of ocean basins, however,
are low lying because the oceanic crust is thin and dense. Under the Himalayas,
for instance, the crust sinks to about 70 km whereas under the oceanic plates
depths from 8 to 10 km occur.
The Earth core lies at depths beyond 2900 km and represents about 30 % of the
planet’s mass. The core again is divided into two layers. The “outer core” is about
2100 km thick. This layer is characterized by rocks that are mostly made up of iron
and nickel (NIFE). The outer core has the highest specific gravity of the Earth mate-
rial and is responsible for the Earth magnetisms. The “upper core” has a molten
state due to excessive heat that is thought to originate from radioactive decay pro-
ducing temperatures that lie between 2200 and 2750 °C. In contrast, the “inner
core” (about 1400 km thick) shows a solid sphere due to the combined factors of
high pressures and temperatures that could partly range between 4300 and 7200 °C.
The density of the inner core is estimated between 12.8 and 13.1 tons/m3. The pres-
sure in the inner core of the Earth is between 3.3 and 3.6 million atmospheres.

Plate Tectonics

The similarity of both the coastlines of West Africa and South America was for a
long time seen as just a curiosity of nature. It was in 1929 when Wegener (1929) a
Germany geographer, made these striking shapes the basis for a new idea on how
the continents may have been formed. He named his theory “continental drift”. Up
to that time most geoscientists were convinced the Earth is contracting due to cool-
ing over the billions of years of its existence. Wegener’s theory was mostly rejected
because he could not explain the driving mechanisms of the continental drifting and
what happen if drifted continents collided. Fifty years later the analytical possibili-
ties had much advanced and opened the chance for a revolutionary change in the
vision of Earth’s development. When in 1965 Bullard et al. (1965) presented their
fit of the African and South American coastlines—this time based on the geophysi-
cal evidence that the continental shelves are part of the continents—they could
show that along the contour line at about 1000 m water depth, the two continents fit
together almost perfectly. It was in the 1960s when the first leading papers were pub-
lished by Hess, Wilson, Vine and Matthews, and many others, indicating that Earth’s
internal forces are the driving mechanisms for the plate movements. In particular the
following scientific developments in the 1960s strengthened the formulation of the
plate tectonics theory and seafloor-spreading hypothesis:
• The detection of mid-ocean ridges and the young age of the ocean floors
• The evidence of repeated reversals of the Earth’s magnetic field
• The documentation that the world’s earthquake and volcanic activity is concen-
trated along oceanic trenches and submarine mountain ranges
60 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

As about two thirds of the Earth’s surface lies beneath the oceans, the knowledge
that developed significantly after World War II of oceans helped significantly to
understand the process that moves the Earth’s plates as originally stated by Alfred
Wegener 50 years earlier. With echo-sounding systems measuring the sea bottom
morphology and using magnetometers recognizing odd magnetic variations across
the ocean floor, the scientific base for modern plate tectonic theory has been laid.
The understanding of the magnetic patterns (“normal” and “reversed”) of ocean
floor basalts reflect the reversing of the Earth’s magnetic field with time that later
became known as magnetic striping (Fig. 3.3). The striping pattern that was iden-
tified as running exactly parallel to the (discovered at the same time) mid-ocean
ridges especially led to the assumption that the ridges mark a structurally weak
zone in the oceanic crust where new magma erupts to the surface and creates a
new oceanic crust, a process that was called “sea floor spreading.” The magnetic
reversals in the oceanic rock can only be dated back about 180 million years (Early
Jurassic) and indicated that the older crustal parts had already been subducted. This
evidence was a further indicator that enabled answering the question of why the
sediments of the oceanic crust are older when departing from the mid-ocean ridges.
Plate tectonics is basically a kinematic phenomenon making the plates move
with respect to one another. Today the driving force behind tectonic plate motion is
assumed to be generated by large-scale heat convection currents in the upper mantle
that dissipate heat through a process called “mantle convection.” When mantle mate-
rial close to the radioactive core is heated up it becomes less dense than the compar-
atively cooler upper mantle rocks. The “warmer” rocks rise while the “cooler” rocks
sink, creating steady vertical convection cells within the mantle. These convection
cells are assumed to be the driving force for mantle material. Although the move-
ment is just only a few centimeters a year it provides a powerful source of energy
that makes the plates move with a velocity ranging from 10 to 40 mm/year along the
mid-Atlantic ridge up to about 160 mm/year at the Nazca plate.
Although this theory has gained wide acceptance, there is still a debate as to
how mantle convection can directly and indirectly be related to plate motion as

Fig. 3.3  Magnetic striping Mid-ocean ridge

pattern of the oceanic crust
as a result of the reversing
of the Earth’s magnetic field Normal magnetic (c)
(Courtesy USGS 2008a) polarity

Reversed magnetic (b)

polarity

(a)
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 61

even modern techniques (seismic tomography) still were not able to discover the
predicted large-scale convection cells. Somehow, the energy must be transferred
to the lithosphere for the plates to move. Another source of energy for moving the
plates is driving forces related to gravity, although such forces are seen as sec-
ondary phenomena within the framework of mantle convection. At the mid-ocean
ridges the uprising magma forms higher elevations from the hot mantle material
along the spreading ridges. As in the course of plate movement, this material is
gradually cooling and thickening with age. The cooling of the oceanic lithosphere
makes it increasingly denser than the hot mantle material. Thus the lithosphere
gradually subsides into the mantle to compensate the greater load. The result is a
slight lateral incline with increased distance from the ridge axis, a driving mecha-
nism that is often referred to as “ridge push,” although it is a gravitational slid-
ing rather than a push movement. A very significant driving force occurs when the
oceanic plate converges with a continental plate and the plate on its way down into
the mantle pulls the plate by its density, a force that is called “slab pull” and is
widely thought to constitute a great force acting on the plates.

Plate Boundaries

As the lithospheric plates of the Earth are either moving apart (diverging) or com-
ing together (converging) they permanently change the Earth’s surface. Although
all the plates appear to be moving at different relative speeds and independently of
each other, a worldwide puzzle of plates results in a multitude of highly intercon-
nected and interrelated plates (Fig. 3.4). No single plate moves without affecting
others and the activity of one can influence another thousands of kilometers away.
For example, as the Atlantic Ocean grows wider with the spreading of the African
plate away from the South American plate, the Pacific sea floor is being consumed
in deep subduction trenches over 10,000 km away (USGS, ibid).
There are three primary types of tectonic plate boundaries as shown in
Figs. 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 that all have been provided by the USGS (ibid).

Fig. 3.4  Pattern of global

lithosphere plates (Courtesy
USGS, ibid)
62 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.5  Divergent plate

margin of Iceland, exhibiting
that Europe and America
are drifting apart (Courtesy
USGS, ibid)

Fig. 3.6  Oceanic–
continental plate convergence
(Courtesy USGS, ibid)

Fig. 3.7  Oceanic–oceanic
plate convergence (Courtesy
USGS, ibid)
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 63

Fig. 3.8  Continental plate–

continental plate collision
(Courtesy USGS, ibid)

Divergent Boundaries

Places where plates are moving apart are called divergent boundaries. When the
Earth’s brittle lithosphere is pulled apart, it typically breaks along parallel faults
(Fig. 3.5). While continuing to separate along the boundary, the material between
the two sides of the fault is plunging down into the soft plastic interior (astheno-
sphere). The sinking of the block thus forms a central valley called a rift. Magma
seeps upward to fill the fractures and allows new crust to be formed. Earthquakes
occur along the faults, and volcanoes form where the magma reaches the surface.
Oceans like the Atlantic are born this way and grow wider when the plates pull
apart. Where a divergent boundary occurs at the ocean floor a rift valley is formed,
generally about several kilometers wide as can be seen along the mid-Atlantic
ridge. They normally rise a kilometer above the ocean floor and form a global net-
work of rifts that can be traced all over the globe. The plates’ separation is quite
slow. For example, the speed of divergence along the mid-Atlantic ridge is only
about 2 cm/year. When a diverging boundary occurs on land a rift, or separation,
will arise and over time that mass of land will break apart into distinct land masses
and the surrounding water will fill the space between them. This can be seen in the
East African Afar triangle, where the African and the Arabian plates have diverged
since 2010 at a local speed of up to a meter per year. Eastern Africa will inevi-
tably break apart into two separate land masses in the future, and Indian Ocean
waters will eventually rush into fill the widening and deepening space between.
On land divergent boundary rift valleys are formed that are typically 30–50 km
wide. Examples include the East Africa rift from Ethiopia down to Mozambique or
the Rio Grande rift system in New Mexico.

Convergent Boundaries

The locations where plates collide or “crash” together are called convergent
boundaries. Three types of plate convergence occur.
64 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Oceanic Crust: Continental Crust Convergence

In general the oceanic plate converges under the continental plate as the oceanic
plate (as already described above) has a higher density and thus plunges under the
“lighter” continental crust, a process that is called subduction (Fig. 3.6). At the sea
bottom where an oceanic plate moves downward, deep sea trenches are formed.
The downward movement of the rock material makes the plate break up causing
earthquakes. During subduction the oceanic crust is destroyed and recycled back
into the interior of the Earth. When the oceanic plate continues to slip down into
the Earth’s interior, some rocks of the plates melt. The subducting plate is heated
up at a depth of about 150 km and at temperatures beyond 1000 °C. Magma cham-
bers are produced as a result of this melting, and as the magma is lower in density
than the surrounding rock material it begins ascending by melting and fracturing
its way through the overlying rock material. Magma chambers that reach the sur-
face break through to form a volcanic eruption. Moreover, the water content in
the oceanic crust is released due to temperature and pressure increase. The vapor
reduces the solidus temperature, for instance, of the basalt. On its way up through
the continental plate the melted rock causes volcanic-related earthquake tremors,
and finally forming volcanic eruptions where it reaches the surface. As the aver-
age travel speed of the plates differs from 2 to 17 cm/year, the collisions generally
last millions of years, a speed that is from a geological history viewpoint rather
fast. The majority of global mountain chains and volcanoes are found where plates
converge; the best example for a chain of volcanoes is found around the Pacific
Ocean, called “the Ring of Fire.” Furthermore with the bending down of the oce-
anic plate the overriding continental plate is lifted up and a mountain range is cre-
ated like the Andes Mountains or the Indonesian Archipelago.
Oceanic Plate: Oceanic Plate Convergence
When two oceanic plates converge the plates—similar to the oceanic–continen-
tal plate situation—subduct under the other (Fig. 3.7). Normally the older plate
will subduct because of its higher density. This type of plate convergence forms
undersea volcanoes. And when over millions of years the erupted lava and vol-
canic debris pile up on the ocean floor, a submarine volcano rises above sea level
to form an island volcano. Such volcanoes are typically strung out in chains called
island arcs. In the course of the subduction the well-known deep oceanic trenches
are formed, such as the Marianas Trench as a result of the Philippine plate sub-
ducting under the Pacific plate. With continued development the islands can
grow larger, and merge to real landmasses like Japan, the Aleutian Islands, or the
Eastern Caribbean islands.
Continental: Continental Convergence
When two continents meet head on they do not subduct because both continen-
tal plates have a density that is much lower than the mantle, which prevents them
from subduction; although there may be a small amount of subduction when the
heavier lithosphere below the continental crust might break free from the crust
and subduct. Fragments of crust or continental margin sediments might be caught
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 65

in the collision zone between the continents forming a highly deformed melange
of rock. Instead of subducting the plates tend to buckle and to be pushed upward
or sideways (Fig. 3.8). The Himalayan mountain range is the best active exam-
ple of this type of plate boundary, where the collision of the India continental
plate 3.50 million years ago caused the Eurasian continental plate to crumple up
and override the Indian plate. After the collision, the slow continuous convergence
of the two plates over millions of years pushed up the Himalayas and the Tibetan
plateau to their present heights. Most of this growth occurred during the past
10 million years. The Appalachian mountain range is an ancient example of this
collision type. The continental–continental plate collision process is still poorly
understood when compared to the other types of plate boundaries. Nevertheless
the huge global mountain chains prove that by this type of convergence a power-
ful collision can occur. The intense compression can also cause extensive folding
and faulting of rocks within the two colliding plates. This deformation can extend
hundreds of kilometers. Moreover the effects from collision include shallow earth-
quake activity, and shortening and thickening of the plates.

Transform Boundaries

Transform boundaries are characterized by two plates sliding horizontally past

one another with sideways and not vertical displacement (Fig. 3.9). These bounda-
ries are also known as transform fault boundaries or faults. Transform faults differ
from normal strike-slip faults because the sense of movement is in the opposite
direction. A strike-slip fault is a simple offset, however, a transform fault is formed
between two different continental plates, each moving away from the spreading
center. Most transform faults are found on the ocean floor. They are best known
from the active spreading ridges—like the mid-Atlantic ridge—producing “zig-
zag plate margins” that are also known as shallow earthquake locations. A few of
such continental–continental plate margins are also known to occur on land and
are in general marked by linear valleys along the boundary where rock has been
ground up by the sliding. The best examples are the Alps, the North Anatolian
fracture zone in Turkey or the famous San Andreas Fault zone in California. The
San Andreas is one of the best monitored transform faults on Earth. It is about
1300 km long and in places tens of kilometers wide. Along it, the Pacific plate has
been moving past the North American plate for 10 million years, at an average
rate of about 5 cm/year. This would lead to the fact that in about 10 million years’
time both cities San Francisco and Los Angeles will be located side by side. Along
the San Andreas fault the land on the Pacific side of the fault zone is moving in
a northwesterly direction relative to the land on the east side of the fault zone on
the North American plate. Transform faults are locations of recurring earthquake
activity and faulting. The earthquakes are usually shallow because they occur
within and between plates that are not involved in subduction. Volcanic activity is
normally not present because the typical magma chamber convection or a melting
subducting plate is not present.
66 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.9  Transform fault

(Courtesy USGS, ibid)

Earthquakes

About three billion people making up almost 50 % of the world population are
supposed to live in areas that are today classified as earthquake prone. And since
1900 it is supposed that more than 1.2 million people were killed in earthquake
disasters; most of the victims were claimed in China (500,000), Japan (200,000),
and Italy 100,000. Nevertheless the strength of earthquakes differs very much
from region to region. Thus in California, the region with the highest earth-
quake risk of the United States, there have been in the last 100 years along the
San Andreas fault the same amount of victims claimed as in the Romanian capi-
tal, Bucharest (1500), on only one occasion in 1977. Four catastrophic earthquakes
have already struck since the beginning of the twenty-first century, including the
2004 Sumatra–Andaman earthquake and tsunami and the 2010 Haiti earthquake
that each may have killed over 200,000 people. Guha-Sapir et al. (2011) listed
that on average since 1990 every year 27,000 people are killed by earthquakes
worldwide. Worldwide about several millions of earthquakes occur every year.
More than 90 % of them are unidentifiable without technical devices. Only some
thousand are strong enough to be recognized and able to create minor damage. It
is supposed that fewer than 1000 earthquakes occur every year that we perceive
as tremors, of which only a couple really create devastating damage. Surface
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 67

manifestations of earthquakes are the most impressive signs people perceive

and that makes them fear. By far the biggest impression comes from the ground
motions that the people feel directly or from the damage of the buildings and
infrastructure installations and rescue operations where people try desperately to
dig out victims using only their hands. But also distorted rows of trees or fences
are often recognized as well as a shift along fault zones, best seen in aerial photos
or satellite imagery (Fig. 3.10).
With the continuous moving of the lithospheric plates by pulling apart, con-
verging, or steadily transforming the boundaries a tremendous amount of energy
is unleashed that often results in earthquakes, tremors, and volcanism. In a very
general sense, earthquakes describe any seismic event, whether natural or caused
by human activity, that generates seismic waves. Earthquakes are caused mostly
by rupture along geological faults or fractures, but can also be generated by other
events such as volcanic activity, landslides, mine blasts, or nuclear explosions. An
earthquake’s point of initial rupture is called its “focus” or “hypocenter”, and the
point at ground level directly above the hypocenter is called the “epicenter”.
The energy is released in the form of a pressure front propagating from the
location where the plates collide or drift away from each other. The energy is
released in the form of elastic seismic waves, as the Earth’s material behaves in
general elastically. The degree of elasticity determines how well the waves are
transmitted through the Earth’s interior. The released energy brings the material
either by compression, tension, or shearing under external strain that means it

Fig. 3.10  San Andreas

Fault zone, California and its
impact on the Earth surface
(Source Wikipedia, file: kluft-
photo-Carrizo-Plain-Nov-
2007-Img 0327.jpg; accessed:
24 May 2014)
68 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

changes its volume and/or its shape. The material reacts to this strain either elasti-
cally, meaning after the external pressure is over the material returns to its former
volume and shape, or it reacts inelastically (ductile, plastic) meaning the external
deformation remains. When the compression, tension, or shearing (stress) and the
resulting strain overstep the limits of the material elasticity (elastic moduli), the
material begins either to crack and crush (brittle) or to react (ductile).
For long time the “elastic rebound theory” was seen to best explain earthquake
generation. This theory describes earthquakes as a result of the elastic rebound of
previously stored elastic strain in the rocks. For a couple of years now there have
been indications that this theory alone will not answer all the questions concern-
ing earthquake generation (Chui 2009). If elasticity is the main trigger this would
imply that earthquakes might be a regular phenomenon as the strain that has been
built up must be released either in the form of earthquakes or through a slow quiet
alternative called aseismic slip. Another view was that faults generally exhibit rup-
turing in large characteristic earthquakes of about the same magnitude again and
again. Another model asserts that big quakes are most likely to strike in seismic
gaps that haven’t suffered major jolts in a long time. But recent research reveals
that earthquakes don’t occur on simple fault structures, rather on fault systems
that are very often involved in complex interactions among faults. In some cases,
quakes come in clusters such as the 9.1 magnitude earthquake that hit Sumatra in
2004 and that led to a series of aftershocks (even until 2014). In other instances,
the earthquakes are rupturing large sections of faults that had not been known to
quakes before. Furthermore there are indications that earthquakes can trigger trem-
ors, geyser eruptions, and other seismic activity thousands of kilometers away.
The seismic waves that travel the Earth are characterized by the way they move
the rock particles: either they move it in the direction of the wave propagation or
perpendicular to it.
Four different seismic wave types are distinguished:
• Compressional waves have a longitudinal polarization that means the dis-
placement of the rock is back and forth in the direction of the wave propaga-
tion. These waves have a high travel speed of 5.5–11.5 km/s. Accordingly they
arrive first in the seismogram and are therefore called primary waves (P-waves).
P-waves are able to propagate in solid, gaseous, and liquid media and thus are
able to travel through the liquid core of the Earth. The P-wave exhibits a change
in volume and shape of the rock material.
• The other underground wave types are shear waves (S-waves). This wave type
propagates horizontally or vertically perpendicular to the wave propagation
direction and only shear the rock material with no change in its volume. Due to
this different mode of wave propagation S-waves travel much more slowly (3.5–
6.0 km/s) and thus they “arrive” in the seismograms after the P-waves; therefore
they are also called “secondary waves.” An S-wave can only propagate through
solid materials.
• Love waves result from the interference of many horizontal shear waves. They
travel with a slower velocity than P- or S-waves, but faster than Rayleigh waves.
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 69

The particle motion of a Love wave is transverse and forms a horizontal line
perpendicular to the direction of propagation. Because Love waves travel on
the Earth’s surface, the strength of the waves decreases exponentially with the
depth of an earthquake. Large earthquakes may generate Love waves that travel
around the Earth several times before dissipating and their amplitude decays
comparatively slowly. Love waves are the most destructive forces outside the
immediate area of the earthquake’s focus (epicenter).
• Rayleigh waves are a type of wave that travels near the surface of solids.
Rayleigh waves include both longitudinal and transverse motions that decrease
exponentially in amplitude as distance from the surface increases. Rayleigh
waves are generated by the interaction of P- and S-waves at the surface of the
Earth, and travel with a velocity of about 3 km/s that is lower than the P-, S-,
and Love-wave velocities.
The seismic waves propagating from an earthquake spread out in all directions
through the Earth’s interior. The waves can either travel through the Earth’s inte-
rior (body waves) or exclusively along the Earth’s surface (surface waves). They
are measured by seismometers that take advantage of a pendulum transferring
seismic waves into a horizontal or vertical movement. The wave propagation from
the hypocenter can be described as a mechanical wave or vibration that leads to
a compression and extension of the rock particles. In this regard a mechanical
wave is comparable to a sound wave. In general earthquake waves can either run
through the Earth’s interior or along its surface. Seismic waves propagate faster
in hard, solid, and uniformly made rock sequences, whereas in soft sediments or
heavily fractured rock sequences they travel much more slowly as they lose their
energy. Such a loss in energy is called “wave attenuation.”
Seismic stations that are located all over the world record the waves accord-
ing to the time difference the waves need to travel from the epicenter. The travel
velocity depends on material properties such as composition, density, mineral
phase, temperature, and so on of the rock material through which seismic waves
pass. Seismic waves travel more quickly through denser materials and therefore
generally arrive earlier with respect to the travelled distance. Moreover, seismic
waves move more slowly through a liquid than a solid. Therefore molten areas
within the Earth slow down P-waves and stop S-waves because their shearing
motion cannot be transmitted through a liquid. When seismic waves pass between
geologic layers with different seismic travel velocities the waves are reflected,
bend, or can even produce new wave phases.
From the seismograms clear indications can be drawn of where the earthquake
has happened and what travel paths the seismic rays have taken (Fig. 3.11). When
the incoming wave signal is identified as originating at a distance of less than 30°
from the epicenter it has mainly travelled through the upper mantle. Between 30
and 100° the P- and S-waves have travelled through the lower mantle and beyond
100° only P-waves can be recorded, as they have travelled through the outer core.
From the time differences of the P- and S-waves recorded at a seismic station the
internal structure of the Earth has been identified. The outer core especially is due
70 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

to its liquid phase which is very indicative as it does not allow S-waves to pass.
Seismic ray paths show that at distances between 100° and 180° a zone occurs
on the surface where no S-waves can be recorded, the so-called S-wave shadow.
In contrast, the reflection of P-waves at the mantle–outer core boundary reveals a
P-wave shadow between 103 and 143°.
A theoretical impression of how seismic waves propagate through the Earth’s
interior is given in Fig. 3.11. The waves travel either along the surface or through
the body of the Earth (body waves). When the waves encounter a lithospheric dis-
continuity a part of the waves is reflected or refracted and another part deviates
like light when passing from one medium to another. Thus the seismic waves are
able to cross the entire Earth and can be recorded even on the other side of the
globe.
According to information given by the USGS (2014) there are about 5 million
earthquakes per year of which:
50,000 have a magnitude between 3–3.9
6000 have a magnitude between 4–4.9
800 have a magnitude between 5–5.9
120 have a magnitude between 6–6.9
18 have a magnitude between 7–7.9
1 has a magnitude of higher than 8
The largest earthquakes in historic times have been of magnitude slightly over
9 (Valdivia 9.3, Chile 1960), although there is no limit to the possible magni-
tude. The most recent large earthquakes of magnitude 9.0 or larger were the 2004
Sumatra quake and the 9.0 earthquake in Japan in March 2011.

Fig. 3.11  Seismic ray paths

through Earth‘s interior
(Courtesy USGS, ibid)
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 71

3.2.1.2 Measuring Earthquakes

People who once or often were affected by earthquakes have worried about why
such a tragedy happened and whether it might happen again. This information
demand can be taken as the origin of modern seismology. From the very beginning
people were interested in having an instrument at hand to provide an objective
assessment of the earthquake’s strength. Therefore in historical documents a mul-
titude of information on natural disaster events such as flood, volcanic eruption,
droughts, and also earthquakes can be found. The problem in reconstructing natu-
ral disaster events from historical records is that the information given is gener-
ally very inhomogeneous, too scarce, and very subjective. What was needed was a
measure that is objective, reproducible, and could be used all over the world under
the same conditions. With the seismograph developed by Wiechert and followers
the technical basis for such independent measures was laid. From the records gath-
ered by these instruments in the course of time two different assessment method-
ologies to define the strength of an earthquake were developed: the “magnitude”
(Richter magnitude scale) which measures the amount of energy released (ES) by
the event and the “intensity” (Mercalli intensity scale).
Information on the first earthquake in man’s history was given by the Chinese
about 1100 BC (Fig. 3.12), and it was mentioned in an earthquake catalogue that
listed several dozen large earthquakes during the next few thousand years. In
Europe the first descriptive records on earthquakes date back to the mid-sixteenth
century. The earliest known earthquake reports in the Americas came from Mexico
where events in the late fourteenth century and in Peru in 1471 were recorded

Fig. 3.12  Model of
the first earthquake
identification instrument
(Han Dynasty), China,
about 132 AD (Source file:
EastHanSeismograph.JPG,
Wikipedia; “Zhang Heng”;
access: 20 May 2014)
72 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

although not very well documented. By the seventeenth century, descriptions of

the effects of earthquakes were being published around the world, with still an
often highly questionable degree of reliability.
The first seismograph of modern times that was able to measure ground motions
reproducibly was built by Emil Wiechert at the University of Göttingen in 1900.
He invented a recording system based on the concept of a reversed and air-damped
pendulum. A solid mass hanging independently over the moving Earth takes up the
amplitude of the ground motion with some delay. The normal amplitude of a free
hanging pendulum is according to the volume of the Earth one second and therefore
pendulums like this are called “second pendulums.” As ground motion not only has
horizontal amplitude but also a vertical component, Wiechert also invented a pen-
dulum that is able the measure the vertical ground motion component.
Thus developing a reliable and homogeneous dataset, for instance, of earth-
quake distribution and damage patterns requires the use of as many different
data sources as possible and makes cross-checking of the results indispensable.
Nevertheless it has to be acknowledged that the older an event dates back the
less reliable is the information on patterns of earthquake location, strength, and
destruction pattern. Furthermore it has to be acknowledged that before 1950
there were no instruments available that guaranteed an accurate and reproduc-
ible record of an event. Meanwhile the technology of seismographs has been
much developed and today even the smallest earthquake anywhere on the globe
can be identified in all three directions (X/Y/Z). The most important and reli-
able measure to identify how strong an earthquake was, is the energy released by
seismographs/accelerographs expressed by its peak ground acceleration (PGA).

Richter Magnitude Scale

From the seismograms not only the epicenter distance and the travel path can be
derived but also the strength of an earthquake as the amplitude of the seismogram
is clearly related to the quantity of energy released.
The best-known measure to rate the strength or total energy of earthquakes
is the famous Richter magnitude scale, invented by Charles Richter and Beno
Gutenberg (Richter 1935). Gutenberg proposed to use the maximum amplitude of
a wave group to be taken as an indicator of the total energy. The scale those days
opened the possibility for a worldwide comparison of earthquake events. It has no
upper limit but usually ranges from 1 to 9. The scale uses a logarithmic scale (base
10-log) which defines the magnitude as the logarithm of the ratio of the ampli-
tude of the seismic wave. Because it is logarithmic scale, an earthquake rated as
5 is ten times as powerful as one rated as 4. Physically this value corresponds to
a 31.6 times greater release in energy than a magnitude 4 earthquake. Richter and
Gutenberg developed the method by putting the seismic travel time and amplitude
of a seismic registration into an empirical relation, based on the evidence that the
farther the distance of an earthquake the longer is its travel time and the higher the
amplitude in the seismogram, the stronger are the damages.
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 73

The Richter magnitude scale was later abolished as the instruments once used
by Richter and Gutenberg were replaced by worldwide networks of seismic sta-
tions. Today the seismic moment of an event is calculated that is proportional to
the physical size of the event as it is derived from the area of the rupture times the
average slip that took place in the earthquake. The millions of seismic data from
all over the world collected every day enable the seismologists to quite precisely
calculate the magnitude even in the range higher than magnitude 9. Moreover, as
seismographs are recording the ground motions as a function of time, a compari-
son of different signals for known seismic monitoring stations enables the calcula-
tion of the distance between the seismic source and instrument.

Macroseismic

Even in ancient times, the first impressions the people had of earthquakes were
the destructive impact on their houses, the number of persons killed, and the
amount of people made homeless. For more than 1000 years the effects of past
earthquakes were therefore written down in historical records mainly describing
the death toll and the date of the event. According to the technical capability of
those times the people mostly reported in short notes, often scarce and imprecise
in the description of the damage pattern and often unclear concerning the date.
Therefore since the Middle Ages all over Europe—the first records can even be
traced back until 1000 AD—natural disasters events (earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions, and floods) were recorded.
As the severity of destruction was the only outcome people could easily rec-
ognize, this fact became the basis of a classification system. Geophysically the
impact on the Earth’s surface is related to the strength of the shaking that again
is related to the energy released. This part of seismology is called “macroseis-
mology” and has developed into a useful and well-accepted part of seismology,
although macroseismology is more a classification of observed effects in a limited
area, rather than a measure of the strength of the shaking of an earthquake. The
classification provides an “idealized” description of the effects generally called
“macroseismic intensity.” Such an assessment nevertheless is exclusively based on
a subjective impression made by an unequipped observer rather than on a physical
parameter. Macroseismic is the most important cornerstone to formulate a seismic
risk reduction strategy. The basic concept is to provide information on the earth-
quake severity from such observation of the damage at the local and regional lev-
els. By transferring such information into a vulnerability model of an area under
investigation it is possible to define the probable damage distribution of future
earthquakes.
The first steps towards an earthquake damage assessment method were based
on visual impressions stated in ancient times. But it took until the 1880s when
the Italian geophysicist Guiseppe Mercalli introduced his famous “Mercalli
scale” which soon became the internationally agreed-upon classification system.
Since then the scale underwent a couple of modifications. It originated on the
74 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

times widely used 10-degree Rossi–Forel Scale. In 1902 the 10-degree Mercalli
scale was expanded to 12 degrees by Italian physicist Adolfo Cancani and later
­redefined by the German geophysicist August Heinrich Sieberg. From that time
on the scale became known as the Mercalli–Cancani–Sieberg (MCS) scale. In
1956 the scale was completely overhauled by Charles Richter (MM56). Today
the Mercalli scale is known as the modified Mercalli scale (MM) or modified
Mercalli intensity scale (MMI). In order to make the scale more practically adopt-
able quantitative aspects of the damage were introduced by Medvedev, Sponheuer,
and Karnik in 1964 (MSK) and used in Europe for almost half a century. Today the
European Macroseismic Scale (EMS-98) has been agreed upon to set the basis for
evaluation of seismic intensities in European countries (Grünthal 1998). The scale
is divided into 12 sections and has meanwhile proved to function as an encour-
agement to the interdisciplinary cooperation between engineers and seismologists.
Since then the scale has undergone several modifications and in 1998 the EMS-98
was declared the sole measure to compare seismic impacts at least in the European
region.
By the EMS-98 scale the effects of an earthquake on the Earth’s surface,
humans, objects of nature, and man-made structures can be quantified and thus
compared on a scale from I (not felt) to XII (total destruction). The lower degrees
of the Mercalli scale generally deal with the manner in which the earthquake is
felt by people. The higher numbers of the scale are based on observed structural
damage. The effect depends upon the distance to the earthquake, with the highest
intensities being around the epicentral area. Data gathered from people who have
experienced the quake are used to determine an intensity value for their location.
The advantage of the method is that it relates directly to the natural phenomenon,
with the damage to buildings, people, and their living environment. The disadvan-
tage is that the Mercalli scale is quite openly formulated, leaving much space for
interpretation. Moreover, the assessment is in general carried out by those affected
and even when carried out by experts is seldom exact enough to be used for
nationwide or international comparison.
The essential feature that distinguishes the MMI from the EMS98 is according
to IASPEI (2002, Chap. 12) “that:
• MMI attempted to distinguish between the effects of earthquake shaking on
buildings of different construction types, using type as an analog of strength,
• EMS 98 employs a series of six vulnerability classes which represent strength
directly and involve construction type, but also other factors such as workman-
ship and condition.”
Moreover the EMS 98 distinguishes between structural and nonstructural damage
and the different forms of damage defining five classes of destruction: slight, mod-
erate, heavy, very heavy, and complete destruction.
In Table 3.1 the European magnitude scale (EMS-98) is given with its respec-
tive vulnerability classification (Description) and in Fig. 3.13 the vulnerability
classes according to building/construction type are also based on EMS-98.
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 75

Table 3.1  European macroseismic scale (EMS-98)

EMS Definition Description
1 Not felt Not felt, even under the moat favourable circumstances
2 Scarcely felt Vibration is felt only by individual people at rest in houses,
especially on upper floor of buiIdings
3 Weak The vibration is weak and is felt indoors by a few people.
People at rest feel swaying or light trembling
4 Largely observed The earthquake is felt indoors by many people, outdoors by
very few. A few people are awakened. The level of vibration
is not frightening. Windows, doors and dishes rattle. Hanging
object swing
5 Strong The earthquake is felt indoors by most, outdoors by few. Many
sleeping people awake. A few run outdoors. Building tremble
throughout. Hanging objects swing considerably. China and
glasses clatter together. The vibration is strong. Top heavy
object topple over. Doors and windows swing open or shut
6 Slighty damaging Felt by most indoors and by many outdoors. Many people in
buildings are frightened and run outdoors. Small objects fall.
Slight damage to many ordinary buildings e.g., fine cracks in
plaster and small pieces of plaster fall
7 Damaging Most people are frightened and run outdoors. Furniture is
shifted and objects fall from shelves in large numbers. Many
ordinary buildings suffer moderate damage: small cracks in
walls; partial collapse of chimneys
3 Heavily damaging Furniture may be overturned. Many ordinary buildings suffer
damage: chimneys fall; large cracks appear in walls and a few
buildings may partially collapse
9 Destructive Monuments and columns fall or are twisted. Many ordinary
buildings partially collapse and a few collapse completely
10 Very destructive Many ordinary buildings collapse
11 Devastating Most ordinary buildings collapse
12 Completely Practically all structures above and below ground are heavily
devastating damaged or destroyed
Courtesy IASPEI (2002)

Other than earthquake magnitude that is recorded from instruments, the inten-
sity is assessed exclusively by visual inspection. In general, data collection on
seismic intensities is based on first-hand surveys of seismologists, second from
interrogation among the people that were exposed to the quake, or third by using
historical data often found in old church documents. The main obstacle to over-
come by interviewing is that memory fades very quickly and that often the same
event is highly differently perceived by different people. Questionnaires should
therefore be easily understandable, simple to answer, but as precise as possible
regarding the factual base of the event. The interviewee should either be chosen
randomly or unselected. Another fraction of interviewees are the mandated offi-
cials and experts. The questionnaire must also be designed for that group of peo-
ple. There is a variety of questionnaires in use all having in common that they
assess the earthquake shaking, its sound, the effects on the people and animals, the
76 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.13  Vulnerability classes according to building/construction type (Based on EMS-98)

Table 3.2  Macroseismic intensity assessment questionnaire

Personal Effects on Effects on Effects on Effects on building
data person objects animals
Name Position during the Hanqing objects Animals indoor Type of building
Address earthquake Glass ware, Animals outdoor   • No idea
Date/Time If inside, which China   • No coment
Location floor Windows, doors   • Stone masonry
Activity before the Easily movable   • Brick masonry
earthquake began objects concrete
How strong the Small stable   • Steel
earthquake was felt objects   • Wood
What type of Light furniture Use of building
motion by the Large objects   • No idea
earthquake was felt overturned   • No comment
Did other people Liquids (jar,   • Private
feel the earthquake containers)   • Public
also Tombstones Degree of damage
Immediate personal (moved)   • No damage
reaction Wave in the observed
  • No reaction ground   • Hairline cracks
  • Surprise Monuments,   • Cracks in walls
  • Awakening columns   • Falling plaster
  • Fear   • Chimney
  • Problems main- collapsed
taining balance   • Individual walls
  • Running outside and columns
  • Panic collapsed
  • Total collapse
Courtesy Lang (2002)
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 77

effects of the household, and the building substance. An example recommended

for Switzerland is given in Table 3.2.
Today such records are used to trace back the disaster history of a region as
demonstrated for all of Switzerland or by Barbano et al. (2001) for the earthquake
events of the town of Nicolosi, Sicily, or for an entire country such as Italy by
the “Catalog of Historical Earthquakes in Italy” (CPTI; Camassi 2004). Once all
the information is transferred into numbers, they can be plotted on a map. The
resulting intensity map gives a comprehensive picture of the pattern of effects of
the earthquake in contours that are equal to the intensity values that have been
observed. The contours are called isoseismals and will be highest near the epi-
center and gradually decrease with distance. The decay of intensity with distance
is called attenuation. Mostly the contours have an elliptical shape with the long
axis directed according to the orientation of the fault that produced the earthquake.
Transforming locally observed damage into a regional earthquake intensity
distribution has been carried out for many earthquake-prone regions of the world,
for example, on the 2009 L’Aquila (Italy) earthquake damage using a Web-based
survey. With the help of an online questionnaire 65,000 people reported on their
individual impressions. The huge amount of answers allowed a broad range of sta-
tistical assessments that revealed good agreement with the magnitude recording of
the area. A similar assessment has been carried out by the USGS on an earthquake
along the San Andreas fault system. Macroseismic assessment from all over the
world proved that it is generally possible to derive information from earthquake
magnitudes from intensities. This is especially useful as it helps to extend earth-
quake catalogues back into historical times. Nevertheless it has to be acknowl-
edged that local geology strongly influences the peak ground velocity, or that
strong but short-time ground motion has lower damaging potential than accelera-
tions that are less in strength but last for a longer period.

Volcano Seismology

Not only plate movements but also volcanic activity can cause seismic signals.
Moreover, it was recognized that nearly all volcanic eruptions have been accom-
panied by seismic signals such as the Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1991 (Newhall and
Punongbayan 1996). Since its first detection in the early 1900s, extensive seismic
networks were deployed, today collecting a variety of information at a great num-
ber of volcanoes worldwide (Scarpa and Tilling 1996).
Nevertheless a huge number of volcanoes are still unmonitored to the extent
necessary (USGS 2005a). Almost all volcanoes showed increased levels of earth-
quake shaking before an eruption took place. It is assumed that rising of the
magma in the vent and the degassing of the magma are the origin for the low-fre-
quency shaking as the material must find its way through the volcanic structure
either by using existing fractures and cracks or by breaking up new pathways.
The shaking can be monitored as high-frequency earthquake signals indicative
78 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

of rock breaking caused by the fracturing of brittle rock as magma forces its way
upward. These short-period earthquakes signify the growth of a magma body
near the surface, and low-frequency waves occur when existing smaller cracks
are used. Often the entire volcanic system is under constant shaking called “vol-
canic tremor”. In most of the volcanoes worldwide volcanic earthquake shak-
ing is identified at depths below 10 km and released earthquakes of magnitude
2–3. Furthermore volcanic seismic signals often do not occur as single events
but rather as swarms made up of a multitude of seismic events over a longer time
period.
The installed seismic arrays at many volcanoes today revealed that identifica-
tion of source mechanisms of magma uplift can be an effective tool for a volcano
early warning. Although the elastic wave propagation is generally the same as that
of earthquakes, the volcanic seismic signals differ somehow and therefore also the
measuring devices and the seismic station’s geometry can be different. The main
problem in volcano seismology is that it is still unclear how and to what extent
the magma movements, fluid flows, degassing of the magma, or cracking in the
volcano’s structure can be identified from the seismic signals. Furthermore the
appearance of continuous seismic signals (volcanic tremor) is seen as the result of
rockfalls, lahars, landslides, pyroclastic flows, and minor volcanic explosions.
Measuring seismic volcanic activity today represents one of the major steps of
an effective early warning system and is often the only tool to forecast volcanic
eruptions and to monitor the eruption process (see Sect. 3.2.1.7). A higher rate
of volcanic tremors is seen as a signal of increased volcanic activity that mani-
fests long before the actual eruption takes place. Together with the other signs
of enhanced volcanic unrest (fumaroles, ground deformation from doming-up of
the structure, thermometry, emanation of radon and other gases, hot water occur-
rences) seismic activity is one of the major components of a volcano prediction.
On December 18th, 2001, seismologists and volcanologists successfully predicted
an eruption of Mt. Popocatepetl (Mexico City) hours before the volcano under-
went its most violent explosion in centuries. The early warning gave Mexican
officials enough time to evacuate some 40,000 people living in the shadow of the
volcano.

Reservoir-Induced Seismicity

Since 1940 when the first extensive study of the correlation between increased
earthquake shaking and the volume of impoundment in a reservoir was made for
Hoover Dam (United States), it became obvious that large dams can trigger earth-
quakes. Today evidence of a causal relationship between earth tremors and arti-
ficial water reservoirs was found for more than 100 dams worldwide. The most
powerful reservoir-induced seismicity (RIS) with a magnitude 6.3 destroyed the
Indian village of Koynanagar on December 11th, 1967, killing 180 people, injur-
ing 1500, and rendering thousands homeless. The dam was seriously damaged by
the quake that was felt up to 230 km from its epicenter. During the 1990s, two
seismic events greater than M5 and a series of smaller earthquakes occurred in
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 79

the vicinity of Koyna following the impoundment of the Warna Reservoir. These
new quakes gave rise to a unique experiment that drilled 21 boreholes to monitor
the water levels continuously. The measurements revealed coseismic changes of
several centimeters occurring in the wells associated with seismic shaking (Gupta
2002). RIS is also suspected to have contributed to one of the world’s most deadly
dam disasters, that of Diga del Vajont in the Italian Alps in 1963 killing 2600 peo-
ple. The 261-m dam—at the time the world’s fourth highest dam—was completed
in 1960 in a limestone gorge at the base of Mount Toc. Tremors began as soon as
the filling of the reservoir started. Later the reservoir was partially drained, and
the seismic activity and slope movement almost stopped. When the reservoir was
then filled again an increase in tremors was recorded. In 1963 heavy summer rains
swelled the reservoir and in September, 60 shocks were registered and the move-
ment on Mount Toc started to accelerate. On the night of October 9th, 350 million
cubic meters of rock broke off Mount Toc and plunged into the reservoir.
The most widely accepted explanation of how dams cause RIS is thought to
occur in two ways (Jauhari 1999):
• By adding millions of tons of stored water that increases the original stress to
faults, causing them to rupture
• By water seeping into the rock and changing the fluid pressure in microcracks
and fissures underground, thus “lubricating” the faults that are already under tec-
tonic strain, but were prevented from slipping by the friction of the rock surfaces.
Although the load effect of the first case is immediate, the pore pressure effect
is delayed because it requires the flow of the water through rock. This delay
can cause some reservoirs to begin triggering earthquakes years after the first
impounding.
Most of the strongest cases of RIS have been observed for dams over 100-m
depth. Nevertheless dams with just half the filling height are also believed to be
prone to quakes. Filling reservoirs can both increase the frequency of earthquakes
in areas of already high seismic activity but can also trigger earthquakes in areas
previously seismically inactive. Seismologists point to the fact that just the lat-
ter effect is the most dangerous as structures in areas thought to be quiescent are
generally not designed to withstand even minor earthquakes (Gupta, ibid). He
therefore recommended generally to consider RIS for reservoirs with filling depth
heights of more than 100 m as the depth of the reservoir is the most important fac-
tor, but the volume of water also plays a significant role. RIS can be immediately
noticed during filling periods of reservoirs or after a certain time lag. The RIS
cases investigated revealed that the seismic patterns are unique for every reservoir.
Moreover, the intensity of seismic activity is generally increased within around
25 km of the reservoir as it is filled. The strongest shocks normally occurred
within days, but sometimes within several years. After the filling of the reservoir
has reached its maximum, RIS events normally continued but usually with less
frequency and strength than before. Thus far the actual mechanisms of RIS are
not well understood therefore seismologists will not be able to predict accurately
which dams will induce earthquakes or how strong the tremors are likely to be.
80 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Lately the 7.9-magnitude Wenchuan earthquake in May 2008, which killed

an estimated 80,000 people has been linked to the construction of the Zipingpu
Artificial Reservoir. An intensive debate began in the public on the cause–effect
relationship generated due to the fact that the newly impounded Zipingpu reservoir
was located just about 20 km east of the earthquake epicenter. But intense seis-
mological investigations on pore pressure diffusion in relation to the variation of
water level in the reservoir revealed that the reservoir operation did not cause an
increase in local stress at the earthquake hypocenter and the surrounding region,
leading to the assumption that the reservoir probably did not play a role in generat-
ing these disastrous earthquakes (Galahaut and Galahaut 2010).

Geothermal Power Plant at Landau, Rhine-Pallatine (Germany)

The location of the city of Landau in close vicinity of the Upper Rhine Graben
Structure that exhibits a significantly increased geothermal heat flow, made the idea
of using low enthalpy geothermal power for heating purposes technically and eco-
nomically feasible. The power plant started operation in 2007 to produce 3 MW of
energy from 160 °C hot water from Triassic limestones at 3000 m depth. The total
investment was about €20 million mostly for the injection and the production wells.
Two years after starting operation, a number of small earthquakes were registered
with a magnitude of M2.4–2.7. The earthquakes were located just below the city of
Landau about 2 km distant from the wells and at a depth of 2.8 km. Some streets
were deforming, some houses showed cracks in the walls, and arsenic was detected
in shallow ground water wells. The State Pallatine commissioned the German
Geological Survey (BGR 2010) to analyze the situation. The experts came to the
conclusion that there is a causal relationship between the seismicity and energy pro-
duction. Although small damage to nonstructural parts of exposed buildings may
occur, damage to the supporting structure can be ruled out. The main reason for
the quakes was seen in the reinjection of the thermal waters that led to an increase
in pore pressure and resulted in a change of the local tectonic stress regime. The
experts proposed to introduce a high-sensitive seismic grid around the plant to ena-
ble a real-time identification of an increase in seismicity one or two days before the
stress releases. Based on such information the reinjection could be reduced accord-
ingly. Moreover the state government ordered the plant operator to increase the
risk insurance coverage. A mediated participation was established where all those
affected were asked to present their specific concerns. The increased costs from
reduced energy production and for the monitoring of the seismicity and the cover-
age of the damages led the operating consortium in 2013 to halt the operation.
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 81

Earthquakes Generated from Producing Gas Field (Groningen,

Netherlands)

In August 2012, an earthquake with a magnitude from 1.8 to 3.2 on the Richter
scale occurred in the village of Huizinge in the province of Groningen in the
Netherlands (Kraaijpoel et al. 2011). The tremors were recorded in the vicinity of
the Groningen gas field, the tenth largest gas field in the world, from which NAM,
a consortium of Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil, has produced natural gas
since 1963. The field has about 300 wells across 20 production sites. Forty percent
of the shares of the operation are held by the Dutch government. Seismological
evidence revealed the tremors to be triggered from the change in reservoir pressure
through production. Gas extraction is known to lead to tectonic subsidence along
the naturally occurring faults and that the energy released results in local tremors.
In the case of the Groningen field, the hypocenter is relatively close to the sur-
face at about three kilometers underground, where the gas is situated. It should be
acknowledged that NAM is producing the gas from conventional production wells
not by fracking. The geotectonic situation of the northeastern Netherlands on the
surface exhibits a flat landscape yet the subsurface terrain is highly complex. Near
Groningen the stratification is distorted severely mainly due to salt tectonics. The
reservoirs are cut into compartments by vertical fault systems. The earthquakes are
associated with differential compaction due to gas extraction and reactivation of
the existing faults. The seismicity pattern shows some lineation, especially for the
larger earthquakes. The catalogue of earthquakes induced by gas production in the
north of the Netherlands contains 688 events to date.
During the initial decades of production the surveying organization KNMI (Royal
Netherlands Meteorological Institute) did not detect any earth tremors from the field.
This changed in the mid-1980s when about 10–20 tremors were recognized per year.
In 2003 there was a significant increase in tremors monitored and KNMI found evi-
dence that the tremors could directly be linked with the gas production.
After the earthquake of August 2012 the Dutch Government started an initiative
to revise the existing gas production plan. Subsequently NAM submitted a revised
production plan on which the Dutch government will make a decision in January
2014. The plan comprises numerous actions to be taken to increase local resilience
including:
• Enhancing knowledge of the regional seismic fault patterns.
• Assessing of the likelihood of the occurrence of higher intensity earthquakes.
• Identifying measures suitable to prevent structural damage to buildings.
• Strengthening communication between NAM and the population at risk.
• Introducing a “Groningen gas website” and other public information campaigns.
• Implementing a program to provide information on structural reinforcement for
vulnerable houses.
Moreover the compensation allowance for damage has been substantially
increased and broadened by NAM in order to compensate the victims in a timely
manner for the 2500 damages claimed since August 2012.
82 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Induced Earthquakes from Waste Water Reinjection

Induced seismicity is earthquake shaking that results from human activity that is
beyond the normal regional level of historical seismic activity and that can lead to
damage to the surrounding communities. In addition, if the seismic activity returns
to background activity after the human activity stops, that would be another sign
that the seismic activity was induced. One of the causes of induced seismicity
can be fluid injection. Fluids in the pores and fractures of the rocks (pore pres-
sure) play a major role in controlling the pressure in a reservoir. If pore pressure
is increased, earthquake activity can be accelerated along existing fractures (shear
failure). Injecting fluids into the underground generally results in an increase of
reservoir pore pressure and that can cause faults and fractures to “fail” more easily.
However, seismicity can also be induced by extracting fluids. In order to improve
understanding of the triggering mechanisms of wastewater reinjection, knowledge
of the local earthquake distribution pattern, the reservoir characteristics, and the
time and amount of waters injected should be analyzed. The epicenters of earth-
quakes induced by fluid-injection activities are not always located close to the
point of injection. It is assumed that the injected fluids can migrate for larger hori-
zontal and vertical distances from the injection location. Therefore induced earth-
quakes commonly occur several kilometers below the injection point. In some
cases, induced earthquakes could be located as far as 10 km from the injection
well.
One of the many applications for wastewater reinjection is carried out by the
oil industry. All over the world oilfield wastewater, after removal of the oil and
the solids, is injected into a deep well for permanent storage underground. In the
United States oilfield wastewater reinjection has been carried out for decades and
it was reported that within the central and eastern United States, the number of
earthquakes has increased dramatically over the past few years in areas that are
under oil exploitation license. More than 300 earthquakes above a magnitude 3.0
occurred in the years from 2010–2012, compared with an average rate of 21 events
per year observed from 1967–2000 (EERI 2014). These earthquakes are fairly
small, although large enough to have been felt by many people, yet small enough
rarely to have caused damage.
USGS scientists analyzed changes in the rate of earthquake occurrence
recorded since 1970 in these areas (USGS 2013). The increase in seismicity has
been found to coincide with the injection of wastewater in deep disposal wells in
Midwest locations from Texas to Ohio. Hydraulic fracturing, commonly known
as “fracking,” does not appear to be linked to the increased rate of magnitude 3
and larger earthquakes. Although wastewater injection has not yet been linked to
earthquakes larger than M6 scientists cannot eliminate its probability as it appears
that wastewater disposal was the cause of the M5 earthquakes at Raton Bazon
(Colorado) and Prague (Oklahoma), that both have led to a few injuries and dam-
age to more than a dozen homes. Evidence from some case histories suggests that
the magnitude of the largest earthquake tends to increase as the total volume of
injected wastewater increases. Injection pressure and rate of injection may also be
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 83

factors, although more research is needed to determine answers to these impor-

tant questions. Nevertheless, according to EERI (ibid), the overall risk of induced
seismicity from wastewater disposal can be rated to be—although not zero—either
minimal or able to be handled in a cost-effective manner.

3.2.1.3 Liquefaction

The damaging impact from earthquakes is different from location to location and
is mainly the result of two different phenomena. One is, how strong a building is
to withstand seismic motion. The other is how the geology (rocks and sediments)
reacts to the seismic energy released. It turned out from the very beginning of seis-
mology that the geology surrounding the epicenter has a significant influence on
the earthquake impact. Thus it was noticed that unconsolidated sediments tend
to react much differently when exposed to seismic energy. Hard crystalline rocks
stay stable, but soft sediments tend to react like a liquid. Seismograms reveal that
in soft unconsolidated sediments the amplitudes can reach three times the height
of hard rocks. Furthermore the time spans the acceleration holds on are consid-
erably longer. The upper 30 m of building grounds especially often consist of
unconsolidated soils, loose sands of river terraces, or gently inclined slopes, and
therefore react significantly to ground motions. This phenomenon is called lique-
faction. Physically liquefaction can be explained as soft sediments with low or no
cohesion being exposed to dynamic acceleration; the energy introduced into the
system increases the pore pressure. And when the pore water cannot be drained
off, the soils react like a liquid. The energy input into the system is then ampli-
fied by the soft medium as it has a different elasticity modulus that leads to a long
period of shaking of the ground, thus the intensity of a magnitude 5 earthquake in
liquefaction-prone sediments can be much higher than if it strikes hard ground.
Furthermore the elasticity modulus of soft sediments is much different from that
of steel-reinforced masonry buildings, with the result that both materials work
against each other and massive large-scale and widely distributed damage occurs.
Many regions on Earth are exposed to this type of natural hazard, especially
former dried-up lake sediments that have been settled extensively afterwards.
The Kathmandu basins in Nepal with its 700,000 inhabitants today is one of the
famous examples of this. Or in Turkey when the building itself remains struc-
turally intact but the building ground reacted like a “liquid” and made the entire
building sink into the ground (Fig. 3.14). In contrast, the island of Manhattan
(New York) is built of granitic ground making the construction of high skyscrapers
possible at all.

3.2.1.4 Earthquake Prediction

Although numerous efforts have been undertaken in the last decades to improve
earthquake prediction, a reliable prediction tool still does not exist (Geller et al.
84 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.14  Liquefaction of
the subsurface strata from
the earthquake event in 1999
made this masonry structure
collapse (Adapazari; Turkey)

1997; Kagan 1997). And this unpredictability makes earthquakes one of the
most lethal natural disasters. Even in the areas best known for earthquakes in
the California San Andreas Fault system or the Adana Fracture Zone in Northern
Turkey, no evidence was ever found that would enable geophysicists to predict the
exact date for an earthquake to occur. For the San Andreas Fault the United States
Geological Survey recently released information that they expect a major earth-
quake in the area of 6.7 Richter scale to occur until the year 2038 with a 99.7 %
probability and an earthquake of magnitude 7.5 with a probability of 46 % for the
same time span. But they also declared that all monitoring instruments and inter-
pretation methods are still not reliable enough to predict the onset at a sufficient
level of reliability, although the area is plugged with thousands of seismic moni-
toring devices.
USGS statistics on earthquake occurrences (USGS 2014) regularly report on
earthquake events from all over the globe. More than 10,000 events occur yearly
with a magnitude of M4.0 and higher, although it is thus far not possible to predict
a future event with a reliable level of certainty. There are geophysicists who are
convinced that a robust forecast will also not be possible in the near future (Geller
et al., ibid), although another school of thought believes that prediction is “inher-
ently possible” (Bakun and Lindh 1985).
The aim of earthquake prediction is to warn the people of a potentially damag-
ing earthquake early enough and specific concerning the time, location, and mag-
nitude to allow appropriate response to the expected disaster. There have been a
number of predictions of earthquake events in the last decades, but none of them
succeeded in identifying the proper parameters for the expected events.
In many cases such predictions did not specify all the required parameters, but
often left out one or more (Bakun and Lindh, ibid). Such an approach is mostly
called trivial as it normally only describes the earthquake parameters in such a
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 85

generalized and unspecified manner that the message holds many possible events
true. His experience with earthquake prediction led Charles F. Richter in 1977 on
the occasion of the presentation of the honor, “Medal of the Seismological Society
of America,” on earthquake prediction to state: “Since my first attachment to seis-
mology, I have had a horror of predictions and of predictors. Prediction provides a
happy hunting ground for amateurs, cranks, and outright publicity-seeking fakers.”
The most reliable way to assess potential future earthquakes is still by study-
ing the history of large earthquakes in a specific area and the rate at which strain
accumulates (USGS 1995a; Kagan, ibid). The assessments are based on millions
of events, listed in international statistics covering the last centuries, as well as
from seismological research in the field but also in laboratories and on theoreti-
cal investigations. For example, the USGS has been monitoring the strain accu-
mulation for years along the fault segments of the San Andreas Fault zone, and
measures the time that has passed since the last earthquake and calculates the
strain that was released during the last earthquake. This information is then used
to calculate the time required for the accumulating strain to build to the level that
may result in an earthquake event. This simple model is complicated by the fact
that such detailed information about faults is rare. In the United States, only the
San Andreas Fault system has adequate records for using this prediction method
(Segall et al. 2007). The information collected thus far allows the assessment of
most earthquake mechanisms and to describe the major fault zones. On studying
the frequency of large earthquakes in the past it is possible to determine at least
the future likelihood of similar large shocks. For example, if a region has experi-
enced four magnitude 7 or larger earthquakes during 200 years of recorded history,
and if these shocks occurred randomly in time, then scientists would assign a 50 %
probability to the occurrence of another magnitude 7 or larger quake in the region
during the next 50 years (200:4 = 50).
To achieve meaningful predictions the assessment should define the range of
possibilities concerning the time the event will set in, the proper location, and the
expected magnitude. For a long time, earthquake prediction was mainly carried
out in a deterministic way, based on various kinds of more or less clearly identifi-
able precursors. Meanwhile earthquake prediction is aiming to quantify the uncer-
tainty of an earthquake event to occur. To achieve a short-time prediction a reliable
forecast requires a statistical approach to simulate the probability of an earthquake
risk. The many forecasting models at hand and the tremendous capacity of com-
puting today allow us to apply a broad range of parameters and then to check the
results against real observations. Kagan and Jackson (1991) have applied the like-
lihood method for many earthquake occurrence studies. Their stochastic modeling
describes “seismicity as a random process, for which a continuous space-time den-
sity distribution of the earthquake occurrence can be defined.” The use of stochas-
tic models is achieving increasing success in answering the question of what the
chance is that another large earthquake will occur in the near future.
A different approach is used when forecasting the next earthquake in the long
term. This approach assumes that on the same seismogenic source, earthquakes
have similar rupture areas, similar mechanisms, and similar magnitudes, and are
86 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

defined by a remarkable regularity. They are often assumed to have similar hypo-
centers, similar displacement distributions within the rupture area, similar source
time functions (leading to similar seismograms), and quasi-periodic recurrence.
This probabilistic approach can be applied when assuming that the elastic strain
energy accumulates over a long period of time after the occurrence of one earth-
quake before the fault is prepared to release in the next earthquake.
Bilham et al. (1989) proposed a method to predict potential future earthquakes
by space geodesy measuring the speed at the plate boundaries. Fundamental to the
assumption that geodetic studies can be helpful to forecast, is a model in which
the strain that is released by an earthquake is equal to the strain developed in the
following interseismic period. They point to the fact that plate motions constitute a
1–10 cm/year displacement input signal to the earthquake process plate movement
and that most of the earthquakes occur within plate boundaries that are typically
less than a few hundred kilometers wide. But as the internal strain rates of plates
are normally less than 1 microstrain per year and the strain at failure is typically
between 10 and 100 microstrain, the measurements can only be successful when
a narrow spaced measuring array is established with spacing less than several tens
of kilometers to understand the mechanisms of plate boundary deformation and
rupture. They furthermore point to the fact that the earthquake rupture zone (the
region where the strain is released) is proportional to the magnitude of the earth-
quake. Thus if one knows the regional extent of a potential future earthquake its
magnitude can be estimated. Space geodesy has three significant advantages over
terrestrial methods: three-dimensional relative point positions are obtained from a
single observing pair, site intervisibility is not needed, and baselines of any length
can be included in a network. These advantages permit great flexibility in field
operations Nevertheless they stated that at present it does not appear promising for
space geodesy to provide predictions of precursory deformation that may be mani-
fest in the days and weeks preceding earthquakes.

3.2.1.5 Examples of Earthquake Occurrences

The First “Well-Known” Earthquake (Lisbon Earthquake, 1755)

One of the biggest earthquakes in Europe and the one that led to the birth of mod-
ern seismology was the earthquake of Lisbon in 1755. In combination with sub-
sequent fires and a tsunami, the earthquake almost destroyed the entire city of
Lisbon and the adjoining areas. Lisbon was in those days one of the richest and
wealthiest cities of the world. As the historic record is not very reliable it is antici-
pated that most probably 30–40,000 people lost their lives in the event (Pereira
2009). Today the Lisbon earthquake is estimated to have had a magnitude in the
range of 8.7–9.0 on the Richter scale with its epicenter 300 km west-southwest of
Lisbon in the Atlantic Ocean.
The earthquake was triggered along the Azores–Gibraltar transform fault that
marks the boundary between the African plate and Europe and that runs just south
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 87

of Portugal and Spain east–west into the Mediterranean Sea. The fault system is
seen responsible also for many earlier earthquakes, such as the ones that occurred
in 1724 and 1750. Historical record proves that the earthquake lasted about 9 min
(one of the longest according to earthquake records) and caused a 5-m wide fis-
sure that crossed the entire center of the city. Forty minutes after the earthquake a
huge tsunami occurred that rushed into the harbor and destroyed those parts that
thus far had not been affected by the earthquake. Afterwards a fire broke out that
destroyed all the houses that were neither affected by the earthquake nor by the
tsunami and that resulted in about 50 % of the houses being burned down. But the
tsunami did not only affect the city of Lisbon but almost the entire Algarve coast
and also heavily struck the islands of Madeira and the Azores. Even the Caribbean
islands of Martinique and Barbados were hit by a 10-m wave. Shocks of the earth-
quake were recorded all over Europe.
The earthquake not only destroyed 85 % of Lisbon’s buildings but had enor-
mous economic and social impact on the entire kingdom of Portugal. A large
amount of assets was accumulated in the city, for example, from a high influx of
gold from Brazil and the African colonies. Pereira estimated the economic losses
due to the earthquake of about 50 % of the gross domestic product, a figure that is
enormous when seen in respect to the overwhelming richness of the Portuguese
empire in those days. In the aftermath wheat and barley prices rose by more than
80 % (Pereira, ibid) for many years to come. In addition the prices for wood and
other construction materials increased considerably, as did labor costs. This was
also due to the effect that many craftsmen refused to work in Lisbon as they feared
to be hit by another earthquake. Nevertheless 10,000 huts were reconstructed in
the following months. Historically earthquakes and their following cascade of dis-
asters were seen as a distortion of national sovereignty. It also became the trig-
ger moment for a radical change in the general policy of the former Portuguese
Kingdom away from close trade relationships with England to a stronger orienta-
tion on colonialism.

Transform Fault Earthquake (Loma Prieta, California, 1989)

The Loma Prieta earthquake was one of the major earthquakes of the world. It
struck the San Francisco Bay Area (California), one of the most densely populated
regions of the United States, although luckily it did not strike the San Francisco
metropolitan area itself. The earthquake occurred on October 17th, 1989, at 5 p.m.
and was the first earthquake that was broadcast live on television as it happened
during a basketball sports game (Bakun and Prescott 1989).
The earthquake was generated by a strike-slip motion along the San Andreas
Fault. The quake lasted 10–15 s and measured 6.9 on the Richter scale. The quake
killed 63 people throughout Northern California, injured 3757 and left up to
10,000 people homeless. A total economic loss of US$6 billion was claimed.
The slip occurred over 35 km of fault at depths ranging from 7 to 20 km with a
maximum offset of 2.3 m. Although the earthquakes along the San Andreas Fault
88 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

system are in general strike-slip movements, the Loma Prieta earthquake had a
significant uplift component along its southwest dipping fault plane. The jolted
crustal segment mostly coincided with a fault segment that had already ruptured
in 1988. Although the San Andreas Fault occurs as a through-going fault in the
epicentral region, the Loma Prieta rupture surface forms a separate fault strand.
“Seismological evidence revealed that the earthquake may not have released all of
the strain stored in rocks and therefore may have a potential for another damaging
earthquake in the Santa Cruz Mountains in the future” (Bakun and Prescott, ibid).
Holzer (1998) describes in detail the main effects caused by the Loma Prieta
earthquake: strong ground shaking and liquefaction of both floodplain deposits in
the Monterey Bay region and on the sandy artificial fills along the margins of San
Francisco Bay and by landslides in the epicentral region. The strong ground shak-
ing was amplified by a factor of about two by soft soils (liquefaction) and caused
damage even 100 km away from the epicenter. Liquefaction alone is seen respon-
sible for about US$100 million in economic loss. Landslides caused US$30 mil-
lion in earthquake losses, damaging at least 200 residences. Many landslides
showed that they had already moved in previous earthquakes. Post-earthquake
studies provided one of the most comprehensive case histories of earthquake
effects ever made in the United States. A comparison of the liquefaction and land-
slide impacts from 1906 with those of 1989 lay the base to work out new method-
ologies to map liquefaction and landslide hazards. Seismographs installed in 28
buildings recorded the respective building responses to the earthquake shaking and
provided physical evidence to understand how different building structures inter-
act with their foundations when shaken and how liquefaction can amplify ground
motion. It furthermore prompted the California legislature in 1990 to pass the
Seismic Hazards Mapping Act that required the California Geological Survey to
delineate areas potentially susceptible to these hazards and communities to regu-
late development in these zones (Holzer, ibid).
Approximately 16,000 housing units were no longer habitable after the earth-
quake; 13,000 alone in the San Francisco Bay region, and another 30,000 units

Fig. 3.15  Collapse of the

MacArthur Maze (Cypress
Viaduct) in Oakland from the
1989 Loma Prieta earthquake
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 89

were even moderately damaged. It turned out that rented houses and low-income
residents were particularly hard hit. Structural failure of the many highway sys-
tems was the single largest cause of loss of life during the earthquake and led to a
death toll of 42 of the 63 earthquake fatalities; all of them died when the Cypress
Viaduct in Oakland collapsed (Fig. 3.15). The cost to repair and replace highways
damaged by the earthquake was US$2 billion, about half of which was to replace
the Cypress Viaduct. Major bridge failures were the result of antiquated designs
and inadequate anticipation of seismic loading. The gas distribution lines and
water pipelines showed a multitude of leaks and breaks all over the region.
In 1989 Mileti (1989) summarized how people and the economy reacted to the
event. Most people responded calmly and without panic to the earthquake and
acted to get themselves to a safe location. Economically the earthquake resulted
only in a minimal disruption to the regional economy that resulted in maximum
losses to the gross regional product of US$3 billion in the months after; but the
loss was 80 % recovered during the first six months of 1990. Approximately 7000
workers were laid off for a certain time period. For the local and national emer-
gency managers, the Loma Prieta earthquake provided the “first test of the newly
established post-earthquake review process that places red, yellow, or green plac-
ards on shaken buildings. Its successful application has led to widespread use in
other disasters including the September 11, 2001, New York City World Trade
Center attack” (Mileti, ibid).

Transform Fault Earthquake (Haiti, 2010)

On Tuesday, January 12th, 2010 an earthquake with magnitude 7.0 (Richter scale)
struck the entire region of the capital, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The epicenter was
located near the town of Léogâne approximately 25 km west of the capital. Within
the next two weeks almost 60 aftershocks were recorded with magnitudes of 4.5 or
greater. The two largest aftershocks were of magnitude 6.0 and 5.9.
An estimated three million people were affected by the quake. According to
official estimates (UNEG 2010) the death toll was estimated to be at least 220,000,
another 300,000 people were injured, 1.3 million people were made homeless,
and almost 100,000 houses were completely destroyed. The earthquake caused
major building damage in Port-au-Prince and other settlements around the capi-
tal. Many notable landmark and infrastructure buildings were significantly dam-
aged or totally destroyed, including the Presidential Palace, the National Assembly
Building, and the Port-au-Prince Cathedral. Nearly the entire communication sys-
tem; air, land, and sea transport facilities; hospitals; and electrical networks had
been damaged or destroyed totally by the earthquake. The lack of a functioning
infrastructure complicated almost all rescue and relief efforts, resulting in heavy
confusion over who was in charge in air traffic and land transport congestion. A
major problem was the long unsolvable problems on prioritization of relief flights.
Port-au-Prince’s authorities were overwhelmed with tens of thousands of bodies.
These had to be buried in mass graves. Delays in food and water supplies, medical
90 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

care and sanitation, and an unprofessional aid distribution management led to

angry protests by the survivors and locally to looting and sporadic violence (IFRC
2011a, b).
The earthquake occurred along the plate boundary that separates the Caribbean
plate and the North America plate. This plate boundary is dominated by strike-
slip motion and compressional tectonics that moves the Caribbean plate eastward
with respect to the North America plate with a speed of about 20 mm/year. The
earthquake did not, although consistent with former seismic events, result in a sig-
nificant surface displacement on the morphologically well-expressed main-strand
of the Garden Fault system, but instead appears to have caused a considerable
uplift of the Léogâne delta. The Garden Fault zone is supposed to have triggered
the historic earthquakes in 1860, 1770, and 1751. Interferometry analysis of the
crustal structure (Calais et al. 2010) revealed that the quake resulted in a vertical
uplift of more than 2 m of the northern block of the fault zone and that it was lat-
erally displaced by 50 cm in the northwest direction. The southern block instead
moved 50 cm in the northeast direction. The plate boundary along Hispaniola
Island (Haiti and Santo Domingo) is partitioned into two major east–west trend-
ing, strike-slip fault systems: one that occurs in northern Haiti and the other where
the earthquake happened runs along the Garden Fault system in southern Haiti.
The steep inclination of the deep earthquakes (Wadati–Benioff zone) indicates
the subduction of the oceanic lithosphere of the Caribbean plate along the Central
American and Atlantic Ocean margins, a subduction that is accompanied with
deep ocean trenches and volcanic arcs volcanoes. On the other hand shallow seis-
micity and focal mechanisms of major shocks in Guatemala, northern Venezuela,
and the Cayman Ridge and Cayman Trench indicate transform fault and pull-apart
basin tectonics at the backside.
The earthquake hit a society that has been living ever since in an extremely
poor social and economic situation. Even in times of no catastrophe, Haiti is
one of the poorest nations on Earth with an almost nonfunctioning public sector.
Even the minimum requirements for a sustainable living were missing. The high
birth rate, poor labor opportunities, and many people with no income, a poorly
functioning medical system, and a highly rotten technical and communication
infrastructure together with a weak political system lay the basis for the total neg-
ligence of any disaster preparedness. The quake thus hit a society that was only
oriented to make their daily living. Even during the years before the earthquake,
the country was exposed to several natural disasters (hurricanes, floods, landslides,
etc.) but did not pave the way for any emergency management.
Immediately upon the disaster the United Nations increased its presence in the
country and supported the recovery, reconstruction, and stability efforts to restore
a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen
Haiti’s government institutions and rule-of-law structures, as well as to promote
and to protect human rights. More than three years after the devastating earth-
quake tens of thousands of families were still living in shelters. The majority of
them are women and children. Those who been made homeless have to struggle to
make a living for themselves and their families with little access to safe drinking
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 91

water, sanitation, health care, schools, or other essential services. The number of
internally displaced people and the number of makeshift camps has been decreas-
ing since July 2010, from a peak of some 1.5 million people living in 1500 camps
to 320,000 people living in 385 camps as of the end of March 2013, according to
the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Thousands of families have
left the camps for other accommodation provided through different projects and
programs. However, forced evictions appear to have become an important factor
leading to the reduction in camp numbers.
Even despite massive support from international donors, Haiti remains one
of the poorest nations in the world, with significant needs in all basic services.
Over half of its population lives on less than US$1/day. And Haiti is a country
with a most unequal distribution of income (Gini-Coefficient 0.59). Nevertheless
the Haitian economy has been recovering slightly since the earthquake. After a
decline in the GDP of 5.4 % in fiscal year 2009–2010, it grew by 5.6 % in FY
2010–2011. Although small, the macroeconomic situation today is relatively stable
with domestic revenue rising slowly but steadily. However, the momentum of eco-
nomic recovery slowed in 2012, due to drought-induced declines in agricultural
output and higher food prices, as well as due to damage from Hurricanes Isaac and
Sandy.

Earthquake Hit a Megacity (Kobe, Japan 1995)

On January 17th, 2005 an earthquake hit the center of the megacity of Kobe,
Japan. It was the first time in human history that a megacity was struck directly.
Even the big earthquakes along the San Andreas Fault all spared cities like San
Francisco, Oakland, or Los Angeles.
The earthquake lasted for only 20 s but was the worst in Japan since the
Great Tokyo Earthquake in 1923 (magnitude 7.9 on the Richter scale) that killed
140,000 people and the greatest disaster in Japan since World War II. The reason
why the disaster so heavily influenced the Japanese soul was:
• It wasn’t anticipated by the public that the Kobe area, not located on one of
the central faults, would be affected by a major earthquake and therefore only
minor prevention measures were undertaken.
• Many Japanese were of the opinion that their country was one of the technically
most advanced, and would be able to master any disaster whatever.
• Kobe was considered one of the nicest cities in Japan and where (ironically)
many people moved to escape earthquakes elsewhere.
Therefore the earthquake of January 17th was more than a natural disaster; it
almost twisted the national sobriety and it happened ironically in the Hyogo
Prefecture.
The earthquake was generated by a strike-slip lateral movement of the rock
masses along the Nojima Fault, which thus far was not considered a danger-
ous fault, shifting the two sides of the fault 20–30 m in opposite directions. The
92 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

epicenter was estimated to be 60 km away from Kobe City between Awaji Island
and Honshu. The surface along the fault moved five feet in one place. This move-
ment could be seen in a rice field on Awaji Island. One of the major reasons for
the extensive damage was that the quake was generated at very shallow depth.
The earthquake claimed 6400 dead, injured 25,000, displaced 300,000 people,
damaged or destroyed 100,000 buildings, and caused at least US$132 billion of
economic loss, constituting about 2.5 % of Japan’s GDP. Only US$3 billion was
covered by insurance. More than 35,000 people were pulled from collapsed build-
ings by neighbors or rescue workers.
As the earthquake took place early in the morning most of the people were
caught asleep. Therefore many bodies were found at or near their homes, although
this later led to the identification of most of the victims in only 10 days. In addi-
tion the damage pattern was very spotty, leaving some areas almost untouched
whereas others were destroyed completely. Even some of the new houses were
badly damaged and some old ones were undisturbed. Nearly 80 % of the victims
died from being crushed by the collapsing buildings. Many people were even
killed when the heavy typhoon-resistant tile roofs collapsed on top of them. Sixty
percent of the victims were older than 60 years and had lived in traditional wood
frame structures that were built shortly after World War II. Many of these houses
caught fire from toppled stoves and kerosene cookers as the earthquake happened
in the very cold Japanese winter season. New, even tall, buildings that were con-
structed to be seismic resistant according to the 1981 building codes all remained
standing. Electricity and water supplies were badly damaged over large areas. This
meant no power for heating, lights, cooking, and so on. Moreover a clean, fresh
water supply was short until April 1995.
Heavy damages were identified along all the major freeways, mostly as they
were not designed to withstand such a strong earthquake. Therefore many of them
collapsed, streets were uplifted, and road tracks buckled and twisted. It took much
time to clear the streets from the rubble. But the immediate rescue and relief oper-
ations just cleared traffic routes. This became the biggest complaint of survivors
to the authorities, that they failed to manage this problem first. Emergency experts
later pointed out that the management of this disaster symbolizes a weak point in
Japanese society after World War II. Public administration even on the local level
turned out be completely inflexible (an attitude that was also recognized in how
TEPCO handled the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe). Any political development
decision in Japan is usually made by consensus and strongly follows the hierarchy
principle. This made the authorities in Kobe reluctant to make decisions on their
own. For instance, the broken telephone lines between the offices and ministries
were not repaired immediately, as such a decision was not in the responsibility of
the local administration. As a result the prime minister’s office received the infor-
mation on the disaster next morning on television. An order to send military forces
for rescue was not issued until nine hours after the quake.
The cost for rebuilding the social and technical infrastructure was estimated
at about US$130 billion of which the government allocated only 50 %, including
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 93

supplementary budgets to carry out “reconstruction” work such as debris removal

and for a period of 10 years.
About 70,000 people were still living in provisional shelters two months after
the earthquake, some of them even until January 2000. It was furthermore learned
that providing new housing did not solve all the problems. Many of the victims
who lost their homes became depressed after being disconnected from their tra-
ditional social networks. Many of homeowners who lost their homes were not
insured and were later reimbursed according to a classification of their damaged
houses as “partially damaged” or “totally damaged.” But this classification was
carried out rather restrictedly and left many homeowners to the rigidity of the
authorities. Nevertheless by January 1999, about 150,000 housing units had been
constructed, new laws were passed to make buildings and transport structures even
more earthquake proof, and a significant amount of money was invested to install
more instruments in the region to monitor earthquake movements.

Earthquake in Istanbul (1999)

The northern part of Turkey as well its eastern flank are characterized by two
major fault zones (North Anatolian Fault zone and the East Anatolian Fault zone)
that both experience earthquakes. Along the North Anatolian Fault zone plate
movements of up to 25 mm/year of right lateral motion, running parallel to the
Marmara Sea were measured (Ilkesik 2002), making northern Turkey highly vul-
nerable to natural disasters, particularly earthquakes. Historic records reveal a sta-
tistical recurrence of one destructive earthquake hitting Istanbul each century.
In 1999 the Marmara/Kocaeli earthquakes of magnitude 7.4 claimed a death
toll of over 17,000 people and caused direct economic losses estimated at about
US$5 billion, or around 2.5 % of GDP along the earthquake occurrence. Even in
Istanbul approximately 1000 people were killed and the damage to buildings was
rather serious, although the epicenter was more than 110 km away.
The city of Istanbul and its surroundings have in Turkey the highest earthquake
risk context. Istanbul is most vulnerable because of its location in the western con-
tinuation of the seismic fault zone and due to its population of roughly 15 mil-
lion people and its commercial industrial densities. In 2002 JICA (Ilkesik, ibid)
carried out a risk assessment for Istanbul that revealed the probability of a major
earthquake affecting the city in the next 30 years was more than 60 %, and the
likelihood of such a devastating event within the next decade is calculated to be
more than 30 % (Erdik and Durukal 2008). Compared to the cities of Los Angeles
or San Francisco, both experiencing a comparably high risk, the damage potential
to Istanbul is significantly higher because of its greater structural vulnerabilities.
If a seismic event of the same magnitude as that in 1999 occurred near Istanbul,
the human suffering as well as the social, economic, and environmental impacts
would be dramatically higher than in the Marmara region. JICA estimated that
an event similar to the Marmara earthquake could result in up to 90,000 fatali-
ties, 135,000 injuries, and heavy damage to 350,000 public and private buildings
94 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

resulting in an economic impact of more than US$50 billion. The number of

injured and affected people was estimated to be around 150,000, but 30 % of the
hospitals are located in the potentially risk-prone areas south of the city.
The government of Turkey clearly sees that an interruption of Istanbul’s social,
economic, and financial life would heavily affect the national economy and the
social sector for many years to come. Managing natural disasters therefore
requires a multirisk approach and the government fosters the development of a
comprehensive hazard risk-management strategy, not only for Istanbul but for the
entire country. It has identified a serious need for improved knowledge, methods,
and integrated framework for the assessment of hazards, vulnerability, and risks.
Furthermore in order to manage the potential earthquake disaster in Istanbul, it is
necessary to prepare disaster prevention and mitigation plans, emergency rescue
plans, and a restoration plan for the earthquake stricken. Therefore detailed geo-
logical, geotechnical, and geophysical studies of the surface strata down to 250 m
have to be carried out in order to forecast likely earthquake motions realistically.
A three-dimensional model should be established to explain the earthquake trigger
elements, the kind of probable tectonic processes, and the geologically originated
amplification features. Recently the Istanbul municipality has run a microzoning
project at the southwestern part of the city to detail information of local ground
conditions. This will later be used to establish the appropriate design parameters
for a city building code, which should be adopted for the more than 1.3 million
buildings in Istanbul (Erdik and Durukal, ibid).

Earthquakes in Western Europe

On April 13th, 1992 the strongest earthquake since 1756 hit the German–Dutch
boundary region, a region that is well known as seismically active. The quake
lasted for 15 s, had a magnitude of 5.9 Richter scale, had its epicenter 4 km south
of the Dutch city of Roermond, and the hypocenter was identified at 18 km depth.
According to the information of the Geological Survey of North Rhine-Westphalia
(GSNRW 1992) the quake was felt all over Western Europe and caused damages
of €80 million. About 30 people were injured, most from falling tiles and stones;
150 houses were damaged in the nearby city of Heinsberg and even the Cologne
Dom was partially damaged. The earthquake had no precursors but caused a series
of about 150 aftershocks, the strongest with a magnitude of 3.6. The entire area
west of the river Rhine along the Niederrheinische Bucht has long been known
as seismically active. The area is part of the north–south oriented fault zone that
crosses Western Europe from the Rhone River delta up to the Oslo Fjord. Along
this fault zone Europe is pulled apart as a result of the ongoing pressure from the
African plate hitting the European plate. The pulling apart has also formed the
Rhine Graben structure and is responsible for a multitude of normal faults and
deep-reaching thrusts west of Cologne.
But the Niederrheinische Bucht (shown in Fig. 3.16) is not the only region
in Germany that is seismically active. The Earthquake Hazard Map of Germany
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 95

Fig. 3.16  Earthquake hazard of the Niederrheinische Bucht based on maximal horizontal accel-
eration exceeding one in 500 years (Courtesy Geological Survey of North Rhine-Westphalia;
Germany)

Fig. 3.17  Earthquake Map of Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (D-A-CH), based on earth-
quake intensities that will not exceed 90 % probability in the next 50 years (Courtesy Helmholtz
Centre Potsdam—GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences, Annual Report 2011)
96 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.18  Seismic risk

zones of Germany (Courtesy
Tyagunov et al. 2006)

shown in Fig. 3.17 identified at least four regions that experience a higher
seismicity:
• Upper Rhine Valley/Swabian Alb
• The Alps
• Thüringer Wald
• Lower Rhine Valley
The classified seismicity zones from III (low risk) to VIII (high risk) give a meas-
ure of the probability for seismic activities at a certain location, a defined time
span, and for a defined seismic intensity or ground acceleration. The map supplies
the basis for introducing seismic building codes in Germany to reduce infrastruc-
ture damage.
Based on the earthquake hazard map, the distribution of seismic risk was
assessed by CEDIM and laid down in a special map (see Fig. 3.18) expressing
about a 90 % probability for an earthquake event in Germany in the next 50 years.
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 97

3.2.1.6 Tsunami

Tsunamis are water waves that occur due to mechanical disturbances in water bod-
ies such as oceans, ocean bays, or lakes but also in artificial reservoirs (dams). The
triggering mechanism for the disturbance of the water can be of seismic origin,
landslides, rockfalls, and volcanic eruptions or may even be of an extraterrestrial
source, such as meteorites.
Tsunamis are found to be one of the most threatening and life-demanding
natural disasters of the world. Most tsunamis are definitively generated by earth-
quakes. But it should be borne in mind that not every earthquake generates a
tsunami (Bryant 2001). Sedimentological indicators of geological coastal strata
revealed that tsunami events occurred all over the world and cover the entire geo-
logical history. Such records could range from sudden onsets of coarse-grained
sand layers in normally fine-grained coastal sediments to the occurrence of several
meters large limestone blocks, as found in southern Italy and Greece (Soloviev
et al. 2000). In the Mediterranean region alone about 300 tsunamis in the last
4000 years could be distinguished by their sedimentary record.
The term “tsunami” became known to the world with the tsunami that hit the
Indian Ocean on December 26th, 2004. Up to that day the term “tsunami” was
known to just a handful of specialists and disaster managers, but from that day, the
term “tsunami” and its related term “early warning system” entered many spheres
of social and economic politics. The 2004 tsunami triggered unprecedented help
and relief assistance from all over the world. It provided US$8 billion in aid
money, a sum that was never raised before and never after. See Fig. 3.19.
The term “tsunami” derives from the Japanese words tsu which means harbor
and nami that means great wave (tsunami = great harbor wave), as the phenom-
enon was first observed by Japanese fishermen when coming home from the sea
and found their harbor and houses destroyed by sea waves, although not having
realized any significant rise in the sea level far offshore.

Fig. 3.19  The 2004 tsunami

moved a ship onto a house in
Banda Aceh. Today the ship
serves as a tourist spot (Own
photo)
98 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Most tsunamis are generated by:

• Tectonic acceleration of the sea floor as a result of an earthquake
• Submarine volcano eruptions
• Landslides or rockfalls that occur either at the flanks of submarine volcanoes or
of rockfalls and landslides from near shore cliffs
• Impact of large extraterrestrial meteorites
The above-mentioned effects cause a disturbance of the entire water body from the
sea floor up to sea level. Thus tsunamis are different from normal, wind- and tide-
induced sea waves that are defined as orbital waves and occur mainly in the upper
30 m of the water column. In a tsunami the entire water column is agitated; that
means in the open ocean a water column of 4–5 km can be in motion.
From the source of generation the tsunami propagates in all directions. In the
open ocean the travel speed may reach 800–900 km/h with an only marginal rise
in the sea level but wave amplitude of more than 200 km. While approaching the
shelf, wave amplitude and travel speed diminish strongly to about 60–80 km/h
and even less on the shelf (about 10–30 km/h). This reduction in speed causes
the wave heights to increase dramatically, so that they may reach 30 m or more at

Fig. 3.20  Tsunami travel travel speed travel speed

speed, wave height, and 700 km/h 10 km/h

amplitude (Courtesy Franzius

Institute, University of
Hannover)
shelf

continental slope

deep
sea

Fig. 3.21  Model of a
tsunami wave train
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 99

landfall (Fig. 3.20). Travel speed, wave amplitude, and wave heights can be calcu-
lated according to the mathematical equation (the travel speed of a tsunami is the
square root of the earth gravity times the water height (Mader 1974).
Like an acoustic signal, a tsunami is made up of a series of wave troughs and
wave crests forming what is called a wave train (Fig. 3.21). Thus a tsunami is not
made up of one single wave but comprises a series of waves. The tsunami of 1960
on the island of Hawaii that devastated the city of Hilo was made up of a total of
11 waves, most of which had wave heights between 4–8 m above sea level, and
the fourth wave exceeded 14 m, the one that destroyed large parts of the city and
harbor (USGS 2009a).
The agitation of the water column floor can either result in a wave crest or a
wave trough, automatically defining the way the tsunami reaches land. Wave
troughs lead to a significant retreat, withdrawing the water body, and can reach
many kilometers, as recognized in the Indian Ocean tsunami, December 2004, at
Khao Lak, Thailand; or in a rapid and strong increase in the water level (wave
crest). Both indicators are the first and most reliable signs that a tsunami is
approaching, still leaving 5–10 min for an immediate evacuation of the area.
Because in a tsunami the entire water column is in motion, the path a tsu-
nami takes in the ocean is next to the concentric propagation from its epicenter,
strongly controlled by the sea floor morphology. Furthermore the tsunami reacts
more strongly on the sea floor morphology the more it enters shallower waters.
Thus bottom morphology and coastal configuration highly influence where and in
which direction the tsunami makes landfall. The coastal morphology also defines
the impact. Steep cliffs lead to a “piling up” of the water masses, whereas gently
inclined coastlines give ample space for a wide inland intrusion. Thus the impact
of a tsunami is described by the water height (run-up height) and the distance the
water penetrated the land (inundation distance; Fig. 3.22). How strongly morphol-
ogy can influence tsunami impact was seen with the tsunami of 1992 in the city of

inundation distance
Tsunami Sea Level

run-up height

mean sea level

Tsunami Normal Sea Water

Fig. 3.22  Relation between run-up height and inundation distance (Own graph)
100 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Maumere (Flores Island, Indonesia) where the tsunami flooded a gently seaward
inclined limestone more than 12 m high, where in the city itself, the water run-up
height was only 3–5 m. According to worldwide evidence the run-up height is nor-
mally twice the amount of the fault slip amount. The 2004 tsunami fault slip was
about 10 m, resulting in a run-up height of more than 20 m. Another rule of thumb
is given by Bryant (ibid), who stated that the run-up height in general equals 10
times the open ocean wave height (a 0.5 m wave height in the ocean would result
in a run-up height of 5 m). But nevertheless it should be kept in mind that local
coastal morphology plays a significant role in defining how far inland the wave
may travel. The inland penetration of a tsunami can be roughly estimated as fol-
lows. On a very smooth, flat-lying terrain with low topographic roughness, inland
penetration can be up to several km (e.g., at a run-up height of 10 m). In contrast,
a steep cliff exposed to a tsunami will only be inundated by several tens of meters
and the run-up height may reach more than 20 m. A coastal area that is densely
populated with buildings close to the shoreline or coastal rim covered with trees
and bushes both hamper the flood from penetrating far inland. The more densely
a tsunami-exposed terrain is covered by buildings and/or trees, the less the waves
are allowed to penetrate inland.
A further indicator for assessing a tsunami impact is that the wave crest/propa-
gation is constantly orienting itself perpendicular to the sea bottom morphology.
Thus tsunamis are subject to sea bottom refraction and bending around higher sea
floor topographies. There is an impressive example of this. In 1996 a tsunami hit
the island of Biak (Irian Jaya, East Indonesia), an almost perfectly round shaped
island. The tsunami approached the island from the east with wave heights of
1–2 m, it traveled on both sides around the tiny island and the waves added them-
selves on the leeward side to heights of 4–5 m, flooding two small villages and
killing 107 people (Matsutomi et al. 2001). The diffractions of the 2004 tsunami
making it travel around the southern tip of Sri Lanka or enter into the Strait of
Malacca are also impressive signs for this phenomenon. Following this, there is
also the possibility that the tsunami, instead of being deviated from a critical area,
may also be focused on a critical region.

Fig. 3.23  2004 Indian

Ocean tsunami travel times
(Courtesy Kowalik et al.
2005)
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 101

The high speed of wave propagation of a tsunami in the open ocean results
in travel times of less than a day to pass the most vulnerable tsunami area √ of the
world: the Pacific Ocean. According to the mathematical equation V = (g · h)
a tsunami that was generated in southern Chile takes about 20–24 h to reach the
Japanese Islands. The same holds true for a tsunami generated along the Eurasian/
Pacific plate boundary to reach Chile (Fig. 3.23). Also a tsunami generated off-
shore Alaska or along the Aleutian Trench will cross the ocean in almost a day to
reach Australia and New Zealand. Regardless of which tsunami generation loca-
tion is taken, each will pass the islands of Hawaii on their way across the Pacific
Ocean. Hawaii is reached from the east, west, or north within just 12 h and is thus
the most tsunami-vulnerable spot in the Pacific Ocean. Following the 1932 tsu-
nami that hit the Hawaii capital, Hilo, the world’s first Tsunami Warning Center
(Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, PTWC) was established there, followed by the
Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC), located in Anchorage, that moni-
tors the northern Pacific region.
Less frequent than earthquake triggered, but nevertheless important for the gen-
eration of many tsunamis, are submarine or near coastal induced mass movements.
The biggest tsunami ever recorded was that of Storrega (Norway; identified in
seismic lines) where a submarine slump 12,000 years BC released a large amount
of sediment from the shelf that today covers large parts of the Norwegian shelf
between Bergen and Tromsö. The impacts of the tsunami could be traced all along
the northwest English coast and was even identified along the North American
coast. Another well-known record of a tsunami generated by a mass movement is
that of Lituya Bay, Alaska (Fritz et al. 2009). There in 1958 in a small estuarine,
north of Anchorage, a landslide was triggered (most probably by an earthquake)
that released a huge mass of sediment. The slump formed a 30 m high tsunami
that overran the 1.3 km wide estuary and climbed up the opposite coast more than
200 m and devastated the entire coastal rim. Still today the scar of the tsunami, its
pathway, and the eroded coasts can be seen in satellite imagery.

Fig. 3.24  Active volcanoes

of the Indonesian archipelago
are lined up like the pearls
of a necklace (Courtesy
BG/Georisk 2005)
102 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.25  Basaltic lava

streams from Mauna Loa,
Hawaii, reaching the Pacific
Ocean

3.2.1.7 Volcano

Sharing the same plate tectonic origin as earthquakes, the volcanoes of the world
are also a result of the above-described plate motion. More than 90 % of the world-
wide active and inactive volcanoes are situated along these boundaries and are thus
called plate boundary volcanoes. In contrast, volcanoes that occur within the plates
are called intraplate volcanoes (Pichler 2006). The Indonesian archipelago impres-
sively demonstrates how volcanos mirror the boundary of the Indian and Eurasian
Plates (Fig. 3.24). Roughly 200 active volcanoes are lined up like pearls on a neck-
lace from the westernmost tip of Sumatra (Aceh Province) to the east (Iryan Jaya)
and even continue eastward into the Philippines and the Japanese Islands.
Volcanoes are the most impressive manifestations of the Earth and are thus
known to everybody. There passes almost no day without impressive pictures
disseminated in the news on an erupting volcano, on high lava fountains putting
the landscape in glowing light, on clouds of ashes that rise up kilometers in the
atmosphere, or lava streams that pour into the ocean forming distinct lava forms
(Fig. 3.25). The geology of volcanoes is one of the oldest scientific subjects in
geoscience. Hundreds of volcanologists meanwhile have studied the nature of
volcanoes, among them famous scientists including Robert Tilling, Tom Simkin,
Haroun Tazieff, Chris Newhall, and the German volcanologist Ulrich Schmincke;
all of them contributed significantly to the state of knowledge.
Nevertheless in addition to photos on erupting volcanoes, are volcano disasters
that are remembered most by the people. The big eruption of the Krakatoa volcano
in 1863 in Indonesia was the first eruption that was witnessed (Verbeek 1885) in last
centuries, and that was (due to the newly invented telegraph) reported all over the
world within a day (Winchester 2003). It was also the Krakatoa eruption that trig-
gered the first government-financed scientific survey worldwide (Royal Society,
London). But Krakatoa was the neither the biggest nor the most severe volcano
disaster that affected the world. The biggest volcano eruption is, according to geo-
logical record, still the eruption of the Toba volcano about 75,000 years BC. The
eruption formed the famous Toba Lake caldera of 100 km by 30 km and is sup-
posed to have had an energy release that equaled 40 million H-bombs (Info: online
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 103

www.ajb-hennings.de, 2008). The biggest volcano eruption of the last 20,000 years
was the Tambora volcano eruption in 1815 which claimed a total of 90,000 lives.
This eruption produced a crater of 7 km in diameter with an estimated volume of
at least 30 km2 (some estimates even say it might be 100 km2) of ashes and bombs.
The ash clouds and the huge amount of sulphur emitted traveled the stratosphere sev-
eral times around the Earth and resulted in a significant change in world climate the
year after (Stommel and Stommel 1983). Historic records reveal that in Switzerland
there was a snow cover of 20 cm even during the summertime, resulting in a drastic
loss of crops and a large famine was thus called, “the year without a summer.”
Although daily present and partially severe in impact, volcanic eruptions are
less lethal than many other natural disasters (flood, earthquakes, landslides). This
is based on the fact that a volcano can be localized directly and seen physically.
The uppermost flanks are normally sparsely settled and the people around have
years of long experience in coping with the volcano. Furthermore the volcano most
often announces an eruption days or months earlier. Therefore the death toll, as
well as the economic losses due to eruptions is comparably small. It is estimated
that about nine percent of the world’s population lives in a radius of about 100 km
around a historically active volcano (Small and Naumann 2001). Five hundred mil-
lion people are exposed to volcano hazards and 10 million people live within a
distance of up to 30 km of an active volcano. Volcano eruptions claimed the lives
of 30,000 people, affected about 6 million, and caused damage of US$2.5 billion
in 230 events in the time span of 1900–2013 (Guha-Sapir et al. 2013).
There are records of more than 1500 volcanoes that have erupted since
Holocene times according to the Catalogue of the Active Volcanoes of the World
published by the International Association of Volcanology, using this definition, by
which there are more than 500 active volcanoes. About half of them are classified
as being active and have erupted in recorded times. On average 50 volcanoes erupt
each year, a frequency that was found by Simkin et al. (1981) to not have changed
since historical times. Inactive volcanoes even when found at repose status for
many centuries may erupt one day. Volcanologists distinguish between active vol-
canoes and inactive volcanoes. Those that erupt regularly are called active, and
inactive volcanboes are defined as either dormant, meaning they are in an inac-
tive status but can still erupt, or as extinct, meaning that they are expected never
to erupt again. Those that have erupted in historical times but are now quiet are
called dormant or inactive and those that have not erupted in historical times are
called extinct. However, there is no consensus among volcanologists on how to
define an “active” volcano as the lifespan of a volcano can vary from months to
several million years. Simkin et al. (ibid) stated that in general, “The longer the
period of interruption reposes is, the more energetic the next eruption” can be (see
Sect. 3.2.1).
Generally three types of volcanoes are distinguished:
• Shield volcanoes (Plateau volcano)
• Strato volcanoes
• Rift volcanoes
104 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

The best examples of basaltic shield volcanoes are the Kilauea Iki and Mauna Loa
(Hawaii) or the Icelandic volcanoes. Extinct shield volcanoes are the Southwest
African volcano formation of Etendaka that was formerly connected with the
Brazilian Parana formation and the Indian Deccan Trap of the massive volcanic
formation that formed Siberia.
Strato volcanoes are in general connected with converging plates. About 1000
volcanoes are known to be active along such margins, but in general occur more
than 150 km in the direction of the subducting plate and have an angle of 30–60°.
This situation was exactly that experienced at the Indian Ocean 2004 earthquake
cum tsunami in Indonesia. The best examples of strato volcanoes are the Nevado
del Ruiz (Columbia), the Merapi (Indonesia), and the Fujiyama (Japan).
About 250 active rift volcanoes are counted worldwide, most of which are
located along the East African Rift system. But by far most of the rift volcanoes
are definitively generated in geological history along the submarine rift systems.
The best examples of rift volcanoes are the Nyiragongo (DR Congo) or the Erte
Ale (Ethiopia), which both allow insight into the lava/magma chamber.
Volcano eruptions are generated as the magma in the Earth’s crust has a lower
density than the surrounding rock material. This leads to an uprising momentum
that seeks structurally predetermined faults or material weaknesses in the Earth’s
crust to make its way upward. The uprising magma is called lava. The higher the
lava rises, the more the solved gases are set free, finally resulting in a massive
expansion of the gas volume that then drives the molten lava out of the vent.
The generation sequence becomes quite different when meteoric water pene-
trates into the upper layers of the Earth. An overlying rock column of even several
hundred meters increases the pore pressure drastically so that the boiling point of
the water is raised to about 200 °C. When such a water–lava mixture then rises
upward, the pressure is released suddenly and the overheated water changes in the
vapor, leading to a hydrothermal explosion.
The molten uprising magma produces lava, ashes, rock fragments (bombs,
lapilli), or gases. What kind of material the volcano is producing depends on the
composition of the magma. In general two different types of magma/lava are
distinguished:
• Basaltic magma
• Dacitic magma
Basaltic magma has a rather low SiO2 content (46–52 %), low gas content, and is
in general up to 1200 °C hot. Such magma forms effusive lava of a low viscosity:
it flows easily and quite fast. There is a distinct relationship between SiO2 content
and the effusion capacity. The lower the SiO2 content in the magma, the higher is
the flowing capacity of the lava. Basaltic magma does not produce ashes nor does
it emit large amounts of noxious gases. These facts make such volcanoes the ones
with a low potential hazard. When the low content of solved gases is boiled out of
the lava before it reaches the surface, the lava shows a red stream of molten rock
material (Hawaiian volcano type).
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 105

Andesitic or dacitic magma is characterized by SiO2 content of 52 % up to

68 % and a temperature range from below 1100 °C. Andesitic lava has SiO2 con-
tents of 52–58 %, and dacitic lava is characterized by SiO2 content of 58–62 %.
The lower temperatures and the higher SiO2 content give these lava types a higher
viscosity and make them less liquid. Therefore these lavas tend to accumulate in
the volcano vent and when the internal pressure exceeds the mechanical stability of
the surrounding rock material it comes to an eruption. Ashes, rock fragments, and/
or molten lava are than explosively produced. In the case where meteoritic water
comes in contact with the lava, a phreatomagmatic explosion may be generated. The
andesitic or dacitic lava often contains many gases (CO2, NHN, H2O and others at
a minor quantity). The severity of such an explosion is indicated by the Volcano
Explosivity Index (VEI) established by Newhall and Self (1982; see Sect. 5.2).
Gaseous emissions are the most powerful and dangerous threat from volcanic
eruptions. Although lava emissions, bombs, lapilli, and ashes can be localized
quite precisely and the area they damage is comparatively small, easily identifi-
able, and often the eruptions are a slow process, the gaseous emissions can spread
over square kilometers rushing downhill with a speed of up to several hundred kil-
ometers per hour. Moreover, such gases can reach temperatures of up to 400 °C
and are often highly toxic. In nongaseous volcanic eruptions the vapor–gas mix-
ture emissions can rise up into the sky for several kilometers. On their way up,
the ashes fall off according to particle size. The gases, however, reach the strato-
sphere and are transported by the wind. So disaster managers while assessing the
vulnerability of a certain volcano need to consider the main wind direction. The
gases when pushed up into the sky are, when they reach the stratosphere, trave-
ling a couple of times around the globe as many examples from Tambora volcano
(Indonesia), El Chichon (Mexico), or Krakatoa (Indonesia) have revealed. At Mt.
St. Helens the ash cloud traveled at a speed of 100 km/h, drawn eastward by the
prevailing winds into the midwestern United States.
The biggest threat from such gaseous vapor emissions are generated when, as
at Mt. St. Helens or Mt. Pelée (Martinique) a flank of the volcano collapses and
the uprising oriented thermodynamics of the ash cloud collapses, reverses, and
rushes downhill. The famous disaster at Mt. Vesuvius (Italy) has given at the city
of Pompeii an impressive example of what happens when a city is covered by a
gas cloud within a couple of minutes. At Pompeii the ashes preserved bodies of
citizens who are concentrated in the uppermost of the eight ash layers, a clear
indicator that only the last ash eruption was accompanied by high gas content. A
high risk for the population exists when large-size conurbations such as Mexico
City are located in the vicinity of active volcanoes that are made up of SiO2-rich
magma that are highly prone to paroxysmal eruptions.
In general volcanic emissions are not composed of only one volcanic material
alone: they normally comprise a mixture of ash, vapor, and gas and even larger
rock fragments. When in the course of the eruption rock fragments break off the
dome flank, the gases dissolved in the lava are explosively set free and fragment
the lava into small pieces. Such an ejection type is called a pyroclastic surge as
it is characterized by a suspension of super-heated gas, ash, and rock fragments.
106 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Once released the pyroclastic surge increases its volume while rushing down-
hill. The experience revealed that the steeper the volcanic flanks are, the higher
is the probability that a pyroclastic surge (also called nuée ardente) is generated.
A pyroclastic surge can be generated when the thermodynamics of the uprising
ash–gas–vapor cloud is interrupted, often due to a collapse of the volcano flanks.
This eruption type is the most deadly of all volcano eruption types. When the gas
column collapses the ejected particles fall down and rush downhill at speeds up
to 400 km/h. At the base of the ash cloud, temperatures of up to 800 °C can be
reached, making the ashes practically glow. The volume of the gas increases when
the pressure is released by 1 atmosphere for every 4 m and can thus reach a 10
times larger volume than originally in the magma.
When volcano emissions enter the atmosphere the aerosols emitted are antici-
pated by the public to add strongly to the greenhouse gas content. However, it was
calculated that all world active volcanoes generate about 250 tons of SO2 annu-
ally, whereas automotive and industrial activities are responsible for a volume of
25 billion tons of SO2 per year. Thus it becomes obvious that the volcanos are
“only” contributing to just 1 % of the world’s SO2 concentration; the SO2 emis-
sion of Mt. St. Helens was about 1 million tons of SO2 released within a couple
of weeks. Another indicator that volcanic aerosols have only a negligible impact
on the world’s atmosphere is the fact that CO2 measurements that are continuously
recorded by the Scripps Institution of Oceanography since 1960 at Mauna Loa
(Keeling Curve: 1960 = 310 ppm CO2; 2010 = 390 ppm CO2) did not reveal a
significant increase after major volcanic eruptions. Instead the total CO2 concen-
tration has increased smoothly and steadily with no erratic increase or decrease
(USGS 1995b). If the increased CO2 concentrations were of volcanic origin,
then CO2 concentrations should rise following volcanic eruptions; the oppo-
site is true: CO2 concentrations decline for decades continuously, smoothly, and
steadily. Assuming that all 200 most active volcanoes of the world emit a simi-
lar amount of aerosols to that Mt. Pinatubo once generated, the yearly total emis-
sion will be “only” less than 20 million of CO2. Another figure clarifies how small
the input from volcanoes is on the Earth’s atmosphere: the emission of the Mauna
Loa volcano of Hawaii of about 2 × 15 kg CO2 equals an emission of CO2 of
200 MW coal-fired power stations, and contributes a volume of just 1 % of the
entire anthropogenic contribution. Nevertheless even when the annual contribution
of aerosols of about 370 ppm is comparatively small and thus does “not directly
impact the greenhouse effect, over the lifetime of the Earth, these gases have been
the main source of the planet’s atmosphere and ocean” (Robock 2000, p. 193).
Therefore even small volcanic eruptions emit gases and these emissions mainly
occur along the plate boundaries. Of the many different gases emitted, H2O in the
form of water vapor, CO, SO2, CH4, and N2 are the major contributors. Although
not the biggest constituent, SO2 is seen to be the biggest contributor to the green-
house gas concentration. The SO2 reacts with other gases to H2SO4 (Newhall
and Self 1982), forming aerosols that have a strong radiative capacity, capable of
withholding the sun’s radiation from penetrating the atmosphere and thus cool-
ing the Earth’s surface. In contrast to that, CO2 has the effect of increasing global
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 107

Fig. 3.26  Drop in
atmospheric temperature due
to volcanic ash emissions
from volcanoes Gunung
Agung (Bal), El Chichon
(Mexico), and Pinatubo
(Philippines) (Based on:
IPCC 2007)

warming (USGS 1995b) as it destroys the ozone layer. Many of the volcano events
of the last decades, most prominently the eruptions of Mt. St. Helens, Gunung
Agung, Pinatubo, and El Chichon proved that their gas emissions had a significant
cooling effect (Fig. 3.26). From measurements of the gas concentrations in the
atmosphere it was calculated that the El Chichon eruption emitted about 20 mil-
lion tons of aerosols (Bluth et al. 1992) that traveled the globe in less than three
weeks, similar to the gases of the Pinatubo eruption. The emissions from Krakatoa
were reportedly visible for months all over the globe and were documented in
many art drawings and photographs.
The ashes and gases emitted not only have an impact on global cooling or
warming, but also can have a considerable impact on public health. In fact not
only human health but international air traffic can also be highly at risk from vol-
canic ash. It was on June 1982 when a British Airways flight from Kuala Lumpur
to Perth (Australia) flew into a cloud of volcanic ash at 12,000 m. The ashes were
emitted from the Indonesian volcano Galunggung (Western Java, Indonesia) that
erupted a couple of days earlier. All of a sudden the windows were hit by parti-
cles that sent them into a sparkling light (like that emitted by a welding machine).
Simultaneously the wings were set with bright glowing light and the cockpit filled
with sulfur-smelling smoke. Finally all four engines failed. A similar experience
occurred on a KLM flight bound for Anchorage, Alaska. That time the aircraft
entered an ash cloud of the Alaskan Redoubt volcano, 200 km away. The route
across Alaska is one of world’s busiest jet airline routes over the North Pacific. As
the ash particles are of volcanic origin, they have a solidus temperature of about
1000–1100 °C. In contrast to that, aircraft turbines run at a temperature of about
1400 °C. These higher temperatures make the glass particles melt and cover the
turbine blades with a thin coating of silica, making it impossible for them to work.
The cool volcanic particles outside the turbine are tiny, jagged, very hard particles
of sand and silt size (>2 mm in diameter), splintery with sharp edges that have an
enormous abrasive potential to diminish visibility.
108 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.27  Autosiphon
degassing carbon dioxide
from Lake Nyos, Cameroon

Another hazard accompanied with volcanism is carbon dioxide and methane

accumulations in water bodies, such as in the African Lake Nyos (Cameroon)
and Lake Kivu (Rwanda). In both lakes gases (CO2/CH4) have accumulated in
the water column and were released suddenly to the surface. At Lake Nyos on
August 21st, 1986 a great amount of CO2 was released from the water body that
is supposed to be generated from underwater volcanoes at a depth of several hun-
dred meters. At about 200–300 m water depth the CO2 is in a liquid state due
to the overlying load of the water column. About two million tons of CO2 were
supposed to have accumulated over a time period of 300 years. All of a sudden
the gas was released, and bubbled up like the gas in a bottle of mineral water
when opened. The trigger is supposed to be either an earthquake or a seismic
tremor generated from uprising magma in the volcano vent. As CO2 is under
an atmospheric condition heavier than air, the CO2 accumulated at the surface
and was flowing downwards following the morphology. It flooded the next city
27 km away and killed about 1700 people within a couple of minutes. In order
to prevent such CO2 from bubbling again an auto siphon system was installed
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 109

Fig. 3.28  Simplified sketch

of typical hazards from strato
volcanoes (Courtesy USGS
2008b)

to de-gas the deeper water layers constantly. In Fig. 3.27 the water fountain is
displayed, the result of the gas driving the water up to 50 m in the air. A simi-
lar auto siphon system was installed at Lake Kivu where it now steadily releases
the methane accumulation and thus protects the people from being at risk from a
methane outburst.
The multifold hazards that can derive from volcanic eruptions are impressively
summarized by Fig. 3.28 from the USGS.
Directly associated are:
• Fumaroles, hot water pools, solfatares, geysers
• Dome growth, microseismic tremors
• Lava flow
• Ash fall, tephra fall, acid rain
• Volcanic bombs, lapilli
• Lateral blasts
• Pyroclastic flows, gas surges
• Dome collapses
• Acid rain
Indirectly associated are:
• Mud flow, debris flows, lahars
• Hydrothermal explosions
110 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

• Landslides
Precursors of a volcanic eruption are (among others):
• Increase in seismic tremors and quakes
• Rumbling sounds
• Increase in steam at the vent and at the flanks
• Change in color of the steam from white to gray
• Appearance of magma at the summit (glowing magma)
• Increase in summit volume
• Opening of fissures at the summit of flanks
• Landslides, rockfalls, and debris flows (without rain)
• Melting of snow caps
• Increase in hot Spring temperatures
• Sulfur smell
Dome growth is recognized when the uprising lava (magma chamber)
penetrates the volcano summit leading to an increase in
volcano summit volume.
Lava flows are masses of molten rock material cascading down from
an eruption vent. The speed of the lava flow depends on the
viscosity defined by the silica and water content. Lava high
in silica and water is highly viscous and flows at 3 km/
days, whereas lava with a low viscosity can flow up to
50 km/h. Speed and geometry of the lava flow depend on
the local topography: steep slopes channel low viscous lava
to form elongated lava streams.
Pyroclastic surges are a turbulent density current made up of a mixture of hot
and often toxic gases and fragmented volcanic materials, that
follows the slope topography with speeds of up to several
hundred km per hour and with temperatures that can reach
800 °C and thus can cover large areas within a couple of
minutes.
Volcanic gas volcanic gas is a basic component of magma and lava. It
can contain water, SO2, SO4, CO, CO2, HCL, and also HF,
all components that might react toxically when released in
large quantities.
Hot and lateral blasts occur when hot gases cannot make their way directly to the
atmosphere due to the impermeable material around the vol-
cano summit. The pressured system is often released by a
rapid and explosive escape. Such blasts are among the most
dangerous volcanic eruptions. They can blast off the entire
summit or can explode obliquely to the vent as lateral blasts.
Mud flow/lahars are a mixture of fragmented volcanic debris and water that
rushes down the flanks during a volcanic eruption follow-
ing the morphology. Lahars can also be generated long
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 111

Table 3.3  Volcanic materials that may be emitted during an eruption (Own compilation)
Lava Lahar (mud flow) Ash Gas
Ejected magma Mixture of volcanic debris Solid material of different CO2
Liquid and water (rain, condensed size: SO2
Temperature up to >1100 °C vapor, ice) Bombs (up to 7 cm in SO4
Lava travel speed 2–3 km/h Highly turbulent stream diameter), HF
Liquid follows morphology (similar to liquid concrete) Lapilli (<2 cm) HCL
Viscous Travel speed up to 100 km/h Ash (<2 mm) H2S
Temperature of 700–800 °C Travel path follows Pyroclastic surge up to
Slowly moving downhill morphology 800 °C
Highly destructive Up to 400 km/h fast
Covers a large area within
minutes
Ash particles sharp-edged
(<2 μm), Threat to
respiratory organs
Abrasive to jet turbines

after an eruption when the unconsolidated ashes and debris

accumulated at the flanks are wet by heavy rainfall.
Table 3.3 gives a general overview of the kind of volcanic materials that are emit-
ted during an eruption and what threat can be derived from this.

3.2.1.8 Examples of Volcanic Eruptions

Paricutin, Mexico (Birth of a Volcano)

The birth of a volcano was for the first time in history witnessed in Mexico when
in February 1943 a peasant observed that the Earth opened on his crop field and
smoke rose up from a hole that was normally used to dispose of debris or other
material. The hole was there for many years and had astonishingly never been
filled up. That time the hole rapidly developed into a crack a couple of meters
long. Several hours later the crack produced ashes and began to pile up. The ash
production increased and also rock fragments started to get unearthed. At the end
of the day, the ash mount had risen to about 2 m. The very next day the area began
to tremble and glowing ashes and lava occurred, piling up to 50 m. A day later the
first seismic tremors set and became more and more intensive, reaching a magni-
tude of 4.5 on the Richter scale. Andesitic lava was produced having a temperature
of more than 1000 °C. Two months later the newly developed volcano had reached
a height of 300 m. By June 1943 the village near the volcano had to be evacu-
ated completely. Due to continuously ongoing lava production the volcano easily
reached a height of 450 m within the next months and covered an area of 25 km2.
About 10 years later the activities ceased and the clock tower of the former village
was left as the sole visible remnant.
The increased density of the worldwide volcano and seismic monitoring net-
works today makes it possible to identify and follow the birth of new volcanoes
112 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

on our planet earlier, more directly, and much more precisely than ever before.
Therefore in 1963 in Iceland the birth of a new volcano (Surtsey) was recorded
(Jakobsson 2007). The volcano rose within its first day of appearance to a height
of 10 m above sea level and to a length of 500 m. Half a year later the new vol-
cano was 175 m high (in total 300 m above the sea floor) and about 2 km long.
From satellite imagery it could be seen that in the vicinity of the volcano Erte Ale in
Ethiopia, the Earth was opening for decades at a speed of about a couple of millime-
ters per year, and from January 2010 on, rifting speed was recorded to have acceler-
ated to several meters per year; indicating the birth of a new ocean. Further evidence
on volcanism and rifting is reported from Central Africa, where in Cameroon a
1500 km long belt of intraplate volcanoes occurs, also showing here that volcan-
ism is a direct indicator of plate movements (Fitton 1980). In 2012 at the southern
tip of the Spanish island of Hierro (Canary Islands) the birth of a new volcano was
announced by a bubbling sea surface and volcanic gases. The news spread all over
the world within hours and made everybody a witness to this event. In the next days
the volcano produced much hot water, gas, and vapor. On underwater photos and on
seismic records the size and shape of the volcano crater could clearly be identified.

Explosive and Lahars (Mt. Pinatubo, Luzon, Philippines)

The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo was one of the infrequent events in modern vol-
canology (in ancient history it was Plinius the Younger who witnessed the erup-
tion of Vesuvius in Italy) that opened the chance to monitor a volcanic eruption
long before it began until the last mitigation operations. And Mt. Pinatubo is the
only example where it was possible by detailed geoscientific analysis to predict
a volcanic eruption successfully and to prevent larger casualties. The investiga-
tions were comprehensively documented in a voluminous report (Newhall and
Punongbayan 1996). Mount Pinatubo is a strato volcano that is located on the
island of Luzon, quite near the Philippine capital, Manila. At its western flank the
American air base (Clark Air Base) and at its southern rim the American Naval
Base for East Asia (Subic Bay) were also located. The volcano had in those days a
height of 1750 m; 30,000 people were living around the volcano and about a mil-
lion around its foot. At the top of Mt. Pinatubo there was a small ethnic minority,
Aeta, living who still had animistic beliefs. Until 1991 the volcano was assumed
to be extinct with no signs of volcanic activity for over 500 years. It was in April
1991 when the monitoring volcanologists registered the first signs of activ-
ity, small seismic tremors accompanied by the first powerful steam explosions,
producing molten rock and lava. Many thousand tons of noxious sulfur dioxide
gases were also emitted. Ten weeks later the volcano erupted in one of the big-
gest volcanic events in modern history. Immediately upon the first eruptions being
registered, a team of geologists and volcanologists of the Philippines Institute
of Volcanology (PHIVOLCS) and the Geological Survey of America (USGS)
installed additional monitoring equipment around the volcano that was able to
identify during its first day about 200 smaller seismic tremors. The center of Mt.
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 113

Pinatubo monitoring was established at Clark Air Base. The scientists made a vol-
canic hazard map of the area and identified the extent and severity of former vol-
canic eruptions. The gas emissions, the shape of the volcano, and its temperature
were measured directly at the volcano as well as from satellite images and aerial
photos. The scientists came to the conclusion that an eruption of Mt. Pinatubo lay
ahead.
On June 12th PHIVOLCS ordered the evacuation of all people in a radius
of 10 km around the volcano, a radius that was soon extended to 30 km. About
60,000 people were evacuated within two days. On the 15th of June Mt. Pinatubo
erupted cataclysmically. The entire summit exploded reducing the height by
150 m, forming instead a caldera of 2.5 km in diameter. The volcano ejected
5 km3 of material, making Mt. Pinatubo the second largest volcano eruption in
the last century, VEI 6. The ash cloud rose 34 km into the air and an incredible
amount of gas and ashes were released. Giant mud flows and pyroclastic surges
were formed, running over 50 km downhill at high speed. These surges filled for-
mer deep valleys up to the top and fresh volcanic deposits accumulated locally up
to 200 m. The pyroclastic surge at one place was five years later easily identified
as its deposits were still approximately 500 °C hot. The ashes covered an area of
about 4000 km2 with a blanket up to 1 m high. Many houses in the area (including
many of the airbase barracks) collapsed under the load of newly fallen ash, espe-
cially as during the time of the eruption a tropical cyclone hit the area. The water
soaked the dry ashes and thus doubled the weight. The (typical of the region) quite
flat metal roofs were not able to withstand the increased load and broke, causing
the biggest fraction of the 700 deaths. The living environment of many people was
completely destroyed and after the eruption no vegetation was left and the pre-
dominant color of the region was gray. Quite a number of aircraft were traveling
the area on the day of the eruption and 16 of them came in contact with the ashes;
with two of them one of the engines failed.
USGS and PHIVOLCS have estimated the costs and benefits for forecast and
evacuation of the people living around the volcano. There were 5000 people reg-
istered to be evacuated but it was estimated that in total up to 40,000 people could
be brought into security, among them 20,000 of the indigenous Aeta people who
settled directly at the top of the volcano. Moreover, 20,000 servicemen of the US
airbase were also brought to safety. Altogether property losses of conservatively
estimated US$250 million with an upper range of U$500 million had been saved
by the eruption forecast. And USGS gave an estimate of the monetary value of the
lives saved of the 5000 refugees registered refugees: it was “estimated” to be a value
between US$0.1 and US$1 million per life (see Sect. 7.2). The total costs for safe-
guarding lives and property have been estimated at about US$50 million, includ-
ing US$1.5 million for the volcano monitoring and eruption forecast, resulting in a
cost–benefit ratio of about 1:10. Altogether the Mt. Pinatubo eruption is a story of a
successful volcano disaster management. The severity as well as the area of impact
was precisely predicted by the scientists. “Only” 700 people lost their lives, most
of them members of the Aeta minority who for a long time denied the evacuation
order. What were the factors that made the disaster and emergency management so
114 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.29  Mount St. Helens,

Washington State

successful at Mt. Pinatubo, where it failed at so many other volcanoes? The reasons
are:
• The Philippines have long-lasting in-depth experiences with volcano eruptions.
• They very early established a well-functioning and skillful disaster management.
• They were working in close cooperation with international well-experienced
volcanological institutes along with the USGS.
• The population at risk was early and comprehensively involved in risk prevention.

Lateral Blasts and Lahars (Mt. St. Helens, United States)

The eruption of Mt. St. Helens, in Washington State in 1980, is today the best
recorded and analyzed volcano eruption of the world (USGS 2005b). It is also
a synonym for a lateral blast: an eruption that runs obliquely to the central vent
and explodes at the flank (Fig. 3.29). Mount St. Helens is still today one of the
most active volcanos in the Cascade Range located in the northwestern part of
the Rocky Mountains near the Canadian border. The volcano has proved to have
a great potential to erupt explosively. Activity of Mt. St. Helens can be traced back
over more than 250,000 years. In this time the volcano has produced both violent
eruptions of ash and debris as well as quiet outpourings of lava.
Volcanic monitoring proved that months before the eruption, magma was
intruding into the volcano leading to an increase in dome volume. The higher
level of activity of Mt. St. Helens dated back to early 1980 when a series of small
earthquakes occurred, followed by hundreds of smaller quakes. A strong steam
explosion on March 17th, 1980 opened a crater through the volcano’s ice cap that
reached a diameter of about 300 m within several days. Two giant crack systems
crossed the entire summit area. More than 10,000 earthquakes have been recorded
and the northern flank of the volcano had grown outward by at least 150 m to form
a significant bump. Such dramatic deformation of the volcano was interpreted by
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 115

the volcanologists from USGS as strong evidence that molten rock had risen high
into the volcano.
At the time of eruption, the volcano dome had reached its point of instability
(USGS, ibid). On May 18th, an earthquake of magnitude 5.1 occurred that lasted
only about 20 s and that made the entire volcano’s bulge and summit slide away
in a huge landslide. Film recordings reveal that the landslide removed the vol-
cano’s entire bulge and summit within a couple of minutes, the largest landslide
ever recorded in Earth’s history. This reduction in material released the pressure
from the magma chamber of the volcano abruptly and allowed the hot water in the
system to flash to steam and to expand explosively. The decreasing pressure even
went through the volcanic conduit down to the magma chamber. The lava began to
rise, formed bubbles, and then degassed explosively. For nine hours a hydrother-
mal lateral blast produced rock fragments, ashes, and gas water vapor, an eruption
that is called cataclastic.
The eruption produced in the first 15 min an ash and gas column that reached
25 km high up in the sky. An hour later a second eruption took place, this time
from the newly formed crater that was followed by the first smaller avalanches
of hot ash, pumice, and gas. The eruptions blasted off the entire summit of the
volcano lowering it by 400 m from its previous 2950 m. Then the first real pyro-
clastic surge occurred running at 120 km/h more than 10 km down the northern
flank. USGS estimated the speed of the ash column to be about 400 km/h that then
slowed down considerably and led to the fall of the huge amount of ash, debris,
and rock fragments. Over the day the volcano released more than 500 million tons
of ash north and eastward across Washington State; and even caused complete
darkness in the city of Spokane (Washington State) more than 400 km away from
Mt. St. Helens. Major ashfalls were also registered to the north as far as central
Montana and covered large parts of the Great Plains to the east. Within the next
three days the ash clouds spread across the entire United States and circled the
Earth in 15 days.
The hot rocks and gas made large parts of the snow and ice cap of the volcano
melt, creating surges of water that mixed with loose rock debris to form massive
mudflows (lahars). The largest and most destructive lahar was formed by water
seeping over days from inside the huge landslide deposit. This sustained flow of
water eroded material from the landslide deposit. While flowing down the lahars
increased in size and as they traveled downstream, flooded the two arms of the
Toutle River, destroying everything (houses, bridges, trees, etc.). Impressive pic-
tures show massive trees ripped off by the eruption all lying aligned in the direc-
tion away from the volcano. The region still today is only covered by small bushes
and loose vegetation. Since 1982 the area has been under a natural conservation
program and was given the status of National Monument.
In the years since the eruptions of 1980 the volcano showed a multitude of dif-
ferent volcanic activities. Its most recent series of eruptions began in 1986 with
several periods of increased seismicity. Between 1989 and 1991 there were about
30 events of short but intense seismic activity lasting minutes to hours, accompa-
nied by small explosions from the dome. The explosions formed a new vent on the
116 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

north side of the dome and produced small eruption columns that rose several kilo-
meters above the volcano. A few explosions also hurled hot rocks a meter in diam-
eter from the dome, generated small pyroclastic flows in the crater, and formed
small lahars. During 1995 and 1998 seismicity increased for several months, but
there were no accompanying explosions. The first signs of recovery of fauna and
flora were seen about six years later (Dale et al. 2005) when a small rat was seen
that survived the catastrophe in hollows under the volcanic debris and spread
lupine seeds on which it lived. Successively other plants and animals invaded the
area. Today the former devastated and grey ash-covered area is covered by bushes,
single trees, and widespread grass, flowers, and colors. For a couple of years now
Mt. St. Helens is again showing higher signs of seismic and volcanic unrest. In
2004 a new lava dome inside the already newly emerged dome continued to grow.
Thermal imaging confirmed that lava extrusion increased noticeably. In addition,
the areas of uplift and those with intense deformation continued to move south-
ward, nearing the crater wall. The new lava extrusion, which occupies the western
part of the uplift, had a volume of almost 1.5 million cubic meters. And tempera-
tures of more than 600 °C were measured. The many different types of indications
of unrest clearly document that Mt. St. Helens will also be an active and highly
hazardous volcano in the Cascade Range in the future.

Mount Pelée (Pyroclastic Surge = Nuée Ardente)

The paroxysmal eruption of the Mount Pelée on the island of Martinique in the
year 1902 laid the base for an up to that day unknown type of volcano eruption
(Pichler 2006, pp. 125–127). Since that time such an eruption type has been called
a pyroclastic surge or in French nuée ardente. Mount Pelée was for a long time a
dormant resting volcano for the 26,000 inhabitants of island‘s capital, St. Pierre,
situated 7 km distant at the foot of the volcano, less a risk than seen as a leisure
destiny. Although pyroclastic surges were recorded in the decades before the
great eruption, no one really felt at risk. But in April 1902 the volcano started to
produce ashes, gas, and white smoke. Sometimes eruption clouds were seen that
rose a couple of hundred meters into the sky. And ash fell on the city. At the end
of April the first seismic tremors were registered and the ashfalls became more
intense. It was May 6th when according to historic evidence lava penetrated into
the crater and produced a molten lava dome there. Simultaneously the heat gen-
erated the first lahars from the molten icecap that rushed downhill and killed 25
people in an adjacent valley. The people became frightened and sought refuge in
the city of St. Pierre. The governor in his intention not to disturb the upcoming
election appeased the people with the words that no one was at risk. But Mt. Pelée
activities increased and on the top burning volcanic flames were seen. On May 8th
the volcano erupted and a dark cloud of ashes ran downhill.
Later, evidence revealed that the cloud had reached a speed of up to 500 km/h
and was up to 800 °C hot. The cloud was accompanied by a sound shock wave
that traveled at a speed of 450 m/s and that covered an area of about 30 km2
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 117

from the top of the volcano 1300 m down to the seaside. The pyroclastic surge
reached the capital, St. Pierre, within a couple of minutes and killed all but two
of the inhabitants. Nearly all the houses were completely destroyed. The thus
far unprecedented witness of this paroxysmal eruption was given by sailors who
just at the moment the volcano was erupting were about to enter St. Pierre har-
bor. The French Academy of Science immediately sent a team of volcanologists
to Martinique to investigate the disaster. They found that the magma of Mt. Pelée
was very rich in SiO2 (dacitic magma) and that the tectonically highly fractured
volcano allowed much phreatic water to penetrate into the volcano vents, leading
to a highly explosive situation. These explosions destroyed the crater flanks and
the normally thermodynamically controlled uprising ash cloud collapsed and the
pyroclastic surge then rushed downhill (Lacroix 1904, 1908 cited in Pichler 2006,
p. 127).
Such types of volcanoes spreading hot and toxic gases over large parts of the
volcano flanks are known from many volcanoes of the world. The best examples
are the city of Pompeii (Italy) whose entire populace was killed within a couple
of minutes by a pyroclastic surge of the Vesuvius eruption in 79 AD. Or from Mt.
Merapi (Indonesia) whose many eruptions often produced highly dangerous pyro-
clastic surges, most recently in June 2006. As this volcano type was intensively
investigated during the eruption of the Surtsey volcano (Iceland) this type is also
called Surtseyian.

Nevada del Ruiz (Mudflow, Lahar)

The volcano eruption of the Nevada del Ruiz in Columbia in 1985 is a world-
famous example of a volcano-triggered mudflow (lahar). The term “lahar” comes
from the Indonesian language and describes a mixture of water with sandy mate-
rial, gravel, and larger boulders that suspended in a fluid–liquid mixture has a
physical density like floating concrete.
The Nevada del Ruiz volcano is about 5400 m high and is one of the volcanoes
of many covered with an icecap. The glacier at the top of the volcano those days
spread over an area of about 23 km2 over the almost flat-lying summit with ice of
up to 200 m thickness. Furthermore under the icecap there was a large crater lake
(Arenas Crater). For more than 150 years the volcano was in repose status. But on
November 13th, 1985 the volcano suddenly produced ashes and increased fuma-
role activity with vapor that rose up to 2 km high (Pichler 2006, pp. 116–118).
Some minor but significant seismic tremors had been recognized for weeks indi-
cating uprising magma in the volcano vent. Consequently a group of Columbians
from the national Committee of Volcano Monitoring investigated the volcano, but
due to limited and rather outdated equipment the investigations were not found
serious enough to convince the national and local authorities about the potential
risk. It was nevertheless understood that in case of an eruption this would defini-
tively melt the ice cap and would generate a massive lahar. In 1595 and 1845 simi-
lar lahars had already been recorded.
118 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

The initial blast occurred on November 13th, 1985 producing a large amount of
ash and pumice that showered down on the area and that even reached the city of
Armero about 70 km away from the volcano. Several hours later molten rocks and
lava erupted from the summit for the first time and also produced a local pyroclas-
tic surge. Together with the eruption a heavy storm with torrential rain set in forc-
ing the people to stay in houses for the next hours. The heavy downpour led the
electricity system in the region to fail and there was no radio communication in
operation (see Sect. 5.3). The uprising magma led to a melting of 10 % of the ice-
cap and filled up the Arenas Crater lake with melt water. Once the surrounding ice
barrier was melted a highly destructive mudflow (lahar) made up of water, ashes,
rock fragments, gravel, and sand was generated that rushed downhill at a speed of
up to 50 km/h and that reached Armero two hours later. The city of Armero was
built on top of a former mudflow that occurred in 1845.
There is no clear evidence that the inhabitants of Armero ever received a gen-
eral evacuation order (Tilling 1989). Even attempts of the local Red Cross (Voight
1986) to evacuate the people failed, as most of the citizens did not have confidence
in the technicians’ statements and instead preferred to follow the advice of the
local priests and city mayor, both disseminating their messages about three hours
before by radio and loudspeakers that “the city is not at risk.” An earlier attempt
to consult USGS volcanologists was stopped by the US government as they saw
a certain risk for their people by terrorist attacks. A total of 23,000 inhabitants of
Armero died that night when the lahar devastated the entire city with a 3-m high
flood causing an economic loss of about US$1 billion (in US$ 1985 currency).
Summarizing the tragedy of Nevada del Ruiz it was “purely and simply a human
error caused by misjudgment and bureaucratic shortsightedness” (Voight, ibid).

Island (Rift Volcano)

A special form of plate boundary volcanoes are the so-called rift volcanoes that
occur along the divergent plate boundaries. The best-known examples of that vol-
cano type are Iceland or the volcanoes in the East-African rift valley. Nevertheless
by far the most rift volcanoes occur under the sea; it is estimated that there are
more than several thousand, although only 250 of them are active and identified.
In Iceland the divergent plates formed in historic times (since 1783), including the
world-famous 27 km long Laki rift valley where the Eurasian and North American
plates diverge with a speed of 1–2 cm/year. Thus one half of Iceland is traveling
with the American plate westward while the other goes east. Next to the Laki
rift there is a series of different almost parallel running rifts that have separated
Iceland for more than 20 million years (Hjartarson et al. 2009). At the time of the
initial rifting of the Laki rift a 25-km wide lava mass was formed covering an area
of 560 km2 with a volume of almost 15 km3, the biggest lava production during
one eruption phase ever recorded (Pichler 2006, p. 64). Similarly, about 100 years
later the eruption emitted a high amount of sulphur aerosols into the atmosphere
that dropped the average temperature in the northern hemisphere in the year after
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 119

Fig. 3.30  Hotspots in the

South Atlantic and their travel
paths (Graph based: Duncan
and Richards 1991)

by about 1.3 °C and made the summer very cold, resulting in a massive crop fail-
ure. In those days according to historic records Iceland’s population diminished by
about 25 % and the livestock losses amounted to 70 %.

Hawaii (Hotspot)

Hotspots are accumulations of magma in the Earth’s crust that are not directly
attached to plate boundaries. Like magma of other chamber types the lava con-
tinuously protrudes through the plates thus forming a volcano. The characteristic
feature of a hotspot is that the overlying plate is steadily moving while the magma
chamber is stable in its position. Thus in geological times a chain of volcanoes is
built. Hotspots are identified all over the world. Well-known examples in Europe
are the hotspots located along a line from the French Cevennes in the west and the
German Eifel volcanoes towards the east (Schmincke 2000), all of them generated
by the northward movement of the African continental plates. The Hawaiian Island
chain is acknowledged to be the most famous example of a hotspot. The westward
movement of the Pacific plate results in the oldest Hawaiian volcano lying in the
west having been generated about 30 million years ago and the youngest (2 mil-
lion years old) located in the east (Lockwood and Hazlett 2010). The Hawaiian
volcano ridge is more than 75 million years old and has produced more than 200
volcanoes. The ridge itself can be traced for more than 5000 km to the north,
where it found its outermost extension in the Emperor Seamount chain. There
120 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

many other examples of hotspots in the Pacific, for instance, the Marquesas Island
ridge, the Salomon Islands, or the Marshall Islands. A famous hotspot in the South
Atlantic is the Island of Tristan da Cunha which is located just at the mid-Atlantic
ridge. The precursors of Tristan da Cunha are to be found in Brazil, the Parana
plateau volcanoes, and on the African continent the basaltic layers of Etendaka,
Namibia. Figure 3.30 shows that from the sea floor morphology the way the plates
took over this hotspot can clearly be identified (Duncan and Richards 1991).
The Yellowstone volcano is also a result of a hotspot. The magma protruded
into the mountain long before, forming the biggest caldera on Earth. Since
then the volcano did not give significant signs of an ongoing effusion process.
Nevertheless there were numerous indications that revealed that the Yellowstone
hotspot is not extinct. Since 1950 the area has lifted up less than a meter, as could
be identified by radar interferometry imagery. Since 2004 the Yellowstone volcano
rose at a record speed of up to 7 cm/year as investigations of the University of
Utah (United States) revealed. At a depth of about 10 km the geologists identified
a huge accumulation of molten magma (www.unews.utah). This uplift frightens
many people in the United States, therefore a geologist in 2009 made an urgent
request to the local emergency management to immediately evacuate Yellowstone
National Park as according to his investigations a major eruption is about to occur
very soon. Since than the volcano did not show any significant unrest. The Utah
geologists stated that uplift must not automatically be followed by an eruption.
Uplift can rather be followed by a descent due to cooling of the magma that rose
up in the vent.

Lake Nyos (CO2 Accumulated in Volcanic Crater Lakes)

Another phenomenon attached to volcano eruptions is submarine gas emissions,

either offshore or on land in crater lakes. Lake Nyos in Cameroon is a promi-
nent example for a submarine gas emission, and caused a major tragedy in 1986
(Walker et al. 1992). The lake is located in the Oku Volcano region within the
Mbere-Graben structure and is a former explosion crater that for centuries has
been filled with water. As the ongoing volcanism continuously produces CO2 the
gas accumulates in the deeper parts of the water in liquid form. According to the
thermodynamic equation a water column of 200 m can take up 10 times more CO2
than water at the surface. Thus it was assumed that at a depth of more than 200 m
a considerable amount of CO2 was accumulated. In August 1986 that CO2 sud-
denly was released from the lake and the CO2 having a lower density than water
was jetted to the surface and resulted in a change in the water–CO2 pressure equi-
librium and resulted in a degassing of more and more CO2. As at the surface CO2
on the other hand is heavier than air, the CO2 accumulated in the adjacent river
system and morphological depressions where many people were living. It was cal-
culated that more than 1.6 million tons of CO2 had been released that time, an
amount of gas that took about 300 years to accumulate. In that night 1700 people
lost their lives and thousands of cattle and other livestock were killed. Although
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 121

Fig. 3.31  The Island of

Santorini and the position of
the former volcano

the actual trigger for this tragedy is not clear up to now, it is assumed that it was
either an earthquake or submarine slum that turned the normal water layering
upside down. A similar tragedy was reported from Lake Kivu in Ruanda (Walker
et al., ibid), one of the largest lakes in eastern Africa that is 2000 times the size of
Lake Nyos. There it is assumed that about 250 cbm of CO2 and 55 billion cbm of
CH4 have accumulated.

Caldera (Santorini Volcano)

The volcanic island of Santorini (Greece) today encompasses four islands named
Thera, Therasia, Aspronisi, and the central Kameni Islands. This group of islands
makes up what is called a caldera (Fig. 3.31). The Santorini volcano is part of
the Cyclades Island Chain in the southern Aegean Sea, located halfway between
Greece and Turkey. The Cyclades Island Chain itself is generated by the north-
ward subduction of the African plate along the Hellenic trench system under
the Eurasian plate. Its outstanding appearance, its perfect circular shape, and
its mere size, make the Santorini volcano the type locality of a caldera. Other
well-known calderas are the large caldera of the Krakatoa volcano in the Sunda
Strait (Indonesia) or the beautifully shaped caldera of Crater Lake in the Rocky
Mountains, although this one is much smaller in size. The vision that the eruption
of the Santorini caldera was responsible for the decline of the Minoan culture is
often cited in archeological literature but could not be verified by geological evi-
dence (Pichler, ibid, p. 40).
122 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Calderas are former strato volcanoes whose central parts, after having emptied
the shallow lying magma chamber through a ring of volcano vents, are collapsed
into the depleted reservoir, thus forming a bowl-shaped depression. In this depres-
sion water ingresses to fill up the former volcano summit (Gudmudsson 2008).
This caldera type is normally generated after the main phase of ash-producing
eruptions.
The island of Santorini wasn’t the result of a single event, but rather of sev-
eral eruptions. The geologic record reveals a long history of eruptions, all con-
sistent with its subduction-zone setting. At least 12 eruptive phases have occurred
over the last one million years. One of the ash clouds is taken to have reached
an altitude of more than 30 km (Pichler, ibid, p. 42) and Santorini aerosols could
be traced up to Greenland. The latest Bronze Age event was a Plinian eruption
with an estimated “Volcanic Explosivity Index” (VEI) of 6.9; an explosivity that
was only surpassed by seven other terrestrial eruptions in the past four millennia.
Before this Bronze Age catastrophe, Santorini was a large circular island with a
water-filled embayment whose central highland collapsed again to generate the
modern caldera. From archeological records it can be followed that Santorini has
been inhabited by numerous civilizations going back to the thirteenth century BC,
contemporaneous with the most recent eruptive events. Historic eruptions may
well have provided dramatic events for these various civilizations. Archeological
excavations indicate that the island of Thera was colonized by the Minoans, a
Bronze Age civilization named after the legendary King Minos of Crete, and that
appears to have had a thriving economy based on an intensive trade throughout
the eastern Mediterranean. The exact date of the last eruption is still controversial.
Most radiometric studies show that it might date from 1615–1645 BC, consist-
ent with a pronounced acid-ice layer from the Greenland cores, dated at 1636 BC.
Since the late Bronze Age eruption, two new islands have formed in the center of
the caldera by numerous eruptive events over the past 2000 years. Santorini thus
appears to be particularly active compared to its geologic past. There have been
several eruptions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the most recent
occurring in 1950. Still today the island group exhibits ongoing seismic activity,
and both fumaroles and hydrothermal springs are common features on the islands.

3.2.2 Hydrological Hazards

This section describes disaster events that were caused by deviations in the normal
water cycle and/or overflow of bodies of water caused by wind setup:
• Flood
• Mass movement (wet)
• Land subsidence
• Avalanche
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 123

subsequent arrival of flood

river „A“
river „A“
river „B“

river „B“
simultaneous arrival of flood

increase
river „B“

river „A“

Fig. 3.32  Flood level increase due to subsequent or simultaneous flood arrival (Own graph)

3.2.2.1 Flood

Different types of floods occur, such as river floods and floods from the sea in
coastal areas. Flash floods and urban floods have been described in Sect. 3.2.3,
however, this section is concerned with the flooding of riverbeds and lowlands.
Flooding occurs when the normal water level in the rivers is increased, in gen-
eral due to excessive rainfall, but also when in times of snow melting the water
level is increased or due to failure of technical infrastructure. A higher than nor-
mal rainfall can occur either as a result of precipitation over a longer time period
or as an abrupt and short-term heavy downpour from thunderstorms. In general
about 30 % of precipitation is drained at the surface, 30 % enters the top soil, and
the rest is taken out of the system by evapotranspiration. The moment the soil
pore space is saturated with water the additional water masses can only drain off,
thus increasing the normal percentage of drained water and it comes to a flood.
The responsibility to define what is a “flood” lies in general with the government
administrations that in Western Europe, according to centuries of hydrological
data, in general define the highest water level of the last 100 years (HQ100) as
the threshold value. Nevertheless higher and lower water levels can be defined for
areas with lower risk or areas where, for example, industrial assets or historical
buildings have to be protected.
124 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

The water of a river normally flows downstream according to the river valley
morphology from the source to the river mouth, a journey that can take weeks with
large river like the Rhine river. But as rivers are normally composed of a system of
smaller and larger tributaries, their water masses can have a great influence on the
water level of the main drainage area. In the case of a regional rainfall event that
occurs upstream, the main river as well as its tributaries draining these areas bear
more water than normal. And where one or several tributaries conjoins with the
main river, the water masses add up to a level that can overstep the HQ100 level.
In the case of such a confluence a flood situation can be avoided. Figure 3.32 gives
an impression of how water masses can add up and moreover points out how a
flood management comprising the entire catchment area can help prevent floods.
There are two trends that point to an increase of flood risk worldwide. First, the
magnitude and frequency of floods are likely to increase in the future as a result of
climate change; second, there has been a marked increase in the number of people
and economic assets located in flood risk zones. There is also a growing awareness
of the significance of river flooding on human health, both physical and psycho-
logical. Substantial health implications can occur, for example, when floodwaters
carry pollutants, or are mixed with contaminated water from drains and agricul-
tural land. There will be mental health consequences as well: in addition to the
considerable stress of extensive damage, the threat of repeated floods, sometimes
coupled with possible withdrawal of insurance cover can make properties impossi-
ble to sell. All experts in flood management see clear indications that the risk from
floods will increase considerably during the coming decades and this holds true for
developing as well as industrialized countries. The challenge for flood managers as
well as for regional planners but also for the populations at flood risk is to antici-
pate these changes and to work out strategies to protect society and the environ-
ment from the negative effects of floods.
Swiss Re (2010) listed 675 floods all the over the world in the time span 1998
to 2010 that claimed 130,000 deaths and resulted in US$30 billion in insured
losses. The country in Western Europe most affected by floods is the United
Kingdom, where in 2007 the biggest flood ever in the last 200 years of history
occurred. The flood devastated large parts of middle England when 360 mm rain
fell in the months from May to July 2007, more than double the amount of nor-
mal rainfall, and covered the country with water for weeks causing damages of
up to US$8 billion, of which about US$6 billion was insured (MunichRe 2012).
The country is regularly struck by floods that have caused damage of another
US$2.5 billion in the time from 1994 to 2000.
More than 200 flood events occur worldwide yearly in the last 30 years of
which about 10 are classified “great and disastrous” (MunichRe 2013). From
1975 to 2001 the number of flood-related disasters increased from 20 (1975) to
more than 150 in 2001, and the number of people killed by floods in general was
quite stable between 5000 and 10,000 per year. CRED-EMDAT listed the 10 most
severe floods of the last 20 years (Guha-Sapir et al. 2013) and it came out that
although China did not occur among the 10 most deadly events, it made up all 10
most severe in regard to the people made homeless. Of the 10 most severe floods
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 125

Fig. 3.33  Statistical evidence on worldwide flood risk (Compiled from MunichRe 2012; Guha-
Sapir et al. 2013; UNISDR 2011)

in regard to economic losses, 80 % occurred in Asia with 20 % in the United

States and Western Europe.
In the year 2012 floods claimed 1600 lives worldwide, made more than 50,000
homeless, and caused an economic loss of more than US$20 million. Similar to
other natural disasters, floods have also primarily affected the low- and middle-
income classes. It must nevertheless be pointed out that although the number of
people exposed to flood hazards has risen significantly from about 100 million in
1980–1990 to more than 150 million by the end of 1990, the overall death toll
from floods is decreasing, a trend that reflects the general death toll from natu-
ral disasters worldwide. By far most of these victims live in Asia, where 90 % of
all the people that were ever affected by natural disasters live. Between 1998 and
2002 Europe suffered over 100 major damaging floods, including the catastrophic
floods along the Danube and Elbe rivers in 2002. Since 1998, floods have caused
some 700 fatalities, and were responsible for the displacement of about half a
million people and at least €25 billion in insured economic losses (EEA 2003).
Floods in developing countries often have wiped out the investments made in
infrastructure of the previous 50 years. Especially in Asian developing countries
where poverty and social indifference are widespread and basic needs are often not
secured is there a great need to build societal resilience to floods. Such a higher
126 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

level of resilience will only be achieved when society in general acknowledges the
importance of flood management and the political levels pave the administrative
ways for prevention countermeasures at national as well as at local levels.
Statistics on flood damages given by MunichRe (2012), CRED-Emdat (Guha-
Sapir et al. 2013), and the United Nations (UNISDR 2011) reveal that floods are in
general responsible for more than 30 % of the total economic losses and for more
than two thirds of the people who have been in total affected by natural disasters
worldwide in last century. Figure 3.33 gives more detailed insights to the flood
risks worldwide. About 1300 events have taken place from 1900 to 2012; in total
2.5 million people have been killed in the said time span, 5 million people have
been affected, and the economic losses total up to more than US$3 billion. But the
geographical distribution of events, the number of claimed lives, the affected ones,
and damages vary significantly. Although more than 80 % of the events occurred
in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, 90 % of the persons killed were in Asia alone
and 80 % of the affected ones live in Europe. Another remarkable fact is that in
America only 1 % of the worldwide flood affected people’s lives, but the damages
(mostly derived from the Mississippi/Missouri flood plain) sum up to about 25 %
of the worldwide flood damages.
The EU-EWFD (2000) stresses the need for an integrated flood management
evaluating flood probabilities and flood consequences in a risk-based assessment.
Methods for the analysis of flood risk should include the following steps: (a) deter-
mination of the probability of flooding, (b) simulation of flood characteristics, and
(c) an assessment of the consequences from flooding (Apel et al. 2006).
In order to reduce the flood risk either of the individual as well as of society
there are three factors that define the main mitigation strategy:
• Reducing flood probability by giving the rivers more space to take up the rain-
water by rebuilding the often aligned river courses, by widening the riverbeds,
by using natural morphological depressions as areas to be flooded (retention
areas, flood polders), and by increasing the dam heights
• Reducing the consequences of flooding by making households at risk flood
resistant, by increasing the flood resilience of critical infrastructure (hospitals,
water and power supply installations, bridges, etc.)
• Establishing organizational measurers such as faster and comprehensive flood
risk probability assessment, a dense and rapid flood level monitoring, reliable
flood simulation programs that cover all types of flood scenarios, an improved
early warning system, an early involvement of the individuals at risk and a
strengthening of the individual coping capacities as well as an early and com-
prehensive involvement of those societal groups that are highly at risk in the
official flood management
Risks from flooding predominantly occur along rivers and the coastal regions.
River flooding is mainly defined by the water retention capability of the river
catchment area as a function of its size and morphology. In this area, when
exposed to rainfall, the amount and intensity of rain define how strongly the river
is able to drain off the water and prevent adjacent areas from flooding. In Europe
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 127

the economic values that are exposed to flood risk are estimated to be more than
€150 billion and along the river Rhine alone, and along its German part more than
2 million people are supposed to be at risk (ICPR 2010, p. 8). By human inter-
vention in the natural environment the original capacity of the catchment areas
to withhold floods in many regions of the world is already highly affected: flood
plains were sealed by settlements, river courses straightened, and deforestations
led to higher runoff.
Flooding in coastal areas, however, mostly depends on the morphology of the
coastal regions that are exposed to storm-induced sea-level increase. The total
value of economic assets located within a 500-m perimeter of the European coast-
line is estimated to reach €1000 billion (EU-EWFD ibid). As with river flood
plains the coastal regions are home to more than 50 % of the world’s population
as these regions are highly settled and used agriculturally and industrially. Thus
flooding leads to high economic and social damages, but also has severe environ-
mental consequences, for example, when coastal aquifers become saline or pol-
luted waters enter into the sea, with negative impacts on the wetland areas and the
biodiversity.
(a) When during a heavy rain a river extends its bed and covers the adjacent
plains this is already a flood.
(b) Mass movement (wet)/mass movement (dry).

3.2.2.2 Mass Movements (Landslides, Debris Flows, Avalanches)

Landslides contribute to major disasters every year on a global scale, and the fre-
quency of occurrence is on an upward trend. The increasing number of landslide
disasters can be attributed in large part to the new reality of changing climate
resulting in more extreme weather conditions combined with overexploitation of
natural resources and deforestation, increased urbanization, and uncontrolled use
of land (Nadim et al. 2006a). Recent examples are the mudflows of December
1999 in Venezuela, involving over 20,000 deaths, and the El Salvador earthquakes
of 2001, which caused 600 deaths in just one landslide. In total more than 600
landslide events have taken place since 1900 according to the CRED-EMDAT
database, claimed about 70,000 lives, affected more than 10 million people, and
caused economic damage of more than US$10 billion.
The landslide hotspots in the world are located in general along the mountain-
ous fold belts in the west along the Rocky Mountains and the Andean mountain
range and along the European–Asian mountain belt that is formed by the Alps,
the Caucasus, the Zagros Chain, and the Himalayas all along through Indonesia
down to New Zealand and northwards along the Philippines, and Japan up to
Kamchatka. In general the landslide risk of these mountain regions has been iden-
tified by Nadim et al. (2006b) to be moderate to medium, although—as landslide
and mass movements are preferably local phenomena—can be locally of very high
risk.
128 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

The term “landslide” describes a wide variety of processes of slope-forming

materials including rock, soil, artificial fill, or a combination of it, that result in
downslope movement of soil, rock, and organic materials under the effects of
gravity. Based on the trendsetting classifications made by Varnes (1978), Cruden
and Varnes (1996), and Hutchinson (1988), the term “landslide” meanwhile has
become widely accepted especially by engineering geologists and civil engineers.
The term “landslide” describes all types of gravitational slope failures: rotational
and translational slides, slow moving earth flows, and fast-moving debris flows
composed of mud, gravel (up to boulder-sized material), and organic debris that
often mobilize from slides (Pierson et al. 1996). In response to periods of intense
rainfall landslides often turn into debris flows. They initiate as rotational or trans-
lational slides that turn into muddy slurries, or from concentrated erosion of sur-
face material by runoff. As they travel downhill slopes and channels, the slurries
can substantially increase in volume by incorporating additional material. Addition
of sufficient volumes of water relative to the sediment content can also result in
dilution of the debris flow to the consistency of normal mudflow. The term also
describes the landform that results from such movement (USGS 2008c). It com-
prises many different ways the materials can move (see Fig. 3.34): either by fall-
ing, toppling, sliding, spreading, or flowing.
Nevertheless there are quite a number of other terms in use that are inter-
changeable with the term landslide (mass movement, slope failure, flow-like mass
movements, debris flow, debris avalanche and mudslide, rockfalls, soil creeping,
and many other variations). A definition that can provide a more precise descrip-
tion of gravity-induced mass movements by emphasizing the formation process
has been proposed by Hungr et al. (2001). They presented a “new division of land-
slide materials based on genetic and morphological aspects rather than arbitrary
grain-size limits.” The proposed definition distinguishes between:
• Slow, nonliquefied sand or gravel flows
• Extremely rapid sand, silt, or debris flow slides accompanied by liquefaction
• Clay flow slides involving extrasensitive clays
• Peat flows
• Slow to rapid earth flows in nonsensitive plastic clays
• Debris flows that occur in steep established channels or gullies
• Mud flows considered as cohesive debris flows
• Debris floods involving massive sediment transport at limited discharges
• Debris avalanches that occur on open hill slopes and rock avalanches formed by
large-scale failures of bedrock
Regardless of the definition actually in use, the definition of the different type of
landslides (dry and wet mass movements) as given above outlines the basic under-
standing of landslides and is summarized in the eight pictures in Fig. 3.34.
Landslides can occur virtually anywhere in the world, a finding that contradicts
the traditional viewpoint that landslides are restricted to extremely steep slopes.
And there is almost no country on Earth that is not exposed to this kind of natu-
ral hazard. Although the primary driving force for a landslide is gravity, there are
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 129

Fig. 3.34  Generalized overview of landslide types (Courtesy USGS 2008c)

130 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

other factors that influence and affect the original stability of a slope, for instance,
the specific subsurface conditions that make an area or a slope prone to failure,
whereas a landslide often requires a trigger before being released. Among the dif-
ferent triggering effects the major causes for landslide are:
• Precipitation
• Earthquakes
• Volcanoes
• Permafrost
• Forest fires
• Erosion
• Flooding
• Human activities
Extremely dry areas as well as very humid areas are highly prone to slope ­failure.
Moreover not only steep slopes are a necessary prerequisite for landslides to occur
but also gentle slopes with an inclination of only 1–2° have been observed to
fail. Concerning the impact of human activities it turned out that many of them
superimpose the natural preconditions and lead to more severe triggering situa-
tions. But landslides can not only occur in bedrock or on soils, cultivated land,
barren slopes, or on natural forests; landslides can also occur under water and are
also recorded from extraterrestrial planets such as the Ophir Chasma landslide on
the Moon that experienced a total height of about 5000 m. New studies revealed
that also thermal expansion for daily temperature fluctuation contributes to slope
movement.
Although landslides have been recorded from everywhere around the world,
three major triggering mechanisms can be distinguished that can occur either
singly or in combination. The impact of all of these root causes can vary widely
and depend on geomorphological factors such as steepness of slope, shape of
terrain, geological factors such as soil type and underlying geology, and on the
human factor including agricultural activity, settlements, or technical infrastruc-
ture. Landslides typically occur when rainfall infiltrates a relatively competent
mass of soil making the soil become gradually saturated. This leads to an increase
in the pore-water pressure while simultaneously decreasing the shear strengths.
The more water infiltrates, the more the initial landslide changes into muddy
slurry transforming the landslides gradually into a debris flow. Such a phenom-
enon is preferably observed on hill slopes steeper than 15° (Iverson et al. 1997).
Landslide-generated debris flows can move rapidly downslope and frequently
incorporate significant volumes of sediment along their way down, thus increasing
in volume. Landscapes disturbed by wildfire, foresting, construction of roads or
dams, or volcanic eruptions reduce transpiration rates as a result of the loss of veg-
etation and to root decay associated with decreases in soil cohesion, that can result
in a higher landslide hazard potential as the increase in rainfall triggers the soil
moisture content (Schmidt et al. 2001). In areas burned by wildfire, for instance, it
was found that debris flows caused by landslide could occur during the first rainy
season immediately after the fire and that hazard potential can last about 10 years
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 131

after the fire, especially when such areas are exposed to prolonged, but infrequent
rainfall events often in combination with rapid snowmelt.
Young mountain ranges that are generally subject to a comparably higher level
in earthquake activity consequently increase the likelihood in vulnerability to
landslides. Earthquakes in such areas experience a comparably significant higher
amount of landslide events due to ground shaking, liquefaction, or just that the
ground motion allows the infiltration of large amounts of water into the subsur-
face. Furthermore rockfalls and rock toppling can also be generated by loosening
the rocky formations. There is also a great danger of landslides forming dams of
debris in streams and rivers. These landslide dams often can block the water com-
pletely from flowing, causing water to hold up behind the dam. While the water
level is increasing these dams often erode and can fail completely, releasing large
amounts of water in a flash flood.
Landslides due to volcanic activity represent some of the most devastating
types of failures. Volcanic lava may melt snow rapidly, which can form a deluge
of rock, soil, ash, and water that accelerates rapidly on the steep slopes of volca-
noes, devastating anything in its path. These volcanic debris flows (also known as
lahars) can reach great distances after they leave the flanks of the volcano and can
damage structures in flat areas surrounding the volcanoes.
Volcanic edifices are young, unconsolidated, and geologically weak structures that
in many cases can collapse and cause rockslides, landslides, and debris avalanches.
Many islands of volcanic origin experience periodic failure of their perimeter areas
(due to the weak volcanic surface deposits), and masses of soil and rock slide into the
ocean or other water bodies, such as inlets. Such collapses may create massive sub-
marine landslides that may also rapidly displace water, subsequently creating deadly
tsunamis that can travel and do damage at great distances, as well as locally.
Landslides also can cause tsunamis and seiches, can overtop dam reservoirs,
and/or reduce the capacity of reservoirs to store water. Steep wildfire-burned
slopes often are landslide-prone due to a combination of the burning and resultant
denudation of vegetation on slopes, a change in soil chemistry due to burning, and
a subsequent saturation of slopes by water from various sources, such as rainfall.
Debris flows are the most common type of landslide on burned slopes.
Additionally such landslides—which usually occur in small, steep stream
channels—can have the same impact as a flash flood whereas they also can cause
flooding by itself when the bulk debris rock material blocks a stream channel thus
holding back large volumes of water behind such a “dam”.

3.2.2.3 Landslide Dams

Rivers dammed by natural processes mainly from landslides, glacial ice, and vol-
canic debris present a great threat to people and property in mountainous areas.
The most common initiation mechanisms for dam-forming landslides are exces-
sive rainfall and snowmelt or earthquakes that form dams from rockfall, debris
avalanches, debris flows, mud slides, and the like. The mass movements block the
132 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

flow of a river, causing a lake to form behind the blockage. The backwater will
pile up to certain level and when the “dam” fails will subsequently flow down-
stream. Moreover, the solid debris material increases the density of the slurry that
can easily reach a density as high as concrete slurry. Most of these dams are short-
lived as the water will eventually erode the dam. If not destroyed by natural ero-
sional processes or modified by human action, this blockage creates a new lake.
Such lakes can last for a long time, although they can suddenly be released and
cause massive flooding downstream, but they may also cause upstream flooding as
the lake rises. Although data are few, there are clear indications that flooding from
a glacier lake dam failure is generally smaller than those from landslide, moraines,
or volcanic debris. Moraine dam failures appear to produce some of the largest
downstream flood peaks due to their normally large extensions whereas in con-
trast, dam failures triggered in more or less steep valleys are more “local” events.
Costa and Schuster (1988) classified landslide dams worldwide based on their
areal distribution in relation to the valley floor. A great number of dams are just
covering a part or span the entire valley floor. Most dams worldwide, however, fill
up the valley over a considerable distance both upstream and downstream from the
landslide failure. Seldom are dams created when a single landslide sends a tongue
of debris into a valley forming a dam. There are some examples of massive rock
failure that extends under the stream or valley and emerges on the opposite valley
side. Most landslide-triggered dams fail within a short time after formation. The
investigations of Costa and Schuster (ibid) revealed that a third of the landslide
dams failed less than 1 day after formation, and about 50 % failed within 10 days.
Overtopping of the water by increasing the water level in the lake is by far the
most common cause of dam failure. The timing of failure and the magnitude of the
resulting floods are controlled by dam size, its geometry, and the material charac-
teristics of the blockage.
In addition to the direct risk from landslides and debris flows, the deposition of
volcanic material in valleys after a volcanic eruption often forms unstable natural
dams that cause blockage of the former drainage system. Such landslide types vary
in size from small mass movements of loose debris on the surface of a volcano to
massive failures of the entire summit or flanks of a volcano. But volcanic land-
slides are not always associated with eruptions. Heavy rainfall or a large regional
earthquake can also trigger a landslide on steep slopes. Volcanic material is highly
susceptible to landslides because it is composed of layers of loose, fragmented,
volcanic material that is piled up on top of the generally steeply inclined topog-
raphy. Furthermore, some of these rocks have been altered to soft, slippery, clay
minerals.
Volcanic debris-generated dams have formed all over the world. One of the
best-known examples is that of Mt. St. Helens, where the eruption of 1980 pro-
duced the largest debris avalanche on Earth in recorded history. The material was
spread over large parts on the north of the volcano covering the area with several
meters of ashes and debris along the South and the North Fork Toutle River. The
debris blocked the water level of Spirit Lake and raised the water level by 20 m.
Spirit Lake has been repeatedly dammed by volcanic material, than filled to up to
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 133

the spill point with water, and at least partially drained due to dam failures causing
several major floods and lahars down the Toutle River. It is believed that pyroclas-
tic flows around 3350 BC first dammed the river to form the lake.
Engineering operations to release water for the lakes comprise digging artificial
spillways, water diversions, and tunnels, but can also be achieved by blasting the
rock material or by conventional excavation. An impressive example for engineer-
ing dam rehabilitation is that of the Xinjiang earthquake of 2008. An earthquake
with magnitude of M7.2 formed a series of 35 lakes, among them one that was
only 3 km away from the next provincial capital, the area worst hit in the devastat-
ing quake. The lake held about 130 million cubic meters of water and was inacces-
sible by road. The impounded water mass was at risk of breaching its banks. An
emergency plan was disseminated among the 1.3 million inhabitants in 169 com-
munities of the entire region to make them aware that if the dam broke they had to
be evacuated within four hours. Meanwhile, hundreds of workers with 40 heavy-
duty bulldozers and excavators and other earth-moving equipment worked non-
stop on top of the barrier to construct a diversion channel for the water. At least
50,000 m3 of debris had been removed to build the diversion channel. Finally the
workers succeeded in releasing the water without any further damage to the people
and their livelihoods.

3.2.2.4 Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF)

Glaciers are nature’s most effective renewable storehouse of fresh water. However,
in the course of climate change, which can most impressively be observed just as
the world’s glaciers retreat, the natural fresh water storage capability of the gla-
ciers is changing. Already today their storage capacity is reducing steadily and
will in future give way to a higher melting rate. Much of the melt waters are
cached in the high mountainous valleys behind very young and mostly unsta-
ble terminal moraines. The more water is accumulated the higher is the risk that
the walls breach. From many alpine mountainous regions of the world, such as
the Columbian Andes but especially from Nepal and Bhutan (Himalayas) such
breaches are known. The breaching results in a sudden dramatic discharge of huge
amounts of water and debris, the so-called “glacial lake outburst flood” (GLOF),
often with catastrophic effects downstream (Mool et al. 2001). In Nepal more than
3000 glaciers were identified and 2300 glacial lakes, of which 20 were considered
potentially dangerous. In Bhutan, 600 glaciers were identified and 2600 glacial
lakes, of which 24 were considered potentially dangerous.
There are several methods available for mitigating the impact of glacial lake
outburst flood surges. The most important mitigation measure is to reduce the vol-
ume of water in the lake. But also downstream in the GLOF-prone area, preven-
tion measures can be taken to protect infrastructure against the destructive forces
of the surge. Careful evaluation of the lake, the glaciers, the damming materials,
and the surrounding geological, geomorphological, and social living conditions
are essential in choosing the most appropriate mitigation measures. Monitoring the
134 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

dam stability, lake volume, and geometry as well as the glacier retreat are indis-
pensable tasks during and after the mitigation process.
The prevention of a peak surge discharge of the glacier lakes can technically be
achieved by:
• Controlled breaching: A controlled outflow over the terminal moraine can be
achieved either by blasting or the excavation of a drainage pass. Several suc-
cessful attempts have been reported from Lake Bogatyr, Kazakhastan (Mool
et al., ibid), where an outflow channel was excavated using explosives and
7 million cubic meters of water were successfully released in a period of two
days, although such a fast lowering of the lake level can lead to a strong and
uncontrollable regressive erosion of the moraine wall. Also by opening cuts in
the moraine dam during the dry season when a lake’s water level is lower, a
reduction of the water level can be achieved. However, such a method is risky as
any displacement of material from the dam may give way to surges from snow
and ice avalanches and can result in a complete breach of the moraine.
• Construction of an outlet control structure: A solid structure made of stone,
concrete, or steel can be used to install a permanent dam through which the
water can be controllably released. However, such constructions need compre-
hensive maintenance works at high elevations, in difficult terrain conditions,
and under extreme logistic situations. Therefore, preference should be given
to constructing the dams with locally available materials such as boulders and
stones that can be held in place by gabions or appropriate anchors.
• Pumping or siphoning out the water from the lake: Today turbines, propelled
by the water force at the outside of the moraine dam, are seen as the most effec-
tive means to release water from critical glacier lakes by steadily pumping off a
defined amount of water. Such siphons that can be adjusted to the specific situ-
ation of a particular lake are cost-effective as they are easy to transport and to
install. Nevertheless, such siphons also need steady maintenance at high alti-
tudes, especially as the debris load of the water may erode the turbine blades.
• Tunneling through the moraine barrier: Digging a tunnel through moraines or
debris barriers is another measure to lower the water in glacier lakes, although
the method is highly dependent on the geological and geomorphological situ-
ation especially of the type of material blocking the lake. Tunneling is best
applied through competent rock formations beneath or beside a moraine dam.
The cost of such a method is very high. Also problems have been reported from
a tunnel through a moraine dam that had been severely affected by an earth-
quake in Peru. A successful tunnel was installed at Spirit Lake after the Mt. St.
Helens volcanic eruption (Sager and Chambers 1986). In the Himalayan region
tunneling will most probably not be efficient as there is no secure electric power
supply and transporting fuel for the diesel engines is too costly.
But not only remedies such as the outflow methods described before are seen as
options to reduce the risk from GLOFs. Prevention measures by geological map-
ping of the potential sources of snow and ice avalanches, landslides, or rockfalls
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 135

around the lake area that may have a direct impact on the lake and dam were car-
ried out at many at-risk GLOF areas. Such studies were helpful in defining preven-
tive measures against slope instabilities by, for instance, removing masses of loose
rock. Additionally bridges were built at levels higher than the expected GLOF
surge levels and gabions were installed to protect the base of the river embank-
ments. Settlements have already been moved to higher places in general to the
upper river terraces in order to increase people’s resilience.

Factors Influencing the Onset of Landslides

Slope saturation by water is a primary cause of landslides and is closely related

to precipitation, runoff, and the saturation of the ground. Water saturation of the
soil can occur from intense rainfall, snowmelt, changes in groundwater levels, and
surface-water level changes along coastlines, lakes, reservoirs, or rivers. In the
last decade many comprehensive investigations have been carried out to define the
onset value for rainfall triggering landsides: the so-called “global rainfall inten-
sity–duration threshold” (Hong et al. 2006) which revealed that rainfall of more
than 20–200 mm rain/day is assumed to trigger a landslide. This threshold value
can be overstepped when, for example, it rains about 6–8 mm/h for one day, or
4–5 mm/h for 2–3 days but also when it rains only about 1 mm/h for more than
7 days. Therefore not only a heavy downpour (the rainfall during the Wenchuan
earthquake 2011 revealed 350 mm in 24 h) but also longer-lasting “mild” precipi-
tation of many days can lead to landslides.
NOAA/USGS investigations came to a similar result on the onset of debris flows
in the San Francisco Bay (USGS 2005c). There an experimental debris-flow pre-
diction and warning system was operated from 1986 to 1995. The model relied on
rainfall forecasts and measurements of precipitation linked to empirical precipita-
tion thresholds to predict the onset of rainfall-triggered debris flows. The investiga-
tions revealed different rainfall intensity–duration thresholds that are indicative of
onset values for landslides (Fig. 3.35) and that can be used as a debris-flow warning
system. The model identifies a safe area at rainfall levels below 20 mm in 3 h and

Fig. 3.35  NOAA/USGS 120

empirical “rainfall intensity– 110
duration threshold” for the 100 „red“
San Francisco Bay area
Cummulative rain fall (mm)

90 high landslide hazard

(Redrawn from USGS 2005c) 80
70 „yellow“
60 moderate landslide hazard
50
40
30 „green“
20 no landslide hazard
10

2 4 6 8 10 12 21 16 18 20 22 24
Rain fall duration (hrs)
136 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

rain fall < 50 mm no landslides

slope angel < 30° no landslides

rain fall rain fall 50 – 120 mm

slope angel > 30° landslides

rain fall > 120 mm landslides

The annual total rain fall in Germany averages at about 700 mm

Fig. 3.36  Decision tree for the occurrence of landslides (Generalized after Hamberger 2007)

60 mm in 24 h (green), a sector with moderate hazard to debris flows as between

50 mm in 3 h and 120 mm/in 24 h (yellow), and in the red area where rainfall vol-
umes exceed 50 mm in 3 h and 24 mm in 24 h, debris flows are likely to occur.
Next to the water factor the factor of slope inclination is also of significant
importance for defining the hazard potential for a landslide. Following a heavy
rainfall (150 mm in 2 h) in the area of Sachseln (Switzerland) Hamberger (2007)
was able to define that most of the 700 shallow landslides that occurred in the area
were triggered at slope angles of between 20° and 40°. The investigations further
revealed that a combination of several parameters mostly morphology, geology,
soil property, the general hydrological regime, as well as vegetation all define the

Fig. 3.37  Percentage of
landslide areas following the
2008 Wenchuan earthquake
(Redrawn from Tang et al.
2011)
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 137

major causes of the landslides there. Following his investigations Hamberger gave
a “decision tree” that combines slope angle and precipitation that can be used to
assess the landslide hazard potential at least as a very general approach (Fig. 3.36).
Other investigations on rainfall volume and critical slope angle reveal even
more differentiated relationships. According to investigations by Tang et al. (2011)
carried out on landslides that occurred before, during, and after the Wenchuan
earthquake (China) in May 2008, the critical slope angles were different for the
different types of landslides (Fig. 3.37). Slope angles between 20° and 40° were
identified for most of the landslides that occurred before the earthquake stroke,
whereas coseismic landslides were mainly triggered at slope angles of 30°–50°.
Based on aerial photographs and remote sensing imagery 40 pre-earthquake land-
slides and 2200 coseismic landslides were identified. As the area was subject
to a strong rainfall even four months after the quake about 1000 new landslides
were triggered as a result of the earthquake tremors and the subsequent rainstorm
that severely weathered the topsoil strata. The earthquake triggered at first mas-
sive landslides and that subsequent strong rainfall prompted the development of
new landslides as well as reactivated pre-existing slides. An almost identical fre-
quency distribution on slope angles has been published by Ruff (2005, p. 80) who
investigated landslide susceptibility in the Austrian Alps. The landslide frequency
distribution showed its maximum (40 %) between 20° and 40°. But about 10 %
of landslides also occurred in young valley fills along the river Lech at angles
between 10° and 20°. The landslides identified by Tang and coauthors and also by
Ruff, occurred in geologically young mountain ranges, although the situation in
China is much more critical as the region is subject to many earthquakes.
Next to water and slope angle the rock material is also a denominating factor
that defines the onset of landslide events. Investigations carried out by Carrara et al.
(1977) in the Calabrian mountains of southern Italy revealed that different litholo-
gies also have an influence on critical landslide-generating slope angles. Although
with sand, clay, and marls the critical slope angle lies between 10° and 20°, hard
rock (gneisses, etc.) sees 25° to 40° as critical. All lithologies together in the area
under investigation provided the maximum critical slope angle between 10° and 20°.
All the given examples show that the corridor of critical slope angles in general
ranges between 20° and 40°. But it should be taken into consideration that water
saturation, vegetation, lithology, or external factors such as an input of energy into
the system such as from an earthquake, may lead to a more different trigger mech-
anism. As described above, gentle slopes (1°–2°) can also be subject to landslides,
a phenomenon that is best described as soil creeping.
The best prevention measures against erosion, wet mass movements, or debris
flows in hilly regions are terraces. Especially in Asia terraced hill slopes are nor-
mally not subject to serious erosion, as long as they are well maintained. Moreover
from volcanic trass regions it is known that slope angles of more than 80° are also
not prone to landslides. It will most probably not be possible to give the “one”
critical slope angle applicable for all landslide-prone areas worldwide. Thus it is
recommended to analyze the region under investigation carefully to find out what
variety of slope angles occur, what substrate and vegetation are dominant, what
138 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

is the exposure to rain and storm, and how far the distance is to the next drainage
path.

3.2.2.5 Green Lake Landslide (New Zealand)

The Green Lake landslide in New Zealand is a very large ancient rockslide that is
considered to be the largest documented landslide of its type on earth (although
larger submarine slides are known). The landslide was generated from gneisses
and granodiorites located in the deeply glaciated Hunter Mountains (Hancox and
Perrin 1994). Geology and geomorphic evidence suggest the slide occurred just
after the end of the last glaciation about 13,000 years ago. The landslide has an
estimated volume of about 27 km3 with a surface area of 45 km2. The main fea-
tures of the Green Lake landslide include a large area of hummocky, bush-covered
slide debris up to 1000 m thick. Within the debris a number of large, semi-intact
blocks up to 2.5 km long occur as well as a prominent v-shaped head scarp that
extends for about 14 km, and four large pull-apart basins. Three of these basins
contain large landslide ponds, the largest being Green Lake and Island Lake.
The landslide area is actually the in-filled part of the former Lake Monowai,
which was cut in half when the landslide occurred and gradually filled with gla-
cial sediments and swamp deposits. Geomorphologic evidence indicates that the
landslide probably was triggered by a rapid rock failure, possibly occurring in
two phases. First a 1500 m high mountain ridge collapsed on the east side of the
former Monowai valley resulting in the destruction of a 9 km long section of the
southern Hunter Mountains. Then the slide debris was transported up to 2.5 km
laterally, and fell about 700 m vertically into the deeply glaciated former Monowai
valley, which at the time of the landslide was probably filled with a glacial lake.
The enormous debris volume formed a landslide dam about 800 m high in the val-
ley, which cut the original Lake Monowai in two, impounding a lake of 11 km
length, which was then gradually filled with glacial sediments, and later with peat
and swamp deposits. Radiocarbon (Delta 14C) dating of lake sediments indicated
that the final infill occurred about 11,000 to 11,500 years ago. Dating of peat
deposits moreover revealed that the lake was later drained about 9000 years ago
after recession of the glacier. The geomorphological investigations showed that
flooding of the landslide failure surface although having reduced the slope stabil-
ity, would not be sufficient to cause such a large mountain mass to collapse. An
earthquake simulation revealed that ground motion of an earthquake magnitude of
8–10 most probably must have triggered the landslide. This earthquake may also
have triggered some of the other old large landslides also identified in the region.
Today, the landslide dam remains essentially intact, and apart from local failures
around the steep head scarps surrounding the landslide, there is little potential
for reactivation of the Green Lake landslide. However, when tectonic movements
might occur again in the future, there are many other slopes in the area that might
cause very large catastrophic landslides. Although experience from many glaciated
mountain ranges revealed that glaciated mountain slopes are most vulnerable to
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 139

collapse just after ice withdrawal, it is unlikely that these will be on the same scale
as the Green Lake landslide.
New Zealand geologists see the Green Lake landslide as a good example of a
hazard type of landslide generated by deglaciation in a mountain area of high seis-
micity. Such landslides can move an enormous volume of debris with extensive
catastrophic effects resulting from a collapse of high mountain ranges.

3.2.2.6 Mt. Rainer Landslide (Lahar)

Water-saturated landslides originating from volcanic eruptions (lahars) pose a signif-

icant hazard to downstream environments. The flows are characterized by their long
travel distances and their high speed, thus reaching areas that are normally far away
from the debris flow source in a couple of hours. Such lahars have caused more than
20,000 deaths on one occasion at the Nevada del Ruiz volcano (see Sect. 3.2.1.7)
and pose a risk to many other volcano locations on Earth (Witham 2005).
Mt. Rainier located in Washington State (United States) at the northern part of
the Rocky Mountain chain is the highest of the active volcanoes that make up the
Cascade Range and erupted the last time in 1895. The volcano carries a volumi-
nous ice cap and at its western foothills are located many smaller towns and also
the megacity of Seattle at Puget Sound. Although most of the Mt. Rainier volcanic
materials of lava, ash, and bombs are known to concentrate despite the great topo-
graphic relief but due to their high viscosity in a radius of a few kilometers around
the volcano, there are quite a number of lahars in the sedimentary record that have
been deposited along the valleys that drain the volcano. The steady increasing
urbanization of the lowlands downstream of Mt. Rainier makes the area one of the
most risky in the United States from a lahar flow (USGS 2009b).
In order to assess the risk from debris flows and lahars to the people in the
area, USGS geologists investigated the volcano and its potential socioeco-
nomic impact. The geologists were able to identify a series of large, generally
clay-rich debris flows that originated as landslides, to occur on average every
500 to 1000 years during the last 6000 years at Mt. Rainier. The Osceola debris
flow about 5000 years ago was found to be the biggest: about 3 km3 of mate-
rial were removed by a huge landslide from the summit of Mt. Rainier by that
time. Although large blocks of the landslide have formed numerous sand and clay
mounds along the White River valley before spreading the flow over a wide area of
the Puget Sound Lowland, the town of Orting is actually directly situated on this
debris flow. Based on the lahar sequences identified, Driedger and Scott (2008)
calculated that there is roughly a 1-in-10 chance of a lahar reaching the cities
around Puget Sound in the next 50 years, an assumption that holds true especially
for the Puyallup and the adjacent Carbon River that both conflate at the small town
of Orting (USGS 2000). The travel times for lahars from Mt. Rainier to reach
Orting are assumed to be about 40 min after a lahar is detected.
140 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

In the 2008 the local government together with the United States Geological
Survey presented the “Mt. Rainer Volcanic Hazard Plan.” The plan identified the
areas that are prone to lahars and classified the lahars into three categories:
• Debris flows that are relatively small in size and of minor destruction potential
• Lahars that develop from debris flows and that give ample time to warn the
people
• Lahars that occur without prior warning, that travel at high speed, and that have
a large destruction potential
The plan was based on the assumption that almost 80,000 people are exposed to
risks from the dangerous lahars, 5000 of them in the city of Orting. As in many
other communities in the valley Orting also has a relatively small amount of devel-
oped land in the lahar hazard zone, which likely represents single-family housing
and associated buildings such as garages and sheds. Next to the residents of the area,
Mt. Rainier and its national park host more than two million visitors every year,
making the volcano a significant source of income and labor in the region. In order
to increase the population’s resilience to volcanic threats, the local government is
operating a lahar-warning system along the Puyallup and Carbon River. Ground
motion is recorded constantly and the data are telemetered to the local emergency
management center. The early warning system is complete with regular monitor-
ing of the geochemistry of the springs around Mt. Rainier, thermal monitoring, and
a visual inspection of its volume. Furthermore the local government enacted the
“Orting Hazard Response Plan” that defined evacuation as the major instrument in
order to safeguard the people. But the hazard plan also indicated that there are only
three smaller bridges to the south, west, and north available to leave the area at risk.
This scenario was taken up by a master’s thesis at the Geological Institute of
the University of Goettingen (Germany) that proposed another way to reduce
the risk from flooding (Friess 2010). The paper proposed that instead of making
evacuation the first priority of emergency management, it should be considered
whether the lahar could rather be hindered from entering the town of Orting. The
paper proposes to install a series of Sabo dams placed at critical positions sev-
eral kilometers upstream along Puyallup and Carbon River in order to diminish the
lahar’s suspension load by removing the bulk rock material from the water. Such
a measure has proven to be able to reduce the destruction potential of a lahar con-
siderably at many risk areas worldwide and it can help safeguard the infrastructure
and the buildings.

3.2.2.7 Landslides Triggered by Tropical Storm

Torrential rains that accompanied Hurricane Mitch in October and November of

1998 triggered thousands of landslides in the moderate to steep terrain in eastern
Guatemala. For five days the hurricane swept over Central America with wind-
speeds of up to 300 km/h, generating torrential rains that flooded large parts of
the areas with mud and debris. The rainfall was exceptional because it was
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 141

geographically widespread in the central and eastern regions, lasted over a week,
was moderate to heavy in intensity, and occurred at the end of the rainy season,
when the ground already had high moisture content.
Guatemalan Hurricane Mitch triggered more than 10,000 landslides in an area
of more than 10,000 km2; on average, this is about one landslide/sq km, a ratio
that could range up to as many as 120 landslides/km2. The main concentrations of
landslides were found on moderate-to-steep hill slopes underlain by diverse geo-
logic units. The landslides were of two general types:
• Relatively small, translational, and rotational landslides that mobilized into
debris flows and covered less than several hectares in area
• Large, commonly translational, landslides that sometimes generated debris
flows and covered between 15 and 25 ha
Between 10,000 to 15,000 people were assumed to be killed by Hurricane Mitch
in Central America, 1.5 million affected, and the total economic losses were esti-
mated to be about US$6 billion (USGS 2001). Like all the countries in the region
the small country of Guatemala was also seriously affected, although the death toll
was much less: 268 dead and 100,000 affected of whom at the end of the year
many thousands still had to live in shelters. Damages were estimated by the gov-
ernment of Guatemala and the United Nations of US$550 million of which the
agricultural sector claimed the greatest damages (US$350 million), and the dam-
age to highways, infrastructure, and private buildings was about US$150 mil-
lion. Damage to infrastructure included 100 damaged or destroyed bridges, 100
road sections, and 2000 houses completely destroyed and 20,000 damaged. There
was extensive damage to productive agricultural areas and farm-to-market access
roads. The agricultural sector was affected most with 90,000 ha of losses in basic
grains, coffee, vegetables, and bananas. Facilities for small production coffee pro-
cessing were also seriously affected.
In order to assess the geological dimension of Hurricane Mitch’s impact, the
USGS (ibid) together with the Guatemala Institute of Seismology, Volcanology,
Meteorology and Hydrology (INSIVUMEH) undertook an assessment of the
regional landslide susceptibility. Based on information on the frequency and
severity probability distribution of historic and Mitch-triggered landslides, it was
possible to identify the critical landslide-prone areas and to discover the basic
onset mechanisms responsible for the gravity movements. To create a landslide
susceptibility map of the region under investigation, a susceptibility threshold
equation based on elevation and slope gradient was developed. For this the ratio
of the elevations of each landslide taken at its point of initiation and the eleva-
tion of the particular grid cell of the topographic map was calculated. About
96 % of the landslides were initiated from elevations between 500 and 2500 m.
At the next step, landslide frequency was tabulated for each 100 m interval in
elevation and revealed the maximum of the landslides (12 %) occurred between
2000 and 2100 m and were initiated from slope gradients between 15° and 45°.
When tabulated for every 5° slope interval, the highest percentage of landslides
(27 %) occurred between 25° and 30°. The ratio between the slope angles where
142 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

landslides were initiated to the entire population of slope gradients indicated that
in the areas between 1200 and 2800 m, the ratio is greater than 1, indicative of
a high susceptibility to landslides. The analysis furthermore indicated that in cer-
tain areas no landslides occurred at all, whereas in the surrounding region many
of them were generated. These areas experienced slope angles below 9°, a slope
angle found obviously not susceptible to landslide formation during the hurricane.
All the landslide-prone areas received between 200 and 600 mm of rain over
the period from October 25th until November 6th, a precipitation equivalent to
the amount the region normally receives during one year. The highest rainfall
amounts (400–600 mm) occurred in the Upper Polochic valley and in the cen-
tral Sierra de las Minas. Lower rainfall amounts (200–400 mm) occurred in the
hills surrounding Sierra de las Minas and along the border region with Honduras.
One rain gauge located near the La Lima landslide recorded a precipitation of
275 mm over the six days of the hurricane before the landslide occurred. As Mitch
occurred at the end of the rainy season, USGS and INSIVUMEH (USGS, ibid)
assumed that the rainy season already had saturated the soils and that the 275 mm
additional precipitation in six days (an average of 46 mm/day) was enough to
overstep the threshold and trigger the La Lima landslide. And as documented in
the report, this type of rainfall (hurricane), on already saturated or nearly saturated
ground has the capability to trigger both shallow as well as deep-seated landslides
over a large area. The study furthermore points out that areas susceptible to rain-
fall-triggered landslides are not necessarily the same as those susceptible to earth-
quake-triggered landslides as USGS (1981) reported on landslides triggered by the
1976 M 7.6 earthquake in Guatemala.
The characteristics of rainfall-triggered landslides found with Hurricane Mitch
in Guatemala can serve as a practical guideline to assess future landslides trig-
gered by rainstorms. The data revealed that landslide susceptibility is highest on
moderate to steep hill slopes. But also less steep areas directly below channels
draining the hill slopes and on alluvial fans at the mouths of drainage fronts can
be highly susceptible to landslides. The investigations further emphasized that
records of historic landslides can be the best indicators for future landslide activ-
ity and provide very useful information to determine the level of future hazard.
The study proved that landslide inventory maps showing historic and modern land-
slides are of critical importance.

3.2.2.8 Submarine Landslides (Grand Banks, Canada; Storegga,

Norway; Lithuya Bay, Alaska)

Landslides do not only occur on solid earth but are also well known in offshore
regions. The so-called “submarine landslide” describes the downslope mass
movement of geologic materials from shallower to deeper regions of the ocean.
Such events can transport a high amount of sediment from the outer shelf down
to the foot of the continental slopes, but not only there. Submarine landslides are
also known to occur in rivers and lakes. The biggest submarine landslides ever
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 143

recorded were either triggered by an earthquake or by erosion, but all of them

have caused deadly tsunamis (see Sect. 3.2.1), such as in 1929 at the Grand Banks
(Newfoundland, Canada), the Storegga landslide offshore Norway in 7950 BP, or
the 1958 Lithuya Bay rockfall in Alaska (United States).
On November 18th, 1929 an earthquake of magnitude 7.2 occurred at the
Grand Banks with its epicenter about 400 km at the outer shelf edge south of
Newfoundland. The earthquake was felt as far away as New York and Montreal
and was generated along two fault zones 250 km south of the Burin Peninsula.
The quake triggered a large submarine landslide of a volume of more than
200 km3 that led to the generation of a large tsunami. The tsunami arrived at the
Newfoundland coast in three waves, each 3–4 m high, about three hours after
the earthquake occurred. The waves traveled at speeds up to 130 km/h and were
recorded as far away as South Carolina and Portugal. The tsunami destroyed many
south coastal communities, causing US$400,000 in economic losses, left 10,000
homeless, and killed 30 people, the highest death toll attributed to an earthquake in
Canada ever since. The tsunami destroyed the entire communication infrastructure
and moreover the relief efforts were hampered by a blizzard that struck the day
after.
The submarine slide snapped 12 submarine transatlantic telegraph cables con-
necting America and Europe. From the time sequence of the cutting off of the
cables, the submarine travel speed of the slump was calculated. It was the first
time in history that such a phenomenon was ever recorded. The knowledge gained
by this event laid the basis for a marine science study on submarine landslides, tur-
bidity currents, and tsunamis by scientists from Columbia University. Since then
geologists have been looking at layers of sand for indicators on tsunamis that can
be originated from earthquakes. Most of the economic loss of the Grand Banks
mudslide was the cost to repair the damaged transatlantic cables.
From evidence in submarine seismic profiles of the oil industry all over the
Norwegian shelf and from geological evidence along the North Atlantic coast from
Norway to Greenland, a large submarine landslide has been assumed to have origi-
nated at the Norwegian coast off the city of Alesund, the so-called Storegga land-
slide. The landslide is supposed to have occurred about 7300 years BP (Bondevik
et al. 2005) and to have generated exceptionally large waves that inundated most
coastlines around the North Atlantic. Even today the submarine morphology off-
shore Alesund gives a clear indication on the location and the dimension of the
slides as it can be seen by Goggle Earth “Offshore Norway.” As the trigger mecha-
nism for the Storegga slide a strong earthquake in the North Atlantic was assumed
but also methane hydrate emissions can be seen that might have destabilized the
shelf edge.
In total five landslides are supposed to be broken off the Norwegian coast, of
which the first was the largest in volume (about 3000 km3) covering an area of
around almost 100,000 km2. The area coverage was about the size of Scotland and
the mobilized sedimentary volume was large enough to generate a large tsunami.
The materials were transported north and westwards over thousands of kilom-
eters across the North Atlantic to be deposited at the coasts of Scotland, Iceland,
144 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

and Greenland and also along the coast of Norway. In fjords in Shetland and the
Faeroe Islands deposits show that the waves reached elevations at least 20 m above
the contemporary sea level, although at the Norwegian coast the tsunami waves
reached heights of more than 10 m. Numerical simulations on the Storegga slide
revealed that it was about 400 m thick in the upper part of the slope and its wave-
front crossed the North Atlantic within 3 h, with maximal sea- level elevation on
the open ocean of 3 m (Bondevik et al., ibid). The simulation further revealed that
along the Norwegian coast the arrival of the first wave might have been associated
with a major water withdrawal, dropping the sea level by 20 m.
The tsunamogenic sediments comprise fine- to coarse-grained sand lay-
ers containing fish bones, mollusk fragments, and even eroded diatoms that are
found intercalated into shallow marine, tidal flat, and swampy sediments. Even at
higher topographical levels along the Norwegian coast tsunami-inundated fresh-
water bodies were observed, again leaving behind characteristic sand layers. These
deposits contain redeposited lake mud, rip-up clasts, and marine fossils. The sand
layers furthermore show a distinct erosional base although the top is transitional,
properties characteristic of modern tsunami deposits.
On the night of July 9th, 1958 an earthquake of magnitude 8.3 (later revised to
7.7) and with an intensity XI (MMI) along the Fairweather Fault zone in Alaska
triggered a rockfall at Lituya Bay that generated the highest tsunami wave run-
up in recorded history (USGS 1960, 1993). Lituya Bay is located in the Glacier
Bay National Park at the southern end of Alaska, directly on the Pacific coast. The
bay was formed by one of the glaciers of Mt. Crillon that shaped the Gilbert Inlet,
a valley following the north–south trending highly seismic fault zone that paral-
lels the coast. The bay is about 10 km long and 2 km wide and opens westwards
towards the Pacific, thus forming the landlocked nature of the bay. At the mouth of
the bay a sill of about 200 m width was formed from glacial debris and moraines.
The submarine contours show a pronounced U-shaped morphology with steep
walls and a broad flat floor sloping gently downward from bay’s end to the mouth:
the depth reaches a maximum of about 250 m in the center of Lituya Bay, then
rises again towards the entrance to a minimum of 10 m.
From geological and geophysical investigations there is good evidence that the
Fairweather Fault is of lateral and oblique habit. The magnitude was determined
to be M7.7 according to the report of the USGS (1960). The southwest side of the
fault moved northwestward for at least 6 m and went up for 1 m. Landslides and
other evidence of strong motion observed in the area indicated a total shift along
the fault probably for up to 60 km. The rocks in the area are largely of diorite and
slightly metamorphosed volcanic rocks, of slate and graywacke that are exposed
on the southwest shore of Gilbert Inlet and the adjoining north shore of the bay.
Bedded sedimentary and volcanic rocks from the Tertiary Age are exposed on
Cenotaph Island, however, in the model of Lituya Bay most of the outer part of the
bay boulder is still exposed at the surface or lies under a thin soil.
The rockfall occurred on steep cliffs above the northeast shore of Gilbert Inlet
and loosened about 30 million cubic meters of rock at the eastern end of Lituya
Bay (USGS, ibid). According to eyewitnesses the earthquake’s shaking lasted for
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 145

3–4 min and 2 min later the rock mass plunged into the water. This mass of rock
fell from an altitude of approximately 900 m down into the bay and generated a
giant but very local tsunami. The tsunami crashed against the opposite lying shore
with such power that it swept completely over the spur of land as high as 524 m
above sea level that separates Gilbert Inlet from the main body of Lituya Bay. This
is the highest tsunami wave that has ever been known, although the actual run-up
height owed more to the inclination of 30–40° of the crystalline rock formation,
making the climb by the tsunami wave rather easy, but not a result of a 524 m
high tsunami wave. The wave then continued to flow down the entire length of
Lituya Bay into the Gulf of Alaska. The force of the wave removed all trees and
vegetation from the entire northern and southern shores of the bay and left com-
pletely barren rocks. Still today the new cover of vegetation (trees and bushes) can
be seen on satellite imagery indicating the outer rim of the inundation level.
Moreover the United States Geological Survey was able to identify evidence
for the occurrence of large waves in Lituya Bay prior to that of 1958. At least four
previous large waves could be distinguished with estimated dates of 1936, 1899,
1874, and 1853/1854. All of these waves are supposed to be significant in size
although the shoreline evidence for all of them was removed by the 1958 tsunami.

3.2.2.9 Snow Avalanche

An avalanche occurred on February 23rd, 1999 in the Alpine village of Galtür,

Austria. Within a minute a powder avalanche, 50 m high and with a speed of
estimated 300 km/h, hit the tourist center just at the winter recreation peak sea-
son (BMLFUW 2012). The avalanche buried 57 people, ruined many buildings,
and overturned many cars. By the time rescue crews managed to arrive, 31 peo-
ple—locals and tourists—died. At the time of the avalanche about 800 locals and
about 5000 tourists were present in Galtür. The avalanche was considered the
worst Alpine avalanche in 40 years, although before the accident the town was
supposed to be safe. Three major low-pressure weather systems the days before
accounted for large snowfalls totaling around 4 m in the area and led the snow
to freeze and thaw. The weather conditions coupled with high windspeeds caused
roughly 170,000 tons of snow to be deposited. In the decades before the accident,
the Galtür area was subject to many severe snow avalanches with a considerable
number of fatalities. Because of the snow masses in this part of Austria, the entire
region was given the highest snow avalanche warning, blocking many traffic con-
nections. The snow masses also buried the only road connection to Galtür, so that
the victims could not be reached by road. The rescue was organized by military
helicopters that flew out most of the tourists when weather conditions allowed fly-
ing. Since then Galtür has built up a series of countermeasures to increase local
resilience. The central part is a 345 m long retention wall that is in part 20 m
high. Behind the wall a museum and recreation center are incorporated that today
give the town a unique ensemble of modern architecture and snow avalanche
prevention.
146 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Snow avalanches are a special sector of landslide hazards (mass movement,

gravity movements) that occur exclusively in alpine regions, regions that are more
or less permanently covered with snow and ice. Like landslides, snow avalanches
also pose a significant threat to humans and infrastructure in mountainous regions.
The worldwide annual average of snow avalanche fatality is estimated at about
250 fatalities, of which in the Swiss Alps alone snow avalanches cause an average
of 26 fatalities per year (Tschirky et al. 2000). Of the Swiss fatalities, 90 % can
be attributed to avalanches triggered by tourists (skiers, snowboarders, climbers)
and again 90 % of which are triggered by the victims themselves. And moreover
90 % of all fatal avalanche accidents occur in uncontrolled avalanche risk terrain.
In the United States on average 17 were killed annually by snow avalanches. Most
of them were snowmobilers, whereas in the European Alps no victims occur from
snowmobiling as such a recreation activity is not allowed there. Statistical evi-
dence from fatal accidents revealed that most fatalities occur in areas that were
rated of low to moderate danger levels. And most of the victims were involved
in recreational activities. At higher danger levels, in addition to recreational activ-
ity, people were killed while driving, walking on paths, or residing in buildings.
Fatalities in the high avalanche danger areas derive from the nonrecreational sec-
tor. When the extreme category is excluded, the normalized distribution of fatal
incidents from international statistics is quite similar worldwide.
According to experience from many snow avalanche risk areas, avalanche vic-
tims do not have a chance to survive if buried for more than 45 min because of
hypothermia. Medical data suggests a core body temperature cooling rate of more
than 3 °C/h between burial and arrival at hospital will be fatal. And experience
revealed that the cooling rate increases even immediately after extraction of the
victim.
In general snow avalanches are divided into two distinct groups (McClung and
Schaerer 1993, p. 61):
• Loose snow avalanches start from a point and move down the slope as a snow
mass without internal cohesion of the snow particles spreading out on their way
down to a triangular shape. They normally move only the upper part of the snow
cover. As their material is not densely packed the hazard from this type is rather
low.
• Slab avalanches start as a cohesive block of snow triggered by cracks in the
upper onset line that propagates through the entire snow cover. Slab avalanches
normally activate a large proportion of the snow cover. Slab avalanches can fur-
ther be divided into dry and wet snow avalanches. Dry slab avalanches can be
naturally triggered, for example, by new snowfall, or by artificial triggers such
as tourists. Because of their high density, their regional extension, and their
travel speed, they are normally highly dangerous to people and property. Dry
snow slab avalanches are responsible for more fatalities and damage to property
than wet snow avalanches.
Ninety percent of all avalanches occur on moderate slopes with an angle of
30°–45° indicating that snow does not tend to accumulate on steeper slopes.
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 147

Avalanches occur when the gravity of the collected snow mass at the top of the
slope is greater than the internal cohesion forces of the snow cover itself. The criti-
cal onset of a slab avalanche is mainly defined by the existence of a weak layer
within the snow cover (McClung and Schaerer, ibid) that moreover can also
change horizontally. Deficit zones are areas on a slope where the snow slab is no
longer supported at the base by the weak layer. Pre-existing cracks in the snow
cover are seen as initiators for fracture propagation in the weak layer. The layers
expand as the crack propagates outwards from the existing deficit zone through
the weak layer (Kronholm 2004). A change in precipitation, temperature, or wind
in combination with the local slope angle but also loud noise or vibrations can
all trigger an avalanche at the “starting zone” at the top of a slope. The avalanche
continues to move downslope steadily increasing in speed and in general follow-
ing the slope morphology and ultimately fans out and settles in the “run-up zone.”
Internationally, the Alpine countries of France, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy
experience the greatest number of avalanches and loss of life annually. The United
States ranks fifth worldwide in avalanche danger and there the states of Colorado,
Alaska, and Utah are the most deadly.
The spatial variability of the snow cover has long been subject to intense inves-
tigations. The Swiss Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research (Davos),
undoubtedly the leading research institute on snow avalanches, was able to iden-
tify distinct differences in the vertical layering and in the horizontal variation
within individual layers at a regional scale making snow cover stability spatially
highly variable (Schweizer and Jamieson 2003). The investigation further revealed
that even at the slope scale, the density of the snow cover is not always constant
and homogeneous (Kronholm, ibid).
As a great variety of factors determine snow quality, avalanche prevention
and mitigation are very complex. Avalanche forecast centers in the United States,
Canada, and Europe daily assess the danger from avalanche according to a five-
level scale (see Sect. 5.2). They submit daily avalanche forecasts by print media,
television, and the Internet. Snow avalanche bulletins are also published daily by
all the winter tourist centers and give detailed warnings on which areas should
not be entered. These bulletins typically describe important snowpack features as
well as the current weather situation. In order to cover the entire country the Swiss
Alps are divided into about 100 forecast areas. Nevertheless it has to be stated that
much of the hazard assessment is still based on visual observation inasmuch as an
automatic and quantitative verification of avalanche forecast is difficult to make
and quite costly (Schweizer and Jamieson, ibid) and that more than 10 % of the
avalanche fatalities occurred on days with no forecast.

3.2.3 Natural Disasters Versus “Extreme Events”

In the summer of 2003 a heat wave hit western and central Europe, an event that
was seen in large parts of the affected population and the national administrations
148 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

as an extreme event. The countries that were affected most by this disaster were
France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, and Hungary (WHO
2008). As a result of a so-called “Omega” weather situation, the 2003 summer
was the hottest ever recorded in Europe for at least 500 years, with a maximum
temperature of 47.3 °C in the Portuguese Alentejo region. The temperatures for
large parts of Western and Central Europe reached 3–5 °C above the long-term
average. The heat was superimposed by dry weather conditions that in many parts
of Europe already prevailed in the months before. Also during the night the tem-
peratures were much higher than normal, hampering the normal cooling down.
The heat wave led to health crises in several countries and combined with a long-
standing drought created a crop shortfall in parts of southern Europe. Statistical
evidence proved that the European death toll reached about 70,000 fatalities and
caused economic damage of an estimated €10 billion. In all the countries, older
people were more strongly affected than other social groups. But not all the
European countries were hit ubiquitously.
France was hit exceptionally hard and experienced seven consecutive days with
maximum temperatures above 35 °C and night temperatures above 2 °C. Here
about 15,000 heat-related deaths were claimed, a death toll ratio 50 % higher than
normal, whereas in other western European countries the excess mortality was
about 10–20 %. Previously unexperienced high death toll figures were recorded
from large capitals including Paris (>130 %) according to information given by the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO 2010). Most of the victims were over
65 years of age and many of them died from dehydration, hypothermia, or cardio-
vascular system failure. The risk was overlain by the fact that the month of August
is the holiday peak season in France, a time when most French pass their vacations
at the seaside. Accordingly public life runs at a much lower intensity at that time.
The same holds true for the medical system and public health assistance. The hos-
pitals were thus understaffed and as such an event was never experienced before,
the medical system especially in Northern France was not prepared to withstand
such a disaster. In the cities in the south, for example, Marseille, the death toll—
although higher than normal—increased by 20 %, an indication that the people
there are more adjusted to higher temperatures. The analysis of the 2003 heat wave
highlighted that the disaster resulted from the intricate association of natural and
social factors: unusually high temperatures, as well as socioeconomic vulnerabil-
ity, along with the social attenuation of hazards. In addition to age and gender,
combinatorial factors included pre-existing disease, medication, urban residence,
isolation, poverty, and, probably, air pollution.
The following discussion gives some insights to the state of knowledge of
extreme events. People exposed to such events often have the impression of being
completely helpless. Although most such events are seen to occur by chance, when
examined in more detail, specific root causes can be identified that trigger such
events. In the actual discussion the term “extreme” event is mostly used in the
context of climate-related disasters such as the many flood events that occurred
in Germany in the last 10 years or the 2003 European heat wave, but also earth-
quakes, volcano eruptions, mass movements, floods, or other natural phenomena
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 149

that are often seen as “extreme” events. But such events vary considerably in their
frequency and their regional distribution. Thus when does a disaster or a series
of disasters occurring at a specific region fulfill the requirements of a normal
event or when does it fulfill the criterion “extreme”. Numerous climate models,
for instance, of the ENSEMBLES research project of the European Union (Vander
Linden and Mitchel 2009) and others, clearly show that events such as the 2003
heat wave most probably will occur in future more often as a result of the chang-
ing climate, with probably even higher temperatures. Meanwhile many Western
European big cities have already started to adjust and improve their emergency
management systems, thus such extreme events will in future without doubt be
better managed than before. Thus automatically the question arises whether such
a disaster then should be called an “extreme event” any more, rather than a strong
but normal event.
The question arises as to what a “normal” disaster event is and what an
“extreme” event is and consequently according to what definition can both event
types be distinguished. As the definition is in practical terms quite unclear, there
are only limited robust data available and “Scientists do not really understand
what causes extreme events, how they develop and when and where they occur”
(Jentsch et al. 2006). When “extreme” events are characterized as “normal” events
of natural, social, or financial origin that take place very rarely, such disasters
might be more appropriately named “rare events.”
Metrics to quantify extreme impacts may include, among others:
• Human casualties and injuries
• Numbers of permanently or temporarily displaced people
• Impacts on property, measured in terms of numbers of buildings damaged or
destroyed
• Impacts on infrastructure and lifelines
• Financial or economic loss
• Duration of the above impacts
In order to structure and to standardize the ongoing discussion on the definition
of the term “extreme event,” IPCC introduced the following definition, although
knowing that such a generalized definition will not cover the full range of this haz-
ard type. Extreme events are characterized as (IPCC 2007):
• To be rare to very rare events (low probability)
• Are of local extension (exceptional)
• Have a distinct social and economic impact (catastrophic)
• Have a high relevance to the society (socioeconomic consequences)
• Are very visible (traumatic)
The definition of extreme events of the United States National Science Foundation
(Steward and Bostrom 2002) is backed by Sornette (2002), a specialist on the pre-
diction of critical (natural/financial) events, who reported on the occasion of an
“Extreme Event Congress” in Hannover (Volkswagen Foundation, 14 Feb 2013)
that for him also an event such as the French Revolution in 1789 must be seen as
150 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

an extreme event. Triggered by a large drought that occurred in 1788–1789 that

took the crowd to the streets, it toppled the feudal system that (over time) opened
the way to a democratic policy system that spread all over the world. This assump-
tion followed an argument given by Grove (1998) who stated that the 1788–1789
drought in France was most probably an El Niño effect. A more recent example
of what an extreme event might be, are the decisions taken by some small island
states such as Tuvalu, Samoa, the Maldives, and others to buy land in Australia,
India, Sri Lanka, and New Zealand in order to settle there after being forced to
leave their countries by the rising sea level.
The problem of understanding the term “extreme event” may derive from the
fact that “extreme” either is used to describe the frequency (how often a disaster
occurs), or to describe the degree of severity (how relevant the event is for the
socioeconomic situation), or to describe that this event got high media coverage
(social visibility). The questions arise whether extreme events are defined by just
one of the factors or do they require a certain (to be defined) relationship to each
other. For example, people living for decades on one of the German North Sea
islands while awaiting a winter storm will rate this hazard as normal, although the
impact might become of an extreme severity. But when such people are on winter
holiday in the Alps and are witness to a snow avalanche, they might get alarmed
although the avalanche is of a comparably normal severity. Or do local adminis-
trations of a region that just experienced a fatal rockfall (as on the German island
of Rügen where one child was killed and the event was covered for a long time
in the media) rate this event extreme as it might have serious consequences for
local tourism. Do insurance companies rate a hailstorm that produced hail of 8 cm
diameter, an event that occurred statistically once in 20 years an extreme event
just from the ball size or from the losses to be covered, especially when the losses
from the hailstorm were much less, as a very local event, compared to a thunder-
storm of a lower severity but with an extremely higher damage ratio.
In the climate change and adaptation discussion extreme events are generally
considered on physical evidence, such as the increase in sea-level height, wind-
speed, or rainfall amount per hour. Such a definition will not fully cover the
impact of natural disasters on the population at risk. Therefore in the disaster risk
context, the term “extreme” should take the level of severity of a natural disaster
event, based on its social connotation, into consideration—fatality, technical dam-
age, and economic loss—rather than defining this event type on its natural phe-
nomena. The following examples make this relationship more transparent. The
extreme events, for example, the hot summer in Europe in 2003 with temperatures
exceeding 40 °C for many days, or the heavy rainfall in Mumbai, India in 2005
that experienced 950 mm in one day (double the amount of the maximum rainfall
thus far) were nevertheless perceived by different societies totally differently. The
European heat wave was without doubt something never experienced before and
was therefore named “extreme.” Whether the heavy rainfall in Mumbai would also
be seen by the people there as an extreme event might be questionable. Scheffran,
on the occasion of the above-cited “VW-Foundation Meeting Hannover”
(2013), gave an impressive example of this: “[A] month of daily temperatures
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 151

corresponding to the daily maximum in Chennai, India, would be termed a heat

wave in France; a snow storm expected every year in New York, USA, might initi-
ate a disaster when it occurs in southern China” (see also: IPCC 2012, p. 53).
When extreme events are defined mainly by the classical means of type of dis-
aster, its severity, frequency, economic losses, and fatalities, it will not arrive at
a common understanding and a general acceptance of the term. When extreme
events are targeted rather on the social impact a societal-oriented discussion is
required that brings together natural scientists, sociologists, mathematicians, and
political decision makers including the different populations at risk. An extreme
event that is believed to change the entire global climate system is the Asian mon-
soon. A change in the monsoon rainy season pattern will lead to a melting of the
ice caps in the Himalayas with the result that less water will arrive at the Indian
subcontinent and can have even more of an impact on North Atlantic thermal cir-
culation, the Greenland ice shield, or Amazon tropical rain forest, but should not
be held responsible for the floods of the rivers Elbe or the Danube.
When the overall significance of extreme events is its rareness and not its
extremeness then we have to define what we understand under the definition of
“rare.” The probability distribution function on frequency (variance) and severity
(tolerance) of disasters (natural, social, financial, etc.) is in general well approxi-
mated by log-normal Gaussian distribution, as can be seen in Fig. 3.38. The blue
line gives, for example, the temperature distribution for a certain region for a one-
year period. Most of the temperatures experienced fall into the sector “normal”
thus representing the temperature regime that has existed for the most of the year.
The bell-shaped curve shows a distinct lower frequency for temperatures on both
sides of the median characterizing slightly lower or higher temperatures. At the
end of the curve the so-called “extreme” events are defined as the tail ends of the
log-normal risk distributions, in this case describing “very cold” or “very hot”
temperatures. Extreme events are the infrequent events at the high and low end of
the range of values of a particular probability distribution. Therefore to understand

Fig. 3.38  Probability
distribution function on
frequency and severity of
natural disasters in general
is well approximated by log-
normal Gaussian distribution
(Redrawn from: IPCC 2007)

very very
cold moderate hot
cold hot

cold moderate hot very hot

152 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

what is “rare,” the IPCC definition needs as a further step the definition of the
onset value of such an event. In order to have an internationally agreed boundary
line that would be verifiable all over the world, the IPCC (2007) proposed to take
the 10th and 90th percentiles of the observed probability density to serve as the
threshold values.
The figure furthermore explains another phenomenon we have experienced
for the last decade. In the course of the changing climate, the Earth’s temperature
regime is getting steadily warmer, with higher temperatures in summer and less
cool in winter times. In the log-normal probability temperature curve this phenom-
enon is expressed in a shift of the bell-shaped curve towards the extreme “hot”
tail end (red line). It “illustrates the effect a small shift (corresponding to a small
change in the average or center of the distribution) can have on the frequency of
extremes at either end of the distribution. And an increase in the frequency of one
extreme (e.g., the number of hot days) will often be accompanied by a decline in
the opposite extreme (in this case the number of cold days such as frosts)” (IPCC
2001).The figure shows quite impressively that the tail end of “extreme hot”

Fig. 3.39  Change in
probability distribution
function due to shift in the
shape of the log-normal
distribution: a shifting
the mean, b broadening
probability, c shift in
skewness (Courtesy IPCC
2001)
3.2 Natural Hazards Originating from the Solid Earth 153

increases significantly whereas on the other side the “cold” tail end is diminishing
in its area. That the assumption of shifting from a colder to warmer climate reflects
the changing climate conditions could be proved by an analysis of Jonas et al.
(2005) in which they assessed the average temperatures in Germany from 1760
until today. In the time span 1760–1880 the average temperatures had their means
at about 0 to −0.5 °C. Since then the average temperatures have risen so that today
the mean temperature lies at about 1 °C and the “hot” tail end increased to a tem-
perature of 3.4 °C. This simple statistical reasoning indicates that “[S]ubstantial
changes in the frequency of extreme events can result from a relatively small shift
of the distribution of a weather or climate variable” (IPCC 2001).
The third IPCC report (IPCC ibid) furthermore gave indications on how a
small shift in the probability distribution function can lead to a comparably strong
change in the climate distribution (Fig. 3.39). As described above, a shifting of
the mean of the bell-shaped distribution towards higher temperatures increases
the “hot to very hot” tail end considerably and the cold tail end is reduced (part
“a”). But not only a shift but also a drop in the mean temperature, leading to a
broadening of the variance, will result in an increase in the cold as well as the
warm tail ends (part “b”). A change in the temperature regime can moreover result

Fig. 3.40  Definition of
extreme event threshold value
based on a random sampling,
or b from normal distribution
function (Own graph)
154 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

in a change of median and variance that results in an increase of one of the tail
ends significantly (part “c”). In this context it has to be considered that up to now
for most of the climate change indicators it is not possible to define whether the
changes result from a changed mean, variance, or both.
Typical indicators for a heat wave are related to the number of days above a
pre-defined temperature value or on a given precipitation threshold (Fig. 3.39).
The big advantage of using such pre-defined indices is that such a method allows
an easy interpretation of the data record and can serve as a good comparison with
other regions. Another definition is based on the threshold of exceedance, where
the number of events, the percentage and fraction of days (i.e., with maximum or
minimum temperature), the amount of days with temperature below the 1st, 5th,
or 10th, or above the 90th, 95th, or 99th percentile for a given timeframe (days,
month, season, annual) are given in a Gaussian normal distribution (Fig. 3.40). In
meteorology it is common practice that temperatures for the 10th and 90th percen-
tiles of Tmax/Tmin are referred to as “cold/warm days/nights” (IPCC-SREX 2011,
p. 116). A large amount of the available scientific literature on climate extremes
is based on the use of so-called extreme indices, which can either be based on the
probability of occurrence of given quantities or on threshold exceedances.
To reach an internationally accepted definition one has to take into considera-
tion that different social and economic systems will define “extreme” differently.
The people in Bangladesh will arrive at another definition than those in New
Zealand or in the Republic of Congo. Therefore the definition of extreme events
is not an exclusive task of natural scientists but will not be successful without a
comprehensive incorporation of the people who are exposed to the threat (see
Sect. 8.6).
According to the definition, extreme events have to be defined from the
impact they trigger rather than from the “extremeness” of the type of occurrence.
Following this definition that extreme events lead to a fundamental change in the
paradigm of social and economic life, the drying up of Lake Aral or the fire clear-
ance of the Indonesian tropical forests with its regional impact on the climate are
extreme events. Thus far extreme events have in general been attributed to climate
and meteorological phenomena, but in risk science other types of extreme events
also exist: the best known is the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center that
led to a complete change in the security architecture of most countries of the world
improving the international antiterror networks.
The IPCC-SREX Report (see also IPCC 2012) warned that just by setting up
probability distribution functions based on frequency and severity of disasters
to assess the situation of future extreme events can be misleading, as it is recog-
nized that climate-related events are mostly characterized by “non-stationary situ-
ations.” Therefore “past experiences may turn out not to be a reliable predictor of
the characteristic and frequency of future events as nature is more complex to be
described by just these two variables.” It has to be acknowledged that the infor-
mation base on climate indicators is still very limited and thus does not yet allow
us to draw generalized scenarios from it. Consequently the main interest of emer-
gency managers, researchers, and engineers is get a better understanding of the
3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution 155

physical processes that lead to extreme natural events by focusing on the cause–
effect relationship of an extreme physical event and its impact. Extreme impacts
are seen to depend strongly on the social and economic context, reflecting both the
degree of vulnerability and susceptibility to which populations, the economy, but
also the ecosystem and other elements at risk are located in the exposure path of
the extreme event. Instrumental records of variability typically extend only over
about 150 years, although since the year 2000 the worldwide monitoring networks
on extreme events has developed substantially, so that on daily temperature and
rainfall extremes there is now a worldwide comprehensive and verifiable database
available for that time span.

3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution

3.3.1 Type of Disaster

Of the many types of disaster the world is exposed to every day, droughts proved
to be the deadliest of all. But, as it not may be believed, drought-prone areas are
not restricted to the well-known drought-stricken areas of the sub-Saharan regions
but also comprise regions in the central United States, Brazil, China, India, and
Australia. Moreover regions in the European Mediterranean are also regularly
subject to drought events. According to Dilley et al. (2005) more than 1 billion
people, that is, about 20 % of the world’s population, living in about 10 % of the
world’s land areas, are regularly exposed to droughts. Other sources see this figure
to be almost double (Misereor 2010). UNISDR (2010) citing data of the CRED-
EMDAT database pointed out that the annual average death toll for the decade
2000 was almost 80,000, a number that was considerably higher than the previous
decade’s.
Droughts are not restricted to easily defined regions and do not occur at regular
return periods like floods or hurricanes. “Droughts emerge slowly and quietly and
lacks [sic] highly visible and structural impacts” (Below et al. 2007). But droughts
are predictable as they do not occur overnight. Droughts affect societies more
powerfully than many other natural disasters when the event is coupled with lack
of financial means, with emergency management failure, and a lack of administra-
tive power to enforce existing laws (UNFCCC 2012).
More than 90 % of the death toll from the 40 biggest natural disasters (1970–
2008) occurred in countries that are in a developing state, including China and
India. According to CRED-EMDAT (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011, 2013) the total
number of people killed by natural disasters exceeded US$ 2.3 billion in the time
span 1975 to 2005. As has been already given in Fig. (2.10), 80 % of this death
toll is concentrated in only 20 major disaster events. Of these the 1983 drought
in Ethiopia and Sudan claimed 450,000 lives, the earthquake of 1976 in China
240,000, the 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh 140,000, and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsu-
nami 225,000.
156 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Similar to the figures on risk mortality and on the economic losses, CRED
data moreover reveal a distinct regional distribution. Of the 20 most costly dis-
asters with damages exceeding US$10 billion from 1975 and 2006, 90 % were
concentrated in the industrialized countries. Also the economic loss, although
slightly less prominent than the death toll figures, was 40 % on 20 disaster events.
The most costly natural disaster ever recorded with estimated economic damages
of US$210 billion was the To-hoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, causing the
failure of the nuclear power plant of Fukushima-Daiichi, followed by Hurricane
Katrina in New Orleans causing damages of US$125 billion, and the Kobe earth-
quake in 1995 with a loss of more than US$100 billion. Of the 20 most costly dis-
asters 14 were of hydrometeorological and climate origin, and 6 were caused by
earthquakes (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011).
Over the last decade, China, the United States, the Philippines, India, and
Indonesia constituted together the top five countries that are most frequently hit by
natural disasters. Of the almost 300 disaster events analyzed by MunichRe (2005,
2012, 2013) only about 30 % were of geological–tectonic origin, responsible for
about 60 % of the death toll, but only 30 % of the economic damages.
The above-given summary on disaster occurrences and impacts of the last
30 years shows a general trend in regional distribution, number of casualties, and
economic losses that is just mirrored by the disasters of the year 2011, making
this year somehow representative of the overall disaster distributions the world
is facing today. According to CRED-EMDAT on the disasters of year 2011 there
were:
• 332 natural disasters
Asia was the continent most often hit by natural disasters (44.0 %), followed by
the Americas (28.0 %), Africa (19.3 %), Europe (5.4 %), and Oceania (3.3 %).
• 30,773 people killed. 79.2 % of global reported disaster mortalities occurred in
seven countries, classified as high-income or upper-middle income economies,
a figure that is quite unusual due to the impact of the To-hoku earthquake and
tsunami (Fukushima-Daiichi) that alone caused nearly 19,000 deaths, represent-
ing 64.5 % of worldwide disaster mortality. The tropical cyclone “Washi” alone
caused 1439 deaths, making it the most lethal storm worldwide in 2011.
• 244.7 million victims (injured/homeless). Asia accounted for 86.3 % of
global disaster victims, followed by Africa (9.2 %). A total of 65.1 %
(159.3 million) of the victims were in China stemming from two floods caus-
ing 87.9 million, a drought affecting 35.0 million, and storms with 22.0 mil-
lion victims. In Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia droughts/famines caused
13.2 million victims. Natural disasters claimed 42.9 % of Somalia’s popula-
tion as victims in 2011, making the country the strongest hit in the world.
The largest impact came from hydrological disasters that caused 57.1 %
(139.8 million) of the victims.
• US$366.1 billion economic damages. With 75.4 % of the total disaster dam-
ages Asia suffered the most, followed by the Americas (18.4 %) and Oceania
(5.6 %).The To-hoku earthquake/tsunami (Fukushima-Daiichi) was the most
3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution 157

expensive natural disaster ever recorded (US$210 billion). The flooding in

Thailand caused damages of US$40.0 billion, the earthquake in New Zealand
US$15.0 billion, and a series of storms in the United States total US$25.0 bil-
lion. The economic losses increased by 235 % compared to the annual aver-
age damages of US$109.3 billion from 2001 to 2010. Among them, the
damages from geophysical disasters (mostly earthquakes) increased the most
(US$230.3 billion against US$24.1 billion (average 2001–2010). Geophysical
disasters thus represented a share of 62.9 % of total damages caused by natural
disasters in 2011.
• The Philippines experienced 33 natural disasters, the highest number ever reg-
istered in its history. The country was affected by 18 floods and landslides, 12
storms, two volcanic eruptions, and one earthquake.

3.3.2 Regional Distribution (Hotspots)

Section 2.2 focused on the victims of natural disasters and was thus mainly ori-
ented on the socioeconomic aspects of natural disasters, however, this section
focuses on the locations, respectively, regions, where such disasters occur. As
stated earlier, natural disasters are very unevenly distributed over the world and
have highly different generating modes. Therefore certain regions of the world

Fig. 3.41  World Map of Natural Hazards; excerpt (Courtesy Munich Re, NATHAN, 2011)
158 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

are exposed to a higher level of threats from disasters whereas others face only
smaller risks. Such areas are called natural disaster hotspots and describe areas
where large-scale disasters regularly claim a significant death toll and/or cause
heavy economic losses.
In order to assess the regional aspects of disaster distribution there are a num-
ber of analytical instruments at hand. The causal relationship of hazard, vulnera-
bility, and risk (see Chaps. 6 and 7) makes an assessment of the worldwide hazard
distribution a substantial tool for such an assessment. Furthermore the regional
distributions of vulnerability and risk, among others, also exist, all serving the
same purpose. In the following some global perspectives of so-called disaster hot-
spots are presented. It should, however, be noted that there are more of these kinds
of assessments worldwide in use.
The famous World Map of Natural Hazards of the Munich Re Insurance
Company (2011) impressively displays where on Earth what kind of hazard is to
be expected (Fig. 3.41). The author gratefully appreciates the permission to make
use of the many data available with the Munich Re Insurance Company NATCAT
Service (MunichRe, ibid). The map just intends to give a general understanding of
the worldwide hazard distribution. Due to scale it is not possible to display each
hazard in its local distribution; therefore the map presents only those hazards that
are to occur with a probability of more than 50 %.
Another way to present an overview about the hazards exposure of a country or
region is presented in Fig. 3.42. The different hazard types are given by using self-
explanatory pictograms/icons symbolizing different hazard types. Such a presenta-
tion is best suited to give a generalized overview, simply to inform a broad public

Fig. 3.42  Synoptic Hazard

Map of Germany; example of
a synoptic hazard map using
symbols for indicating type
and regional distribution of Flood
natural hazards (Own graph)

Storm

Earthquake

Volcano
3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution 159

rapidly and in an easily understandable manner. Such synoptic maps can provide
valuable information to the people at risk, to laymen, or other people who are not
familiar with natural hazard/disaster/risk assessment. The icon distribution, moreo-
ver, delineates a potential agglomerated exposition of hazard types of a specific
region.
In the following, a number of tools to define disaster hotspots are presented.
First are those that assess the regional risk level by a country-to-country compari-
son based on a standardized and harmonized risk-defining algorithm, the so-called
“risk index.” Second are those that identify disaster hotspots based on disaster
events (worst-case scenarios). The first tools are restricted in their significance due
to the fact that the data availability is very different in number and quality, mak-
ing a country-by-country assessment a real challenge, whereas the other type of
hotspot assessment tool, based on real events, lacks the possibility to generalize
the findings. This holds true especially for such types of disasters that are to occur
frequently and severely, but have only a small regional extension, whereas other
events are to occur quite frequently and cover large areas but only affect a small
population. More on the methodology to assess disasters and risks at world and
local scales is given in Chaps. 6 and 7.
One approach to give a perspective on disaster occurrence and impact on a
world scale is presented by the Disaster Risk Index (DRI) of the United Nations
based on the “Global Risk and Vulnerability Index Trend per Year Programme”
(GRAVITY; Peduzzi et al. 2002, 2005, 2009). The disaster risk assessment pre-
sented here (Fig. 3.43) covers the risk of mortality exclusively. The assessment
clearly revealed that the Asian and Eastern African countries are especially at the
highest risk of mortality from natural disasters worldwide.

Fig. 3.43  Spatial distribution of risk mortality classes assessed by the Disaster Risk Index (DRI)
of the UNDP-GRAVITY Programme (Courtesy Peduzzi et al. 2005)
160 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

UNDP has initiated the GRAVITY-Programme to assess worldwide vulner-

ability as a compulsory step to identify the countries’ different risk exposure
levels. The purposes of the GRAVITY research were to identify whether global
datasets could be used for identifying populations living in risk-exposed areas.
The program moreover was targeted to identify the links between socioeconomic
parameters and vulnerability. With the GRAVITY-Programme UNDP was able to
highlight the root causes leading to human vulnerability and provided substantial
information identifying the populations at risk. The research was focused on the
four natural hazards: earthquakes, volcanoes, cyclones, and floods based on data
provided by the CRED-EMDAT database.
The four maps on vulnerability/exposure and on risk clearly indicate where on
the globe the people are exposed to a higher risk. But maps at global scale like
the DRI and its accompanying statistical findings should not be used as risk pre-
dictors. Local disaster risk reduction should always be based on detailed local
assessments. By using GIS for spatial analysis a significant relationship between
the number of casualties, physical exposure, and socioeconomic parameters was
found. Now confirmed by statistical evidence it was possible to show the role of
the development in the resilience capacity, a relationship that thus far was more
intuitively understood. The analysis revealed that there is a clear relation, that a
low development may lead to high casualties, while a high hazard exposure may
also result in a low economic development. The statistical analysis demonstrated
that physical exposure constitutes the major factor leading to casualties, but other
socioeconomic parameters are also substantial variables that lead to high human
vulnerability. The level of correlation achieved delineates that both physical expo-
sure and socioeconomic variables are of significant importance and can be easily
adopted from international statistics. All in all, the method used in this statistical
analysis proved to be appropriate and allows the identification of the parameters
leading to a higher risk and vulnerability.
The Global Risk Index was able to highlight the areas of high natural hazard
occurrences by combining the number of people living in an exposed area with
their respective socioeconomic variables, mainly the HDI, GDP, urban growth,
percentage of arable land, and local population density. The main limitation of
mixing geophysical and socioeconomic parameters lies in the difference of time
scale. Earthquakes or volcanoes may have a returning period measured in several
centuries, whereas socioeconomic features can change extensively during a single
decade. Other difficulties are inherent to global scale, such as how to compare the
situation of earthquakes in South America with the problem of drought in Africa.
Not only is the number of people affected very different, but also the percentage
of occurrence varies largely for each continent. Hazard impacts differ in scale, in
regional extension, and frequency or magnitude as well as in duration.
Such a model, however, should not be used as a predictive model: first because
of the level of data quality and second, because significant discrepancy of losses
between two (similar) disaster events in the same country was found. This shows
the high variability is often due to a temporal context. For earthquakes the num-
ber of those killed is highly dependent on where and at what time the disaster
3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution 161

happened (during the night or during the day); it moreover depends on the type
of habitat, type of soils, direction of fault lines, depth of epicenter, and so on. To
bring such variables into a worldwide context is hardly possible.
Another approach for a generalized world disaster risk distribution assessment,
called the World Risk Index 2012, was given by the United Nations University,
Bonn (UNU-EHS 2012). The assessment was also mainly based on the CRED-
EMDAT database. But other than the assessments of UNDP and World Bank (see
further below), the UNU-World Risk Index (WRI) is not only restricted to risk
exposure as indicated by the “frequency” of disaster occurrence and social vul-
nerability, but furthermore included the factor of “coping capacity.” In this regard
UNU-EHS further distinguishes between the coping capacity, defining the capabil-
ity of a society to cope with adverse effects from natural disasters, and the adapta-
tion capacity. Adaptation capacity in this sense sets in when “a society has already
changed structurally before a disaster strikes in a sense that this makes much miti-
gation no longer necessary” (UNU-EHS, ibid, p. 17).
From the many World Risk Index Maps published by UNU-EHS, the one on
“Coping Capacity” is presented here (Fig. 3.44). Although the map might at a first
glance not be informative regarding the disaster cum risk distribution of the world,
the factor “coping capacity” describes a substantial input societies may be pro-
vided in order to reduce disaster impact and is thus contributing to a better under-
standing of risk exposure of the world.
Like the other world maps on disaster distribution, the distribution of deficits
in the coping capacity also revealed that the Asian countries are at high exposure
to risk from disasters. Nevertheless the coping capacity shows certain differen-
tiations: the highest deficits are identified in Central Africa but also for parts of
Central America. When the assessment of World “Coping Capacity Deficit” is
combined with “Hazard Distribution” and the DRI-Index maps (here on “Risk of

Fig. 3.44  World Risk Index Map showing the “Deficit in Risk Coping Capacity” (Courtesy
UNU-EHS, Bonn)
162 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Mortality”) a realistic impression of the world risk from disasters can be derived.
For example, Australia and Chile both are in the same high-risk exposure class,
although their technical standards to cope with a disaster differ a great deal. The
opposite holds true for Mongolia. There, the overall risk exposure is low, but the
country has a very high deficit in disaster structural and socioeconomic capabil-
ity, especially against risk from climate change, a situation Mongolia shares with
Bolivia and Paraguay. Africa (with the exception of South Africa) is the region
of the world that is at the highest risk in all categories, the same as Afghanistan
and Pakistan, whereas the other Asian countries down to Papua New Guinea have
already made quite significant advances in their local capacity to withstand a dis-
aster (e.g., Thailand and Malaysia).
The most comprehensive and therefore most adopted index-based risk
assessment of the world has been worked out by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank (Dilley et al. 2005). The Bank
has over many years successfully tried to establish a generalized risk index: the
Global Disaster Risk Index (GDRI) that intends to provide an overall assessment
on the risk of mortality from natural disasters for the world in total. Due to the
varying quality and quantity of the databases available, the approach aggregated
all data accessible to the World Bank into one set of data, and consequently could
only provide a very generalized impression. The DRI therefore should not be
taken as a source of information on a regional differentiation of the disaster type
and its severity and frequency. The Global Disaster Risk Index assessed the distri-
bution of risks worldwide based on two disaster-related outcomes: mortality and
economic losses. Both parameters are assessed by combining the regional expo-
sure to earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, floods, drought, and cyclones with vul-
nerability data on population distribution and the national gross domestic product.
The study presented the first successful approach for an index of the global risk
to natural hazards. The calculation was based on grid cells, as such an approach
gave a more detailed insight to the subnational and local distribution of the risks
than an assessment based on a national scale. The GDRI of the World Bank gives
two more sets of information of the global risk distribution: on the total economic
losses and the economic loss as a portion of the GDP.
The Natural Disaster Hotspots study identified that East and South Asia,
Central America, and large areas of the Mediterranean and the Middle East are at
the greatest risk of loss from multiple hazards and indicated that about 3.4 billion
people, more than half the world’s population, lives in areas where at least one
hazard could significantly affect them. Other key findings of the report were:
• About 20 % of the Earth’s land surface is exposed to at least one natural hazard.
• 160 countries have more than one quarter of their population in areas of high
mortality risk from at least one hazard; more than 90 have more than 10 % of
their population in areas of high mortality risk from two or more hazards.
• In 35 countries, more than 1 in 20 residents lives at a relatively high mortality
risk from three or more hazards.
3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution 163

Fig. 3.45  Risk of mortality from earthquakes (Courtesy Dilley et al. 2005)

Fig. 3.46  Risk of mortality from landslides (Courtesy Dilley et al. 2005)

• Taiwan may be the place on Earth most vulnerable to natural hazards, with
73 % of its land and population exposed to three or more hazards.
• More than 90 % of the populations of Bangladesh, Nepal, the Dominican
Republic, Burundi, Haiti, Taiwan, Malawi, El Salvador, and Honduras live in
areas at high relative risk of death from two or more hazards.
Although the World Bank (Dilley et al., ibid) approach provided an impressive
comparison of the disaster hotspots of the world (Figs. 3.45, 3.46, 3.47, 3.48
and 3.49), it is nevertheless obvious that even such an impressive data collection
164 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.47  Risk of mortality from floods (Courtesy Dilley et al. 2005)

Fig. 3.48  Risk of mortality from cyclones (Courtesy Dilley et al. 2005)

cannot cover all parameters that define “risk.” For example, the risk distribution
from volcanic eruptions has not been incorporated in the study, as the World Bank
argues that volcanoes on a world scale are only represented by very tiny spots.
The study moreover deliberately left out those areas with low population density
or without agricultural importance, a systematic approach that is contradicted by
many researchers such as Birkmann (2007) who claimed that many of these areas
show a high relative mortality to floods. The World Bank although confessed that
the findings should not be overinterpreted as the database is still sparse concern-
ing availability and quality of natural hazards and occurrences as well as on his-
torical economic losses. Therefore the World Bank sees its global hotspot analysis
3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution 165

Fig. 3.49  Risk of mortality from droughts (Courtesy Dilley et al. 2005)

Fig. 3.50  World Climate Risk Distribution (Courtesy GermanWatch 2014)

as an instrument for identifying the relative levels of risk rather than an indicator
on the absolute risk levels. The fundamental drawback of the study results from
the lack of availability of reliable and reproducible indicators of vulnerability.
Vulnerability, in the understanding of the concept, cannot simply be determined
by past losses of life and economic values. From the many world maps of risk dis-
tributions only those from earthquakes, landslides, floods, cyclones, and drought
were therefore taken up.
Also index-based is the World Map on Climate Risk (Fig. 3.50) published by
the GermanWatch (2014). It is presented here as many of the disasters are cli-
matic in origin. The study mirrors the already-presented risk distributions and
revealed that the Asian countries and Central America are at high risk from climate
166 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

Fig. 3.51  World Map of Natural Catastrophes 2011 (Courtesy MunichRe, NatCatSERVICE;

online access: 30 July 2014)

disasters. But in addition, the risk from climate gives a different picture than that
above. Countries like Russia (very high risk), the United States of America (high
risk), and Australia (high risk) are especially climate-disaster exposed compared to
geotectonic and hydrometeorological affected countries. All three countries regu-
larly faced regionally extended, severe, and long-lasting drought events in the past,
and Russia and the United States moreover faced serious cold waves. Interesting is
the rather low climate risk assessed for the Northern African Sahel region although
this region was subject to the most serious droughts in history. But as (climate)
risk is defined as a “combination of high temperature and the number of people
exposed,” the region is therefore rated of a rather moderate climate risk.
A further step towards identifying the worldwide distribution of disaster hot-
spots is to record the natural disasters by number and event type. Such an assess-
ment is regularly carried out by many international organizations. The MunichRe
(2013) for more than a decade has published statistics on natural catastrophes every
year. When combined with the type of disasters such a map (Fig. 3.51) provides an
impressive indication of the world disaster hotspots. The map clearly shows that
there are three disaster hotspots. One center is located in the United States, another
in Western Europe, and the third in South and East Asia. The regional distribution
of this event and type-based assessment fully coincides with the risk-based assess-
ments of UNDP (DRI), WB (GDRI), and the UNU-EHS (World Risk Index).
The broad range of assessment tools in use mainly originated in the different
topics the authors intended to cover (scientific, economic, political). Nevertheless
each provides valuable information and when combining the different sets of
3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution 167

Fig. 3.52  Historic development of natural disaster events from 1980 until 2010 according to
type of disaster (Courtesy Munich Re, Topics Geo Online, 2013)

Fig. 3.53  Generalized trend in type of natural disasters from 1980 until 2010 (Courtesy Munich
Re, Topics, Geo Online, 2013)
168 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

information, an ideal insight to the regional distribution of risks from natural dis-
asters is provided.
But disaster hotspots should not be defined only by their number and type of
event. Also the development of disasters over the course of time, their frequency,
and severity are factors that help to identify the potential future risk. Therefore
disaster distribution assessments deserve to be accompanied by a “time” and
“impact” component. Only when the data on the historical development of disas-
ter events are combined with severity (impact) does such an assessment become
meaningful and open a reliable insight on the risk the people may be exposed to
worldwide in future.
A statistical assessment of the disaster events of the last 30 years (Fig. 3.52)
published by Munich Re indicates that there is a steady increase in the num-
ber of disaster events worldwide, that has more than doubled in this time span.
Nevertheless a closer view (Fig. 3.53) reveals that the increase has a different ori-
gin. Although geophysical–tectonic disasters more or less occur at a steady rate,
disasters of climate and meteorological origin have increased almost threefold.
Moreover this increase shows a large year-to-year fluctuation.
Moreover Figs. 3.51, 3.52 and 3.53 from Munich Re do not detail how the
people in the different regions are really affected by the disaster. There are many
regions that are exposed to frequent events but only experience disasters with

Fig. 3.54  Historic development of overall and insured economic losses “1980 to 2013”
­(MunichRe 2012)
3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution 169

a low intensity, neither claiming a significant death toll nor causing heavy eco-
nomic losses, and others that are highly exposed to disasters but face mainly eco-
nomic losses whereas other countries are hit by rare (extreme) events that cause
a high death toll or economic losses. The degree of vulnerability from a natural
disaster of an individual or a societal group cannot be realized from such a type
of assessment. A further indicator of vulnerability is given by Munich Re by the
“Loss Events Worldwide” (Fig. 3.54). The figure clearly indicates that the insured
losses and the overall losses are both increasing. Similar to the increase in number
of people affected by disasters worldwide the distribution of insured and overall
losses is also dominated by single mega events, such as the 1995 Kobe earthquake.
Nevertheless the trend in overall losses worldwide clearly mirrors the general
increase in economic values accumulated in the developing countries. A very gen-
eral assumption can be made: the higher the income of a society, the better devel-
oped is its capacity to adjust against adverse risk impacts. But that does not say
that countries with a low income did not develop effective capacities to withstand
adverse impacts or, for instance, societies that are living at the seaside or living in
areas exposed to snow avalanches.

Fig. 3.55  Mortality risk of selected disaster affected countries (based on: UNISDR 2007, 2009a, b,
2013)
170 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

The above-given generalized “World Risk Indices” demonstrate that risks from
natural hazards are not uniformly distributed over the world. In order to relate the
risk distribution to specific countries, UNISDR (2004, 2007, 2009a, b) plotted
the relative vulnerability against the hazard exposure for all different risk types.
Figure 3.55 sums up losses from droughts, earthquakes, floods, and storms for all
countries with the exception of those where risk exposure was rated negligible
or where less than 2 % of the total population was exposed. The risk index plot-
ted the absolute figure of persons killed per year and the relative multiple risk,
indicated by the people killed per year as a percentage of the total country popu-
lation (Peduzzi et al. 2009). The plot shows (without surprise) the top countries
at risk are in Africa and in eastern Asia. In terms of those killed per year are the
most populated countries—China, India, Indonesia, and Bangladesh rank high-
est—whereas in terms of people killed per million inhabitants per year, the small
island states of Vanuatu, Dominica, Mauritius, Antigua, and so on have the highest
risk. The plot moreover points out (also not very surprising) that countries such as
Germany, France, England, and so on are, although facing natural disasters includ-
ing floods almost every year, nevertheless rank low, as these disasters (fortunately)
do not claim a high casualty ratio. In flood vulnerability Venezuela ranked high,
as it has been subject to many flood events in the last decades that once claimed
a hundredfold higher death toll rate than the other types of disasters, and as these
floods made millions of people homeless and caused high economic damages.
Over the last decades China, the United States, the Philippines, India, and
Indonesia ranked together as the top five countries most frequently hit by natu-
ral disasters (primarily floods and cyclones). In the year 2011 the Philippines
set a record on disaster events when a total of 33 natural disasters hit the coun-
try, the highest number ever registered in its history. The country was affected by
18 floods and landslides, 12 storms, two volcanic eruptions, and one earthquake.
Among the top 10 countries in terms of disaster mortality seven countries (Japan,
United States, Brazil, China, Colombia, Thailand, Turkey) are classified as high-
income or upper-middle income economies according to the World Bank Income
Classification. These countries accounted for 80 % of global reported disaster
mortality (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011).
The general assumption can be drawn from these findings that the higher the
income per person, the lower is the vulnerability to natural hazards. The UNISDR
Disaster Risk Index further revealed that vulnerability from earthquakes shows
countries such as Japan, Turkey, and the Republic of Iran to have a comparatively
higher risk than all the others. Regarding the vulnerability from tropical cyclones
and storms, the countries of Bangladesh, India, and the Philippines stand first, and
here also the countries in Western Europe are ranked low. An exemption to the
general finding “high income is equal to low vulnerability” are the United States
of America that faces numerous tropical cyclones every year and occur next to
China, and Vietnam in the plot (UNISDR 2009a, b, plots 2, 3, 5).
Furthermore, exclusively making statistical evidence a basis for an assessment
of a disaster impact can lead to biased assumptions. Much information especially
when related to drought disasters is often given in a time span that exceeds one
3.3 Natural Disaster Distribution 171

year. Thus it is often difficult to compare drought disaster with another in the same
year in the same region. Or a drought followed by a severe dry period one year
later but with the victims of the former still in need of external help. For exam-
ple, if a drought struck a region for a period of, say three years, affected in total
100,000 people, and killed 10,000 people, it is possible that all of the 100,000 are
being affected over the entire three years, whereas the 10,000 fatalities are killed
in the first year. Statistically the casualty is (normally) attributed to the entire
drought time span. Moreover, many drought-stricken countries often do not have
the administrative and operational capacities at their disposal necessary to assess
the number of victims really affected.
The lack of standardization in drought hazard characterization contributes
to the problem of attributing definitive losses. Even if drought information has
improved and the methodology applied in CRED-EMDAT has been strength-
ened over the last years, data still remain inconsistent because of the complexity
of droughts, especially in terms of measuring the direct human impact (Below
et al. 2007), a situation happening at many refugee camps, for instance, in the sub-
Saharan region, even when the international community is rendering assistance. In
this context it has to be acknowledged that many countries, especially those who
deeply depend on external aid to cover yearly losses (sometimes), tend to exag-
gerate their death toll in order to keep up tension while raising international aid
solidarity.
The GDRI assessment made an important point regarding the timewise and
geographical distribution of disaster events. As described above, the assessment
did not incorporate, for instance, volcanic eruptions as they only cover very tiny
spots and therefore will not be sufficiently represented on a world scale. This evi-
dence clearly indicates that disaster and emergency management cannot be solely
based on statistics of time and regional occurrence of natural disasters. The geo-
physical–tectonic disasters (earthquake and volcano eruptions) mainly occur on
short notice and are quite local. Droughts and the other climate-related disaster
heat waves, however, are very slow in their onset and are characterized to last over
many years and to cover even continents. On the other hand the majority of the
hydrometeorological disasters, such as snow avalanches or flash floods are short in
onset and duration and normally restricted to morphology. The generating mode of
the different disasters—fast and local, or slow and widespread—provides the keys
for mitigation and prevention countermeasures. Snow avalanche prevention, for
instance, is therefore mainly technical to avoid avalanches reaching the villages
whereas heat waves and droughts due to their large areal extension require opera-
tional management capabilities helping the victims to survive.
172 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

3.4 Database and Data Reliability

Official disaster statistics, such as those preferably used in this book, are nor-
mally provided by CRED-EMDAT, UNDP, UNISDR, the World Bank, or other
insurance companies such as the Munich Re Insurance Company or the Swiss
Re Insurance Company. The most comprehensive database exists with the indus-
trial countries, especially the United States of America, that have collected an
enormous databank to serve the needs of the national Natural Disaster Risk
Assessment Program “Hazus 99” (FEMA 2014) or the United Nations Global
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2013) that every two
years comprehensively reviews and analyzes the world disaster risk and the inter-
national initiatives of disaster risk management.
The EMDAT database today contains core data on the occurrence and impacts
of about 16,000 disaster events in the world dating back to 1900 (Below et al.
2007). Although the quality of the reported data is steadily improving, its data
quality still differs strongly. Priority is therefore given to data provided by UN
agencies, followed by OFDA, official releases from national governments and
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The data-
base provides a functionality to make the information collected from all over the
world comparable. The entries are constantly reviewed for redundancy, inconsist-
encies, and incompleteness. At least two different sources are necessary to con-
firm figures. The figures are validated according to the priority sources but can be
completed by secondary ones. The incoming data are validated monthly and inter-
nationally cross-error-checking and are made available for the public every month.
Furthermore there is a yearly quality data control.
CRED defines a disaster according to the international definitions of (UNISDR
2004). For a disaster to be entered into the database, at least one of the following
criteria must be fulfilled:
• 10 or more people reported killed
• 100 or more people reported affected
• Declaration of a state of emergency
• Call for international assistance
Data on earthquakes are mainly taken from the USGS database, on floods from
the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (DFO), on epidemics from the WHO Diseases
Outbreak News, on economic losses from the UN-ECLAC and from the global
reinsurance companies, whereas data on social aspects are mainly taken from the
UN-OCHA ReliefWeb or the UNISDR PreventionWeb.
The EMDAT database provides access to different search possibilities:
• Country profiles
• Natural and technological disaster profiles
• Disaster lists
• Regional maps
• Trends in disaster distribution
3.4 Database and Data Reliability 173

Although quite reliable data on casualty and economic loss are easy to obtain, data
on the number of affected people very often lack independent proof. Such figures
are mainly based on a subjective perception by local risk assessors, often based
on a rough estimate of the population settling in the disaster-affected area but not
headcount. Therefore still most information given on natural disasters is by the
number of casualties. But it should be noted that for every victim about 3000 peo-
ple are affected by disasters (Nadim et al. 2006a, b).
Another international database that aims to improve evidence-based disaster
risk management at the regional, national, and global scales is the Global Risk
Identification Program (GRIP) of the UNDP/UNISDR (UNDP 2007) with the sup-
port of the ProVention Consortium of World Bank and Columbia University. The
program is outlined to strengthen the effectiveness of national and international
disaster risk reduction strategies by adding value to, and improving coordination
between ongoing international initiatives. It provides a framework where inter-
national donor agencies, governments, regional organizations, and research insti-
tutes as well as the private sector can share respective knowledge, information, and
expertise.
In addition, major insurance companies of the world, especially the Munich
Re and the Swiss Re insurance companies have established databanks to suit their
specific needs. The Munich Re databank is named NatCat and comprises some
30,000 data records, making it the most comprehensive natural catastrophe loss
database in the world. Approximately 1000 events are recorded and analyzed
every year.The information is collected by Munich Re to perform risk and trend
analyses on individual natural hazard types in various parts of the world. The
Munich Re statistics are freely accessible from the NATHAN-Online. The data
collection provides information on all major natural disasters since 1980. But it
not only comprises data on damages and casualties but also provides basic infor-
mation on the hazards and risk exposure of the areas at risk. Munich Re regu-
larly publishes a variety of disaster-related brochures, all on the four “Topics
Geo Online” (MunichRe 2012, 2013) but also brochures on specific disasters
on all natural and technical topics. World famous is the World Map of Hazard
Hazards. SwissRe yearly publishes their data collection in the Sigma publication
series, a series that like the data collection of Munich Re is freely accessible via
the Internet (Swiss Re 2010). Furthermore the Asian Disaster Reduction Center
(ADRC) has initiated a new disaster database, called Glide (ADRC 2009) which
gives specific features on hazards and disasters by a unique identifier and a num-
ber of relevant attributes.
There are several problems in using disaster statistics as they are provided by
the different organizations, and often collected with different intentions. The col-
lections are much affected by the monitoring procedure, the way the data are col-
lected, processed, and finally transmitted to the international agencies. Normally
local government organizations in the disaster-affected districts collect the data
within their jurisdiction and report these to their national data centers. From
there the international data centers such as CRED and UNDP are informed. As
the different data providers have very different monitoring network densities and
174 3 Natural Disasters: Definitions and Classification

equipment, collecting the data at very different intervals and duration, some pro-
vide handwritten and visual-based data after a disaster happened, and others pro-
vide data online, digitally, and 24 h a day. The different data quality makes the
CRED prioritization scheme concentrate on meaningful international data sources
as many reporting sources do not cover all disasters due to political limitations
or do not cover transboundary effects. For instance, Myanmar did not report any
casualties or damage of the 2004 tsunami although neighboring Thailand and
Indonesia were seriously hit. Moreover often the data on disaster events are not
collected according to the internationally agreed format. The author’s own expe-
rience revealed that often local administrators in remote districts do not see the
relevance of gathering such information and are reluctant to report as they feel
that reporting on tragedies and disasters might harm their political standing. Such
practice resulted in a very uneven distribution of disaster occurrences in Indonesia
(BG/Georisk 2005). It was recognized that those districts properly equipped with,
for example, a seismic detection network and are furthermore densely populated
and moreover have high media coverage show a much higher frequency of natu-
ral disasters than far remote districts although they might have a much higher risk
potential. It is a well-known fact that the more people live exposed to a disaster, the
more is reported even on smaller disasters. The opposite results from areas that are
far remote. There a low population density does not support detailed investigations
and thus reports on disaster are often not transferred to the central government.
Moreover disaster information in general is linked to the final type of disaster
that struck. For example, landslides that were triggered by earthquakes or by tropi-
cal storms are grouped under the triggering event “landslides”, although the actual
triggering mode was different. Thus far no disaster event statistic is available that
also covers the triggering causes. The 2004 tsunami in Banda Aceh is anticipated
to have destroyed 80 % of the capital’s houses. But that assumption does not take
into account that the tsunami was triggered by the third biggest earthquake ever
recorded in history. The statistical number of destroyed houses does not indicate
how much of the building substance had already been destroyed before the tsu-
nami struck. This problem is difficult to solve, as there are only a few cases known
where such an attribution is possible. If the houses in Banda Aceh had been more
seismic resistant it is assumed that many of them would have been to withstand the
following tsunami.
Although the database is unique worldwide CRED itself acknowledges that
reliable assessment of the disaster events cannot be made for the time span before
the years 1985–1990. Since then the number of reports on disaster events has at
least doubled, a factor that often led to the incorrect assumption that the amount of
disasters has increased simultaneously.
The still limited reliability of data often makes assumptions regarding the
working out of risk reduction strategies a real challenge. Nevertheless the data
record compiled thus far by the many reputed disaster management and research
organizations now enables them to draw a realistic picture of the risk situation and
to make effective proposals for disaster risk prevention activities, although it has
References 175

to be confessed that still too often such strategies are based on a transfer of experi-
ence from other regions.

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Chapter 4
Institutional and Organizational
Framework for a Disaster Risk
Management

4.1 General Aspects

There are a multitude of organizations and mechanisms worldwide targeted at

social and human development. The key word for all the different approaches is
“sustainability.” Although there are many different concepts, strategies, and instru-
ments in practice in development policy, they all have the same aim, “to reach sus-
tainable human development.” Berkes et al. (2000) emphasize that for reaching
sustainability a holistic approach is necessary that integrates the social and natu-
ral components by dealing with their interrelationships. They report on the “Vanua
Concept” of the Fiji Islands where in the traditional belief, land, water, and the
human being are regarded as an entity. Thus far they state, resource management
is purely defined from technical, scientific, and economic viewpoints. They pledge
to tear down the arbitrary and artificial delineation between the two systems
(social and ecological) and call for a comprehensive incorporation of the system
into one systematic approach. Such approaches were practiced for centuries by
many traditional societies of the developing world (Ostrom 1990).
Today such problems even have accelerated: globalization of resource mar-
kets, depletion of natural resources, financial crisis, environmental degradation,
and the changing climate all make human beings on Earth more and more vul-
nerable. The same holds true for an increase in natural hazard exposure that in
many events turns into serious risk to societies. Through disaster risk reduction
activities many international institutions mandated with development seek good
opportunities to protect livelihoods from shocks by making societies more resil-
ient and more capable of absorbing the impact of, and recovering from, disruptive
events. Furthermore, disaster risk reduction creates a multiplier effect that acceler-
ates the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals reflecting the Hyogo
Framework of Action and makes disaster risk reduction an integral part of the
international efforts to eradicate poverty.
Making a society resilient against the impact of natural disasters requires a
conducive legal and operational framework that defines the overall as well as the
planning and operational procedures. In the first order, the well-being of a society

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 183

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_4
184 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

is the responsibility of every nation as laid down in the Charter of the United
Nations. This principle meanwhile has been incorporated into all basic laws
worldwide. In the United States the Natural Hazard Mitigation policy is laid down
in the Stafford Act Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance ACT (“Stafford
Act”) of 1974 (FEMA 2007). The act is to provide an orderly and continuing fed-
eral assistance to state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities
to alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters. The act defines the two
strategic targets:
• To substantially increase public awareness of risk from natural hazards so that
the public demands safer communities in which to live and work
• To significantly reduce the risk of life, injuries, economic costs, and destruction
of natural and cultural resources that result from natural hazards
To achieve this and to guide the states and local governments in mitigation plan-
ning and implementation 10 principles among others are summarized:
• Proactive measures can reduce disaster costs and impacts.
• Hazard identification and risk assessment are cornerstones of mitigation.
• Risk reduction comprises preventive and corrective measures.
• Risk reduction measures for one natural hazard must be compatible with risk
reduction measures for other natural or technical hazards and with the goals of
protection of the natural and cultural environment.
• All mitigation is local.
• Those who knowingly choose to settle in hazard exposed areas must accept
responsibility for that choice.
According to the Stafford Act, the national government can render financial and
technical assistance after a request for a “presidential emergency declaration” by
a local movement, when it sees its reaction capacity overstressed. Section 409 of
the act deals specifically with the responsibilities of disaster risk assessment and
mitigation. According to 409 a hazard mitigation plan is declared the cornerstone
of any mitigation measure. In such a plan, the natural conditions and the social
vulnerabilities of a hazardous region have to be summarized and evaluated. At a
minimum a hazard mitigation plan shall comprise:
• An evaluation of the types of natural hazards
• A description and analysis of the local hazard management programs as well as
its local reduction capabilities
• An assessment of the local mitigation objectives, their respective implementa-
tion, monitoring, and evaluation of the reduction achievements
The following compilation names the most important organizations and mecha-
nisms targeted at social and human development, those acting according to inter-
national agreements and UN mandates making them world leaders in social,
economic, and environmental development. Not only organizations are listed,
but also the instruments and mechanisms that are prerequisites to implement the
political strategies and concepts. Nevertheless such a compilation is somewhat
4.1 General Aspects 185

arbitrary and acknowledges that there are quite a number of international, espe-
cially nongovernmental, organizations that contribute significantly to human
development.

4.2 The United Nations System

With the report “Our Common Future” a new era on human development was
initiated. The main outcome of the report was the concept of “sustainable devel-
opment” that in the aftermath became one of the most successful approaches in
international development policy. The concept provided the basis for an interna-
tional agenda and the attitude towards economic, social, and environmental devel-
opment. The report was published in October 1987 by the Brundtland Commission
(UN 1987), chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, the former Norwegian prime
minister. The former general of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, com-
missioned the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) as
a reaction to the first serious signs of heavy deterioration of the human environ-
ment and natural resources especially in the developing world. Although people
in the developed countries were starting to become more aware of environmen-
tal issues stemming from industrialization and growth, developing countries were
discouraged because they were not substantially able to reach the higher level
of economic growth. As a reaction to this need for growth, developing countries
were desperate to use cheap methods in agricultural and industrial production with
negative environmental and social impacts and often unethical labor practices. The
United Nations saw a growing need to address these environmental challenges and
their interrelationship with economic and social conditions.
The Brundtland Reoport “Our Common Future” was the first in history to
define the term “sustainable development” as a “Development which meets the
needs of current generations without Compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs.”
The Brundtland Report was the first to officially identify that the majority of
the global environmental problems result from both the south’s enormous poverty
and the north’s un-sustainable consumption and production. The report underlined
that the complex issue of environmental deterioration should be integrated with
human development policy. Moreover it clearly suggested that poverty eradica-
tion and environmental conservation will only be solved simultaneously and in a
mutual way. The idea of sustainable development designs an attempt to connect
environment with development and thus called for a combined strategy that united
these two. The report was radical in stating that ecological sustainability cannot be
achieved if the problem of poverty is not successfully addressed globally.
It was quite enviable and without doubt one of the objectives, that such a
“revolutionary” approach should create an intensive debate. Many argued that
the Brundtland Report is a regressive document which strongly supports the tra-
ditional belief that growth and affluence are necessary to solve problems related
186 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

to the environment. Another critical objection was that the report addressed the
problems mainly from the viewpoint of the environment, leaving aside the many
socioeconomic causes that influence environmental degradation. The most serious
objection was that it failed to identify the root causes of the problems and that it
favors a continuation of the same developments which were seen by many critics
as fundamental to the problems.
Following publication of the Brundtland Report, numerous attempts were made
to operationalize sustainable development. The most popular and common attempt
is the triangular concept with the three pillars of economy, environment, and soci-
ety, which was agreed upon at the United Nations summit in Johannesburg in 2005
and later named the P3 concept of “people, planet, and prosperity.” And the report
paved the way for a multitude of initiatives to introduce the sustainable develop-
ment concept in national and local policies. The Rio Earth Summit gave this a real
boost and afterwards local Agenda 21 documents and action plans were drawn up
in a great number of municipalities. Furthermore the United Nations Commission
for Sustainable Development started to scrutinize the implementation of the Rio
decisions at its annual meetings.
Despite the many objections, the Brundtland Report created a broad and inten-
sive dialogue on human development and natural conservation. The concept has
been seen as inclusive and operational enough to make meaningful action in pur-
suit of sustainable development possible and broadly supported and therefore the
international community has continued using it.

4.2.1 United Nations Millennium Development Goals

(MDGs)

Eight development goals were internationally agreed upon in September 2000,

when 189 world leaders and representatives of more than 20 international aid
organizations met at the United Nations after a two-year consultation process, to
agree to free more than a billion people from extreme poverty by year 2015. On
the occasion of this meeting, called the Millennium Summit, the United Nations
Millennium Declaration (UN 2000) presented a roadmap how to achieve these
­targets, known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
The goals are:
• Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger
• Achieving universal primary education
• Promoting gender equality and empowering women
• Reducing child mortality rates
• Improving maternal health
• Combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
• Ensuring environmental sustainability
• Developing a global partnership for development
4.2 The United Nations System 187

Each of the goals has been given specific targets and dates and indicators for
achieving them.
The aim of the MDGs is to encourage development by improving social and eco-
nomic conditions in the world’s poorest countries by addressing issues as poverty
eradication, environmental protection, human rights, and protection of vulnerable soci-
eties. The MDGs assert that every individual has the right to dignity, freedom, equal-
ity, and a basic standard of living that includes freedom from hunger and violence,
and encourages tolerance and solidarity. The MDGs were made to operationalize these
ideas by setting targets and indicators for poverty reduction in order to achieve the
rights set forth in the Declaration on a set 15-year timeline from 2000 to 2015.
To accelerate progress, the G8 Finance Ministers agreed at the Summit to allo-
cate the necessary funds to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and to the African Development Bank (AfDB). Furthermore the OECD
countries abstained from remittance of about US$50 billion outstanding debts
owed by the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)—the group of the most
impoverished countries of the world—when used for national social programs for
improving health and education and for alleviating poverty. The MDGSs reiter-
ated the so-called 0.7 % target that the United Nations had already set in 1970
for the OECD countries, to finance development assistance (Official Development
Assistance, ODA, of the gross national income, GNI). Although most of the coun-
tries (except the northern European countries) failed the 0.7 % target, the total
amount of ODA assistance nevertheless summed up to more than US$130 billion.
A sum that nevertheless must be put into a relationship of international financial
market activities: for example, the investment by the private sector in the develop-
ing countries reached more than US$350 billlion at that time and official fund-
ing for restructuring East Germany was more than US$130 billion per year, over a
time span of more than 20 years.
The United Nations stated that since then the Millennium Development Goals
have become the most successful global antipoverty push in history. Significant
and substantial progress has been made in meeting many of the eight targets,
including halving the number of people living in extreme poverty and the propor-
tion of people without sustainable access to improved sources of drinking water.
Remarkable gains have been made in the fight against malaria and tuberculo-
sis. There have been visible improvements in all health areas as well as primary
education.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said, “In more than a decade of experience
in working towards the MDGs, we have learned that focused global development
efforts can make a difference.”
He pointed out that:
• The proportion of people living in extreme poverty has been halved at the global
level.
• Over two billion people gained access to improved sources of drinking water.
• Remarkable gains have been made in the fight against malaria and tuberculosis.
• The hunger target is within reach.
188 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

But also that there is still much to do inasmuch as:

• Environmental sustainability is under severe threat.
• Progress on maternal deaths reduction is falling short.
• Access to antiretroviral therapy and knowledge about HIV prevention must
expand.
• Too many children are still denied primary education.
• There is less aid money overall, with the poorest countries most adversely
affected.
For the purpose of “reduction of hazard exposure and achieving a higher level of
resilience form natural disasters,” the MDG target No. 7 is most relevant. MDG
(7) concerns “ensuring the environmental sustainability” and as can be shown in
this book, the population of developing countries is at highest risk, especially from
climate-related disasters: floods, droughts, and epidemics. Therefore any reduc-
tion of vulnerability, risk prevention, and preparedness and increasing the coping
capacity on natural disasters at every level of a society, will contribute not only
to the MDG 7. As all the MDGs interact and have a high interdependency, risk
management will also help to achieve the MDG goals of improving social and
­economic conditions in the world’s poorest countries.

4.2.2 United Nations (UNISDR)

The UN General Assembly adopted the International Strategy for Disaster

Reduction in December 1999 and established the UNISDR-secretariat to ensure
its implementation. The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction builds upon
the experience of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1990–
1999) (UNIDNDR 2000). Since then UNISDR has been the United Nations central
office for disaster risk reduction and thus serves as the focal point in the UN sys-
tem for the coordination and implementation of international disaster risk reduc-
tion activities. The United Nations emphasizes that the national governments have
the primary responsibility for protecting their citizens from risks and disaster, and
moreover stated that local communities and elements of civil society are identified
as the key initiators of disaster prevention actions. Through an early and compre-
hensive partnership of the decision-making levels with the population at risk the
necessary encouragement and support to realize the vision of disaster resilience
can be achieved. For regional/subregional and international collaboration is essen-
tial, especially with regard to the dissemination of experience and information,
scientific and technical applications, continual advocacy, and the coordination of
strategies to assist in the development of national capabilities. The United Nations
system has been mandated by the international community a special leadership role
in global risk and disaster reduction and to serve as a forum for global dialogue.
The vision of UNISDR was given by Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary
General: “We must, above all, shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of
4.2 The United Nations System 189

prevention. Prevention is not only more humane than cure; it is also much cheaper.
… Above all, let us not forget that disaster prevention is a moral imperative, no
less than reducing the risks of war.”
UNISDR aims at enabling all communities of the world, but especially those
who lack capacities to work out their own measures making them capable to with-
stand natural, technological, and environmental hazards. An effective means is
seen by UNISDR in the integration of risk prevention into sustainable develop-
ment. UNISDR has been mandated with a series of goals:
• Increase public awareness on hazards that pose a risk to modern societies.
• Obtain commitment by public authorities to reduce risks to people, their liveli-
hoods, social and economic infrastructure, and environmental resources.
• Increase public participation at all levels of implementation.
• Reduce the economic and social losses of disasters.
• Form a global community dedicated to making risk and disaster prevention a
public value.
In order to achieve these goals UNISDR is engaged in the following sectors:
• Stimulate research and application, provide knowledge, convey experience,
build capabilities on natural hazards and disasters.
• Allocate necessary resources for reducing or preventing impacts of hazards.
• Extend the operational capacities of the science and technology sector to pro-
vide more information to the public decision-making process.
• Develop an interface between the disaster risk management sector and the risk
reduction practitioners.
• Link risk prevention with economic competitiveness to enhance economic
partnership.
• Carry out and integrate risk assessments in development plans.
• Develop and apply risk reduction strategies and mitigation measures at all soci-
etal levels.
• Establish risk monitoring capabilities, and early warning systems as integrated
processes.
• Develop and institutionalize public information and educational components for
all ages.
• Establish internationally agreed-upon standards/methodologies for the analysis
and expression of the socioeconomic impacts of disasters on societies.
UNISDR articulated its principles in a number of major documents in particular,
the following.

4.2.3 The Yokohama Strategy

The “Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World” (UNIDNDR 1994) provided the
first internationally agreed-upon guideline on how to take action for a worldwide
190 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

reduction of impacts from natural disasters. The Yokohama Strategy identified

major challenges for ensuring systematic action to address disaster risks in the
context of sustainable development and in building resilience through enhanced
national and local capabilities to manage and reduce risk.
The review stresses the importance of disaster risk reduction being underpinned
by a more pro-active approach to informing, motivating, and involving people in
all aspects of disaster risk reduction in their own local communities. It also high-
lights the scarcity of resources allocated specifically from development budgets for
the realization of risk reduction objectives, either at the national or the regional
level or through international cooperation and financial mechanisms, while not-
ing the significant potential to exploit existing resources and established practices
­better for more effective disaster risk reduction.
Specific gaps and challenges are identified in the following five main areas:
• Governance: organizational, legal, and policy frameworks
• Risk identification, assessment, monitoring, and early warning
• Knowledge management and education
• Reducing underlying risk factors
• Preparedness for effective response and recovery

4.2.4 Hyogo Framework of Action

The World Conference on Disaster Reduction was held from January 18th to
22nd, 2005 in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan (UNISDR 2005) and unanimously adopted
the Hyogo Framework for Action, “Building the Resilience of Nations and
Communities to Disasters.” The conference was the logical consequence of the
UNIDNDR 1990–1999 decade and (eventually) was dated just one month after
the disastrous tsunami event of the Indian Ocean. The conference for the first time
formulated an international accord for the need for worldwide actions to promote
a strategic and systematic approach to reducing vulnerabilities and risks to haz-
ards. It underscored the need for, and identified ways of, building the resilience
of nations and communities to disasters. With the Hyogo Framework of Action
the international community pointed to the fact that disaster losses are on the rise
with serious consequences for the survival, dignity, and livelihood of individuals,
particularly the poor. In the past two decades on average more than 200 million
people have been affected every year by disasters. Moreover the Action reiter-
ated that disaster risk is becoming a global concern and its impact and actions in
one region can have an impact on risks in another. An increase in vulnerability
related to changing demographic, technological, and socioeconomic conditions;
unplanned urbanization of high-risk zones; environmental degradation; and cli-
mate change leads to geological hazards threatening the world’s economy and
especially the sustainable development of developing countries. The Action Plan
is seen as a milestone for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.
4.2 The United Nations System 191

It further reiterates that the targets envisaged will only be achieved by a systematic
integration of disaster prevention and emergency management into national and
international policies, plans, and programs. The way to achieve this is seen in a
more effective integration of disaster risk management into sustainable develop-
ment policies, planning, and programming at all levels, with a special emphasis
on disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness and vulnerability reduction.
Moreover institutions, mitigation mechanisms, and capacities at all levels, in par-
ticular at the community level, have to be developed and further strengthened.
Only by a systematic integration of hazard risk mitigation approaches into design
and implementation of emergency preparedness, will response and recovery pro-
gram sustainable resilience be achieved.
The main objectives of the Hyogo Framework of Action for the decade 2005–
2015 are:
• Review the Yokohama Strategy and where found necessary update the guiding
framework on disaster reduction for the twenty-first century.
• Share good practices and lessons learned to further disaster reduction within
the context of attaining sustainable development, and to identify gaps and
challenges.
• Increase awareness of the importance of disaster reduction policies and promote
the implementation of those policies.
• Increase the reliability and availability of appropriate disaster-related informa-
tion to the public and disaster management agencies in all regions, as set out in
relevant provisions of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.
• Identify activities aimed at ensuring the implementation of relevant provisions
of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (World Summit on Sustainable
Development, Rio de Janeiro 1992) on vulnerability, risk assessment, and disas-
ter management.
With the Action Plan the following outcomes are expected.
• To reach a substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social, eco-
nomic, and environmental assets of communities and countries.
The Action Plan acknowledged that the realization of this outcome will require the
full commitment and involvement of all actors concerned, including governments,
regional and international organizations, civil society, the private sector, and the
scientific community.

4.2.5 United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs

(UNOCHA)

In deep concern about the suffering of the victims of disasters, the loss in human
lives, the flow of refugees, the mass displacement of people, and the mate-
rial destruction, and in review of the capacity, experience, and coordination
192 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

arrangements in the United Nations system for humanitarian assistance, the United
Nations adopted the resolution (UN 1991) for the strengthening of the coordina-
tion of emergency humanitarian assistance of the UN system.
There is a clear relationship among emergency, rehabilitation, and develop-
ment. In order to ensure a smooth transition from relief and rehabilitation to a
sustainable development, emergency assistance should be provided to support
recovery and long-term development. The United Nations has been given a cen-
tral and unique role in providing leadership and coordinating the efforts to support
disaster-affected countries. As called for in the International Decade for Natural
Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), efforts should be intensified to develop measures
for prevention and mitigation of natural disasters and similar emergencies through
technical assistance. The United Nations calls for identification of technologies
and management strategies for disaster relief and prevention as a prerequisite for
an increase in disaster resilience as well as worldwide information dissemination.
Moreover, a comprehensive exchange should be initiated of existing and new tech-
nical information related to the assessment, prediction, and mitigation of disasters.
The guiding principles are:
• Humanitarian assistance is of cardinal importance for the victims of natural dis-
asters and other emergencies.
• Each state has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of
natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory.
• Humanitarian assistance should be provided in principle on the basis of an
appeal by the affected country, and will be given as supplementary aid.
• Humanitarian assistance will be provided in accordance with the principles of
humanity, neutrality, and impartiality as laid down in the Charter of the United
Nations.
The United Nations sees economic growth and sustainable development as essen-
tial elements for a sustainable resilience from natural and other disasters. The
international community therefore offers assistance to (especially) developing
countries in strengthening their capacity in disaster prevention and mitigation,
both at the national and regional levels. The United Nations reiterates disaster
relief, prevention, and preparedness as the main elements of disaster and emer-
gency management:
• To assist developing countries to strengthen their capacity to respond to disas-
ters at the national and local levels by improving the capacities to mitigate the
effects of natural disasters and to cope efficiently with all emergencies
• To increase awareness of the need for establishing disaster mitigation strategies
• To provide assistance relevant to all sectors of prevention and preparedness
• To increase the capacity of disaster-prone countries to receive and make use of
this information as well as their operational capacities for rapid and coordinated
response to emergencies
• To develop emergency management procedures within the disaster-prone coun-
tries to expedite the rapid procurement and deployment of equipment and relief
supplies
4.2 The United Nations System 193

By the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNOCHA) and
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) all bodies within the United
Nations system (e.g., the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the International Organization for
Migration) are asked to assist UNOCHA in building up a capable unit to analyze
the regional natural hazards exposure, disasters, and other emergencies of devel-
oping countries. The findings should be disseminated freely to the countries at
risk. The international community is urged to provide the necessary support and
resources to programs and activities undertaken to further the goals and objectives
of the Decade and to assist these countries upon request with the establishment
and enhancement of national early-warning systems. Organizations and entities of
the United Nations system should continue to respond to requests for emergency
assistance within their respective mandates.
The secretary-general should establish under his authority a central emergency
revolving fund as a cash-flow mechanism to ensure the rapid and coordinated
response of the organizations of the system. This fund should be put into opera-
tion with an amount of US$50 million. The fund should be financed by volun-
tary contributions of the member states. The United Nations should further build
up a register of available experts and technical capacities within the different UN
organizations.
The UN resolution made the United Nations the only legal authority man-
dated to pursue contracts with interested governments and intergovernmental
and nongovernmental organizations to enable them to have better access to the
international emergency and relief capacities. The Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs was given the mandate including the coordination of humani-
tarian response, policy development, and humanitarian advocacy. OCHA thus car-
ries out a coordination function primarily through the United Nations Emergency
Relief Coordinator (ERC). The ERC’s function is seen as most critical in order to
ensure comprehensive preparation for, as well as rapid and coherent response to,
natural disasters and other emergencies. This ERC was given these responsibilities:
• Processing requests from affected member states for emergency assistance
• Organizing, in consultation with the government of the affected country, a joint
interagency needs-assessment mission and preparing a consolidated appeal to
be issued by the secretary-general
• Facilitating the access to emergency areas for the provision of emergency
assistance
• Managing the central emergency revolving fund and assisting in the mobiliza-
tion of financial resources
• Serving as a focal point with governments and intergovernmental and nongov-
ernmental organizations to emergency relief operations
• Providing consolidated information, including early warning on emergencies to
all interested governments and concerned authorities
• Preparing an annual report on the coordination of humanitarian emergency
assistance, including information on the central emergency revolving fund, to be
submitted to the General Assembly
194 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

At the country level resident coordinators should organize and facilitate the
humanitarian assistance of the UN system. The local resident is the central UN
authority to advise local authorities in a speedy implementation of the relief opera-
tions and should facilitate the transition from relief to development. The resident
coordinator should chair the emergency operations under UN auspices and main-
tain close contact with the national authorities.

4.2.6 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Official data of the United Nations Preparatory Commission for the

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBT 2103) stated that
more than 2000 nuclear tests have been carried out worldwide since 1945. In the
aftermath of World War II, the increased radioactive fallout from atmospheric
nuclear tests made the world aware that there is a need for a binding contract that
bans all nuclear explosions. One of the first to call for such a treaty was Indian
Prime Minister Nehru. His initiative was quickly joined by many other interna-
tional politicians and scientists and finally after lengthy discussions, the UN
General Assembly in 1966 adopted a treaty called “Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty” (CTBT). In the treaty the nations agree “not to carry out any nuclear
weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and prohibit and prevent
any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control” either
for military or civilian purposes. The ultimate goal is to strengthen the interna-
tional “nuclear disarmament efforts and the nuclear non-proliferation regime by
a total elimination of nuclear weapons and by constraining their development and
qualitative improvement.” The seat of the organization was decided to be Vienna
(Austria). The treaty was ratified as of March 2014 by 162 states, including five
of the eight “nuclear-capable states”; another 23 of the so-called Annex 2 states
have signed but not ratified (China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States),
and India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed it. The CTBT will enter into
force 180 days after the treaty has been ratified by all 44 Annex 2 states. Annex 2
states are those who possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at the
time of the CTBT’s negotiations between 1994 and 1996.
As the treaty is not yet in force the United Nations made a strong appeal
(CTBT, ibid) and called on all states to “refrain from nuclear weapon or any other
test explosions, the development and use of new nuclear weapon technologies and
any action that would undermine the objective of the CTBT.” However, CTBTO
was able to prove the effectiveness of the verification regime on the occasion of
the nuclear test explosion, announced by the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea on February 12th, 2013. Its international monitoring system (IMS) could
successfully detect seismic signals and infrasound signals, providing relevant and
useful physical data on the test. Further measurements of radioactive noble gases
later in April 2013 also confirmed the sensitivity and specificity of the monitoring
network. The verification system comprises a worldwide network of monitoring
4.2 The United Nations System 195

stations, an International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, and onsite inspections.

Seismology and other technologies including hydroacustic, infrasound, and the
monitoring of radionuclides in the air, are used to monitor for compliance with
the treaty. Once the treaty enters into force, onsite inspection (ISO) will provide
information where concerns about compliance arise. The monitoring network con-
sists of 337 facilities located all over the globe. As of May 2012, more than 260
facilities have been certified. The IMS, when completed, will consist of 170 pri-
mary and auxiliary seismological monitoring stations and 60 infrasound stations
to detect very-low-frequency sound waves. Eighty radionuclide stations can detect
radioactive particles released from atmospheric, underground, or underwater
explosions that are analyzed in 16 laboratories. When conducting onsite inspec-
tions quite a number of highly sophisticated detection techniques can be used
including visual site observations, passive seismic measurements, and gamma
radiation measurements, and the detection of radioactive noble gases such as
xenon and argon. The ISO inspection will be carrried out for an initial period of up
to 25 days that can be extended up to 60 days to carry out, for instance, resonance
seismic measurements, ground-penetrating radar, gravity, and electric and mag-
netic field mappings. Argon-37 field measurement is a unique technology specially
developed for the purpose of ISO. Moreover scientific drilling to obtain radioac-
tive samples from a suspected underground explosion site is also allowed. The
data are sent to states that have signed the treaty and are simulataneously transmit-
ted to the IDC in Vienna through a global private data network largely based on
satellite communication. The technical and scientific capabilities that have been
established will furthermore bring benefits to disaster alert and early warning sys-
tems for natural disasters such as tsunamis.

4.2.7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC)

In 1992 the world community met in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) at the Rio Earth
Summit (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development;
UNCED 1992) to agree on methods and instruments to be undertaken by the
international community to reduce greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. The
UNCED conference was the biggest international conference ever held by the
United Nations on the environment. High-level representatives from all nations,
2400 from nongovernmental organizations, and more than 17,000 environment
experts and politicians participated in the conference. The most important out-
comes were the adoption of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development (outlining the framework for a sustainable development), the
“Forest Principles” and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Following
Rio the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was founded to moni-
tor the implementation processes agreed upon. After intensive debates the confer-
ence agreed upon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
196 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

(UNFCCC 1992). Since 1992, 195 nations have ratified the convention. Its central
aim is laid down in Article No. 2 “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system.”
By the UNFCCC the nations committed themselves voluntarily and signifi-
cantly to reduce their respective greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). The conference
further agreed upon a yearly monitoring of the achievements made in accordance
with the convention. The next two conferences (1995; 1996) revealed that the vol-
unteer commitments were not really sufficient to reduce the amount of GHG emis-
sions into the atmosphere as envisaged. Therefore the fourth conference negotiated
an agreement (Kyoto Protocol; UNFCCC 1992) that for the first time in human
history agreed upon defined and legally binding emission targets (on average 5 %
reduction of GHG based on the emission levels in 1990) that are to be reached by
the OECD countries. The European Union, however, offered a self-commitment
that goes beyond the 5 % reduction target on an average of 8 % until 2012.
The Kyoto Protocol comprises the following GHG:
• Carbon dioxide (CO2)
• Methane (CH4)
• Nitrogen (N2O)
• Fluorocarbons (perfluorinated carbons PFC; hydroflourocarbons H-FCKW)
• Sulphurhexafluorid (SF6)
The protocol identified two main sectors to reduce GHG: one is the commitment
of each member state to reduce emissions by setting up a national GHG emissions
reduction strategy and second by fostering renewable energy generation via an
emission-reduced agriculture.

4.2.8 The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction

and Recovery (World Bank—GFDRR)

The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR 2012) is a
partnership of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) to support
the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). Established in
2006, the GFDRR is a partnership of 41 countries and eight international organ-
izations committed to helping developing countries reduce their vulnerability to
natural hazards and adapt to climate change. The partnership’s mission is to main-
stream disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in country develop-
ment strategies by supporting a country-led and managed implementation of the
HFA. Under the guidance of a high-level consultative group of the donor coun-
tries/organizations, the United Nations and the World Bank, and the government
of Sweden, the GFDRR secretariat manages the global operations of this partner-
ship. Its secretariat, located at the World Bank headquarters in Washington DC,
acts as the support hub for a decentralized network of disaster risk management
4.2 The United Nations System 197

experts in the countries. These specialists play a leading role in locally managing
the GFDRR program.
GFDRR is a grant-making facility but not a “direct implementer.” The grants
have increased from US$6 million in 2007 to US$75 million in 2012. Moreover
GFDRR also manages special initiatives that focus on particular regions or topics,
including a five-year €54 million initiative of the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific
group of states financed by the European Union. GFDRR is responsible for allo-
cating funds entrusted to it in line with priorities set by its donors and partners.
In any given country, GFDRR adopts a number of criteria to help in allocating
resources, including established vulnerability indicators and past evaluation of
impact and donor priorities. Geographic priorities currently include 20 countries
financed through a multidonor trust fund, and 11 countries targeted by individual
donors. All across the disaster management programs, GFDRR is committed to
ensure all projects are gender-neutral regarding hazards and risk analysis, pre-
vention and mitigation actions, monitoring, and evaluation of achieved results.
GFDRR is further committed to ensure, wherever possible, that projects include
consideration of the particular vulnerabilities of the elderly, children, and the
disabled.
The work of the GFDRR is divided into three main business lines:
• Financial support to the secretariat of the ISDR secretariat. This track is
designed to enhance global and regional advocacy, partnerships, and knowledge
management for mainstreaming disaster reduction.
• Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in coun-
try development processes to ensure that risk assessments, risk mitigation, risk
transfer, and emergency preparedness are incorporated in all strategic plans
and programs. This track is designed to provide technical assistance to enhance
investments in risk reduction and risk transfer mechanisms, as well as disaster
management planning to low- and middle-income country governments.
• Is aimed at early, post-disaster recovery in low-income countries through its
standby recovery financing facility (SRFF). Thus this track is less program-
matic than Tracks I and II because it is deployed for post-disaster situations.
Nevertheless it is oriented to build national capacity and facilitate knowledge
management in the long-term.
Through five pillars GFDRR provides grants to disaster risk reduction measures:
• Risk Identification Grants: Supporting partner governments and local experts in
the development of detailed national, subnational, or sector-specific risk assess-
ments, including hazard exposure and vulnerability. Risk identification is the
foundation to sensitize countries at risk and guide risk reduction, preparedness,
and risk-financing work.
• Risk Reduction Grants: Supporting countries at risk by identifying strategies
to avoid the creation of new risks (spatial planning; building standards) and by
assisting them to address existing risks through the proper development plan-
ning and implementation of risk reduction plans and investment programs.
198 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

• Preparedness Grants: Improving national and institutional capacity to antici-

pate, prepare for, and respond to disasters. GFDRR works together with the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), for example, to institutionalize
alert systems that provide early warning especially to hydrological, meteorolog-
ical, and flood risk. This comprises the preparation of plans and technical, finan-
cial, and manpower resources for rapid response by local or national emergency
management agencies.
• Financial Protection Grants: Financing governments, businesses, and indi-
viduals to cope with the financial and economic consequences of disasters. By
this not only the government’s budgets are subsidized but an opportunity to
strengthen the private sector is also provided.
• Resilient Recovery Grants: Assisting countries in implementing reliable
and internationally accepted damage, loss, and needs assessment methods.
Moreover, GFDRR supports such countries by providing solutions for better
post-disaster recovery planning and financing recovery programs.

4.2.9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 1988) is a scientific

body under the auspices of the United Nations. It was established in 1988 by the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological
Organization to provide a scientific view of the current state of knowledge in cli-
mate change and its potential environmental and socioeconomic impacts. The
IPCC is an intergovernmental body that is open to all member countries of the
United Nations and is hosted on the WMO premises in Geneva. Currently 195
countries are members of the IPCC. Because of its scientific and intergovernmen-
tal nature, the IPCC embodies a unique opportunity to provide rigorous and bal-
anced scientific information to decision makers. By endorsing the IPCC reports,
governments acknowledge the authority of their scientific content. The work of the
organization although policy-relevant, is exclusively policy-neutral. Governments
participate in the review process and in delineating the work programs. Hundreds
of scientists from all over the world contributed to the work of the IPCC on a vol-
untary basis. Review is seen as an essential part of the IPCC process, to ensure
an objective and complete assessment of current information. The IPCC aims to
reflect a range of views and expertise, and its work is guided by a set of principles
and procedures.
The IPCC member states meet once a year at plenary level that is in general
attended by government officials from member countries, national and interna-
tional scientific agencies, well-reputed research institutions, and from observer
organizations to approve, adopt, and accept the reports. Each IPCC member
country has a focal point. The focal points prepare and update the list of national
experts to help implement the IPCC work program. The focal points also arrange
for the provision of comments on the accuracy and completeness of the scientific
4.2 The United Nations System 199

and/or technical content and the overall scientific and/or technical balance of
drafts of reports.
In addition to the working groups and task force, further task groups and steer-
ing groups can be established for a limited duration to consider a specific topic or
question. One example is the Task Group on Data and Scenario Support for Impact
and Climate Analysis (TGICA).
Hundreds of experts are involved in the preparation of IPCC reports, coordi-
nated by lead authors who were selected by the relevant Working Group/Task
Force Bureau from among experts listed by governments and participating organi-
zations, and other experts known through their publications and works. To ensure
a high level of quality, transparency, and neutrality, IPCC reports undergo a multi-
stage review process. A team of review editors is introduced, two to four per chap-
ter. Their role is to comment on the accuracy and completeness of the scientific,
technical, or socioeconomic content and the overall scientific, technical, or socio-
economic balance of draft reports. None of them is paid by the IPCC.
IPCC regularly publishes reports in different categories:
• Assessment reports
• Special reports
• Technical papers
• Methodology papers
Most important and a matter of a broad and intense international discussion on cli-
mate change became the assessment reports.

4.2.9.1 1990 First Assessment Report (FAR)

The report was the first that addressed global climate change issues by an inter-
national body (IPCC 1990). It revealed that greenhouse gas emissions resulting
from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations
of water vapor, CO2, methane, CFCs, and nitrous oxides. Furthermore it stated
that the global mean surface air temperature has increased by 0.3–0.6 °C over the
last 100 years. These increases will most probably result in an additional warm-
ing of the Earth’s surface. The main greenhouse gas, water vapor, will increase in
response to global warming and further enhance it. An increase of the global mean
temperature during the next century of about 0.3 °C per decade will be greater
than over the past 10,000 years and will most probably lead to an average rate of
global mean sea-level rise of about 6 cm per decade over the next century.

4.2.9.2 1995 Second Assessment Report (SAR)

The second report (IPCC 1996) confirmed the findings of the first report, this time
based on a broader database and more sophisticated scientific assessments. It revealed
that carbon dioxide remains the most important contributor to human-induced change
200 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

of climate. It gave a projection on the future global mean temperature that will lead
to a rise in global sea level and confirmed that human activities have the potential to
alter the Earth’s climate to an extent unprecedented in human history. The findings
pointed to long time scales that control both the accumulation of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere and the delayed response of the climate system to those accumula-
tions that will effectively make the climate change irreversible.

4.2.9.3 2001 Third Assessment Report (TAR)

The third assessment report (IPCC 2001) has become one of the central inter-
national references on the subject of global warming. An increasing number
of observations from all over the world pointed to a warming worldwide and to
greenhouse gas emissions related changes in the climate system. It confirmed the
global average surface temperature has increased over the twentieth century by
about 0.6 °C per year. And if the emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols con-
tinue it will definitively alter the atmosphere and affect the global climate. Overall
scientific confidence in the ability of the projections has increased significantly.
Although the models cannot yet simulate all aspects of climate and there are par-
ticular uncertainties associated with clouds and their interaction with radiation and
aerosols, there is nevertheless a high confidence that the models will provide use-
ful projections of future climate. There is strong evidence that most of the warm-
ing observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities. The TAR
estimated an average surface temperature increase by 1.4–5.8 °C over the period
1990–2100, and that the sea level will rise by 0.1–0.9 m over the same period.

4.2.9.4 2003 Fourth Assessment Report (4AR)

The fourth report (IPCC 2007) was released in three principal sections:
• The Physical Science Basis of Climate Change (Working Group I)
• Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (Working Group II)
• Mitigation of Climate Change (Working Group III)
It assessed current scientific knowledge of natural and human causes as well as the
observed changes in climate over the last decades. It looked at the ability of sci-
ence to attribute changes to different causes and made projections of future climate
change. Simulations were based on various computer climate models. As a result
predictions for the twenty-first century were derived: surface air warming was esti-
mated in a “low scenario” to reach 1.8 °C, whereas the estimate for a “high sce-
nario” was 4.0 °C. Based on multiple models (that exclude ice sheet flow) it was
estimated that the sea level would rise in a “low scenario” by 18–38 cm and in a
“high scenario” by 26–59 cm. The sea ice shields are projected to shrink in both
the Arctic and Antarctica. The report furthermore projected that dry regions are to
get drier and wet regions to get wetter. Drought-affected areas will become larger
and heavy precipitation events are very likely to become more common and will
4.2 The United Nations System 201

increase flood risk. The water stored in glaciers and snow cover will be reduced over
the course of the century. The change in climate will likely exceed the resilience of
many ecosystems by a combination of climate change and other stressors. The thus-
far effective carbon removal by terrestrial ecosystems is likely to weaken or reverse.
This would amplify climate change and lead to more coastal erosion, to an increase
in coral bleaching, and a widespread mortality of species unless there is thermal
adaptation or acclimatization by corals. The report finally stated that many millions
more people will be threatened by floods every year due to sea-level rise up to 2080.
One of the key conclusions of the report was that it is possible to stabilize the
greenhouse gas concentrations between 445 ppm and 535 ppm at costs of less than
3 % of global gross domestic product.

4.2.9.5 2014 Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)

The Fifth Assessment Report was like the previous reports based on the findings
of the three Working Groups of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). It provides an integrated view of the observed changes in climate and their
effects. It stated clearly that the warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as
is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean tem-
peratures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.
Again a Synthesis Report (SYR) gives a condensed vision of the findings for the
international policy makers.

The findings of WG I are as follows:

The warming of the atmosphere and ocean system can no be longer questioned.
There is clear evidence that human influence has been the dominant cause of
observed warming since 1950, an assumption that has reached a level of confi-
dence much higher than that in 4AR. It is likely that 1983–2013 was the warmest
30-year period for the past 1400 years. It is virtually certain that the upper ocean
warmed from 1971 to 2010. Moreover it can be said with high confidence that the
inland ice sheets have been losing large masses in the last two decades and that
the northern hemisphere spring snow cover has continued to decrease in extent.
There is high confidence that the sea-level rise since the middle of the nineteenth
century has been larger than the mean sea-level rise of the previous two millennia.
Concentration of greenhouse gases has increased to levels unprecedented on earth
in 800,000 years. The total radiative forcing in the earth system is today positive
and the most significant driver is the increase in CO2 atmospheric concentration.

4.2.10 ISO (International Organization for Standardization)

Without standards and norms technical and operational activities cannot be carried
out successfully. Standards proved indispensable to define the quality of technical
202 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

products (ISO 2014). They define production processes and make production and
human acting comparable. The more technology and industrialization developed
in the last century, the more standardization and norms were required. Standards
facilitate trade, spread knowledge, and share technological advances and good
management practices. Today almost no activity in households and production is
carried out without being underlined by norms and standards. Thus every coun-
try on Earth has its national norms, for instance, in Germany the longstanding
DIN-Norm, in the United Kingdom the British Standards Institution (BSI), or
the United States of America the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). The globalization of markets made it necessary to harmonize the many
standards to allow for worldwide marketing. Thus under the auspices of the United
Nations an international harmonization of standards was initiated that resulted in
the founding of the ISO.
The ISO is a network comprising the national standards institutes of 163 coun-
tries and is thus the world’s largest developer of voluntary international standards.
ISO standards ensure quality, ecology, safety, reliability, compatibility, interoper-
ability, efficiency, and effectiveness. The ISO has over 19,500 standards touching
almost all aspects of daily life, including the sectors environment and risk manage-
ment. The most popular standards covered by the ISO standard families are the
ISO 9000 family on quality management, the ISO 14,000 family on environmental
management, and the ISO 31,000 family on risk management (ISO 2009).
The ISO 9000 family of standards is related to the fundamentals of quality
management systems designed to help organizations ensure that they meet the
needs of customers and other stakeholders. Over a million organizations world-
wide today make ISO 9001 one of the most widely used management tools in the
world today. ISO 9004 is the quality management approach designed for the inter-
nal managerial processes of an organization.
The ISO 14,000 family addresses various aspects of environmental manage-
ment. It provides practical tools for companies and organizations looking to
identify and control their environmental impact and constantly improve their envi-
ronmental performance. ISO 14,001 and its sister 14,004 focus on environmental
management and map out a framework that organizations can follow to set up an
effective management system. It can be used by any organization regardless of its
activity or sector.
A third standard tool that can be applied in disaster risk management is the ISO
31,000 family, in which the risk management standards are described. Risk man-
agement is a rapidly developing discipline and there are many and varied views
and descriptions of what risk management involves, how it should be conducted,
and what it is for. ISO 31,000 provides standards and descriptions on what risk
management is. By applying the standard an organization can increase the prob-
ability of success, and reduce the probability of failure. Some risks can have both
external and internal drivers and therefore can interact in different areas of activity.
Such multisectorial risk can be categorized further into types of risk such as strate-
gic, financial, operational, hazard, and so on.
4.2 The United Nations System 203

Risk management should be a continuous and developing process that runs through-
out the organization’s strategy and the implementation of that strategy. It should
methodically address all the risks surrounding the organization’s activities in the past
and in particular in future (IRM 2002). Identification of risk is based on three pillars.

4.2.10.1 Risk Identification

This requires an intimate knowledge of the organization, the market in which it

operates; the legal, social, political, and cultural environment in which it exists; as
well as the development of a sound understanding of its strategic and operational
objectives, including factors critical to its success and the threats and opportunities
related to the achievement of these objectives, best displayed by using a table:.
• Name of risk
• Scope of risk
• Type/nature of risk
• Quantification of risk
• Stakeholders
• Risk tolerance
• Risk treatment and control mechanisms
• Potential action for improvement
• Strategy and policy developments

4.2.10.2 Risk Estimation

Next to follow is the estimation of the probability of occurrence and the possi-
ble consequence. The assessment can be done either qualitatively or quantitatively
(semi-quantitatively) and should be prioritized in terms of threats (downside risks)
and opportunities (upside risks) which may be high, medium, or low, and with
an estimation of the probability to occur (high, medium, or low). The assessment
requires, however, an agreed-upon definition of “threats” and “opportunities.” The
use of a well-designed structure is necessary to ensure a transparent and objective
assessment process.

4.2.10.3 Risk Evaluation

When the risk analysis process has been completed, a further step is to analyze the
estimated risks against risk criteria the organization has established. The risk cri-
teria may include associated costs and benefits, legal requirements, socioeconomic
and environmental factors, concerns of stakeholders, and so on. Risk evaluation,
therefore, is used to make decisions about the significance of risks to the organiza-
tion and whether each specific risk should be accepted or treated.
204 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

4.3 The European Union

The European Union is the world’s largest donor of humanitarian aid. Through
Directory General ECHO (EU 1992), the European Union provides significant
assistance in humanitarian crises. The EU disaster management policy is guided
by the principle of solidarity, respect for human dignity, equality, and tolerance.
It is based on international law, and on the fundamental principles of impartiality,
nondiscrimination, and neutrality. The European Union is well placed to assume
a leading role in the pursuit of a disaster reduction strategy within the context of
global sustainable development. So far the EU commitment on disaster risk man-
agement has been systematically enshrined in only three EU legal documents, nev-
ertheless the legal situation of the European Union allows an almost worldwide
coverage of disaster preparedness measures through commission instruments
other than ECHO. The commission has acknowledged the challenges imposed by
disaster events not only affecting its member countries but especially the devel-
oping countries. Every day natural disasters worldwide exhaust the coping capaci-
ties of the population bringing these societies deeper into the poverty trap. The
European Union therefore sees in a systematic incorporation of disaster prepared-
ness and prevention activities in its members’ development policies a prerequisite
for increasing natural disaster resilience. The European Union also underpins the
avoidance of natural disasters becoming a political imperative in disaster mitiga-
tion and requires appropriate disaster preparedness to a more rapid recovery from
the effects of disasters. ECHO points out that the following sectors are the corner-
stone of its disaster preparedness policy:
• Preparedness: Organizational activities that ensure that the systems, procedures,
and resources required to confront a natural disaster are available in order to
provide timely assistance to those affected, using existing mechanisms wher-
ever possible (e.g., training, awareness raising, establishment of disaster plans,
evacuation plans, pre-positioning of stocks, early warning mechanisms, and
strengthening indigenous knowledge).
• Mitigation: Measures taken before disasters that intend to reduce or eliminate
their impact on society and the environment. These measures reduce the physi-
cal vulnerability of existing infrastructure or of vulnerable sites that directly
endanger the population (e.g., retrofitting of buildings, reinforcing “lifeline”
infrastructure).
• Prevention: Activities conceived to ensure permanent protection against a dis-
aster. These include engineering, physical protection measures, and legislative
measures for the control of land use and codes of construction. These activi-
ties reduce the physical vulnerability and/or exposure to risks through infra-
structure through improving existing infrastructure and sustainable development
practices.
ECHO’s disaster preparedness policy is mainly carried out by the Disaster
Preparedness Program (EU-DIPECHO 1992). This program finances disaster
4.3 The European Union 205

preparedness and reduction measures in areas of risks from natural catastrophes.

In order to optimize the administrative and financing measures, action plans have
been established for many of the countries at risk with the focus on areas at high
risk of natural disasters and low coping capacities. DIPECHO’s main objective is
to address disaster prevention and preparedness targeting the most vulnerable pop-
ulations in the world in the main disaster-prone areas with low coping capacities.
DIPECHO’s main focus is on preparation, rather than mitigation or prevention.
The scope of activities includes:
• Community training/capacity building, (including, e.g., material and services
for capacity building, training of disaster brigades, simulation exercises)
• Provision of equipment (including, e.g., equipment for refugees, primary emer-
gency kits, scientific advocacy)
• Small-scale mitigation works for demonstration purposes and awareness rais-
ing (including, e.g., reforestation, machines and material, building of emergency
shelters, water tanks)
• Early warning systems (including, e.g., radio communications)
• Emergency response planning, hazard mapping
• Public awareness raising, education
• Research and dissemination
• Facilitation of coordination
• Institutional strengthening

4.3.1 Eurocode

The European Commission initiated in 1975 a harmonization and standardiza-

tion of technical specifications for all kinds of construction within its jurisdic-
tion. Since then the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) published
nine building codes, including the EUROCODE 7 and 8 (EU-EN 1998) that are
concerned with the geotechnical design and stability of structures for earthquake
resistance (European Standard EN 1998-2, CEN/TC259). All national stand-
ards organizations (in Germany: DIN-EN 1998-2; in UK: BS-En 1998-2, etc.)
were called to give this European Standard the status of a national standard. The
Eurocode Standards provide common rules for the design of entire buildings and
other technical structures and component products in order to make them seismic
resistant and technically safe. The codes serve as reference documents for the fol-
lowing purposes:
• As a framework for drawing up harmonized technical specifications for con-
struction products
• As a basis for specifying contracts for construction works and related engineer-
ing services
• As a means to prove compliance of building and civil engineering works with
the essential requirements
206 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

Eurocode 7 (“Geotechnical Design”) applies to geotechnical aspects of the design

of buildings and civil engineering works. In its first part the code covers the gen-
eral basis for the geotechnical aspects of the design of buildings and civil engi-
neering works, assessment of geotechnical data, use of ground improvement,
ground reinforcement, dewatering, fill, and geotechnical design of spread foun-
dations, piles, retaining structures, embankments, and slopes, as well as calcula-
tion rules for actions originating from the ground (e.g., earth and ground water
pressure). And in its second it covers requirements for the execution, interpreta-
tion, and use of results of laboratory tests to assist in the geotechnical design of
structures.
Eurocode 8 (“Earthquake”) explains how building and civil engineering
structures are to be constructed in seismic-prone regions. It outlines the general
requirements and rules for the assessment of seismic risk and seismic risks in
combinations with others. It furthermore specifies the different construction ele-
ments to increase resistance of buildings, bridges, tanks, pipelines, and tall struc-
tures such as towers, masts, or chimneys.

4.3.2 European Water Framework Directive (EWFD)

Water does not stick to national boundaries. This is why EU member states have
agreed to establish a framework for the European Union in the field of water pol-
icy, the European Water Framework Directive (EU-EWFD 2000). The directive
commits the member states to achieve qualitative and quantitative good status of
all water bodies within its jurisdiction including marine waters up to one nauti-
cal mile from shore by year 2015. Following the successful implementation of the
EU Drinking Water Directive and the Urban Waste Water Directive, the European
Water Policy addresses the increasing awareness of citizens and other involved
parties of their water. The EWFD is a framework in the sense that it prescribes
steps to reach common goals rather than adopting the more traditional limit value
approach. The directive stipulates that groundwater must have a “good quantitative
status” and a “good chemical status” and should be classified as either “good” or
“poor”. An assessment of the ecological and chemical status of all surface waters
has to follow criteria on:
• Biological quality (fish, benthic invertebrates, aquatic flora)
• Hydromorphological quality (riverbank structure, river continuity, or substrate
of the river bed)
• Physicochemical quality (temperature, oxygenation, and nutrient conditions)
• Chemical quality (environmental quality standards, specific pollutants)
4.3 The European Union 207

With the EWFD the European Union presented a binding directive to be imple-
mented by the national governments with the following key aims:
• Expanding the scope of water protection to all waters, surface waters, and
groundwater
• Achieving “good status” for all waters by year 2005
• Water management based on river basins
• “Combined approach” of emission limit values and quality standards
• Getting the prices right
• Getting the citizens involved more closely
• Streamlining legislation
One important aspect of the Water Framework Directive is the introduction of river
basin districts leading to a management of entire water bodies based on their natu-
ral, geographical, and hydrological units rather than on administrative or political
boundaries (the “catchment area”). As many rivers cross national borders, repre-
sentatives from the respective member states have to cooperate and work together
for the management of the basin, the so-called “transboundary basins.” The very
successful initiatives such as the International Commission of the Protection of the
River Rhine (ICPR 2010) or the Elbe River (ICRE) have served as positive exam-
ples of this approach, in the case of the Rhine even beyond the EU territory. For
each river basin district a river basin management plan has to be established and
updated every six years.
A second milestone of the directive is the call for EU-wide coordinated actions
to achieve a good status for all water bodies. Key objectives are related to water
quality: “good ecological status” and “good chemical status.” These objectives are
seen as indispensable for integration into every protection initiative at the national
level. A set of procedures for identifying these requirements for a given body of
water, and establishing particular chemical or hydromorphological standards
to achieve it, is provided, together with a system for ensuring that each member
state interprets the procedure in a same way. The target “good chemical status” is
defined in terms of compliance with all the quality standards established for chem-
ical substances at the European level. The directive also provides a mechanism for
renewing these standards and establishing new ones by means of a prioritization
mechanism for hazardous chemicals
Moreover the EWFD reiterated that scientific-oriented investigations will not
be successful if there is no full integration of the directive into the national leg-
islations and if its implementation is not accompanied by comprehensive public
participation. The directive formalizes the rationale for a coordinated application
of the respective pollution prevention and reduction measures of science and
managers with public participation. But over and above this, implementation
also requires a framework for monitoring and controls. The framework therefore
comprises a list of priority substances for action at the EU level, prioritized on
the basis of risk, and designed the most cost-effective set of measures to achieve
load reduction of those substances. The rationale for extensive public participation
is at first that the implementation of prevention such as load-reducing measures
208 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

will have to balance the interests of various groups. The second reason concerns
enforceability and public acceptance. The greater the transparency in defining
the objectives, during implementation and reporting of standards, the more citi-
zens are invited to participate in environmental protection, the greater the societal
acceptance will be.

4.3.3 Natura 2000

With the aim of protecting Europe’s most important wildlife areas, the European
Commission has set up the NATURA 2000 network of protected areas. It is the
most important initiative ever undertaken in the European Union to conserve
areas of high importance for threatened species and habitats (NATURA 2000
2000). By protecting these “precious components of biodiversity,” NATURA 2000
aims to meet the European Council’s goal of halting biodiversity decline within
the European Union by 2010 (EU 2003). It represents a major contribution to
global nature conservation and a model for international cooperation on sustain-
able development. NATURA 2000 is the official term for the EU-wide established
coherent network that was erected according to the EU-Directive 92/43/EWG
and thus consequently follows the 1992 Habitats Directive. Often the directive
is abbreviated as Birds Protection Directive. With the establishment of this net-
work the European Union fulfils their obligations under the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity.
With the NATURA 2000 network the EU aims at providing an EU-wide trans-
boundary protection of wildlife fauna and flora. It is not a system of strict nature
reserves where all human activities are excluded, but rather a network of areas
where private use is not restricted although emphasis is given to ensuring that
future management is sustainable, both ecologically and economically. Restriction
means that new building construction, business, agricultural, or recreational activ-
ity within sites is not in general prohibited. But any special development has to
follow procedures laid down in the Habitats Directive that asks for an assessment
of adverse impacts on the designated sites. The network defines two different
areas: Special Areas of Conservation (SAC) and also bird protection areas, called
Special Protection Areas (SPAs) both organized by the respective member state
under the Habitats Directive. There is no specification given on how much land
and water need to be included in NATURA 2000. The directive only states that
this depends on the biological richness of the different regions and that the desig-
nated areas should be in proportion to the wealth in biodiversity. Up to today the
NATURA 2000 network has proposed an area for conservation under the network
larger than the size of Germany, equivalent to more than 15 % of the European
Union’s territory. Thus more than 26,000 areas of highest ecological value
between Scandinavia and the Mediterranean are under formal protection against
further biological and environmental degradation. The fauna–flora and the bird
conservation sites cover nine different geographical regions.
4.3 The European Union 209

According to NATURA 2000 all EU member states are obliged to ensure full
compliance with the legal requirements, regardless of whether they are receiving
financial assistance from EU structural funds. In order to achieve comprehensive
compliance, the EU Commission informed the member states that noncompliance
in presenting lists of NATURA 2000 sites could result in the suspension of pay-
ments under certain structural fund programs. With this the commission wanted
to prevent its members from irreparable damage to sites before they have been
proposed officially for protection under the NATURA 2000 regime. However, it
became clear from the very beginning that such an ambitious target would not be
achieved on short notice. Therefore the directive allows beginning with activities
to increase the ecological situation of areas that are regarded ecologically under
stress until 2020. The amelioration process shall be initiated to at least increase the
level by one step.
The European Commission has elaborated a number of guidance documents
with regard to the management of defined NATURA 2000 sites. A large variety
of organizational approaches, experience, and practical examples have been pub-
lished. The guidance is one of the most important parts in the Habitats Directive as
it defines how the sites are to be managed. To assist in the understanding and cor-
rect application of the directive, the commission has produced a number of general
interpretative and methodological documents on specific provisions of the direc-
tive. The guidance stipulates that the member states have:
• To transfer the directive into national law within two years
• To take appropriate conservation measures to maintain and restore the habitats
and species for which the site has been designated
• To ensure that no area defined shall be subject to further environmental and bio-
logical deterioration
• To avoid damaging activities that could significantly disturb these species or
deteriorate the habitats
• To carry out environmental impact assessments on all areas eligible to the
directive
• To ensure that any plan or project likely to have a significant effect on a Natura
2000, either individually or in combination with other plans or projects, should
undergo an appropriate assessment to determine its implications for the site
• In spite of a negative assessment, a plan or project may nevertheless be allowed,
provided there are no alternative solutions and the project is considered to be of
overriding public interest.
Regardless of the undisputed success of the directive, there is, however, much crit-
icism from different stakeholders (Ebert 2012):
• Binding definition of the term “environmental protection” is missing.
• This also holds true for regulations that define the “management” of the direc-
tive at the national level.
• The funds allocated under the directive are rated not sufficient at all.
• The environmental impact assessments often do not correspond to international
standards.
210 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

• The criteria and indicators for the assessment of the actual environmental status
are often unclearly formulated, leaving much room for interpretation.
• The methodological approach declared compulsory is not suitable to cover the
time variance of environmental changes.
• Assessing the mere existence of species as the sole indicator for biological vari-
ance does not reflect any changes in the species’ quantity.
• Although the member states are called on to identify protection sites the
response is lagging a great deal behind the envisaged timeframe.
• Many states had to be forced to action by lawsuits of the European Court of
Justice.
• Often states and business lobbyists oppose a straight implementation of the
directive with the argument that this will hamper economic and social develop-
ment in the region.
The environment commissioner of the European Union, Margot Wallström,
reacted to the many critics and started an initiative to ensure that NATURA 2000
is better understood. She acknowledged some misconceptions that have provoked
unfounded concerns. The EU Commission will respond to these concerns by com-
municating more effectively, especially with the different stakeholder groups. The
European Union is convinced that, through partnership with the member states
and the different stakeholder groups, it will be possible to reconcile economic and
social goals with their responsibilities towards nature.

4.4 German Regulations of Natural Disaster Management

4.4.1 German National Law to Increase Flood Prevention

According to the German Federal Water Act (Wasserhaushaltsgesetz-WHG; BMUB

2013), flood risk prevention is a task that is in Germany mutually shared between
the public and the private sector. The law defines flood-prone areas are to be gener-
ally managed in a way that they can either withhold floodwater as well as they can
secure damage-less drainage of the floodwater. Moreover the law defines what areas
are flood-prone and how they can be safeguarded to enhance their flood-diminishing
function. On the other hand, the law requests that every person exposed to flood
risk, implement his own measures oriented to decrease the flood risk. This espe-
cially concerns flood risks to households, land property, animals, and the living
environment, as far as it is technically possible and economically reasonable.
Flood-prone areas are defined by law as areas that are lying along rivers or
streams, or between dams and levees, that are known to be at risk from a 100-
years flooding or that are defined to have a distinct flood retention function. By act
of law, local governments until 2012 had to define such areas within their jurisdic-
tion and to define concrete measures that focused on enhancing ecological sus-
tainability to diminish soil erosion. This also comprises the definition of measures
4.4 German Regulations of Natural Disaster Management 211

meant to foster damage-less drainage and outline such areas that can function to
retain floodwaters (retention areas, flood polders). The law furthermore clarifies
that local governments have to inform the public in time and regularly on these
decisions and requests to incorporate societal groups in this decision making. In
flood-prone areas in general no new buildings are allowed to be constructed unless
there are no alternative locations for such settlements, no harm is expected to life
and property, and the buildings are not hampering drainage of floodwaters, they do
not restrict the retaining function, or their impact can be balanced by other flood-
diminishing action in order to avoid harm to the low-lying populations and assets.
Local governments are obliged to display their findings and decisions on the areas
at risk, on the retention areas, and on the envisaged countermeasures in maps of an
appropriate scale and to make this information accessible to the public. The maps
have to be updated regularly.

4.4.2 German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)

The rationale for establishing the Scientific Advisory Council to the Federal
German Government (WBGU 2014) was given as follows:
The critical environmental changes are advancing worldwide; include climate change,
biodiversity loss, soil degradation and freshwater pollution and scarcity. The continuing
spread of non-sustainable lifestyles and the persistence of absolute poverty and a growing
global population are fundamental to this environmental deterioration. One consequence
of global environmental change is the mounting vulnerability, especially of developing
countries to natural disasters, food crises and disease. Thus, environmental degradation
has also become a security issue.

Consequently to prepare for the Rio Earth Summit (1992), the German Council
on Global Change (WBGU) was installed by the German Federal Government as
an independent, scientific advisory body, serving the overall target of advising the
federal government on all kinds of global change politics. The council consists of
independent experts that are commissioned by the German Ministries of Education
and Research (BMBF) and Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and
Nuclear Safety (BMUB). The WBGU is free to make its own choice of themes
to be addressed. It takes a transdisciplinary approach to assess hazards and risks
that derive from changing climate conditions. WBGU identifies critical scenarios
for humankind and elaborates precautionary options by which irreversible damage
to human societies and natural systems can be avoided. The investigations under-
taken enable it to provide guidance for political decision makers. Thus WBGU
draws the attention of politicians and the wider public to initiate corrective action.
Since 1992 WBGU:
• Analyzes global environment and development problems
• Reviews and evaluates national and international research in the field of global
change
• Provides early warning of new issue areas
• Identifies gaps in research to initiate new research options
212 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

• Monitors and assesses policies on sustainable development

• Elaborates recommendations for action and research
• Raises public awareness on global change issues
Biannually WBGU publishes flagship reports. Additionally it prepares special
reports and policy papers. Meanwhile 14 flagship reports, eight special reports,
and seven policy papers have been published covering the full range of global
change challenges and human interference with the natural environment.
Of the many reports those that have a significant relation to natural disaster risk
management the following ones have been chosen and are summarized below.

4.4.2.1 Flagship Report 1995 “World in Transition: Ways Towards

Global Environmental Solutions”

At the first UN Climate Convention in Berlin (WBGU 1996) it became evident

that anthropogenic-triggered climate changes made a reshuffling in individual’s as
well as society’s way of thinking and behavior indispensable. This accounts for all
areas of global environmental change especially on global trends such as soil deg-
radation, loss of biological diversity, water scarcity, and population growth, that all
show little or no sign of improvement. In its 1995 report WBGU considered two
aspects to lead to a reduction of environmental degradation and thus can help to
sustain living conditions of the poor. WBGU sees an improvement of the societal
conditions with a significant increase in environmental awareness, especially in
the most disaster-affected regions as a prerequisite. Therefore strong efforts must
be taken in environmental education worldwide. A critical element for environ-
mental degradation is located in the steadily increasing world population, despite
the fact that the statistical increase is leveling off somewhat. That leveling off,
however, should not be taken as an excuse not to address this sector any further. As
the persistent trends in poverty migration into the larger conurbations will increase
rather than go on as in the past, WBGU pledges for concerted efforts to incorpo-
rate global environmental policies including climate change, biodiversity, deserti-
fication, and soil degradation into international agreements such as the GATT and
WTO treaties. WBGU closed the report with the pledge for the international com-
munity to make more efforts to address global environmental problems as they are
more evident than ever before.

4.4.2.2 Flagship Report 1998 “World in Transition: Strategies

for Managing Global Environmental Risks”

Global risk potentials and their economic, social, and ecological outcomes have
already reached global dimensions. This has been driven by a growing global
population, particularly in developing countries, and on the other hand by rising
human aspirations in the developing countries for an increase in development,
as well as in conjunction with specific patterns of resource dependency of the
4.4 German Regulations of Natural Disaster Management 213

industrialized countries. The report (WBGU 1999) contributed first to a classifi-

cation of risk and second recommended a number of cross-cutting strategies for
international policies. These include worldwide alignment of liability law, creation
of environmental liability funds, establishment of a UN risk assessment panel and
an implementation of strategies aimed at reducing vulnerability.
The risk classification concept was presented and defined risk according to its
severity and frequency, an approach that is also described in more detail in Chap. 7
and can either be “normal,” meaning they are of low probability and small sever-
ity, leading to low potential of societal conflicts, inequities, and social discrepancy
and low economic loss. Or they occur with higher probability (“significantly tran-
scend everyday level”) with an uncertain distribution of adverse effects of the pop-
ulations at risk. Third, risks can occur in the “prohibited area.” Such risks will lead
to irreversible damage, have ubiquitous spreading, and can lead to severe social
and socioeconomic conflicts. The report sees an overall acceptance in societies
that such kind of risk should be avoided in general. Although the “normal zone”
does not require any corrective action, the “transitional zone” develops as the field
of political and social intervention. It is there where disaster risk reduction has to
be formulated and implemented accordingly.

4.4.2.3 Flagship Report 2000 “World in Transition: New Structures for

Global Environmental Policy”

The 2000 flagship report (WBGU 2000) dealt with the international architecture of
environmental agreements seen by WBGU among others as poorly interacting and
not interrelated to a degree necessary. Eight years after the Rio Summit, more than
900 bi- or multilateral environmental agreements are in force, but the most urgent
environmental problems remain unsolved. The lack of coordination and collabora-
tion provoked the council to set up a vision for a framework of international envi-
ronmental institutions and organizations to improve coordination called an Earth
Alliance to be established with the United Nations.
All activities in the field of natural conservation should be harmonized and
restructured under the wings of such new entity (Earth Alliance). This entity is to
oversee all activities attributed to three crosscutting sectors: (a) Earth Assessment,
(b) Earth Organization, and (c) Earth Funding. The duty of this central entity
would be to issue timely warnings of environmental risks. This authority should
be deliberately limited in size and have the rights to address the public as needed.

4.4.2.4 Earth Assessment

Knowledge and knowledge assessment are the keys to risk management.

Following the example of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the
WBGU recommended the establishment of an IPCC comparable scientific body
to advise and support the environmental activities under the United Nations, for
214 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

example, combatting desertification and soil degradation, natural disaster risk

management, or on biodiversity These tasks should be directed and coordinated by
a special Earth Commission to be newly established. The Earth Commission body
should provide long-term thinking and also should give motivation for research
and political action. It should be composed of not more than 15 leading figures
who can command the attention of a global audience, such as the Brundtland
Commission has done successfully. The Earth Commission, with its scientific pan-
els, should achieve four accomplishments in particular:
• Elaborating an overall perspective of the Earth system using the existing moni-
toring systems
• Giving early warning on potentially irreversible environmental damage
• Guiding international environment policy towards nature conservation and pre-
vention based on scientific data and findings
• Annually reporting to the secretary general of the United Nations on the
achievements, gaps, and future orientation

4.4.2.5 Earth Organization

The identified lack of coordination and effectiveness of global environment policy

calls for a comprehensive reconfiguration of international institutional and organi-
zational structure. In order to improve coordination and cooperation, WBGU
pledges a strengthening of the UNEP to become an “International Environmental
Organization” to secure a closer linkage among the different secretariats of the
international environmental conventions and their scientific panels. The Council
proposes among others:
• To proceed in “using protocols to advance the purposes of framework agree-
ments,” that define the general goals and implementation strategy, but in order
to arrive at a speedier ratification of a convention, the voting procedures have to
become more flexible. Therefore the consensus principle of “tacit acceptance”
should be used more frequently.
• To modify those decision-making activities that affect human heritage as a
whole. In such cases the formal principles “one state, one vote” or in agree-
ments about financial contributions, the common practice of “one dollar, one
vote” should be reconsidered in favor of a “one person, one vote.”
• To introduce a general scientific appraisal of member states to report on the ful-
fillment of their commitments in the way of reach at a more transparent interna-
tional compliance control function.
4.4 German Regulations of Natural Disaster Management 215

4.4.2.6 Earth Funding

The increasingly entrenching provision of industrialized nations’ contributions for

financing global environment policy led the WBGU Council to recommend three
measures for a more efficient use of these funds:
• Only when the global earth policy is based on an appropriate and secure financ-
ing, will the challenges to master natural damages and climate changing impact
be successful. This would require an increase of the 0.7 % of GNP target of
financial contributions.
• The system to monitor and review the fund’s expenditure of multinational
organizations has to be strengthened. Only by a constant evaluation of compli-
ance with the envisaged targets will it be possible to make achievements trans-
parent and reliable.
• The Earth organization should be given overall trusteeship on global common
resources such as international airspace, world oceans, outer space, and so on.
The use of these resources should be levied from the users. The introduction of
such an innovative financial instrument should be used to finance pre-defined
mitigation activities.
• Earth Funding needs competition among a variety of individual, innova-
tive financing schemes. The Advisory Council sees in the combination of the
various financing instruments a distinct opportunity. It will further encourage
global players to assume a more responsible use of global resources and no
longer to plan their activities in accord with their own environmental standards.
Additionally, global NGOs are in a position to influence the behavior of indi-
viduals, groups, and organizations at a point where government standards do not
apply effectively and where private initiatives can take over. WBGU therefore
rearticulates its call for the creation of institutional framework conditions that
can galvanize the private sector and strengthen national noncommercial funds,
for example, in combination with a worldwide debt-relief initiative.

4.4.2.7 Flagship Report 2007 “World in Transition: Climate Change as

a Security Risk”

On the occasion of the G8 Summit, the Advisory Council submitted its report on
“Climate Change as a Security Risk” (WBGU 2007). The core message of the
report is that if no resolute counteractions undertaken, climate change will over-
stretch many societies’ adaptive capacities. In some regions of the world, this may
result in internal destabilization processes with diffuse conflict structures, inter-
state conflicts, and an overstretching of the international system. Classic security
policy cannot respond adequately, making climate policy and strategies key ele-
ments of a preventive security policy. If it fails to do so, climate change will draw
ever-deeper lines of division and conflict in international relations.
216 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

WBGU analyzed selected regional hotspots in more detail: Southern Africa, the
Ganges Delta, and Amazonia. All were found to be especially at risk. Compared
with the rest of the world, Africa is already most at risk from destabilization and
violent conflict. Millions of people there are refugees from civil war and poverty,
and climate change is likely to exacerbate simmering conflicts. A further exam-
ple is Amazonia, where the collapse of the rainforest would have incalculable eco-
nomic and social consequences. In addition to the developing countries, however,
major ascendant economic regions such as the east coast of China are also at risk:
here, storm and flood disasters could in future threaten densely populated cities
and industrial regions with severe economic and social impacts.
The flagship report calls on resolute climate policy action within the next 10 to
15 years; in order to avert the socioeconomic disruption and negative implications
for international security it recommended among others that the German federal
government implement the following measures:
• A reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions of 50 %, against the 1990 base-
line by 2050. For the period after 2012, the industrialized countries should com-
mit themselves to a 30 % reduction in GHG emissions by 2020. Germany and
the European Union should enter into strategic “decarbonization partnerships”
with newly industrializing countries,
• In order to master the security challenges it is essential to promote the partici-
pation of the ascendant new world powers, China and India. Germany should
undertake the necessary advocacy work within the European Union and work
proactively at the international level for the adoption of confidence-building
measures,
• The Security Council’s mandate must be adapted to meet the security policy
implications of climate change. Furthermore, the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) should be strengthened and upgraded to the status of a UN
specialized agency. Finally, the German government should lobby to increase
the funds available to finance international crisis prevention and peacebuilding
at the UN level.
• Climate change is likely to further destabilize fragile states. The German gov-
ernment is called on to initiate an action plan, “Civilian Crisis Prevention,
Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building.” In this context, the
European security strategy should also be enhanced with the aim of avoiding
military intervention as far as possible. The WBGU also recommends the clear
restructuring of military budgets in favor of preventive measures in the field of
development cooperation.
• Climate change capacities of most developing countries lack the capability to
implement effective adaptation measures. WBGU identifies a particular need for
action in relation to water, food security, disaster prevention, and migration pol-
icy. In order to master these challenges, the European Union shall increase ODA
to 0.56 % of gross national income by 2010 and to 0.7 % by 2015.
• In time of climate change timely warning on extreme events is becoming
increasingly important. The German government should therefore continue to
4.4 German Regulations of Natural Disaster Management 217

participate in the development of a global early warning system. There is also a

need to provide processed data on predicted regional climate impacts, especially
for developing countries,
• Environmental migrants currently do not fit into the agreed categories of inter-
national refugee and migration law. Under current law, states have no specific
obligations in relation to the treatment of environmental migrants, nor are any
other legal mechanisms in place for their protection. A multilateral convention
for environmental migrants should therefore be established.

4.4.3 German Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change

(DAS)

Acknowledging the fact of a changing climate and in accordance with the

Germany’s obligations in the frame of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the federal German government announced its
central climate policy objective, in order to strengthen the national capacities to
limit the increase in global temperature to less than 2 °C above the pre-industrial
level. In accordance with Article 4 of the UNFCCC-Convention, the govern-
ment initiated the “German Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change” (DAS;
BMUB 2011) that formulates a national strategy to master the follow-ups of
the changing climate. The legal frame for the adaptation strategy is given by the
German Constitution, Article 20a (GG) stipulating the “Protection of Nature and
Environment,” a national objective.
With the strategy, the government fulfills its obligations within the European
Union to formulate an EU-wide harmonized strategy aiming at preventing the
expected consequences of climate change. With this strategy, the federal govern-
ment for the first time adopted a political framework on how to adapt to the con-
sequences of climate change and how to establish a structured mitigation dialogue
among all stakeholders. The adaptation strategy pursues an integrated approach to
assessing risks and action need by defining adaptation objectives and identifying,
developing, and implementing measures for a sustainable development. The inter-
nationally heightened debate on climate change issues makes clear that the time
horizon of the climate change poses political, scientific, and technical challenges
that neither have been experienced in history nor settled by international law thus
far.
The adaptation strategy requires these action objectives:
• Identification of the probability of risks and the potential damages
• Creation of awareness with the societal stakeholders
• Incorporation of climate change issues in all public and private sectors
• Capacitation of the stakeholders to take necessary precautions to increase
resilience
• Definition of mitigation options and defining responsibilities to implement
measures
218 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

The adaptation strategy provides a comparative regional risk evaluation for

Germany, based on four regional simulation models (ensembles). These ensembles
evaluated the corridors of change and led to recommendations on the future risk
reduction targets for the different German regions. The following key regions are
especially sensitive to climate change:
• Central parts of eastern Germany, the northeast German plain and the southeast
German basin and hills could be increasingly affected in future by a reduced
water supply.
• The hill country on both sides of the Rhine is expected to see a general increase
in precipitation with large consequences for agriculture and forestry, and for
flood control. Heat waves in the Rhine rift valley could become more frequent
and more intensive, and the risk of flooding could increase.
• The Alpine regions are very sensitive from the point of view of biodiversity. The
retreat of the glaciers would have an impact on water resources. The risk of nat-
ural dangers, such as rockfalls or mudslides, must be expected to increase.
• The coastal regions could be increasingly at risk from the rise in sea level and
changes in the storm climate. However, there is great uncertainty about the
probable size of changes in sea level and the storm climate. One aspect of spe-
cial importance is the potential danger to wetlands and low-lying areas and to
regions with high damage potential, such as the port of Hamburg.
Following the issuance of the adaptation strategy, further provisions were made
to the Competence Centre on Global Warming and Adaptation (KomPass) at the
German Federal Environment Agency (UBA). KomPass will collate and evaluate
information and results from the various subject areas and ministries and com-
municate them via an Internet portal. Second is the establishment of a Climate
Service Centre at the Helmholz-Gesellschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren
(Hamburg). The center is located at the interface between climate system research
and users of the data obtained from scenario and model calculations. The aim is
user-oriented acceleration of knowledge dissemination and research processes in
the field of climate modeling and scenario development.
With the adaptation strategy the German government contributes to the chal-
lenges of an international climate policy. The government stresses the need for a
rigorous examination of world development policy strategies, concepts, and pro-
grams as to whether they are sufficiently robust in the face of possible effects of
climate change and whether they can help to strengthen the capacity of the soci-
eties to adapt (“climate check”). This addresses not only the direct impact from
climate change but also indirect outcomes, such as those concerning the global
security architecture, poverty migration, and sustainable development. With the
DAS, Germany has accepted to play an active part in the development of relevant
climate risk reduction concepts under the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, including the development of suitable mechanisms for financing adapta-
tion measures in developing countries
4.5 The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) 219

4.5 The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC)

The IRGC was established in 2003 (IRGC 2003) as a consequence of the height-
ened level of public concern about the lacks in natural disaster risk management
in the late 1990s. Although the council was established by the Swiss Parliament,
the IRGC functions as an independent and international body to bridge the natu-
ral sciences, technological development, and the socioeconomic sector, the spatial
planners, and the risk-affected population. The mission of the council is to act as
the catalyst for improvements in the design and implementation of effective risk
governance strategies by developing concepts of risk governance. To ensure the
objectivity of its governance recommendations, IRGC activities are backed by
international scientific expertise from both the public and private sectors (IRGC
2010). The Scientific and Technical Council (S&TC) is the leading scientific
authority of the foundation. Its members comprise experts from a range of scien-
tific and organizational backgrounds who overview the scientific quality of IRGC
work and assure the quality of IRGC’s publications and other deliverables. They
provide input and scientific advice to the work program, and advice on selection
of affiliates to the IRGC network. The IRGC operates as an independent think-
tank with multidisciplinary expertise that can help bridge the gaps among science,
technological development, policymakers, and the public. Since 2003 the IRGC
has developed a series of fact-based risk governance recommendations for policy
makers to help them anticipate and understand emerging risks, as well as the risk
governance options, before they become urgent policy priorities.
The main objectives of the IRGC are:
• Identifying potential risk issues at the earliest possible stage
• Understanding the issue and the associated risks as well as the institutions and
risk governance structures and processes that are currently in place for assessing
and managing the risks
• Identifying governance gaps that appear to hinder the efficacy of the existing
risk governance structures and processes
• Making recommendations for overcoming these gaps
Essential to the Risk Governance Framework (IRGC 2009) is to gain a thorough
understanding of a risk and to develop options for dealing with it. Therefore the
IRGC’s risk governance framework distinguishes between analyzing and under-
standing a risk and deciding what to do about a risk. This distinction reflects the
IRGC’s strategy for the clear separation of the responsibilities for risk appraisal
and management as a means of maximizing the objectivity and transparency of
both activities. Those responsible for both should be jointly involved in the other
three elements of the framework:
Pre-Assessment

This defines the baseline for how a risk is assessed and managed. It captures
the variety of consequences that stakeholders and society may associate with a
220 4 Institutional and Organizational Framework for a Disaster …

certain risk and delineates measures and routines that help to improve the resil-
ience of either the individual or certain social groups. The IRGC’s pre-assessment
approach begins with “early warning” and “framing” the risk in order to provide
a structured definition of the problem and how it may be handled. This approach
should address the questions:

• What kind of risks and risk reduction opportunities can be addressed?

• What are the dimensions of the risk?
• How are the limits for risk assessment evaluations defined?
• Which indications are already defining the risk?
• Is there a need to act?
• Who are the stakeholders and what are their perceptions of the problem?
• What are the established scientific/analytical tools and methods that can be used
to assess the risks?
• What are the current legal/regulatory systems and how do they potentially affect
the problem?
• What are the organizational capabilities of the relevant governments, interna-
tional organizations, businesses, and people involved?

Appraisal

Risk appraisal generates and synthesizes the knowledge base for the decision on
whether a risk can possibly be reduced or at least contained. Risk appraisal com-
prises both scientific risk assessment, the field of the risk’s factual, physical, and
measurable characteristics including the probability of it happening, and a con-
cern assessment, a systematic analysis of the perceived consequences (benefits
and risks) that stakeholders may associate with a hazard. The concern assessment
is a particular innovation of the IRGC framework, ensuring that decision makers
account for how the risk is viewed when personal perceptions and emotions come
into play. Scientific risk assessment deals with these types of questions:

• What are the potential damages or adverse effects?

• What is the probability of occurrence?
• How ubiquitous and persistent could the damage be?
• Is there a clear cause–effect relationship?
• What scientific, technical, and analytical approaches, knowledge, and expertise
should be used to better assess these impacts?
• What are the primary and secondary benefits, opportunities, and potential
adverse effects?

Characterization and Evaluation

The IRGC deliberately included this element to ensure that scientific evidence-
based disaster risk management is combined with a thorough understanding of
societal values in order to make the decision whether a risk is “acceptable” (risk
reduction is considered unnecessary), “tolerable” (to be pursued because of its
4.5 The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) 221

benefits), or “intolerable” (to be avoided). This phase involves making a judgment

based on such questions as:

• What are the societal, economic, and environmental benefits and risks?
• Are there impacts on quality of life?
• Are there ethical issues to consider?
• Is there a possibility of substitution?
• Can the risks be compared (regionally, socially)?
• Does a choice of a particular risk-reduction technology have an impact on other
risks?
• What are the possible technical, financial, and social options for risk reduction?
• Can risk compensation be a matter of mitigation strategy?
• What are the societal values and norms for making judgments about tolerability
and acceptability?
• Do any stakeholders have commitments or other reasons for wanting a particu-
lar outcome of the risk governance process?

Management

All tolerable and intolerable risks need an appropriate and adequate risk manage-
ment. According to the IRGC, risk management involves the design and imple-
mentation of the actions and remedies to avoid, reduce, transfer, or retain the risks.
Risk management includes the selection of appropriate risk-reduction options as
well as implementing the selected measures, monitoring their effectiveness, and
reviewing the decision if necessary. Based on the range of options the most appro-
priate risk-reduction measures are to be put into practice. The questions are:

• Who is, or should be responsible for decisions within the context of the risk
management?
• Have the decision makers accepted this responsibility?
• What management options could be chosen (technological, regulatory, institu-
tional, educational, compensation, etc.)?
• How are these options evaluated and prioritized?
• Is there an appropriate level of international cooperation and harmonization for
global or transboundary risks?
• What are the secondary impacts of particular risk-reduction options?

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Chapter 5
Hazard Assessment

5.1 General Aspects of Data Monitoring and Measuring

Natural disasters strike the people in general randomly, infrequently, and w ­ ithout
prior warning. But frequency and impact of the natural disasters are not at all
equally distributed over the world. There is a clear geographical and time-related
preference that results in some regions of the globe being more often and more
heavily affected than others. World Bank reports have recorded more than 3 mil-
lion deaths from natural hazards recorded since 1970, making an average death
toll of about 82,000 a year (Kreimer and Munasinghe 1991; Dilley et al. 2005).
The emergency disaster database of CRED (Guha-Sapir et al. 2013) listed over
8800 events that claimed the lives of about 2.2 million people. In the same period
economic losses worth US$1500 billion were caused by disasters. But mortality
and economic losses are not equally distributed over the globe. There are regions
that are more prone to fatal disasters and areas that are more exposed to eco-
nomic losses: in Asia more people die from natural disasters whereas in Northern
America more assets are subject to destruction. All disaster records clearly reveal
that disasters predominantly affect the poor in the developing countries, a fact that
has been highlighted in many publications especially by the UNDP Report (2004,
2013; World Bank 2013).
There is a variety of definitions of “hazard” (see Annex A). Very generally, haz-
ards are: “natural conditions that can cause damages on property, claim death and
injury or destroys the economic and ecological base of human life.”
From a geological standpoint the Earth is a “product” of geological processes
that define the distribution of land and sea, of mountains and plains, rivers, and
lakes, of meteorological processes that constitute our atmosphere. All of these pro-
cesses are steadily changing the face of our Earth and are thus a phenomenon of
which human mankind is a part. But these changes are not in every case running
smoothly, gently, and peacefully, rather sometimes are very sudden, eruptive, and
incidental. A volcano, for example, that has long been producing lava and ashes in
the middle of the Saharan desert can be seen from the standpoint of a geologist or
volcanologist a fascinating event, but does not constitute a hazard, as long as the

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 225

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_5
226 5 Hazard Assessment

gases from the eruption are not changing the world’s climate. Also seawater that
for centuries regularly floods marshland is a natural process that helps sustain the
local ecology, but also is not a hazard, as long as the marshland is envisaged to be
used for agriculture. Winds that are drifting Saharan desert sands westward to the
Atlantic Ocean are a phenomenon but do not constitute a hazard as long as the
winds are not eroding fertile soils thus deteriorating the local population’s living
source.
But not only nature can be hazardous to humankind; human activity also often
interferes with the natural system that may again interfere with the human envi-
ronment. Human-induced hazards originate from technological or industrial acci-
dents, dangerous procedures, infrastructure failures, or certain human activities,
which may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic
disruption, or environmental degradation (e.g., industrial pollution, nuclear activi-
ties and radioactivity, toxic wastes, dam failures, transport, industrial or techno-
logical, all result from modifications of natural processes in the Earth’s system
caused by human activities which accelerate and aggravate the damage potential
(e.g., land degradation, landslides, forest fires). Human-made hazards also often
interfere with the climate and have already led the sea-level increase and warmed
the global temperature.
Natural processes or phenomena are hazards when they have the potential
to become a physical event (natural disaster) that can harass human life. In this
regard it should be acknowledged that the term “natural disaster” is in the strict
sense of the word not correct, as the term comprises two different viewpoints: one
is “natural” that defines all processes that occur on the planet and thus are sub-
ject to natural sciences, and “disaster” that describes a paradigm defining adverse
interference with humankind and the living environment. Nevertheless the term
has overall acceptance. Consequently the term “natural disaster management”
should be extended to “natural disaster risk management” as in light of the above,
nature cannot be managed: only the impact from such processes to the living envi-
ronment can be managed and sometimes even changed for the better.
Natural hazards occur all over the world, although the regional distribution of
the different hazard types follows a distinct relationship to geological and climate
patterns (see also Sect. 3.3). Hazards can be single, sequential, or combined in
their origin and effects. Each hazard is characterized by its location, area affected,
magnitude and intensity, duration, probability, and frequency as well as the speed
of onset (Fig. 5.1).
The graph clearly demonstrates that the different indicators describing a hazard
vary a great deal and that there is no “single” relationship between them. There
“fast” hazards (“lead time to onset”) such as a snow avalanche or tsunami that
on the other hand have very different areas of impact (“regional distribution”).
A snow avalanche in the Alpine region is normally restricted to a certain valley
whereas tsunamis may be extended over very large areas, like the 2004 tsunami
that affected the entire Indian Ocean region. Drought and heat waves share slow
to very slow onset speeds (sometimes decades) and both are regionally largely
extended and their probability is (comparatively) low. Earthquake and volcano
5.1 General Aspects of Data Monitoring and Measuring 227

Fig. 5.1  Comparison
of different hazard types
by probability, regional
distribution, lead time, and
duration (A snow avalanche,
E earthquake, D drought, H
hurricane, S storm, T tsunami,
and V volcanic eruption; Own
graph)
228 5 Hazard Assessment

eruption are in general local events that, however, experience a high probability
but moderate lead times.
There is no hazard type that has the highest probability, the largest regional dis-
tribution, the strongest impact, the longest duration, or the shortest lead time. On
the other hand there is no hazard type that has the lowest probability, the short-
est duration, the smallest regional distribution, or the longest lead time. The very
different character of the hazard types makes working out a generalized risk-
reduction strategy difficult, not to say impossible. However, there is in the large
difference in hazard types the clue for hazard-specific risk-reduction measures.

5.2 International Classification Scales of Hazard Intensity

Disaster risk mitigation requires objective means to compare different disaster

events at different locations either globally or within a country, for example, on
volcanic eruption, earthquakes, flooding, tsunamis, forest fires, heat, wind, and
storm surges, hail, avalanches, and so many others. There are quite a number of
scales in use that enable scientists and risk managers to better qualify each event
according to its severity and frequency. The main criteria are in general physical
parameters that were instrumentally recorded or assessed by visual inspection. The
criteria mainly comprise casualty or injury of disaster victims, and actual or pos-
sible damage to buildings or the natural environment. The indicators chosen are in
general independent of the site of damage occurrence, are reproducible, and can
be traced back into geological history. They are simple, neutral, and indicative in
order to also serve the needs of the nonspecialist.
All major disaster management agencies worldwide such as PHIVOLCS,
UN-OCHA, the European Union, or the Swiss-BUWAL (see below) have set up
classification schemes of natural hazards to better address the hazards. All such
schemes have in common that they intend to standardize and harmonize disaster
impact data in order to make them understandable, transferable, and comparable
worldwide. Therefore it is not very important which of the many classification
schemes is used; important is that for one assessment the same scheme is in use
and the risk assessors are well trained.
In the following, some examples of commonly used alert scales are reproduced
from different published sources. The choice gives an overview of how different
nations are addressing the alert level definitions. Many of the great industrial and
technical oriented countries often set a high value on the geoscientific background
and administrative operational aspects of warning, whereas many developing
countries (e.g., the Philippines) often provide additional information for the public
at risk on how to assess the individual risk and how to initiate mitigation measures.
Using the different magnitudes in identifying the severity and frequency of nat-
ural hazards is daily practice in disaster hazard assessment, although it may lead
to significant problems. The information on the severity and frequency of disas-
ter events is generally based on scientific measurements, given in ordinal numbers
5.2 International Classification Scales of Hazard Intensity 229

from zero to ten or more. Such standardization is meaningful, if the momentum of

just one hazard type, for example, an earthquake, is compared to another within
a country or between different countries. An M5 earthquake in Indonesia has
released the same energy as an M5 earthquake in the United States. But when dif-
ferent kinds of hazards are compared, for example, in order to assess the over-
all hazard exposure of a certain area, different hazard scales are to be combined
and compared. But how can a volcano eruption with a severity of say, VEI 4 be
compared with a flood level measured say, 5 m above normal. There is a meth-
odological dichotomy to be solved. Generally this bias is bridged by attributing the
different quantitatively generated figures, a qualitative description, often ranging
from nil to very high.
A problem arises from the fact that an arbitrarily described hazard exposure
(“low–moderate–high”) for a certain region for hazard management purposes has
to be transferred back into quantitative indicators. For example a “high” ranked
flood level, can in the following serve as the baseline for a flood threshold indi-
cator. For this the formerly arbitrarily given ranking “high”, subsequently will be
transferred into an ordinal number, say 7 m above normal. A 7-m flood level will
then be the threshold value that starts a flood warning or evacuation.

5.2.1 Earthquake Magnitude and Intensity Scale

Richter Scale and Mercalli Scale

Information for the public and scientific purposes on earthquake occurrence is in
general answering the questions of what happened where, by what severity and
causes, and what kind of impact. The basic scientific indicator for ranking the
strength of such events is the Richter scale already described in detail in Sect. 5.2.
The Richter scale measures the energy of an earthquake by its ground acceleration,
however, the Mercalli scale is a measure of the earthquake’s intensity. However
the Mercalli intensity is not exclusively determined by the earthquake’s magni-
tude, rather by geological cum sedimentological features as well as by a building‘s
substance. For engineering purposes it is therefore indispensable that a correlation
between magnitude of the quake and intensity of damage is assessed, based upon
several factors including the depth of the earthquake, the site-specific geological
and sedimentological features of the location, building structure stability, as well
as factors such as population density and the like.

5.2.2 Volcano Explosivity Index

The Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) was established in 1982 by the US

Geological Survey to provide an assessment tool that ranks the severity of vol-
canic eruption (Newhall and Self 1982). The index is based on the records of over
230 5 Hazard Assessment

8000 historic and prehistoric eruptions and provides a good knowledge of the fre-
quencies of highly explosive, moderately explosive, and nonexplosive eruptions.
It is a composite estimate of the magnitude of past explosive eruptions. It is based
on the volume of volcanic material (ash, volcanic bombs, lapilli, etc.) ejected, the
height of the eruption cloud, how long the eruption lasts, the occurrence of pyro-
clastic flows, the height of the ash column, and some specific qualitative obser-
vation indicators using terms ranging from “gentle” to “mega-colossal”. The VEI
only refers to andesitic/dacitic lava and does not comprise basaltic lava as it has,
according to lava composition, no explosivity potential. Also the density of vol-
canic material and the gas content (vesicularity) are not considered. Moreover the
VEI cannot give an indication of how strong the ejection was, as there is no way
to measure such a value reproducibly. Each factor is given in a numerical quali-
fier on an open-ended scale with the largest volcanoes in history given magnitude
8. A value of 8 represents a “mega” explosive eruption that can eject more than
1000 km3 of tephra and have a cloud column (plume height) of over 50 km. The
scale is logarithmic, with each interval on the scale representing a tenfold increase
in observed ejected material, with the exception of between VEI 0, VEI 1, and
VEI 2.
The authors defined the index as a simple scheme for estimating explosive
magnitude, although knowing its limitations, as it provides a combination of quan-
titative or semi-quantitative assessments as a basis for comparing explosive erup-
tions. The index has a simple numerical index of increasing magnitude (1–8), as
eruptions greater than 8 could not be reconstructed from history. The volume of
tephra ejected increases by a factor of 10 for each VEI-interval; except the step
from VEI 1 to VEI 2 where the tephra ejection volume increases by 100. The VEI
furthermore provides a generalized assessment of an expected climate impact of
the eruptions as well as the number of eruptions since Holocene times. For com-
parison, recent volcanic eruptions are added, such as the ones of Mt. St. Helens or
Krakatoa.
The problem establishing the index scale was that records of eruptions in his-
toric times often are highly incomplete and lack quantifiable data: therefore many
of the historic data had to be estimated, especially where lava temperatures are
concerned. Only the largest eruptions of Mt. Tambora (1815), Indonesia, had a
complete record, but reliable information is not dated before 1960. The compi-
lation of the magnitude of historic volcanism was mainly based on professional
experience and expertise for each eruption and an analogous reporting system did
not exist in those times. In this regard the VEI differs much from other scales such
as the Richter scale that is based on instrumental records.
Table 5.1 summarizes the VEI-scale and is extended by the factor “dispersion”,
defined as the “outer limit where the volcanic deposit thickness decreases to 1 %
of its maximum thickness” (Walker 1973; cited in Cas and Wright 1988).
All data on volcano eruption events are documented in the largest volcano data-
bank of the world: the Global Volcanisms Program of the Smithsonian Institute
(GVP). This databank is the worldwide unique documentation of current and past
5.2 International Classification Scales of Hazard Intensity 231

Table 5.1  Volcanic explosive index (summarized from Newhall and Self 1982; Walker 1973)
Ejecta Classification Description Plume Frequency Stratospheric Dispersal Example
volume injection
1 >10,000 m3 Strombolian Gentle <1 km Daily None >0.05 km2 Nyiragonqo,
Raoul lid
2 >1 mio m3 Strombolian Explosive 1–5 km Weekly None >2.5 km2 Unzen
Galeras
3 >10 mio m3 Pelean Severe 3–15 km Few months Possible >5 km2 Nevada
del Ruiz
soufriere
4 >0.1 km3 Pelean/Plinian Cataclysmic 10–25 km >1 year Definite >200 km2 Mayan Mt.
Pelee
5 >1 km3 Plinian Paroxysmal 20–35 km >10 years Significant >500 km2 Vesuvius
Mt. St.
Helens
6 >10 km3 Plinian Colossal >30 km >100 years Substantial >1000 km2 Krakatao
Pinatubo
7 >100 km3 UItra-Plinian Super- >40 km >10,000 Substantial >5000 km2 Thera
colossal years Tambora
8 >1000 km3 Super-volcanic Mega- >50 km >10,000 Substantial >10,000 km2 Yellowstone
colossal years Toba

activity for all volcanoes on the planet active during the last 10,000 years. The
GVP‘s mission is to document, understand, and disseminate information about
global volcanic activity. The databank that was established in 1968 documents
current eruptive activities and regularly publishes on volcano activities in the
“Weekly Volcanic Activity Reportˮ and in the Bulletin of the Global Volcanism
Network. The “Weekly Volcanic Activity Reportˮ is a cooperative project between
the Smithsonian’s Global Volcanism Program and the US Geological Survey’s
Volcano Hazards Program updated every Wednesday. The reports do not intend
to provide a comprehensive list of all of Earth’s volcanoes erupting during the
week, but rather provides comprehensive reporting on recent eruptions on a longer
time horizon. The Bulletin of the Global Volcanism Network, however, carefully
reviews the different reports on various volcanoes and is published monthly. The
GVP website presents more than 7000 reports on volcanic activity, provides access
to the baseline data and eruptive histories of Holocene volcanoes, and is openly
accessible.

5.2.3 Examples of Volcanic Alert Levels

Volcano Alert Level (United States of America)

By the Stafford Act, the law on natural disaster emergency management of the
United States of America, the US Geological Survey (USGS) is mandated to
monitor volcanic activity in the United States and give a warning according to an
232 5 Hazard Assessment

Table 5.2  Volcano alert levels of the United States of America (USGS 2006)
Level Criteria
Normal Volcano is in a noneruptive state. This level allows for periods of increased steaming,
seismic events, deformation, thermal anomalies, or detectable levels of degassing as
long as such activity is within the range of typical noneruptive phenomena based on
its monitored history. Or the volcano has returned from a higher level of activity to a
noneruptive background state
Advisory Volcano is exhibiting signs of elevated unrest, increased steaming, seismic events,
deformation, thermal anomalies, or detectable levels of degassing above known
background level. But a progression towards eruption is not certain. After a change
from a higher level or volcanic activity has decreased significantly, but requires still
requires close monitoring for possible renewed increase
Watch Volcano is exhibiting heightened or escalating unrest with increased potential of
eruption, or minor eruption is underway but poses limited hazards. This level is
used for both heightened precursory unrest and for minor eruptive activity because
both states require continuous monitoring but no immediate hazardous effects are
expected. When changing from advisory to watch this implies an increased potential
for an eruption. When changing from warning to watch, the volcano is still showing
signs of heightened activity that may lead to renewed highly hazardous activity
Warning This level implies that a major or highly hazardous eruption is underway, is con-
firmed, imminent, or at least suspected. When the activity cannot be confirmed by
visual evidence, ground-based monitoring data may indicate the probable onset,
duration, size, intensity, or explosivity of the eruption as well as the potential impact
on landscape and atmosphere

international standardized procedure. The USGS assigns an alert level based upon
a dense monitoring network and interpretation of changing phenomena. Four alert
levels are defined (Table 5.2) reflecting the status at the volcano and the expected
or ongoing hazards and function as guidelines for scientists to assess the level of
hazardous volcanic activity as well as for public officials and the public to con-
sider when deciding what actions they need to take.
Volcano alert notices are accompanied by explanatory text to give a fuller
explanation of the observed phenomena and to clarify hazard implications to
affected groups. Updates that describe the ongoing activity are issued on a regular
basis, at increasing frequency at higher activity levels.
Volcano Alert Level (Taal Volcano, Philippines)
The following volcano alert levels have been established by the Philippine
Institute of Volcanology (PHIVOLCS 2014a, b) for the purpose of volcano warn-
ing of Mt. Taal, one of the most active volcanoes in the Philippines. The warning
scale (Table 5.3) offers additional information for the public settling the area on
the potential development of the unrest. Similar alert levels have been set up for
many other volcanoes in the Philippines, for instance, of the volcano Hibok-Hibok
on Mindanao.
5.2 International Classification Scales of Hazard Intensity 233

Table 5.3  Volcano alert levels of the Mt. Taal Volcano, the Philippines (PHIVOLCS 2014a, b)
Alert level Criteria Interpretation
No alert (“normal“) Seismic background noise No eruption in foreseeable future
Volcano quiet
1 (“abnormal”) Low level of seismicity Fumarolic Magmatic, tectonic of hydrother-
Other activity mal disturbances No eruption
imminent
2 (“alarming”) Low to moderate level of seismic- (a) Probable magmatic intru-
ity, persistence of local but unfelt sion, could eventually lead to an
earthquakes. Ground deformation eruption
measurements above baseline levels. (b) If trend shows decline volcano
Increased water and/or ground probe may soon go back to level 1
hole temperatures, moderate bub-
bling at Crater Lake
3 (“critical”) Relatively high unrest manifested by (a) If unrest is increasing, erup-
seismic swarms including increas- tion may be possible within days
ing occurrence of low-frequency to weeks
earthquakes and/or harmonic tremor (b) If trend is decreasing, volcano
(some events felt). Sudden or may soon go to level 2
increasing changes in temperature or
bubbling activity or radon gas emis-
sions of Crater Lake pH. Bulging
of the edifice and fissuring may
accompany seismicity
4 (“eruption Intense unrest, continuing seismic Hazardous explosive eruption is
imminent”) swarms, including harmonic tremor possible within days
and/or low-frequency earthquakes
that are usually felt, profuse steam-
ing along existing and perhaps new
vents and fissures
5 (“eruption”) Base surges accompanied by erup- Hazardous eruption in progress
tion columns or lava fountaining or Extreme hazards to communities
lava flows west of the volcano and ashfalls
on downwind sectors

5.2.4 Volcano Alert Levels for International Air Traffic

(Aviation Color Code)

Volcanic eruptions pose a steady threat to aviation safety when clouds of vol-
canic ash disperse into the air and cross the flight paths of jet aircraft. Numerous
incidents of aircraft flying into volcanic-ash clouds have experienced the life-
threatening potential of this type of hazard. In the aftermath of such incidents
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO 2004) has established the
International Airways Volcano Watch System (IAVW) with nine Volcano Advisory
Centers worldwide that control air traffic routes of occurrences of explosive
234 5 Hazard Assessment

Table 5.4  ICAO Volcanic alert color code

ICAO color code Status of Volcano’s activity
GREEN Volcano is in normal noneruptive state. Or, after a change from a higher
level: Volcanic activity considered to have ceased, and volcano reverted to
its normal, noneruptive state
YELLOW Volcano is experiencing signs of elevated unrest above known background
levels. Or, after a change from a higher level: Volcanic activity has
decreased significantly but continues to be closely monitored for possible
renewed increase
ORANGE Volcano is exhibiting heightened unrest with increased likelihood of
eruption. Or: Volcanic eruption is underway with no or minor ash emission
RED Eruption is forecast to be imminent with significant emission of ash into
the atmosphere likely. Or: Eruption is underway with significant emission
of ash into the atmosphere
(Courtesy ICAO-online: http://www.icao.int/NACC/Documents/eDOCS/ATM/ATMVolcanicAsh
ContingencyPlanEN.pdf)

volcano eruptions and the whereabouts of airborne ash clouds globally. The ICAO
furthermore institutionalized an internationally binding color code for quick refer-
ence that describes the actual volcano hazard alert levels (Table 5.4).

5.2.5 Beaufort Wind Scale (United Kingdom, Royal Navy)

Traveling the sea, wind is a major factor defining the maritime business. However,
since weather observations were first made there was for a long time no standard scale
that enabled the sailors to compare weather observations at different locations. In
1805 Sir Francis Beaufort succeeded in standardizing a wind scale. Based on previous
work of others he defined what is, for instance, a “storm”, a “gale”, or a “breeze”. The
scale he invented (Table 5.5), was made up by increasing classes from zero to twelve,
mainly making reference to qualitative wind conditions that in those days affected the
sail canvas and the ship’s maneuverability. Today windspeed is instrumentally meas-
ured by anemometers; nevertheless the classes are harmonized to the Beaufort Scale.
Windspeed is affected by a number of physical factors and climatic and geographical
situations. The main constituents are the wind direction and local weather conditions.
Windspeed is mostly linked to the air pressure gradient, which describes the differ-
ence in air pressure inside and outside a low or high pressure location.

5.2.6 The Saffir–Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale

The wind scale is a 1–5 categorization based on the hurricane’s intensity. The
scale, originally developed by Saffir and Simpson (1971) has proven an excellent
tool for comparing the various intensities of hurricanes. Mirroring the utility of the
 235

Table 5.5  Beaufort scale (Wikipedia; online access, 20.7.2014)

Force Knots WMO classification On water On land
0 Less than 1 Calm Sea surface smooth and Calm, smoke rises
mirrorlike vertically
1 1–3 Light air Scaly ripples, no foam Smoke drift indicates
crests wind direction, still wind
vanes
2 4–6 Light breeze Small wavelets, crests Wind felt on face, leaves
glassy, no breaking rustle, vanes begin to
move
3 7–10 Gentle breeze Large wavelets, crests Leaves and small twigs
begin to break, scat- constantly moving, light
tered whitecaps flags extended
4 11–16 Moderate breeze Small waves becom- Dust, leaves, and loose
ing longer, numerous paper lifted, small tree
whitecaps branches move
5 17–21 Fresh breeze Moderate waves taking Small trees in leaf begin
longer form, many to sway
whitecaps, some spray
6 22–27 Strong breeze Larger waves, white- Larger tree branches
caps common, more moving, whistling in
spray wires
7 28–33 Near gale Sea heaps up, waves, Whole trees moving,
white foam streaks off resistance felt walking
breakers against wind
8 34–40 Gale Moderately high waves Twigs breaking off
of greater length, edges trees, generally impedes
of crests begin to break progress
into spindrift, foam
blown in streaks
9 41–47 Strong gale High waves, sea begins Slight structural damage
to roll, dense streaks of occurs, slate blows off
foam, spray may reduce roofs
visibility
10 48–55 Storm Very high waves with Seldom experienced on
overhanging crests, land, trees broken or
sea white with densely uprooted, considerable
blown foam, heavy roll- structural damage
ing, lowered visibility
11 56–63 Violent storm Exceptionally high
waves, foam patches
cover sea, visibility
more reduced
12 64 and Hurricane Air filled with foam,
more waves over 45 feet, sea
completely white with
driving spray, visibility
greatly reduced
236 5 Hazard Assessment

Richter scale on earthquakes, they devised a 1–5 categories scale, based on wind-
speed that today is the internationally agreed-upon sole measure to classify tropi-
cal hurricanes in the Western Hemisphere east of the International Date Line. The
other areas use different scales to categorize their tropical storms. In the Pacific
Ocean they are called “Taifoons” and in the Indian Ocean “Cyclones.” The scale
is based on the maximum sustained surface windspeed that prevails at least for
1 min, measured at 10 m over ground. Earlier versions of this scale, known as the
Saffir–Simpson Hurricane Scale, incorporated central barometric pressure and
storm surge as components of the categories (Table 5.6). The central pressure was
used until the end of 1980 because accurate windspeed intensity measurements
from aircraft were not routinely available for hurricanes. Storm surge was also
quantified by category in the earliest published versions of the scale dating back to
1972 but since then has been abolished.
To be classified as a hurricane Category (1), a tropical cyclone must have at
least a maximum sustained windspeed of 119 km/h, whereas in the highest
Category (5) windspeeds exceed 251 km/h. Combined with information on the

Table 5.6  Saffir–Simpson hurricane wind scale

Category Sustained winds Types of damage due to hurricane winds
1 119–153 km/h Very dangerous winds will produce some damage.
Well-constructed frame homes could have damage to roof, shin-
gles, vinyl siding, and gutters. Large branches of trees will snap
and shallowly rooted trees may be toppled. Extensive damage
to power lines and poles likely will result in power outages that
could last a few to several days
2 154–177 km/h Extremely dangerous winds will cause extensive damage.
Well-constructed frame homes could sustain major roof and
siding damage. Many shallowly rooted trees will be snapped or
uprooted and block numerous roads. Near-total power loss is
expected with outages that could last from several days to weeks
3 178–208 km/h Devastating damage will occur.
Well-built framed homes may incur major damage or removal
of roof decking and gable ends. Many trees will be snapped or
uprooted, blocking numerous roads. Electricity and water will
be unavailable for several days to weeks after the storm passes.
4 209–251 km/h Catastrophic damage will occur.
Well-built framed homes can sustain severe damage with loss of
most of the roof structure and/or some exterior walls. Most trees
will be snapped or uprooted and power poles downed. Fallen
trees and power poles will isolate residential areas. Power out-
ages will last weeks to possibly months. Most of the area will be
uninhabitable for weeks or months
5 252 km/h or Catastrophic damage will occur.
higher A high percentage of framed homes will be destroyed, with
total roof failure and wall collapse. Fallen trees and power poles
will isolate residential areas. Power outages will last for weeks
to possibly months. Most of the area will be uninhabitable for
weeks or months
Courtesy NOAA, US National Weather Service (2014)
5.2 International Classification Scales of Hazard Intensity 237

estimated time of landfall, the general pathway the hurricane will follow, and on
the rainfall volume, the scale provides reliable indications of the potential dam-
age the hurricane will cause. The Saffir–Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (SSHWS)
underwent a minor modification in 2012 in order to resolve some problems associ-
ated with conversions among the various units used for windspeed assessments.
The scale provides, in addition, examples of the type of damage and impacts asso-
ciated with winds of the indicated intensity. In general, damage rises by about a
factor of four for every category increase. Historical examples provided in each
of the categories correspond with the observed or estimated maximum wind-
speeds from the hurricane experienced at the location indicated. The scale does not
address the potential for other hurricane-related impacts, such as storm surge, rain-
fall-induced floods, and tornadoes. It should also be noted that these wind-caused
damage general descriptions are to some degree dependent upon the local building
codes in effect and how well and how long they have been enforced.

5.2.7 Tsunami Watches and Warnings

Australia
The Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Centre (JATWC 2014) operates 24 h a day to
monitor, verify, and warn of any tsunami threat to the coastline of Australia. Table 5.7
shows the different stages of the tsunami warning chain. The first stage of the process
is a “Tsunami Watch,” when seismologists have determined that there is the potential
for an undersea earthquake that may cause a tsunami threat. If sea-level observations
and further data confirm the tsunami threat, or if any potential first point of impact is
less than 90 min away a “Tsunami Warningˮ is issued. Once separate Tsunami Watch

Table 5.7  Tsunami watch and alert system of Australia

Level Criteria
Watch Seismologists or oceanographers have determined the potential for an
undersea earthquake that may cause a tsunami threat, or if a tsunami
is (although unconfirmed) identified by sea-level observations and any
potential first point of impact on Australia is more than 90 min away
Warning Seismologists or oceanographers have determined a tsunami threat, or
if a tsunami is (although unconfirmed) identified by sea-level observa-
tions and any potential first point of impact on Australia is less than
90 min away
Warning “summary” Issuance list of all watches, warnings, and cancellations that are in
effect for the current tsunami event
Watch “cancellation” Issued when the main threat has passed or if a tsunami didn’t eventuate
Warning Issued when the main threat has passed or if a tsunami didn’t eventuate
“cancellation”
Event “summary” Issued after the event
Courtesy (JATWC 2014)
238 5 Hazard Assessment

or Tsunami Warning have been issued a “Tsunami Warning Summary” will also be
issued listing all the watches, warnings, and cancellations that are in effect for the
current tsunami event. When the main threat has passed or if a tsunami didn’t eventu-
ate, “Tsunami Watch Cancellation” or a “Tsunami Warning Cancellation” is issued.
Finally a “Tsunami Event Summary” is issued after the event.
All relevant emergency management organizations, regional and local author-
ities, as well as the media and the public in general are automatically informed
in the case of a tsunami event, according to the national “Tsunami Warning
Distribution List.” The information is disseminated through the organization’s
website and media information channels and furthermore provides a complemen-
tary graphic showing the coastal areas currently under threat. The graph distin-
guishes between “green” not tsunami threat, “yellow” as an indication that there
might be a tsunami threat, and “red” as a regional/local warning that a tsunami is
imminent and poses a risk to the identified coastal region.
Tsunami Alert Scheme (Philippines)
Tsunami alert levels established by the Philippines additionally provide informa-
tion to the public on how to react as citizens of affected places (Table 5.8).

Table 5.8  Philippines tsunami alert scheme

Alert level Threat Recommendation for affected places
0 A large earthquake has been No evacuation needed
generated but either The bulletin is issued for information
1. There is no tsunami generated purposes only
by this event or
2. A tsunami was generated but
will not reach the Philippines
1 (“ready”) There is potential threat to the No evacuation order is in effect but
Philippines coastal communities that may be affected
are advised to be on alert for possible
evacuation
2 (“watch/ There will be a minor sea level The public concerned is advised to be on
observe”) disturbance alert for unusual waves
(A confirmed tsunami is People are advised to stay away from
expected to arrive at the the beach and not to go to the coast to
Philippines with wave heights of watch the tsunami. People whose houses
less than 1 m above the expected are located very near to the shoreline are
ocean tides.) advised to move farther inland
3 (“go”) Destructive tsunami is generated Coastal communities that may be affected
with life-threatening wave are strongly advised to immediately
heights evacuate to higher ground
(A confirmed tsunami is Owners of boats in harbors, estuaries,
expected to arrive to the or shallow coastal waters of the affected
Philippines with wave heights provinces should secure their boats and
greater than 1 m above the move away from the waterfront. Boats
expected ocean tides.) already at sea are advised to stay offshore
in deep waters until further notified
Courtesy PHIVOLCS-online; access: 20.7.2014
5.2 International Classification Scales of Hazard Intensity 239

5.2.8 European Snow Avalanche Danger Scale

In April 1993 the avalanche warning services of the Alpine countries agreed upon
a uniform, five-part European Avalanche Danger Scale (Table 5.9; EU-EAWS
2014). Until then the individual countries had used various scales with differing
numbers of danger levels (e.g., seven levels in Switzerland, eight levels in France)
and a variety of definitions of the individual dangers. Since the adoption of a uni-
form scale, user groups in all countries can refer to the same warning levels, which
is of great benefit for all people living in the areas as well as to all snow sport
recreationists. The new scale provides a uniform scale with equivalent formula-
tions that furthermore pays tribute to the sensitivities of the different languages in
the region. It also explains the individual danger levels by describing the relevant
avalanche-triggering probabilities.
The European Avalanche Danger Scale contains five ascending danger levels:
low–moderate–considerable–high–very high. These danger levels are described
by reference to the snowpack stability and the avalanche-triggering probability,
as well as the geographical extent of the avalanche-prone locations and the ava-
lanche size and activity. The snowpack stability forms the basis of all statements
concerning the avalanche danger because it directly controls the probability of an
avalanche being released. In general a strong and well-bonded snowpack is associ-
ated with low avalanche danger. A similar rule applies in reverse: low snowpack
stability, in other words, a weak bonding of the snow layers, indicates elevated
avalanche danger. The avalanche-triggering probability is a measure of likelihood
that depends directly on the snowpack stability. It indicates both the conditions
that exist in the absence of external influences (for natural avalanches) and the
probability of avalanches being released by additional loads as originating from
snow sport participants, etc.).
Fujita Tornado Intensity Scale
The Fujita Scale is a scale for rating tornado intensity, based primarily on the
damage tornadoes inflict on human-built structures and vegetation. Originally the
scale was developed by Fujita (1971) to connect the Beaufort Scale and the Mach-
Number scale (Table 5.10).
The Fujita scale (NOAA), was introduced in 1971 to differentiate tornado
path, windspeed, and intensity based on visual inspection. Moreover, although
the scale gave a general description for the type of damage a tornado could cause,
it did not taken into consideration how the stability of a construction and other
natural-related factors might influence the damage. This methodological bias was
addressed with the Modified Fujita Scale introduced in 1992. Nevertheless the
scale was again modified in 2007 and since then replaced by the Enhanced Fujita
Scale (EF-Scale). It accounts for five different levels of damage that occur related
to different building types and topographical situations. The enhanced scale now
provides a refined damage indicator and thus sets a tornado damage standard.
It also is thought to provide a much better estimate for windspeeds, and sets no
upper limit on the windspeeds for the strongest level (EF5).
Table 5.9  European snow avalanche danger scale
240

Danger level Snow pack stability Avalanche trigger probability Consequences for infrastructure Consequences for persons outside
secured zones
Low The snowpack is generally well Triggering is generally possible No danger Generally safe conditions
bonded and stable only with high additional loads
on very few steep extreme
slopes. Only sluffs and small
natural avalanches are possible
Moderate The snowpack is only moder- Triggering is particularly pos- Low danger of natural Mostly favorable conditions.
ately well bonded on some steep sible with high additional loads, avalanches Careful route selection, especially
slopes; otherwise it is generally mainly on the steep slopes indi- on steep slopes of indicated
well bonded cated in the bulletin. Large-sized aspects and altitude zones
natural avalanches not expected
Considerable The snowpack is moderately to Triggering is possible, some- Isolated exposed sectors are Partially unfavorable conditions.
weakly bonded on many steep times even with low additional endangered. Some safety Experience in the assessment
slopes loads mainly on the steep slopes measures recommended on those of avalanche danger is required.
indicated in the bulletin. In cer- places. Steep slopes of indicated aspects
tain conditions, a few medium and altitude zones should be
and occasionally large-sized avoided if possible
natural avalanches are possible.
High The snowpack is weakly bonded Triggering is probable even with Many exposed sectors are Unfavorable conditions.
on most steep slopes. low additional loads on many endangered. Safety measures Extensive experience in the
steep slopes recommended in those places. assessment of avalanche danger is
In certain conditions, frequent required. Remain in moderately
5

medium and also increasingly steep terrain/heed avalanche run-

large-sized natural 6 avalanches out zones
are expected
Extreme The snowpack is generally Numerous large natural ava- Acute danger. Comprehensive Highly unfavorable conditions.
weakly bonded and largely lanches are expected, even on safety measures required Avoid open terrain
moderately steep terrain
Courtesy EU-EAWS, online access: 20.7.2014
Hazard Assessment
5.2 International Classification Scales of Hazard Intensity 241

Table 5.10  Enhanced Tornado Fujita scale introduced in 2007

Danger level Intensity Windspeed (km/hr) Probability of Damages
occurrence (%)
EF 0 Gale 64–117 38 Some light damage to chim-
neys; branches broken off
trees; shallow-rooted trees
pushed over; sign boards
damaged
EF 1 Weak 118–180 35 Moderate damage, the lower
limit is the beginning of
hurricane windspeed; roofs
begin peeling off; moving
cars pushed off the roads;
attached garages may be
destroyed
EF 2 Strong 181–253 20 Significant damage. Roofs
torn off frame houses;
mobile homes demolished;
boxcars overturned; large
trees snapped or uprooted;
highrise windows broken and
blown in
EF 3 Severe 254–332 5 Severe damage. Roofs and
some walls torn off well-
constructed houses; trains
overturned; most trees in
forest uprooted; heavy cars
lifted off the ground and
thrown
EF 4 Devastating 333–418 1 Devastating damage. Well-
constructed houses leveled;
structures with weak founda-
tions blown away some
distance; cars thrown and
large missiles generated
EF 5 Incredible 419–512 <1 Incredible damage. Strong
frame houses lifted off foun-
dations and carried consider-
able distances to disintegrate;
automobile-sized missiles
fly through the air in excess
of 100 m (110 yard); trees
debarked; steel reinforced
concrete structures badly
damaged
Courtesy Fujita (1971)
242 5 Hazard Assessment

Table 5.11  Indicators of rainfall Intensity

Time Heavy precipitation Very heavy Examples
(mm) precipitation (mm)
5 min 5.0 16.3 mm Berlin-Tegel (25.08.2006)
10 min 7.1 126 mm in 8 min Füssen (25.05.1920)
20 min 10.0
1h 17.1 25 108.3 mm Berlin-Tegel, (25.08.2006)
6h 35
1 day 10.0 20 European definition (http://eca.knmi.nl)
Courtesy German weather service (DWD-online access: 20.7.2014)

Rainfall Intensity
As are the other natural hazards, rainfall intensity is also ranked according to an
internationally harmonized scale. The ranking in general follows the princi-
ple of combining rainfall intensity and time. All meteorological surveys world-
wide exchange their data online under the auspices of the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO). The most important aspect in assessing rainfall intensity
is to define the threshold values for “heavy rainfall” and “very heavy rainfall”.
Table 5.11 summarizes indicators given on such threshold values based on informa-
tion by the German Weather Service (DWD). Next to the definition of the threshold
values, the ranking “very heavy rain” is also defined by statistical assessment. For
this the rank is defined by using percentiles of a normal rainfall intensity distribu-
tion, for example, a rainfall that oversteps the 1, 5, or the 95 % percentile. Another
threshold value defining “heavy rain” is the 24-h rainfall that exceeds 20 % of the
quarterly amount. In practice a combination of percentile values, descriptive statis-
tics, and the frequency distribution of a particular threshold value allows an over-
view of the regional rainfall distribution and provides an easy classification. The
main problem of rainfall intensity assessment is that, for instance, a monitoring sta-
tion that is just hit by a heavy rainfall normally represents a larger region, where in
this case the rainfall was less. Rainfall pattern is very much influenced by the local
geomorphology and the microclimatic situation thus making a regionalization of the
particular value difficult (Baumgartner and Liebscher 1997). This difficulty is the
reason that up to now an internationally agreed-upon definition was not found.

5.3 Hazard Assessment

5.3.1 Single Hazard Assessment

The next step is to go from data on a particular hazard to a regional hazard distri-
bution. The aim of hazard assessment is to identify and map the different hazard
types according to their regional distribution, severities, and frequencies on the
Earth’s surface. In regional disaster prevention hazard maps play a fundamental
5.3 Hazard Assessment 243

role, as only by this instrument can areas of equal levels of hazard be identified:
aggregated to low, middle, or high severity ranks. Based on local data, as well as
on assumptions drawn from equal hazard exposures or from a similar geologi-
cal condition of a well-known region, quite reliable hazard maps can be drawn.
Knowledge of regional hazard distribution is indispensable for spatial planners to
design hazard prevention countermeasures. The conceptual approach of a hazard
map (and this holds true also for disaster distribution maps) therefore has to be
chosen according to the specific topic that is to be worked out. Nevertheless, the
more reproducible data are available and the denser the data and time coverage
is, the more reliable assumptions on the hazard distribution can be drawn on the
potentially affected populations and respective economic assets.
Hazard assessment serves two different aims:
• To assess the hazard potential of a certain area. Therefore detailed information
on a small map scale is required.
• To assess the general hazard exposure of an entire region or a country.
Consequently the map scale has to be much larger and the information density
is less detailed and more generalized.
Assessing the regional distribution of natural hazards deserves at first to define
what type of hazard should be analyzed. This decision automatically defines the
map scale to be chosen (Fig. 5.2). Looking at climate change related hazards

Fig. 5.2  The type of hazard defines the map scale (Own graph)
244 5 Hazard Assessment

(drought, heat wave) deserves a map scale that allows for a very general assess-
ment of the hazardous potential thus covering continents and therefore has a
transnational scope. Assessing storm surge hazards, however, has a more regional
focus, covering an entire country or a part of it. Earthquake or volcanic hazards
are in contrast rather local phenomena that deserve information densities in map
scales that allow for in-depth local assessments. An assessment of the hazard
potential at household level, however, must be based on data at very small scales
collected from the communities or equally exposed households.
A problem in regional hazard distribution maps is how to distinguish between
local hazards that are identified to have low severity and those that have a high
impact potential. The World Map of Natural Hazards (MunichRe 2011) therefore
only displays, for instance, earthquake hazards when they have a probable maxi-
mum intensity of more than 20 % to be expected in a period of 50 years. The Global
Seismic Hazard Assessment Program (GSHAP) of the United Nations (Giardini
1999) on earthquake events only provides those earthquakes with peak ground
acceleration that have a 10 % chance of exceedance in 50 years and a return period
of 475 years. The seismic hazards were calculated probabilistically based on avail-
able earthquake catalogues and databases combined with earthquake source char-
acteristics and an evaluation of the regional ground motion patterns. The GSHAP
program was thus able to clarify the long-standing opinion that only earthquakes
with magnitudes higher than 6.5 are to be ranked as potentially hazardous is no
longer valid. Even small- to medium-sized earthquake hazards can have disastrous
impacts when the geological conditions amplify the ground shaking (liquefaction).
The next problem is how to identify the areal distribution of a hazard type
based on local values. There are different approaches possible to attach a certain
event type to its reasonable area of impact. Hazards that are related to small scales,
such as household accidents or subregional assessments such as traffic accidents
can be easily geocoded by latitude and longitude and then entered into a geograph-
ical information system (GIS).
For example, for assessing hazards from traffic accidents, in Germany the
insurance business breaks the data on losses down to the postal code numbers.
MunichRe (2013) was able to demonstrate that the probable maximum losses
when attributed to the specific policyholder (household) can be reduced by 1–2 %
compared to a postal code attribution. Another example is the US HAZUS-MH
Hazard Assessment (FEMA 2002) that based its hazard distribution on the county
numbers of the entire United States.
However, displaying hazard distribution on a transboundary or even world scale
deserves quite a different approach. Such event types often cover more than one
country or district and thus have to be much more generalized and aggregated
than at a local level. The technical means for displaying such hazard types can be
achieved by using different color codes such as the example given for Germany on
the national distribution risk of storm and hail (Fig. 5.3) or for a largely extended
country such as Indonesia (e.g., “Natural Hazard Distribution; Fig. 5.4).
Alternatively a country affected by a disaster can be defined by a circle the
diameter of which can indicate the severity of the impact, as it has been given
5.3 Hazard Assessment 245

Fig. 5.3  Regional
distribution of Germany
on risk from storm
surges and hailstorms
(Courtesy: Gesamtverband
der Deutschen
Versicherungswirtschaft,
Berlin)

by the MunichRe (2012) (Fig. 5.5) on the aggregated losses of the continents for
the time span 1980–2010 as compared to the volume of insured losses in 2011.
Although such a display has the big advantage to provide an easily understandable
comparison—here a significant shift of insured losses from America to Asia—it
nevertheless does not provide a deeper insight to the specific conditions at risk.
The broader the scope of work or area of interest, the larger is the map scale.
Whereas local hazards are based on investigation at the household, street, or city
level, transnational hazards such as droughts or floods deserve information col-
lected from very large areas. Large areas cannot be assessed by area-related moni-
toring. For such kind of hazard assessment remote-sensing techniques are best
applied. Remote sensing refers to processes of monitoring the Earth’s surface by
optical sensors mounted either on aircraft or on satellites. The technique is espe-
cially applicable to natural hazards assessment because nearly all geologic, hydro-
logic, and atmospheric phenomena are recurring events or processes that leave
evidence of their previous occurrence. Moreover as natural hazards are highly
dependent on the morphology at the location, morphology can play a signifi-
cant role in hazard assessment. Therefore the type of hazard and its specific areal
246 5 Hazard Assessment

Fig. 5.4  Regional distribution of disaster events of Indonesia at provincial level (Courtesy

Badan Geology/Gitews 2005, Indonesia)

Fig. 5.5  Generalized overview of disaster impact severity indicated by circles: comparison of

insured losses per continent (Courtesy MunichRe 2012)

distribution is to be overlain by a digital elevation model (DEM). Natural hazards

including volcano eruptions, earthquakes, floods, or landslides in general follow
distinct geological patterns. It is therefore the central task of any natural hazard
assessment to identify those patterns carefully. Volcanoes are in general easily
located from geographical maps and are visible in nature, whereas earthquakes (in
general) follow plate tectonic and fault zones and are thus in general to be located
by earthquake monitoring. Floods generally occur along river catchment areas and
5.3 Hazard Assessment 247

droughts are highly related to zones with no or little rainfall. But it is not only the
geological setup alone that makes a natural phenomenon hazardous, rather than
the combination of geology with morphology, vegetation, local climate conditions,
and so on. Hazard assessment is thus to identify these different root causes and to
put them in a meaningful cause–effect relationship.
Figure 5.6 gives an example of a landslide hazard assessment of a river catch-
ment area north of the city of Ende (Flores Island, Indonesia; BG/Georisk 2004).
In early 2003 there was a minor landslide that killed 23 people after several days
of heavy rainfall. For hazard assessment the trigger elements of that particular
landslide event were analyzed: geology, morphology, prevailing vegetation, slope
inclination and orientation, and rainfall pattern, all entered into a GIS system to
identify those areas made up of the same parametric given in the figure as red-
marked areas. Thus it was possible to identify those areas along the river that are
composed of the same hazard elements that generated the landslide in 2003 and
that have a similar hazard potential.
Even more local scales are in use when it comes to the assessment of the haz-
ards from (local) flooding, hailstorms, landslides, or snow avalanches. Figure 5.7
gives an example of a detailed map of the snow avalanche hazard of the village
Hinterrhein (Switzerland).
Other than the “classical” geological- and tectonic-based natural disasters, snow
avalanche disasters in most cases result from human interference with nature.

Fig. 5.6  Landslide hazard map of the village of Ende, Flores Island, Indonesia (Courtesy
BG/Georisk 2004)
248 5 Hazard Assessment

Fig. 5.7  Snow avalanche hazard map; village Hinterrhein, Switzerland (Courtesy Amt für Wald,
Gemeinde Hinterrhein, Mittelbünden/Moesano, Switzerland)

A snow avalanche hazard results from the physical interrelationship of four critical
variables: the slope inclination, the snow pack, the weather, and human activity.
Nevertheless even when the weather conditions and the snow quality can change
rapidly, the hazardous situation in general can be assessed beforehand.
The snow avalanche hazard assessment of the village Hinterrhein (Switzerland)
carried out by the national snow avalanche by the Swiss Institute for Snow and
Avalanche Research (SLF) gave a clear indication that the people in former times
(most probably based on long-time experience) located their village where the
lowest to almost a negligible snow avalanche hazard occurs.
Based on the multitude of evidence, experience in the past and transfer of
knowledge from similar hazard-prone areas, the natural hazard distribution of a
certain region can be assessed in general at desk study level. By combining pub-
lished geological, geophysical, volcanological, or other data with disaster events,
for example, of earthquake events, location, magnitude, frequency, and severity
of impact, it is theoretically possible to identify the hazard potential at a level of
certainty, very often already sufficient to work out the baseline for a prevention
strategy. Figure 5.8 provides a stepwise approach to work out a hazard assessment.
First is the identification of the hazard to be investigated, where it is located,
and the geographical, social, and economic patterns that define the area, moreo-
ver, how many disaster events have been recorded. In the example the hazard type
“Snow Avalanche” has been chosen that is known to pose a high threat to a village
in the Swiss Alps, a village that is highly dependent on winter sports recreation-
ists. When a snow avalanche is assumed to pose the only threat to the village, this
5.3 Hazard Assessment 249

Fig. 5.8  Hazard assessment matrix for desk study purpose example: “snow avalanche” (Own
graph)

automatically leads to the assumption that there is no threat in the summertime.

For the desk study analyses it is normally sufficient to resort to the information
that is easily accessible (mainly topography, geography, geology, land use, popula-
tion census, social and economic data, etc.). For the Swiss Alp example it can be
stated that the area at risk is small, comprises a steep to mountainous morphol-
ogy, and has a small and very scattered population distribution. The area is highly
tourist-oriented and experienced two snow avalanches in the year 2003.
The collection of hazard indicators as given in Fig. 5.8 just serves as an exam-
ple. The list of indicators should be worked out according to the data available
and felt necessary. But not necessarily will the assessment be better the more
information there is listed: the indicators should be chosen according to their haz-
ard-related specification and whether they are representative for area under inves-
tigation. There are indicators that are qualitative in nature and others can only be
quantified. The challenge is how to combine qualitative and quantitative indicators
in order to arrive at a harmonized understanding of the risk from snow avalanche
hazard to a certain area. In hazard assessment practice it turned out that data on
the regional hazard distribution, number of previous events, the amount of dam-
age and casualties, the morphology, land use practice and precipitation, the popu-
lation distribution, and the critical infrastructure are best to be listed. To follow
the above-given example on a snow avalanche, the data collected can moreover be
organized in the form of a multifunctional diagram, here for example: a pentagon
(Fig. 5.9). Such a display helps to better assess and value the area at risk from a
snow avalanche hazard and is especially recommended when different areas have
250 5 Hazard Assessment

Fig. 5.9  Hazard assessment pentagon “fictitious” (Own graph)

to be compared. A diagram such as a pentagon, sechseck, or other enables the risk

assessor to either understand the relation of the different sets of indicators to each
other or simultaneously assess their respective level of severity.
When all these data are entered into an area-specific topographical map, a first
hazard assessment of the area can be drawn. However, no risk assessment can be
derived based on such a set of hazard indicators. Such a desk study will rather lay
the base for in-depth local hazard investigations and can perfectly serve to concen-
trate on those areas that are prominently exposed to a certain hazard. Nevertheless
the following steps to a “reliable” and “reproducible” hazard assessment will not
differ very much.
Another tool for an easy, fast, and generalized hazard assessment is a so-called
“decision tree” (also called “decision support system”; Fig. 5.10). The principle
for such a rapid appraisal procedure is given in the example of a tsunami gen-
erated by a volcano eruption. The volcano eruption is supposed to occur with
either a low to negligible VEI (0–2) or is expected to have a higher VEI (2–5).
The volcano might occur submarine or on land, near the coast. Whereas near
coast volcano eruptions even with a VEI higher than 2 are not expected to gener-
ate a tsunami, submarine volcano eruptions experience much different generation
potentials. Underwater volcano eruptions with a VEI of 2–5 can either originate
from an older volcano mountain slope or may produce its own caldera. If the
slope is quite steep and is to occur near the coast (<100 km) the tsunami genera-
tion potential is ranked high, the same as a newly generated volcano that is to be
supposed to form a caldera. All other combinations (small caldera diameter, loca-
tion more than 100 km away from the coast) are supposed to be moderately or
non-tsunamogenic.
5.3 Hazard Assessment 251

Fig. 5.10  “Decision support system” for identifying the tsunami hazard potential from a volcano
eruption “fictitious” (Own graph)

5.3.2 The Hazard Cascade

A regional earthquake occurring along a known tectonic fault or a very local vol-
cano eruption is normally not the kind of event that really puts many people at
risk. The risk from an earthquake rather is that ground motion lets construction
walls collapse and kills people living in that house. Or, for example, a local and
not life-threatening volcanic eruption produces a large volume of ashes that is dis-
posed at the volcano flanks. The eruption, when accompanied by heavy rainfall
(very often the case) often triggers large landslides or lahars that at the foot of the
volcano can flood the houses of citizens settling there. So the lahar that destroyed
the house was a secondary effect (if not tertiary or more). Such a succession of
different types of natural disasters is called a “disaster cascade” as displayed in
Fig. 5.11.
Natural hazards are mainly a result of plate tectonics or climate factors.
Such factors can directly trigger ground motions, volcanic eruptions, a vari-
ation in rainfall patterns, or many other hazardous event types. Indirectly they
can cause secondary hazards, such as landslides that then can develop into mud-
slides when simultaneously heavy rainfall sets in. Or a tsunami is generated
from an earthquake when the oceanic plate is suddenly lifted up. Hazards caused
by other hazards are referred to as concatenated hazards or cascading hazards.
From Fig. 5.12 it becomes clear that these multihazard relationships can be very
252 5 Hazard Assessment

Fig. 5.11  Volcano-lahar multihazard cause-effect relationship (Own graph)

Fig. 5.12  Generalized cause-effect relationship of natural hazards (Own graph)

5.3 Hazard Assessment 253

complex to assess. At the end natural disasters either of tectonic or climatic

­origin all affect society in general or the individual in particular. There are quite
a number of different hazard cascades to be drawn, that can generally be distin-
guished to be of tectonic origin:
• Plate tectonics—ground motion—earthquake—collapse of house—victims
• Plate tectonics—ground motion—earthquake at seafloor—oceanic plate uplift—
tsunami—lowland inundation—destruction of houses—victims
• Plate tectonic—up rise of magma—volcanic eruption—ash deposition—rain—
lahar—flood—damage—victims
Or of climatic/meteorological origin:
• Combustion of carbon—increase in CO2 in atmosphere—change of climate—
melting of ice caps—increase in sea level—inundation of lowlands—
flood-damages—victims
• Climate change—modification of regional climate regime (“ENSO”)—increase
in extreme weather—heavy rains—flooding—damages—victims
As most of the hazard information will be available in the form of highly scien-
tific, technical, or sociologically based information, it is thus difficult to under-
stand by nonscientists. The maps and their verbal explanations have to be
“translated” for user-application purposes (VanWesten 2004). In such a way
“worked over” hazard maps (single and multihazard) can be a significant contri-
bution in the decision-making process, best by having the scientists explain their
findings.
In this context it becomes obvious that many of today’s disaster statistics do
not indicate what type of natural hazards really were the cause and what hazard
type (secondarily) contributed to the disaster. Normally disasters are attributed to
the final type of hazard (lahar/landslide) and not to the lahar-triggering volcano
eruption. The damages caused or the death toll claimed consequently are identi-
fied as lahar/landslide generated, making a realistic disaster assessment quite dif-
ficult. The 2004 tsunami caused damage of two thirds of the buildings of the Aceh
capital. But the damage figures did not distinguish between the tsunami and the
foregoing earthquake event, although it was the third biggest in history. Thus far
our disaster assessment lacks reasonable operation procedures to identify such a
complex means–end relationship. To demonstrate that this discussion is not purely
scientific: if the earthquake resiliency of the many Acehnese houses had been bet-
ter, many houses would (most probably) have been able to withstand the deadly
tsunami flood.

5.3.3 Multiple Hazard Distribution

Multihazard assessment is the basic means for regional and spatial plan-
ning. Single-hazard assessment although it provides valuable information for a
254 5 Hazard Assessment

preventive risk management, is still mostly in use to assess specific scientific and
technical problems related to natural hazards often carried out by natural scientists
and risk assessors. With multiple hazard assessment the focus shifts from a sin-
gle event to a complex relationship between different types of hazards in a certain
region. No longer is a particular problem in the focus but the “risk exposure” of
a region instead. Consequently multihazard assessment has to take the different
hazard types and their interdependencies into account thus requiring a higher level
of generalization of the data compared to a single-hazard assessment. By applying
multiple hazard assessment the natural scientists, engineers, and technicians are
entering the social dimension of risk management, or at least are contributing to it.
In any case multiple hazard assessment demands from natural scientists to address
targets that (often) are seen to lie beyond scientific responsibility; but it is this final
orientation natural scientists have to understand. The society at risk clearly calls
for the provision of reliable and robust data in order to arrive at sustainable solu-
tions to increase social, economic, and ecological resiliency.
The combination of overlay or dependency of different natural hazards to
finally sum up to the hazardous situation a region is exposed to is also called
“cascading” or “concatenating” hazards. Such hazardous situations can best be
assessed by a multihazard assessment, “an instrument that synthesizes informa-
tion derived from several sources. The data is agglomerated in a single assess-
ment to allow for a composite picture of the hazard types, their areal distribution
and severity of impact” (VanWesten ibid). The multiple hazard distribution is dis-
played in overlay maps, a map type that has already proven an excellent tool in
risk management, as it provides a “regional and agglomerated assessment of haz-
ard on an equitable basis.”
Multiple hazard maps deserve, as do single-hazard maps, a pre-emptive deci-
sion to the type of map that should be established:
• What kind of questions shall be addressed?
• What kind of data are available?
• What kind of data are required?
• What groups of society or spatial planners should be addressed?
• What kind of data and in what form do the users need the information?
• What kind of disaster prevention activities should be triggered with the
information?
The assessment of the hazards is normally based on a set of data (statistical, his-
torical, heuristic or scenario-based), that has been collected in the past on the area
of interest. Therefore a hazard type (e.g., landslide run-out, area of volcano ash
deposition, flood levels, earthquake peak ground acceleration distribution, etc.)
is listed, ranked, and then displayed in a map according to the specific areal dis-
tribution. Often such a database proves insufficient for reliable and meaningful
assumptions. Then data from regions that are made up of a similar geological,
morphological, and hazard setting are transferred to supplement the database (see
Fig. 5.6). Such a data “transfer” is justified as long as the data transfer is taken into
account in the final assumption.
5.3 Hazard Assessment 255

In Fig. 5.13 an example of a “synoptic” generalized hazard distribution for the

Asia-Pacific region is given (UN-OCHA 2011). The map shows the areal distri-
bution at risk from earthquake damage (yellow to dark brown), tropical storms
(light to dark blue), and volcanic eruptions (triangles), based on internation-
ally established risk scales. The earthquake intensity is shown according to the
Modified Mercalli Scale (MMI) indicating zones where there is a 20 % prob-
ability that the intensity level will be exceeded in 50 years. For this assumption
the 12° MMI data of MunichRe (NATHAN) were condensed to five in order to
increase understanding. The tropical storm risk was taken from the World Map of
Natural Hazards and indicates tropical storm intensity based on (condensed) five
windspeeds of the Saffir–Simpson hurricane scale. The zones indicate where there
is a 10 % probability of a storm of this intensity to strike in the next 10 years.
Triangles indicate the hazard exposure distribution of volcanoes that have shown
activity in 11,500 years (Holocene). The information the synoptic map revealed is

Fig. 5.13  Synoptic map of risks from natural hazards in Asia-Pacific (Courtesy UN-OCHA
2011)
256 5 Hazard Assessment

that countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar are also in future highly exposed
to earthquake damage and tropical storms, whereas both countries do not show a
risk for hazards from volcanic activity. The Philippines, however, will most prob-
ably be exposed to all three hazard types. In contrast, the western part of Indonesia
shows high exposure to volcanic activity and earthquake hazards and its eastern
parts will mostly face (just) an increased level of earthquake damage. Nevertheless
it should be considered that such type of synoptic maps only give a very gener-
alized picture of the risk or hazard distribution of the area under investigation.
Moreover they do not provide information on how the hazard types may interact,
if they occur simultaneously.
A methodology to derive at such a synoptic (synthesized) distribution of risks
or hazards is, for example, given for a “peak ground acceleration hazard” cum
“landslide hazard” based on an analogue-grid-cell approach for a certain region in
Fig. 5.14. First the distribution of each hazard (“earthquake”; “landslide”) is laid
down in a specific map based on an arbitrary chosen grid. To be able to compare
severity and regional distribution of the different hazard types they have to be clas-
sified according to their respective level of severity. The use of a ranking between
“very low”, “low”, “moderate”, “high”, and “very high” proved to be meaningful
and effective as often tangible (measured) and intangible (arbitrarily assessed) data
have to be combined. Moreover it did turn out to be impractical to introduce too
many severity classes, although the classification is arbitrarily and should be cho-
sen according to the specific situation. In Figure 5.14 the following hazard classes

Fig. 5.14  Multiple hazard assessment based on peak ground acceleration and landslide suscepti-
bility (“fictitious”): dark green 1; lush green 2; yellow 3; pink 4; red 5 (Own graph)
5.3 Hazard Assessment 257

have been identified: very low (green) = 1; low (light green) = 2; moderate (yel-
low) = 3; high (light red) = 4; very high (dark red) = 5. In order to arrive at an
overall hazard distribution of a certain region all hazards are added up (overlain)
to one synoptic multiple hazard distribution map. The example given displays the
sum of severity values at a grid cell base (peak ground acceleration plus landslide
susceptibility). Such a methodological approach opens the chance to aggregate
as many different hazards as required, although the different hazard types are not
identified according to their specific geological, tectonic, or climatic interdepend-
encies, for example, an earthquake that triggers a landslide.
The analogue grid cell approach is only given here in order to explain the oper-
ational procedure. Normally such an aggregation is carried out by a GIS system. A
GIS has (when supported by a digital elevation model) the further advantage that
can display the multiple hazard distribution according to its real morphological,
geological, and land use settings.
In a next step the value of each grid cell is then added to arrive at a synoptic mul-
tihazard assessment as an arbitrary estimation of the hazard exposure level of a cer-
tain area from both landslide susceptibility and peak ground acceleration (Fig. 5.15).
A generalized understanding of a region’s hazard exposure is often given by the
average hazard exposure (50 %). To arrive at this, the percentages of the different
hazard levels are added and then the “mean” hazard value as representative for the
entire region displayed (Fig. 5.16).
Finally, multiple hazards cannot be assessed properly without taking the human
factor into consideration. When a flood, although being a predominantly meteoro-
logical and (somehow climate-related) phenomenon, is entering a human activity
altered flood plain (versiegelte landschaft), the above-normal increased water level

Fig. 5.15  Grid-based A B C D E F G H I J
synoptic multihazard
assessment (Own graph) 1 4 6 7 7 5 4 3 2 2 2

2 4 5 6 7 7 7 6 5 3 2

3 4 5 5 7 7 7 6 4 3 2

4 4 5 6 7 7 7 7 5 3 2

5 4 5 6 8 8 7 8 5 4 3

6 4 5 6 8 9 8 8 6 4 4

7 4 6 6 6 7 8 7 7 5 4

8 4 5 6 6 7 8 7 7 5 4

9 4 5 5 6 7 8 8 6 5 4

10 3 4 5 6 6 7 7 5 5 4

11 2 3 5 5 6 7 7 5 5 4

12 2 3 5 4 5 6 7 6 5 4

13 2 3 2 2 4 4 5 6 6 4

14 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 5 5 5
258 5 Hazard Assessment

Fig. 5.16  Assessment of the

“average hazard” level (50 %)
of an area (Own graph)

can result in a hazard that in turn can develop into risk to the people. Even in devel-
oping countries there are almost no culturally unaltered flood plains any more. There
is a multitude of human interference that changes the former natural conditions of
an area, making it hazardous. Even when we acknowledge that the root causes for
floods are essentially uncontrollable and cannot be prevented entirely, it is human
activity that finally creates the hazard. Therefore hazard assessments should not be
restricted to the natural conditions that contribute to the hazard but also to analyze
where and how human activity is exacerbating the hazard. For instance a flood-
prone broad valley that normally gives ample space to spread heavy rainfall becomes
a hazard when the valley is densely populated, with settlements that deteriorate
the soil–water uptake capacity leading to an increased likelihood of adverse flood
impact. This especially holds true for rivers that are very long or have a large catch-
ment area. The hazard situation gets even more severe when the river crosses coun-
tries with different risk reduction capacities. For instance, the Danube River crosses
on its 2800 km way to the sea 10 different countries. All of them can be affected, if
in the case of technical measures upstream that increase the runoff.
In order to give all river neighbors an equal chance to cope with such flooding, all
major rivers riparian worldwide have founded alliances to organize their waterways.
Famous for such an alliance is the International Commission for the Protection of
the River Rhine (ICPR 2010) that since 1950 coordinates and concerts activities
on the hydrological and ecological protection of the river and particularly on flood
protection and prevention of its five neighboring countries. Such a form of harmo-
nized flood risk management is an integral part of the so-called Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM). Other examples to manage shared water bodies
and thus to solve inherent conflicts from the use of the water in times of droughts
5.3 Hazard Assessment 259

or the release of floodwaters to a low-lying neighbor is the bilateral Ganges Joint

River commission of India and Bangladesh established in 1972. Or the Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI 2014), that was once anchored in a vision to achieve socioeconomic
development through the equitable and sustainable utilization from the common Nile
Basin water resources. The NBI was founded to provide a convenient and permanent
forum that, based on a legal and institutional framework, helps to ensure the equita-
ble and sustainable utilization of the waters. Although the Nile basin carries water
to serve the needs of about 800 million Nile riparian by 2025, it still lacks political
harmony and standardization to settle conflicts from the many national interests. The
flood-related hydrological conditions along the Danube river and the ones prevailing
along the Nile river actually form the “real” hazard of both areas.

5.4 Example of a Multiple Hazard Assessment

(Ende, Flores)

Based on the author’s own research activities in the Flores City of Ende an assess-
ment of the general hazard exposure of the area was carried out in 2003 by the Badan
Geology-GEORISK Project (BD/GEORISK 2005). The district of Ende was sub-
ject to a series of natural disasters in the last 50 years, among them an earthquake
in 1961, and a volcanic eruption in 1969 when Mount Iya, a volcano just 5 km from
the city erupted, producing many flows of lava and several large lahars. The eruption
claimed three lives and destroyed almost 200 houses. In 1988 heavy rainfall triggered
massive landslides and mudflows that claimed 48 lives. Another earthquake in 1992
killed 25 people and let many buildings collapse. In spring 2003 a massive land-
slide was triggered after days of heavy rain along the upper parts of the river reach-
ing the sea just next to the city. The landslide most seriously hit the small village of
Detumbawa north of Ende where 27 people were killed. In the aftermath the Ende
District Administration addressed the GEORISK Project for a rapid and general
assessment of the risk exposure level and for assistance in working out and dissemi-
nating community-based mitigation and prevention measures. To meet the demand
comprehensive field surveys have been carried out, evaluating the morphological,
geological, geophysical, and volcanological base parameters and combining the find-
ings with the land use pattern, rainfall data, and population distribution (Fig. 5.17).
The specific hazard-related occurrences were mapped as shown in Fig. 5.18:
• Volcanic hazard
• Landslide hazard
• Liquefaction hazard
• Tsunami hazard.
Finally all four hazard types identified were combined according to their spatial distri-
bution to a synoptic multihazard assessment. The hazard assessment (hazard specifica-
tion) was based on a Bayesian expert knowledge assessment by which the hazard level
was identified from experience of the Indonesian geoscientists and from perceptions of
the people of Ende. The findings were entered into an assessment matrix.
260 5 Hazard Assessment

Fig. 5.17  Identified natural

disaster occurrences in Ende
District (Flores, Indonesia)
L landslide; A volcanic
ashes; LB volcanic bombs
and lapilli; T tsunami; EL
earthquake/liquefaction.
(Google Earth, city of Ende,
Flores, Indonesia; access
March 2014)

Multiple hazard assessment matrix (Courtesy Badan Geologi /GEORISK project)

Type of hazard Condition of hazard Hazard exposure level
1 2 3
Earthquake/Liquifaction Potential Moderate High Very high
Tsunami Run-up height <3m 3–6 m >6 m
Landslide Susceptibility low Moderate High
Volcanic ash fall Thickness < 5 cm 5–10 cm >10 cm

One area along the eastern shoreline was specifically investigated for its haz-
ard exposure level as it hosts a number of critical infrastructure elements (air-
port, jetty, central full tanks, power station) of the Ende capital. The assessment
revealed that there the hazard level is ranked 8 out of 9.
The volcanic hazard exclusively derives from the Mt. Iya volcano that already
erupted several times claiming casualties and damages. But from volcanologi-
cal surveys around the crater it became evident that significant fractures occurred
around the vent, indicating that if Mt. Iya erupted it would (most probably) be
directed southwest of the peninsula right into the sea. The eruption would be
5.4 Example of a Multiple Hazard Assessment (Ende, Flores) 261

Fig. 5.18  Multihazard assessment of Ende district (Courtesy BG/GEORISK 2004)

similar to the lateral blast of Mt. St. Helens (USA). An assessment of the volume
of volcanic material that may be thrown out from the flank might be enough to
generate a tsunami (BD/GEORISK ibid). The volume of lava flows and the amount
of erupted bombs and lapilli in the past were altogether quite small and were not
believed to pose a considerable risk to the city of Ende. Moreover the volcanic
ashes in the past did not pose a threat to the Ende citizens that would not overstep
their coping capacity. Thus the volcanic hazard was ranked low to moderate.
The landslide hazard assessment revealed that the northern parts of the city of
Ende are exposed from low to moderate, whereas people settling along the river
towards the north were seen to be exposed to higher levels. As with the landslide
event in Detumbawa in April 2003, a landslide also destroyed the only bridge
over a small tributary river just several hundred meters north of the small village
Aemuta, blocking any rescue and relief assistance to the people living upstream in
case of a disaster (Fig. 5.19).
The parameters defining the Detumbawa event revealed, when entered into a
digital terrain model, a general overview about the landslide hazard exposure of
the entire region (see Fig. 5.6). The red-marked spots are concentrated at the east-
ern flank of the valley. But when superimposed on the locations of villages, roads,
bridges, and irrigation canals, it turned out the “only” 10 spots pose a real risk for
disasters. Such an assessment helps disaster risk managers to concentrate on the
most critical hotspots.
262 5 Hazard Assessment

Fig. 5.19  Bridge destroyed from a landslide/debris flow N’ of Aemuta, Flores (Google Earth,
City of Ende, access: March 2014)

Fig. 5.20  Critical infrastructure locations direct at the shoreline; city of Ende Flores, Indonesia;
Google Earth, access, March 2014)
5.4 Example of a Multiple Hazard Assessment (Ende, Flores) 263

The liquefaction hazard is generated from soils becoming liquid when exposed
to physical energy. The energy is in general brought into the system by earth-
quakes. Thus earthquake distribution and unconsolidated fine–medium grained
soil favor liquefacation pose the hazard. In Ende the soils that are conducive to
liquefaction are distributed along both shorelines. They are of volcanic origin or
were deposited at the river mouth east of Ende. But as the soils were not very thick
and their areal distribution is restricted to the broader shorelines, the liquefaction
hazard of the city of Ende was rated low to moderate.
When combining all four hazard types into one single multiple hazard assess-
ment it turned out that the city of Ende is primarily exposed along its east coast
to a tsunami hazard. There the risk for disaster is quite significant, as many criti-
cal infrastructure elements (airport, fuel tanks, power station) are located just there
(Fig. 5.20). As the airstrip is placed at heights between 5 and 15 m above sea level,
a tsunami experiencing a run-up height of more than 6 m already poses a risk to
the airport. And also, because the city of Ende lies more than 2000 km east of
Java, any rescue and relief operation can only be effective when the airport is not
risk exposed. A similar situation also defines the hazard levels of the fuel deposi-
tory and the power station. Recommendations by the GEORISK Projekt were
made to the district administration to level-up the airstrip pavement by at least 2 m
and to protect the tanks and the power station by 6 m high earthen dams.

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and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) in collaboration with the DOST-Advanced Science and
Technology Institute, Manila (online: www.tsunami-alarm-system.com/
Richter, C.F. (1935): An instrumental earthquake magnitude scale.- Bulletin of the Seismological
Society of America, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 1–32, Albany CA
Saffir, H. & Simpson, B. (1971): Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale.- National Weather
Service (NOAA), National Hurricane Center, Miami FL (online: www.nws.noaa.gov)
UNDP (2004): Reducing disaster risk – A challenge for development. - United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations, Geneva
UNDP (2013): Human Development Report 2013 - The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a
diverse World.- United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations, Geneva
UN/OCHA (2011): Natural Hazard Risk in Asia-Pacific (Risk Map). - Regional Office for Asia
and the Pacific (ROAP), Bangkok
USGS (2006): U.S. Geological Survey’s Alert-Notification System for Volcanic Activity. United
States Geological Survey (USGS), Fact Sheet 2006–3139 (online: volcanoes, usgs.gov/
activity/alertsystem)
VanWesten, C.J. (2004): Remote Sensing and GIS for Natural Hazards Assessment and
Disaster Risk Management. - Faculty of Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation
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and Development/The World Bank, Washington DC (online: www.worldbank.org)
Chapter 6
Vulnerability Assessment

6.1 General Aspects

In 2010 there were three earthquakes all of magnitude about 8 on the Richter scale
that caused totally different impacts:
• In Chile the earthquake claimed the life of 500 people, affected 3 million, and
caused a loss of US$30 billion.
• In China the quake killed 2200 people, affected 30 million people and caused a
loss of US$6 billion.
• In Haiti 220,000 people were killed and 4 million affected and the economic
loss amounted up to US$8 billion.
This example clearly shows that the impact can vary from earthquake to earth-
quake, thus raising the questions of why one country is more vulnerable to a dis-
aster than others and what really makes people vulnerable. And other questions
immediately follow:
• Why are particular populations vulnerable?
• How they are vulnerable?
• What group of a society really is vulnerable?

These questions lead to the central question: “What is vulnerability”?

The above-given example clearly points out that vulnerability is related to social
processes and is generally based on the societal, economic, and political fragil-
ity of a country exposed to various hazards. In other words, although disasters
are biophysical in nature and their occurrence (locations), their respective impact
(severity) is the result of a lack of resilience. The prevailing socioeconomic condi-
tions of a country (Chile, China, and Haiti) are in general the dominant factors
favoring the adverse impacts thus creating the risk. The factors defining vulner-
ability have to be identified to lay the base for designing disaster risk mitigation
options. In this regard it is necessary to stress that vulnerability assessment is not

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 265

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_6
266 6 Vulnerability Assessment

and end in itself, but an opportunity to learn from experience in order to identify
future risk exposure.
There are 29 different definitions of the term “vulnerability” collected by
Thywissen (2006) that cover a wide range from technical assessment to impact
on a specific vulnerable group to the behavioral reaction of the global society.
Today’s generally accepted definition is given by UNISDR (2004) and stresses the
factors that make a society vulnerable: “The conditions determined by physical,
social economic and environmental factors or processes, which increase the sus-
ceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards.”
This definition comprises the physical root causes of a disaster as well as the
outcome for the population at risk, although other definitions such as that of
(UNDRO 1991) put the focus more on the damage that potentially may derive
from a disaster. Or in course of the climate change debate the focus shifted more
to the sensitivity of the global systems to cope with assumed impacts (Klein 2003).
Although there is still some confusion in the use of the term “vulnerability,” the
many definitions in use can be viewed essentially as complementary. Moreover the
intensified debate on vulnerability terminology will help to master the complex-
ity of the concept especially in its relation to the state of development. Still much
research on vulnerability merely describe it based on tangible outcomes affected
by stochastic forces of nature, such as aspects of undernourishment, poverty, or
lack of shelter, and still often ignore the social impact or the adjustment capacities
(Kasperson et al. 1988).
The vulnerability definition has no universally acceptance up to now, yet it
can generally be characterized as a function of societal exposure to natural haz-
ards and of the susceptibility of an individual or a societal group to damage or
harm, as well as its capacity to absorb or cope with the effects of these threats. In
this regard vulnerability is a systemic approach that focuses on coping or adap-
tive capacities. But as vulnerability is a multidimensional construct it is not easy
to capture in one single figure. In this context vulnerability is not an “outcome”
but rather a “state or condition of being” as a result of social inequities, for exam-
ple, limited access to resources, lacking of mitigation opportunities as they were
derived from historical patterns of social domination, and marginalization (Eakin
and Luers 2006). When we accept that vulnerability comprises more than the tan-
gible manifestation in loss and harm, then lack of capacity is essentially equivalent
to vulnerability.
As a risk is always closely related with the uncertainty of its occurrence, risk
can be best described by the term “probability”. What is the probability that I will
be injured by a bicycle accident in my home town, or how probable will another
9.2 earthquake offshore Fukushima be? But in this regard another discussion,
closely related to this, complicates the matter: the difference between “probabil-
ity” and “frequency”. Kaplan and Garrick stated (1981, p. 17) that “probability” is,
although being a numerical measure, describing the degree of belief, or of the state
of confidence and knowledge, that such an event will occur, whereas “frequency”
is the (tangible) measurable and objective outcome of an experiment or of a trial.
6.1 General Aspects 267

“Frequency” thus describes the hard facts, whereas “probability” is soft and sub-
jective in this sense actually “non-measurable.” The way the probability scale uses
to compare different kinds of uncertainty needs a calibration for which the fre-
quency will give the standard reference (Kaplan and Garrick ibid., p. 18) “showing
the intimate connection between frequency and probability” and continue saying:
“when ‘frequency’ is the science of handling statistical data then ‘probability’, as
a subject, we might say is the science of handling the lack of data.” They sum-
marize, “when one has no or insufficient data at hand, than probability is the only
thing that can be used.”

6.2 Methods and Instruments

Following this argument, vulnerability assessment has to be based on analytical

methods and approaches that next to the assessment of the physical manifesta-
tions of a disaster, also analyzes the social entitlements and mitigation capabilities.
This would shift the vulnerability paradigm away from food security, sustainable
livelihood, and poverty assessment to a human-oriented conception in which the
people, their activities, their institutions, and their coping capacities will become
the center of analysis (UN-AFD 2004; Benson and Twigg 2007). In its strategic
sense, emergency management is not just about understanding hazard causation;
it is about understanding the relationships of environmental, political, social, and
economic forces that influence and shape the frequency, nature, and location of
emergencies (Buckle 1998).
Next to the hazard assessment the vulnerability assessment addresses the
social, economic, and ecological aspects of the risk-exposed population. Therefore
the categories for vulnerability assessment mainly have to answer the following
questions:
• Who are the vulnerable groups?
• What factors make them vulnerable?
• What are the social and economic outcomes of the disaster exposure?
• What are the needs of the vulnerable groups to increase their level of resilience?
• What are the capacities and abilities the vulnerable groups need to increase their
level of resilience?
These questions (Benson and Twigg, ibid) consequently lead to address vulner-
ability by using indicators. As the disasters are by their frequency, severity, their
probability, and socioeconomic impact difficult to be objectively measured, resort
has been taken to a set of indicators to “measure” the major key elements of vul-
nerability. For practical application purposes only a limited number of indicators
268 6 Vulnerability Assessment

can be used, that have to be aggregated and that are relative in nature. Using indi-
cators to “measure” vulnerability provides a methodological approach that make
at least a generalized vision and impression of the risk exposure of a popula-
tion possible, and that furthermore provide a means for comparing risks of dif-
ferent regions and evaluating the effectiveness of risk mitigation activities. The
main requirements indicators have to fulfill to be used as standard means are that
they are transparent, robust, representative, replicable, comparable, and easy to
understand. Consequently it has to be accepted that the methodologies have their
limitations, reflecting the complexity of what is to be measured and what can be
achieved. Therefore it has in many cases to be accepted that a lack or scarcity of
data may make it necessary to accept assumptions, analogies, and tradeoffs from
other regions (Cardona et al. 2003).
Although the discussion has since long incorporated all kinds of vulnerability,
still most people understand “vulnerability” as only related to economic losses, the
loss of lives, or the number of injuries. This perception is quite understandable as
such elements are easy to assess and communicate. They can be counted, proved
on money terms, or identified on the mere number of casualties. But such elements
only describe a minor fraction of the lives of a society. The reason that social
aspects of vulnerability are very often neglected is based on the fact that such ele-
ments are very difficult to assess. And moreover such an assessment will undoubt-
edly give very different results in different societies, thus making a comparison on
a national basis inhomogeneous, not to say impossible. But such a comparison is
indispensable for a nationwide risk reduction strategy.
Thus any vulnerability assessment has to identify the different elements:
• Direct
• Indirect
• Tangible
• Intangible
Figure 6.1 visualizes the complex relationship between direct and indirect, tangi-
ble and intangible impact from disasters as well as the relationship among these
groups. The graph clearly shows that there is much more in disaster management
to take into consideration than just to count victims and losses.
The relationship between the different elements at risk (Fig. 6.2) can be
explained by an example of the Fukushima-Daichii Nuclear Power Plant
catastrophe.
A Direct–tangible Economic losses, respectively, the costs for reconstruction of
the Fukushima-Daichii Nuclear Power Plant as well as costs for
­reconstruction of the damaged regional infrastructure
B Direct–intangible Death toll from earthquake and tsunami as well as from the nuclear
power plant explosion and radioactive fallout
C Indirect–tangible Economic losses from power failure, interruption of industrial and
agricultural production as well as gross social product
D Indirect–intangible Mistrust in the socioeconomic and cultural leadership of national
and local governments
6.2 Methods and Instruments 269

Fig. 6.1  Direct and indirect social and economic vulnerability (Own graph)

tangible intangible

direct
direct

A B
indirect

indirect

C D

tangible intangible

Fig. 6.2  Relationship between different elements at risk (direct and indirect, tangible and intan-
gible; Own graph)
270 6 Vulnerability Assessment

Direct and tangible losses are those losses that can be measured, calculated, and
valued in terms of money and statistics. In the case of an earthquake, such losses
comprise the number of houses destroyed and their reconstruction costs, as well as
the costs for the rehabilitation of the technical and material infrastructure. Indirect
and tangible losses comprise losses that cannot be directly attributed to the dis-
aster anymore. For instance, the earthquake has damaged much of the industrial
assets and machinery, so that industrial production cannot start again; or most
of the labor workers have been killed, so that experienced personnel are lacking.
Intangible but directly attributable are losses that concern the victims themselves.
As a rule, although it was for a long time not seen as ethical to economically value
a person’s life quite a lot of attempts have been carried out in the last years to
value the statistical life (see Sect. 7.2). Thus far the death toll of an earthquake
from a following tsunami has not been counted economically. Much more difficult
to assess are losses that are hardly measurable and that seldom can no longer be
connected to the disaster event. For instance, as with the tsunami event in Banda
Aceh (Indonesia) most of the administrative infrastructure was destroyed, and
the health system and the social services were not functioning at all. The survi-
vors often died or suffered from the missing services. Imagine that the tsunami
destroyed many local health service centers in a far remote area. Among the vic-
tims was an elderly woman who survived the flood without any injury, but lost
all her family and relatives. The psychological stress resulted in a heart attack a
couple of days later, therefore she was admitted to a hospital 50 km away, where
she died three weeks later from lung failure. Was the death of the woman a follow-
up from the flood and how it is methodologically meaningful to attribute the lethal
lung failure to the original disaster onset of the earthquake plus the tsunami.
Obviously a simple tangible loss calculation methodology will not be able to
estimate the complete losses and it thus creates a bias situation on the adverse
effects of “higher-order of impacts” (Kasperson et al. 1988), a bias that can only
be overcome by introducing a “social amplification” factor in the vulnerability
assessment. Although Slovic et al. (1982) confessed that they are not able to offer
a complete assessment instrument, they point out that by incorporating “social
amplification” in the assessment, the impact of disasters will be more reasonably
evaluated. Their main approach is to “link technical assessment with psycho-
logical, sociological and cultural perspectives of risk perception and risk-related
behavior.” They point out that such components can either amplify or attenuate
the felt impacts. Moreover, in emergency management practice death is the basis
for loss coverage. But in addition to the death toll, very often people are missing
and as long as they are not recovered (dead or alive) they are not entered in the sta-
tistics. It takes often years before missing persons are officially declared dead. In
the meantime insurance companies do not cover the loss. The situation even gets
worse if the husband was killed on the occasion. In many societies a widow is not
accepted as “head of a family” and thus has big problems in being a partner to set-
tle financial and social formalities. In many countries, moreover, the risk insurance
operational practice is the so-called 72-h rule, meaning that all incidents occur-
ring 72 h after an event are not attributed to the risk insurance liability. On one
6.2 Methods and Instruments 271

hand this deadline makes sense in regard to how else can live insurance companies
handle the many kinds of illnesses following an event. But the multitude of dead-
full crisis and conflicts results very often in serious and long-term traumatization
of the victims who are consequently not liable for insurance. Thus far there is no
methodological instrument at hand that combines the two aspects of risk manage-
ment in a meaningful and operationally practical manner.
The normally applied instrument of valuing direct tangible losses is by using
reconstruction costs. If insured, such costs are covered by the insurance company
either totally or partially. But what if the house owner was not able to pay the
risk premium? Then the loss would be fully on him. Secondly, reconstruction can
mean to repair just the damages based on the value of the house at the time of the
disaster. But what if it were an old house with a very low value; the repair cost
coverage would be low, although it might not be livable anymore, a situation that
exists quite often in developing countries.
The following indicators provide possible descriptions of the factors that make
up “vulnerability”: natural disaster risk exposure, socioeconomic weaknesses,
level of societal resilience, and so on:
Social sector
• High population density in settlements (large housing complexes)
• Settling high-risk areas (flood-prone lowlands, landslide-prone slopes)
• Low-quality houses (not seismic structured, bad electricity, no sanitation)
• Lack of mobility (no transport facilities to evacuate from a disaster), limited
access to resources (no financial means, poor technical knowledge), exclusion
from development decisions (no participation)
• Risk perception differs strongly
• Lack of education
• Poverty
Institutional sector
• Poor risk and emergency management
• No hazard/vulnerability/risk assessment
• Low interest in problems of socially and economically marginalized groups
• Urban planning not reflecting natural hazards
• Unplanned urbanization
• Lack of proper risk planning
• Lack or poor implementation of identified mitigation measures
• No or low level of enforcement of law and order (failed states)
Physical/technical sector
• Poor construction quality (bad bricks, no cement, no tightening of roofs to
walls)
• Infrastructure not or badly maintained
• Critical infrastructure exposed to high risk
272 6 Vulnerability Assessment

Economic sector
• High import and low export quota
• Dependency on monocrop agriculture
• No diversification of industrial and agricultural production
• No added-value production
• Subsistence economy
• Bad ratio of indebtedness to export earnings
• Dependency on foreign aid (budget, relief, welfare)
• Sale of fertile land to international investors (landgrabbing)
Environmental sector
• Erosion of fertile land (degradation)
• Deforestation
• Flooding or drought
• Pollution of soils and groundwater bodies
• Destruction of mangrove forests
• Local change in climate (hot summers, dry winters)
This meta-category structure helps to identify the specific dimensions that define
people’s exposure to disasters that makes them vulnerable. As the central aim of
vulnerability assessment is to provide information on how to diminish problems, it
is better to avoid future vulnerability in total, and serious information can only be
derived from many impacts and events of the past. For this quite a long timeline of
disaster information is required; unfortunately often such timelines are missing or
scarce. Furthermore, acquiring the necessary information is in general easier to be
achieved from individuals and well-organized communities that have robust and
reliable information at their disposal, whereas societies settling in remote areas
often lack this kind of information system. The dilemma is that those who are well
organized and living at a state-of-the-art disaster resilience normally are not those
strongly exposed to natural disasters, and those living in marginalized environ-
ments suffer more. In order to cover the information gap making specific assump-
tions and drawing analogies to assess at least the dimension of hazardous threats is
very often unavoidable.
There are at least three different levels of interventions to identify vulnerability:
• The local level, where the information is in general quite easily structured as the
problems have a distinct cause–effect relationship (e.g., local flood after heavy
rainfall).
• At the national level (e.g., drought in one of the Sahel zone countries) different
socioeconomic and political root causes interact.
• At the regional level a strong participation of local stakeholders as well as the
national level is required, as there, many “local” mitigation activities need
national backing for implementation.
In order to design appropriate countermeasures at the local level, participation of
the people at risk is indispensable, as only they can provide information according
to long-time experience and, moreover, give the identified countermeasures politi-
cal legitimization. At the national level an involvement of the many stakeholders,
6.2 Methods and Instruments 273

affected population, decision makers, as well as disaster risk managers will open
the chance to combine insights on the local problems and experience of disaster
management with the authority to implement the findings. The larger the area at
risk (regional/national level) the more it will be necessary to draw knowledge from
best-practice examples based on expert opinion, analogous or historical studies,
and/or modeling.
As we have seen, the impact of natural disasters is not randomly distributed
over the globe. There are distinct patterns to be recognized, where the disas-
ter impact is superimposed by the social status of the exposed populations, their
“membership in a devalued social category,” their social organization, and their
way of interaction (Bolin and Stanford 1998). There is great disparity to be seen
between the rich and poor leading to an increased isolation of the poorest in settle-
ments on metropolitan fringes, in inner cities, in remote rural areas, or in areas that
are historically known to be unsuitable for any settlement. Moreover, all devel-
opment statistics prove that this trend will increase in the future. The impact is
that poor households recover more slowly, likely have higher mortality rates, and
many never fully regain pre-impact levels, increasing their vulnerability to future
hazards (Morrow 1999; Wisner et al. 2004). In the beginning, emergency manage-
ment concentrated mainly on material and economic (tangible) indicators, and
in the course of time it was extended to include human resources (labor, income,
education), family and social resources (medical care, access to water, energy),
and political resources (political participation, self-determination), making risk
assessment today a complex task that deserves a working together of natural sci-
entists, sociologists, medical doctors, and even psychologists (traumatization) and
others. The “social order and its everyday relation to the habitat and the larger
historical circumstances” define the vulnerability. The resiliency of a household
not only depends on the social status (income, education, etc.) but is also clearly
defined by its integration into the community. Only when the affected populations
formally participate in the prevention and awareness-raising efforts, will they be
able to develop mechanisms that enable them to master their living circumstances.
Thus they would no longer be exposed to the decisions by the governing politi-
cal structures that too often (“only”) promote their particular interests (Cannon
2008; Morrow ibid) by neglecting the social and economic processes to govern the
impact.
Cannon (ibid) further stated that there are “sets of unequal access to opportuni-
ties and unequal exposures to risks as a consequence of the socio-economic sys-
tem.” This social paradigm not only is true for societal minorities or, for example,
women or ethnic minorities, but also holds true for many least-developed countries
as the Haitian earthquake disaster clearly has demonstrated.
Emergency management therefore has to recognize the importance of design-
ing prevention policies to suit the specific needs of the risk-exposed societies. It
has to focus on the socioeconomic and cultural patterns of vulnerability, not on the
geographical alone. The first step for such an emergency management is to work
out a community vulnerability inventory, sometimes referred to as a community
hazard and risk assessment profile by registering the population density, its age,
274 6 Vulnerability Assessment

sex, and income distribution as well as the percentage of elder, younger, and disa-
bled people, who all are likely to need special attention in an emergency. Although
it is unrealistic to collect such vulnerability data for every individual household,
planners should make use of communal databases, or from areas under detailed
investigation to extrapolate the percentage of vulnerable groups. A community
vulnerability inventory can comprise (among others) these indicators:
• Population distribution
• Ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities
• Population concentration: <15, >65
• Ill, disabled
• Women, children
• Poor/large households
• Residents rendered homeless
• Material infrastructure (communication, traffic)
• Access to resources (water, power, sanitation)
• Access to medical care, schools, hospitals
• Distribution of income, labor, insurance, political participation
By many societies and based on tradition, experience, and ethnic belief, disasters
are often seen as a token of external origin. But when carefully evaluated, it turns
out that in many cases disasters are a result of an interaction of natural conditions
that are superimposed and/or juxtaposed to human activity. According to the risk
definition given in Chap. 7, risk is seen as the social, economic, and ecological
impact of a natural hazard with serious adverse effects, and having in mind that
disasters are often a result of a cascading nature of disasters, a more complicated
picture develops. For example, a dam that is constructed in the upper part of a val-
ley to manage the numerous floods there increases the water flooding rate and the
water level that reaches the low-lying riparian, making that region more vulner-
able than it was before the risk management measures were undertaken. Thus not
only rainfall and the shape of the catchment area define the flood risk but also very
often interference of the human being.

6.3 Vulnerability Indicators

The basic intention of a vulnerability assessment is get a measure that enables the
risk assessors to compare the threat to which a society or a social group in differ-
ent regions or countries is exposed. In order to make the vulnerabilities compara-
ble it is necessary to develop sets of specific hazard-related indicators that rank
the levels of vulnerability in relation to the likelihood of future disasters. Based
on such indicators local vulnerability maps can be worked out that help to identify
where high-risk groups are concentrated and, where found necessary, mitigation
countermeasures can be designed and implemented accordingly. As often there
are not enough data available on a specific area at risk, data from other analogous
6.3 Vulnerability Indicators 275

regions and generalized assessments can be incorporated to put the assessment

on a more reliable base. But vulnerability maps should not only identify the
areas at risk but also identify community self-help potentials and resources, such
as shelters, community health services, capacity of water and energy, local vol-
unteer service groups or neighborhood response networks, and so on. Combining
vulnerability indicators with the hazard distributions is best achieved by using a
GIS system. Such GIS-based information provides effective crisis-response tools.
Emergency managers are provided with indispensable baseline data to design
appropriate disaster prevention measures as well as provide the populations at
risk with information to improve their disaster resilience capacity. The informa-
tion compiled in the vulnerability maps is a strategic tool for awareness-raising
initiatives, disaster mitigation programs, evacuation plans, humanitarian relief
distribution, and other response services (FEMA 2012). And they moreover allow
working out the disaster prevention infrastructure in accordance with locally
adoptable technologies. As mitigation is costly and—as all over the world the
financial means for prevention are generally too small—such prevention measures
can thus be prioritized and implemented accordingly.
In 2006 the United Nations carried out a worldwide assessment in order to
identify the populations and localities that are at risk, as well as to understand
the different causes leading to human vulnerability. The Gravity Project (Peduzzi
et al. 2002, 2009), as a part of the United Nations International Decade of Natural
Disaster Reduction, aimed to highlight the populations with the highest needs
in risk reduction to mitigate hazardous exposure and to decrease possible future
casualties. This assessment was mainly based on a collection of information and
datasets from open accessible data of leading disaster risk management organi-
zations including UNOCHA, UNISDR, UNEP/GRID, or the USGS. The main
difficulty in comparing human vulnerability of different societies consists of dif-
ferentiating whether populations are affected because of a high frequency and/or
magnitude of events, or because of a high vulnerability from the different situa-
tions in which they live. The geoscientific-related aspects of the Gravity Project
were derived from comprehensive databanks such as the Global Seismic Hazard
Assessment Program, the Smithsonian Institution’s Global Volcanism Program, or
many others.
The project combined extensive geographical, geological, and hydromete-
orological datasets in order to estimate the physical disaster exposure (frequency,
magnitude, and population exposed), as well as data on the socioeconomic ele-
ments. The advantage of the Gravity Project was that it successfully combined
data of purely geoscientific origin with those of social and economic origin. The
main limitation while mixing scientific and socioeconomic parameters lies in
the difference of regional expansion and in the time scale of the datasets. Social
data are normally clearly to be defined in number and value (population den-
sity, income distribution, unemployment rate, and so on) whereas geoscientific-
related data are often not tangibly accessible. Moreover, socioeconomic factors
can change within in short time span, whereas geological phenomena in general
take centuries to result in visible changes. Hazard occurrences are not confined
276 6 Vulnerability Assessment

to national boundaries or sovereignty delineations. Another difficulty that con-

cerns geoscientific as well as socioeconomic data is quality. The state of science
and statistics is highly different all over the world. For instance, much of Africa
had never been properly assessed for its volcanic and earthquake exposure.
But social data are in many developing countries also highly difficult to assess,
although the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been able
to classify the living conditions of all countries for more than 30 years by the
Human Development Index (HDI) or the Human Social Index (HSI) and others.
Moreover, it is complex to compare, for instance, seismic-structured buildings or
well-maintained flood protection dams that were installed by prosperous nations
enacted under comprehensive building codes with impacts from disasters in coun-
tries that lack all of such legal, technical, and financial means. An aspect relat-
ing to neighboring countries, for instance, regards a water catchment area. How
does one compare the hazard exposure when the upper riparian does not comply
with agreed-upon flood protection measures and thus the lower riparian territory is
flooded regularly. The most critical step in every vulnerability assessment is when
data of very different scales and measures are categorized in classes from 0 to 10
or 0 to 100, and so on. In the next step these newly created classes are then com-
pared exclusively on these harmonizations (Table 6.1) that mean, for instance, data
on peak ground acceleration measured by instruments are then treated as equal to
data based on personal perception, such as on the felt earthquake impact based on

Table 6.1  Factors used by the Gravity Project to compare socioeconomic status of countries
under investigation
Economy Gross domestic product at purchasing power parity
Total dept. service in percentage of the exports of goods and
services
Inflation rate and annual food price index
Unemployment rate as percentage of total labor force
Land use Percentage of arable land
Percentage of urban population
Percentage of woodland and forests
Percentage of irrigated land
Demography Annual population growth rate
Growth rate of urban population
Population density as percentage of total population density
Age–dependency ratio
Health and sanitation Average calorie supply per capita
Percentage of people with access to adequate sanitation
Percentage of people with access to safe water
Number of physicians per 1000 inhabitants
Number of hospital beds
Life expectancy at birth
Politics Transparency index (corruption)
Infrastructure Number of radios per 1000 inhabitants
Courtesy Peduzzi et al. (2002)
Table 6.2  Example of vulnerability indicators for country “A” (fictitious)
Sector Very high High vulnerability Moderate Median Low vulnerability Very low
vulnerability vulnerability vulnerability vulnerability
Population >1 million 1 million–500,000 500,000–250,000 250,000–100,000 100,000–50,000 <50,000
6.3 Vulnerability Indicators

Urban planning No planning at all Poor planning, Disaster risk Disaster risk Disaster risk Sustainable ­planning
no disaster risk management only management management is that integrates disas-
management generally men- mentioned in an integral part of ter risk ­management
tioned in planning detail in planning planning process and prevention
documents documents but prevention measures are
measures not implemented
implemented
Stability of Adobe Brick Concrete Reinforced con- Steel-structured Seismic structure
buildings crete–steel framing construction
Agricultural sector High dependency Monocrop, most Food supply based Agriculture partly Diversified Highly diversified
on international food must be on 2–3 crops diversified agriculture and value- added
food aid imported production lines
Natural disasters >9 m 8–9 7–8 6–7 5–6 <5
(earthquake)
Economic sector Single product, no Single product, Added-value pro- Diversified prod- Multiple ­products, Added-value
added-value pro- added-value duction, still high uct, market highly fair market ­production, high
duction (gold) options import dependency volatile opportunities export earnings
277
278 6 Vulnerability Assessment

Fig. 6.3  Comparison of vulnerability index

vulnerability of different 36
countries (A) to (E) based on
34
indicators given in Table 6.2 Country (A) E
32

30

28
26 C
24 D
A
20
18
B

12
6

the empirically developed Mercalli scale. The Gravity Project made use of all such
kinds of datasets and successfully arrived at a single standard for natural hazards.
Methodologically the vulnerability categories are entered into a table attribut-
ing the different values (severity) in a harmonized scale. The scale can be set arbi-
trarily (see also: PAHO/WHO 1998; Dwyer et al. 2004) in order to harmonize the
validity of the categories as given in Table 6.2.
For example, the vulnerability of a country (A) is assessed in relation to other
countries based on the above given “harmonized” vulnerability indicators (based
on Table 6.2): very high = 6, to very low = 1). Summing up the different vulner-
ability levels for country (A) to (E) it turns out that the vulnerability index ranges
between 19 and 33. Country (B) has the lowest vulnerability (19), whereas (A) is
low to moderate and (E) is the highest (33). With such an operation it is possible
to compare vulnerabilities of different regions, as long as the investigation is based
on the same set of indicators (Fig. 6.3). The method does not provide a measure of
the “objective” vulnerability of a certain region rather than the relationship of the
vulnerabilities of different regions.

6.4 Vulnerability Assessment

According to the term, “the past is the key to the future,” such a vulnerability
assessment can also be used to identify the level of resilience a society intends to
achieve. Therefore vulnerability should not only be restricted to information on
the present state of risk exposure but also as a measure of potential consequences
(casualties, physical damage, cultural deterioration, etc.) such events may cause
(Table 6.3).
The basic means to assess future vulnerability are to identify the specific haz-
ard exposure of people and livelihoods by either evaluating the level of exposure
6.4 Vulnerability Assessment 279

Table 6.3  Assessment of potential consequences from natural disaster (fictitious)

Consequences
In-significant Minor Moderate High Very high
Likelihood Most probably Moderate High High Extreme Extreme
Likely Moderate Moderate High Extreme Extreme
Seldom Low Moderate High High Extreme
Rare Low Low Moderate High High
Unlikely Low Low Moderate High High

deterministically or probabilistically. The basis for the evaluation is in any case

experience and expertise, experience that has been encountered by the risk-
exposed population or knowledge-based by the expert’s judgment (Bayesian
assessment). In reality both ways are combined and result in the most usable infor-
mation gain. Following this argument, vulnerability assessment has to be based
on analytical methods and approaches that next to the assessment of the physi-
cal manifestations of disasters, also analyzes the social entitlements and mitiga-
tion capabilities. This shifts the vulnerability paradigm away from food security,
sustainable livelihood, and poverty assessment to a human-oriented conception
in which the people, their activities, their institutions, and their coping capacities
become the center of analysis (UN-AFD 2004; Benson and Twigg 2007). In its
strategic sense, “emergency management is not just about understanding hazard
causation; it is about understanding the relationships of environmental, political,
social and economic forces that influence shape the frequency, nature and location
of emergencies” (Buckle 1998).
The method that is today mostly in use to define the dependency of “frequency”
and “probability” is given in the following graphs, derived from log-normal dis-
tribution of probability versus frequency (see also: WBGU 1999). The example
in Fig. 6.4 describes the basic elements of a vulnerability assessment procedure.
It deliberately refrains from any mathematical/stochastic algorithms and only
wants to present the main operational steps. The figure gives the weekly flood-
level record of a particular year. The river normally experiences a low-water level
of about 1 m, that can rise up to 10 m in times of flood. The number of water
levels recorded is summed up and then categorized accordingly. The graph gives
a three-modal water-level distribution with flood peaks in February, August, and
December. As the water level rises up to, for instance, the 5-m level, it has also
passed the 1 to 4-m levels. These water levels are also entered into the calculation.
When entered into a cumulative curve, the probability of exceedance of a mean
flood level (50 %) can be calculated, as well as every other flood level (Fig. 6.5).
For instance the 10 % exceedance percentile that means a flood level of 10 m will
be exceeded only in 10 % of all floods, or the 90th percentile with water levels
higher than 1.2 m. If the level of the hundred-year flood is entered into the graph,
it becomes obvious from which water level on flood risk reduction measures have
to be initiated.
280 6 Vulnerability Assessment

Fig. 6.4  Water level record of a river over a one-year period (fictitious)

Water level

Probability
(%)

Fig. 6.5  Cumulative curve on probability of exceedance of flood levels (fictitious)

As the vulnerability is according to what has been mentioned before composed

of two different elements:
• Risk exposure
• Risk preparedness
a method is required to enable us to distill the indicators describing these two sub-
jects and enable us to arrive at just one figure. As large countries such as India or
the United States are known to be exposed to a multitude of natural disasters and
both countries are at places populated by hundreds of thousands of inhabitants and
6.4 Vulnerability Assessment 281

Fig. 6.6  Idealized Probability

(severity/impact)
mathematical relationship
between probability and
frequency (Own graph) high

medium

moderate

low

rare seldom frequent often

Frequency

other regions only have a small population, an indicator has to be developed that
can work out the difference between such different regions.
The mathematical dependence between probability and frequency is based on
the general idea: Catastrophic events that are very strong, occur only rarely; while
those that are of a low in intensity occur quite often. From this assumption, the
graph in Fig. 6.6 can be derived.
Probability is one of the governing factors in risk assessment as it is “an equally
weighted parameter that helps us to quantify and prioritize mitigation actions”
(FEMA 2004, 2012). Probability is seen by many risk managers as a solely techni-
cal parameter, based on tangible counting of disaster events and its direct losses.
Several probability calculation tools are in use, especially by the insurance sector
mostly applying Monte Carlo simulations or other stochastic probability calcula-
tion methods. But to an individual affected by a hundred-year flood it is difficult
to communicate that he was victim to an event with just a probability of 0.001 %
per year. To overcome this misunderstanding, it turned out that probability is better
expressed by qualitative expressions, using words that describe the chance of an
event occurring.
Possible descriptions of likelihood of risk are:
• Certain (>99 % probability) = one or more occurrences per year.
• Likely (50–90 % probability) = one occurring every 1 or 2 years.
• Possible (5–49 % probability) = one occurring every 2–20 years.
• Unlikely (2–5 % probability) = one occurring every 20–50 years.
• Rare (1–2 % probability) = one occurring every 50–100 years.
• Extremely rare (<1 % probability) = one occurring every 100 or more years.
Accordingly possible verbal descriptions of risk consequences are:
• Catastrophic = Large number of fatalities and severe injuries, extended and
large number of people requiring hospitalization.
• Major = Extensive injuries, significant hospitalization; fatalities.
282 6 Vulnerability Assessment

• Moderate = Medical treatment needed but no fatalities; some hospitalization.

• Minor = Small number of injuries but no fatalities; first-aid treatment required.
The methodological concept behind this type is the functional relationship
that low-grade events occur quite often, and strong and severe events occur rather
seldom. Such curves are known from all kinds of probability distribution func-
tions, for instance, the health sector (increase in illnesses vs. age), damage from
car accidents, or crop yield versus years, and has found broad application also for
the assessment of natural disasters: earthquakes, floods, landslides, and so on. For
example, the many hailstorms in Germany over the last decades were monitored
by German risk insurers. They plotted the diameters of the hail particles and com-
pared them with the frequency of their occurrence (Fig. 6.7). It turned out that hail
of 1–2 cm in diameter occurred very often, whereas hail the size of 5–7 cm has
been very rare. Nevertheless in summer 2013 there was a hailstorm in Germany
that locally produced hail particles of 8 cm in diameter; the biggest particle size
ever recorded in Germany leading to damages of €1 billion within in 1 h. From
such type of plot, risk insurers calculate their hailstorm portfolio. Superimposing
the hail’s size-induced damages (severity) with frequency an insurance company
may decide that it might be economically unreasonable to allocate financial means
to cover losses, for instance, for hail damage smaller than 5 cm in diameter, but to
raise the premium for larger hail-size damage.
In order to arrive at a probability distribution of floodwater levels, the recorded
flood levels are categorized according to their severity levels and juxtaposed to the
respective frequencies. The indication on severity and frequency can be chosen
arbitrarily (Table 6.4; Fig. 6.8). A further advantage of such type of probability
distribution is it opens the chance to extrapolate the distribution function to assess,
for instance, flood levels that have not been experienced thus far.
The probability distribution function for the vulnerability from earthquake is
broadly used. From the geological record, say 30 earthquake events were taken
with magnitudes ranging from 4.1 up to 7.8 on the Richter scale over a time span

Fig. 6.7  Hail-size
distribution as an
example of a loss
damage frequency curve
(Courtesy Gesamtverband
der Deutschen
Versicherungswirtschaft,
Berlin)
6.4 Vulnerability Assessment 283

Table 6.4  Flood levels Water level (m) Severity level Frequency

categorized according to
>9 Very high <10 % Very rare
severity and frequency
(fictitious) 9 High 10–25 % Rare
8
7 Increased 25–40 Seldom
6
5 Moderate 40–55 Occasionally
4
3 Low 55–70 Often
2
1 Very low 70–85 Very often
<1 Nil >85

Fig. 6.8  Probability of
flood-level distribution
(fictitious)

of 80 years in a certain area; the vulnerability is assessed by a vulnerability curve

(Fig. 6.9). From the record it can be revealed that 16 earthquakes with a magni-
tude 4.0–5.0 have occurred, and earthquakes with magnitudes >7.0 were very sel-
dom (3). The magnitudes (4.1–7.8) were grouped into 4–5 (low), 5–6 (middle),
and 7–8 (high) Richter scale classes and were then plotted against their frequency
(1–3, 3–6, 6–10, >10 times of occurrence). The boundaries were set arbitrarily.
The vulnerability curve indicates that earthquakes with low magnitudes in the past
have occurred and will in future be expected to occur about 10 times in a 80-year
interval, whereas earthquakes of magnitudes >7.0 on the Richter scale should
occur (only) four times in the same time span. The vulnerability curve thus pro-
vides a quite realistic vision of the future vulnerability from earthquakes for the
area under investigation, stating that earthquakes higher than M7.0 will occur very
rarely (time scale has to be defined arbitrarily) whereas earthquakes of a lower
severity (M < 4.5) may occur very often.
The instrument of the vulnerability curve can also be applied for very specific
vulnerability assessments, for instance, on earthquake-exposed buildings. An
example for this is the assessment of the vulnerability for residential buildings in
284 6 Vulnerability Assessment

Fig. 6.9  Probability estimate severity

of possible earthquake
occurrence from historical
magnitude and frequency high
distribution (fictitious)

middle

low

veryrare rare quiteoften often

frequency

Fig. 6.10  Mean damage 5

Meandamage grade

vulnerability index 0.9

grade based on vulnerability
vulnerability index 0.8
curves from relating to
vulnerability indices of the 4
vulnerability index 0.7
Manjil earthquake 1990
(Courtesy Omnidar et al. 3
2011)

6 7 8 9 10 11
Earthquake intensity
(acc. European Macroseismic Scale 98

Iran (Fig. 6.10) to provide a basis for estimating the damage features by future
earthquakes (Omvidar et al. 2011). For such a vulnerability assessment, all struc-
tural damages from the Manjil earthquake (Iran 1990) have been assessed, using
a set of indicators that comprehensively describe the disposition of a building for
earthquake events such as adobe walls, unreinforced brick walls with wooden
beams, unreinforced steel frame without bracing, steel frame with bracing, rein-
forced concrete frames or reinforced concrete shear walls, and many more. When
the findings are plotted against the seismicity’s experience, a set of vulnerability
curves is derived indicating what damage ratios are to be expected if in the area
under investigation an earthquake, say of magnitude 7.8 struck buildings of a vul-
nerability index, say 0.8 (=damage ratio of 2). Such an assessment can then be
made the basis for designing and implementing seismic mitigation measures in
order to improve local earthquake resilience.
Following this methodological concept Kammel (2012) made a much gener-
alized assessment of the vulnerability of central Java (Indonesia) based on pub-
lished disaster event data. He calculated the specific vulnerability distribution of
6.4 Vulnerability Assessment 285

earthquakes, landslides, floods, and tsunamis and then combined the respective
vulnerability curves in one plot, deriving the overall vulnerability from the said
hazard types of that particular region (Fig. 6.11). Although the earthquake vulnera-
bility shows a broad range of frequency compared to severity, the other vulnerabil-
ities (landslides, floods, tsunamis) show different curves according to their disaster
event characteristics. In the next step all curves are aggregated into one graph
revealing a corridor of vulnerabilities for the country “A”. The average vulnerabil-
ity for the country is given by the red curve, and the upper and lower limits of the
vulnerability corridor are marked by the pink curves. By arbitrarily dividing the
vulnerability corridor into meaningful sections, for example, 30, 60 %, higher or
lower than the average, the potential vulnerability for country “A” can be assessed.
The disaster vulnerability curves pinpoint the assumption that country “A” has a
potential vulnerability on average for a disaster to occur with a <60 % probability
(“very rare”) with a high severity, and there is a >60 % probability (“quite often”)
that a disaster of a severity “low to medium” will occur.

Fig. 6.11  Assessing the overall vulnerability of country “A” based on the respective vulnerabili-
ties of earthquakes, landslides, floods, and tsunamis (Courtesy Kammel 2012)
286 6 Vulnerability Assessment

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Chapter 7
Risk Assessment

7.1 General Aspects—Definition and Explanations

The international discussion on risk has mostly originated from the assessment
of risk in the fields of medical services, the chemical industry, and especially
after the nuclear catastrophes of Three Mile Island (United States) in 1979 and
Chernobyl (former Soviet Union). The discussion is not detailed here, but authors
including Paul Slovic, Stanley Kaplan, Ulrich Beck, Ortwin Renn, and many oth-
ers are the main representatives who have given a multitude of explanations and
examples of risk assessment. Today in every nation worldwide are institutional-
ized organizations, such as the Wissenschaftliche Beirat der Bundesregierung
Globale Umweltveränderungen (WBGU) in Germany, the Swedish Nuclear
Fuel and Waste Management Corporation, the Swiss Nagra, the British Civil
Contingencies Secretariat (SCC), or the US Federal Emergency Management
Agency/Department of Homeland Security (FEMA). These organizations deal
with all kinds of technical and man-made but also natural disasters and all have
contributed substantially to the subject.
Basically natural hazards are defined by the cause–effect relationship between
the natural situation described by its physical exposure that may interact in a way
to become a threat to people and their living environment/livelihood. As an exam-
ple, a volcano in the Saharan Desert is just a volcano that can be described geo-
logically, volcanologically, geomorphologically, and so on, but it does not pose a
risk as (almost) no people are living there. But a volcano with a great potential to
erupt near a megacity, for example, Mt. Popocatepetl, poses a considerable threat
to the people in Mexico City. But volcanoes not only pose a risk to the people by
their mere physical appearance; such a volcano achieves hazardous potential when
people interact with the volcano, for instance, by settling on the steep flanks. This
definition leads to the assumption that as long as no one is settling near the vol-
cano, no one is making his living from it, nor has a cultural heritage there, such a
hazardous situation will not become a risk.
Tobin and Montz (1997) therefore pledge to broaden the context of hazard and
risk by emphasizing that it is not only the action of nature on the human being, but

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 289

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_7
290 7 Risk Assessment

also society’s interaction with nature that defines a risk. For them, hazards “repre-
sent the potential interaction between humans and natural events. It represents the
potential or likelihood of an event (it is not the event itself)” that may become a dis-
aster. Renn (2003) defines “risk of natural disasters to be at the crossroad between
natural events (partially altered and amplified by human action such as the emission
of greenhouse gases), economic, social and technological developments and policy
driven actions.” And for coping with risk they pledge “a holistic approach to haz-
ard identification, risk assessment and risk management.” In 2009 Aven and Renn
stated, “Risk is more than just multiplying the losses with the probability of occur-
rence, it rather deals with uncertainty about the occurrence and the consequences.”
They give the following example of this: everyone who crosses a busy street
unconsciously assesses her risk of a traffic accident and automatically analyzes
ways and means to manage the situation based on her experience. But there are,
for instance, hazard exposures that pose a threat that is not to be assessed right
from the beginning in all its consequences.
Purdy (2010) even goes a step further by extending the former risk definition.
He points out that there is a “shift in from the possibilities of an event to the pos-
sibilities of an effect,” thus “making the risk management a process of optimizing
resilience that makes risk management an inseparable aspect of disaster manage-
ment.” For him the process of risk management comprises “a steady communica-
tion and consultation process internally as well as externally to gain input as well
as to trigger impact on decision making by monitoring and review.”
Another definition points to the fact that a natural hazard automatically and
implicitly comprises a “component of damage probability that is quantitatively
assessable” (Felgentreff 2008). Moreover, hazard assessment is predominantly
based on natural sciences and technical indicators; the assessment of the popula-
tion’s vulnerability is exclusively derived from socioeconomic factors.
The broad discussion on risk can be summarized as following the general defi-
nition as given by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(UNISDR 2004): “Risk is the product of the exposure of a society to a hazardous
natural or mankind generated hazard situation, that may result in (physical, psy-
chological, social, financial, etc.) threats to the individual or the society and its/
their living environment, juxtaposed to the capacity of the society or the individual
to cope with the impact.”
The general relationship of hazard and risk is given in the mathematical
equation:
Risk = hazard × vulnerablity : coping capacity.
There is a variety of applications on the risk formula in use, a simplified equation
of risk:
risk = hazard × population × vulnerability
When the population is replaced by physical exposure:
risk = physical exposure × vulnerability
7.1 General Aspects—Definition and Explanations 291

The following formula used by insurance companies generally constitutes the two
components:
risk = frequency × potential maximum economic loss
There have been multiple attempts to define the term “disaster” and to distinguish
it from an emergency or a catastrophe (Quarantelli 1989). Researchers emphasize
the need to understand and conceptualize the term, however, they agree that a dis-
aster is an event caused by human or natural forces and resulting in an enormous
loss of life and property. All definitions (UNDRO 1979; Coburn et al. 1991, p. 49)
point to the same basic features of risk assessment: “In general, risk is always the
outcome of a potential threat and thus is derived from three basic components:”
• A component that describes how likely a potential hazard may occur (fre-
quency × severity = hazard exposure)
• A component that describes the consequences that may occur from a disaster
(e.g., annual casualties versus average population at risk = vulnerability)
• A component that describes the ability of a society to withstand the disaster
impact based on technical capacity and experience (preparedness = coping
capacity)
The formula proposed by UNDRO (1979) for modeling risk combines the above
three components by multiplying them with each other. Multiplying was intro-
duced because if the hazard is nil, then the risk is also nil: 0 (hazard) × population
(4) × vulnerability (5) = 0 (risk). The risk is also nil if nobody lives in an area
exposed to hazard (population = 0); the same situation applies if the population is
invulnerable (vulnerability = 0, induce a risk = 0).
The hazard exposure of a society to a certain risk is a clear indicator whether
such a society is at risk. The critical relationship between hazard and risk can
be explained by the “tightrope walker” example given by the British Columbia
Ministry for Public Safety (Canada) that explains:
The risk to a tightrope walker in about 100 m height is falling-off and getting killed.
When considered that the wire is installed only one meter above the ground, the chance
of falling off the rope still remains the same as 100 m above the ground, but the risk to die
is nil. Thus risk does not mean (solely) the statistical chance or probability to get killed.
Risk is rather a total concept of likelihood of occurrence of a hazard and the severity of
possible impacts. Moreover the likelihood for a risk of injury even exist to the crowd
below the tightrope walkery. The severity of impact to the tightrope walker and the crowd
can be mitigated by a safety net, the chance of falling can be reduced by special training
and the extent of injury the crowed can be diminished by emergency medical response
capability: all components that are summarized as coping capacity.

A risk definition that points in the same direction was given by UNDRO (1979)
and Burton et al. (1993, p. 34) that both gave strong emphasis to the importance of
the time factor in risk definition: “The term risk refers to the expected losses from
a particular hazard to a specified element at risk in a particular future time period.
Loss may be estimated in terms of human lives, or buildings destroyed or in finan-
cial terms.”
292 7 Risk Assessment

Although there are quite a number of different definitions of risk, all of them
have in common that risk is something harmful to people, the living environ-
ment, or the ecology. We do not add another risk definition, but for sake of a better
understanding, the book underlines what Kaplan (1997) said about risk. Risk can
indirectly better be understood when we ask three questions about the specific haz-
ard to which a population at risk might be exposed:
• What can happen?
• How likely is it that an event may occur?
• What are the consequences for those affected?
Kaplan stated that when posing the above questions, a risk definition becomes
more flexible and will provide a much better starting point for further risk manage-
ment considerations. From these three questions it immediately becomes clear that
risks are highly complex and very dynamic in nature and that it will therefore not
be possible to generalize the disaster impact beforehand. Following Kaplan, the
starting point for a risk mitigation concept lies in the combination of the answers
to the three questions. He therefore pledges that according to the complex nature
of risk a specific assessment of each and every hazard situation is required and has
to consider its specific geological characteristics. But also the level of resilience
that defines the society’s potential to withstand disaster is indispensable.
Kaplan raised the following question: when a risk is “subjective” from the
standpoint of the observer, is then the risk this person might be exposed to really
a risk or does he or she (only) feel that risk (“perceived risk”). When the risks are
“perceived” does this mean there also exist “absolute risks” or “objective risks?”
Objective in this regard would mean that such risks have to be risks to which the
entire society is exposed. As this discussion will only lead to a very philosophi-
cal discussion, Kaplan suggested an easier approach to the matter, by introducing
another term, “probability,” making the story much clearer and more manageable.
Over the centuries risk-exposed societies all over the world have developed a
multitude of instruments, methods, and capabilities that have all—based on real
disaster experience—led to effective disaster mitigation. For example, people liv-
ing on the North Sea coast on tiny Warden Island have broad experience to protect
themselves against storm surges. Such surges are normally effective when north-
ern winter storms press seawater into the German bight and additionally the full
moon causes an exceptional rise of the tides. Similarly many people living along
the rivers Rhine and Mosel have tiled the ground floors up to the highest water
levels experienced, retrofitted their windows and doors to be flood-proof, and keep
electrical appliances in the upper floor during flood season.
But figures on death tolls and demolished houses normally only rarely repre-
sent the real extent of a disaster. Even information on the economic losses does not
fully describe the disaster’s extent. A figure, given on this by the UNDP (2004a, b,
c), states that for every single man killed in a disaster, about 3000 worldwide are
exposed to it. Furthermore disaster information normally does not comprise infor-
mation on the injured, the displaced, and the homeless. Although this phenome-
non is not yet fully understood and has not been investigated in depth, a group of
7.1 General Aspects—Definition and Explanations 293

leading American risk managers and sociologists (among them Stan Kaplan and
Paul Slovic but also the German Ortwin Renn) identified that social disparities are
the highly forming factors that “govern risk perception” (Kasperson et al. 1988;
Slovic 1987, 2000; Renn 1989). Consequently they introduced a new term in risk
management, “the social amplification of risk.” According to their investigations
“social structures and processes in risk experience resulting in repercussions on
individual and group perceptions and the effects of these responses on community,
society and economy compose a general phenomenon.”
Gender shapes the social worlds and is thus a primary factor of social organiza-
tion before, during, and after a natural event occurs. Not gender but rather gender
inequality puts girls and women at risk (Enarson 2000). Therefore there are dis-
tinct differences in emergency preparedness, coping strategies such as voluntary
self-help initiatives, emergency communication, stress, fears, and post-traumatic
stress. Mortality patterns are also strongly gender related as well as the exposure
to injury or to become homeless. Experience from the Indian Ocean tsunami of
2004, earthquakes in China, and cyclones in Asia revealed that women dispro-
portionally died from disaster of such kinds than men, although men are killed,
for instance, more from disasters such as lightning, or technical and man-made
disasters.
Women are very proactive responders. According to their traditional role in the
family they care much more for household security and family sustainability and
thus are recognized by the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction
(UN-ISDR) as “keys to prevention” actors. Masculinity norms, however, orient on
immediate, “heroic” (risk anticipating) action during the search and rescue period,
debris removal, and reconstruction. But restoring the social aspects of the system
is often left to women.
Most disaster assessments that focus on natural disasters thus far defined the
severity of natural events preferably according to their impact on the individual
and on economic losses, as such data (numbers of victims, amount of economic
losses) are easily assessed and are very often highly impressive. But many studies
of the last years, especially the long data record series of CRED-EMDAT, reveal
that the amount of people killed is steadily decreasing whereas that of economic
losses is rising (see Fig. 2.3). The number of people who are affected by natural
disasters as opposed to the death toll is rising significantly. There is a clear rela-
tionship to be seen between the increase of risk-exposed people and the population
increase in the big conurbations. Numerous reasons for this can be found, but the
most important is that since the mid-1990s more and more people are migrating
into the big cities so that already today more than 50 % of the world’s population
lives in megacities, such as Shanghai, Tokyo, Jakarta, and the like. And there is no
sign that this trend will change in the decades to come. As most of the big megaci-
ties are located on coastal plains or flat-lying extended river valleys, the exposure
of the population to natural disasters is rising. Therefore this change in the basic
disaster assessment parameters (death toll, economic loss) to describe the sever-
ity of a disaster impact, will in future lead to inappropriate figures and judgments.
Thus in future, the impact of a disaster should be based mostly on a description
294 7 Risk Assessment

of the people and their living conditions exposed to a risk in order to get a more
realistic picture of their risk exposure and in order to make such assessments more
comparable internationally. Vulnerability has to become the important indicator, as
it describes the potential risks an individual or a societal group is exposed to as
well as defining their future living conditions. Vulnerability should therefore be
taken as the cornerstone of a modern natural disaster risk management as only by
such an assessment can the potential of the population risk for self-help be defined
as well as the duties of the public sector to set up a legal and technical framework
suitable to increase social resilience.

7.2 Valuing Statistical Life (VSL)

In the last 10 years a variety of studies has been carried out by economists world-
wide to calculate a monetary value for the loss of life or an injury, an approach
that is called “valuing statistical life” (VSL). The calculations aim at identifying
an economic value of the statistical life of an individual at risk. The calculations,
however, vary significantly mainly due to risk exposure, prevailing socioeconomic
situations, technical standards of prevention, and the type of living environment.
The calculations clearly reflect that different societies make different choices over
risks and have different perceptions of the values of life-saving initiatives. The risk
variables used in several of the empirical studies were in general based on job-
related accident and mortality data.
Different methodological approaches have been used to analyze this strate-
gic financial sector, all derived from economic and actuarial science. One is the
“willingness-to-pay” approach that was used by many authors, for example, by
Lindhjem et al. (2011). Their investigation revealed a VSL mean value of about
US$7 million with a variance of US$190 billion maximum and US$5000 mini-
mum values and a median of US$2.3 million, based on a US dollar of the year
2005. By screening out the upper and lower 2.5 %, the values range between
US$5–6 million, a value that comes close to the values given by the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 2010), that estimated the VSL at about
US$8 million. Another Swedish assessment carried out by Carlsson et al. (2010),
also based on the “willingness-to-pay” approach, came to the conclusion that the
value of statistical life ranges between US$2 to 3 million.
Other methodological approaches were found by Viscusi and Aldy (2002) in the
literature. All of them had in common “an occupation-specific measure” reflecting
an average of several years of observations for fatalities, on relatively rare events.
They stated that an ideal measure of the risk to be killed or injured on job would
reflect both the “worker’s perception of such risk and the firm’s perception of the
risk.” Because these variables consider both, the worker’s choice is for a certain
job (income) and his risk exposure perception, as well as the company’s interest to
7.2 Valuing Statistical Life (VSL) 295

produce at as low cost and secure a safety level as possible. If the i­ndividual’s and
the company’s risk perception arrive at an objective measure of fatality risk, then
such objective risk data could be used to identify the range of the risk premium.
Viscusi and Aldy (ibid) suggest that
Refining VSL for the specific employment characteristics of the affected population at
risk remains an important priority for the research community and the government agen-
cies conducting these economic analyses. Improving the application of VSLs can result in
more sustainable government interventions to address market failures related to environ-
mental, health, and safety mortality risks.

The study reported that in the United States and many other highly industrial-
ized countries the value of statistical life for a prime-aged worker falls within a
range of US$4–9 million, with an average value is about US$7 million, when con-
verted into year 2000 US dollars. The VSL for developing country labor markets,
however, shows significantly smaller values of statistical life. In South Korea, the
VSL of the industry sector was estimated at approximately below US$1 million. In
the United States individuals with jobs with very minor risks have values of statis-
tical life ranging from US$12–22 million, a value that drops between US$10–18
million when the risk increases tenfold. People working in jobs with very high
risks result in much smaller values of statistical lives (far below US$10 million).
White collar employees and members of US labor unions benefit from higher risk
premiums than others. Moreover, it was found in the literature that the value of a
statistical life decreases with age (Fig. 7.1).

Fig. 7.1  Range of statistical life assessments (Based on Viscusi and Aldy 2002)
296 7 Risk Assessment

7.3 Deterministic Risk Assessment

The aim of risk assessment is to define the likelihood that a certain disaster will
threaten a society. Such estimations are carried out based on natural evidence
recorded from a single disastrous event or on many disasters over a longer time
span (historic dataset). There are two different methods in practice to assess risk.
One is based on single point data defining an individual risk that can be called
a worst-case estimate of exposed factors from which the worst-case scenario is
derived. On the other hand, risks are assessed by true probabilistic estimates (see
below). There is no a priori presumption that risk assessment can or should only
be estimated by a deterministic or probabilistic analysis (Power and McCarry
1996), but over the time the probabilistic assessment method has proven to have
many significant analytical advantages, mainly greater insight into the magnitude
of expected effects.
For the sake of completeness and to give easy access to quantitative risk assess-
ment, the deterministic method for risk assessment is briefly described here,
although knowing that the “dynamics of nature systems reduce the validity of
using simple deterministic approachesˮ (Power and McCarry, ibid).
Traditionally most assessments have focused on estimating single effects and
exposure values to determine the risk using a “quotient method” to determine fre-
quency and severity over a time period. The likelihood is assessed quantitatively
by using deterministic models and simulations. Next to quantitative data (tangi-
ble data such as the amount of casualties, the number of destroyed houses) also
qualitative data (such as a statement on perceived risk) are entered into the model
when no numerical data are available (intangible data such as socioeconomic data,
data on societal risk perception, risk experience, etc.). But it should be taken into
consideration that even such quantitative data have to be transformed into quali-
tative data by numerically classifying a descriptive scale, although knowing that
such transformation is arbitrary and depends strongly on the experience of the risk
assessor. In order to address that problem the assessors must indicate the level of
confidence in their estimates. The chosen level of confidence will be presented,
along with final results, to indicate to decision makers where some low or very
low confidence assessments may necessitate caution in interpretation.
The deterministic risk assessment generally correlates the dependency of two
random variables or sets of data to indicate a predictive relationship of causal fac-
tors that, for example, describe the hazard/risk exposure of a natural, social, and/
or economic origin. The causal factors and their relationship can be described
by numbers, physical characteristics, or by statements. Predictive are relation-
ships that follow an entirely known rule (law, equation, or fixed procedure) so
that the state of each component and of the entire system can be foreseen “at any
time for any time in the past and future.” Such a system is called deterministic
(Kirchsteiger 1999). The aim of such a correlation is to investigate the factors of
dependency or behavior on the basis of its components’ changes with time. The
results of the analysis can be expressed in qualitative statements and quantitative
7.3 Deterministic Risk Assessment 297

numbers. The application of a deterministic approach in risk assessment is based

on the assumption that in general, a lack of adequate and reliable data as well as
the behavior of a system can be better predicted using more basic components.
The risk data are processed by a point estimate method that allows for an estima-
tion of the levels of risk and to compare between different risk situations based on
similarities. Deterministic risk assessment is used when the risk or hazard distribu-
tion and the probable consequences show a very direct, easily identified relation-
ship. But it has to be acknowledged that such a direct exposure–risk relationship in
reality is very rare.
However, statistical dependence is not sufficient to demonstrate the presence
of such a causal relationship, “Correlation does not imply causation” (Wikipedia,
access: 19.11.2013). An example of earthquake risk may illustrate this depend-
ency. A correlation of the average annual number of earthquakes and their magni-
tude does not say anything about the pattern of earthquake occurrence in the past
being repeated in the future. Statistical models usually assume independent events
and a constant trend, but in reality such assumptions merely provide a first approx-
imation. To reach a higher degree of reliability requires a larger dataset (data vol-
ume and time span).
For undertaking deterministic risk analysis it is necessary to classify the data
according to severity categories for both likelihood (severity) and consequences
(impact) of the identified hazards and to assess the severity category of each par-
ticular hazard (Table 7.1).
Following the assumptions in Table 7.2 a deterministic risk matrix can be
established according to the following approach. The cells of the matrix express
the likelihood/consequence category to which each individual hazard has been
assigned. The shading in the figure indicates an increasing risk. High assess-
ments such as i 4–i 5 and F 4–F 5 (black squares) are estimated to have a very

Table 7.1  Example of definition of severity categories of an identified hazard (fictitious)

Likelihood Qualitative definition Quantitative definition Severity category
(frequency) (occurrence per year)
Likely once in next 0.2–2 F1
year
Possible but not likely 0.02–0.2 F2
Unlikely 0.002–0.02 F3
Very unlikely 0.0002–0.002 F4
Remote 0.00002–0.0002 F5
Likelihood (impact) Qualitative definition Severity category
Catastrophic, multiple fatalities i5
Major single fatality, multiple injuries i4
Very serious, permanently disabling injury i3
Serious injury, full recovery i2
Minor losses, short time injury, short absence i1
from work
298 7 Risk Assessment

Table 7.2  Deterministic risk matrix to outline the likelihood/consequence relationship to which

an individual hazard can be assigned (fictitious)

severe risk. Dark grey squares have a moderate to severe risk; light gray squares
have low risk assessments, and the white squares are considered to have no risk.
A scheme of this kind can be worked out for any kind of risk assessment and
can be organized arbitrarily according to the situation under investigation. Such
schemes have proven an effective tool for obtaining a simple overview of a range
of hazards with regard to onsite risks, and for prioritizing them for improvement
actions.
For undertaking deterministic risk analysis it is necessary to classify the data
according to “severity categories” for both likelihood and consequences of identi-
fied hazards and to assess the severity category of each particular hazard in terms
of these. Using this approach requires the use of a quantitative definition for the
risk factors, although they are in general expressed (only) by qualitative definition.
To ensure consistency it might be advisable to incorporate benchmarks or semi-
quantitative data in the analysis. In schemes of this type, the assessment team,
usually comprising geoscientists, risk assessors, safety engineers, and operation
managers will first identify all hazards, and then assign a severity category to each
of these for both likelihood and consequences. Figure 7.2 shows another form to
assess deterministically the risk, here from earthquakes for Germany, California
(United States), Indonesia, and Japan. The assumption is fictitious and not based
on real earthquake data. First the hazard exposure is identified by a cross-plot of
severity versus frequency. It reveals that in Germany the earthquake hazard expo-
sure is very low compared to California and Japan. The risk factor of vulnerabil-
ity was assessed by combining the factors of average annual death versus average
of earthquake-exposed people. Here Germany and California show comparably
low vulnerabilities whereas Indonesia and Japan are highly vulnerable. The third
risk factor, coping capacity, reveals that “technical resilience” and “disaster expe-
rience” are greatest in California and Japan whereas in Germany, for instance,
the technical expertise is high but only little experience of earthquake mitigation
exists. Calculating the risk according to the risk formula given above,
Risk = hazard × vulnerablity : coping capacity
7.3 Deterministic Risk Assessment 299

Hazard Vulnerability Coping capacity

ranking
1
Germany 2
Japan
3
Indonesia
4
California
Risk
5

Fig. 7.2  Example of deterministic risk assessment (earthquake risk of Germany, California,

Indonesia, Japan (fictitious)

reveals that Indonesia and Japan have the highest risk from earthquakes. Germany
has almost no risk and California although it faces a multitude of earthquakes
every year, has a comparable lower risk, mainly due to its well-developed risk mit-
igation capacity.

7.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Computer-Based

Hazard and Risk Assessment)

Emergency management practice in the last decades showed that probabilistic

distribution functions are becoming increasingly important for risk assessment.
Risk managers, regulators, and decision makers realized that physical sciences
and engineering are best capable to provide reliable and independent data to
assess the uncertainty of risk, although the mathematics involved are quite com-
plex and it often proved difficult to make the findings understandable to the users.
Moreover it should be taken into consideration that risk assessment is an approach
in which often qualitatively acquired data are transferred into quantitative expres-
sions of uncertainty and the limits of the method are based in the mathematics of
probability.
300 7 Risk Assessment

In contrary to the deterministic model a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) using,

for instance, a Monte Carlo analysis provides for viable, effective, and well-estab-
lished statistical tools for analyzing variability and uncertainty in risk assessments
(USEPA 1997). The probabilistic analysis is to estimate quantitatively the uncer-
tainty and variability of a hazard exposure or disaster risk; secondarily to iden-
tify the “sources of the variability and the uncertainty and to quantify the relative
contribution of these sources to the overall variance and range of model results.”
The probabilistic risk assessment (Monte Carlo) is a tool that allows simulating
the risk variables, making it a dynamic process. One of the important features of
PRA is that very often the data input are qualitative in nature and are then trans-
formed into quantitative variables. Probabilistic PRA analysis is best applied
when it is necessary to rank hazard or risk exposures, to identify exposure path-
ways and locations that are risk exposed as well as populations at risk. Moreover
PRA can provide helpful indications to identify the most suitable and effective and
best implementable risk mitigation measures or remedial actions as a scientifically
based tool for political decision making. Although the use of probabilistic risk
simulations such as Monte Carlo is increasing considerably, there is still a debate
on how strong the data input may influence the simulation output. Bukowski et al.
(1995, pp. 215–219) stated that “The choice of input distribution in the simula-
tions likely has a greater effect on the resultant risk distribution than does the
inclusion or exclusion of variable correlations.”
Probabilistic risk assessment is based on the following two pillars.
1. Bayesian Analysis
The general model for a quantitative assessment of risk uncertainty is called
Bayesian analysis. The “Bayesian or subjective view is that the probability of an
event is the degree of belief that a person (a disaster expert but also an individual
at risk) has, given some state of knowledge, that the event will occur” (USEPA
1997). The subjective view on probability is in general based on scientific knowl-
edge, expert judgment, and past experience, but also on intuition that these subjec-
tive probabilities can later be combined with new data to reach an updated output.
In hazard exposure and risk assessment, representative and complete datasets are
rarely available and inferences in these situations are inherent. The decision as to
the appropriateness of following the Bayesian approach is based on the quality
of data and the risk manager’s subjective experience. The application of a quan-
titative numerical statistical assessment of uncertainty requires first the establish-
ment of an appropriate likelihood function for the observed data to be formulated
upon the general understanding of the hazard or risk situation. Combined with a
Monte Carlo simulation Bayesian/Monte Carlo simulation offers an effective
numerical technique for carrying out uncertainty analysis by generating a repre-
sentative sample of uncertainty distribution just from the probabilistic distribution
function of the input variables. Through a mathematical model the input variables
are then processed with the help of computer software. Such IT-aided models are
today available (in general) by open source software packages (see page 248 ff).
The selection of input distributions for the uncertainty analysis can be taken from
the literature, from similar risk exposure situations, or experimental studies. In
7.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Computer-Based Hazard and Risk Assessment) 301

p­ ractice the final selection of the form of the data input and the processing param-
eters significantly depend on the experience of the risk assessor.
Complex systems such as the ones that prevail in natural disaster distribu-
tion require hundreds of input parameters and it is rarely obvious which of the
parameters are of more and which are of lesser importance. Disaster risk assess-
ment experience, however, revealed that in reality only a relatively small subset
of input parameters really influence the distribution. The choice of input param-
eters (parameterization) is in general the analyst’s objective, based on her personal
experience with the subject. The expert’s opinion then has to be valued according
the parameters:
• Uncertainty: Describes the variability/range of input/output parameter.
• Sensitivity: Describes the rate of change in the output when the input parameter
changes.
• Importance: Describes the degree to which the output changes in response to
the uncertainty.
The threat a population at risk is exposed to cannot be assessed solely by the
number of disaster events. Therefore a realistic risk assessment requires next the
number of events and also an understanding about the negative impacts of a dis-
aster. The “public interest normally focusses on disasters which are dramatic in
their impact, that claim a high death toll and as it was to be seen in the World
Trade Center attack that have a specific psychological evidence” (Slovic 2002).
This behavior attributes disasters very much with a subjective-related component.
Disaster risk assessment thus becomes quite a challenge as it demands an objec-
tive-related viewpoint. Disaster events and their impacts when assessed impartially
generally follow a probability distribution function: hazards with a high intensity
rate occur very seldom, whereas hazards with a low intensity occur very often
(high frequency). On the contrary the relationship between hazard consequences
(impact) and intensity shows the opposite distribution. Hazards with a high inten-
sity and a high frequency result in high consequences (impact) whereas those that
are seldom and have a low intensity result in low consequences.
2. Regression Analysis
Regression analysis is in use in a multitude of different applications in economic,
social, and also natural science. The analysis is best applied when the interaction
between the input parameters is minimal and direct and the functional relationship
between input and output is independent and linear. Furthermore linear regression
analysis can also be used to provide a prediction model, indicating the probability
of a future event, for instance, the probable flood level based on historic flood-
level time series analysis (Fig. 7.3).
Regression analysis in natural hazard and disaster assessment often lacks an
equally distributed database. In general there are many reliable and interpretable
data available in one or two regions of the area of interest, but for a large part of
the area such a robust database is lacking. Then the data gap has to be filled by
analogue data transferred from regions that have a similar or almost similar haz-
ard/disaster occurrence distribution. Such data are validated as to whether they are
302 7 Risk Assessment

Fig. 7.3  Linear regression analysis to predict probable future flood levels based on historic
flood-level time series analysis (fictitious)

applicable by undergoing an assessment method called the ordinary least squares

method (OSL). If the data are usable for a generalized assessment the OSL method
proves reliable with a sufficient closeness.
In general probabilistic risk assessment is based either on the data that have been
recorded or taken up from analogue cases. Thus the type of data can be of a physi-
cal nature (exact measurement), of a statistical survey, or on a qualitative assumption
such as an emotional feeling of a disaster impact. In order to make these very differ-
ent types of datasets applicable for assessment, they have to be harmonized. For such
a harmonization mostly the statistical relationship of frequency and severity of disas-
ter events—already described in Chap. 6—is in use. The relationship is based on the
assumption that severe disaster events quite rarely occur, whereas disasters with low
impact occur quite often. Probability and severity are then ranked according to occur-
rence in respect to a certain pre-defined area (country, region, or a specific locality).
Figure 7.4 shows the principle behind working out a risk assessment matrix.
Such a matrix provides the technical base for development decision making.
It enables the political decision makers to value and compare disaster preven-
tion measures to reach a sustainable risk reduction strategy. The figure shows,
according to the data input, that the general risk of the area under investigation is
medium to be increased. For the purpose of comparing risks of different regions,
such an assessment has again to be generalized. Thus, for instance, maps such as
the World Map on Natural Hazards (Munich Re 2011) only display risks that have
a 50 % exceedance of probability.
The figure shows on the left side the general probability function of natu-
ral ­disasters derived from the disaster events that occurred in a certain area.
7.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Computer-Based Hazard and Risk Assessment) 303

Fig. 7.4  Risk assessment matrix (Own graph)

The ranking of severity and probability was based on the available or assumed
data and was attributed to different quadrangles. On the right side of the graph the
ranking was given, arbitrarily, specific values from 1 to 9. These values serve as
the bases for any further assessment procedure.
In quadrangle:
No. 1 (low)
The probability of a disaster to occur is very “unlikely” and its severity is “low”.
That means quadrangle 1 comprises a hazard potential that only poses a low and
rather unlikely threat to the society.
No. 2 (moderate)
The probability of a disaster to occur exists (“may occur”) although its severity is
ranked still “low”. Or it is quite “unlikely” to occur, but if does, it may result in a
“moderate” impact. Societies exposed to quadrangle 2 threats may be harmed to a
certain extent (injury, property damage, financial loss), all at a level that does not
seriously interrupt the society’s resilience.
No. 3 (medium)
The probability of a disaster event is ranked quite high (“probable”). But when
it occurs it is anticipated to have a “low” impact (“severity”). Or it “may occur”
but if it happens, the severity is ranked higher than low (“moderate”). Moreover
the risk can, although “unlikely” in its probability, be of an increased (“medium”)
impact. For societies exposed to quadrangle 3 threats this means that such events
may cause serious harm (injury, rather high economic losses, strong damage to the
infrastructure as well as to livelihood, agricultural, and industrial production).
304 7 Risk Assessment

No. 4 (increased)
The probability and severity of quadrangle 4 risks is most widespread. They com-
prise disasters that are either “likely” to occur, but may result only in a “low” sever-
ity. Or that may be “probable” in frequency, with a “moderate” severity. Moreover
they can be even less frequent (“may occur”) but with an already increased impact
(“medium”). Finally they may even be “unlikely” to occur, but simultaneously fall
into the highest severity class identified. Societies at threat of quadrangle 4 risk may
be exposed to unusual interruption of their societal functioning.
No. 5 (high)
Threats that are attributed to quadrangle 5 describe exposures that enter the level
of high risk. Whether of a “likely” probability with a “moderate” severity, an aver-
age “probable” frequency with a “medium” severity level, or even disasters with
quite a low (“may occur”) frequency combined with a “high” severity, all of them
pose serious threats to a society (severe injury, extended financial and economic
losses) as well as interruption of the societal functioning that exceeds the self-help
capacities of the populations at risk.
No. 6 (very high)
Threats that are ranked very high either substantiate by combinations of the high-
est level of probability (“likely”) with an impact that is ranked “medium”, or by a
somewhat lower probability (“probable”) with a “high” severity level. Quadrangle
6 risk comprises a large number of death casualties and a large number of injured
and homeless people, as well as widespread, extensive, and lasting interruption of
human safety. Societies that are exposed to such kind of risk are no longer capable
of managing the disaster impact.
No. 7 (extreme)
Threats that have a “likely” probability to occur and that are combined with “high”
severity of impact define quadrangle 7 risks. Disasters of this ranking have a
destructive impact on the area, causing a high death toll and a great number of cas-
ualties, making thousands of people homeless, result in extensive, widespread, and
long-lasting economic losses, severe damage to the infrastructure, and cut victims
off from life-supporting assistance. Societies that are exposed to such kinds of risk
are totally dependent on external assistance for the immediate crisis response as
well as for the following rehabilitation measures.

7.5 Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Practice

“HAZUS-MH”

Making people more resilient from natural disasters needs to develop a regional
understanding of the “general” risk exposure. Therefore it is necessary to begin
with data concerning one specific hazard (location, severity, frequency) to come to
an assessment of the hazard potential of an entire area.
7.5 Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Practice “HAZUS-MH” 305

Basically data on hazards exist symbolized as either:

• Point data
• Line data
• Polygons
The most suitable operational tool for working on a regional hazard assessment
is a geographical information system. There are several hazard assessment tools
available based on GIS-software that have all proven their usefulness. Nevertheless
the most appropriate and best elaborated instrument for hazard analysis is the US
“HAZUS-MH Risk Assessment Guide.” The assessment guide has been worked
out by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2004, 2014) and
exclusively concerns the United States of America territory. According to FEMA
“HAZUS-MH” risk assessment includes the largest compilation of geo-referenced
data made available by the federal US government and provides a nationally
applicable standardized methodology for estimating potential losses from earth-
quakes, floods, and hurricanes. Furthermore HAZUS-MH provides software tools
to assess mitigation and recovery activities as well as preparedness and response.
The software was used for a long time by states and local government planners
and emergency managers to perform economic loss scenarios for the said natu-
ral hazards. But meanwhile the number of HAZUS-MH users increased and more
and more private companies and homeowners now make use of it to assess their
particular risk. HAZUS-MH uses GIS to illustrate graphically the limits of identi-
fied high–moderate–low risk locations and thus can visualize the spatial relation-
ships between populations and the economic assets or natural/cultural resources at
risk. Emergency managers can moreover use HAZUS-MH to determine the most
beneficial mitigation approaches, giving the program a crucial function in the pre-
disaster planning process.
HAZUS-MH analyzes potential loss estimates on:
• Physical damage to residential and commercial buildings, schools, critical facil-
ities, and infrastructure
• Economic loss, including lost jobs, business interruptions, repair and recon-
struction costs
• Social impacts, including estimates of shelter requirements, displaced house-
holds, and population exposed to scenario floods, earthquakes, and hurricanes
HAZUS-MH is available free of charge online by the FEMA Map Service Center
(MSC) Web Store (www.fema.gov/fima/planning_toc4.shtm). The program ­(MH 2.1)
is compatible with Windows 7 and Windows XP and with ArcGIS 10.0. Menu options
in the user interface of the three modules in HAZUS-MH (earthquake, flood, and hur-
ricane) have been adjusted to provide greater consistency.
The software is accompanied by a voluminous guide that provides the meth-
odological steps for estimating potential losses. As the tool has many software
options to be integrated, HAZUS-MH software can be applied as a method to
guiding principles for hazard and risk assessment for natural disasters to occur at
other places than the United States of America.
306 7 Risk Assessment

One of the first tasks in hazard assessment is to define the level of hazard analy-
sis envisaged to be achieved at the local, regional, national, or even transnational
level. Accordingly, the level of data aggregation is different. A small-scale aggre-
gation provides information in detail, but has only limited evidence for a larger
area, whereas for a more regional or national scale the many detailed pieces of
information have to be generalized. But they then cannot be used to identify the
hazard potential of a particular location. For example, the general hazard assess-
ment of the United States reveals that earthquakes occur most frequently and most
severely in California, floods mostly in the riverine areas of the Mid-West, and
hurricanes mostly strike the Gulf and the Atlantic coasts. But such a very general
assessment neither provides information on the many earthquakes that are also
known in the Mid-West, nor on the floods generating landslides along the Rocky
Mountains or the Appalachian mountain chain.
The following methodological approach is mainly based on the FEMA 386
publication family (FEMA 2002a, b, 386-1 to 386-9) and FEMA 433 (FEMA
2004). The program presumes to begin with the identification of the level of data
aggregation. At first all types of hazards are listed (geotectonic, hydrometeorologi-
cal, climate, human, technical) and then, as shown in Table 7.3, the hazard types
are indicated that are potentially relevant for the area of investigation.
Next, as shown in Table 7.4, the specific characteristics of the identified haz-
ards are listed (modified from FEMA 386 on the Austin, Texas region). Note
that the more detailed information is available, the better will be the assessment.
Nevertheless the level of detail is dependent on the scope of the assessment (local,
regional, national, transnational).
The next step (Table 7.5) goes from the hazard assessment to a risk assessment.
The likelihood of occurrence of a potential hazard, its severity, and frequency can
in general be assessed from past evidence. Such risk profiling is a key element of
HAZUS-MH. Based on the “characteristics of the identified hazards” their respec-
tive area of occurrence (geographical coordinates), number of events (frequency
per year), duration, the statistical probability, and their magnitude, respectively,
intensity, the hazard exposure can be elaborated in more detail. When entered in
the GIS system, the areal distribution of the newly collected hazards combined

Table 7.3  Relevant hazard types of the area of interest

Dam failure No
Drought No
Earthquake Yes
Heat wave No
Flood (coastal) No
Flood (riverine) Yes
Hail storm Yes
Wind/storm No
Fire Yes
Hurricane Yes

Courtesy FEMA (2002, 2004)

7.5 Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Practice “HAZUS-MH” 307

Table 7.4  Characteristics of the identified hazards

Hazard Year No. of events Impact Available data
Earthquake 1850–2005 160 154 deaths (1907), USGS, Texas A&M,
66 deaths (1943), Texas Dept. of Geology,
45 deaths (1967), Nat. Earthquake Reduct.
34 deaths (1973), Prog.
23 deaths (1985)
Flood 1987–2002 64 35 deaths (1915), USGS, Flood Insurance
(riverine) 215 deaths (1921) Rate Map
Hailstorm 1993–2000 223 No data available NOAA Hail Storm Map
Fire 1990–2001 151 Average 4 deaths/year Austin City Fire
Brigade
Hurricane 1897–2002 50 1 windstorm caused American Society of
one death (year?), Civil Engineers, NOAA
3 windstorms in 1967 Hurricane Track map,
caused 3 deaths and historic data
17 injuries
Courtesy FEMA 386, Worksheet 2-3 on Austin, Texas

Table 7.5  Prioritization of identified hazards

Hazard Frequency Duration Severity Intensity Ranking Qualifier
Snow avalanche 2 2 1 1 6 6×1=6
Dam failure 1 1 1 1 4×1=4 4×1=4
Flood (riverine) 4 3 4 4 15 × 3 = 45 45 × 4 = 180
Earthquake 4 4 5 5 18 × 4 = 112 112 × 4 = 448
Landslide 4 3 4 3 14 × 3 = 42 42 × 3 = 166
Volcano 4 2 2 2 10 × 2 = 20 20 × 2 = 40
Liquefaction 3 2 5 4 14 × 4 = 56 56 × 4 = 224
Ranking: no = 1; low = 2; moderate = 3; high = 4; very high = 5

with historical data, provide the best available database for the ongoing assess-
ments. HAZUS-MH furthermore provides a software routine that allows integrat-
ing data from various sources that experience an analogous geological setting, or
hazard assessment models from other organizations or scientists, if the collected
and historical dataset is rated insufficient. Such kind of data may concern: topog-
raphy, surface roughness, vegetation coverage, and change in land use patterns,
seismic structuring, earthquake intensity distribution, all-hazard insurance cover-
age, vectorial diseases, coastal salt water intrusion, and many others.
The program continues by a qualitative prioritization of the identified hazards.
For this all the hazards are rated according to their frequency, duration, severity,
and intensity ranked from no, low, moderate, and high to very high. The software
also offers the inclusion of other factors if this is felt necessary. Moreover it is also
possible to enter a qualifier for each factor that weighs the factor, for example, the
building quality in areas that experience high storm surges (reinforced masonry vs.
wooden construction).
308 7 Risk Assessment

Table 7.6  Ranking on Hazard Ranking (max. 500)

hazard based on evidence
Snow avalanche No (<100)
and experience (qualifier)
Dam Failure No (<100)
Flood (riverine) Moderate (100–200)
Earthquake Very high (>400)
Landslide Moderate (100–200)
Volcano No (<100)
Liquefaction High (>200)

Table 7.5 is modified from FEMA 386 Worksheet 2-3.

Following this procedure a ranking (“qualifier”) on the hazards can be given
(Table 7.6).
As the intention of a hazard assessment is to anticipate the potential risk of
a community it is necessary to assess what groups of society and what kind of
technical and economic assets might be exposed to what type of hazard. Note:
HAZUS-MH does not provide an assessment of human losses, deaths, or injuries
(see Sect. 7.2).
HAZUS-MH as a next step provides for a geographical hazard assessment
based on the population distribution and the locations of hazard-exposed techni-
cal assets. In this regard it should be recognized that in developing countries more
than 60 % of the assets at risk are with the private sector, whereas in the developed
countries the ratio is almost opposite. Nevertheless it is a well-proven fact that
even in developing countries a set of basic and essential facilities (critical infra-
structure) is indispensable to uphold societal life. Therefore every risk assessment
has to compound the risk exposure of such facilities in order to ensure efficient
maintenance of life after a disaster strikes. Therefore HAZUS-MH included the
population distribution as well as the location, type, and values of public assets
including building stocks, streets, bridges, traffic lifelines, hospitals, schools,
waterworks, power generation facilities, and the like (see Sect. 8.10). The char-
acteristics of the above assets can be displayed in special vulnerability maps
identifying the location of hospitals, fire brigades, and so on in the form of point
features; streets, bridges, and pipelines as line features; and industrial areas, liv-
ing quarters, airports, harbors, and such in the form of polygons. Table 7.7 gives
an example for a categorization of assets according to their (arbitrarily) assessed
level of hazard exposure. The percentage of hazard exposure is based on the total
amount of the particular asset (=100 %).
The table provides useful indications on how strong and what kind of assets
are exposed to what level of vulnerability. But as regional planners have to make
the entire city area risk resilient they have to know the spatial distribution of each
of the particular hazards. From the data in the table (point, line, polygon features)
specific hazard maps can be created. But also very important for special plan-
ning is to create a synoptic hazard map that comprises all hazards in one map.
Such synoptic hazard maps should also include indicators for social and economic
7.5 Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Practice “HAZUS-MH” 309

Table 7.7  Categorization of assets according to their “arbitrarily assessed” level of hazard

exposure
Inventory No Low Moderate High Very High
hazard hazard hazard hazard hazard
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Population Residential 30 30 15 15 10
Assets Public 25 20 20 15 20
Commercial 15 35 30 15 5
Critical 50 25 5 10 20
Industrial 10 5 5 15 65
Main traffic routes 20 40 25 10 5
Lifelines Bridges 70 20 6 3 1
Waterways 5 15 25 50 10
Pipelines 40 0 10 25 5
Sewage system 35 5 10 25 25
Power lines 30 50 10 5 5
Waterworks 0 20 0 0 80
Utilities Sewage treatment 0 0 0 0 100
Power generation 55 0 0 45 0
Airport 0 0 100 0 0
Harbor 0 0 0 0 100
Telecommunication 0 30 30 40 0
Dams 5 50 25 15 5
Hospitals 30 35 25 10 10
Courtesy FEMA (2002)

features, such as income distribution; migration of high-income or low-income

groups to hazard-exposed living quarters; or the age, gender, and race distribution
of the population and their anticipated changes. They can moreover give insight
to the quality of the building stock, multiple-storied buildings, rented house occu-
pancy, and many other issues according to the task that is to be done.
The loss estimation in the HAZUS-MH Risk Assessment Program provides a
special risk assessment tool (RAT) that helps to assess the loss and damage not
only regarding the costs for reconstruction of the structural/building substance
(tangible losses) but also to assess the functional downtimes due to the damage.
Still there is no accepted tool in disaster management at hand to assess the loss
due to casualties. The question is how to assess the impact on human life from a
disaster. Thus far casualties are just counted by head and the number of injured
or homeless. But such an assessment does not really cover the social and finan-
cial damage that occurs. In Indonesia there were villages where almost no women
were living after the tsunami, leaving behind a great number of orphaned children.
Their life began with a significant traumatization, still not possible to be quantified
seriously. On the other hand, international assistance helped to reconstruct almost
all the houses destroyed by the tsunami in the city of Banda Aceh, that today
310 7 Risk Assessment

provide a much higher standard of living than before. But how to quantify such an
impact? Furthermore risk assessment comes to answer the question on the value
of life, for example, if a father was killed and can no longer feed his family (see
Sect. 7.2).
HAZUS-MH points to the fact that estimating the losses on building structures
can only be made by (arbitrarily) generalizing the different loss data and can thus
not define the potential loss of a particular building (that would require an assess-
ment by itself). Furthermore loss estimation cannot be carried out without a sim-
plification and generalization of historic loss data.
To obtain the economic loss two different methodological approaches are in
practice:
• The deterministic loss scenario: This correlates the potential losses based on
geological, physical, or technical evidence of real previous disaster impacts.
Such an approach only describes the worst-case scenarios in general and does
not take the frequency distribution of a specific disaster type into account.
• The probabilistic loss scenario: HAZUS-MH propagates a probabilistic
loss scenario to obtain a more realistic assessment of potential future losses.
Probabilistic assessment is generally based on statistical and historical evidence
on the likelihood that a certain event will occur with a specific frequency and
severity and with a potential loss. The losses are given in annualized losses
(average loss over a certain time span) or on an expected average return period.
For this the economic losses or the return period and other risk assessment fac-
tors are correlated versus time to develop a vulnerability curve (see Chap. 6).
The next step in the program is the estimation of losses. For example,
HAZUS-MH therefore comprises, for a loss prediction on earthquake, data input
next to the location of the epicenter, the event’s frequency and severity, also an
input of the geological environment of the earthquake hazard area: distribution
of soil type, liquefaction potential, morphology-induced landslide probability, as
well as water depth in order to assess the tsunami potential. All such data can be
entered into the software in order to arrive at a more realistic loss estimation sce-
nario. The additional data have to be ranked (arbitrarily) between 1 and 5 (very
low–moderate–high–very high). Concerning flood loss estimation the program
provides, moreover, a software tool to enter additional data on the morphology
(digital elevation model), the water catchment area, flood plain boundaries, the
upstream and downstream limits of the area of interest, as well as technical instal-
lation flood mitigation (FEMA 2008).
When all available and necessary data are entered, the HAZUS-MH program
offers to run probabilistic scenarios either:
• Pre-defined from overall data on the United States territory
• Individually defined according to the specific site of investigation
Next come risk assessments carried out with the risk assessment tool. The tool
compiles the findings on the natural hazard distributions, the data on the technical
and material inventory, and on the population distribution as well as on the loss
7.5 Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Practice “HAZUS-MH” 311

estimation results obtained. The RAT runs the assessment automatically based on
the above-given datasets. The software program then gives the final risk assess-
ment for the areas of interest in the form of quantitative loss estimation for earth-
quakes, floods, or on the risk exposure, for instance, landslide susceptibility or on
wildfire hazard. HAZUS-MH, however, recommends not simply taking the data
from the program, but reviewing the results according to their reasonableness.
A multitude of software packages are offered on the Internet and are accessible,
free, and open source, among them:
RStudio
The software integrates the comprehensive state-of-the-art statistical package with
a superb user interface, available both as a desktop application and as a browser-
based server application. The Web version of RStudio offers a great opportunity
for research advisors and IT departments for customized applications without
much hand coding.
SciGraphica
The software is a scientific application for data analysis and technical graphics. It
has many similarities with Sigmaplot and the very popular commercial applica-
tion, Microcal Origin. The main features are:
• Easy plot functions and manipulation of data in worksheets.
• Several worksheets can be used interactively at the same time.
• The plots are fully configurable.
• Output in PostScript quality.
• Software has a native XML file format.
• Data manipulation and fitting features are in a roadmap.
• Programming language available for Windows, Linux, NextStep, and Mac.
• Provides a wide variety of statistical (linear and nonlinear) modeling, classical
statistical tests, time-series analysis, classification, and clustering.
• Provides graphical techniques and is highly extensible.
Gnu Regression, Econometrics, and Time-Series Library (gretl; Free
Software Foundation).
It is a cross-platform software package for econometric analysis, written in the
C programming language. The main features are:
• Easy intuitive interface (now in English, French, Italian, Spanish, and other).
• A wide variety of least-squares based estimators, including two-stage least
squares and nonlinear least squares.
• Single commands to launch software applications such as Vector Autoregressions, etc.
• Output models as LaTeX files, in tabular or equation format.
• Integrated scripting language: enter commands either via Gnu or via script.
• Command loop structure for Monte Carlo simulations and iterative estimation
procedures.
• GUI controller for fine-tuning Gnuplot graphs.
• Links to further data analysis software packages possible.
312 7 Risk Assessment

OpenStat
A widely applicable statistics package for Windows and Linux, with a detailed
manual in PDF format.
Vista
A statistical software program with broad graphical user interface/desktop for
Windows, Mac, and Linux. The advantage of this software package lays in its
broad data visualization capacities.
ADE-4(2004)
This is statistical software for multivariate analysis and graphical visualization and
includes Freeware for Windows and Mac applications.
Dataplot (2002)
This is software mainly for running nonlinear model related statistical analysis
with good data visualization. The software is applicable for Windows, UNIX, and
Linux.

7.6 Risk Assessment (Disaster Risk Index)

The complex nature of risk-defining elements and their manifold interaction and
even superimpositions, for a long time made it very difficult to come up with a
reliable analytical instrument that condensed all the different elements of disaster
information into one single set of data. Such assessments are required to enable
risk assessors to quantify standardized and harmonized information, in order to
compare the disaster risk exposure of one location with another, at the national
scale as well as internationally. The most appropriate instrument allowing for such
national as well as global risk quantification was seen by many scientists in the
development of a Natural Disaster Risk Index (NDRI). The index must be based
on the most reliable available data on the natural hazard impact on a society. Such
an index has to specify the level of exposure and vulnerability of a certain area by
integrating the different risk elements into one comprehensive picture. However,
for methodological reasons it has to be stated that such an index can only be based
on past data and for a projection of the identified risk pattern into the future much
care should be taken. The main limitation to establish such an index is that the
database is (still) very heterogeneous and it turned out that it was in many cases
not comparable. From many countries, for example, the United States, the Hazus
99 assessment provided a complete set of data but countries such as Bangladesh
mostly lack such an inventory. The challenge in risk indexing is to find out what
kind of data can be used for a worldwide comparison. There have been several
attempts but they were all very limited in their conclusions. Only after a consid-
erable volume of information has been collected by CRED-EMDAT, are the risk
researchers today better disposed to generate harmonized datasets, enabling them
to generate a disaster risk assessment at a global scale.
7.6 Risk Assessment (Disaster Risk Index) 313

Such information can help to create a better understanding of the root causes of
natural disasters to occur and the potential mitigation, prevention, and prepared-
ness measures, including prioritization of resources, targeting of more localized
and detailed risk assessments, implementation of risk-based disaster management
and emergency response strategies, and development of long-term land-use plans
and multihazard risk management strategies.
“There is a great need for a global index to compare country’s risk exposure”
(Peduzzi et al. 2005, 2009). The reason that such a comparison was missing for
so long is the complex nature of the indicators defining hazards, vulnerability,
and risk. The difficulty derives from the fact that such a method has to be able to
compare different countries (large and small), very differently exposed to very dif-
ferent kinds of disaster: floods, droughts, or earthquakes and volcano eruptions.
One of the biggest difficulties occurs when trying to compare human vulnerability
from natural hazards with that from socioeconomic parameters, especially because
of the different time scales: social and economic changes occur within months or
years, whereas geological phenomena can take centuries or decades, as well as cli-
mate changes. Other difficulties are inherent to global scale. How does one com-
pare the situation of earthquakes in South America with the problem of drought in
Africa? Not only the number of people affected is very different, but also the per-
centage of occurrence varies greatly for each continent. Disasters may occur very
slowly (like climate change) or set in very rapidly. It may occur largely extended
like a drought or flood that can destroy the country’s harvest, or very locally, like
an earthquake that strikes a small settlement or an industrial estate, killing a large
number of people or making them homeless or jobless. Moreover, one hazard may
trigger another one, so that at the end the people are victims of a totally different
disaster type (hazard cascade; see Sect. 5.3). For instance a drought is often fol-
lowed by a flood and the deteriorated living conditions make such a society much
more vulnerable from the following flood. Or the situation of the tsunami-stricken
capital Banda Aceh (Indonesia) where definitively the third biggest earthquake
damaged large parts of the building structure that then was swept away by the tsu-
nami. The problem with disaster risk comparison is that many disasters are not
attributed to the root causes, rather than to the final type of disaster: a volcanic
eruption that triggers a lahar that at the foothill turns into mudflow that then dam-
ages a house is statistically attributed to mudflow. Mathematically it is thus far not
possible to incorporate the hazard cascade into the calculation. Such an assessment
can therefore not be carried out without extensive “simplification and normaliza-
tion” (Peduzzi et al. 2009).

7.6.1 Disaster Risk Index (DRI–UNDP)

The Disaster Risk Index (DRI–UNDP) was the first functioning instrument
to monitor the evolution of risk (UNDP 2004a, b, c; Peduzzi, et al. 2002, 2005,
2009). The DRI was a major step towards understanding the causal relationship
314 7 Risk Assessment

between social and economic development and disaster. With the DRI the UNDP
aimed towards assessing outcomes of disasters rather than their root causes. In
order to present a generally applicable method the UNDP-DRI defined a disas-
ter not exclusively as an impact from a natural event, but as related to trigger-
ing agents, mainly human activity, and from the interaction between these two
spheres.
The methodological approach of the DRI was based on identifying the relevant
disaster impact hazards and socioeconomic variables for specific geographic loca-
tions. This methodological approach made the selection of locally adoptable indi-
cators on disaster risk variables an arduous and time-consuming task. But it should
be noted that such tasks are often handed over to experts to discuss what could
result in outcomes of socially debatable appropriateness, particularly in the realm
of policy implications.
The UNDP Disaster Risk Index distinguishes several classes of natural risks
at the national level based on a model developed by UNEP-GRID and CRED-
EMDAT, the Global Resource Information Database (Peduzzi et al. 2002). As a
primary goal and intention, the DRI seeks to explain the correlation of a coun-
try’s development status and its vulnerability to natural hazards. It thus combines
physical exposure to hazards (population density) and vulnerability (socioeco-
nomic situation) to calculate the mortality risk for a certain hazard type. In addi-
tion to physical exposure and mortality, data on the purchasing power parity per
capita, the percentage of arable land, urban growth, forest coverage, as well as the
percentage of cropland to total land coverage were calculated. The Disaster Risk
Index shows impressively that the highest risk on mortality from natural disas-
ters occurs in South and Southeast Asia, from Iran down to Papua New Guinea.
Another mortality hotspot is eastern and central Africa, whereas along the west-
ern Latin American coast, although high, the threats are comparably lower (see
Fig. 3.43).
Several years before, the United Nation Development Program (Peduzzi et al.
2005) had initiated the first statistical evidence of the links between hazard distri-
bution and social vulnerability. The study carried out a multicriteria analysis for
identifying a country’s risk exposure, The World Vulnerability and Risk Report—
Global Risk And Vulnerability Index Trend per Year (GRAVITY). GRAVITY
consists of several reports assessing the different aspects of international risk
distribution.
The DRI calculated worldwide the average risk of death per country in disasters
associated with the four natural disasters: earthquakes, tropical cyclones, floods,
and droughts, based on internationally available data from 1980 to 2000. In the
DRI, risk refers exclusively to the risk of loss of life and excludes other facets of
risk because of a lack of datasets available at the global scale. The DRI further
enables us to assess the socioeconomic and environmental variables that are cor-
related with risk of death in respect to a certain area that is at risk. In order to cal-
culate the risk of life, variables such as the number of people living in an area, the
economic value of the infrastructure, and economic activities were combined with
the frequency of hazard events. All of these data are expressed in the DRI variable
7.6 Risk Assessment (Disaster Risk Index) 315

“physical exposure”, as the average number of people exposed to a hazard event

in a given year. In the DRI, physical exposure is expressed both in absolute terms
(the number of people exposed in a country) and in relative terms (the number
exposed per million people).
But physical exposure is insufficient to explain risk, as countries with similar
levels of physical exposure to a given hazard can experience widely differing lev-
els of risk. This factor is indicated by “vulnerability.” In the DRI, vulnerability
refers to the different variables that make people able to absorb the impact and
recover from a hazard event. These may be economic, social, technical, or ecologi-
cal. The DRI, therefore, calculated the relative vulnerability of a country to a given
hazard by dividing the number of people killed by the number exposed. A total
of 26 variables were selected for each hazard type. The Global Map on Disaster
Risk summarizes UNDP findings on the distribution of risk classes worldwide.
The map outlines that South and Southeast Asia from Afghanistan to China as well
as countries in parts of central Africa experience the highest risk of life on Earth.

7.6.2 Global Disaster Risk Analysis (World Bank)

A similar approach as the UNDP-Disaster Risk Index has been developed by the
Global Disaster Risk Analysis of the World Bank and Columbia University (Dilley
et al. 2005; Arnold et al. 2005). Like the DRI, the Global Disaster Risk Analysis
expresses risk as a function of hazard exposure and social vulnerability. The analy-
sis was targeted to identify the disaster risk potential of geographical areas of the
world (hotspots) by a synoptic view of six major natural hazards: earthquakes,
volcanoes, landslides, floods, drought, and cyclones. The analysis was based on
publicly accessible data mainly from CRED-EMDAT, UNEP/GRID, GSHAP, or
the World Bank and succeeded in quantifying the risk from the identified natu-
ral disasters. It furthermore has given much emphasis to disasters that originated
from multiple hazard impacts. The analysis was based on the calculation of two
fundamental types of risks: the risk of mortality and the risk of economic losses,
by combining the following three components that contribute to the overall risk of
natural hazards:
• Probability of occurrence of the six hazard types
• Physical elements exposed to these hazards (public and private)
• Vulnerability of the elements exposed to specific hazards indicated by a gridded
population and their respective gross domestic product (GDP)
The analysis was carried out in respect to pre-defined grid cells. Using grid cells
instead of entire countries made it possible to calculate the relative risks at subna-
tional scales. Moreover the calculation was restricted to the time span of the last
25 years, as the database beyond that date proved to be insufficiently reliable in
quality and data density.
316 7 Risk Assessment

Although the World Bank analysis provides an impressive and useful tool to assess
the world’s disaster risk distribution it is, however, unsuitable to identify the absolute
risk level of a specific hazard of a certain country or region. For such an analysis the
database is still not adequate. It was, however, adequate for identifying areas that are
at a relatively higher single- or multiple-hazard risk. It could identify those areas that
are at higher risk, for example, of a flood loss than others and at higher risk of earth-
quake damage than others, or at higher risk of both. Moreover, the World Bank analy-
sis provides the ability to assess in general terms the level of risk exposure and the
potential magnitude of losses to people and their assets in these areas.
In Fig. 7.5 the relative risk exposure for selected countries has been summa-
rized based on the World Bank data (Dilley et al., ibid). The table clearly shows
that the level of risk of a country is not just a matter of risk exposure, but rather
derives from a complex interaction between the exposure and the prevailing socio-
economic conditions. Although countries such as China, due to their large terri-
tory and their extremely high population density automatically arrived at a very
high risk level, countries such as Japan and the Philippines, although lying in the
same risk area of Southeast Asia, however, show distinctly lower risk exposures.
Comparing the United States and Bolivia give an even more different picture. Both
countries share the same risk pattern although they are highly different in size,
population, and economic potential.

China

Japan

Philippines

Bangladesh

Turkey

Venezuela

Indonesia

Bolivia Percentage of total area

Percentage of population in areas at risk

USA Percentage of GDP in areas at risk

Fig. 7.5  Comparison of risk levels of selected countries (Based on: Dilley et al. 2005; Table 7.2)
7.6 Risk Assessment (Disaster Risk Index) 317

7.6.3 Indicators of Disaster Risk and Risk Management

(Inter-American Development Bank)

The Inter-American Development Bank (Cardona 2005) has developed a risk

assessment tool, the “Indicators of Disaster Risk,” that mainly focused on vul-
nerability (see also ECLAC 2003). The tool was developed for an application in
the Latin America context for the time span from 1980 to 2000 for twelve Latin
American countries. Based on historic loss intensity patterns, the probable maxi-
mum future losses were quantified for disaster return periods of 50, 100, and
500 years. The methodological approach of identifying the economic and social
factors that affect risk exposure of a population in a mathematical-probabilistic
form makes application to other regions of the world possible. The assessment tool
comprises a system of risk-defining criteria that was based on four different indi-
cators, representing the main elements of vulnerability.
Disaster Deficit Index (DDI)
The DDI is based on historic geoscientific evidence to forecast potential disaster
losses, combined with data on existing and probable future values of public and
private assets. By this combination the risk assessors are enabled to identify the
expected vulnerability at a country level. The assessment tool is based on the use
of “relative indicators” defining the relationship between the “demand for con-
tingent resources to cover the losses caused by the ‘Probable Maximum Loss’
(PML) and the public sector’s economic resilience that describes the available
financial resources to restore damages (‘Economic Resilience’)” (Cardona, ibid).
The potential losses are calculated probabilistically based on the indicators “fre-
quency” and “severity” that have been already described in Chaps. 6 and 7 and
“economic resilience”, that is denominated by the volume of the internal and
external financial resources and capabilities to recover, on the government side as
well as by the private sector. To give an example of the aspect “resilience” this is
incorporated into the calculation by, for instance, the:
• Number of insured assets
• Availability of disaster reserve funds
• Volume of the government’s budget provisions for disaster remediating
• External and internal creditability
In many developing countries also the amount of aid donations received in the past
and that may be expected in the future from private and international donor agen-
cies can be used as an indicator for a country’s economic resilience.
Local Disaster Index (LDI)
This indicator is composed of three subindicators: number of deaths, number of
affected people, and the direct costs of rebuilding private and public structures and
agricultural losses from geotectonic and hydrometeorological disasters. In order to
reveal the LDI value, the ordinal numbers of the three indicators were added and nor-
malized according to the area under investigation to which the indicator corresponds.
318 7 Risk Assessment

Prevalent Vulnerability Index (PVI)

This indicator measures a country’s predominant vulnerability conditions by adding up
the physical exposure, the direct and indirect impact (fragility) and the lack of social
coping capacity (resilience). The composite nature of this indicator index makes it nec-
essary to sum up the indicators to derive at the PVI.
Exposure combined from data on:
• Annual population growth rate
• Urban annual growth rate
• Percentage of population that lives on less than US$1/day
• National capital stock in US$ million per square kilometer
• Import/export as percentage of GDP
• Gross domestic investment as percentage of GDP
• Arable land as percentage of total land area
Fragility combined from data on:
• Human poverty index (HPI)
• Percentage of people depending on income of working population
• GINI coefficient
• Unemployment rate
• Annual food price increase
• Percentage of agriculture on GDP
• Debt service as percentage of total GDP
• Percentage of (human) soil degradation
Resilience combined from data on (“inverse relationship”):
• Human Development Index (HDI)
• Gender-Related Development Index (GDI)
• Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)
• Social expenditure on health, education, and so on as percentage of GDP
• Infrastructure issuance coverage as percentage of GDP
• Number of TV sets per 1000 people
• Number of hospital beds per 1000 people
Risk Management Index (RMI)
The RMI describes the risk management capability of a society to withstand the
adverse nature of disasters by benchmarking the risk management capacities
according to pre-defined achievement levels. The RMI was constructed to quantify
the different aspects of public risk reduction policies by summing up all compo-
nents and dividing by four:
• Risk identification (RI) as a measure of individual risk perception and the offi-
cial risk assessment
• Risk reduction (RR) quantifying the implemented mitigation and prevention
measures
7.6 Risk Assessment (Disaster Risk Index) 319

• Disaster management (DM) as a quantification of response and recovery activities

• Financial protection capability (FP) measuring the state’s capacity to institution-
alize risk transfer
With this set of indicators the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was able
to identify the root causes of vulnerability and to quantify the risk of countries
under investigation. For the economic losses that a particular country may suffer
from natural disaster impact it can provide an estimation of the extreme impact,
for example, from a hurricane, floods, tsunami, or earthquake event during a given
exposure time. It moreover quantifies the financial and social resources that are
needed to restore the pre-disaster situation. The tool furthermore contributes to an
international, cross-border comparison of risk based on the same set of criteria. It
assesses the risk level by defining the probability of exceeding a pre-determined
level of economic, social, and environmental consequences at a certain place and
time, called “convolution.” This term describes the interaction between hazard and
vulnerability (see Chap. 6) and refers to the fact that if no one lives in an area that
is subject to natural hazards, or if a society is settling an area not exposed to haz-
ards it will not be at risk and vice versa.
The assessment of the World Bank revealed that in respect to the DDI Index all
countries investigated with the exception of Costa Rica, are lacking an adequate
prevention and mitigation policy to cope with natural disasters. Regarding the
time span of the next 500 years, Colombia is at the most critical situation. The
calculation revealed probable losses of US$20 billion in the next 500 years are
to be expected. When the next 50, respectively, the next 100 years are regarded,
the maximum possible losses are expected to occur in Mexico with about US$4,
respectively, 7 billion.

7.6.4 Global Climate Risk Index (Germanwatch)

Another approach to quantifying the impacts of natural disasters is the yearly

Global Climate Risk Index 2014 (CRI) presented by Germanwatch (2014), with
special regard to the impact of extreme weather events. Similar to the former
reports, the seventh edition of the CRI also ranks the countries according to their
number of fatalities and economic losses. The data are provided mainly by Munich
Re NatCatSERVICE (MunichRe 2012, 2013) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) on economy and population distribution. Both are worldwide databases and
are among the most reliable and complete on this matter. The result is an average
ranking of countries in four indicators, of the absolute and a much stronger weigh-
ing of the relative impacts:
• Number of deaths
• Number of deaths per 100,000 inhabitants
• Sum of losses in US$ in purchasing power parity (PPP)
• Losses per unit of gross domestic product (GDP)
320 7 Risk Assessment

As in previous years, the 2012 Global Climate Risk Index analyzed to what extent
countries have been affected by the impacts of weather-related loss events: storms,
floods, heat waves, and so on. Geological and tectonic disaster types such as earth-
quakes, volcanic eruptions, or tsunamis were not incorporated, although there was
quite a reliable database available, but for the purpose of weather-related disasters,
they were rated not relevant. The index represents one of different steps possible in
the overall “puzzle of climate-related impacts and associated vulnerabilities” and as it
is based on past data, the findings should not be used for a linear projection of future
climate impacts. Furthermore the data only reflect the direct losses and fatalities of
extreme weather events; for instance, disasters such as heat waves that often lead to
much stronger indirect impacts (e.g., through droughts and food scarcity) were not
incorporated. Also, the total number of affected people (in addition to the fatal casu-
alties) was not included, since the compatibility of such data is very limited.
The presented analyses comprise all loss events that have caused substan-
tial damage to property or persons. It is important to note that the index origi-
nates from an event-related examination that does not allow for an assessment
of continuous changes of climate parameters. Thus far Germanwatch (2014) is
methodologically not able to quantify effects such as the “long-term decline in
precipitation that as it co-occurred in some African countries as a consequence of
climate change. Such parameters nevertheless often substantially influence impor-
tant development factors like agricultural outputs and the availability of drinking
water.” The Climate Risk Index does not provide an all-encompassing analysis
of the risks, but should be seen as an analysis regarding countries´ exposure and
vulnerability to climate-related risks. Each country´s index score derived from a
country’s average ranking in all four analyses, according to the following weight-
ing: death toll 1/6, deaths per inhabitants 1/3, absolute losses 1/6, and losses per
GDP 1/3. The quantification revealed that the most affected countries in 2010
were Pakistan, Guatemala, Colombia, and Russia (see Fig. 3.50). For the period
from 1991 to 2010, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Honduras rank highest. The long
series of climate risk assessments revealed that in most cases, countries that were
already afflicted in the past will most probably be endangered in future, although
Germanwatch refrained from giving a deterministic projection of the future.
The methodological approach of identifying the risk through relative and not
absolute values is deliberately chosen, as this allows for analyzing country-specific
data on damage in relation to real socioeconomic conditions. Germanwatch reiter-
ates that, for example, that US$1 billion in damage poses much smaller economic
consequences for a rich country than for one of the world’s poorest countries.

7.6.5 WorldRiskIndex (German Alliance

Development Works)

Another assessment of risk at the global level was carried out in 2013 for the
third time by the German Alliance Development Works (2013), publishing the
7.6 Risk Assessment (Disaster Risk Index) 321

World Risk Index, which provides a methodology enabling the risk manager to
assess the risk from natural disasters on a worldwide scale. In order to compare
the risk worldwide, a standardized and internationally accepted methodology
has been developed that enabled the risk assessors to compare findings of one
country to another. Such an approach cannot be successfully addressed when
it is not clear, where, what kind of risk exists to whom, and at what frequency
and severity. The World Risk Index has been calculated for 173 countries based
on 28 indicators that were grouped into four components, describing the level
of risk exposure as well as the societal capacity of a country to withstand the
impact:
• Hazard exposure
• Hazard vulnerability/susceptibility
• Coping capacities
• Adaptive capacities
The data used for the assessment were mainly called up from the Internet which
ensures transparency and verifiability. In order to be aggregated into indices, the
indicators were transformed in dimensionless rank levels accordingly. The trans-
formation into percentage values and classification was carried out with the help
of the quintile method integrated into the ArcGIS10 software packet. Five classes
were calculated and translated into a qualitative classification: very high–high–
medium low–very low. The risk calculated by the index is determined by the
extent to which communities are exposed to natural hazards such as droughts,
storms, or earthquakes, but also by their degree of vulnerability. The latter is
dependent on social factors such as the public infrastructure, medical services, the
prevailing nutritional situation, governance, the level of education, the availability
of insurance that might help deal with economic losses in an event, as well as the
condition of the environment.
Acknowledging the fact that the database for such a global assessment is very
heterogeneous, the authors see the presented index more as a communicating
instrument than a technically sophisticated assessment instrument. The aim of the
index is to sensitize the public as well as political decision makers towards the
important topic of disaster risks. The index wants to draw attention to the people
and countries at risk, as the disaster coping capacity is basically defined by the
national socioeconomic resilience. The broad press coverage confirmed the neces-
sity for such an assessment instrument and emphasized its need to set a base for
political decision making (IPCC 2012).
Figure 7.6 displays the general methodological approach. The risk assess-
ment is basically divided into the factors “people exposed” and “vulnerability,”
that account for 33 %, respectively, 66 % of the total risk. The factor “vulner-
ability” is composed of four components that all are set to account for 100 %.
Within “vulnerability” the components “exposure”, “susceptibility”, and “coping
capacities” are furthermore divided, for instance, into the basic features, “sanita-
tion” and “access to water” (both weighted by 50 %). Only the component “adap-
tive capacity” is not further divided. The four components are taken to contribute
322 7 Risk Assessment

Fig. 7.6  Methodological approach for a risk assessment combining “people exposure” and “vul-
nerability” (Own graph)

by 28 %, respectively, 14 % (“adaptive capacity”). By such a weight-attributed

assessment, the risk index wants to value the importance of the different com-
ponents. The World Risk Index proved to be a successful attempt to standardize
risk assessment worldwide. The approach, however, does not say that there are
no other options for a universal risk index. Nevertheless it should be noted that
the basic risk-defining components will not change. If a different methodological
approach is chosen, it will most probably only alter the weight factors attributed
to the different factors.
According to the report, global hotspots for disaster risk are concentrated
in Oceania, Southeast Asia, and the southern Sahel, and especially in Central
America and the Caribbean. Within the Pacific, the island state of Vanuatu has
the highest disaster risk, whereas Malta and Qatar face the lowest risk worldwide.
In these regions a high risk exposure is exaggerated by a highly vulnerable soci-
ety. For example, the small island states have a very high risk exposure owing to
their proximity to the sea that make them particularly exposed to cyclones, flood-
ing, and sea-level rise and are facing a low coping capacity. On the other hand
the Netherlands shows a similar risk to flood exposure, what makes the country
rank 11 among the states most at risk worldwide. But due to a very high standard
of social, economic, ecological, and institutional development, the Netherlands is
able to reduce its risk enormously; its risk ranking is much lower (rank 51).
7.6 Risk Assessment (Disaster Risk Index) 323

7.6.6 Earthquake Disaster Risk Index (EDRI)

Other than the risk indices described before that focus on the general risk dis-
tribution in order to provide a measure for comparing exposure from differ-
ent risks, the Earthquake Disaster Risk Index (EDRI) of Stanford University,
California (Davidson and Shah 1997) was developed especially to assess the risk
from earthquakes. Such a single-risk-oriented assessment was therefore called a
“topic-related risk index.” Generally speaking, the EDRI assessment works on the
assumption that by a comparison of earthquake risk-determining indicators it will
be possible to identify the risk at different locations. The EDRI was calculated
for 10 highly earthquake risk-exposed cities of the world from San Francisco to
Tokyo. The assessment was based on five sets of indicators, earthquake hazard,
earthquake hazard exposure, earthquake vulnerability, external political and eco-
nomic context, and emergency and recovery capability (Table 7.8). The choice of
indicators used and their attribution to different factors was based on a broad range
of data from different sources. Although ERDI provides an effective tool for earth-
quake risk assessment it should be analyzed whether the method can serve the
needs of the disaster risk assessment on earthquakes in other regions of the world
or on other types of disasters.
The main objective was to arrive at one single number and to attribute the most
probable value for each indicator, a process called “weighing values.” The data-
sets available from many open accessible sources were graphically, mathemati-
cally, and statistically combined and weighted according to the severity of the
recorded disasters. Figure 7.7 shows how the different indicators are weighted.
The assessment moreover was accompanied by a subjective assessment routine to
counterweight the technical figures by assigning values by the risk assessor based
on expert knowledge. Then the values for each indicator were calculated to work
out an index figure for all five indicators that at the end were all combined in the
EDRI.
The EDRI on earthquakes of 10 international cities was then compared to the
earthquake hazard factors known from geologic evidence. The EDRI for the city
of Tokyo, for instance, revealed a high risk index and also a high hazard exposure
factor. In contrast, Santiago de Chile has a low EDRI and also experiences a low
earthquake hazard, whereas the city of San Francisco experiences a high hazard
exposure although its EDRI is comparatively low (due to its strongly developed
institutional and operational disaster risk management capacity).

7.6.7 Natural Disasters Risk Index (Maplecroft)

The Natural Disasters Risk Index (NDRI; Fig. 7.8) was released by global risks
advisory firm Maplecroft and their findings are summarized here (Maplecroft 2010).
The index has been developed to enable businesses and insurance companies to
324 7 Risk Assessment

Table 7.8  Factors used for assessing the earthquake disaster risk index
Main factors Factors Indicators
Hazard Ground shaking MMI: 50-year return period
MMI: 500-year return period
% urbanized area with soft soils
Collateral hazards % urbanized area with high
liquefaction susceptibility
% buildings constructed of wood
Population density
Tsunami potential indicator
Exposure Physical infrastructure Population (number)
exposure GDP per capita
Number of houses
Urbanized land area
Population exposure Population
Economy exposure GDP per capita
Vulnerability Physical infrastructure Seismic code indicator
vulnerability City wealth indicator
City age indicator
Population density indicator
City development speed indicator
Population vulnerability % of pop. age <4/>65
External context Economic external context Economic context indicator
Political external context Political country context indicator
Political world context indicator
Emergency response Planning Planning indicator
and recovery planning Resources GDP per capita
10 years average of real growth in GDP
Housing vacancy rate
Number of hospitals per 100,000 people
Number of physicians per 100,000 people
Mobility and access Extreme weather indicator
Population density
City layout indicator
Courtesy Davidson and Shah (1997)

identify risks to international assets. It is calculated by measuring the human impact

of natural disasters in terms of deaths per annum and per million of population, plus
the frequency of events over the last 30 years. The methodology has been refined
to reflect the likelihood of an event occurring and covers disasters including earth-
quakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, storms, flooding, drought, landslides, extreme
temperatures, and epidemics. The NDRI includes the Geophysical Disasters Index,
the Hydrometeorological Disasters Index, and the Natural Disasters Economic
7.6 Risk Assessment (Disaster Risk Index) 325

Fig. 7.7  Weight of risk factors according to the severity of the disasters recorded: EDRI
(Courtesy Davidson and Shah 1997)

Losses Index. Data sources for the NDRI include EMDAT, the International
Disaster database, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, USAID’s
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the World Bank, and IMF. Maplecroft
assumes that due to climate change, extreme hydrometeorological events are to
increase posing a risk to business and property. This will also lead to interruptions
or a complete breakdown of infrastructure such as transport and power and com-
munication networks; plus there can be devastating impacts on local workforces.
This makes it essential that businesses plan for the possibility of a disruptive natu-
ral disaster. Poverty is an important factor in these countries exposing large parts
of the societies to the impact of natural disasters. In combination with a generally
poor infrastructure, plus dense overcrowding in high-risk areas such as flood plains,
river banks, steep slopes, and reclaimed land, this will in future result in even higher
casualty figures. The index ranked countries including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran,
India and China at the highest risk category.
326 7 Risk Assessment

Fig. 7.8  Natural disaster risk index 2010 (Courtesy Maplecroft, London)

7.7 Final Remarks on Disaster Risk Indexes

The many disaster risk indexes that have been developed, some of which are
described above, all have in common that they intend to provide a means to under-
stand the generating risk factors as well as to provide a worldwide applicable
measure to compare the levels of risk at different locations. But the large variety
of concepts and methodological approaches presented contradicts this intention to
have an index available that serves all needs and purposes all over the world. The
number of risk-identifying methods and tools available, all of them developed by
reputable organizations and generally based on a multitude of data, did not fulfill
the target of an overall applicability. There is still not that “one” risk index that can
be used for all countries worldwide and that covers all the different disaster risk
situations known. But such a world index is actually needed.
Figure 7.9 very generally depicts the bias in the findings of different organiza-
tions. As examples (far from being representative), the findings of UNU-EHS, the
World Bank, Germanwatch, and the Maplecroft Natural Disaster Risk Index are dis-
played for a selected choice of countries. The country rankings (0–130) follow the
given rankings as they have been identified by the four organizations. In general the
higher the ranking, the less is the risk exposure. It turns out that the findings of UNU-
EHS differ a great deal from the findings of the other organizations. For example,
UNU-EHS ranks countries such as the United States, Bolivia, Turkey, and Venezuela
low risk, whereas most of them were assigned to the m ­ oderate and even the high-risk
sectors by all the others. Japan is ranked by the organizations to be from highest to
lowest risk. It is not the intention here to question the respective findings, but as long
as findings differ that strongly a world unique risk index is still pending.
7.7 Final Remarks on Disaster Risk Indexes 327

Fig. 7.9  Comparison of world risk indices of different organizations for selected countries
(Based on UNU-EHS, Worldbank, Maplecroft, Germanwatch)

The main reason for these differences is seen in the way the basic parameters
were chosen to measure hazard distribution and vulnerability. The main obstacle
seen by all organizations begins with the first analytical step: who is collecting,
which kind of data, and originally for what purpose. Are the data collected at the
same time intervals (calendar years, fiscal years, or according to agricultural pro-
duction cycles)? The vulnerability data were collected unsystematically therefore a
countrywide representative coverage is not achievable and thus often assessed by
rule of thumb. This holds true for remote areas as well as for the densely settled
fringe areas of the big conurbations. There is a huge difference in data reliability
between industrialized countries such as the United States that hold a tremendous
amount of datasets on all technical, economic, and social issues and many devel-
oping countries such as Indonesia, that can hardly keep up their statistical record.
Sometimes the data collection method differs from country to country and the
statistical methods to process the raw data still are not harmonized to a degree that
makes a worldwide comparison possible.
For example, the World Bank (Dilley et al. 2005) defines their disaster hotspots
by dividing the country into grid cells and bases the population density on deciles
to arrive at more reasonable results and furthermore allow weighing each hazard
individually. Other risk assessment data processing schemes take the data as rep-
resentative for an entire country. In fact, more information comes from the densely
settled areas where the administration is well functioning, thus exaggerating the
weight of such areas. Moreover it is important to recognize that “Complex systems
328 7 Risk Assessment

are often defined by multiple variables (physical, social, cultural, economic, and
environmental) that cannot be measured using the same methodology” (Dilley
et al., ibid.). Often the assessment is carried out qualitatively on tangibly defined
issues or qualitatively when intangible “soft” criteria are processed. In the next
step these different datasets have to be harmonized to one assessment. What finally
makes an interpretation of the data barely possible? Dilley further stated,
As a global analysis was conducted with very limited local-level participation and based
on incomplete data, the results presented here should not provide the sole basis for design-
ing risk management activities. The analysis does, however, provide a scientific basis for
understanding where risks are highest and why, as well as a methodological framework
for regional- and local scale analysis.

Concerning the collection of “hard” facts such as the frequency and severity of
natural hazards, the number of disaster occurrences, the death toll, and economic
losses, it must be stated that although there are a number of national and interna-
tional data collection networks steadily producing data, the networks still do not
cover the Earth evenly. Moreover many of the networks were established in the
last 50 years hampering the compilation of long-term data sequences. Many of the
monitoring networks have very different states of technology, lack suitable accu-
racy, or are not functioning permanently, leading to distorted findings. To give two
examples, in the United States according to information of the USGS (2005) the
current monitoring level of active volcanoes revealed that only 3 of the 18 very
high threat volcanoes are monitored at the highest (level 4); or in Indonesia on
occasion of the eruption of the volcano Mt. Leroboleng in year 2004. In order to at
least document the seismicity after the eruption, a seismometer had to be brought
in by motorcycle over a distance of more than 80 km.
There is growing recognition of the need for better data and information on
hazard distribution and disaster-associated impacts both at local and regional lev-
els, on national and international levels, as well as on historical and current data
(Subbiah et al. 2008). The first direction to improve the underlying databases is
to follow each possible opportunity to reach a higher level of data reliability on
disaster risks and economic losses. A range of new global-scale datasets is cur-
rently under development with the intention to get broader and more comprehen-
sive regional datasets for areas at risk and on the subnational distribution pattern
of poverty and hunger. Still the data monitoring is hampered by often unclear and
inappropriate definitions. The characterization of what water level defines a flood,
how many dry weeks constitute a drought, or whether a ground motion is derived
from a new earthquake or should be counted an aftershock.
Another direction to improve data reliability is to institutionalize investigation
networks of long-term key processes, for example, (Dilley et al., ibid.) on the:
• Potential effect of changes in hazard frequency due to human-induced climatic
change coupled with trends in human development patterns.
• Degree changes in tropical storm frequency, intensity, and tracks interact-
ing with continued coastal development (both urban and rural) may lead to an
increase in risk in these regions.
7.7 Final Remarks on Disaster Risk Indexes 329

• Question of whether agricultural areas that are already under pressure from
urbanization and other land-use changes are likely to become more or less sus-
ceptible to drought, severe weather, or floods.
• Can new types of disaster hotspots occur if the changing land-use patterns inter-
act with the changing of drought, landslide, and deforestation distribution?
Although many aspects of these questions have already been addressed in gen-
eral, the full range of hazard probability and the evolving vulnerability of the risk-
exposed people have not been fully explored to the extent necessary. Moreover
an integrated and interdisciplinary focus on data acquisition as well as in data
processing is required to better understand the nonlinear relations of the hazard
vulnerability context and the social and economic complexity and dynamics of
societies. The task ahead is to follow the direction already started by the many
national, regional, international, public, and private sector and scientific institu-
tions, but it is recommended that the many and often duplicating activities of the
different organizations should be harmonized, best under the auspices of the UN
ISDR secretary and CRED-EMDAT, in order to come up with an overall agreed-
upon and formally binding risk assessment tool. This would lead to achieving a
broader and deeper insight to the complex system of hazard, vulnerability, and risk
and would result in more effective risk management by the different stakeholders
involved in risk reduction or adaptation decision making.

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Chapter 8
Integrated Disaster Risk Management

8.1 General Aspects: The Concept of Risk Governance

The term “governance” comprises a multitude of different definitions; all of

them have proven their usefulness, although there is much difference in under-
standing. The political definition as it is used in our daily life is that governance
means running the country. For this a government has set up necessary structures
and processes to develop national decision making and an according implementa-
tion. Good governance aims at an early and comprehensive societal participation,
but nevertheless even a high level of participation of the society will not result
in outcomes that satisfy the expectations, needs, and interests of all the different
societal groups. Thus risk governance is a systemic approach to enable develop-
ment processes associated with social, ecological, natural, and technological risks.
The approach is based on the principles of participation of all parts of a society
to reach a consensus on how to achieve disaster reduction targets and simultane-
ously fulfill the requirements of sustainability. “An effective disaster risk manage-
ment that is convergent with other public and private policies seeks to reduce risk
exposure and vulnerability by filling gaps in order to avoid or reduce human casu-
alty and economic losses caused by disasters” (Aven and Renn 2010). In order to
achieve the envisaged targets two groups of stakeholders exist: the political and
implementing institutions mandated with risk management and the other the popu-
lation at risk. An effective risk governance invites both groups jointly to formulate
management strategies that serve the needs of the society in total. The role of the
population in this regard is to participate in the decision-making process by con-
tributing personal experience and express expectations and fears. The population
at risk is on the one hand benefiting but there are also groups in the society that
might be negatively affected by the decisions. The process of bringing these dif-
ferent expectations into a meaningful equilibrium is called “vertical governance”.
In this regard risk governance is following the principles of good governance
when the governance procedures and structures encompass criteria such as trans-
parency, accountability, and participation. As described by the International Risk
Governance Council (IRGC 2009):

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 333

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_8
334 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

Governance refers to the actions, processes, traditions and institutions by which authority
is exercised and decisions are taken and implemented. Governance is a permanent and
important part of life and the willingness and capacity to take and accept risk is crucial
for achieving economic development and introducing new technologies. Many risks, and
in particular those arising from emerging technologies, are accompanied by potential ben-
efits and opportunities. Better risk governance implies enabling societies to benefit from
change while minimizing the negative consequences of the associated risks.

But a government not only acts on the society but is also connected with other
governments to bring national interests into the international interconnectedness,
as many of the risk types are systemic and are not confined to national borders.
Therefore such kind of risk governance requires linking national and international
actors to implement a multistakeholder approach within governments, business,
science, and civil societies. The integration of national bodies into the interna-
tional risk governance architecture can either concern nations that share the same
targets, interests, and opinions as well as those who do not. Such governance is
called “horizontal governance”.
In disaster risk management “reality,” very often vertical and horizontal govern-
ance approaches are closely linked. For example, a flood in the upper catchment
area of a large river may call for a local mitigation concept that might deterio-
rate the flood mitigation capacity of the low-lying neighbor country. Furthermore
risk governance should not be seen as synonymous with providing information
on what the government does, but on how risk management is organized through-
out the country for the sake of society. Thus the term “risk governance” can be
described as built up by the three pillars of risk assessment, risk management, and
risk communication assembled under one roof, a “risk trinity,” as can be seen from
Fig. 8.1.

Fig. 8.1  Trinity concept of risk (Based on Böschen et al. 2002)

8.1 General Aspects: The Concept of Risk Governance 335

The “trinity” concept as given by the Office of Technology Assessment at the

German Bundestag (TAB), although affirming the traditional form of allocating
responsibilities between technically oriented risk assessment and welfare-oriented
participation, strongly pledges not to be used as individual standalone pillars. The
advantage of the three viewpoint experiences should be used to make the bounda-
ries permeable and profit from interconnecting the inputs. The boundaries result
from the different methodological approaches and reflect the classical tasks of sci-
entists and decision makers. TAB points out that the more these methodological
boundaries become transitional this will help to overcome the traditional bounda-
ries between technology and sociology for the sake of a prevention-oriented disas-
ter management culture.
The classical methodological approach of risk assessment is, without doubt, not
at all free from methodological problems, but as long as there are no convincing
alternatives available, science and technology are still given the highest priority in
risk assessment (Böschen et al. 2002). The debate runs along the following lines:
sociologists strongly pledge that as natural science does not know the term “risk”
all evaluations of a risk exposure have to be named “risk analysis”. A real “risk
assessment” only fulfills its requirements when the social, cultural, and economic
framework is taken into consideration. Risk management even goes a step further
and starts when the operational, administrative, and legal base for implementing
risk prevention is provided. “Risk management depends, however, not only on sci-
entific input. It rather rests on three components: systematic knowledge, legally
prescribed procedures and social values” (Aven and Renn 2009).
To give an example for an effective and reliable risk governance initiative: every morning
and every evening the North German Radio broadcasts information on the expected high
tide level at the North German Sea coast. The text of the message is: “Along the North
German Sea Coast the evening high tide level is expected to set in three to four decimeter
higher than the mean high tidal sea level”.

To make the early warning on sea level at the coast effective, the German gov-
ernment has enacted a special institution:
• The Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) was mandated to sup-
port maritime shipping and the maritime industry and to promote sustainable
use of the oceans. In general such a function is handed over to state-owned bod-
ies; but there are also models where such a mandate was given to the private
sector. As maritime bodies all over the world are internationally linked, the BSH
is the formal representative of the German government in this sector.
• To set up the institutional framework composed of the scientific cum opera-
tional capacity as well as the allocation of a sustainable financial budget.
• Establishing and maintaining a pool of experience and expertise in order to ful-
fill the state’s obligation to deliver information on a level of competence that
copes with international standards.
• Enacting a national law of broadcasting that obliges the public-financed news
agencies to fulfill a “societal” duty on information dissemination. Thus the
news, for instance, on an expected sea level are regularly broadcast to the public.
336 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

Although the BSH example is tailored to the specific demand of the people living
along the coast, the example perfectly highlights how risk assessment, risk man-
agement, and risk communication can be organizationally integrated to serve the
needs of the public. A central aspect in tide-level forecast is the role of natural
scientists and maritime engineers to define, for instance, “the mean sea level” as a
regulatory standard. The tasks are daily worked out on certified quality standards
so that they can be exchanged via the worldwide communication networks.
There are moreover quite a number of similar institutions mandated with, for
example, snow avalanche or extreme weather forecasts.
The governing factor of risk assessment and communication differs with the
national culture, political traditions, and social norms. They directly influence the
mechanisms and institutions for elaborating knowledge and expertise to be fed
into the policy arenas. Policy analysts have developed a classification of govern-
mental styles that address these aspects and mechanisms (IRGC ibid; Aven and
Renn ibid):
• The adversarial approach is characterized by an open forum in which differ-
ent stakeholders compete for social and political influence. For this the actors
need scientific evidence to support their position. Policy makers pay attention to
formal proofs of evidence. Risk management, communication, and stakeholder
involvement are mandatory.
• In the fiduciary approach, the decision-making process is confined to a group of
patrons. The public can provide input but is not allowed to be part of the nego-
tiation or policy formulation process. The system relies on producing faith in
the competence and the fairness of the patrons involved in the decision-making
process. Scientific and technical advisors are selected according to expertise,
sometimes according to national prestige or personal affiliations.
• The consensual approach is based on social groups and scientists working
together to reach a pre-defined goal. In general such negotiations take place in
closed circles of influential actors. Controversies are not made public and con-
flicts are reconciled on a one-to-one basis. Stakeholder participation is only
required to the extent that further insights from the affected groups are needed.
• The corporatist approach is similar to the consensual approach, but is far more
formalized. Well-known experts are invited to join a group of carefully selected
policy makers representing the major forces in society. Often the groups repre-
sented within the club are asked to organize their risk management and commu-
nication to enhance the credibility of the decision-making process.

8.2 Institutional Framework for Risk-Based Planning

According to the international consensus, disasters whether natural or man-made

have to be reduced in order to increase the living conditions of societies. This
understanding is the rationale for social and economic development planning and
8.2 Institutional Framework for Risk-Based Planning 337

was first formulated by the Brundtland Commission in 1987. The commission

introduced the term “sustainable living” in regard to resources, ownership, access
to basic needs, and livelihood security. The intention of the vision is that people’s
capacities to generate and maintain their means of living in order to enhance their
well-being and that of future generations should be strengthened wherever possi-
ble and wherever necessary. The discussions following the recognition of climate
change have especially made such a reorientation necessary. According to DFID
(Twigg 2002), sustained individual and societal livelihood comprise a pentagon of
human, technical, financial, natural, physical, and social assets that enable them
to cope with the adverse impacts of disasters. Thus livelihood resilience describes
the capacity of a population to adapt and adjust to actual or potential impacts from
natural disasters as well as from the changing climate. After the Second World War
this approach has widely been used under the term “civil defense” but in the last
decades efforts to cope with threats to local communities are called “emergency
management” or “disaster planning” (Quarantelli 1995).
A sustainable disaster resilience will not be achieved without a national strat-
egy that describes short-term responses to periodic stress, as well as long-term
perspectives in response to anticipated future challenges. As a result of these out-
comes, the Hyogo Framework of Action initiated a multitude of documents and
research papers on the current status of disaster risk management and called for
an integration of disaster risk management into national strategies for sustain-
able development. Meanwhile that initiative has been adopted in nearly all coun-
tries of the world and disaster risk reduction has been taken up by governmental
bureaucracies. All over the world the countries have meanwhile integrated natural/
man-made disaster risk reduction in their vision of civil defense. Especially after
the 9/11 terror attack when the United States reorganized their civil defense sec-
tor and established the Department of Homeland Security, all countries have put a
“generic or all-hazard or risk reduction” in their focus. In general there is no great
strategic and conceptual difference between risk reductions from external attacks
than that from natural disasters.
As an outcome of the UN Decade on Disaster Risk Reduction (IDNDR 1990–
1999) the importance of policy and its resulting implementation has now become
generally accepted. By law, the envisaged disaster risk reduction is defined at
first concerning the national “level of protection” and secondly under which legal
framework the objectives should be achieved. The definition of the level of protec-
tion is a matter that requires a nationwide consensus of all stakeholders (national
governmental authorities, local governments, nongovernmental organizations,
research institutions, business, and the representatives of the social groups at risk)
in an embracing dialogue. To find such a consensus is not a matter of weeks or
months but should be implemented as a permanent review process. Next to the
law, risk reduction requires a set of regulations defining the operational environ-
ment that enables the authorities to bring risk reduction into being. Guidelines are
to follow that explicitly describe who is doing what, where, and who is benefit-
ing, but also who may not be benefiting from the countermeasures. Thus the pol-
icy sets the frame by defining regulations, authorizations, prohibition, provisions,
338 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

sanctions, declarations, or restrictions but does not outline activities actually to be

carried out.
Mitigation, as demonstrated in the “Emergency Management Cycle” (see
Sect. 5.3) is the step where policies and strategies are institutionalized before a
disaster strikes. Thus mitigation has a very close causal relationship with the step
of “preparedness and prevention” where the mitigation policies are actually imple-
mented. Although there is no generally accepted definition of mitigation, most dis-
aster risk managers nevertheless stick to this definition rather than to define it as
an overall term describing all the measures from disaster assessment to real imple-
mentation of risk reduction countermeasures. Focusing on mitigation as a central
part of national development strategies has been driven by several factors. First,
due to the ever-increasing economic costs of disasters and disaster relief, socie-
ties are increasingly expecting and demanding that their governments protect
them from disasters before a disaster strikes rather than just reacting to its impact.
Second, the increasing understanding of the cause–effect relationship between
hazard exposure and poverty calls for state intervention long before a crisis. In
developing countries moreover risk reduction is traditionally seen as the state’s
task. Altogether the arguments raised give a distinct rationale to link disaster plan-
ning to development planning, a linkage often reiterated by the World Bank and
other international donor agencies (Kreimer and Munasinghe 1991).
Natural hazard mitigation comprises every step taken to contain or reduce
the effects of an anticipated or already occurred disastrous event, regardless
of whether these steps are taken by an individual, a social group, the public, or
states’ official emergency management agencies. The aim of hazard mitigation is
sustainably to reduce or better eliminate the long-term risk to life and property
from hazards. Mitigation is taking action (in general) before a disaster strikes to
reduce human and financial consequences later. But often actions that are taken
right after a disaster occurred are called mitigation. Nevertheless mitigation is used
exclusively here in context with prevention and preparedness as has already been
described above. Mitigation when successful increases the resilience of formerly
vulnerable societies. Effective mitigation requires that all stakeholders understand
local risks, and address the root causes as well as the consequences and define the
political will to invest in long-term community well-being. This definition dis-
tinguishes actions that have a long-term impact from those that are more closely
associated with immediate preparedness, response, and recovery activities. Hazard
mitigation is the only phase of emergency management specifically dedicated
to breaking the cycle of damage, reconstruction, and repeated damage. The pri-
mary purpose of mitigation is to identify community policies, actions, and tools
for implementation that will result in a communitywide reduction in risk of future
losses.
Figure 8.2 gives a generalized overview on how risk mitigation is addressed
today. In the past emergency management agencies very often started disaster
management as an ad hoc relief and recovery scheme. Experiences from the last
decades, however, revealed that the long-term effects of severe disasters require
a shift in paradigm: to assist hazard-prone communities in a holistic way, before,
8.2 Institutional Framework for Risk-Based Planning 339

Fig. 8.2  Disaster risk mitigation planning structure (light brown scientific sector; Red-brown
state levels; light green local implementation) (Own graph)

during, and after a disaster. Moreover there was a strong drive in the management
focus towards cost-effectiveness. The long-time prevailing evidence-based disaster
response and crisis reaction thus got a strong movement towards a culture of pre-
vention. All these demanded a new disaster risk management strategy framing the
legal and operational base. The new approach is that today the factor of prevention
became an indispensable part of any strategy.
The strategy shows disaster risk management as a cycle. As with every cycle
it has neither a beginning nor an end. Nevertheless let’s start with the onset of a
disaster, the impact of which, root causes, people at risk, and their affected liveli-
hoods have to be assessed in a scientifically sound, careful, and neutral manner. In
these tasks geoscientists, technicians, sociologists, and development planners are
called upon to combine their expertise to come up with a reliable assessment. A
legal frame for a systematic and rigorous disaster risk assessment on the national
level must be established, that must furthermore comprise a stipulation on data
collection systems and research and analysis by scientific institutions to ensure a
knowledge-based disaster risk assessment. Only such a multisector knowledge-
based assessment reveals the best opportunity for an in-depth assessment of the
disaster that occurred and thus lays the basis for sustained disaster mitigation.
But such an assessment alone will not give a realistic assessment of future events.
Therefore based on the deterministically assessed single event, it is necessary to
340 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

draw scenarios for probable future events. For such probabilistic risk assessments,
well-educated and experienced scientists are necessary. Their findings are handed
over to the national authorities to serve as the basis for defining the national level
of protection. This definition should not be declared by government order. It has to
be the outcome of a dialogue process that incorporates all stakeholders. Based on
the level of protection, a national strategy of disaster risk reduction can be formu-
lated: in general by a law that defines the legal framework of the national disaster
risk management. The legal frame together with adjoining regulations benchmark
the operational setup required, stipulate the different mandates, and define (in gen-
eral) the task necessary to reach the envisaged level of resilience. Based on the law
and the regulations topic-oriented guidelines should be formulated that describe
the different tasks at the implementation level. Here again geoscientists’ expertise
is indispensable to develop and implement mitigation measures at the local level.
But not only technical matters are to be addressed. Sustainable risk reduction
needs to get the people involved in mitigation. Therefore mitigation programs have
to start right from the beginning initiatives with the focus on community aware-
ness raising, risk-reduction education, and on strengthening the self-help capaci-
ties of the populations at risk. Another effective means for increasing resilience is
by disaster preventive land-use planning. Next, every mitigation measure has to
be subject to a critical review of its achievements. Only when lessons learned are
been drawn regarding the strength and the weaknesses, can the next measures be
designed more efficiently.
To institutionalize implementation at the local level the provision of financial
and technical support for cost-effective natural disaster mitigation measures as
well as an effective expenditure monitoring is required. Without sufficient ade-
quate financial support and the “binding forces of law” any attempt to increase
resilience by planning and organization will be not successful. Therefore the
state and its local authorities must endorse cost-sharing principles that neverthe-
less include a focus on the responsibilities of individuals, businesses, and insur-
ers. Only when all decision-making levels are collaborating and are coordinated
according to national strategy, can the government take up its original responsibil-
ity in guiding natural disaster risk management but not being actively involved in
local mitigation.
The preceding statements clearly point out that risk-based planning is a pre-
requisite to shift the paradigm from a culture of reaction to a culture of preven-
tion. Such a shift allows planning for future risk reduction based on a coherent risk
assessment, defining safety levels that are applicable to the respective risk level,
and moreover facilitating the setting of priorities and defining the level of public
and private interactions. Risk-based planning is the main step in achieving this. In
order to develop a long-term strategy to protect people from the adverse impact of
future natural disasters, risk-based planning creates the general framework on the
national as well as on the local level. Therefore mitigation planning has to involve
the science sectors, the legally mandated authorities, and the implementation sec-
tors, as well as the populations at risk. The envisaged benefits are that exposed
people understand the nature of risk, the problems are addressed properly, and that
8.2 Institutional Framework for Risk-Based Planning 341

reduction measures lead to an increase in societal resilience. The most important

aspect of risk-based planning is that understanding risk is deeper and more broadly
anchored in the society.
In Tables 8.1 and 8.2 an arbitrary selection of the major activities related to
risk-based planning are cross-plotted with the major actors. It reveals that first of
all, the legal framework for a risk-reduction strategy has to be established. Based
on the framework the scientific sector sets in, assessing hazard, vulnerability,
and the level of risk of the areas under investigation. Based on these findings the
planners and local administrators are able to define the specific reduction meas-
ures and can initiate and pursue the implementation. National, international, pri-
vate, or public financing schemes are then required to allocate the necessary
funds. Risk reduction will not be successful and sustainable if the risk-exposed
population is not involved adequately. The link between the official development
decision-making process and implementation at the local level is part of the com-
munication process carried out by the media and the official publication channels.
The tables clearly demonstrate that all these interactions function as what can be
called a “risk planning path.” However, it should be noted that the table highly

Table 8.1  Administrative and societal sectors affecting activities disaster risk management
342 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

Table 8.2  Administrative and societal sector’s relation to disaster risk management procedures

generalizes the different functions, responsibilities, and interests the actors have
in the field. And that there exists in the actual planning process a number of very
specialized and sophisticated interactions between the different actors and differ-
ent organizations.
Risk-based spatial planning lay the base for a long-term management of a
disaster risk reduction strategy. The planning comprises elements from hazard
identification to the definition of risk reduction measures and their respective
implementation. Furthermore it allows the monitoring of the effectiveness of the
countermeasures long after the actual measures have been completed. Spatial risk
reduction planning should also entail conceptual means to identify alternative or
additional uses for the area at risk under the assumption that these newly intro-
duced land-use patterns will not lead to further endanger the area. To achieve
completeness in planning, all possible alternative reduction measures have to be
considered and have to be checked against their technical realization as well as
against the envisaged economic benefits. These many requirements define the inte-
gral nature of any risk planning concept. As already mentioned, risk planning is
in general based on a snapshot of the actual risk exposure situation, but it has to
8.2 Institutional Framework for Risk-Based Planning 343

Fig. 8.3  Benefit–cost relationship of risk reduction measures (Courtesy Bründl 2009)

be considered in the planning that the implementation measures may be in effect

for some time. A time span of up to several years may have to be considered, for
instance, for stabilizing a slope against avalanche debris falls or even decades in
the case of reforestation measures.
The risk-planning strategy has to comprise a methodological approach for
time-differentiated quantitative risk assessment, based on the technical implement
ability and the benefit–cost relation as given in Fig. 8.3. Generally the envisaged
level of resilience should be oriented at the state of technology. Such a demand
holds true especially for strong economies, whereas in many developing coun-
tries such a claim is often not achievable. In these countries the implementation
in fact is mainly based on the low cost principle, although the measures should
at least serve a minimum level of resilience and should be locally adoptable and
socially accepted. In this context, the issue of translocation has to be mentioned.
This describes the strategy to locate risk-affected people in other no risk areas, an
instrument that is often practiced in developing countries. Translocation is often
seen by the authorities as the sole measure as it is easily implemented, based on
hierarchical decision-making structures, and is generally taken by technocrats. But
such decisions mostly disregard the emotional “soft” aspects of regional planning.
It turned out that as long as such measures are not rooted in the society at risk, the
effectiveness proved to be very questionable.
The operationalization of the risk reduction measures should be laid down in
the planning documents defining the main steps of the implementation process:
• Define the local prevention level (individual, public).
• Carry out risk assessment of the area under investigation.
• Outline the risk reduction measures.
• Define the cost regime with respect to the envisaged level of resilience (benefit).
344 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

• Enhance acceptance of the reduction measures by early involvement of the peo-

ple at risk.
• Assess compliance of the risk reduction measures with other claims on the area,
for example, industrial activities, agricultural production, environmental protec-
tion, social and cultural heritage, and ethical values.
The complex relationship between the risk-generating factors and the individual
or societal group’s perception of such kind of threats, brings risk governance to
the crossroads of scientific, technical, and probabilistic assessment. Fact-oriented
risk assessment collides with psychological, cultural, social, and ethical perspec-
tives. Responsible and meaningful risk governance therefore has to take these dif-
ferent experiences into account. The natural scientists mostly see this context as
a technical challenge, but as the risk definition originated from the social sector,
the societal perspective based on cultural heritage, social status, ethnic and gender
relations, and the participation perspective prevail. Risk governance therefore is
placed at the “crossroad between natural events and socio-economic and techno-
logical developments and policy driven actions” (IRGC 2010). The risk govern-
ance framework has to become an integrated framework that sets the rules for a
comprehensive (technical and social) assessment and for the formulation of man-
agement strategies to cope with risks, at the local level as well as internationally.
Based on the conviction that both the factual and the sociocultural dimension
of risk must be considered during the risk governance process, the risk govern-
ance framework integrates scientific, economic, social, and cultural aspects and
includes the effective engagement of stakeholders. Coping with risk “requires a
holistic approach to hazard identification, risk assessment and risk management.
This makes risk more than just multiplying the losses with the probability of
occurrence; it rather deals with uncertainty about the occurrence and the conse-
quences” (Aven and Renn 2009).
The IRGC (ibid) stated that
[G]governance of global systemic risks needs to focus on a community of multiple institu-
tions and disciplines, including natural scientists, social scientists, engineers, policy mak-
ers, practitioners and educators from around the world. It ought to be truly integrative,
especially in the face of the ever more complex, inter-connected and cascading risks that
society faces. The global risk community must develop and apply innovative tools and
methods, including theoretical, mathematical and computational tools as well as enhanced
management approaches.

An effective and sustainable risk management strategy able to comply with the
multitude of different risk settings first needs a definition of the role of the major
stakeholders.
The Role of Government
• To work out and make effective a national disaster management strategy that
defines the national level of resilience that is to be achieved and that is condu-
cive to the ecological sustainability of the country
• To develop and implement an effective risk-based land management and risk plan
8.2 Institutional Framework for Risk-Based Planning 345

• To develop and implement an effective disaster prevention and emergency

management at all administrative levels
• To define the stakeholders and mandates of the different administration levels
• To allocate the funds and secure a comprehensive implementation of the strategy
• To inform people regularly, early, and in depth about how to assess risks and
reduce their exposure and vulnerability to hazards
• To raise awareness of the disasters the nation is exposed to, and to make the
people understand what options are available to respond effectively to a hazard
• To support individuals and communities to prepare for all kind of events
• To mandate, equip, and provide trained and skilled personnel for an effective
and well-coordinated response of the emergency services
• To help communities to recover from devastation by technical assistance and
the allocation of rehabilitation funds
• To help the society to learn and adapt in the aftermath of a disastrous event.
The Role of Individuals
• To take their share of responsibility for preventing, preparing for, responding
to, and recovering from disasters according to their individual, financial, tech-
nical, and personal resources
• To work out guidelines to improve their household resilience
• To acknowledge that most of the immediate rescues are rendered by those affected
• To make a disaster resilience approach the basis of the mitigation and preven-
tion activities at the household and community level
• To regularly inform regarding hazard exposures and disaster events to raise
awareness of the individual and society
• To organize regular emergency drills to keep the community alert regarding the
hazards
• To increase individual disaster resilience by active planning and preparation for
protecting life and property
• To actively strengthen cooperation between the local community disaster and
emergency management authorities
• To take part actively in working out a local disaster management strategy
• To organize rescue and rehabilitation in case a disaster strikes.
The Role of Business and Nongovernment Organizations and Volunteers
• Business can play a fundamental role in supporting a community’s resilience to
disasters as it can provide technical resources and expertise and many essential
services on which the community depends. The provider of critical infrastruc-
ture (water, power, heavy duty machinery) can especially substantially contrib-
ute to rescue and rehabilitation by providing services during or soon after a
disaster. Governments as well as local authorities should look for close coop-
eration with the private sector by involving it as early as possible in the general
considerations to increase local disaster resilience,
• Nongovernment organizations and volunteers are often first at the forefront when
a disaster strikes and often provide most urgently needed support. But NGOs can
also help communities to cope with and recover from a disaster. Governments
346 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

as well as local authorities should look for an intensive and comprehensive

involvement of the NGOs to make them partners in the process of awareness
raising and prevention.
A good example for a statewide multihazard management planning is the State of
California’s Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2007 (OES 2007) with which the
then-acting Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger transferred US national law into
state law. He commissioned California’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) to
work out a plan that in detail explained how the Office of Emergency Services
could integrate the many state hazard mitigation programs into one statewide
emergency management plan. Much emphasis was given to the planning process
and its legal, institutional, and policy framework. The plan defined the advisory
function under the umbrella of California’s Office of Emergency Services (OES).
Hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessments were made compulsory for all coun-
ties, districts, and local administrations at least for the primary hazards of earth-
quake, flood, wildfire, landslide, and tsunami. Broad space was reserved on
improving the managerial capabilities that are required for sustainable risk preven-
tion and reduction measures. The plan foresaw a provision for a regular update.

8.3 The Risk Mitigation Cycle

There is a common understanding that there will be never a 100 % chance to avoid
a catastrophe (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). But all experience in disaster manage-
ment from all over the world revealed that there are realistic chances to avoid at
least some of the major impacts when knowing more of the specific details of
the disaster characteristics, defining its onset, trigger mechanism, and its loca-
tion of impact (risk assessment). Hillary Clinton, in those days secretary of state
of the United States, is right when saying: “Never waste a crisis.” With this sen-
tence she wanted to express that in every catastrophe, there lies a real chance to at
least tackle some of the risks. There is only one language worldwide in which the
word “crisis” is composed of two other words, “threat” and “opportunity”: this is
the Chinese language (see Fig. 8.4). The basic meaning of the Chinese character

Fig. 8.4  The Chinese

character “crisis” (Courtesy
UNISDR 2004)
8.3 The Risk Mitigation Cycle 347

“crisis” is that a crisis originates from a “threat” but opens the way to future pre-
ventive action: “opportunity”.
The central and most important task in disaster risk management is to organ-
ize how a society reacts to a disaster. The moment a disaster strikes, a multifold
set of activities starts that at first is oriented to rescue the victims. Then the soci-
etal functions have to be restored. But in order to increase the people’s resiliency
to withstand the next disaster, it is indispensable to improve the society’s risk pre-
vention capacity. The United States of America’s Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) has set up a “Natural Disaster Risk Management Cycle” that compre-
hensively describes the different steps of disaster management from the disaster
onset to the preparation for the next (FEMA 2003). As FEMA concentrates on the
emergency aspects, the cycle starts with the disaster impact. The onset of a disas-
ter, its remedial actions, restoration, and rehabilitation of the social system followed
by preparedness for a possible future disaster form a sequential terminology that
is given in the graph in Fig. 8.5. FEMA furthermore underlines the management
aspects in an emergency by introducing the step “mitigation” to the cycle and delib-
erately placing it last. Thus the cycle demonstrates that mitigation is that one activ-
ity which finally prepares the society to face the new risks. This approach makes the
FEMA cycle different from many other incident operation plans. The management
cycle expresses the significant change risk management perception has undergone
since the International Decade on Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) addressed

Fig. 8.5  Natural disaster risk management cycle (Own graph)

348 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

the issue in the 1990s. Since then disaster prevention became an integral part of
­emergency management. Rescue and restoration were seen as the main field of
intervention of emergency management, mainly carried out by military rescue oper-
ations. By introducing prevention, the management is now called on to incorporate
risk prevention in order to enable populations to become less risk exposed. Today in
almost all industrialized nations and even in many further developed countries this
approach is now part of the emergency management operational procedures.
Nevertheless, there are many developing countries still lacking this vision and
ad hoc military interventions are seen as the main rationale. Even in Indonesia dis-
aster prevention was not given a high priority until the tsunami happened in 2004.
But since 2006 a new National Emergency Management Law strongly emphasizes
the notion “to be prepared.”
The Natural Disaster Risk Management Cycle with the onset of a disaster and
clockwise follows all the steps of disaster risk management. Regardless of where
one starts, all steps form a cycle that encompasses the different mitigation steps
either as a source of disaster or as the outcome (cause–effect relationship).
The cycle in Fig. 8.5 is divided in two sectors: on the right there are activities
that describe the response to a disaster event and on the left activities are placed
that describe the future-oriented disaster prevention. The steps on the right side,
Crisis Reaction and Rehabilitation are both post-incident steps and start upon the
disaster impact. The two steps of Preparedness and Mitigation form preventive
actions to avoid the negative impact of future disasters.
Immediately after the disaster has happened, the management cycle starts with
first-aid activities to save lives and to rescue people from the damaged environ-
ment (“crisis reaction”). It is that part of the management cycle where the well-
known rescue teams and medical assistance are brought in that save the victims,
build emergency shelters, and restore the necessary critical infrastructure such as
electricity, water, and fuel supplies, telecommunication, and transportation. At this
time most of the victims are housed in provisional camps, provided with food and
water, and are given medical and social assistance by local authorities or nongov-
ernmental organizations. Further activities are carried out by the police or military
services that care for safety and security and to enforce law and legal stability.
Next in the cycle follows the rehabilitation step. It starts weeks or months
later and is targeted to bring the affected society stepwise back to “normal” life.
Therefore many activities are undertaken in order to restore life as before the
event. This not only holds true for restoring the physical infrastructure including
hospitals, schools, and bridges, but also for bringing the social system back to pre-
disaster functioning. In the rehabilitation step the society is still exposed to the
adverse outcomes of the event and the people still often depend on external assis-
tance. Next to caring for daily living, rehabilitation is oriented to long-term stabili-
zation of the social, economic, and cultural as well as the institutional conditions.
The other half of the cycle comprises the proactive oriented preparedness and
mitigation steps. Here the management cycle enters the field of structural and
nonstructural risk reduction. This sector is mainly oriented towards making the
people more resilient to future disasters. The aim here is to carry out sustainable
8.3 The Risk Mitigation Cycle 349

and effective actions that help to eliminate or at least to diminish negative long-
term effects to the people, their property, or their living environment from future
disasters.
The step preparedness mainly addresses operational procedures and brings the
risk reduction plans into operation. Here risk assessments are carried out, lines
for coordinating technical and political issues are established, and emergency
operation plans are developed. These activities are either done by the national
authorities or at a local level. Often the science sector is involved here. Based on
experience from past disasters and findings of the risk assessments, local emer-
gency managers will be enabled to review the existing spatial planning and will
come up with improved plans. In this step also the communities themselves are
addressed. Either the societies at risk or the individuals are called on to carry
out their individual and local disaster reduction measures. Making the society
more resilient to the impact of natural disasters will not be successful without
the involvement of the population. It is the people who are vulnerable and with
it the social system. Thus only by an early and comprehensive participation of
the risk-exposed ones, can a sustainable resilience be achieved. There is a term
in international disaster management saying, “Every mitigation is local,” meaning
that 90 % of the immediate action of a disaster strike is carried out by those who
are affected. The development of emergency operation plans have therefore to be
worked out together with the risk-exposed population. Experience has shown that
such an operational approach can best define responsibilities and mandates and
help to narrow the bridge of the administration and those affected. The better and
the earlier the people are incorporated, the better they are informed and equipped,
and the better they are integrated into the operational procedures, the better they
will be able to save themselves. This holds true especially for an involvement of
the people in emergency management. Experience shows that comprehensive par-
ticipation is the best way to facilitate disaster response and help to improve the
society’s stability not only before a disaster strikes, but also to strengthen the self-
help capacity in case of emergency.
Mitigation, as the last step in the cycle, mainly focuses on operational meas-
ures based on the experience gained from the last disaster and reflects the findings
of the risk assessments carried out. Mitigation covers structural as well as opera-
tional activities such as improving the stability of roads and bridges, implementing
the redefined building code, or reorganizing the operationality of the local health
care system and social services. But not only technical matters are incorporated in
mitigation, also many ecologically oriented aspects such as setting up recreational
areas or planting trees and mangroves in near-shore areas. Rehabilitation not only
concerns tangible matters to be brought back to functioning, but it moreover aims
to make the society more resilient against future disasters. This can be either be
achieved by technical matters such as improving the way houses are constructed
to reach a higher degree of stability by introducing stronger pillars in the construc-
tion frame (seismic structuring), by just taking more cement, or giving the build-
ing an open floodable ground floor in flood-prone areas. Also allocating necessary
funds for private rebuilding, or by counseling the victims on employment chances
350 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

or for entering into private business will result in a higher degree of resilience.
Nevertheless all actions taken on this side of the cycle are reactive in nature.
Although all the steps in emergency management aim at improving individual
and societal resilience they nevertheless do not give a complete picture of the situ-
ation. Imagine all the prevention actions were successful, and then at the end of
the cycle, the level of resilience would not be at the same level as in the begin-
ning. So this book introduces instead of a cycle an “emergency management spi-
ral,” thus stating that at the end the population at risk will be better prepared and
safer than before (“safety increment”). A flood dam that was rehabilitated and
heightened by, say 3 m will hold off more water than before. Nevertheless a much
stronger than normally experienced flood may destroy the dam. Even having the
spiral end successfully reached, a certain risk still remains. The spiral concept is
therefore seen as the task of the emergency managers to inform the people liv-
ing behind the dam that their risk is now less than normal, but in case a much
stronger than traditionally experienced flood level inundates an even larger area
than before, it will be with a much lower probability. See Fig. 8.6.
But disaster risk management is not exclusively the domain of emergency
management agencies, rather it is the result of the collective responsibilities of
all sectors of society, including all levels of government, the nongovernment sec-
tor, and the science and technology sector, as well as the affected individuals to
reach what is called a resilient society. A disaster-resilient community is one that
works together to understand and manage the risks that it confronts. It is a notion
of shared responsibility in strengthening the societal resilience to disasters. The
concept of resilience helps to explain individual variations in response to risk in
order to develop and make use of the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties.

Fig. 8.6  Emergency management spiral (Own graph)

8.3 The Risk Mitigation Cycle 351

Broadly speaking, resilience is the capacity of a disaster-exposed society to adapt

successfully to stressful situations and shocks. Defining resilience should always
answer the question, “Of what and to what is a society resilient?” (DFID 2011).
This answer identifies which level of resilience was envisaged as being reached
and which implemented prevention measures successfully made the country, com-
munity, or household more resilient. But the material infrastructure is less of a
concern for resilience than the social groups, socioeconomic or political system,
environmental context, or institutions that benefit from prevention.
Resilience is believed to contribute to individuals’ and communities’ abilities
to maintain their well-being in the face of a sudden impact from a catastrophe.
Concerning the level of the individual, resilience is understood as a set of personal
capacities to become an adaptable person, who is better able to frame stress-induc-
ing situations in positive terms to return quickly to positive functioning, despite
the challenging circumstances. Resilient communities are those able to integrate
the individual’s coping capacities and integrate these capacities into the organiza-
tional and legal framework of communal disaster mitigation activities. Although
the term “resilience” is not very clearly defined and difficult to measure, it nev-
ertheless helps to describe the situations disaster-affected people are confronted
with and how they are able to overcome stressful situations in order to return to a
normal and sustainable post-event functioning (Zahran et al. 2011). It turned out
that certain groups are less resilient than others. At the individual level, factors
including an age higher than 65 years, women, illnesses, prior mental and physical
disorders, lower socioeconomic status, membership in a marginalized ethnic/racial
minority, persons with low social support, abundant children, no or a low income
make such persons especially vulnerable. Of all groups single females with many
children are those who are most likely exposed to traumatic stress. Moreover there
is quite an agreement among disaster managers that those who were exposed to
higher risk and have already experienced a number of disasters developed a deeper
understanding of the cause–effect relationship of hazard and risk, and thus gained
automatically a higher level of resilience.

8.4 Definition of National Goals on Disaster

Risk Management

With defining the national goals on disaster risk management, a state or a local
government and even the international community declare what kind of material
and ideal values the society wants to protect from damages, deterioration, or harm-
ful impact. This process is called “subjects of protection.” Defining such a target
always originates from the impact that is envisaged to be avoided, but cannot be
disconnected from the root causes that are responsible for the catastrophe. There
is a clear relationship between the causes and the effects for any subject of pro-
tection. Defining a subject of protection is in the purest sense neither a matter of
natural science nor of social sciences, rather than a jurisdiction (object of legal
352 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

protection). But as in reality these discussions worldwide mainly concentrate on

topics including pollution, climate change, and natural and man-made disasters,
natural sciences developed to an integral part in these discussions. In general the
subjects of protection are mostly related to the:
• Human being (health, security, personal integrity)
• Natural environment (fauna, flora, biodiversity, landscape)
• Natural resources (water, air, climate, soil)
• Cultural heritage
• Industrial and agricultural resources
• Ecological interconnectedness and relationship of natural and human resources
The general question to be answered is: “What kind of assets, subjects, or environ-
mental objects are worth being protected” and if this is defined, the next question
is: “To what extent should such a system be protected.”
The discussion that follows regards how a system (e.g., water, soil, air, biologi-
cal diversity) can be protected or empowered so that it will be able to fulfill its
original functions in the future.
As the definition of a national goal of disaster risk management is at first a legal
matter, all states worldwide meanwhile have enacted a variety of norms, rules, and
regulations to guide the policies of human and natural protection strategies. In general
the enforcement of these acts is handed over to state-owned authorities responsible for
implementing the regulations. Sometimes, however, that authority needs to be further
refined or explained, a task to which natural scientists are called on to contribute.
In the United States one such agency is the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) that is mandated to write guidance, develop, and implement policies to
encourage the national authorities as well as third parties to comply with envi-
ronmental requirements. In Europe, the European Environment Agency (EEA,
Copenhagen) is commissioned to provide sound and independent information on
the environment for the countries in Europe. EEA is the EU major information
source for developing, adopting, implementing, and evaluating environmental pol-
icy and also the general public. The EEA’s mandate is:
• To help the European Community and EEA member countries make informed
decisions about improving the environment, integrating environmental consid-
erations into economic policies, and moving towards sustainability
• To coordinate the European environment information and observation network
The EEA is directed by a management board consisting of one representative of
each of the member countries, two representatives of the commission, and two sci-
entific personalities designated by the European parliament. A scientific committee
advises the management board by providing advice and/or opinions on any scien-
tific matter to be taken up and incorporated into the EEA work programs; among
them specialist for life science, marine ecosystems, sustainable agriculture, biol-
ogy, atmospheric processes, climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies,
natural hazards and risk assessment, industrial risks, as well as spatial planning
and management of natural resources and environmental law.
8.4 Definition of National Goals on Disaster Risk Management 353

In Germany, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation

and Nuclear Safety, usually shortened to Federal Environment Ministry (BMUB)
is the responsible authority for the environmental policy of the German govern-
ment. The aim of environmental policy is to create or maintain a healthy living
environment. The environmental policy of the German government encompasses
many different areas for which the ministry sets goals, drafts legislation, and
guides the implementation process. The ministry is primarily concerned with cli-
mate policy, conserving the diversity of fauna and flora, efficient use of resources
and energy, as well as protecting people’s health from environmental pressures.
German environmental policy follows the principles of sustainability. This means
being environmentally aware by simultaneously maintaining economic productiv-
ity as well as living and trading in a way that is socially fair. On the international
agenda BMUB is active on all matters related to a sustainable living, especially
the issue of global challenges to overcome climate change impact and the loss
of biological diversity. BMUB has since then enacted a multitude of rules and
regulations. The most important is the Law on Environmental Assessment
(EIA) with which Germany has taken over an EU directive into national law.
Other regulations concern, for instance, the Ordinance on Requirements for the
Discharge of Waste Water, the Atomic Energy Act on the Peaceful Utilization
of Atomic Energy, the protection against its hazards, and a regulation for the
National Climate Protection Initiative. The World Bank report on disaster hot-
spots (Dilley et al. 2005) further stated that disaster preparedness has to become
a standard element in development strategies, as the natural hazard cycles are
repeating themselves faster every few years. The many floods in Germany since
2005 clearly underpin these findings. Management of disaster risk has therefore
to become an integral part of development planning rather than only as a humani-
tarian issue. Moreover disaster prevention and preparedness in high-risk areas has
to be strengthened by implementing multihazard risk management strategies from
the very beginning. Only when effective efforts are undertaken to a proactive and
preventive disaster management and by an early and comprehensive involvement
of the people at risk, will it be possible to address disasters before they strike.

8.5 Society’s Decision on Acceptable and Unacceptable

Risk

The term risk assessment in general describes instruments to assess the risk from
a hazard in respect to the benefits related to this hazard. To decide whether a risk
is (according to Chap. 7) really posing a threat to a society, depends on the situa-
tion the society is living. A hazard that poses a threat to a certain society will not
pose a threat to another one. Even within a society a threat, say from flooding, is
not at all seen as a threat to people living higher up in the mountains or even in the
lowland where many of them benefit from the nutritious material that was brought
in. The rating that a hazard is risk-imminent is thus a result of a sum of different
354 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

personal perceptions. In general the individual assessment of the level of risk is

answered by the questions (Kaplan and Garrick ibid):
• Do I feel threatened by this hazard?
• Do I have experience with this kind of hazard?
• Do I feel experienced enough to cope with the risk?
Answering these questions automatically brings the discussion to the central
aspect of risk assessment: the personal evaluation of risk exposure.
The next step in individual risk assessment is whether the individual accepts or
tolerates that risk. Investigations of risk perception revealed that personal experi-
ence on, for instance, a flood standing one meter high in a private house or a risk
from a faraway nuclear catastrophe, are generally assessed by a comparison of this
particular risk event with events in the past: is this risk higher than last time, or
less, and is the expected outcome rated acceptable or not. The division of accept-
able (tolerable = a risk that we cannot avoid) or unacceptable (intolerable = a risk
that we have to avoid) depends exclusively on the individual’s risk perception,
although to a large part the rating is influenced by risk assessments that are carried
out by the official sector. Their judgment without any doubt influences the cogni-
tive assessment processes and helps the society and the individual to determine
personal risk rationally. But experience turned out that the normative assessment
processes carried out by natural scientists, engineers, and sociologists only help
the individual to get a personal view of the risk, but never replace the individual’s
final assessment (Fischhoff et al. 1981).
Different societies—even when facing the same type and severity of hazard—
react completely differently to a disaster event. The acceptance of a risk is accord-
ing to experience in the last decades fully dependent on the state of knowledge
of such a disaster, from the historical background, as well as from the skills of
prevention technique and of society’s acceptance of finance countermeasures. Risk
acceptance is furthermore in many places a matter of faith, belief, and sometimes
fatalism. Every time a disaster strikes, the people ask one central question: do we
have to accept such kind of tragedy or can we avoid it? The question generally
addresses the authorities and seldom addresses the affected population itself. And
there is another phenomenon to be recognized. Large deadly accidents such as a
plane crash or a bursting dam see people reacting aggressively and with anger and
immediately raising the question of who is responsible for the disaster, whereas on
the death in a murder case of one young child, sadness and helplessness prevail.
Furthermore risk acceptance, or nonacceptance, is a social question: a manifes-
tation of poverty. “Poor” societies very often have a different opinion than “well-
off” societies on what is a catastrophe. Such a rating is in general based on high
cases of recurrence of disasters and the realization that they are normally left alone
with their problems, resulting in suffering and faith. For example, the Indonesian
capital Jakarta’s living quarter Kampung Malaju is every year subject to high
flooding. The shelters are made up of high-rising bamboo poles that already reflect
the increased water levels, although the residents yearly face a significant death
toll, damage to their living shelters, and their adjacent (very small) vegetable
8.5 Society’s Decision on Acceptable and Unacceptable Risk 355

gardens. Very often also the artisanal working places at home are destroyed. But
when asked how they are adopting to the yearly floods, they answer, “Where is the
problem; its only water.”
The several floods in Western Europe in the last year mostly in England,
Germany, and Poland in contrast were the starting point for an extensive upgrad-
ing of the Elbe dams and an increase in local and even transnational flood man-
agement. Thus different societies react differently to the risks they are exposed to,
based on the state of technology, their financial capability, and traditional, cultural,
and social values. In the last consequence it is society that declares what kind of
hazard and with what frequency and severity it will accept threatening the levels of
social welfare.
Compared to this, the task of the technicians and scientists is to determine how
the societal demand for safety can be settled without compromising the demand
for safety and welfare of other social groups. But is has to be mentioned here
very clearly: risk acceptance, as seen by the public, normally does not consider
the onset of a disaster. The risk from the standpoint of the population almost
exclusively regards the damaging impact, the loss of lives, and damage of the
property or living environment in general. Therefore when we talk about risk
acceptance, we should be aware that the term “risk acceptance” is seen by the
population at risk in most cases as a question of the acceptability of the disaster
impact. Especially when natural/geologically generated disasters are considered,
risk acceptance is restricted to the disaster outcomes. A totally different situation
occurs when we discuss the risk acceptance of man-made and/or climatic-gen-
erated disasters. When human interference with nature causes a risk resulting in
losses or damages, the public standpoint is totally different. In such situations the
public sees the unexpected outcomes of, say the use of nuclear energy for power
generation, and asks how we can organize society without such technology in
order to be more on the safe side.
As risk governance has a responsibility for society in total or at least to cer-
tain exposed groups, risk governance has to find out what kind of risk and at what
level of severity is accepted by the society. To give an example, there is a common
understanding that even with the best available technology it will not be possible
to prevent the Earth from being hit by meteoritic impact. Such impacts geologists
estimate have hit the Earth several times in history, creating the Pacific Ocean and
the moon and may have resulted in the massive extinction of fauna at the end of
the Cretaceous period. A similar meteoritic impact is regarded as most probably
leading to a complete extinction of life on Earth. Nevertheless there is no reasona-
ble request to protect the Earth from such a catastrophe. Such a risk is weighted as
“least probable” and thus is taken to be “acceptable,” a risk that we cannot avoid.
In contrast, climatic change originated a sea-level rise and is seen to be mostly
man-made. In this case societies worldwide are asking for preventive measures
that—even if they may not avoid local disasters—should at least minimize the
impact.
The different risk exposure societies face every day make them neverthe-
less distinguish between risks that cannot be avoided, meaning risks they
356 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

have to accept (tolerate) and those they are not willing to accept (intolerable).
Consequently the question arises as to where to place the boundary between the
two sectors, and moreover who is mandated to set this boundary. As elaborated in
the previous chapters, there is no one boundary line that can be drawn here. Even
in a small disaster-affected locality it may turn out to be difficult to define that
boundary exactly. A flash flood that destroys the hutch of a Bangladesh rice peas-
ant simultaneously provides fertile soils to his rice paddies, making one part of the
disaster highly appreciated whereas on the other side it is not accepted. A scenario
when transferred to an entire society or even to the world in general makes obvi-
ous how challenging it is to define such a boundary.
In practice the boundary constitutes a corridor rather an exact well-defined
boundary line. In risk management this corridor has been named the ALARP cor-
ridor. ALARP is an acronym for “as low as reasonably practical” and thus points
to the fact that the definition of the boundary line is fully dependent on the risk
situation and will change accordingly from hazard to hazard. The term “reason-
ably” indicates that risk-reducing countermeasures should be governed by the idea
of meaningfulness, giving the term a socioeconomic and cultural dimension. The
term “practical” points to the issue that the envisaged mitigation measures should
be technically achievable and follow scientific and technical standards and moreo-
ver that they be financially possible.
The situation of acceptable and unacceptable risks can best be explained by
using the Risk Assessment Matrix already described in Chap. 7 (Fig. 8.7). The
ALARP concept has been introduced into geology mainly by Fell and Hartford
(1997) based on a series of structured risk assessment approaches. In his book,
Morgan (1997) gave practical examples for the definition of acceptable and unac-
ceptable risk in the field of landslide risk assessment in Canada.
The Swiss Ministry for Environment (BAFU) gave an example of how to define
the boundaries between low and high risks (BUWAL 1996). In the manual BUWAL
published a series of boundaries for the severity of a disaster impact as shown in the
graph in Fig. 8.8. BUWAL points to the fact that posing the boundaries is an arbi-
trary and subjective decision that is mainly based on the risk experience of experts
(Bayesian approach). Defining risk classes can be either given in a metric as well as
in a logarithmic scale, depending on the variance of the data assessed.
The boundary line between acceptable and unacceptable is also called the line
of acceptance. Moreover the line divides the sector of personal, individual risk
responsibility (acceptable) and the risks that the society defines as unacceptable,
where most people see the public sector to be responsible. But who defines that
line? The definition of “acceptable” is based on the common understanding that
the risk from a (major) hazard should not be significantly higher when compared
with other risks to which a person is exposed in everyday life, a discussion that is
mainly based on technical terms. Second, the debate comprises a social dimension.
All groups of a society that are risk exposed, want to see their definition taken
up by the society, thus defining the overall “level protection” for the entire soci-
ety. There is only a legally authorized instruction (government) that has the man-
date to settle the conflict and reconcile such different opinions. Third, who defines
8.5 Society’s Decision on Acceptable and Unacceptable Risk 357

Fig. 8.7  Definition of acceptable and unacceptable risk: ALARP (Own graph)

what is “practical” and what is “reasonable”? Furthermore normative risk assess-

ment should be based on the paradigm that once a society has accepted a certain
level of risk as acceptable, than consequently all risks of lower severity have to
be accepted also, although comparing risks emphasizes the difficulty in deciding
what shall be compared: the disaster impact or the benefits from the use of a cer-
tain technology (WBGU 1999). Such a risk comparison moreover addresses cer-
tain emotional aspects of risk. Altogether the ALARP concept can help to reach
a better understanding of risk. The debate finally resulted instead of drawing a
line between accepted and unaccepted that it would be more practical to define
the ALARP boundary by a corridor. But how wide the corridor has to be defined
makes the assessment a scientific and political challenge. There is much agree-
ment that it would be most worthwhile to narrow the corridor as far as possible by
shifting the unacceptable sector down towards the sector rated unavoidable.
The ALARP corridor is the field where risk governance takes place. It is the
sector where societies call on the natural scientists and engineers to provide
sector-specific expertise. They acknowledge that scientists have the expertise
to analyze and assess the state of risk and to offer implementable risk solutions.
The provisions by the scientists are thus welcomed as a substantial and integral
part of risk governance. But to gain such expertise, a society has to provide an
358 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

Fig. 8.8  Example of risk class definition (based on BUWAL 1996)

institutional framework conducive to scientific investigations by allocating the

necessary financial funds and by providing manpower as well as the operational
means. Without such an institutional framework scientists will not be able to work
out reliable and robust risk assessments. The mitigation measures worked out by
the scientists, engineers, and risk managers then have to be presented to the soci-
ety and will lay the base of a societal dialogue. There is a common understanding
that although such a dialogue should be based on scientific expertise, at the end
the society has to make the development decision. The task of science and technol-
ogy in risk governance is to provide technically feasible solutions but not to make
the decisions. Such an assumption moreover reveals that without scientific input,
sustainable disaster risk mitigation and prevention will not be successful.
Making use of risk definitions based on acceptable (tolerable) and unacceptable
(intolerable) risk meanwhile has gained widespread acceptance. Today it is a com-
monly used instrument in disaster risk management and has proven its applicabil-
ity in a series of different issues. One prominent example is the risk assessment on
nuclear power plants of Switzerland (Fig. 8.9; v.Piechowski 2000) and Germany
(BMU 2004) (Fig. 8.10). Also the German Commission for Environmental Change
Assessment (WBGU) adopted the approach in its Year 2000 report; although it
made some minor adjustments. Nevertheless these risk assessment concepts are
also based on the fundamental understanding that a society has to decide what
kind of disaster it is willing to accept. In this regard it is recommended to extend
the term unacceptable by an additional explanation “what we shall avoid” and
acceptable by the addition of “what cannot be avoided for the time being.”
8.6 Risk Perception 359

Fig. 8.9  Definition of risk acceptance on Swiss nuclear power generation plants (v. Piechowski,
cited in WBGU, Report 1999; Courtesy Springer)

8.6 Risk Perception

Normally people tend to believe more in what they see and what they remember.
Many research papers revealed this relationship is especially true in respect to
individual risk perception from natural disasters and from climate change affected
environments. Thus the availability of information that they have cognitively pre-
sent and understanding the cause–effect relationship define what people recognize
as a risk. Cognitive risk perception is the evidence-based perception of the likeli-
hood and severity of a disaster whereas the emotional aspects of risk perception
concern the impression of fear, helplessness, anger, distress, insecurity, hopeless-
ness, sadness, and anxiety.
For long time it was felt (Combs and Slovic 1979) that the more salient the
information is, the more dramatically it is displayed, and the more the risk at dis-
cussion is rated hazardous, the higher the individual sees it as a risk. This led to
the assumption that the more often media—radio, television and movies—report
360 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

Fig. 8.10  Definition of tolerable and intolerable risk to the natural environment (Courtesy
WBGU 1999)

on disasters the more likely media consumers reflect risk scenarios. But new stud-
ies point to the opposite direction. In countries where ample and comprehensive
information on disasters, catastrophes, and risks is available, the less the people
are influenced by this information. It turned out that even the nuclear accident of
Chernobyl, the Indian Ocean tsunami 2004, or epidemics such as mad cow dis-
ease were not given higher relevance in the individual’s perception when, for
example, media coverage was intensified on occasion such as the tenth anniversary
(Chernobyl). It rather turned out that individual risk perception is highly influ-
enced (also) by the media when the information is new; it is felt to be trustworthy
when it explains the generating mechanisms and transparently offers information
on the anticipated effects (Sjöberg and Engelberg 2010).
Although risk is a “mental construct” (Slovic 1992), the natural and social sci-
ences have developed specific concepts of risk. This construct also holds true for
the part of the risk assessors as well as for the population at risk. Nevertheless, risk
is closely connected with the impression people have of the risk they are exposed
to, what they feel about or perceive: a situation that is called risk perception.
Risk perception has much to do with how people behave in time of crisis. Such
8.6 Risk Perception 361

behavior is, according to social and psychological sciences, basically driven by

personal experience, by the social, economic, and gender context, by expectations,
fears, and hopes. Risk perception is thus a matter of emotions and not of facts
(Rohrmann and Renn 2000), especially when it concerns technical or natural phe-
nomena. According to Slovic (ibid) people’s behavior facing a threat reacts along
four cultural patterns: flight, fight, play dead, or experimenting trial and error.
The individual perceives her specific risk deterministically: she recognizes the
incidentally occurring event and attributes it according to a risk pattern based on
experience, or the individual realizes her risk exposure as probabilistic, meaning
unavoidable as “act of God” (Renn 1989). Many studies of individual and societal
risk behavior revealed significant differences between the objective risk and the
felt risk. The question arises as to the reasoning for such different perceptions. For
the time being there are a multitude of descriptions and ideas presented to explain
this. Kasperson et al. (1988) stated that even “After a decade of research on public
experience of risk, no comprehensive theory (is available) that explains why an
apparently minor risk sometimes produces massive public reactions.” Some people
feel threatened by a hazard for which another group of people does not see any
risks at all. He questioned what makes one person perceptive to a risk and another
not. As stated in Chap. 2, risks should be predominantly assessed in their social
context rather than only from the natural science position. This book has already
emphasized the position that natural/geoscience and civil engineering should play
a substantial and integral part of such assessments. It is the combination of both,
the sociological and science and technology sectors, that will lead to more reliable
risk assessment methods than we have to date.
In this regard it is a well-known fact that individual risk perception lays the
basis for how one copes with the risk he is exposed to and that such percep-
tion automatically defines the position on risk behavior. Based on a variety of
sociological studies on “how people feel a risk” mainly carried out by Slovic,
Kasperson, Renn, Beck, and many others, it can be stated that risk perception in
general is:
• Intuitively generated. It is made up of psychometric risk indicators as estimat-
ing the risk by its severity, from the fears of death, or on personal integrity, of
damage of property, loss of social and/or family bonds, loss of income, labor,
and welfare, and cultural heritage. But risk perception is also a reaction of
confidence or mistrust in the operational capacity of the disaster management
structures.
• Experience based. This perception is based on knowledge of the risk charac-
teristics, on the frequency of the event, an idea of the cause–effect relation-
ship between onset and disaster impact, the disproportional memory of disaster
events already made, as well as a self-assessment on how to be able to with-
stand the event. But it comprises a significant bias between “quantitative knowl-
edge” versus the “quality of knowledge” as elaborated by Schütz (1971) and
Malzahn and Plapp (2004).
362 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

According to the state of the art of risk perception analysis, two generally different
approaches can be distinguished:
• The psychometric approach describes risks according to their perceived or
anticipated characteristics.
• The culture-oriented approach describes risks according to how the individual
is coping with the disaster.
In a study on the perception of frequency of lethal risk from accidents in the
United States, Lichtenstein et al. (1978) came to the conclusion that in general
even different kinds of people showed the same risk perception (Fig. 8.11). But
this perception showed furthermore two different kinds of systematical biases:
• There is a clear tendency to (objectively) overestimate small frequencies of
events and to underestimate large frequencies.
• To exaggerate the frequency of special causes.
The study could impressively demonstrate that external risk causes (natural disasters)
are generally overestimated whereas personal disease-related risk causes (cancer, dia-
betes, etc.) are normally underestimated. So the risk from a tornado was estimated
to claim a yearly death toll of about 8000–9000, whereas in fact it claims “only” 80.
Similarly it holds true for the underestimation of death from heart disease: despite the
anticipated toll of almost 100,000 the actual figure is more than a million.

Fig. 8.11  Judged frequency of lethal events (Based on Lichtenstein et al. 1978)

8.6 Risk Perception 363

In risk perception a great difference can be seen whether the population at risk
is well informed on the risks with which they are confronted (Luhmann 2001).
The distinction goes along with what he describes with terms “confidence” or
“trust”. People are confident when they believe in their experience and feel sure
about their own expectations. They are confident in their “disaster coping capa-
bility” when they feel they will be able to withstand the impact. In contrast to
that, “trust” is associated with risk, say from AIDS or BSE. Such risks bring the
not-well-informed individual (Luhmann: “man on the street”) to see a danger
or a threat that is difficult to describe as the exposed has “not developed a well-
founded opinion” on the outcome. The specific knowledge, the increased level of
insight or experience, automatically enables the individual to consider the situa-
tion more technically. He develops an understanding to find the reasons for the
risk causes and the probable effects that automatically make him increase his
coping capacity. Luhmann further pointed out that trust will turn into confidence
(downgrade) when the individual feels that he has no chance to alter the situation
in his direction, yet on the other hand in the course of an increased coping capac-
ity, confidence can also turn into trust. Plapp (2003) even goes a step further when
summarizing that individual risk perception is in general deeply connected with
self-assessed coping capacity, delineating the individual risk perception much
more strongly than the experienced-based approach. She further pointed out that
her analysis revealed that the social situation of the individual (income, social sta-
tus, education) has only a minor influence on the psychometric risk perception.
Only the age of the individuals turned out to alter risk perception significantly in a
way that risks are anticipated to be more severe with increasing age.
A politically influential segment of society and therefore often referred to as
a representative fraction of society queried on risk perception, are white males; a
phenomenon that is called the “white male effect” (Olofsson and Rashid 2011).
There are many studies on this subject among them by Rivers et al. (2010)
and Slovic (1999) that revealed that in the United States white males generally
have a different perception of any kind of risk. They tend systematically to per-
ceive lower levels of risk (natural, technical, biological) when compared to other
members of society (e.g., white women, nonwhite women, and nonwhite men).
Their privileged demographic position in society makes them “a strong believer
that at the end the things will turn out for the best” (Palmer 2003). The reason
why such a group has a different risk perception is seen in sociopolitical factors
such as power, status, alienation, and trust. White males are generally better edu-
cated, have a better career, better income, are living in well-developed quarters,
are politically conservative, and show an extraordinary trust in technical and sci-
entific expertise, thus making them strong supporters for administrative decisions.
There is another striking notion: many policymakers fall into this group, and
observations revealed a tendency that this phenomenon is the rationale behind this
group becoming a preferential partner in risk perception assessment. These find-
ings on the other hand revealed that women (white or nonwhite), ethnic minori-
ties, and marginalized groups in the United States have a higher risk perception
and that such groups are significantly less queried on their risk perception. Such a
364 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

tendency, however, does not hold true, for example, for a state like Sweden, a state
that is internationally known as strongly gender-equal. Here the findings revealed
that Swedish men and women do not differ strongly in their risk perception. But
also in Sweden ethnic minorities show significantly higher risk perception, a
measure for sociologists of a still-prevailing inequality.
The results from Plapp’s empirical assessment pledge fostering the vision that
risk assessment inquiries should first make use of a qualitative risk assessment
method as already proposed by Kaplan and Garrick (ibid), asking three central
questions:
• What can happen?
• How likely is it that an event may occur?
• What are the consequences for the affected ones?
Such an approach is easy to perform but still a scientifically serious enough start
for a risk assessment. This holds true especially in areas where the database is
not broad enough to apply the many sociological and scientifically oriented risk
assessments. It furthermore holds true for risk perception of a catastrophe that is
threatening urban or rural areas. In rural areas risk perception is mainly charac-
terized by a prevailing culture and practice-based knowledge from people’s own
experience or from the hearsay of the elderly. Because in urban areas the people
are in general more technically experienced and define themselves often as “glob-
ally oriented,” they immediately consider a risk situation from an operational and
technical viewpoint. Risk behavior thus becomes impersonal and is seen more
a matter of the authorities concerned than of the individual. In general an urban
population has only very low risk experience resulting in a risk perception that is
cognition based and much less intuitive than in rural areas leading to a lower risk
perception. Social scientists have found that when the informed public is asked to
order well-known hazards in terms of their potential number of deaths, they do so
with reasonable success. However, when the same people are asked to rank those
hazards in terms of perceived risks, they produce quite a different order (Slovic
1987).
The public normally is accustomed to rate the severity of a disaster event by
the number of fatalities. Consequently that figure dominates the headlines of the
news (“250 people killed in torrential flood”), making this event serious, dramatic,
and important. But Fig. 2.3 clearly proves that in the course of the last century
the death toll from natural disasters has significantly diminished, and at the same
time the number of people exposed as well as the number of injured, made home-
less, and socially affected has increased tenfold. Therefore there is a great need to
change our risk perception from the mere number of fatalities to the overall num-
ber of victims, killed, missing, and affected. Especially those who are declared
missing are a group of people very seldom treated as respectfully as necessary.
In industrialized countries where many lives and much of the economic assets are
insured, the life insurance payout for the loss, after the death of a person is clearly
proven. Therefore many of those left behind have to fight sometimes for years to
get the contracted subsidy. In developing countries the situation is even worse.
8.6 Risk Perception 365

There, very often the husband is the sole legal representative of the family. When
he is missing and as long he has not been declared dead, the widow has almost no
legal protection to claim for the restitution of the house, plot, or the family herit-
age. Such a situation has taken place after the earthquake hit many villages along
the North Anatolian Fault zone (USGS 1999) and especially in the aftermath of
the 2004 tsunami in the Indonesian district capital Banda Aceh, where the local
government documentation centers were also flooded and no legal documents
were available anymore. As a symbol of acknowledgment of the rights of the sur-
viving people, the local government initiated with the assistance of the German
Max-Planck Institute for Anthropological Research (Arskal Salim 2010) a medi-
ated reconciliation process that was able to solve most of the conflicts.

8.7 Risk Perception: “Gender Equality”

Women are considered the most vulnerable parts of society from natural disas-
ters, together with children, aged persons, the ill and disabled, or other margin-
alized groups on the basis of ethnicity, culture, or class (Wisner et al. 2004). A
key to understanding the particular vulnerability factors specific for women, is
their social and cultural role in the family. Consequently their needs after a disas-
ter differ from those of men. Their physical and psychological vulnerability arises
from their inherent family instincts. Loss of shelter and family poses a tremen-
dous pressure after any disaster. Despite their own loss, the women are tradition-
ally expected to take the primary role of family care and to feed the children or
other (most elderly) family members. Household duty and family responsibility
make the women more vulnerable to physical, mental, and emotional stress that
often leads to fears and trauma. After a major disaster, it is seen that women are
more prone to depression and other emotional disturbances. A multitude of social,
cultural, and economic consequences affect women either directly or indirectly.
Women when they become widows often lose their social support and are often
deprived of almost all social privileges. Often they become widows with young
children. Having lost their spouses, women who have never worked outside their
houses are suddenly confronted with administrative procedures, for instance, to
obtain financial compensation for the death of their husbands, to provide food for
their children, or in sending their children to school.
But women are not only most vulnerable from disasters; they also can contrib-
ute a lot to make a society more disaster resilient. Studies of the women’s role
in disaster risk management revealed that women contribute from the grass roots
and household/family perspective. Their long-lasting traditional and cultural
knowledge is recognized as valuable expertise that can improve the sustainability
of risk management. The main contribution women can give to increase resilience
mainly concerns their expertise in small-scale gardening and agriculture. Women
are not “experts” on big catastrophes such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions,
rather on avoiding local soil degradation by wind erosion, flooding, and landslides
366 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

and provide information for a positive diversification of livelihood on a variety of

natural disasters that is widespread and responsible for serious impacts all over
the world. As women are highly bonded to the villages and run effective social
networks, those networks are seen as favorable starting points for local disaster
reduction awareness-raising campaigns. Therefore natural disaster mitigation will
not be successful if women are not made an integral part of the local disaster miti-
gation process. Such integration furthermore has the advantage that it fosters the
changed role of women in a society in general. Furthermore as stated by Blakie
et al. (ibid), gender inequality should not be addressed after a disaster, but rather
should draw attention to the root causes for such type of vulnerability.
Although in industrialized nations the gender discussion predominantly refers
to gender equality in the workplace (OECD 2005) and to bring the demographic
structures into better balance, the gender discussion in the developing countries
is concentrated on the issues of how to manage the survival of families. Natural
disasters and even due to challenges following climate change, gender equality
has been identified as a major approach to improve social resilience. This was the
rationale to include gender issues in the strategies of natural disaster risk reduc-
tion and to consequently make them a substantial part of many concept papers.
Thus the gender issue was incorporated in the Hyogo Framework (see Sect. 4.2)
that has since been endorsed by more than 170 nations. The framework outlines
the basic facts for a political strategy on gender-related disaster risk reduction and
focused on the statement that the gender perspective has to become an indispen-
sable part of all disaster risk management policies, from disaster assessment, the
plans to increase resilience, as well as the follow-up processes of awareness rais-
ing, warning dissemination, and gender-neutral training. The framework points out
that gender-equal disaster risk reduction is especially necessary at the household
and community levels where women can contribute substantially in building a
culture of disaster prevention. Gender equality in this respect refers to the equal
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities of women, men, girls, and boys. Gender
equality is achieved when the different behaviors, aspirations, and needs of women
and men are equally valued and favored. The Hyogo Framework moreover stated
that thus far the important capabilities of women are often neglected and there-
fore mostly left untapped. Women and men experience, perceive, and identify risks
differently.
Although everyone can be exposed equally to a hazard, it is a well-known fact
that women and girls experience different levels of vulnerability and that they are
disproportionately affected by disasters. Worldwide more women die from disas-
ters than men. Statistics from past disasters including the Indian Ocean tsunami
and the 1991 Bangladesh cyclone have shown women are overrepresented in mor-
tality rates. For example, in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, male survivors from the
2004 tsunami outnumber female survivors by three to one (UNISDR/UNDP/IUCN
2009). Almost one billion people in the world are illiterate, of whom two-thirds
are women. Three in five of the more than 100 million children that do not go to
school are girls. After a disaster or other stressful impact, many girls are forced
to drop out of school to help with chores in the house, or to save money. Women
8.7 Risk Perception: “Gender Equality” 367

are at greater risk of injury and death due to their societal restrictions and gen-
der roles. The current gender relation between men and women in risk exposure
originates from the roles and responsibilities women and men have at home and in
society. They result in different identities, social responsibilities, attitudes, and expec-
tations leading to an unequal socioeconomic development between men and women,
including differences in vulnerabilities to disasters. For instance, swimming and
climbing are not skills girls and women are encouraged to learn in some cultures.
In some regions women’s clothing limits their mobility. In some societies and cul-
tures, women cannot respond to warnings by leaving the house without a male
companion. Loss of crops and livestock due to a drought has a direct detriment
to family food security and moreover such droughts make arable land barren with
the result that many of the young males migrate to the cities to find jobs, leaving
women alone in charge of the households. Women are given the responsibility of
caring for children and the elderly, binding them to the house. No social accept-
ance of women as persons that are allowed to enter a contract makes them depend-
ent on male decisions. Women’s income of the lower social levels is more likely to
be derived from the informal sector, which is often the worst hit by disasters and is
least able to recover from the effects of disasters. And in the case of an emergency
they are—when the men are not at home as on the occasion of the 2004 tsunami in
Indonesia that happened on a Sunday morning when most of the men were gone to
the markets—they have no chance to react properly.
Lower levels of education hamper women’s access to information, and
limit their ability to prepare and respond to disasters. In many cases women do
not receive hazard warnings at all, as authorities disseminated warning infor-
mation normally exclusively via the official channels (radio, newspaper, press
conferences, meetings). Such information broadcasts exclude women from get-
ting proper information thus making them again more vulnerable, and women
have a generally low level of participation in decision-making bodies. Women’s
capacities are not applied, their needs and concerns are not voiced, and they are
overlooked in policies and programs. Women are poorly represented in decision-
making bodies as sociocultural norms and attitudes bar them from participation in
decision making. Although women’s vulnerability to disasters is often highlighted,
the role of women in building a culture of resilience and their obvious contribu-
tions has not been adequately recognized. Benefiting from women’s experiences
and contributions to a gender-neutral disaster risk reduction starts with an incorpo-
ration of women’s experiences at all levels of vulnerability analysis and by work-
ing out standard operation procedures that ensure:
• A comprehensive participation of men and women
• A gender-based identification of the inequalities between men and women
• A gender-differentiated vulnerability analysis (physical, social, economic, cul-
tural, political, and environmental)
• Identification of the root causes for the many key determinants of vulnerability
from historical analysis, disaggregated by sex
• Identification of women’s needs and concerns
368 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

• Recognition of importance of the capacities and authority of women to conduct

risk reduction
• Inclusion of women in training and awareness raising
• An active engagement of women’s organizations in disaster reducing capacity
building.

8.8 Risk Communication

8.8.1 Communication Processes

After a disaster strike, society is interested to know what happened and why and
whether such a disaster may happen again. Moreover the news consumer is inter-
ested how it might put him personally at risk. Those affected in disaster events
are the victims and the authorities on the other hand, with the media positioned
in between. The media business is to sell news and in our daily life, either by dis-
seminating information on what has happened, by presenting the human tragedy
and a “moral assessment.” The media help to outline the problem and describe
the cause–effect relationship that led to the specific disaster, but normally do not
see their responsibility in elaborating on problem-solving recommendations. The
position of the media between the disaster and the external observers defines the
media’s position as favorable not only to influence the public agenda but also com-
bine different bits of information into a broader context that can magnify, drama-
tize, or simplify the catastrophe, just as felt necessary (Vasterman et al. 2005).
To achieve this, the media operate in different modes. They often define their
responsibility as a part of the socioeconomic and cultural system by taking up the
task of information dissemination of official information to the public. But they
can also follow quite another track, by strengthening people’s perception of anxi-
ety and fears, thus amplifying the perception of risk. Through these two modes,
the media can have a huge impact on society. Whether the media act as agenda set-
ters depends on their business policy. Nevertheless for the purpose of emergency
management, the positive function of the media as an independent broadcasting
instrument should be acknowledged, as it helps to disseminate official information
to the public. The fact that moreover the media can also dramatize the news, lead-
ing to an amplification of risk perception cannot be excluded from the discussion.
Emergency managers should be aware of the dichotomy the media can play. Risk
management therefore has to develop a strategy that defines the role of the media
to make it an ally not an enemy. It seems that when media and authorities col-
laborate to provide the public with reliable and neutrally formulated information,
beneficial effects can be achieved and the well-being of the disaster community
can be enhanced.
Risk communication is the strategy to disseminate information to people who
require information. But communication should not be restricted to the channels
by which the information is disseminated. Moreover the information disseminator
8.8 Risk Communication 369

is interested to know whether the news reached the consumer and whether it is
understood in the way it was intended (Luhmann 1988). Therefore communica-
tion has a twofold direction: from the sender to the recipient and vice versa.
According to the general rule of communication, everybody is communicating
every day (Watzlawick 2009), even if someone intends not to communicate, she
is still communicating. Watzlawick formulated this rule as: “There is never no
communication.”
Although there have been many advances in risk assessment in the last
20 years, until today the impact of a disaster has mostly been given in technical
terms. Still today the number of death casualties is that one piece of informa-
tion that has the widest spread in the media. Accompanying this information with
impressive pictures and live interviews, based on fact, is what Kahneman et al.
(1982) describe as the dissemination of “the paradoxical beauty of destruction”
fascinating all those who are unaffected. The best examples were the pictures of
rubble and debris of the dust-hidden latticework girders that gave the destroyed
World Trade Center a worldwide symbolic image. Although 2880 people lost
their lives in the attack, there were disasters in Pakistan and India with a magni-
tude higher death toll the very same year (Swiss Re 2002), which did not reveal a
similar or even higher degree of attention. Or the tsunami of 2004 with its many
pictures showing the flood-inundated shores and villages, resulting in a world-
wide unprecedented wave of financial and technical help “showering Indonesia
with US$7 billion aid money” (Indonesian Minister for Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation, BRR; speech held 2010 at GTZ, Berlin).
Communication requires a specific regulatory framework with rules and laws
that define who is mandated to assess and disseminate information to the public.
An example of such a regulatory framework is the EU-EWFD (2000), which asks
EU national authorities to assess flood risks regularly and to disseminate the infor-
mation to the public. Moreover in order to be effective, communication should
not be restricted to response to a crisis but to establish communication as a pro-
cess even in times of no disaster. The mistrust of much of society is derived from
the fact that the authorities only address the public in the case of an emergency,
a situation that is often felt as disregarding the population’s concerns. This gap
has been filled by many “environmental groups” that specifically address the needs
of certain societal groups. In order to strengthen the efficiency of the authority’s
fiduciary responsibility risk-related communication should be institutionalized as a
continuous process.
The process of understanding information triggers on the side of the recipi-
ent an “information processing” that results in an individual reaction based on his
individual socialization. The information can be understood as intended, but mis-
understanding has to be taken into consideration every time. The main aspect in
this regard is “acceptance.” Whether a recipient accepts the information is gen-
erally based on personal experience and on trust in the honesty of the informa-
tion disseminator. As a society is made up of a multitude of individuals it has a
multitude of cultural socializations and risk experiences. Consequently the level of
“acceptance” is multifold. But as political decision making depends on acceptance
370 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

of the society in total, the question arises how far an individual reaction can be
accepted by the “news sender” in order to serve the needs of the society or at least
a fraction of the society. The question is described as the rule of “individual ver-
sus collective acceptance” (Ruhmann and Kohring 1996) and describes the dif-
ferent responsibilities and different demands of sender and recipient. Information
broadcast by written or verbal communication is able to create interest, can exag-
gerate emotion, or revitalize emotions. In this regard the “circulation intensity”
(Süselbeck 2013) of certain verbal expressions or the recurrent presentation of,
for instance, emotional impressive pictures on certain events, makes the accept-
ance of such news as “reality” much easier. There is a multitude of studies that
critically review the role of media in the aftermath of a disaster (Vasterman et al.
ibid). In most studies, the media are portrayed writing sensation-seeking articles
of enlarged anecdotal stories on topics such as who is to blame for the incident,
who hinders the work of rescue workers, and so on. By repeating the same images
(e.g., the airplanes hitting the World Trade Center’s Twin Towers) over and over
again such articles often create a “news syndrome” with the media consumer. The
news receiver cannot in every case distinguish between news from a distant disas-
ter event as a cognitive process making it quite understandable that the media are
able to manipulate the news receiver.
The long-prevailing hierarchical communication policy, where the state has the
overall responsibility to disseminate information has more and more been abol-
ished by the idea of participation, giving both sides equal responsibilities in infor-
mation generation and dissemination. Consequently the exchange of information
is in addition to a cognitive, also a procedural, process that has to tailor a message
to the concern of the recipient and the bouncing back of the acceptance or nonac-
ceptance of the sender. As the exposure to stress during a crisis is much higher
than normal, information has to be delivered quickly and with a high degree of
accuracy. But very often just such reliable information is not available. This situa-
tion bears the risk of creating an information vacuum. The reaction will be rumors,
stress, tension, and finally mistrust, very often exaggerated by the media. In the
course of a crisis situation the way information content may develop in an adverse
direction has been distilled by SAMSHA (2002) and outlined in Fig. 8.12. In order
to avoid negative exaggeration of the disaster information content, risk communi-
cation has to be simply formulated and target-oriented messages, from which the
news consumers are getting the impression that they are provided information that
will enable them to better address the situation.
The communication channels used are either direct from sender to the recipient
(e.g., a communication by the local authorities on flood evacuation) or via a trans-
mitter, the media. The media works on one hand as a driving force for individual
or collective perceptions and to approve concomitant opinions but also reflects and
sometimes even exaggerates existing or inherited cultural and social discussions.
The media—print, voice, or visual—are an organized means of reaching a
large number of people quickly, effectively, and efficiently. This includes news-
papers, magazines, radio, television, and video, as well as movies. During recent
times electronic media including Twitter, Facebook, and other Internet-based
8.8 Risk Communication 371

Fig. 8.12  Cascade of amplification of risk perception of socioeconomic marginalized populations

due to limited information (based on SAMSHA 2002)

media networks have emerged as a major component. The informative and analyti-
cal role of the media has become a key component of information dissemination
worldwide. The pressure of the media in a democratic setup is tremendous and it
should be used in a responsible and constructive manner for the benefit of society.
Media consumption is mainly based on cognitive effects such as education, experi-
ence, and belief as well as on affective effects, such as emotional responses. The
“importance of these cognitive and affective effects rests on the degree to which
they influence behavioral effects that define the social situation” of the individual
(Beaudoin 2007).
Most impressive in media coverage are pictures and TV live reports on dog-
rescue teams searching for buried victims, setting up tents, and installing water
and electricity. Such kinds of information give the media consumer an impression
of being part of the aid. Moreover very often, the high interest of the public in dis-
aster information is often taken up by politicians. When at the location of the dis-
aster politicians can demonstrate decision-making power, such as the day (shortly
before a federal election took place) when the German chancellor visited flood-
devastated villages in the Elbe/Oder River or when American presidents comforted
earthquake victims in Turkey or consoled the Hurricane Sandy-affected New York
area. But public interest in disaster reporting is short on time and generally con-
centrated on very symbolic events. And the momentum of public interest is mostly
restricted to the rescue phase. After this, interest unfortunately diminishes very
372 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

rapidly. An analysis by the University of Munich in 2001 revealed that more than
50 % of the people do not recall a disaster that happened 10 years back. The recall
ratio of a disaster dated back 40 years is less than 10 %. Nevertheless in Germany
there is still a large memory of the Elbe flood in Hamburg of 1962, as this was the
first great disagreement after the Second World War and is still today a nationwide
example of how a local politician brought in military services for rescue, although
the operation was not backed by laws and regulations.
In time of disasters and catastrophes the mass media play an important role in
reporting on the three primary characteristics of a disaster: short response time,
surprise, and threat. The media become an indispensable part of disaster com-
munication as impressively proven on the occasion of the Indian Ocean tsunami
(2004) and the Haiti earthquake (2010). Media not only report on technical and
scientific facts of a disaster, but also take over a responsibility to examine it in
humanitarian, social, and economic terms. The print media have a major role to
play in the pre-disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities, and the
electronic media due to their direct and fast technical potential preferably report
on the events themselves. In both cases the media need to be proactive in nature
rather than reactive. In this regard the mass media, mainly the print media, tel-
evision, and radio no longer take up the work of simple news distribution but
meanwhile developed into a most potent means of educating society on disaster
prevention, mitigation, and rehabilitation.
But what drives the media to take up one disaster while another is almost
neglected? A study carried out by CARMA International (Franks 2006) analyzed
the media coverage of Western countries of the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004),
Hurricane Katrina in the United States (2005), earthquakes Bam in Iran (2003)
and Kashmir (2005), Hurricane Stanley in Mexico (2005), and the racial conflict
in Darfur, Africa (since 2003). The questions the study wanted to answer were,
“What factors drive western media interest” and, “Whether these disasters are
perceived equally and if not, why not?” The general outcome of the study was
that “western self-interest is the main precondition for a significant coverage of a
humanitarian crisis” (Franks ibid). Furthermore the “perceived economic impact
of a disaster on western markets is clearly correlate[d] with the quantity of media
coverage.” It turned out that where the (western) economic interest is highest,
there was the broadest coverage. For example, the expected economic losses from
Hurricane Katrina were covered in 17 % of all analyzed media reports, whereas
the impact from Hurricane Stanley or the earthquakes in Bam or Kashmir were
perceived to be only small, resulting in a media coverage of only 1 %. Moreover
there seems “to be no link between the humanitarian scale of a disaster and the
media coverage.” Of all the disasters, Katrina suffered the least death toll and had
one of the lower population displacement rates, but generated more than 1000
articles, the highest figure in global media than any other disaster studied. On the
other hand, the earthquake in Kashmir did not attract similar media interest as the
quake of Bam although it suffered a 3.5 times higher death toll (90,000). The tsu-
nami of 2004 resulted in nearly double the coverage of the Darfur crisis, although
it had the same number of casualties (circa 180,000). Around 40 % of all reports
8.8 Risk Communication 373

that covered the tsunami in the western media were mainly directed to the 900
deaths and few displaced ones from Western countries. Although a direct associa-
tion with the global economy was only low for the tsunami, the coverage nonethe-
less was dictated next to economic concern also from the strategic importance the
region as a whole has to Western tourists.
Although the public wants to be informed quickly and sensationally, there is
nevertheless a great demand for a serious, evidence-based information policy. The
public generally do not accept it if their information demand is not settled properly
and immediately question the authority’s seriousness and sense of responsibility, a
matter that once former US President George W. Bush experienced when visiting
the Katrina-devastated city of New Orleans only after massive invitations from the
local public and publications.
The media can be extremely effective in the following areas:
• Educational: Before a disaster, educating people about the hazard, prevention,
and self-help. During the disaster, the media can be extremely helpful in provid-
ing accurate and unbiased information and post-disaster on individual impacts
and needs.
• Partnership: Guiding people in preparing individual disaster prevention and
mitigation, but also calling on the authorities to fulfill the resilience require-
ments of society.
• Critical: By critically evaluating the emergency planning and resilience targets
that are envisaged by reviewing existing plans.
• Suggestive: The media can call for the strengthening of mitigation efforts. Thus
the media have taken over the role as solicitors for society’s needs and as an
appeal to the people to come forward to render help. Generally the media have
a responsible image in the public eye and this image can be utilized to claim
resources to help disaster victims.
• Watch-dog: By playing the role of “giving the floor to the affected ones,ˮ
­especially after the disaster and when rehabilitation work is going on and for
keeping the disaster machinery active.
• Assistance: Helping or even sometimes taking over or replacing the established
lines of communication.
With such a multifold orientation the media not only transports fact-oriented infor-
mation but ventures into the position to interfere in social matters by critically
reviewing, for example, the disaster mitigation concept of the local risk managers
(Rusch 2011). If necessary the media question specific rescue operations or the
general concept of crisis management, or the concept of the many help agencies
that automatically gather in the case of an emergency.
To successfully reach the populations at risk by radio, television, or the Internet
requires that the information needs:
• To be reliable, trustworthy, and fact-based
• To be independent, impartial, and not driven by particular interest (open/hidden
agenda)
374 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

• To be able to make the information channels transparent

• To have a fast, appropriate, and functional organizational setup
• To be mandated under a legal framework (rules, regulations, laws)
• To be financially and politically independent
According to Stallen (1991) risk communication either on man-made (technical/
industrial) risks or on natural disasters has different objectives to fulfill:
• Practical: Populations at risk require comprehensive and reliable information
on their actual or potential risk exposure.
• Moral: A proof for a well-functioning society is when it is able to provide basic
information to all social groups on risks to which they are exposed.
• Psychological: Information should be rendered in a way that enables the indi-
vidual to assess the personal risk situation adequately, so that she is able to
address the risk appropriately according to her attitude, belief, and capability.
• Instrumental: A society has to provide the basic functions by establishing effec-
tive means of risk assessment and risk communication (laws, rules, regulations)
in a fact-oriented, freely accessible, independent, and effective manner.
The following seven (cardinal) rules for building trust and credibility have been
proposed by Covello and Allen (1988) as a basic means to outline a risk communi-
cation strategy:
• Accept and involve the public as a partner. Understand the task as serving the
needs of the public to be informed.
• Appreciate the public’s specific concerns. Statistics and probabilities don’t nec-
essarily answer all questions. Be sensitive to people’s fears and worries on a
human level and respect their humanity.
• Be patient, honest, and open. Once trust and credibility are lost they are difficult
to regain. Try to avoid misinformation, fears, and concern.
• Meet the needs of the media. Never refuse to work with the media. The media’s
role is to inform the public. Work with the media to ensure that the information
they are providing is accurate and enlightening. Thus the media are not enemies.
• Cooperate with other credible sources and coordinate your information and
communications with those of other organizations. Conflicts and disagreements
among organizations create confusion and breed distrust.
• Arrange your messages according to a hierarchy of importance and deliver brief
(20–30 s) statements that explain each one.
• Do not express personal opinions and never speculate.
In mass communication either on natural disasters, or on politics or sports events,
the media are at first oriented towards the media consumer. In order to sell the
news, their intention is to catch the interest of the media consumer. Thus eye-
catching events that can be displayed through dramatic pictures, or that cover
the fate and destiny of disaster-stricken families are much better to transmit than
purely formulated descriptions of a catastrophe. Although media are by their
understanding oriented to deliver information, they nevertheless see their position
8.8 Risk Communication 375

as an external and independent observer and when necessary as a critical analyst of

the situation. In any case, the media wants first to settle the information demand of
the public. Therefore they do not define themselves as having the official task of an
information-disseminating agency. The fast nature of disaster information moreo-
ver results in a quick response attitude that requires the media not be too deeply
involved in the event.
Therefore a catastrophic event brings the media into the bias situation, to give
as much as possible of information about the facts, and on the other hand to have
news that “sells”. Moreover the media have to understand the great expecta-
tions of the people during a disaster. People who are affected by a disaster expect
widespread support from the media, by sound and reliable information that is not
superimposed by the news agency’s political agenda. They expect the media to
play a constructive role as being partners instead of critics by rendering proven,
correct, and reliable assessments and not to exaggerate the news by subjective
interpretation.
Another problem arises for the media that in general information interest on
natural catastrophes is very short in time. A study was carried out in 2001 by the
Forestry Institute of the Munich University, on how long a disaster event is pre-
served in the memory of the people. It turned out that only 10 years later only
50 % of the people can remember the event. A disaster of 1971 is only memo-
rized by less than 20 %. This shows that disaster remembrance is extremely short
and can even vanish within a couple of weeks. On the other hand Baudoin (ibid)
reported on public behavior after the attack on the World Trade Center (9/11).
The study revealed that the use of the CNN Website after the attack doubled
every seven minutes between 9 AM and 10 AM and that within three hours more
than 90 % of the American public was aware of the attack. More than 90 % of
Americans got their information from television and radio that day. The “media
dependency theory postulates that people’s dependency on the media and the
effects of such dependency escalate during times of societal change and conflict”
(Baudoin ibid). Thus far little is known about the effects of such news and media
campaigns during the subsequent phases of catastrophe: restoration and recov-
ery. But a media campaign with the goal of stimulating public safety following
Hurricane Katrina raised safety concerns that resulted in an increased public and
private flood prevention. But there is still quite a concern among emergency man-
agers that thus far there is little evidence that such media campaigns can really
change the “safety beliefs.” These “findings are counter to the idea that attitudes
(beliefs) are easier to influence than behavior” (Beaudoin ibid).
A problem for the media to assess is that disasters are in many cases complex
in nature. The media are thus reluctant to go into too much detail: what the trig-
gering element of the disaster was; the geological characteristics that were disaster
prone; how the people were affected; and what kind of prevention was under-
taken, but failed, and what has to be done to prepare the people better for the next
event. Another problem for media dissemination is the different interest of local
and regional/super-regional media. Local media are much closer to the event and
want to cover the information demand of the public that is more or less affected by
376 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

the event. They show the victims, speak to the neighbors, the local officials, and
visitors in a way that the readers/listeners become part of the situation, whereas
regional media want to cover the general aspects of the event. Local media cover
a limited area but the regional can distribute the news over a large area. The dif-
ferent news media—print, radio, TV—preferably cover those events that are dra-
matic, that display damages, loss of life, and uncover the victim’s harm in the
personal living sphere. It is thus the individual gets the feeling of direct engage-
ment, in fact even with comprehensive coverage the news consumer will still
remain a visitor, as he is not affected himself. On the other hand “concern” is the
major emotional source of the many donations. Thus in the aftermath of the Indian
Ocean tsunami about US$8 billion in aid money had been collected, for an esti-
mated economic loss of about US$6 billion in Indonesia alone. The high amount
of aid donations experienced in the course of the tsunami, made the German
Alliance Development Works request the donors not to identify their donations
“Indian Ocean tsunami,” so as not to identify a specific aid operation for which the
money should be spent. The consequence of the huge donations was that the group
realized there was no money left for all the other emergency situations on Earth.
Next to post-disaster rescue and relief operations to provide water, power, food,
shelter, and medicine the disaster victims also ask the authorities to protect them
after the disasters and in general to restore their lives. Studies in the United States
revealed that although the citizens often are well aware of the risk from natural
disasters they themselves are nevertheless reluctant to take steps on their own in
order to increase their personal risk exposure. It is assumed that only up to 30 %
of Americans have an emergency preparedness kit at hand that suits the recom-
mendations of FEMA. Many studies on risk perception wanted to enlighten the
bias between risk understanding (attitude) and risk behavior. It turned out that
the majority of people see their main interest in disaster preparedness primarily
in not being caught by a disaster unprepared. The people in assessing their per-
sonal risk distinguish between the severities of a potential hazard (saliency),
whether this hazard will really occur (immediacy), and how eventual this will
happen (certainty). These factors are juxtaposed to the assessment of whether
the individual feels susceptible to the potential outcomes and how well she esti-
mates her disaster remedies (self-efficacy). These factors define what is called the
vested interest in disaster preparedness (Miller et al. 2013) as well as the attitude
towards risk perception. Thus risk preparedness concepts have to take into account
that the risk-exposed individual will first see his personal interests covered and is
thus not necessarily inclined to adopt the official technocrat-oriented resilience
efforts immediately. As long as official risk prevention action is not addressing
the individual vested interest most of the official risk mitigation efforts will be not
successful.
In general the risk-concerning messages are based on official communication
bulletins and press releases given by local administrations. But by such informa-
tion paths only the official side of the catastrophe is covered and the side of the
victims often is not addressed. Good risk communication thus comprises informa-
tion gathered from experts and integrates the victims’ experiences. Although the
8.8 Risk Communication 377

media claim to help bridge the gap between officials and the victims and that they
help to increase the self-help potential of the population in the crisis, there still
exists a great distance between those affected and the media consumer.

8.8.2 Risk Communication as a Responsibility

of Science and Technology

Risk messages even when delivered by official sources may be given in a way that
can lead consumers to misunderstanding and confusion and very often leads to
distrust. Risk communication therefore especially when delivered by emergency
management authorities must be understandable to everybody, accountable, trust-
worthy, and transparent and should cover the (frightening) risk perceptions of the
exposed population. Still very often expert information does not reach the people
as it uses a language and describes models the recipients don’t understand. This
holds true especially for information delivered from science and technology lead-
ing to a significant communication gap between scientists and society. There is at
least one reason that causes this adverse public attitude: it is mainly due to pure
misunderstanding of science and technological information content. This results
from the normal inability of scientists to communicate ideas in plain language.
The public often sees science and technology as something apart from their daily
living experience and does not feel that such information can be helpful for them.
The limited effectiveness of risk communication is mostly attributed to the lack
of trust on the side of the news recipients (Slovic 2000). He pledges therefore that
scientists should use a language that is commonly understood, for example, not
to rate a probability of occurrence in a number like “0.000001 %” or a “100-year
flood.” For him, risk communication must be:
• Understandable to everybody
• Accountable, reliable, and fact-based
• Transparent and reproducible
• Should cover the information needs of the population
An effective warning to the public at risk of an imminent hazard should consist of
four items (Wolgalter et al. 1987):
• A signal word (“danger”; “caution”, “warning”)
• A description of the hazard (“location”, “severity”, “frequency”)
• A statement of the consequences that may happen (“death”, “injury”)
• An instruction on how to avoid the hazard (“contact local emergency help
desk”)
Good scientific communication via the mass media is especially important in those
areas directly and strongly affecting people’s lives, for example, before, during,
and after natural disasters. But this also holds true for communicating on risks
that have a very long onset, such as the global climate change or the depletion of
378 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

natural resources. In communicating their ideas, scientists should make clear the
limitations of their predictions and carefully explain the basis for their scientific
conclusions or opinions. Scientists moreover should be aware that a publicly dis-
seminated finding may contradict the public expectation, may raise fears and mis-
understanding, and may place the scientist in juxtaposition to the news receiver.
For coping with such a situation scientists should be prepared. They can address
this problem by reiterating the point that their part in risk assessment is just to
analyze and interpret the data and that drawing any further assumption lies beyond
their responsibility. Nevertheless it is a clear fact that scientists as being part of
society will not be able to “escape from the scene” and should keep in mind the
adverse impacts from risk-prone situations.
As the UNISDR (2011) points out:
One of the most important drivers of accountability is access to information, particularly
to information on disaster risks. However, access to information is only effective when
governments actively support the right to information and when citizens are aware of their
legal right and are willing to assert it. A culture of social accountability directly improves
the effectiveness of governance and service delivery.

UNISDR emphasizes this statement as risk communication has become one of

the central tasks of government institutions in emergency situations. Consequently
it is been laid down in numerous national and international laws and regulations
on disaster risk management. The regulations emphasize that risk communication
strategies should not be restricted to mere information dissemination but to include
public participation. The prerequisite for this is an understanding of how the pub-
lic perceives risk, how the media translate information, and how representatives of
the public and private sector can integrate the information into the local rehabilita-
tion, mitigation, and prevention measures. Effective risk communication must be
based on state-of-the-art understanding of the scientific and technological cause–
effect relationships of risk, a multihazard assessment comprising long-term data
sequences as well as effective communication processes. “In democratic societies,
decision-making processes have increasingly involved the public as legitimate
partners” (Sinisi 2004). Successful risk communication is costly and needs to be
integrated into overall risk management to be able to communicate policy deci-
sions successfully (Covello and Allen ibid). Risk communication in the context of
implementing policy options requires communication goals to be set before the
communication strategy is put into practice.
The following basic considerations should define the risk communication strat-
egy. It should:
• Be oriented towards an informed public, not to disseminate public concerns.
• Listen to the public’s concerns. People care more about trust, credibility, com-
petence, fairness, and empathy than about statistics and details.
• Accept and involve the public as an equal partner.
• Be honest, reliable, transparent, independent, and based on credible sources.
• Be aware that trust and credibility are difficult to obtain; once lost, they are
almost impossible to regain.
8.8 Risk Communication 379

• Be given in a commonly understandable, nontechnical language.

• Be given with compassion acknowledging the tragedy of illness, injury, or
death.
• Accept that people even when understanding the risk information, may still not
have planned carefully and later evaluate on the outcome of the communication
efforts.
• Accept that different goals, stakeholders, and media channels require different
actions.
Contributions from science in risk communication are highly welcomed to
increase risk perception in the population at risk, although it became obvious that
the people do not solely rely on scientific expertise. Studies on risk communica-
tion revealed that scientific advocacy is accepted as one pillar of the knowledge
transfer, and the experience of laymen is often given a similar importance. Expert
knowledge is highly accepted as far as it analyzes the root causes, the uncertainty,
and consequences of natural disasters, whereas the laymen’s vision is mostly
related to the social impact. To increase efficiency in disaster risk reduction both
types of expertise should be integrated into the decision-making process under the
auspices of an institutionalized and legalized body. Such a body is then acting as a
clearing house between natural sciences (risk assessment), the population at risk,
and the government that is responsible for the well-being of society. Dombrowski
(1992) describes this concept of a “society-oriented disaster management.” This
means it calls on accepting the people as an equal partner in risk reduction, thus
increasing the legitimacy of the decision making. By a comprehensive and early
integration of all three parties, the social acceptance of risk reduction measures, of
which sometimes only a few groups are benefiting while society in total often has
to shoulder the financial burden, will increase significantly.

8.8.3 Communication from the Administration

Information on risks is often released just to “reduce conflicts and smooth risk
management.” The German authors Ruhmann and Kohring (ibid) stressed that
“the main objective of risk communication is not to disseminate information but
to establish a reliable relationship between sender and receiver. Thus risk commu-
nication is a vital approach to build-up acceptance and accountability.” Risk com-
munication should therefore be established as a dialogue process that early and
comprehensively incorporates those affected in the political decision-making pro-
cess. The authors furthermore pointed out that it is not enough just to dissemi-
nate a qualified expertise and to take this as a sign for a successful communication
rather than understand risk communication in the first order is an instrument to
build up reliability and trust. But how to get the news accepted by the affected
population? It turns out that acceptance is better, the better the political system is
rooted in the society. Acceptance means that the information recipient is not only
380 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

given the role of a mere news receiver, who is allowed to agree or disagree with
the administrative directives. Normally many authorities at the national, provin-
cial, as well as communal level still take the stand that their insight and directives
are indisputable and should be followed uncritically for the sake of the people.
Such a standpoint does not give the population at risk the status of an equal part-
ner. The way the people take up the contents of the risk messages can differ very
much. It turns out that the more the people are familiar with the kind of risk they
are exposed to and the more they already experienced successful countermeasures
and trust in the official risk mitigation capacity, the more they are inclined to fol-
low the directives. Ruhmann and Kohring additionally stated that this lay the basis
for a new definition of the term “acceptance,” in a way that official risk communi-
cation is only to be achieved by engaging the population early, comprehensively,
and at equal eye-level in the communication process. The basis for such a defini-
tion is that risk communication is open to social aspects. If a catastrophe is an
event that endangers society then acceptance has to take this notion into account,
making it not just a following of directives but attributing a political dimension to
it.
“Without participation there will be no acceptance” (Dombrowski ibid).
Communicating on risks is to establish a connection between authorities and
the population at risk, by making risk communication an interactive process of
information exchange among individuals, social groups, and institutions. As risk
communication is a two-way-message instrument transporting messages from
the experts to nonexperts and the other way round, the messages are difficult to
formulate. Risk managers tend to formulate their messages purely in technical
terms, making the messages autocratic and very often in a form of a directive. On
the other hand, the information that the risk managers receive from the affected
population is normally not very clear and in most cases very emotionally and not
technically or operationally formulated. In order to make risk communication a
successful tool, risk communication has to be established as a process. By a direct,
event-related, and permanent exchange of information at the same eye-level, even
when the information givers and receivers come from different social establish-
ments, risk communication can raise the level of understanding on the risk expo-
sure situations of the population. Having in mind that “[E]very mitigation is local,”
it is the population at risk that has to be incorporated in prevention and mitigation.
This is best achieved when the people are provided with information that reflects
the available knowledge and is accompanied with an offer for an information
exchange. Thus risk communication will raise the level of understanding and sat-
isfy the population‘s demand for security.
Renn and Levine (1991) emphasized the fact that many risk-exposed people
have serious problems understanding technical terms such as probability, fre-
quency, risk occurrence, and so on. Linked to this, “is the problem that success of
risk management is difficult to measure.” In the case where a mitigation counter-
measure is successful, the population at risk often does not see a justification to
discuss or implement risk mitigation any further: there is no risk; why do some-
thing. This situation brings risk management into a bias situation. Risk managers
8.8 Risk Communication 381

propagate further engagement in this matter; on the other hand they are proud
of the higher level of resilience achieved (security increment; see Fig. 8.7). This
book proposes for such a situation, the use of the term “prevention dilemma.” The
dilemma gets even stronger momentum when the amount of money for the mitiga-
tion measures becomes a matter of public debate and the managers have to justify
their decision that the money on, for example, elevating the dam height was spent
meaningfully and target-oriented, nevertheless having in mind that the probability
of another flood event cannot be avoided forever. The nonappearance of an antici-
pated flood is the success; not the higher dam. In such a situation it is the task of
the risk communication to convince the people in times of no risk that risk mitiga-
tion is worthwhile.
Risk communication in times shortly after a disaster is quite easy. Everyone is
longing for information. The victims need information on how better to cope with
the disaster impact. The news people need the information to cover their headlines
and the politicians want to see themselves brought out. The time following a disas-
ter is the time of the risk managers and risk communication. But the time before a
disaster strikes or between two disasters when the memory has already vanished is
the “real” time for risk communication. The problem risk managers are confronted
with in that period is that no one is inclined to receive news of such kind anymore.
It took only a couple of days for the terrific pictures on Hurricane Sandy in 2012
to vanish from TV screens. Risk managers have to keep this in mind when com-
municating disaster prevention initiatives.

8.8.4 Pre- and Post-disaster Communication

As pointed out already, the best risk communication is that taken by public offi-
cials in advance of an incident to better prepare communities at risk, risk manag-
ers, and the news media for a probable event. Below there is a series of questions,
information, and messages given, that can serve as an initiative to create pub-
lic interest, well before a disaster event might occur. If such messages are dis-
seminated well in advance they can start an interactive process of information
exchange and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions. The American
Mental Health Services (SAMSHA 2002) proposed a series of questions that
should be posed to start a risk communication with the public:
• What are the messages to be delivered prior to an incident?
• What are the obstacles to effective communications and how can they be
minimized?
• What are the opportunities for effective means of communication?
• What questions can we anticipate from the public in this nonrisk situation?
• What kind of information is supposed to be communicated by the media?
Post-event debriefing is a successful support mechanism for the staff to learn from
the experiences garnered from the last emergency. In this sense “debriefing” can
382 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

also be defined as a contribution to “pre-disaster” planning. Debriefing comprises

a couple of structural elements, mainly on the:
• Technical elements of the emergency management operation
• Elements of the social and cultural situation to which the affected population
was exposed
• Kind and the way assistance was rendered
• Lessons learned from the operation to improve the organization’s performance
in crisis reaction.
Debriefing furthermore improves the structural setup of the administrative pro-
cedures and the skill of the staff’s organization. Post-event learning will help to
improve crisis reaction capacity by an open critical reviewing not of those matters
that went perfectly, but those where deficiencies occurred. Debriefing transports
crisis-acquired knowledge to those who are not yet familiar with the experiences
gained, making implicit knowledge explicit by bringing the information also to
other groups in the organization. Thus the factor “debriefing” in the disaster man-
agement cycle has to be seen as a substantial element of the management capabil-
ity. The general rule on debriefing is that it has to follow the principle of privacy
and confidentiality, as most of the matters discussed are matters of individuals,
often marginalized social groups, or governmental organizations that fail to pro-
vide the envisaged services. Therefore such debriefing has to be conducted openly,
honestly, and with much respect for the rights of individuals. Furthermore all staff
members involved in the emergency case has to take part in the debriefing as all
aspects have to be elaborated.

8.9 Risk Financing

Although in industrialized countries the great majority of damages are covered by

insurance, most of the developing and many advanced countries still lack appro-
priate means to cover financial losses from natural disasters. In such countries the
traditional way of covering losses by the individual is to wait for the government
to cover the losses, often by providing money for reconstruction of the damaged
buildings. But as many of these countries (e.g., a country like Bangladesh) do not
have appropriate means at their disposal to cover at least the minimum losses,
most of the burden rests with the victims. Many of the countries at risk, however,
have generally only a very limited financial resource base from their tax income
Thus many of these highly risk-exposed countries depend on foreign aid either in
the form of donations, like Indonesia that received about US$8 billion for reha-
bilitation of the tsunami damage, or in the form of long-term loans from the World
Bank or from one of the regional development banks. But such loans are made
at market conditions and one day have to be paid back. The deep dependency on
external resources makes these countries even more vulnerable and was in many
cases the reason that hindered a sustainable recovery.
8.9 Risk Financing 383

The low income levels make such poor or deprived countries nontarget areas
for the international insurance business, and if not, then it is restricted to the
wealthier segment of the society or the highly productive industrial sector. The
lack of many financial resources often hampers a fast recovery after a disaster as
the necessary infrastructure rehabilitation measures are either not implemented or
at best start with much delay and not to the necessary dimensions. To overcome
this lack of money, risk-related financing schemes have to be implemented before
a disaster strikes, especially in those societies at highest risk that have the lowest
access to risk splitting or risk transferring mechanisms. This holds true for margin-
alized societies in industrialized countries (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) or entire socie-
ties such as Bangladesh. Both damages are, if covered, only to a limited extent.
The most appropriate way for societies at risk not to depend on external
help from international donor agencies such as the Holdback, the International
Regional Development Banks, or from private donations, is that the national gov-
ernments declare their willingness to institutionalize a state, parastate, or privately
organized risk transfer mechanism. Such a willingness opens good chances to
uncover not only effective means for financing disaster losses but also can include
risk prevention elements. Most important is that state authorities:
• Base their assumptions on realistic pictures of the local risk exposure.
• Understand sharing of risk to be a social challenge.
• Acknowledge that prevention pays off (reduces the costs by two to five times).
• Know about what kind of social, scientific, and technical elements disaster risk
management should include.
• Be open to a dialogue with the private sector for identifying options for risk
transfer mechanisms.
• Institutionalize a conducive legal framework that fosters cooperation of the gov-
ernment authorities with the private sector.
Sharing risk means that there is a mechanism that transfers or splits the risk from
the people who are affected by a disaster to those who are not affected. All part-
ners in the mechanism contribute a “low” amount of money (premium) to cover
a high loss of an individual. But such kind of risk sharing is significantly differ-
ent in countries with high and low income. There are many societies that cannot
afford even the lowest premium, and those are often at the highest risk. In indus-
trialized countries private as well as industrial buildings are generally comprehen-
sively insured against damages. There are even countries where parts of the risk
premium are taken over by the government or by tax exemption. In many develop-
ing countries, however, such risk- sharing mechanisms either do not exist or are
only of a limited capacity and thus loss compensation is seen by the society as a
national task, a situation that is well known also in many industrialized countries.
In this context Kunreuther (1966) emphasized that instead of covering the losses
by the states, the insurance companies should be “convinced” to assess regularly
the building standards of private homes as a prerequisite for insurance. Another
point in defining the premium should be not to base it exclusively on the individu-
al’s risk pattern but also take the livelihood conditions, the location, and the social
384 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

environment as an equal determinant of vulnerability into account when defining

the insurance premium.
Consequently risk mitigation should always be accompanied by an insurance
industry. Insurance is by definition a form of disaster preparedness. It represents
an important, if not decisive, prerequisite for many economic activities (Berz
1997). Without insurance coverage, for example, engineering projects in highly
risk-exposed regions, such as power stations in earthquake zones, would expose
such installations to uncontrollable risk of failure that is not acceptable to the
investors as well as to regional development efforts. Insurance is a market-oriented
instrument that allows for a more even distribution of the financial burden from
disaster among the four parties concerned: the insured, the insurer, the reinsurer,
and the government (MunichRe 2012). The insurer and the reinsurer bear most of
the burden. But where the financial losses overstep the insurer’s liability, in gen-
eral governments step into help out as the last-resort insurer or provide financial
incentives to the victims either by direct loans or by tax relief. The insurer moreo-
ver can contribute to increasing self-responsibility in disaster risk reduction behav-
ior with the insured by introducing a rebate in the insurance policy: a substantial
deductible as a clause in the insurance policy often initiates individual prevention
measures. This cost-sharing principle is for both parties involved (insured and
insurer) a vital means that rewards the insurer with a substantial premium rebate
and on the other side reduces the risk of the insurer. The wealth of data make the
insurance able not only in calculating premiums and in classifying hazard areas—
known as rating zones—but also in tracing relationships between event intensity
and loss intensity and estimating loss potentials from realistic disaster scenarios
(MunichRe ibid). By this information they contribute a broad experience to world-
wide cooperation with governmental, nongovernmental, and scientific institutions,
industry, and the media. Also due to this information pool it was possible recently
to reduce drastically the financial expenditure of the insurers, eligible for settling
natural disaster losses by relatively modest deductibles as most of the natural dis-
asters always entail a large, sometimes enormous, number of minor losses.
In general, people make choices on how much risk they are willing to bear and
how much money they want to spend for the desired amount of prevention. But
this choice is a matter of income. In this sense the people distinguish between
a risk they are willing to tolerate and those they do not accept (see Sect. 8.5). It
turned out that the individual often sees the sector for a personal involvement in
the field of “tolerable” risks, and he attributes the intolerable risks generally as a
state’s responsibility. Reaching a higher level of resilience is thus not only a mat-
ter of personal experience but also of a substantial risk reduction commitment by
society. In this regard risk mitigation is a prominent example for the “paradigm of
social balance” that makes a society vital and sustainable.
Practically the populations at risk distinguish between self-insurance, when the
person feels able to absorb a loss, and insurance coverage, which pays a speci-
fied sum when the event occurs. Prevention entails measures that have a cost,
and insurance entails a financial premium, and a person chooses the level and
8.9 Risk Financing 385

combination that best moderates consumption fluctuations. The following tiers

summarize effective measures of risk sharing at individual and household levels:
• Savings for loss prevention
• Personal hazard and risk assessment (individual disaster risk profiling)
• Investment to protect and maintain assets
• Insuring assets, property, and household goods
• Retrofitting stability of building structures
• Timely repairs
• Relocating to safer areas
• Awareness rising, training, evacuation drills
• Part of the early warning system
• Increasing participation in social networks
People who are insured for a risk often develop a different awareness of the risk
to which they are still exposed. This makes them less sensitive to the hazards and
makes them lose interest in taking their own loss prevention measures. Insurers
thus see their role not only in just covering financial losses but also to counteract
this mode of thought and behavior through awareness-raising campaigns. This sce-
nario is for them the rationale to inform their clients comprehensively on the rela-
tionship between hazard, vulnerability, and risk. All major insurance companies
therefore have established scientific and technical expertise in risk assessment.
In so doing, the companies often find themselves at the forefront of scientific and
technological development. They regularly publish information in the form of
leaflets, brochures, and in the media in order to alert the public to risks and draw
attention to the precautions they could take.
Three terms are fundamental to understand risk sharing:
• Deductible describes the amount or percentage of an insured loss that the poli-
cyholder must cover before any claims are paid by the insurer.
• Insurance pool is the collective pool of risk from multiple insurance compa-
nies. Pooling facilitates the development of insurance markets by spreading risk
across insurers that would otherwise lack financial capacity to participate in the
market. It enables insurers to provide affordable coverage for high-risk events.
• Reinsurance describes the mechanism to sell an insurance by an insuring com-
pany to another specialty insurance company (the reinsurer) for the purpose
of spreading risk and reducing the insurer’s own losses from large insurance
claims.

8.9.1 Insurance (Self-Insurance)

Damages from natural disaster occur as we have seen worldwide, hitting industri-
alized nations as well as nations that are in a development status. But as in indus-
trialized countries most of the values that are at risk are (normally) insured, so that
386 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

losses did not extremely burden the economy of the individual as well the country
in general, low-income households as we find in many developing countries are
highly vulnerable to losses from natural disasters. An appropriate means to protect
households from such kind of economic losses is through insurance. Insurance is
an instrument to share the risk among a group of the society that is exposed to
the same kind of risk. The principle of insuring losses from risks such as acci-
dents, health, life term, equity price risk, or crop failure, as well as from natural
disasters are based on assessing the possible financial losses of randomly occur-
ring events based on statistically measurable and thus predictable distributions
of disaster events. Such statistics allow the insurer to assess the risks and conse-
quently to define the burden. “Ironically the widely accepted practice of insur-
ances in the World’s largest economies reflects a collective method of socializing
losses” (World Bank 2001). As catastrophic events occur comparatively seldom,
their potential loss is quite high, making the use of the traditional insurance prac-
tice of spreading risks over a large number of insured individuals difficult. The
insurance risk management therefore developed a series of alternative risk financ-
ing concepts of which the most important are described below.
Turkey is one of the countries in the world that is most exposed to natural dis-
asters, particularly earthquakes. Around 70 % of Turkey’s population and 75 % of
its industrial facilities are exposed to large-scale earthquakes. The 1999 Kocaeli-
Izmit earthquake along the North Anatolian Fault Zone claimed a death toll over
17,000 and caused economic losses estimated at about US$5 billion; or around
2.5 % of gross domestic product. The nation’s disaster hotspot is located at the city
of Istanbul. There almost 15 million inhabitants—making the city the fourth biggest
megacity on Earth—and a high industrial density, living on the highly active fault
zone. According to recent assessments carried out by JICA (cited in Ilkesik 2002)
the probability of a major earthquake affecting Istanbul in the next 30 years is higher
than 60 %, resulting in a seismic risk exposure comparable to Los Angeles; but with
damage potential that is much higher because of Istanbul’s greater structural vulner-
abilities. A seismic event of the same magnitude as that in 1999 would result in more
than US$2.0 billion economic loss, up to 87,000 fatalities, 135,000 injuries, and
heavy damage to 350,000 public and private buildings. Experts see this risk expo-
sure as very dramatic, as it would burden the national economy to an extent that it
would take Turkey years to recover again economically. But the Turkish exposure to
natural disasters is not unique on Earth. There are many other places that also suffer
economically from such disasters. Although the costliest disasters generally occur in
developed countries, for instance, hurricanes since 2005 in the United States added
up to losses of more than US$250 billion, fortunately mostly covered by risk insur-
ance, in low- or median-income countries facing increasing economic losses only a
few of them get insured. Thus disasters often significantly affect the national econo-
mies, leading to expenditures that normally were earmarked for social development
projects and that then have to fund emergency and recovery needs.
Covering losses from natural disasters can either be managed before a disaster
strikes, ex-ante, which means financial means are invested to prevent losses from
occurring, or ex-post, which means losses from disaster events have to be covered.
8.9 Risk Financing 387

Ex-ante disaster loss financing requires that the potential losses are known and
have to be assessed prior to the event and a provision of money has to be made
in the budgets for such an event. In fact, regarding loss assessment from many
natural disasters of the 1990s (World Bank/GFDRR) it was possible to prevent
economic losses of more than US$280 billion by investing US$40 billion in pre-
vention, a ratio of 1:7. There are also other figures giving ratios of 1:5 or 1:8, but
all of them bearing the same message: prevention pays. In this context another
effect has to be considered, that in the case where prevention was successful, no
loss occurred. Such a situation often brings the decision makers into a bias sit-
uation that can be described as the prevention dilemma, leaving the authority to
explain why money has been invested, although nothing has happened.
Ex-post disaster coverage has the advantage that the costs can be quanti-
fied quite exactly but on the other hand this puts a huge financial burden on the
national budget. In many countries with limited economic resilience, the finan-
cial means to be allocated were in general financed by new debts. Such financing
has often heavily affected the country’s debt service in the past and consequently
could only be adjusted by raising taxes that once again strongly affected and dis-
couraged new private investments. In addition, the lack of financial means in the
aftermath of a disaster often has led to hamper recovery and forced governments
to conduct an emergency budget reallocation often at the burden of other social
development programs. Therefore many disaster-stricken low–middle income
countries in the past had mostly to rely on foreign assistance. But such assistance
is often rendered only for a short time (weeks or months) and is generally sched-
uled to finance relief and rehabilitation measures rather than to change the risk
exposure. Moreover such donations do not cover the entire losses. An exemption
on this was the overwhelming support by the international community on the 2004
tsunami in Indonesia, where more money was allocated by the international com-
munity than the actual loss of about US$5 billion. Furthermore in the future it is
most probable that due to the rising frequency and intensity of losses from cli-
mate-related disasters, the traditional model of post-disaster financing and reliance
in low- and middle-income countries on the donor community is no longer guaran-
teed (Cummins and Mahul 2008).
Despite the frequency and expenses of natural disasters in industrialized and
developing countries, there is no internationally agreed-upon system in either the
public or private sector for consistently compiling information about their eco-
nomic impacts. Therefore for a long time, organizations involved in economic loss
assessment pledge to establish an informed risk management policy that integrates
any data on the direct as well as on the indirect losses from natural disasters. The
committee proposed to base such calculations not on the reconstruction costs but
on the losses from the disaster impact. This approach covers a much broader range
of cost categories, as the term “costs” conventionally is understood to cover the
losses that are reimbursed by insurance companies and governments. A calculation
method should be developed that not only incorporates the local direct reconstruc-
tion costs but also the indirect costs such as price increases in far remote areas,
death toll from medical service functioning failure, restricted energy generation
388 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

due to disruption of the traffic connections (transport of coal), and many more.
The algorithm furthermore should address the benefits of mitigation measures on
the basis of a life-cycle investment, or at least for a decade in the future and not
calculate the costs just by comparing the invested money and the cost of a normal
or worst-case scenario.
The experience from the many risk events brought the developing countries and
the international donor community to review the situation and was the rationale
for many political approaches to economically secure disaster risk financing. The
long-used practice just to rely on the international donor community to cover the
losses is anticipated in regard to the many costly hydrometeorological disasters to
be increasingly unrealistic. In addition, more and more countries realized that it
would be less costly to invest in disaster prevention measures than to cover post-
disaster losses. Therefore the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and
the subsequent Kyoto Protocol refer to the potential role of insurance in disaster
mitigation and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 (UNISDR 2005)
identified the need to promote the development of financial risk-sharing mecha-
nisms, particularly insurance and reinsurance against disasters, as a priority action
for building the resilience of nations and communities to recover from disasters
and recognized the need for innovative risk-financing mechanisms to be particu-
larly relevant to the middle- and low-income countries.
Thus far funding for disaster mitigation and prevention in developing countries
mostly was provided by industrialized country-financed international donor agen-
cies such as the World Bank, the United Nations, or the many regional develop-
ment banks (ABD, AfDB, etc.). In more advanced economies, losses from natural
disasters are typically funded through a combination of private risk-financing
arrangements and an efficient public revenue system. In middle- and low-income
countries, with fiscal pressures, funding of post-disaster reconstruction strongly
was based on ex-post borrowing and assistance from international donors.
Well-established forms of financing losses from natural disasters or of prevent-
ing future losses include different economic approaches. Risk compensation can
be financed either through risk retention or risk transfer to an outside party.

8.9.2 Microfinancing

A special type of insurance that offers protection against the risks in life, espe-
cially for low-income people in the developing countries is called microinsur-
ance. There have been in the past many successful attempts to provide financial
means to such a group of people, who normally do not have access to the finan-
cial markets. The first to start such a credit scheme was Professor M. Yunus in
Bangladesh, who invented the Grameen Bank model and was later honored with
the Nobel Peace Prize. Since then the microfinancing market has strongly devel-
oped. Today many different credit schemes are offered by the international insur-
ance business; all of them aim at risk financing for low-income groups and can
8.9 Risk Financing 389

be tailored according to the needs in developing countries. The world market for
microinsurance is estimated to comprise more than two billion people, repre-
senting an economic potential of US$40 billion, according to information from
Allianz, Germany (Allianz Insurance Company, Pro Vention Consortium).
The basic principles for microinsurance are that the losses must occur by
chance, unexpected, and randomly. The losses must be pre-defined in terms of tim-
ing, region, type of risk, and severity. The rate of losses must be predictable, must
embrace quite a large insured clientele, and should have quite a large areal distri-
bution. The premium must be proportionate to the likelihood and costs of the risk
involved but the mode of payment can be tailored according to the needs of the
clientele. The insurance payments can be used to restore household and productive
assets that were damaged during a disaster. The social and economic sectors that
are subjects for microinsurance comprise the entire sector of insurance, from term
life insurance, accidents, home insurance, to livestock insurance, as well as protec-
tion against natural perils including floods, rain, hail, or others.
Microinsurance can help split the risks especially of low-income households.
Munich Re and ILO published in 2006 (Churchill 2006) a brochure that explained
how microinsurance schemes can help to split risks from natural disasters.
Traditionally such kind of informal risk splitting is known from many societies
worldwide, but in fact such insurance schemes preferably covered agricultural
losses, or economic burdens in the health sector or from accidental deaths. The
outreach for such systems is limited and in reality only small. The poor are that
fraction of a society who are more vulnerable to a crisis than all other societal
groups and are those who are the least able to cope with disasters. The traditional
coping strategies are normally restricted in the effects and low in return, thus providing
only insufficient protection. According to ILO (2001) half of the world’s population
is excluded from any type of social security protection; in sub-Saharan Africa not
even one in ten. Various experiences with microinsurance proved it a valuable instru-
ment of risk sharing. Traditional microinsurance can mean that a peasant puts aside
money from a good harvest for a time of emergency. Microinsurance in the sense
ILO is propagating even goes a step further. It is rather designed to cover risks
through a regular payment of premiums that is proportionate to likelihood, sali-
ency, and the losses from natural disaster. Thus ILO pointed out microinsurance
does not differ much from normal insurance but has a clear focus on low-income
people, people who are in their majority defined by not having a regular income
and not having access to formal social protection neither by employers nor from
the government. The basic concept of microinsurance is “risk pooling” that means
all insured participants pay the premium in a great pool from which a loss in a
certain time period and of a defined nature will be covered. Thus all contribute
a small amount of money but only a few benefit strongly. ILO pointed out that
microinsurance schemes are best applicable when the risks are sudden, not pre-
dictable, and of a significant severity. Insuring such kind of risk is a means to give
social protection for all those who are lacking respective government schemes.
Microinsurance examples from Asia and Africa reveal that also the poor can
increase their disaster resilience, thus making them interesting partners for the
390 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

insurance business. The normal insurance business tries not to insure high-risk
persons whereas the low-income oriented microinsurance policy runs the opposite
way. It seeks to get many people into the portfolio thus sharing the risks to all and
thus reducing the risk of a particular household. A reasonable way to share the risk
is to identify groups of persons that share the same type of risk: agricultural coop-
eratives, small-scale entrepreneurs and religious groups or women associations.
Such associations exist in all developing countries, making them a preferable tar-
get group for microinsurers.
Microinsurance schemes have already in many cases proven their general capa-
bility to provide security against natural perils. But “in practice there are only few
successful experiences and it has proved extremely challenging to structure and
implement affordable and high value micro-insurance products specifically for dis-
asters” (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler 2009). They recognized that to implement
a microinsurance system successfully, a couple of basic factors must be opera-
tional, including a powerful and diversified risk pool, low transaction costs and
affordable premiums, together with a transparent and efficient mode of payouts.
In addition microinsurance requires a highly specialized staff that operates under
clearly defined procedures. Furthermore experience clearly shows that microinsur-
ance deserves a backing by reinsurers, “as it is very difficult for most systems to
provide insurance alone.”

8.9.3 Risk Retention

Retaining a risk means that the individual, a company of (even) the government
puts money aside from the annual budget in order to cover a loss when it occurs.
This can be managed either according to plan or be done unplanned. If neither loss
reserves nor disaster reconstruction funds have been established or designated,
very often losses are just taken from available cash. From a risk-financing point of
view, this technique is acceptable for losses that are small in nature and infrequent
in occurrence. A more sustainable approach is to establish a loss reserve. Such an
approach comprises a significant difference from the technique described above,
as it recognizes a liability for loss and demands setting aside money or assets to
fund that liability. Such a loss reserve is typically based on expected losses and
is treated as a budget provision, requiring a pre-defined liability in the financial
statements. The losses can be funded by cash, securities, or other liquid assets that
are earmarked for the designated liabilities. Another element in risk financing is
self-insurance which means that such an organization finances its losses through
a planned strategy. The most typical forms of self-insurance are a self-insurance
trust or a captive insurance company. A self-insurance trust is not insurance but
a funding vehicle (e.g., a bank account with an independent third party/trustee)
that is designated for the sole purpose of paying losses. The trustee administers
the trust through a formalized agreement and a statement that outlines the type
and limits of loss to be paid. The trusts were for long the most common vehicle
8.9 Risk Financing 391

for self-insurance, but they are gradually being replaced by captive insurance
­companies because these vehicles can more flexibly accommodate the various
exposures and risk financing needs (Carroll 2001). A captive insurance company is
an organizational structure established for instance by a large company or a private
entity to cover their respective losses from natural disasters. The insurance busi-
ness is primarily controlled by its owners who are also the principal beneficiaries.
As before (self-insurance), captives are also insurance vehicles but with a greater
flexibility to accommodate the many and different types of risk. As captives are
obliged to tax and income statements, there is a great importance that they act in
line with the company’s risk-management program, which consequently will ele-
vate risk management a part of the organization management.

8.9.4 Risk Transfer

Risk transfer by definition transmits an individual, party, or organization, and so on,

risk to an insurance company which itself spreads it among many insurance hold-
ers. The most common method of risk transfer is a commercial insurance first-party
insurance also called direct damage coverage of losses, providing financial reim-
bursement as the result of damage that also comprises all types of natural disasters.
Insurance is a contractual relationship that exists when the insurer agrees, for a pre-
mium, to pay the insured a loss caused by a pre-defined event (peril). The risk pre-
mium is the amount of money the insured pays regularly to the insurer and depends
on the agreed-upon level of returns. The premium thus describes the willingness of
the insurance taker to accept a certain risk. From a practical view, insurance will
nearly always involve some form of risk retention on a planned or unplanned basis
and is generally subject to a deductible. A deductible is the percentage of an insured
loss that the policyholder must cover by himself, before a claim will be paid by
the insurer. The insurance companies themselves also seek to split their respective
risks by passing their risk to a reinsurer or a group of reinsurers. In many countries
the insurance companies are legally bound not to issue policies exceeding a maxi-
mum solvency margin of normally 10 % of their company net worth, unless those
policies are reinsured. This significantly improves the insurer’s capability to take
on higher risks because some of that risk is transferred to collective risk pools with
reinsurers like the Munich Re, the Swiss Re, or the Hannover Re. Over the years
the reinsurers have developed sophisticated and reliable models to assess risk from
natural disasters. One of the most famous is the Munich Re-Insurance Company
that for a long time has established a powerful natural disaster risk assessment divi-
sion and that has established the Munich Re Foundation to develop in-depth assess-
ment of methods and strategies for risk assessment.
Today, risk financing is as described above viewed as a complex system involv-
ing economic aspects, contracts between insured and insurer, and a legal frame-
work. The goal of risk financing is ultimately to protect assets and personal lives
including some of the following:
392 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

• Identification of types of exposures and losses faced

• Anticipation of risks of the groups
• Financial provision to cover losses
• Pooling resources
• Spreading/transferring risks
• Risk prevention and retention
• Legally binding contracts
• Identification of ways to finance loss without jeopardizing the financial integrity
of the contract partners
Transferring risks to the capital market often uses so-called insurance-linked secu-
rities (ILS) to reach a higher level of security by subsequently trading risks onto
the secondary insurance market. This holds true especially for risks from natural
hazards or to hedge against pandemic risks. This concept gave ILS a “foothold as
an alternative asset category for investors and as an alternative form of reinsurance
for insurers” (MunichRe 2012, 2013). And it is expected that this form of insur-
ance will continue to gain in significance, because developments in supervisory
law such as Solvency II are likely to give a further boost to their popularity.
Risk transfer also can be accomplished through the use of an indemnification
provision. In natural disaster risk financing such a method can be a rationale if
someone’s interference with nature (e.g., the construction of a building) ampli-
fied the impact of a natural disaster leading to a claim for indemnification to be
restored or reimbursed to make whole again. Nevertheless it should be noted that
any insurance policy should never be viewed as a complete transfer of risk.
In developed countries private organizations and entities other than the govern-
ment take over a large portion of the financial risk by insurance. Thus insurance is
the primary tool for risk transfer in such countries. Risk transfer by insurance has
several major advantages: it spreads risks between parties thus reducing the risk
to the individual and it “allows the segregation of risk” (Freeman et al. 2003). In
the higher-income countries about 30 % of the loss from natural hazards is insured,
whereas in low- to middle-income countries insurance covers just 1 % of the losses.

8.9.5 Catastrophic Bonds (Cat Bonds, Cat Swaps,

Risk Swaps)

Not only traditional financial insurance is an option for transferring risk. In the
aftermath of the big disasters in the United States, for example, the Northridge
earthquake and Hurricane Andrew, the insurance industry realized that the finan-
cial losses from such megadisasters can reach magnitudes that the insurance
industry assumed not to be able to absorb in the future (Damnjanovic et al. 2010).
The insurers therefore initiated a number of studies to estimate financial exposure
based on the natural disaster experience. The anticipated financial losses from
such disasters has led economists and geoscientists to develop alternative risk
8.9 Risk Financing 393

financing strategies, also known as alternative risk transfer techniques (ARTs).

Among them are the so-called catastrophe bonds (cat bonds). Both instruments,
insurance and cat bonds, are risk-management strategies potentially to embrace
the impact of financial risks. Generally speaking, the difference of cat bonds and
insurance is that cat bonds are paid by the insurance company when the eco-
nomic losses from a natural disaster overstep the pre-disaster-defined level risk.
Cat bonds are other than normal investment bonds not depending on the solvency
of the creditor rather than on pre-defined type, location, and severity of a natural
disaster.
The concept of cat bonds emerged from the intention of insurance compa-
nies to share the high to very high risks they would face if a major catastrophe
occurred, and that could not be covered by the premiums. An insurance company
therefore issues such bonds which are then sold to investors. If until the end of
the contracted period no catastrophe occurs, the insurance company pays back the
invested capital plus the premium and the interest to the investors. On the contrary,
if a catastrophe occurs as defined in the bond’s contract, then the incurred losses
are paid by the insurance company to the claimholders, a situation that happened
lately with the US$300 million cat bond of the Japanese Muteki Ltd catastrophe
bond issued in 2008 by Munich Re after the damages of the March 11th Tohoku
(Fukushima, Japan) earthquake cum tsunami were declared a total loss.
The advantage for the insurance company lies in comparatively high interest
rates (when the losses are rated low), and those who want their risks from earth-
quake, flood, or hailstorm events to get covered, do not need to make respective
budgetary provisions and can thus hand over their risks to the capital market. But
not only private insurance companies are issuing cat bonds, governments also
make more and more use of that financing scheme. Today the value of the world-
wide assets reached about US$100 trillion, making that market highly interesting
to the insurance business.
In response to increasing demand from risk-exposed countries, international
donor organizations developed catastrophe bond issuance platforms that allow
governments to use a standard framework to buy insurance. One of the best-known
tools was launched by the World Bank, called the MultiCatProgram (World Bank
2014). The objective of the program is to facilitate access to insurance cover-
age for governments on terms that are better than normal market conditions, to
help with disaster preparedness and to ensure governments’ access to immediate
liquidity to finance emergency relief and reconstruction work after a natural dis-
aster. The first country to make use of the MultiCatProgram was Mexico that in
2009 had already sold US$290 million in catastrophe bonds that will cover up to
US$140 million of earthquake damage, US$100 million against Pacific hurricanes
and US$50 million against Atlantic hurricanes. The bond sale was managed under
the lead of the World Bank by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Swiss Reinsurance
Co. The World Bank’s function in the program is to reduce the cost of issuing the
bonds and make it easier to sell the bonds on emerging markets: “The bank will be
playing a real catalytic role in getting some of these countries that have no access
or are afraid to get this access to the markets.”
394 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

Table 8.3  Selection of international catastrophic bonds executed by Munich Re Insurance

(Courtesy Municn Re)
Client/company Financial volume Perils covered/region
(million)
VenTerra Re Ltd. USD 250 Tropical cyclones Australia/earthquake
United States
Bosphorus 1 Re Ltd. USD 400 Earthquake Turkey
Tar Heel Re Ltd. USD 500 Named storms (tropical cyclones)
Lakeside Re III Ltd. USD 270 Earthquake North America
Johnston Re Ltd. USD 202 Hurricane United States
Queen City Re Ltd. USD 75 US named storms
Queen Street VIII Re USD 75 Hurricane United States and Cyclone Australia
Ltd.
Queen Street VII Re Ltd. USD 75 Hurricane United States and Windstorm Europe
Queen Street VI Re Ltd. USD 100 Hurricane United States and Windstorm Europe
Queen Street V Re Ltd. USD 75 Hurricane United States and Windstorm Europe
Queen Street IV Capital USD 100 Hurricane United States and Windstorm Europe
Ltd.
Queen Street III Capital USD 150 Windstorm Europe
Ltd.
Queen Street II Capital USD 100 Hurricane United States and Windstorm Europe
Ltd.
EOS Wind Ltd. USD 80 Hurricane United States and Windstorm Europe

Table 8.3 was published by the Munich Re Insurance company in 2013

(MunichRe 2013) and gives some examples of reinsured catastrophe bonds the
company is executing:

8.9.6 National Risk Sharing

• US National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)

There are a multitude of examples on national insurance programs. One of the most
popular programs worldwide is the US National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
that was created in 1968 through the National Flood Insurance Act (FEMA 1968).
Floods are the most destructive natural hazard in terms of economic loss to the
United States of America. The program enables property owners to purchase insur-
ance protection from the government against losses from flooding. The insurance is
designed to provide a nonmarket-based insurance alternative to disaster assistance
to meet the escalating costs of repairing damage to buildings caused by the yearly
occurring floods mostly along the Mississippi/Missouri river path and in Florida.
Since its inception in 1969, the National Flood Insurance has covered losses of
more than US$40 billion in claims, of which more than 40 % of that money has
8.9 Risk Financing 395

gone to residents of Louisiana. The program moreover ­­reiterates retrofitting the

building standards that today save an estimated US$1 billion annually. In 2010, the
program insured about 5.5 million homes in nearly 20,000 communities. Within
the program, flood-prone areas are identified, specifically tailored flood insurance
offered, and flood-prone communities are encouraged to implement flood-plain
management activities. Originally, NFIP was meant to be self-supporting and
intended that its operating expenses should be paid from the premiums collected
for flood insurance policies. But it was found that there is a repetitive loss of about
US$200 million annually that has to be covered by US taxpayers. Actually there is
an initiative underway that aims at raising the premium in order to make the NIFP
self-supporting.
Homeowners who want their property to be insured can participate in the NFIP
if their local community has signed a legally binding agreement with the federal
government that stipulates that if a community will adopt and enforce a “flood
plain management ordinance” to reduce future flood risks, the federal government
will make flood insurance available to the community. The agreement furthermore
demands that flood risk maps be set up and regularly updated, for a sustained flood
plain management and for the identifying local flood risk premium zones. The
compensation of losses, the money spent on future flood reduction measures, as
well as the implementation of the communal flood management plans is overseen
by the FEMA. The compensation of losses provided by the program is oriented on
the value of flood damage on houses and assets. The loss compensation is based
on either the replacement cost value or the actual cash value. The replacement cost
value is the cost to replace that part of a building that is damaged. To be eligible,
certain conditions must be met: (1) the building must be a single-family dwell-
ing; (2) it must be the principal residence, meaning the family lives there for at
least 80 % of the year; and (3) the reconstruction costs are at least 80 % of the
full replacement cost of the building. The actual cash value is the replacement
cost value at the time of loss, less the value of its physical depreciation, and the
replacement costs of personal property are always valued at actual cash value.
In order to encourage communities to do more and better in flood risk reduc-
tion a Community Rating System (CRS) was implemented in 1990 (FEMA 1990)
as a voluntary program for recognizing and encouraging community flood plain
management activities that is in full compliance with or even exceeds the mini-
mum NFIP flood plain management requirements, and may apply to join the CRS.
CRS-eligible communities can get their flood insurance premium rates discounted
to reward community actions if the activities meet three goals:
• Reduce flood damage to insurable property.
• Strengthen and support the insurance aspects of the NFIP.
• Encourage a comprehensive approach to floodplain management.
Meanwhile more than 1200 communities participate in CRS, reaching nearly
3.8 million policyholders. Although CRS communities represent only 5 % of
the over 20,000 communities participating in the NFIP, almost 70 % of all flood
insurance policies are negotiated in CRS communities. Eligible for CRS support
396 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

are communities that qualify a class rating system that is very similar to the fire
­insurance rating system of the United States. CRS classes are rated from 1 to 10.
Each CRS class improvement produces a 5 % greater discount on flood insurance
premiums. A community that does not apply at all for the CRS or that does not
comply with the minimum requirements is considered a “class 10,” and a “class 1”
community thus receives the maximum 45 % premium reduction. But lowering the
costs of flood damage is only one of the rewards a community receives from par-
ticipating in the CRS. Other CRS benefits include:
• Citizens and property owners have increased opportunities to learn about risk,
evaluate their individual vulnerabilities, and take action to protect themselves,
as well as their homes and businesses.
• Flood plain management activities provide enhanced public safety and reduced
damage to property and public infrastructure to avoid risk of lives, economic
disruption, and loss.
• Communities can better evaluate the effectiveness of their local flood programs
against a nationally recognized benchmark.
• Provision for technical assistance in designing and implementing flood reduc-
tion activities.
• Communities have incentives to maintain and improve their flood programs
over time.
Although the NFIP is widely accepted as significantly increasing flood loss reduc-
tion in the United States, the program itself is under great criticism. Most of the
criticism refers to the financial situation of the program. The cash-based budget-
ing is seen to obscure the program’s actual costs and does not provide transpar-
ent information on emerging financial problems. A system that allows for an
accrual-based budgeting is anticipated to better address the revenues and expenses
situation. Moreover it has been estimated that less than 50 % of eligible prop-
erty owners in flood plains participate in the program. In addition, even when the
purchase of insurance is mandatory, the extent of noncompliance with the man-
datory purchase requirement is unknown and remains a concern. In the past organ-
ization-introduced reduction of the subsidies often caused policyholders to cancel
their policies or reduce their program participation, thus leaving them vulnerable
to financial loss from floods. Furthermore, placement of the program within the
Department of Homeland Security and no longer with NFIP itself, bears the risk
of decreasing the attention, visibility, and public support the program receives.
Moreover, homeowners who have built their houses before the flood zone was
defined are also eligible for reduced premiums of up to 40 % lower than the nor-
mal risk premium. The incorporation of properties with two or more losses in a
10-year period has also added to program losses. This group of persons represents
38 % of claims losses, but accounts only for 2 % of insured properties.
On October 1st, 2013, the New York Times reported that the National Flood
Insurance Program had changed its insurance policy. The report is summarized
here. From that day on, the insurance premium will start going up steadily by
25 % per year for regions that are severely or repeatedly flooded, until the rates
8.9 Risk Financing 397

balance the actual risk expenditure. That means property owners in flood-prone
areas who might have once been paying around US$500 a year (rates that were
well below what the market would charge) will go up by thousands of dollars over
the next decade. This took many homeowners affected by Hurricane Sandy to the
streets to call for a “Stop FEMA” rally. Congressional representatives from states
such as Louisiana and Florida that are likely to be hit by the NFIP changes have
called on FEMA to delay the implementation of the new rule, although the law
got overwhelming support from all political parties. FEMA says its hands are tied,
as the Biggert–Waters Act obligates the program to adjust flood premium rates
accordingly. By November 2012 the NFIP was more than US$20 billion in debt,
a number that would take the NFIP 100 years to recoup its losses. The changes
were aimed at those 1.1 million policyholders who were paying far less than what
the market value for flood insurance would have been. Thus quite a number of
policy owners have essentially been subsidized with public money for years, even
decades. Therefore property owners are confronted with unexpected outcomes of
the subsidized flood insurance policy, although the NFIP was once created to sup-
port these people. Before NFIP, the private insurance industry was unwilling to
provide flood insurance simply as it wasn’t profitable for them. The premiums did
not cover the payouts following the many big floods. Thus the government stepped
in, offering subsidized flood insurance to property owners, often at below market
rates.
But shifting the burden from the private market to the government didn’t really
lower the costs of major floods, especially as more and more Americans moved to
coastal areas. From 1970 to 2010, the population of shoreline counties increased
by almost 40 %, to 120 million and is projected to increase by an additional
10 million people by 2020. Some critics mention that just the subsidized flood
insurance, by shifting the risk from the individual to the public, had perversely
incentivized building in flood-prone areas. And it is anticipated that things will get
even worse if the consequences of sea-level rise continue as in the last decades. A
recent study found that if no actions are taken to reduce flooding risk, losses could
approach US$1000 billion by mid-century, assuming a sea-level rise of just 40 cm.
The sea level around New York City has risen by about a foot and a half over the
past century, which added to the devastating flood damage during Sandy. Investing
in mitigation such as raising homes and protecting coastal communities with sand
dunes and seawalls is therefore seen as the only alternative.

8.9.7 Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP)

Turkey is one of the most risk-exposed countries in the world to earthquakes.

Around 70 % of Turkey’s population and 75 % of its industrial facilities are
exposed to large-scale earthquakes. Most of the earthquakes occur along the
North Anatolian Fracture zone (bordering the Marmara Sea) and along the East
Anatolian Fracture zone. Since 1984 more than 120 earthquakes occurred with a
398 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

magnitude higher than M5 that resulted in direct property and infrastructure losses
frequently exceeding US$5 billion per event. The last major earthquake in the
Marmara region in 1999 resulted in the loss of 15,000 lives and placed a financial
burden of about US$6 billion on the economy and the government, also due to the
fact that only less than US$1 billion in losses were covered by risk insurance.
Earthquake insurance coverage was relatively low at the end of the 1990s in
Turkey. Only around 3 % of residential buildings were insured, as households tra-
ditionally relied on the government to finance the reconstruction of private prop-
erty after major natural disasters. In the aftermath of the Marmara earthquake, the
government decided to develop a property catastrophe risk insurance mechanism
to reduce its fiscal exposure to natural disasters arising from the traditional gov-
ernment-funded reconstruction of private property. In 2000, the Turkish govern-
ment created by Law No. 587 an earthquake insurance system compulsory for all
residential buildings on registered land in urban areas. The World Bank (Gurenko
et al. 2006) provided financial and technical assistance by the Global Facility
for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). The TCIP has become the first
national catastrophe insurance pool in World Bank client countries that provides
standalone earthquake insurance coverage to homeowners and small and medium
enterprises. The catastrophe risk-financing strategy of the TCIP relies on both cov-
ering the losses by their own financial resources and by transferring the risk to the
reinsurance market. About US$80 million of losses will be covered through TCIP
reserves; this part of the expenditures is initially complemented by a US$100 mil-
lion World Bank contingent loan facility. The overage will be transferred to the
international reinsurance markets. Moreover the Turkish government covers losses
that would exceed the overall claims, which is currently sufficient to withstand a
1-in-350-year earthquake.
The main objectives of the TCIP are to:
• Ensure that all property dwellings have affordable earthquake insurance coverage.
• Create a culture of prevention and resilience.
• Reduce citizens’ dependence on government to fund the reconstruction of private
property.
• Reduce government’s fiscal exposure to earthquake and fire damages.
• Transfer catastrophe risk to the international insurance markets.
• Encourage physical risk mitigation and safer construction practices.
In August 2000 the TCIP became a legal public entity targeted to lower govern-
ment expenditure for catastrophes. Moreover the government intends with the
TCIP to improve the risk prevention culture and insurance consciousness in the
public by incorporating the three stakeholder groups into a public–private partner-
ship: the risk-exposed individual, the national mandated authorities, and the insur-
ance cum reinsurance market for a socially affordable risk sharing. The program
is not subsidized and the premium rates are oriented at levels for people with an
average income with a deductible of 2 % with a contract duration of 30 years
(around US$62 per homeowner; the maximum coverage lies at approximately
US$92,000 per policy). This financial scheme will lay the base for long-term fund
8.9 Risk Financing 399

accumulation and aims at sharing the financial burden between the individual
and the international insurance market. The program offers a variety of insurance
possibilities according to building type and property location. The risk coverage
includes earthquakes and fire damage to residential structures but no household
contents. Since the year 2000 the TCIP public–private partnership has stimulated
the growth of the catastrophe insurance market in Turkey significantly. The num-
ber of earthquake policies sold increased sixfold from 600,000 in 1999 to more
than 3.5 million in the year 2010. Nevertheless the TCIP still needs more time to
achieve deeper market penetration. Today, the insurance coverage is at about 23 %
of dwellings countrywide and about 40 % in particularly disaster-prone areas. Still
the expectation prevails with homeowners that the government will pay for dam-
ages regardless of the insurance program. It became obvious that a program such
as TCIP relies on a strong communication strategy (Gurenko et al. ibid) to ensure
that residents are aware of earthquake risk, mandatory insurance laws, and the pro-
gram’s excellent claim-paying record. The World Bank has drawn furthermore the
assumption from the TCIP, that catastrophe insurance requires high state-of-the-art
catastrophe risk modeling techniques to price premiums that accurately reflect the
underlying risk.

8.9.8 National Agricultural Insurance, India

The National Agricultural Insurance Scheme in India (NAIS 1999) is another

impressive example of how insurance-based market conditions can help to reduce
damages from natural disasters. With two thirds of the Indian population depend-
ing on agriculture for a livelihood, crop insurance has long been an important ele-
ment of agricultural risk management. The government of India has historically
defined crop insurance as a national responsibility to mitigate the risks of natural
perils on farm production. In 1999 therefore the government established the insur-
ance scheme that offers insurance for food crops, oilseeds, and selected commer-
cial crops through the state‐owned Agriculture Insurance Company (AICI). With
about 25 million farmers insured, and a premium volume of US$650 million in
2011–2012 NAIS is the largest crop insurance program in the world.
The risk coverage by NAIS is based on the crop yield of a defined area known
as the “indexed approach,” where the actual yield of the insured crop, measured
by crop‐cutting experiments in a so-called “insurance unit” (IU) is compared to
historical yields. If the former is lower than the latter, all insured farmers in the IU
are eligible for the same rate of insurance compensation. This strategy proved to
be technically much more operational as compared to individual crop insurance.
The large number of very small landholdings in India made it virtually impossi-
ble to base premium and risk coverage on such a type of yield‐based assessment.
As NAIS is funded exclusively by the government this commitment leads to a
highly variable fiscal exposure for the national budget often exceeding 100 % of
the allocated budget. At the end of the crop season, aggregate claims exceeding the
400 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

farmers’ premium are funded 50–50 % by the state and central governments. The
long-used post-disaster funding arrangement was defined by the lack of an actu-
arially sound premium rating methodology, which means that estimating payouts
was not really feasible (Raju and Chand 2008). A revised funding and compen-
sation scheme was therefore seen necessary. A new NAIS that would operate in
a way that the government’s financial liability predominantly would be rendered
in the form of premium subsidies given to AICI and by funding ex-ante a disas-
ter occurred, was found long overdue. Such a new mechanism would reduce the
yearly budget management problems of this sector, as well as help to reduce the
delays in claims settlement. The actual system of a comprehensive involvement
of the national government was found not to be optimal. To address the identified
challenges, the government requested the World Bank in 2005 to provide technical
assistance to second a modification of the NAIS program. With this initiative the
Indian government moved from a social crop insurance scheme to a market‐based
crop insurance program with actuarially sound premium rates and with a deeper
participation of private insurers. The World Bank provided technical assistance to
support modification of NAIS based on international best practice and in-country
experience.
The New NAIS combines traditional and modern methods for crop yield
assessment: a Weather-Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS) has been piloted
for 11 growing seasons since 2007, with 11.6 million farmers and US$370 mil-
lion covered in the most recent season and the modified NAIS has been conducted
for four growing seasons since 2010, with greater than 1.1 million farmers and
US$67 million covered in the most recent season.
The New NAIS launched for the 2010–2011 growing season now comprises
among others:
• A best practice, standardized actuarially sound pricing system
• An experience‐based approach for area‐yield insurance
• Intensive institutional capacity development that serves the needs of the highly
specialized agricultural insurance business
• Introduction of commercial weather‐based crop insurance products
• The introduction of mobile technologies for improving crop-cutting data quality
and timeliness
• The institutional capacity conducive to transfer NAIS to a market-based
program
• Prototype of actuarial software that allows the pricing of 200 crop insurance
products
After modification, NAIS was introduced in 12 districts, covering more than
300,000 farmers, with an expected claims ratio within 50 %. The program was
targeted at 400,000 farmers for the growing season 2011–2012. Furthermore the
policy dialogue with various line ministries about the fiscal impact of the modi-
fied NAIS was institutionalized as well as a dialogue on the welfare implications
of the modified scheme. The program today underlies the insurance products by
using a suite of technological and statistical innovations including GPS with video
8.9 Risk Financing 401

recording capabilities and mobile phone software. The use of weather and remote
sensing data will lead to better crop-cutting experiments. As a result, the modi-
fied NAIS has increased reliability of insurance products for farmers by the intro-
duction of checks and balances into yield indices to enable private insurers and
reinsurers to take on the risks that were previously retained by government. New
NAIS significantly reduced the total cost for the government through remote sens-
ing and weather data and moreover increased the speed of claim settlement for
farmers.

8.9.9 General Conclusion

In many developing countries, however, such an institutional and regulatory

framework is still missing or is in its infancy. The lack of such structures hinders
an insurance market from developing. And the traditional way the banking system
is organized in many developing countries makes necessary institutional reforms
that allow risk insurance to operate properly very difficult, although the strategies,
structures, and operational setup for implementing insurance markets are already
well understood. In addition to the regulatory framework, there are concerns
related to the fundamental structure of the market for insurance, for example,
many countries are ranked too small for a national insurance market to survive.
Experience from Central America revealed that the region’s small middle classes
and medium-sized businesses represent the most frequent purchasers of insur-
ance in developed countries. One option to initiate a risk insurance market is to
make insurance mandatory by law and to demonstrate the benefits of insurance at
the government level, for example, by insuring government-owned buildings and
infrastructure construction. Another option is the creation of regional or transna-
tional insurance markets. If a market comprises a large number of license holders,
the market becomes attractive for the insurance industry as this would lower the
cost of insurance. The larger the market is, the more the international insurance
industry will enter the business. Regional proposals, such as the World Bank’s ini-
tiative for a Central American insurance market, are based on overcoming barriers
to the supply of insurance.
The advantages and limitations of commercial risk transfer are generalized
based on Freeman et al. (ibid):
Advantages
• Predictable compensation of losses
• Higher reliability than foreign disaster relief assistance
• Strengthening of the private sector
• Payment of premiums reflects the actual risk
• Equitable distribution of costs and benefits
• Encouraging the adoption of measures to minimize damages
402 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

Limitations
• Property owners pay premiums that do not reflect their actual risk.
• Insufficient hazard database to predict average annual losses.
• Premium rates do not bear the full cost.
• Private insurance unobtainable in high-risk areas.
• Significant number of policyholders are underinsured.
• Low voluntary uptake.
• Unlikely fully reimbursement of a loss.

8.10 Critical Infrastructure

Critical infrastructure comprises assets, systems, and networks, whether physical

or virtual that is vital for a proper functioning of society and thus defines a key
responsibility of a state. An undisturbed functioning of a society is greatly depend-
ent on the provision of essential goods and services. The threat can be caused by
natural disasters, technical failure, man-made disasters, international terrorism,
criminal acts, or civil war. The challenge to arrive at a higher level of resilience
of the critical infrastructure has developed as a critical target in the last decades
especially as many infrastructure systems are of a highly interconnected nature.
Moreover most infrastructure assets and systems seen as critical for our society
are privately operated. A system’s interruption can thus result in unanticipated and
cascading impacts from events across infrastructure sectors and geographical areas.
Generally speaking, critical infrastructure consists of systems and assets that:
• Supply and distribute (energy, oil, gas, electricity, water, sewage).
• Allow communication (telephone, radio/TV, IT technology).
• Provide transportation (roads, railways, air transport).
• Maintain law and order (police).
• Secure personal integrity (fire brigade).
• Provide medical health services and other livelihood-related services (rescue).
• Secure the functioning of public institutions (schools, etc.).
National authorities are in general responsible for setting rules and regulations
for the protection of infrastructure facilities in their territories, involving meas-
ures oriented to prevent disruptions, mitigate damage, and restore supply under
the best conditions. Critical infrastructure comprises facilities that are moreover
characterized by high capital intensiveness and high public investment at all levels
of government. Moreover they are directly critical to the nation’s welfare as well
as to the nation’s economy. The United States’ “National Strategy for Homeland
Security” listed the following critical infrastructure sectors:
• Agriculture
• Food production
• Water supply and sewage
• Public health
8.10 Critical Infrastructure 403

• Emergency services
• Government (national, federal, local)
• Industry (hazardous chemical industry, biological substances)
• Information and telecommunications (public and private media)
• Energy generation and distribution
• Transportation (road, rail, air)
• Banking and finance
In addition to these critical sectors, the strategy also introduces the concept of
“key assets” as a subset of nationally important key resources. The strategy defines
“key assets” as
“[I]ndividual” targets whose destruction would not only endanger vital systems, but could
create local disaster or profoundly damage a nation’s morale or confidence. Key assets
include symbols or historical attractions, such as prominent national, state, or local monu-
ments and national symbols. Key assets also include individual or localized facilities that
deserve special protection because of their destructive potential or their value to the local
community.

The number of sectors included under the definition “critical infrastructure” has
expanded in the last decades from the most basic public works to a much broader
set of institutional, social, economic, ecological, and even psychological issues.
Today due to the emerging threat from international terrorism the issue “criti-
cal infrastructure” risk assessment of virtual assets and cyberspace systems has
become a dominant issue, especially due to its technological and operational inter-
connectedness. Forty percent of international value creation today is based on the
computer and communication technology, a situation that is envisaged to increase
even further, securing the IT-sector indispensable for sustainable economic and
social development. Moreover in many countries, the energy supply is based on
nuclear power generation that poses a serious threat to technical and man-made
failure as well as to terrorist attacks. As due to globalization many such systems
are often no longer “at the hands” of one nation or proprietor—such as the trans-
national energy networks that result in extensive cross-border infrastructure—an
interruption immediately affects the functioning of several states.
Incapacitation or destruction therefore are of great concern to nations as well
as private companies as this might have a debilitating effect on national secu-
rity, the economy, public health, or any combination thereof. The fact that a vast
majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, any
risk reduction strategy has to be based on building partnerships to ensure secu-
rity and resilience of the critical infrastructure assets and systems. In order to
increase resilience of the infrastructure, for instance, the United States of America
has set up a specific legal framework. As in most countries of the world, the cen-
tral responsibility was handed over to the ministry of the interior mandating it
to work out the legal base and to assure its respective implementation. The cen-
tral objective of this was to guide the everyday work in protecting the system to
enhance resilience. A prerequisite to achieve comprehensive infrastructure pro-
tection is seen in the identification and validation of the critical assets. Moreover
404 8 Integrated Disaster Risk Management

the strategy stipulates the local authorities, private companies, and federal agen-
cies have a shared responsibility for the critical assets and demands they jointly
contribute to the “National Infrastructure Assurance Plan” by assessing the vul-
nerabilities of the sector to natural disasters, or physical or cyber-based attacks.
The assurance plan targets developing and maintaining lists of critical assets with
at least a minimum importance to become an essential part of the respective pro-
tection strategies. A main pillar of any risk assessment strategy is to establish
and operationalize a “Risk and Crisis Management Plan” (BBK 2008) to evalu-
ate the respective company’s elements at risk and put a value on each of the key
assets. The impact of loss is estimated at least by using a rating system based on
user-defined criteria. The risk and crisis assessment should cover all phases of the
production cycle from planning to operation. The task should comprise a check
whether the particular risk profiles can be managed and whether preventive meas-
ures taken are capable of increasing resilience. Such an evaluation should be car-
ried out regularly, preferably once a year. Additional evaluations are necessary
after countermeasures have been implemented, but are indispensable if the threat
situation changes. When risk and crisis management are taken seriously it can pro-
vide long-term added value and thus are a management tool to lay the basis for a
continuous optimization of the organization’s level of security.

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Chapter 9
Community Awareness and Participation

9.1 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management

(CBDRM)

A “community” in general comprises both rural villages and urban neighborhoods.

But what exactly defines a community is often difficult to describe (UNISDR
2006). This definition also holds true for disaster risk management, although often
only a segment of the community can be exposed to a hazard whereas the other
part can even benefit from it. But a community cannot be defined just from geo-
graphical location alone, but by the area where people share the same living con-
ditions, have a common social structure and cultural interest, and speak the same
language. The complex nature of indicators makes it difficult for an outsider to
identify where a community starts and ends; however, generally speaking, the geo-
graphical area often comprises people that can be grouped under the above-given
indicators.
A community-based organization is thus defined as an organization that is
either publicly or privately organized, such as a political party, a sports club, a
religious group, and/or being a member of a social network (i.e., elderly, orphans,
disabled, children, etc.) or that is representative of the community as a whole, or
of a significant segment of it. Community-based disaster risk reduction is a pro-
cess that initiates activities and actions to increase resilience to reach a better and
more sustained life, either within a community or of a community in total. Such
actions and activities can therefore vary greatly from one community to another.
Rifkin and colleagues (Rifkin et al. 1988) defined community participation as a
“social process whereby specific groups with shared needs living in a defined geo-
graphic area actively pursue identification of their needs, take decisions and estab-
lish mechanisms to meet those needs.” Thus community participation is a social
process whereby specific groups are not restricted to being observers but can be
actively involved in decision making and implementation. Since Arnstein (1969)
introduced the “ladder” as an indicator for the level of community involvement,
it has been possible to compare participation within and between different soci-
etal groups. Like the steps of a ladder, the degree of participation can be identified

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 409

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_9
410 9 Community Awareness and Participation

Fig. 9.1  Ladder of
participation (Based on
Arnstein 1969)

from “nonparticipation” (lowest step) ultimately to reach the top of the ladder,
“citizen control” (Fig. 9.1). The ladder example, although it impressively describes
the anticipated increase in participation, cannot neglect that it is not compulsory
that step No. 2, for instance, leads to reaching step No. 3. The interdependencies
in communal reality are much more complex and therefore it should be acknowl-
edged that improvements at one step will result in changes at other steps.
There are a number of terms that describe society’s involvement: “partici-
pation,” “empowerment,” “ownership,” “capacity,” or “competence” and some
others. All these terms, even when their exact definitions may differ, all have in
common that they are oriented to strengthen the ability of risk-prone societies to
withstand possible adverse future impact. However, there is a certain logical inter-
relationship suggesting that community “participation” enhances community
“ownership”. “Ownership” in turn leads to increased “capacity” or “competence”
and vice versa (Robertson and Minkler 1994). An emergency management that
invites interest group representatives to participate in a census-based collaboration
process by involving stakeholders changes risk-management behavior from a tra-
ditional public-meeting format to methods that involve relatively small groups of
people (Beierle 2002). By such an intensification of societal involvement public
participation is extended and deepened and will increase “capacity” on the individ-
ual and community levels as well. In this regard, the literature of disaster reduction
is full of information on the importance that women play in disaster risk reduction.
All too often women are not seriously incorporated in development decisions,
particularly in the preparatory process of defining the rules and regulations of the
decision-making process. They are often invited to sanction the already taken deci-
sions. Although it has been published for quite a long time, the Gender Terrain
of Disaster (Enarson and Morrow 1998) clearly indicates that one of first steps
towards an effective organizational and policy change has to reflect the realities of
women’s lives, an approach that no longer excludes 50 % of a society from devel-
oping planning decisions.
9.1 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) 411

But shifting the focus from the individual to the community to reach a
­ idespread behavioral change is best achieved by changes in the norms of ­acceptable
w
behavior at the community level. It turned out that the moment society is involved
as whole, changes are more likely to occur rather than if only individuals are
addressed. The envisaged increase in resilience is best achieved by enabling
­individuals and communities to identify the cause–effect relationship of hazards
and disasters as well as by participating in defining their specific vulnerability
exposure and by an integrated working out of solutions to those problems.
The level of competence achieved can be valued by assessing the links of per-
sonal elements (engagement, trust, social cohesiveness) in socioeconomic and cul-
tural contexts in strengthening:
• Social networks, social learning
• Capacity building
• Conflict resolution
• Community participation and stakeholder involvement
• Collaborative decision making
• Leadership and capability to assess the root causes
• Sustainability of the organizational structure
• Technical, operational, and financial resources allocation
• Identification of the social dimension of the root causes
• Accepting the role of seconded experts as mediating agents
Experience of disaster risk reduction programs all over the world indicates that it
is not reasonably possible to quantify the success ratio of community participa-
tion in disaster resilience. Such an assessment is considered not meaningful as the
dynamics and changes associated with “participation” are hardly to be quantified.
Therefore resort should be made to the above-given set of indicators. Thus a more
realistic picture can be drawn from the situation and the outcomes. Community
participation and empowerment have to be seen as a dynamic process rather than a
measurable static outcome.
Moreover programs on disaster risk reduction should not be designed far from
the places of risk, as this implies a theoretical—although systematically, technically,
and implementation driven—attempt. Such attempts often lack the inclusion of the
“real” needs of the exposed population. Even when a society is at high risk, does
this mean that it is helpless and lacks long-standing mitigation experience? Many
communities have gained much experience from the grass roots-level c­ risis reac-
tion. This approach is often referred to as a “bottom-up” process, because many
a solution comes from the community itself and not as a directive from higher
authorities. Disaster-stricken communities, although when they obviously were
disenfranchised by a disaster, are not unable and unwilling to provide locally
adoptable mitigation concepts. Therefore planners and managers that make full
use of citizen expertise and energy will be more effective improving the safety and
survival chances of their communities. Based on experience from the Northridge
earthquake, where it was observed that a combination of local activism coupled
with financial and organizational support from government and nongovernment
412 9 Community Awareness and Participation

agencies can be highly effective, FEMA integrated public and private ­partnerships
as compulsory in the current US “Earthquake Hazard Mitigation Handbook”
(FEMA 2002).
Community-based disaster risk management is an organizational and
­educational strategy to increase resilience through a set of community-oriented
measures. It is people and development oriented and focuses on prevention and
mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, and recovery from natural ­disaster
impact. The aim of CBDRM is to create resistant societies by reducing the
­probability of disasters through target-oriented risk reduction measures, to reduce
the social and economic consequences (death, casualty, injuries, direct, indirect
losses) from damage, while simultaneously increasing the coping capacities to
strengthen the recovery (ADPC 2006a).
The starting point to reach a sustainable level of disaster coping capacity is to
define what makes a society vulnerable and what indicators define the capacity
to withstand adverse effects from disasters. It is a well-known fact that people all
over the world have learned to adapt permanently to crisis, and with every crisis
they continuously come up with creative solutions (ADPC 2006b). Thus resilience
is something like a moving target, but realistically it may not be possible for com-
munities to achieve absolute resilience against hazards or other risk factors neither
in industrialized nations nor in developing countries (“zero risk is out of reach in
the contemporary world”). However CBDRM is a vital means to help communities
achieve a certain level of sustainability. The level envisaged should be defined on
indicators the stakeholders have agreed upon. Indicators that describe a disaster-
resilient society are:
• A function community organization
• A disaster risk reduction strategy with an all-hazard risk assessment
• An early warning system
• Knowledgeable people on the cause–effect relationship of natural disasters
• Trained manpower for risk assessment, rescue, and relief
• Defined escape routes and evacuation centers
• Medical services in disaster-safe places
• A disaster-safe main transport and communication system
• Sustainable water and power supply
• Functioning relationship between disaster-exposed societal groups and local
authorities
• Knowledge of risks and risk reduction actions
CBDRM moreover should have as a target to create a conducive although ena-
bling environment for locally adoptable risk reduction. This should include the
establishment of organizational schemes that allow independent forms of moni-
toring of the success ratio, generating objective judgment (not only on the side
of the experts), and measures to overcome the often inherent imbalance of power
between those who are recipients and those who are donors. Thus CBDRM should
be the central institution to initiate an active search for a best fit with the particu-
lar local circumstances of the risk-affected areas by providing tools and topics for
9.1 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) 413

a better understanding of the cause–effect relationship of hazard and disaster, for

defining ways and means to a sustainable risk reduction, to define supporters and
objectors, and to outline scientific and technical expertise required. Experience
from other risk-affected regions may also be included in the communal decision
making as well as transferring expertise gained to other risk-affected regions.
Moreover the decision should be targeted to achieve an equilibrium between
the “technically necessary” segments of disaster reduction and the “maximum
honoringˮ of the people’s concerns. Such an equilibrium can best be achieved by
broad involvement of the public representatives and an normative e­ qualization of
participants’ power (Renn et al. 1995). Regardless of the different experiences with
community-based disaster reduction, they all confirm that stakeholder ­involvement
proved to better address the needs of the populations at risk. The technical exper-
tise should be generally based on scientific evidence, elaborated independently,
neutral and transparent, and the personal, emotional, and social aspects of the
problem-solving mechanism should be brought in from the representatives of
the different social groups in a process guided by an external mediator. To solve
the dichotomy between science and politics, Beierle (ibid) proposes iteratively to
bridge both spheres to accommodate the social aspects as well as technology and
science. He points out that “technocrats argue that mitigation can best be achieved
by science-based tools like risk assessment, building codes, wh while the advo-
cates of the stakeholder involvement argue identifying the needs of the people at
risk is a prerequisite for a higher people motivation and reflects a much broader
the interests of the risk exposed.”
However, stakeholder involvement has also raised some concern that mostly
originates from the fact that for instance spatial planning and definition of rules
and regulations for natural disaster reduction generally refer to the technical and
operational sector. Therefore the critics emphasized that a too broad i­nvolvement
of too many stakeholders from all sectors of society may “water down” the
­evidence to a “mixture” of aspects that are technically easy and socially ­difficult
to define. The claim is that many “stakeholder[s] make inadequate use of ­scientific
information and analysis and are too ready to sacrifice technical quality for
­political rationality” (Beierle, ibid). Beierle could, however, prove from a num-
ber of environmental protection planning processes in the United States, that this
concern does not exist in reality and that an early and comprehensive stakeholder
involvement in general led to technically adequate decisions supplemented with
social aspects. There are no examples where community involvement resulted in a
low-quality decision.
As it turned out to be an effective measure of disaster reduction, community-
based and community-driven development projects have become an important
form of development assistance worldwide; the World Bank’s portfolio alone
is approximately US$7 billion. A review by the World Bank (Manzuri and Rao
2004) of the conceptual foundations and effectiveness of such community-based
programs showed that projects based on community participation often have not
been that effective in reaching the needs of the poor as planned. There is some
evidence that such projects, although they often created an effective community
414 9 Community Awareness and Participation

infrastructure, did not provide clear evidence of having reached the poor
­precarious sector. The reason is seen in the fact that most such projects are carried
out by external specialists that automatically cooperate with local elites, resulting
in getting the intimal project orientation out of focus. Several qualitative studies
indicate that the sustainability of community-based initiatives depends crucially
on an enabling institutional environment, which requires government commit-
ment, and on accountability of leaders to their community to avoid “supply-driven
demand-driven” development. External agents strongly influence project ­success,
but facilitators are often poorly trained, particularly in rapidly scaled-up p­ rograms.
The naive application of complex contextual concepts such as participation,
social capital, and empowerment is endemic among project implementers and
­contributes to poor design and implementation. The evidence suggests that com-
munity-based and -driven development projects are best undertaken in a context-
specific manner, with a long time horizon and with careful and well-designed
monitoring and evaluation systems.
Although there is quite some concern about the effectiveness of community-
based disaster risk reduction, the concept nevertheless proved a vital instrument of
disaster risk management. Community-based means the community and its peo-
ple are the central stakeholders and thus are to be comprehensively and actively
engaged in the identification, analysis, treatment, monitoring, and evaluation
of their specific risks. This means risk mitigation is based on the people’s expe-
rience on those making decisions and implementating disaster risk management
activities.
A handbook published by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (Abarquez
and Murshed 2004) identified seven sequential stages that can be executed by
­disaster risk managers to reduce future risks before the occurrence of a disaster or
after one has happened. Each stage grows out of the preceding stage and leads to
further action. Together, the sequence builds up a powerful and proved planning
and implementation tool:
• Selecting the Community: This is the process of choosing the most vulnerable
communities for assistance on risk reduction to be rendered should be based on
a predefined set of criteria.
• Understanding the Community: This step basically builds up a mutual, ­trustful,
and transparent relationship with the local people. By such relationship, the
general position of the social, economic, political, and economic aspects of the
community is understood.
• Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment: This is a diagnostic process to i­dentify
the risks the community faces and to define the potential of the people to over-
come those risks. The process involves hazard, vulnerability, and capacity
assessments. In doing the assessments, people’s perception of risk is considered.
• Participatory Disaster Risk Management Planning: In this step the people
themselves identify risk reduction measures that will reduce vulnerabilities and
enhance capacities. These risk reduction measures are then translated into a
community disaster risk management plan.
9.1 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) 415

• Building a Community Disaster Risk Management Organization (CDRMO): For

an effective disaster risk management a community organization that serves the
specific local requirements is indispensable. Therefore it is imperative to build a
community organization that includes representatives of all stakeholders Next to
the organizational setup training should also be rendered to the stakeholders and
the members of the organization.
• Community-Managed Implementation: The CDRMO should lead in working
out and implementing a community risk reduction plan. This should include
means to motivate all members of the community for their support.
• Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation: An assessment and evaluation
­strategy has to be institutionalized to secure a steady and unrestricted exchange
of information among all people involved in the project, as well as to lay the
base for a critical review of the achievements made. This project evaluation
serves as the factual base for designing future activities.
As the basic intention of CBDRM is to get all stakeholders involved in the mitiga-
tion process, automatically quite a large number of individuals and social groups
and political decision makers become part of the process. The actors in this multi-
ple stakeholder scenario can be divided into two broad categories:
Insiders
Those who are either affected directly by a disaster or those who have the
legal mandate to initiate and carry out the identified mitigation activities. This
­comprises individuals, families, representatives of the civil societies, as well as
public services and the private sector. Very often these two groups are assisted
by seconded external advisors. Indispensable to harmonize the different actor’s
­interests, expectations, and fears, is to have an organizational setup conducive
to the local situation: a “community disaster risk management organization.”
This organization is to act as the focal point of the management of disaster risk.
It ­moderates between the different stakeholders and those responsible for the
development decision making. Later it organizes and evaluates the implementa-
tion of the countermeasures. In order to establish effective working relations, the
­management main objective is to facilitate a broad consensus on targets, strategies,
and methodologies among the multiple stakeholders in the community.
Outsiders
The term “outsiders” refer to those individuals, organizations, and stakeholders
located within the community, but not directly risk exposed. Outsiders can include
the government departments and agencies, but also the private sector and other
agencies necessary to reach a consensus. Although they themselves are only indi-
rectly related, they should not be excluded from the process. Such groups often
have a great interest in reducing the community’s vulnerability, for instance, labor
unions or the business sector that employs many people in the area. Their role
can be to support the local efforts in reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing cop-
ing capacities for the longer term. They can do this through providing their own
416 9 Community Awareness and Participation

technical, material, financial, and political support that may be initiated as part of
their agenda. The management organization should include them from the very
beginning; but such incorporation should be based on an all-stakeholder’s con-
sensus. Often outsiders dispose a variety of financial and technical resources and
managerial expertise and even more important, often have great political influence
that may help to push forward the community priorities.
In countries where emergency management is well organized and technically
equipped to a high standard, the people mainly rely on help and support from
mandated authorities, however, the risk-exposed in developing countries very
often stand on their own in the case of an emergency. It is a well-known fact 90 %
of all immediate rescue operations are done by the people who have been affected
by a disaster themselves. Such help is often rendered by neighbors and volunteers
without any technical resources and plan. Thus emergency management created
the saying, “every mitigation is local,” which already points to the fact that mitiga-
tion without the involvement of the population at risk will hardly be successful.
In disaster risk management it became apparent that top-down approaches, when
standing alone, fail to address the specific local needs of vulnerable communities.
This assumption holds true especially for those countries where local emergency
management is poorly established and when implemented, the mitigation and pre-
vention measures often ignore local capacities and experience.
The key aspect of community involvement is its orientation on the sustainabil-
ity of a community. It aims at empowering people to address the root causes of
their vulnerability in order to change adverse socioeconomic and political struc-
tures into a sustainable paradigm of livelihood. There can be many reasons behind
the often recognized lack of sustainability of disaster reduction measures. Some
of them are the result of a lack of ownership, low participation, and a missing
empowerment of communities at risk. Unless the disaster risk management efforts
are not incorporating individual and community level, it would hardly be possible
to reduce the vulnerability and losses. There is therefore no alternative to an early
and comprehensive involvement of the people right from the risk assessment up to
the following decision-making strategies. Different experiences in disaster is the
rationale that the risk-exposed population has to be involved in any mitigation and
makes it indispensable to address the group’s particular demands. The only way to
achieve this can be done by an early and comprehensive involvement of all stake-
holders in the policy decision-making process. The reason why so many mitigation
actions fail is that too often those who are designing and implementing although
technically meaningful countermeasures are administrators that—often not com-
ing from the affected regions and often not speaking the local vernacular—rely on
recommendations from scientists and technicians but neglect the social dimension
of disasters. Moreover mitigation measures are often implemented that proved per-
fect in one location, but are not suitable for another, even when the region faces
the same type of hazard. For example, people regularly exposed to storm surges
at the coast have a different perception of this kind of hazard than people living in
narrow valleys of the Alps often threatened by avalanches in winter. So if a coastal
riparian is taking a winter holiday in the Alps, he may either be over-worried about
9.1 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) 417

avalanche risk or not even feel worried at all, due to lack of experience; the same
holds true for a Bavarian taking a holiday at the North Sea coast during storm
times.
As personal experience, education, and skills significantly influence vulner-
ability, effective hazard mitigation and emergency response begins with an under-
standing of the complex ways in which social, economic, and political structures
define the level of vulnerability. This understanding (Morrow 1999) can “only
be achieved, when planning starts at the local level and when it engages even the
most marginalized stakeholders in the process. Cultural norms regarding family
size and household composition vary throughout the world, influenced by eco-
nomic conditions, demographic trends and housing availability.” In most rural
societies technical and economic reasons still call for large extended families,
whereas industrialization and urbanization result in small-sized families. Thus
cultural differences can cause misunderstandings and mistrust between the disas-
ter victims and the emergency rescue workers. The situation is even more com-
plex in countries where people have to fight to make their daily living and do not
have enough resources left to consider the possibility that a disaster might threaten
their lives, even when they were complaining of the loss of lives from the last
event. Furthermore many such societies are strongly traditionally organized and
thus often rely on recommendations and advice from the elderly. Furthermore the
elderly often base their recommendations on ethnic values or traditional beliefs
rather than on a natural scientist’s or technician’s advocacy. For example when
Mt. Merapi (Java) was about to erupt in the summer of 2006, the local administra-
tion ordered the evacuation of the settlements on the flanks of the volcano. But
the local population rejected leaving the area. Leaving the house poses for many
agriculturally oriented societies serious problems. Mostly these people just own a
small hutch, made from local construction material, having a cow and a couple of
goats and some poultry. The moment they leave the village, they fear their houses
can be destroyed or no longer be protected against looting and their animals will
not get food and water. So within a couple of days, the family food basis and shel-
ter can vanish. Therefore at Mount Merapi the locals were asking for the Sultan
of Yogyakarta, as their spiritual and political leader to come and tell them what
to do (“We only go, if the Sultan tells us to go”). Soon after the Sultan was at
the location, the people evacuated the area without any delay. But such conflict-
ing situations not only occur in developing countries. In Germany on the occasion
of different Elbe floods (2002, 2005, 2013) experience showed, that although the
water level was steadily rising, a large number of residents rejected strongly evac-
uating their houses, with the consequence that they had to be evacuated later under
much greater technical effort. This situation triggered a discussion whether the
German public administration should be allowed to have the additional costs for
the evacuation reimbursed by the residents when emergency management admin-
istrators must get their orders enforced in due course, therefore asking police or
military forces to execute the order. The outcome is in many cases a big riot or
social turmoil. This stress situation often develops although both groups have the
same objective: to save the people from the potential disastrous event. So the basic
418 9 Community Awareness and Participation

problem is not the evacuation process itself and its reasoning for doing so, the
main problem is that both sides speak different “languages” and do not understand
each other: automatically getting into a verbal juxtaposition.
Even in areas that are regularly at risk from natural disasters, the population is
very often not alert enough to their personal risk. An Australian assessment (EMA
2010) on the status of public engagement in disaster prevention revealed that:
“Very often the individual do[es] not see a personal risk, very often the advices
given by the authorities, are not in line and understood with resident’s values and a
lack of understanding of hazard safety messages.”
The study concluded that:
[T]he content of communal engagement must be focused on clarifying to what kind of
risk a household is exposed, to make the house-owners and their families understand
the hazard behavior they are living in, to understand what limitations the national/local
emergency management services have in protecting life and properties, to learn what eve-
rybody can do on their own to reduce their specific vulnerability without affecting their
normal life style.

The study worked out six principles that responsible disaster mitigation should
comprise:
• Localize programs and activities where possible.
• Develop a general plan for enhancing natural hazard preparedness in a locality
or region that provides a template for detailed planning and implementation and
a roadmap for evaluation.
• Develop a small suite of programs/activities that focus on intermediate steps
(processes) along the pathway from risk awareness to preparedness.
• Wherever appropriate, consider an all-stakeholder integrating approach to plan-
ning, program development, and research.
• Conduct and report frequent evaluations of programs and activities continually
to enhance the evidence base for what works in particular contexts in commu-
nity safety approaches.
• Seek to optimize the balance between central policy positions, agency-opera-
tional requirements, and specialist expertise, and community participation in
planning, decision making, preparation, and response activities.
The study furthermore came to the conclusion that:
Public awareness is arguably the least and most poorly funded mitigation meas-
ure in Australia. With very few exceptions, it is undertaken as a limited auxiliary
activity to the disaster management initiatives, rather than as a sustained strategic
measure to raise public consciousness and understanding of hazards, risks, impacts
and minimization.
A responsible risk management has to be aware of the technical/administrative
and social conflicts. In order to develop a higher level of resilience the following
measures should be implemented for the sake of the population at risk.
• Define the mitigation efforts as a process.
• Identify and involve all stakeholders in the decision-making process.
9.1 Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) 419

• Involve well-experienced experts and the powerful political leaders.

• Institutionalize roundtables.
To achieve the desired community resilience the method of community-based dis-
aster risk management has proven its general practicability. The Asian Disaster
Preparedness Center (ADPC 2006b) emphasizes that any disaster risk reduction
strategy should be based on the following two aspects:
• CBRDM should become an integral part in all sectors of national disaster risk
reduction policies.
• Governments should make local participation compulsory in all planning and
implementation of the national risk reduction programs

9.2 Risk Reduction Education

An earthquake on September 20th, 2009 in West Sumatra killed more than 1000
people and injured many more in the city of Padang, a city that is highly prone to
earthquake hazards. The Indonesian National Tsunami Warning Centre (NTWC)
in Jakarta immediately identified the magnitude (7.9) of the quake and that no tsu-
nami developed. However, the strong tremor caused widespread panic and fear of
a tsunami among the people of Padang. Field research in Padang (GITEWS 2010)
was carried out to uncover public reaction to the event. The study focused on the
first 30 min after the tremor and interviewed 200 individuals. The study revealed
that the first information on the event reached the authorities in Padang within
5 min via the Internet. As the earthquake left several local cellular telephones
unable to function, the Padang mayor could receive the information only via text
message. It took another 25 min until the warning was disseminated by the mayor
to the general public by radio. The study revealed that there was no communica-
tion between the mayor and the Emergency Control Centre in Padang. Both actors
operated separately from each other. As official information was absent in the first
30 min, the vast majority of the people were without guidance. The information
spread mainly based on rumors. Over time, the radio news gradually found its way
and more and more people went back home. Meanwhile half of the people had
evacuated the low-lying coastal areas within 15 min. The majority of the people
left the city mainly due to the strength of the quake they felt. Locally the evacua-
tion underwent was unorganized. Panic caused massive traffic congestion as most
people tried to escape on motorbikes and cars. The designated evacuation routes
turned out to be not large enough to channel the masses. Moreover the people did
not consider vertical evacuation a meaningful option. Those who did not follow
the evacuation advice claimed different reasons for doing so. An inquiry of 102
randomly selected people (GITEWS ibid) revealed two thirds of the (interviewed)
persons were aware of a tsunami risk (Fig. 9.2). They acted according to visual
inspection, official information, and an individual risk estimation. About 40 %
rushed to the sea to see whether the water was retreating, which convinced them
420 9 Community Awareness and Participation

1% 12%
5%
3% 39%
8%

7%

9% 15%

Fig. 9.2  Padang people’s reasons not to evacuate (Based on: GITEWS 2010)

to refrain from evacuation. Another 20 % of the people hesitated to evacuate either

to protect personal belongings, because of operational difficulties (traffic jam),
or for fatalistic reasons. Only a minority of 1 % confessed not to having received
any information, and 10 % claimed other reasons. The overwhelming majority of
those interviewed acted on information and took their personal decisions on tech-
nical evidence. The Padang inquiry proved that information based on facts, ren-
dered in time, and that is trustworthy is a key factor for an effective early warning.
Nevertheless the situation in the city of Padang during evacuation did not fully
correspond to the evacuation scheme envisaged.
A disaster such as the earthquake in Padang can affect people’s lives and live-
lihoods in almost all parts of the world. And some societies are vulnerable and
others not. Furthermore, within communities different households may be exposed
differently and even within households the levels of vulnerability of individual
household members may vary. There is also a great disparity in vulnerability
between nations and communities, even when settling the same geographical loca-
tions, as the rescue and rehabilitation efforts for hurricanes proved that hit the
island of Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and Haiti). After a disaster event, many
of the societies and individuals at risk, especially those who live in far remote
regions, such as the people on the island of Leyte (Philippines) when Taifoon
Haiyan hit in late 2013, often do not have access to emergency service provid-
ers. Moreover before a disaster, different parts of a society are differently prepared
even for regularly occurring hazards such as floods and tropical cyclones.
The findings from Padang, Haiti, and Leyte underscore the importance of pro-
viding specific and targeted education to enhance community capability to with-
stand a natural hazard with minimal harm and loss of property. From empirical
analysis to the impact of natural disasters it could be proved that vulnerability
has its causes at the macrolevel as well as at the microlevel as national-level fac-
tors including “good governance” and “educational setup” are the main determi-
nants defining vulnerability. At the local level, “income” turned out to be the main
9.2 Risk Reduction Education 421

predictor of vulnerability. Thus advocacy, education, and awareness are becoming

the substantial cross-cutting components that aim at all possible actors. The core
pillars for awareness raising are approaches based on natural and social science
evidence that have to be condensed to standard messages, tools, and guidelines
and that are in accordance with the disaster risk reduction efforts as shaped by the
Hyogo Framework of Action (IFRC 2011a, b).
There are a large number of studies dealing with the impacts of education
on social behavior in crisis situations. It especially turned out that there exists a
strong relation between female education, for instance, on lowering fertility and
population growth and the family exposure to external stress (Lutz and Samir
2011). Almost universally, women with higher levels of education have fewer
children thus better education is associated with lower mortality, better health,
and different migration patterns. However, this assumption that education (in gen-
eral) will lead to a higher sensitivity to risk reduction related to natural disasters
does not automatically hold true for the exposure to natural disasters. Nevertheless
the basic relation that education leads to a higher income (Lutz et al. 2008) and
that educated people are more aware or better informed of the risks as well as on
ways and means of mitigation and adaptation has become a well-accepted fact.
Although only few studies (Faupel et al. 1992; Striessnig et al. 2013; IFRC 2011a)
have thus far considered education in the analysis of vulnerability in relation to
natural disasters, it is nevertheless largely known that education is a prerequisite
that strongly defines vulnerability in general. In the United States it was found
that participation in disaster reduction training programs strongly defines individ-
ual and family disaster awareness. The authors found that pre-disaster education
significantly improves a household’s disaster preparedness, for example, in iden-
tifying safe escape routes, planning for what to do in the event of family sepa-
ration, as well as on adaptive response measures such as stored food and water,
battery-powered flashlights and radios, or securing items around the house, and a
car with a full tank of gasoline. The authors conclude that disaster education is a
powerful dimension to prepare a population for a disaster and that it makes much
more sense to just empower people in the form of better general education than
specifically to increase disaster resilience whereas education mostly probably will
indirectly influence preparedness. A study by Samir (2013) even went a step fur-
ther and tried to differentiate between the influence of education and of income
and social status on the preventive risk behavior of village communities in Nepal.
They studied the damage due to floods and landslides in terms of human lives lost,
animals lost, and other registered damage to households. At all levels and under
all statistical models, the results showed a significant effect of more education on
lowering the number of human and animal deaths. With respect to the wealth indi-
cator, the inquiry did not reveal such unambiguous results. Nevertheless the study
gave a clear causal relationship that at the community level, the educational attain-
ment of the young adult’s statistically significant explanation for an improved
coping capacity. Education was seen also to play a substantial part in bringing
leadership to work effectively with the local people, and to communicate with
higher authorities. Thus the educated ones were better prepared to address their
422 9 Community Awareness and Participation

specific concerns and to participate with their experience in community develop-

ment, including issues related to flood and landslide risk reduction. In addition,
educated people could have an opportunity to diversify their income by taking
nontraditional jobs that were not affected by such events.
Inasmuch as emergency situations are atypical events for most people, it seems
meaningful for individuals to gain appropriate skills that they could recall and prac-
tice in case of emergency. This finding requires external support until the reactions
have become automatic. The recognition of the triggering moment of an emergency
event can only be reached when often rehearsed. Numerous studies on people’s
reaction in crisis situations have shown that repeated practice of skills and behav-
iors and the recognition of the situations lead to an automatic performance. There is
a strong, although theoretical, link between practicing sets of emergency skills and
their respective performance in a crisis. Researchers have shown that emergency
and disaster education as well as prior experience with the disaster hazard corre-
lates with the chosen adaptive disaster responses. In repeatedly seeing the connec-
tion between two events, people learn to correlate a predictable relationship between
them. Learning a new skill involves more than just the cognitive understanding of the
relationship between two events. Skills require the rapid physical and mental percep-
tion and understanding of a set of specific circumstances, coupled with automatic
performance of the skill itself. Skill learning therefore requires the ability to follow
instructions plus to recall experience from former emergency situations. Emergency
researchers have recognized repeated performance of a skill to be the most criti-
cal component of skill learning. In this regard it has to be acknowledged that the
causal relationship between training and practicing disaster reduction behavior has
only been dealt with in a few studies. Most of the findings given above are based
on theoretical background analysis. A tracking back of actually taken actions to the
respective training given is hard to prove. However, the large numbers of reports on
educational programs, actions taken, and positive outcomes demonstrate that the suc-
cessfulness of education to increase resilience can hardly be ignored (FEMA 1994).
Programs to increase public awareness and education for disaster reduction
aim at applying existing knowledge of disaster reduction to local situations. Such
actions are oriented to the populations at risk that normally comprise a variety of
social groups of different age, gender, and ethnicity. Immigrants, homeless, disa-
bled, unemployed, and marginalized are also common in such groups. Awareness
raising has the task of bringing all these people together, to mobilize and encour-
age them to initiate their own activities. This can best be achieved by informing
them about the hazards to which they are exposed. As the information is normally
technical and knowledge based it has to be transferred into a vernacularly under-
standable language. The people at risk can usually quite well describe the prob-
lems they faced in the past, but they are seldom able to describe their needs and
demands as they do not understand the complex cause–effect relationship of haz-
ards and their potential impact on them. Several approaches have been success-
fully run to increase public awareness for disaster risk reduction. IFRC (2011b)
listed training and education programs that have been successfully implemented,
among them the following.
9.2 Risk Reduction Education 423

Campaigns
The campaigns are in general large-scale national training programs, such as cam-
paigns to refrain from smoking, on child immunization, or the appeal to use seat
belts. The main objective of such type of campaigns is to manage a change in
social behavior on all levels of society. Campaigns are successful when they are
built on consistent, easily formulated messages that are often repeated by trustwor-
thy organizations and run by representatives of the public or the civic sector. Most
memorable are standardized messages that are built around a single, unifying, and
enduring slogan that may be implemented by:
• Publications, posters, newspapers or magazines, information cards, flyers,
brochures
• Oral presentations, education modules, slide presentations
• Performing games and competitions
• Audio and video materials
• Web pages and activities
• Social media and telecommunication
The advantage of such an approach is that it reaches a large number of people in a
short time. On the other hand it must be carefully planned and requires an excel-
lent organization and much patience Moreover there is generally no direct success
to be seen.
Participatory Learning
People can best be motivated by approaches in which they are the main actors.
Together with experienced moderators, the participants can work out risk reduc-
tion countermeasures based on assessments of their respective vulnerabilities and
in accordance with their coping capacities. The focus of participatory learning is
to incorporate the risk-exposed populations in a dialogue and to call on them to
bring in their specific experience. Participatory learning can be applied at all social
levels from the level where the people are directly exposed to a disaster, and the
level of the local communities that are responsible for implementing risk reduction
strategies, up to the national level where such strategies are worked out and initi-
ated. Elements for participatory learning can comprise:
• Action-oriented research hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessment, with a focus
on the assessment of the coping capacity
• Disaster management planning
• Defining means and actors for risk reduction measures
• Joint elaboration of local emergency evacuation and simulation drills
• Monitoring drills and improving the evacuation plans
According to the Red Cross Guidebook the advantage of this approach lies in
its incorporation of the local disaster-exposed people and calls to identify their
respective fears and needs. It invites the people to bring in their expertise and
develops their personal ownership. The disadvantage of the participatory approach
424 9 Community Awareness and Participation

is among others that it normally takes much time and effort. Moreover it often
raises high expectations by the participants on the mitigation capabilities of the
local authorities that in general require the approval of higher levels.
Informal Education
Informal education takes advantage of moments often in the aftermath of a disas-
ter event to stimulate thinking and engagement of people in order to increase their
safety and resilience. Informal education involves
disseminating of standard messages but with the flexibility to accommodate the needs
and concerns of specific local audiences.This is particularly effective because it offers the
chance to get those directly involved who are highly at risk. According to IFRC (ibid)
informal education in communities and schools turned out to be the “most flexible of all
approaches” with respect to agenda setting, addressing a wider public, and the point of
time after a disaster. The tools that can be used for informal education are more or less the
same as those used for campaigning. Education modules that have proven its effectiveness
are:

• Presentation by experts
• Brainstorming that encompasses the disaster experience of individuals or spe-
cific social groups
• Moderator-guided discussion in small groups
• Demonstration of case studies, supported by disaster impact simulations and
role play
The method has the advantage that it helps organizing, sensitizing, and mobilizing
communities. Thus it is building up relationships between different social groups
and higher level authorities. Moderated and expert advocacy
works equally well with adults, youth and children especially when it comes to a cross-
generational dialog. Nevertheless the point of time often generates a highly euphoric
momentum for the risk-changing behavior, a momentum that later can often not be ful-
filled by the local authorities or by the participants themselves. Even when externally
moderated, many in the workshop-defined requirements turn out to be unrealistic, creating
much disappointment.

9.3 Examples of Community Disaster Risk Management

9.3.1 Indonesia: Banda Aceh an Example for a Peaceful

Settling of Dispute

The tsunami of December 2004 that hit the northern part of Sumatran Aceh
Province and destroyed almost its entire coastal area had its biggest impact in
the Aceh capital, Banda Aceh, where about 80 % of the houses and of the physi-
cal infrastructure, including the only port facility in the region were completely
destroyed. More than 100,000 people lost their lives in the city of Banda Aceh
9.3 Examples of Community Disaster Risk Management 425

itself. The tsunami eroded the fertile topsoils of the area and covered the land with
several centimeters of debris and rubble, leaving 23,000 ha of rice paddies and
120,000 ha of arable land no longer usable; altogether 300,000 land plots that hold
confirmed land titles were destroyed. Furthermore all geographical orientation
points, landmarks, and other markers were lost, along with the land title documen-
tary of the Banda Aceh communal administration. Thus none of the landowners (in
the case where he and his family had survived the catastrophe) was able to prove
his claims. Immediately bitter conflicts arose among the landowners. The problem
was how to establish an instrument that could settle these disputes in a meaning-
ful, juridically sound, and socially acceptable way, knowing that the landowners
had lost everything and therefore were definitively unable to present documents
to prove their claims. And on the other hand, the settlement of disputes procedure
should also guarantee that no illegal claims could be presented, especially as dur-
ing the different political rule over the area and a more than 20-year-long military
control over Aceh Province, many former land titles had been lost due to legal or
illegal land reforms. The task of the Aceh administration was to establish such a
process based on a dialogue that gave the plaintiffs a chance to sue for their claims
objectively. Such a dialogue process has a long-lasting tradition in Indonesian his-
tory and is called “Adat,” functioning as a kind of common law and has its legal
base for administering such form of justice in the Islamic tradition. “Land is
given by God and no one has the right to waste it,” defining land as thus a com-
mon good. Based on that interpretation of the laws, the lawyers of the plaintiffs
proposed a broad and comprehensive discussion forum. But after several long and
very dramatic discussions no result was achieved. So the elders one day proposed
to mandate one lawyer to settle the dispute. The lawyer invited representatives of
both parties to a closed session, not before inviting all members, relatives, and
friends of the filed case to a great party. And it took less than a day and the dispute
was settled. The solution was that the party who was strongly benefiting from the
settlement spent a considerable amount of money to restore a tsunami-demolished
mosque, an offer “no good Muslim” can ever reject. In the long run, the money
was taken to pave a parking lot of a new supermarket (Arskal Salim 2010).
The Banda Aceh example clearly demonstrates that it is not the administrative,
technical, or scientific setup that defines the living environment of a region, rather
the geographical, cultural, and traditional relations and socioeconomic conditions
that make a region for the people a place to live. The society is a moreover defined
by individuals or groups of people with personal and operational relations sharing
the same like-minded interests, and having the same cultural heritage and political
expectations and fears. Even when the society is made of different ethnic groups
the patterns of relationships can enable its members to benefit in ways that would
not otherwise be possible on an individual basis; both individual and socially com-
mon benefits can thus be distinguished, or in many cases found to overlap. Their
overall activities and interests lead to develop a social, economic, and technical
infrastructure that may be threatened by external impact such as a natural disaster.
The 2004 tsunami induced an economic crisis that threatened the existence
of the entire Maldives nation. It was not the impact form the tsunami itself that
426 9 Community Awareness and Participation

created this crisis—the impact was comparably limited—it was the fact that in the
aftermath the tourism sector collapsed totally. This forced the former government
to create a “Sovereign Wealth Fund” with money earned from tourism to be used
to purchase land elsewhere for the Maldives people. The money for land acquisi-
tion would be taken from the income produced from the more than 600,000 tour-
ists every year that made up to about 30 % of the gross domestic product of 2008.
The then-acting President Mohamed Nasheed’s statement on the “Future of the
Flood Threatened Maldives Islands” was the first political leader’s address to the
world that there are places on Earth where the climate-induced sea-level rise has
shown the first serious signs. The water level rises steadily and starts threatening
free existence on the islands, as in many other small island states: Tuvalu, Tonga,
Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, Funafuti, and others. There is furthermore the well-known
example of the island of South Talpati offshore Bangladesh, as the first islands
that vanished from the Earth’s map; the same will happen with the Tegua Atoll of
Vanuatu. The same happened in Papua New Guinea where the government evacu-
ated the 980 inhabitants of Carteret Island in 2005 (Jacobeit and Mettmann 2007).
The more than 1000 islands forming the State of Maldives lie less than 1 meter
above sea level, making the 380,000 inhabitants (and by the way the capital Male
is with its 36,000 inhabitants the most densely populated area of the world) most
vulnerable from flooding. But not only is the land size diminishing every day, also
the ingress of sea water is destroying the island’s fresh water reservoirs.
Thus the prime minister addressed his people that in the long term, “the
Maldives will not survive as an island state.” He urged his country that they have
to face one day leaving the islands and seeking new homes somewhere. He there-
fore started to negotiate to buy land in the Indian Union, in Sri Lanka, and as well
in Australia. The government of the Tuvalu Islands did the same. It negotiated with
Australia and New Zealand to get shelter in those countries. But the Australian
government will only accept up to 90 Tuvaluans every year, as it claims that there
is no real risk from sea-level rise to Tuvalu and the Tuvaluans are coming as “eco-
nomic refugees“ and not for climate reasons. For Maldivians, India and Sri Lanka
pose the first choice for evacuation, as they share the same language, culture, and
ethnic heritage, especially with the Indian federal states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
But the Maldivian population did not accept this “vision” and were afraid of being
forced to leave the country. Therefore after heavy riots and political turmoil and
following the opposition’s charge that the Nasheed government was no longer able
to govern the country in the way the people were demanding, Nasheed resigned in
February 2012.
The Maledives example shows impressively what can happen when a rea-
sonably founded and seriously thought over and meaningful oriented strat-
egy failed, most probably due to not incorporating the population at risk in the
decision-making process. Instead they were just presented a government’s deci-
sion. Those who were deeply affected by the political decision, were not given the
chance to express their views and especially in that sector overwhelmingly deal-
ing with their everyday life. A broad and extensive discussion should have been
institutionalized, giving everyone the feeling her fears, experiences, and “vision
9.3 Examples of Community Disaster Risk Management 427

on livelihood” were properly taken up by the authorities. Next to the individual,

representatives of all social groups (religious leaders, the political opposition, rep-
resentatives from industry and science, etc.) should have been gathered and given
ample time to express their views at a national roundtable. It is clear that such a
discussion would have taken much effort and much time, but the time problem
was then and is still today, not threatening the island’s existence overnight. The
government should have given such a socially comprehensive discussion enough
space although respecting the fact that the rising sea level allows no way out other
than a change in policy. Thus the fears of the population were neither focused on
the technical matters of the sea-level rise nor on the financial aspects, but found
its expression in the field of emotions and feelings; in the last consequence is was
formulated on behalf of the Islamic belief and tradition.
But the problem of the “Maldive Vision” of resettling in other places also has
an international dimension. A question that immediately arose was, what kind
of political status will such persons be attributed after resettling. Are they still
Maldivians, who are now living in India or will they be given Indian nationality
or will they be treated as emigrants or ethnic minorities. The International Law on
Refugees as it is laid down in the Charter of the United Nations distinguishes only
between “refugees” and “internally displaced persons” (IDP), who are forced to
leave their country or parts due to military, racial, or ethnic conflicts. Sometimes
such refugees were forced to leave their country for decades (Afghanis settling
in Pakistan in the 1980s) and for that time the people do not have any interna-
tionally accepted political representation. In such cases the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) takes over representing these peoples. A
similar representation exists for IPDs. The basic legal definition on what forms a
nation requires, according to international law, a nation’s territory and a nation’s
population. But when territory is flooded due to rise in sea level and no terri-
tory exists anymore, the basic definition of what a nation is, is no longer valid.
Although the United Nation Environmental Program (El Hinnawi 1985) intro-
duced the term “climate refugee” into the public debate, there is no internationally
accepted legal authorization for the UNHCR to take care of the climate refugees.
The question for UNHCR is whether the refugees left their home deliberately or
whether they were forced to do so. In the case of the Maldives the idea was to
seek shelter in another country. The decision was supposed to be definitively taken
voluntarily and not a subject of “forced migration.” The United Nations since
then has several times put the notion on the agenda of the United Nation Security
Council but neither the five permanent members nor the industrialized nations, as
well as many advanced countries, were inclined to take up the matter, although it
was stated that already in 1990 the amount of “climate refugees” was estimated to
be about 25 million, many more than those refugees of wars and conflicts (Myers
2001). The IPCC stated in 1990 that next to the climate-induced sea-level rise also
desertification, soil erosion, and heat waves will make “climate refugees” a sub-
stantial problem of the future. In the Rio UNCED Agenda in Chap. 12 the notion
of “climate refugees” was already made (see also Stern 2007). In order to object
to the reluctance of the industrialized states the governments of the affected island
428 9 Community Awareness and Participation

states formed the Alliance of the Small Island States (AOSIS) to raise their voices
in order to fight for a worldwide reduction of greenhouse gases. They argue that
they release almost no CO2 into the atmosphere but are those who suffer first.

9.4 Community and Volunteers in Disaster Risk

Management

The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 (UNISDR 2005) acknowledges that
“civil society, including volunteers and community-based organizations are vital
stakeholders in supporting the implementation of disaster risk reduction at all lev-
els.” The role of volunteerism in any disaster risk management strategy turned out
to be of particular significance when oriented to strengthen community-related
relief and recovery actions. UNISDR has addressed the role of volunteers (UNV
2007) and reiterates “all too often” disaster risk management neglects the many
contributions volunteers can make, either in assessing the population’s vulner-
ability or in using the imminent strengths to increase resilience. The central func-
tion of volunteers is not to act as the risk assessors, decision makers, or mitigation
measure implementers, but to support the capacities of national and local actors in
mitigating and coping with natural disasters. Both society at large and the individ-
ual benefit from volunteerism that thus can help to strengthen trust, solidarity, and
reciprocity among citizens by purposefully creating opportunities for participation.
The UN General Assembly defines volunteerism as “undertaken of free will, for
the general public good and where monetary reward is not the principal motivating
factor” and recognized that “volunteerism proved an important component of any
strategy aimed a poverty reduction, sustainable development or disaster prevention
and risk management in particular to overcome social exclusion and discrimina-
tion.” That will help to achieve the development goals and objectives set out in the
UN Millennium Declaration.
Acknowledging that volunteerism is a fundamental source of community
strength and resilience, the United Nations Volunteers Program (UNV) has been
initialized to promote volunteerism to support peace and development. The pro-
gram is to encourage local and national disaster risk managers to integrate vol-
unteers into the local risk mitigation through a wide range of activities, including
traditional forms of mutual aid and self-help, formal service delivery, campaign-
ing and advocacy, as well as other forms of civic participation. The UNV strategy
therefore is oriented to achieve a broader and deeper integration of volunteerism
into disaster management strategies by identifying ways and means that volunteers
can assist local disaster risk management. The United Nations Volunteers Program
fosters building a “spirit of volunteerism” in community participation in disaster
risk reduction strategies by an inclusion of volunteer resources in the local miti-
gation measures by establishing locally adopted specific mechanisms that enable
9.4 Community and Volunteers in Disaster Risk Management 429

engaging active stakeholder participation. This furthermore calls for the initiation
of specific community-based training programs that indispensably consider the
role of volunteers as appropriate to enhance local coping capacity.
At the national level volunteerism can among others assist to:
• Support the establishment of a common awareness and understanding of disas-
ter cause–effect relationship among key stakeholders, including local authorities
and local communities.
• Support governments in preparing, coordinating, and implementing crisis-sensi-
tive development and recovery plans.
• Advocate for the recognition of imminent experiences the disaster-affected soci-
eties have in disaster mitigation.
• Facilitate the development of institutional capacities of national and/or local
authorities.
• Strategically plan, negotiate, coordinate, and mobilize the support of local vol-
unteers and civil society organizations.
• Provide coordination, operational, and technical support to district administra-
tions, nongovernmental organizations, and volunteer-involving organizations.
At the community level volunteerism can among others assist to:
• Create a space to engage, empower, and mobilize community members at local
disaster risk management efforts.
• Raise awareness, promote preparedness, and strengthen the local coping
capacities.
• Assess hazard, risk, vulnerability, and capacity assessments.
• Develop local disaster plans that feed into district and national disaster plans.
• Mobilize community contributions (other volunteers, in-kind and other
resources) for the implementation of local disaster mitigation countermeasures.
• Facilitate the inclusion and participation of affected communities, especially
women and youth, in the planning and implementation of disaster risk manage-
ment plans.
• Mobilize extended volunteer support to other districts/regions.
The program generally calls for developing national volunteer infrastructures,
which could include the development of specific volunteer legislation and national
volunteer schemes, the operational framework for mobilization, and coordinate the
activities of volunteer-involving organizations, promote good volunteer manage-
ment, and advocate the value of volunteers. Only when these policy forums are
functioning accordingly, will disaster risk reduction be effective, ensure a good
dissemination of information, and substantially increase public awareness.
In Germany a well-established volunteer service institution, the “Technisches
Hilfswerk” (THW 2014) for decades has been committed to support people
in need all over the world. The THW is administratively attached to the Federal
German Ministry of the Interior (BMI). More than 80,000 volunteers are enrolled,
430 9 Community Awareness and Participation

but only 1 % of them are actually employed by the organization. Such an organi-
zational setup is unique worldwide. And the status of volunteerism of the THW
is its main objective and as such is highly appreciated and accepted in German
society. The volunteers are stationed in almost 700 localities all over Germany.
The specialists of THW cover all sectors of modern crisis intervention and relief
and rescue operational demand. World famous are the sniffer dog groups that
in many cases were able to rescue victims from under heaps of earthquake rub-
ble. The technical equipment is state of the art and the people are well trained
and many of them have years of experience. The THW specialist in her normal
life is employed and in different private jobs and is released from work by law.
THW has been involved in nearly all the bigger catastrophes of the world, like the
tsunami in Banda Aceh, the earthquakes in China and Haiti, and with the many
drought events in Northern Africa. But THW also helped in in Germany nearly all
the catastrophes including the large floods of years 2002, 2003, and 2013. In the
2013 flood catastrophe the specialists executed 1.6 million hours of rescue work
in strengthening dams with sandbags, erecting flood bridges, movable protection
dams, and providing electricity, water, and medical services. But they were also
involved in planning and administering the rescue operations.
A similar situation holds true for the volunteer programs that are rendered
under the auspices of the European Union. Although there is a vast array of defini-
tions and traditions concerning volunteering, the common denominator throughout
Europe is that “wherever people engage in activities to help each other, support
those in need, preserve our environment, campaign for human rights, or to initiate
actions to help ensure that everyone enjoys a decent life—both society as a whole
and the individual volunteers benefit and social cohesion is significantly strength-
ened” (EU-EAC 2010). The European Union therefore ranks voluntary action
as an important component of the strategic objective of the European Union of
becoming a competitive and dynamic, knowledge-based economy.
More than 100 million Europeans engage in voluntary activities, meaning that
every third European claims to be active in a voluntary capacity and about 80 %
feel that voluntary activities are an important part of democratic life in Europe.
But the European Union does not institutionalize volunteerism itself under its
administration, but is engaged to orient and standardize volunteer initiatives of its
member states strategically. Some member states already have well-organized vol-
unteering landscapes whereas others lack broad support by the public. It turned
out that such countries with a longstanding tradition of volunteerism such as the
Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom, or Austria are well established,
but especially those countries that entered the Union late, are lacking a broad
acknowledgment in society. There is no uniform regulatory framework defining
volunteerism across the member states. Three distinctions can be made, states:
• Where a legal framework relating to volunteering is in place (Belgium, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, and Spain)
9.4 Community and Volunteers in Disaster Risk Management 431

• That do not have a legal framework, but where volunteering is regulated within
other existing general laws (Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom)
• Who are in the process of developing a legal framework for volunteering
(Bulgaria and Slovenia)
The European Union identified funding to be the major obstacle to running a vol-
unteer institution effectively. The main source of financing is from public funds. In
some EU countries, however, this trend is starting to change. The state’s capacity
to fund the social sector has been declining and nongovernmental organizations
began gradually taking over. Simultaneously, the proportion of financial resources
coming from the private sector has been marked by a steady growth. However, the
levels of financial resources will also in future present a significant challenge for
the majority of voluntary organizations across the European Union. The economic
value of volunteering varies greatly in the member states ranging from less than
0.1 % up to 5 % of the gross domestic product.
But more than the economic benefits, voluntary activities are focused on deliv-
ering social impacts to individuals, marginalized societal groups, or local commu-
nities that are deprived of free access to goods and services by a disaster. Many of
these impacts contribute directly to a number of key objectives set out in EU poli-
cies such as promoting:
• Social inclusion and integration
• Social cohesion and social solidarity
• Self-satisfaction and dignity
• Involvement of citizens in local development
• Civil society development and democracy
providing:

• Education and training

• Support to the integration into the labor market
• Skills and competences
• Support to local sports clubs
Concerning an institutional development of the volunteer sector in the European
Union the following challenges were identified. Although overall the level of vol-
unteering has increased in most of the EU countries, the main difficulties seem to
be related to the changes affecting the nature of voluntary engagement, as well as
a mismatch between the needs of voluntary organizations and the aspirations of
the new generations of volunteers. Factors include inadequate knowledge of the
needs of the volunteer organizations, the general preference for short- rather than
long-term voluntary commitments, and that most of the volunteers appear to be
less willing to take on decision-making responsibilities. A dramatic increase in the
number of voluntary organizations results in a spread of volunteers across a large
432 9 Community Awareness and Participation

number of organizations. Moreover the increasing professional nature of field

applications means new challenges to the volunteers regarding the management of
human resources and sometimes very specialized skills and expertise.
These increasingly demanding tasks create a tension between the required pro-
fessionalization and the ability of volunteers to meet these demands, and their
willingness to do so in an unpaid fashion. Moreover the European Union sees a
certain risk of a political instrumentalization of the voluntary sector. In some
countries the sector is increasingly seen as an instrument for tackling problems or
providing services that the state cannot provide any more. These difficulties are
expected to increase due to the economic crisis. A fundamental lack to recruit “the
right volunteer” is furthermore hampered by a general lack of recognition by soci-
ety. The European Union therefore emphasizes that voluntary activities become
more broadly accepted by the public by a change in rewarding volunteers for their
participation and thus becoming a matter of attracting new volunteers. One step
towards this can be a higher validation of nonformal and informal learning from
the volunteer’s application home and abroad by society in general, by the private
sector, as well as by state employers. This change in paradigm will also lead to
abolishing stereotypes and negative connotations still existing in some civil socie-
ties. National strategies declaring “honoring appointment a social task” is seen by
the European Union to be the central target to further develop volunteerism in its
member states.

9.5 Early Warning Systems

Every year, on the first Wednesday in February at 1:30 PM all 7800 warning sirens
are tested all across Switzerland (FOCP 2014). The aim is to ascertain the opera-
tional readiness of both the “General Alarm” and the “Water Alarm” sirens. The
population is notified beforehand through announcements on the radio, on TV, and
in the press. The sirens give a regular ascending and descending tone, which lasts
for 1 min, and is repeated once after a 2-min interval. Where necessary, the sirens
can continue to be tested until 2 PM. Then from 2:15 PM to 3 PM the “Water
Alarm” signal is tested in those areas in the proximity of dams. It consists of 12
low continuous tones lasting 20 s and repeated at 10-s intervals.
In former times tolling a bell was a sign, understood by everybody that some-
thing extraordinary had happened. It was for centuries the usual way to warn peo-
ple of approaching enemies, a fire, flood, and other disasters. The warning was
originally based on information by eye-witnesses, for example, a fire brigade
located in a forested area. As the messages are spread by mouth, the farther away
people live from the location of the disaster, the longer it will take to reach them.
Today the warning of an impending disaster is in principle not very different,
although the technology has advanced significantly (Ferruzi 1997). The warn-
ing systems we use today rely on measurement techniques, mostly from physics.
Quantitative and mostly visual inspections of the changes in nature have been well
9.5 Early Warning Systems 433

established for more than 100 years, but quantitative assessments such as in mete-
orology date back to the 1940s, quantitative seismology to the 1960s, and quanti-
tative volcanology is only about 30 years old. But the overwhelming breakthrough
in early warning came with remote-sensing techniques that began when the first
satellites started orbiting the Earth in 1970. Since then Earth observation science
and technology developed extremely rapidly, so that together with the advances
made in communication technology, world societies are provided every day with a
multitude of information from any part of the globe. Whereas formerly a disaster
could only be identified by visual evidence, today there are numerous networks
installed all over the world that permanently record any changes in nature that
may turn out to be hazardous. Together with the advances in disaster identification
the science of risk prediction has also developed to provide the expression “early
warning” is not only used to describe operational means to warn people of natural
disasters but of all kinds of dangerous circumstances such as epidemiological dis-
asters or even complex sociopolitical emergencies.
There are many emergency managers who define “early warning” as not to be
restricted to the technical system to “toll the bell” but comprises also all actions in
the forefront to identify the onset moment of the disaster as well as all actions that
are to follow in the aftermath. Moreover the information provided should initiate
sector-specific counteractions to be taken in advance to mitigate the anticipated
risks. The UNISDR (2009) terminology (see Annex A), early warning is defined as
“the provision of timely and effective information, through identified institutions,
that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their
risk and prepare for effective response.” To be effective and complete UNISDR
recommended an early warning system should comprise four interacting elements
(UNISDR-PPEW 2005):
• Risk knowledge
• Monitoring and warning service
• Dissemination and communication
• Response capability
Although this set of four elements appears to have a logical sequence, in fact
each element has direct two-way linkages and interactions with each of the other
elements. The second element, the monitoring and warning service, is the most
well-recognized part of the early warning system, but experience has shown that
technically high-quality predictions by themselves are insufficient to achieve the
desired reduction in losses and impacts. Failures in early warning systems typi-
cally occur in the communication and preparedness elements. The human fac-
tor in early warning systems is very significant (Twigg 2002). This was true of
Hurricane Katrina which affected New Orleans in late August 2005, although in
this case there was the additional failure in respect to risk knowledge.
The primary goal for early warning systems is to protect lives and property.
This goal can be achieved by giving a warning signal before the disaster strikes to
give the people at risk ample time to bring themselves to safe places. Such fore-
casting comprises information on the place where the event is expected to strike,
434 9 Community Awareness and Participation

Table 9.1  Assessment matrix to forecast probability of a disaster event according to time and
location (Based on Feruzzi ibid)
Type of Hazard Can occur Lead time of occurrence
at location
Short term Medium Long term
(days/hours) (weeks/month) (years and more)
Earthquakes Yes No No Yes
Extreme weather Yes Yes Almost No
Flash floods Yes Yes No Yes
Forest fire Yes Yes No No
Landslides Yes Almost Almost Yes
Plain floods Yes Yes Almost No
Volcanic eruptions Yes Almost Yes Almost
Storm surges Yes Yes Almost No

the time of onset, and the severity that is to be expected. The main obstacle in dis-
aster forecast is that even when the data collection and interpretation technologies
are already highly advanced still only a few natural hazard types can be predicted
with sufficient reliability. Table 9.1 gives a general impression of the probability to
forecast a disaster event.
A reliable instrument in early warning is the daily weather forecast. Since a
number of satellites have been geostationary placed or are polar orbiting the Earth
(Meteosat, Eumetsat, and Geos) weather forecasts increasingly improved. It now
possible to collect information on the changing weather on a very large scale in
the form of images of cloud distribution over continents and oceans, while a mul-
titude of ground stations continuously report on surface temperature, humidity,
wind, and others. Thus weather forecasting has reached a sufficient level of reli-
ability in regard to the next two to three days, although the medium- to long-term
forecast is still problematic. The ability to generate a weather forecast effectively
is mainly influenced by the factors of surface and air temperature, wind direc-
tion and speed, precipitation duration and amount, and by the local and regional
sky conditions, as well as by the barometric pressure changes. Moreover weather
observations are influenced by local terrain to varying degrees. This means a good
knowledge of local effects on the weather regime is necessary to interpret and
apply the observations correctly.
On the other hand, a scientifically meaningful and reliable forecasting of nat-
ural hazards is problematic; especially the prediction of earthquakes is still not
possible. A study by Shearer (1999) stated that even from the surely best known
region of earthquakes in the world (San Andreas Fault) where the most sophisti-
cated instrument networks have been deployed, it is thus far not possible to pre-
dict the next big earthquake with a certain level of reliability. From earthquake
records the next major earthquake was to be expected for 1990; but up to now it
has not occurred. The chance to predict an earthquake even within a short term is
poor, due to the fact that there are a multitude of the earthquake precursing seis-
micity, local changes in the electrical or magnetic fields, changes of groundwater
9.5 Early Warning Systems 435

levels, local emissions of radon, carbon dioxide, and other gases along fault lines.
As such indicators also occur independently of earthquakes they do not pose a reli-
able measure that can be used to forecast such a hazard. In the case of the big
earthquakes (Loma Prieta, Northridge, Wenchuan, etc.), “All such indicators have
never all occurred together or have been observed by instrument networks.” Still
we do not know enough about the source of earthquakes, neither on the processes
that occur along the plate boundaries nor about the exact meaning of a numerous
earthquake precursors. So geoscientists are still very reluctant to claim “prediction
of earthquakes is possible.” There is “Every reason to believe that through technol-
ogy, our disaster-warning capacity will improve and that soon it will be possible
to organize a timely response to all natural risks” (Ferruzi ibid). From geological,
geophysical, and geomorphological evidence and from historical data, it is thus far
possible to identify areas at risk that have a higher probability for natural disasters
(e.g., earthquakes) than others. For the purpose of emergency management such a
prognosis is fundamental as it opens the chance to work out risk reduction strate-
gies and to implement them accordingly, but such knowledge will not prevent peo-
ple from being hurt in the case of a disaster.
Figure 9.3 is based on findings from “Day-Curve” (Day 1970), who “proposed
that the tangible benefit of a flood warning system could be estimated as a function
of warning time.” The concept has been adopted for the purpose of the GITEWS
Tsunami Early Warning Project and was presented by Joern Lauterjung on occasion
of the annual GITEWS conference in June 2009 at GFZ, Potsdam. The concept is
adopted here to outline a decision support system for the assessment of the natural

Fig. 9.3  Decision support system for a probability assessment of a “volcanic eruption” (Based
on Day 1970)
436 9 Community Awareness and Participation

disaster probability of an example of a volcanic eruption. The graph demonstrates

very generally that the assessment of the probability for the onset of volcanic erup-
tion fundamentally differs from say, the prediction of a raffle jackpot. Although nat-
ural disaster probability can be assessed from basic information of geological and
historical evidence to say, 80 %, the ultimate success in a raffle is when the last
ball has fallen. Thus as a general rule, the algorithm indicates that from internation-
ally accessible information a prediction can be made that is a good approximation
to reality. From evidence it is today already possible to define at least the area at
risk and time horizon. With an increase of the international disaster monitoring sys-
tems, a real-time transmission of information and more sophisticated disaster prob-
ability simulation models, the probability assessment success ratio will definitively
increase, although such a risk assessment is more directed towards formulating risk
reduction strategies than serving the needs of a local early warning.
Following the tsunami of 2004 the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and
Recovery (GFDRR) of World Bank (World Bank 2006) and the United Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR 2005) analyzed the econ-
omy of Early Warning Systems that are in operation in Asia countries (Subbiah
et al. 2008). Studies quantifying the effectiveness of early warning systems (EWS)
have formerly been carried out mostly on flood warning systems in the United
States.
The cost–benefit relation of EWS for selected Asian countries was calculated
according to their input costs of:
• Scientific risk assessment and technical requirements to generate forecast
information
• Institutionalizing the system and making it operational (training, capacity devel-
opment running costs)
• Enabling communities to take up forecast information and respond
appropriately
in relation to the maximum possible loss (PML). From this the actual dam-
age costs of a disaster event (in the case of a successful early warning) were
deducted = actual early warning benefit. From this the costs for operating the
EWS were deducted = total EWS benefit.
Example:
US$100,000 (PML) minus US$50,000 (actual damages) is equal to US$50,000 (ben-
efit); minus US$10,000 (operational EWS costs) is equal to the total EWS benefit of
US$40,000

The probability of the forecast accuracy was taken for short-term forecasts of
less than 10 days by 90 %; that means the forecast would be correct in 9 out of
10 cases, whereas for seasonal, long-term forecasting an accuracy level of 70 %
was assumed. The economic benefits from successful warning were calculated by
multiplying them by a factor of 0.8 (9–1/10), because there are 10 possible occur-
rences. In one of ten cases, however, the warning was assumed to fail. The pos-
sible losses from such “wrong” forecasting was deducted from the benefits due
to a “correct” forecast. The calculation furthermore included the return rate by
9.5 Early Warning Systems 437

simple multiplication. The calculations were made based on the disaster impact.
For this, worst-case scenarios were used when robust and reliable data were miss-
ing and such cases could be assumed to be representative also for the future. In
cases where reliable data existed, such as on floods in Sri Lanka, the damage of
a 50-year flood was calculated to be 5 % for an annual flood, and for a 10-year
flood a damage reduction of 25 % was calculated. The next step was to assess the
factor of damage reduction due to an early warning. The study assumed the dam-
age reduction factors shown in Fig. 9.4 for household, agriculture, livestock, and
official buildings.
The benefits were calculated according to the damage scenarios for selected
Asia countries.
Bangladesh (tropical cyclone) US$40.0 for every US$ spent
Sri Lanka (flood) US$0.9 for every US$ spent
Thailand (flood) US$1.8 for every US$ spent
India (drought) US$2.8 for every US$ spent
Vietnam (tropical cyclone) US$104.0 for every US$ spent
Regional tsunami forecast US$200.0 for every US$ spent

Although the benefits calculated differ a great deal, they generally fit into fig-
ures that have been published before by the World Bank and Columbia University
(Dilley et al. 2005) according to which successfully disaster prevention can result
in damage reduction ranging between 1:5 to 1:7 US$. A similar figure was given by

Fig. 9.4  Assumed damage reduction factors due to successful early warning for Asian countries
(Based on Subbiah et al. 2008)
438 9 Community Awareness and Participation

the Canadian Public Safety Agency on the “Manitoba Red River Flood Prevention
Program” (APEGM 2014) which revealed a loss reduction ration of 1:8.
The great difference in figures for Asia is seen to have its origin in the highly
different scenarios chosen that were based on very different datasets. Nevertheless
the study came to the conclusion that in order to lower the costs for EWS systems
a regional system would be able to optimize distribution of observation systems,
reducing capital investment requirements and the implementation, as well as the
annual operational costs Such transnational collective EWS systems should also
integrate warning services for high-frequency and low-impact hazards includ-
ing heavy rainfall local floods as well as low-frequency high-impact events such
as earthquakes, tsunamis, and or volcano eruptions. The example of the “Regional
Tsunami EWS” that is set up by Australia, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia can serve
as a showcase on how early warning can be of benefit to risk-exposed societies.

9.5.1 The German-Indonesian Tsunami Early

Warning System (GITEWS)

Tsunami early warning in the Indian Ocean became an issue after the December
26th, 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which killed more than 170,000 in the
Indonesian province of Aceh Darussalam alone. The main scientific and techno-
logical challenge for the installation of such an early warning system in Indonesia
was the tectonic setting of the so-called Sunda-Arc structure, an active continen-
tal margin that closely parallels the western coastline of Indonesia resulting in
tsunami arrival times of less than 40 min after the occurrence of an earthquake
(Rudloff et al. 2009). The challenge was to develop a technical and scientific con-
cept that allows reducing early warning lead times down to 5–10 min escape time.
Previously used systems, such as the Pacific Tsunami Warning System, are not
optimal for Indonesia due to its geological situation along a subduction zone. If
a tsunami is generated here, the waves will, in extreme cases, surge up the coast
within 20 min, leaving only very little time for an early warning. This limiting fac-
tor was therefore the basis of the concept for the whole system.
For assuring a rapid recording of seismic parameters (Fig. 9.5) a dense network
with monitoring stations, consisting of 160 seismic sensors all over Indonesian ter-
ritory and sea floor seismic stations and buoy systems, tide gauge stations, were
deployed as close as possible to the plate boundary, including a grid of real-time
GPS crustal deformation monitoring devices. Introducing GPS buoys is a new
invention that enables getting rapid information of a plate’s deformation mecha-
nism, seen as the trigger for tsunami generation. The dense seismic monitoring
system is at the heart of the GITEWS project and is the cornerstone of the early
warning system. Together with a set of GPS buoys it is possible to register any
seismic activity that may lead to a tsunami. The interpretation of the data is man-
aged through a series of newly invented, sophisticated modeling techniques and
decision-supporting procedures to provide the exact epicenter, the focal depth, and
9.5 Early Warning Systems 439

Fig. 9.5  Concept of the GITEWS tsunami early warning communication system (Courtesy
­Rudloff et al. 2009)

magnitude of the earthquake within a couple of minutes. After having identified

an earthquake and tsunami the data are permanently completed with new incom-
ing information from the sensor systems that allow a continuous upgrading of the
probability assessment. A special evaluation software, called SeisComP 3.0 has
been developed at the German Research Centre for Geosciences (GFZ) for data
processing and tsunami simulations. The program has meanwhile been taken up by
almost all Indian Ocean riparian nations. Several hundred pre-cast calculations on
a probable tsunami generation were carried out in order to guarantee as fast as pos-
sible an assessment. In general such a calculation cannot be carried out within less
than several hours. The interpretation programs now check whether the incoming
data have already been calculated and then can immediately present the result.
In order to reach the people at risk (“last mile”) as quickly as possible, the pop-
ulation along the shores of Northern Sumatra were trained how to react properly.
For this GITEWS and the Indonesian Center for Earthquake Monitoring (BMKG)
institutionalized the cooperation of the different national, local, and private stake-
holders to organize the emergency management and to implement specific preven-
tion measures. Thus the project has laid the foundation for the national disaster
management strategy in Indonesia. Furthermore a series of training and education
programs was developed to raise awareness of tsunami and earthquake response.
These activities, termed “capacity development,” have been an integral part of
increasing the efficiency of the system. Scientists, disaster managers, national and
local government, and local people underwent intensive training in what to do
before, during, and after an earthquake and what special prevention has to be taken
to cope with a tsunami. In order to increase tsunami resilience special training
and education programs were carried out in three test regions (Padang, Sumatra;
440 9 Community Awareness and Participation

Cilacap, South Java; Kuta/Sanur, Bali). For these cities, specific emergency man-
agement strategies were developed targeted to strengthen the understanding of the
operating mode of the warning system and on the definition of hazard and risks.
The training concluded with a compilation of the different hazards into one syn-
optic hazard map and to work out recommendations as a basis for future infra-
structure planning. At the three test locations communication means (sirens,
loudspeakers, police announcements, and radio and TV programs) were installed,
respectively, initiated. Moreover in all locations local disaster management organi-
zations (DMOs) were established and trained and given clear mandates in the
warning process. Ultimately, the entire sequence from a warning up to the evacua-
tion of the coastal area was drilled with thousands of inhabitants.
A Tsunami Warning Centre was established by the Indonesian Agency for
Meteorology and Geophysics (BMKG, Jakarta) and went into operation in
September 2007, just in time to successfully prove its capabilities when evaluating
the earthquake parameters of the Bengkulu quake on September 12th. The center
was able to identify a moment magnitude of 7.9 based on 25 stations within 4 min
and 20 s, leading to the first tsunami alert ever disseminated by an Indonesian
institution. In addition to the technical training and academic education which
is of importance to operate such a system, GITEWS offers substantial capacity
building programs. To ensure a permanent and independent operation of the warn-
ing system a public–private partnership model was established. Following this
model BMKG was given the responsibility for the nationwide tsunami warning.
The GITEWS project was funded by the German government. The pro-
ject was led by the GFZ and the BMKG although many German and interna-
tional partners contributed substantially to the success of the warning system,
mainly the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and the Marine Research (AWI),
the German Aerospace Center (DLR), the GKSS Research Centre and the
Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), the German
Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), and the Leibniz Institute for Marine
Sciences (IFMGEOMAR). The main international partner was the United Nations
University’s Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS).

9.5.2 Katwarn “Use of Early Warning Systems”

The Katwarn (“catastrophe warning“) is a Germany-wide concept to provide early

warning for individuals, social groups, and companies on all kind of risk from
natural, technical, epidemiological, and weather-related hazards or infrastructure
failure (KATWARN 2014). The system furthermore provides recommendations on
how to best address the identified risks. Katwarn is conceptualized as an additional
dissemination tool for disaster occurrence information generated by local emer-
gency management authorities (police, fire brigades, emergency services, etc.).
The challenge of Katwarn was to have an operational system that reflected the
state of the art of linking various information logistic technologies with market
requirements. Thus it is now possible to help reduce the information chaos that
9.5 Early Warning Systems 441

often occurs during crises and disasters. The information is specifically tailored for
the local risk situations based on the postal codes of Germany and is rendered via
e-mail, fax, Internet, and smartphones and delivers advice on appropriate conduct
to people wherever affected, in their home, office, or when out and about, and the
so-called “last mile” in civil protection is overcome. Unlike previous approaches
that mostly focused on how to identify a risk, Kartwarn aims at identifying infor-
mation needs of the populations at risk and offers information logistics asking,
“Who must know what and when in order to act properly.” Katwarn was developed
by the German Fraunhofer Institute on behalf of the public-sector insurance com-
panies in Germany (Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft) and
has meanwhile been successfully implemented in quite a number of German cities
and districts. The insurance companies are providing the system and the technical
infrastructure to administrative districts and urban districts.

9.5.3 Hurricane Early Warning

The multitude of severe hurricanes in the North Atlantic alone cause billions of
US$ of economic loss and kill hundreds of people every year in the Caribbean and
along the southern and east coast of the United States of America (USNHC 2014).
The 13 cyclones of year 2005 alone generated a loss of more than US$150 billion
and killed 2800 people in the region.
The many concerns about hurricane risk led in the last century in the United States
and in the Caribbean to institutionalize a hurricane assessment network. In the last
decades there were many efforts to even further strengthen the monitoring and fore-
cast capacity under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
and in cooperation with United States National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Agency (NOAA). For example, in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean NOAA has
established the National Hurricane Center and mandated the official body to issue
tropical cyclone warnings for the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico, and the
Central Pacific Hurricane Center is responsible for the Pacific Ocean from 140° west
longitude to the International Dateline. The purpose of these organizations is pre-
paring for and issuing forecasts and warnings of all tropical cyclones in the areas of
interest. For this, specific extraterrestrial satellite observational platforms including
land-based radar were installed to monitor sea surface temperatures, complemented
by aircraft radar reconnaissance flights as well as upper-air observations from so-
called “flying meteorological stations.” NOAA furthermore operates Doppler radar to
track tropical cyclone paths as well as monitor weather conditions both at the sur-
face and in the upper atmosphere. Weather radars are able to locate exactly the areas
of precipitation, calculate its motion, and estimate its type (rain, hail, etc.) and the
amount, and to forecast future positions and intensity. Doppler radar is capable of
detecting the motion of rain droplets in addition to intensity of the precipitation. Both
data can be analyzed to determine the structure of approaching storms and hurricanes.
Radar imagery monitoring during tropical cyclones is among the most important as it
provides vital evidence from high-level (extraterrestrial) observation positions.
442 9 Community Awareness and Participation

Worldwide the assessment is mostly based on the information provided by the

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES 12, 13, 15) that fol-
low geosynchronous orbits and are stationed over the west and east coasts of the
United States and cover South America or from Meteosat-9 and 10. These opera-
tional spacecraft are located at 0° providing visible and infrared image data that
are disseminated by Eumetsat or Eumetcast-America. The ocean surface topog-
raphy is measured by the Jason-2 altimetry satellite that provides high-precision
reference measurements of the ocean surface topography. Furthermore NOAA’s
mission is to conduct basic and applied research in oceanography, tropical mete-
orology, atmospheric and oceanic chemistry, and seawater acoustics. All over the
world weather services such as the German Weather Service (DW) or the Royal
Observatory in Hong Kong regularly monitor weather conditions and track storm
movements by the visible and infrared spectra. The aim is to reach a better under-
standing of the physical characteristics and processes of the ocean and the atmos-
phere, both as a separate and as a coupled system.
The hurricane risk statements issued provide details of the storm’s impact on
the area such as the onset of winds, rainfall, and storm surge. They also call on
the local emergency managers to start appropriate preparedness actions by pro-
viding specific information on evacuation preparations and on locations where
emergency shelters are to be placed. In addition NOAA operates its own weather
radio providing 24-h official weather information. The internationally agreed-upon
Saffir–Simpson hurricane scale on windspeed is used to measure the hurricane’s
intensity (see Sect. 5.2). The scale is a five-class rating based on a hurricane’s
sustained windspeed and provides reliable indications that allow an estimation of
potential property damage and flooding expected along the coast from a hurricane
landfall. Hurricanes reaching category 3 and higher are considered major hurri-
canes, whereas category 1 and 2 storms are, although dangerous, require constant
monitoring and often also preventive measures. Four different alert categories are
distinguished:
• Tropical Storm Watch is an announcement that tropical storm conditions (sustained
winds of 39–73 mph) are possible within the specified coastal area within 48 h.
• Tropical Storm Warning is an announcement that tropical storm conditions
(sustained winds of 39–73 mph) are expected somewhere within the specified
coastal area within 36 h.
• Hurricane Watch is an announcement that hurricane conditions (sustained winds
of 74 mph or higher) are possible within the specified coastal area. Because hur-
ricane preparedness activities become difficult once winds reach tropical storm
force, the hurricane watch is issued 48 h in advance of the anticipated onset of
tropical storm force winds.
• Hurricane Warning is an announcement that hurricane conditions (sustained
winds of 74 mph or higher) are expected somewhere within the specified coastal
area. Because hurricane preparedness activities become difficult once winds
reach tropical storm force, the hurricane warning is issued 36 h in advance of
the anticipated onset of tropical storm force winds.
9.5 Early Warning Systems 443

In order to be able to track the many tropical cyclones worldwide and over time,
each storm is identified by a name, beginning each year with A and ending with Z.
The names given were female names until 1978. Then the system was abolished
and alternating male and female names are in use. The names for year 2015 were
already fixed in 2008 for the Atlantic Ocean starting with A (Andrea) to (W) for
Wendy, and for the Pacific Ocean the names start with A (Alvin) and end with Z
(Zelda). The names for the years until 2018 are also already fixed.
The central aim of the warning centers is to track adverse weather changes that
may lead to hurricanes by an effective use of all available science and technologies
to provide accurate and timely warnings and advisories on forecasts for hazard-
ous weather conditions. The degree to which loss of life or harm can be reduced
is dependent on how people receive the risk information and how they interpret
the message to take the necessary decisions for protection. But it turned out after
many hurricane warnings that the information provided was not used as intended.
The problem starts when the forecasters at the warning centers, the local offices,
or the local emergency managers create the message. Those who create the mes-
sages are in general technical people, whereas those the message concerns are lay
people who only want their life and property safeguarded. Both groups are speak-
ing different languages and are experiencing a broad range of social backgrounds.
Although the forecasters are in general formulating their messages in technical
terms, based on scientific evidence and operational facts, the information receivers
are often unable to understand the message content (see Sect. 9.3). Risk informa-
tion that is not understandable and that does not make transparent the cause–effect
relationship of a probable hurricane track and its envisaged consequences creates
mistrust and leads to a lack of trust in the hurricane risk assessment capacity in
general. The next obstacle is via which information channels the message is to
reach the populations at risk. The media have a responsibility to transfer informa-
tion but also are highly interested in raising public interest often by overexaggerat-
ing news. A study carried out for the US National Weather Service (Demuth et al.
2012) therefore recommends that the partners in the warning system develop a cul-
ture of hurricane reduction responsibility by:
• Building up an understanding of each other’s needs and constraints
• Ensuring formalized, yet flexible mechanisms exist for exchanging critical
information
• Improving risk communication by integrating social science knowledge with
design
• Testing and evaluating the message’s reception with intended audiences.

9.5.4 Warning Chain

Table 9.2 gives an example of an effective alert communication system that is

mainly based on the Australian Emergency Agency Manual No. 38. Extended by
personal experience.
Table 9.2  Australian alert communication system (Courtesy Australian emergency agency manual no. 38)
444

Telecommunication Advantages Disadvantages

Telephone network (fixed wire) Network already in place, versatile, direct communication, Only in fixed locations, vulnerable to physical
Network designed to handle normal ­ allows question and answers, reliable and stable network, ­network failures, disaster affected have to call,
traffic load; congestion can occur in case low cost equipment, system can be extended to fax, uses system can be overloaded in case of emergency,
of emergency lines and satellites system needs intensive maintenance
Cell/mobile phones High mobility, international roaming, GIS/emergency limited battery capacity, net congestion p­ ossible,
Should not be relied upon as the only ­message add-ons, large distribution, very personal and coverage limited to network distribution, no
communication system direct information system, low cost equipment, uses lines ­broadcast capability
and satellites
Facsimile Low cost equipment, messages can be read, answers can Paper necessary, system must be in operational
be formulated in sentences, messages can be stored, maps mode, congestion possible, long messages take
and graphs can be transmitted, transmission to multiple much time, system cannot receive a message
addresses possible, easy to operate, widely used in homes, while transmitting, congestion may occur when
offices, schools, hospitals, and emergency centers ­destination is busy
Satellite communication Equipment small and light, ready to operate, low-cost Limited battery capacity, net congestion possible,
equipment, reaching a large area, messages can be coverage limited due to network distribution,
9

received by cellphone, individual messages and broadcast ­satellite system can be affected by the disaster
messages, versatile, voice and optical messages, message
storage system, user friendly system widely distributed,
user can be located with the system
Personal computer Equipment small and light, ready to operate, low-cost Limited battery capacity, net congestion pos-
equipment, reaching a large area, messages can be sible, coverage limited due to network distribu-
received, individual messages and broadcast messages, tion, transmitting can be affected by the disaster,
versatile, voice and optical messages, message storage hardware limitations, extensive hardware neces-
system, user friendly, system widely distributed sary, technology advances can make the system
outdated, high cost of technology, system requires
IT skills
(continued)
Community Awareness and Participation
Table 9.2  (continued)
9.5

Telecommunication Advantages Disadvantages

Radio Flexible, messages can reach houses, cars, schools, Radio system must be operational, messages must
buses, no physical connection necessary, messages reach be understandable to everybody, message must
almost everyone, system is reliable and functional, be in time, radio messages must be formulated by
system widely distributed, message can be repeated emergency managers, messages often too general
often, messages tailored for local demand, messages for the individual problem, complex technical
clear and understandable, low cost of equipment, system
reaching large areas
Early Warning Systems

Print media Large distribution, medium is very cheap, medium is Medium comes (normally) one time a day, mes-
known to everybody, message can be read and stored, sage needs to be printed, message is normally one
message can be distributed to others, medium comes day old, messages need experienced personnel
regularly to be formulated, only one-way communication,
reader cannot raise questions, messages give only
generalized info, no direct communication pos-
sible, reaction of affected ones cannot be assessed
Sirens Direct and event-related alert possible, fast and local, People have to know what messages the system
loud, technically reliable and easily established will transmit, system can generate panic, reaction
of the people cannot be assessed, system depend-
ing on power supply, systems often stolen, too
many failure alerts make people not listen
445
446 9 Community Awareness and Participation

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Chapter 10
Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural
Disaster Risk Management

10.1 Science and Technology

10.1.1 The Role of Science and Technology

Progress in the science and technology of natural hazards and of related coping
mechanisms have made it possible over the past years to introduce significant
changes in our response to natural hazards. Science is a systematic approach of
collecting knowledge about nature and condensing and synthesizing that knowl-
edge into testable laws and theories, whereas technology is a term referring to a
collection of techniques and the knowhow to make practical use of them. Science
and technology significantly empower humans to control and adapt to their natu-
ral environments and moreover comprise how scientific research and technological
innovation can affect social, political, and cultural values. In this context, it is the
current state of humanity’s knowledge of how to combine resources to produce
desired products, to solve problems, and fulfill their needs; it includes technical
methods, skills, processes, techniques, tools, and raw materials. When combined
with the term “disaster risk management” science and technology, it refers to the
state of the respective field’s knowledge and tools regarding the assessment of root
causes of natural disasters and their respective impact on the population at risk
(WCS 1998).
Scientists in disaster risk management should:
• Assess the natural condition conducive for disaster. Such assessments should be
carried out according to the state of the art and should comprise standardized
quality management. Science should be independent, verifiable, and transparent
and should be carried out under the assumption of a pre-set goal.
• Data collections, analyses carried out, and their interpretation should be under-
taken carefully and prudently and be comprehensively documented and pub-
lished accordingly. A problem with many scientific investigations is they are
often third-party financed and commissioned under a certain topic. This often
brings bias into the investigation of how far the financiers define the outcome
and to what extent the findings can be made openly accessible.

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 449

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2_10
450 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

• Scientists should define their role to be honest “brokers” for the issue.
• The findings should be published in a way that opens space for alternative inter-
pretations and carefully explain the implications and inherent limitations of the
findings to the public.
• Multidisciplinary approaches should be promoted to encourage cooperation
between the social and natural sciences, and draw lessons from local knowledge
and promote the inclusion of experiences from international cooperative pro-
jects as well as from aboriginal wisdom.
• Encourage a holistic approach to incorporating the socioeconomic aspect.
• Whenever possible, the orientation of the investigations should be shifted from
isolated local single-topic disaster assessment to a holistic assessment that
reflects the dynamic of time and space scales.
• Scientists should be aware of the potential of communication. They should not
restrict their responsibility to the scientific realm rather than take the chance to
disseminate knowledge. This nevertheless requires awareness and a respective
capability of transforming pure scientific wording into commonly understand-
able language. In many cases scientific outcome is given in very technical terms
(risk probability of 0.0001 %) but not in a way that is understood by those to
whom the information is addressed.
• The predictive power of science should be fully exploited to serve social needs
with candid awareness of the limitations of scientific predictions.
Science is according to the German sociologist Horkheimer (1968) in general
understood as the application of technical systems that uses theoretical proposi-
tions to analyze and interpret thematic fields, problems, and questions that are
thus far not understood. Such scientific findings are then to be tested in practice,
although the scientific approach is still of a strictly theoretical nature. Horkheimer
emphasized that this traditional ideal of science is primarily applicable to the
natural sciences. “Science in the traditional view seems to be neutral, independ-
ent, objective and a-historical and seems to be independent of person, place and
time. Thus natural science itself is mainly viewed as a purely theoretical enter-
prise of which the practical possibilities of application should normally consider
afterwards” (Klapwijk 1981). The restriction of responsibility only on the side
of data creation and interpretation, leaving the social application to “someone
else” is highly objected to by Horkheimer. He does not want scientists to define
themselves as a specialist “who only thinks about his own area and thus favor
the illusion of a neutral, unprejudiced science.” For him consequently science is
not neutral, and neither is scientific expertise. Scientists have to accept a funda-
mental responsibility towards society, because natural science functions within a
society. All tasks, the field investigations, laboratory analysis, and data interpre-
tation carried out by natural scientists are rooted in a pre-defined, specific, and
target-oriented context in a way to “organize society in a scientific way, based on
rationality and by reflecting the present state of technology” (Klapwijk ibid). “The
idea of science must entail a critical consciousness of the possible positive and/
or negative contributions to human life and culture. There is not one good reason
10.1 Science and Technology 451

for eliminating this social dimension from the idea of (natural) science, however
much of this understanding has been ignored in university education and in practi-
cal research.”
For natural scientists technical and naturally given facts generally govern the
way of thinking. The motto is, “Knowledge is power,” but Habermas (1968, 1994)
also called on the natural scientist critically to reflect, “Why and to what end he is
doing his research and how these interests relate to the social, economic, cultural
and ecological situation of the society” (Klapwijk ibid), thus making traditional
insights of natural “science an integral part of an all-encompassing social-critical
view.” Science must result in social responsibility (Horkheimer ibid) and empha-
sizes that theory always has to have a practical intent. He further points out that
the “acceptance of social responsibility is more than having a perspective on the
social relevance of social research.”
But it should be acknowledged that making natural science political can only
be achieved by a steady and iterative approach of both natural science and sociol-
ogy. Finally there was a lecture given at the University of Goettingen by a sociolo-
gist with the title, “About the Naturalization of Sociology,” indicating that it is not
a one-way approach of natural science towards sociology, but that sociology also
has to be open for “understanding nature” (see also: Beck 2011). The “responsibil-
ity of the natural sciences for society and politics cannot withdraw him from the
political problems and moral issues he is integrated in” (Klapwijk ibid). The natu-
ral scientist must make political decision makers aware how and to what extent
his or her findings can best be applied for the sake of society. On the other hand,
the responsibility of political government for science is also only an indirect one.
It is expressed, among others, in its care for the quality and financing of scientific
activities. In any case policy should not direct or even not stimulate anticipated
results to science, a sector that is for the time being highly controversial when we
thinks of the discussion on nuclear waste disposal sites all over the world. Science
has its own responsibility in the field of acquiring knowledge and in theory forma-
tion. The results of scientific activity could conflict with political planning, but this
may not prevent the scientist from doing his work.
From the above given examples of natural catastrophes, the Indian Ocean tsu-
nami, the earthquake at L’Aquila, and the another example of a landslide in the
small German town of Nachterstedt clearly document the mandate and respon-
sibility geoscientists are involved in risk identification and in increasing societal
resilience.
Thus in the aftermath of the Nachterstedt event, the German Society of
Geologists gave the following statement in a press release on the role and func-
tion of geoscientists in disaster situations. DGG made clear that the “Geologists
see their responsibility not only in hazard assessment and working out expertise
on the geologic factors leading to a disaster but also in disseminating this knowl-
edge to official regulators and to the affected individuals.” The partially dramatic
outcomes of natural disasters in Germany but also elsewhere require a much closer
cooperation and networking of science and implementation as is practiced thus far.
And that kind of cooperation should not be restricted to the aftermath of a disaster
452 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

but should be established in times of no disaster. These are the times where trust
and confidence can be generated with the population at risk, in order to keep up
their vigilance. The geosciences “are ready to take up their fraction of the social,
moral and economic responsibility” with their engagement in disaster mitigation.
But it should also be noted that not every aspect of probable disasters or a catas-
trophe that had happened should be commented on by the science sector. Although
acknowledging the fact that especially in the case of emergency, the public and in
this regard very often strongly demanded by the media, geoscientists are urged to
give their opinion. The geoscientists have to take this demand into consideration
and make clear that their responsibility is to work on the facts. But on the other
hand the geoscience sector should acknowledge that even with its scientific elabo-
ration, geoscience automatically becomes involved in the public debate and that
there is no escape possible. The geosciences have to be prepared for this and to
be open to take over this responsibility. But it has to make clear that it will restrict
itself to the natural facts, but this restriction does not mean that geosciences see
themselves not a part of society.
A striking example for the potential that science and technology have in order
to protect people against the impact from natural disasters is the December 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami. This event was the onset of recommendations made by the
British government (UK-DTI 2005) to propose an increase in science and tech-
nology in disaster prevention. The study came to the conclusion that, although
the international geoscientific monitoring networks provided ample evidence of a
major tsunamogenic earthquake shortly after the event, this information had not
been effectively communicated to decision makers. The reasons for this were man-
ifold, but in general, it originated in the very short distance between the epicenter
and coast as well as in the politically unstable conditions after 20 years of mar-
tial law over the Aceh province that hampered a rapid dissemination of informa-
tion. The study emphasized that science and technology can help to understand
the mechanisms of natural hazards and to analyze their potential risks. However,
the state of understanding of differing natural hazards and their potential impact
is not equal all over the world and significantly differs on the type of disaster.
Still there are significant shortcomings in understanding and information relating
to such potential catastrophic events. The scientific and technological disciplines
that are involved include basic physical and engineering sciences, natural, social,
and human sciences. They can provide a wealth of information to the policy envi-
ronment (sociology, humanities, political sciences, and management science).
Scientific knowledge of the intensity and distribution in time and space of natural
hazards, and the technological means of mitigation and prevention have expanded
greatly as well as in understanding of the root causes and parameters of natural
phenomena, in modeling techniques for predicting their behavior and in techno-
logical means of resisting their forces have increased considerably.
But the general assumptions drawn from this event are that the international
community has to establish better ways to communicate the scientific expert’s
evidence to the people at risk. The contacts among natural scientists, engineers,
and the political levels are still not established in a way that supports a social and
10.1 Science and Technology 453

economic oriented decision making. The contacts are too weak, too long, and
mostly not based on a mutual understanding. As long as scientists restrict their
role in assessing, analyzing, and explaining the causes of the disaster and do not
accept a social and economic dimension related to each disaster, the gap between
science and politics will hardly be bridged. What is necessary is to improve the
integration of science into disaster risk management by strengthening the mutual
understanding of the cause–effect relationship of natural disasters as well as the
establishment of robust communication lines. Moreover as many of the hazards
and disasters have global or regional impacts a deep and strong internationaliza-
tion of scientific cooperation is indispensable, especially concerning hydrometeor-
ological events, heat waves, tropical cyclones, drought, but also for transboundary
pollutants and other threats (nuclear, chemical, diseases).
The above-given examples clearly demonstrate how deeply natural science is
interlinked with the social, political, and economic sectors. This also holds true
for the geosciences in general and especially holds true for the geoscientists in the
field of natural disaster risk management. Many such examples can be found: all
of them prove that natural science in this field is not restricted to technical and
basic geological investigations and therefore cannot be regarded as not being an
“independent” factor. In this context it has to be stated that sociology as a science
for a long time did not accept any influence by natural facts (Plapp 2003).
In the past, advances in science and technology often proved to be of social
benefit (UNESCO 1998). But even when the output often has been admirable,
research and technology have to acknowledge that it rather should define itself
at first to serve the needs of society. Often the opinion among scientists prevails
that society shall have to accept the fact that science has to be free and independ-
ent. This common understanding has sometimes isolated scientists from the main-
stream of society, making it difficult for them to realize the true public needs.
Science must accept that even “basic, neutral, and independent” science has a
societal responsibility. On the other hand, there is much evidence that the policy
sector is sometimes in need of very urgent advice on technical matters, and has
often been unaware of the scientific expertise available due to mere lack of infor-
mation. A greater, broader, and deeper dialogue among scientists, policy makers,
and the public is needed in order to overcome the often-recognized opaque deci-
sion making. Such a pro-active involvement would bring scientists into policy
making with much benefit for society. Another source of hindrance for scientists
to develop social responsibility is the general perception of science. It is seen by
most scientists to be an intellectual property, resulting in a retention of informa-
tion, an attitude that hampers an open circulation of information as is required for
political decision making (cited in: UNESCO ibid.). Moreover in the course of
the globalization, the perception of science as a general “market good” worldwide
increased, challenging the traditional perception of science as a “public good”
with the consequence that already today there are signs that cutbacks in research
expenditure in welfare, education, health, and natural disaster risk-related sectors
have taken place, sectors that enjoyed broad acceptance when science was recog-
nized as a public good (UNESCO ibid.). In order not to duplicate the mistakes of
454 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

the past, UNESCO sees a serious risk that only the higher income classes will ben-
efit from the technological innovations and the poorer not or only less. This holds
true especially for those resources that in many countries have traditionally been
supplied through the subsistence economies: an economic approach that today is
referred to as the “commodification” of livelihood.
In 1998 WCS (1998) stated that the scientific influence on our daily life has
already increased and will ever increase. In order to comprehend this responsibil-
ity scientists should be aware that many findings in modern technology may create
fear in the people. Similar to the international debate on climate change there is
also in the natural disaster management sector a clear tendency that scientists and
technicians are more and more involved in political decision making. This involve-
ment leads to a political dialogue that can be described as “scientific or evidence
based policy” (Rayner 2006). Such a tendency undoubtedly leads to a “scientifica-
tion of politics” and on the other hand to “politicization of science” (Beck 2011).
The complex nature of many of the cause–effects of natural processes calls for a
deeper involvement of scientists especially in the sectors that are often “obscure,”
barely visible and are characterized by complex spatial, time, and socioeconomic
relationships with strong vertical and horizontal interdependencies and interrela-
tions. In this dialogue scientists are especially called on to work out model cases
and theories and to deliver multisectorial solutions based on scientific evidence.
But scientists should be aware of their specific function, to give orientation to
policy (WGBU 2014) but not determine it and that it should follow the empirical
science tradition. Scientists moreover should “reflect on the social consequences
of the technological applications of their work.” They are called on to “explain
the degree of scientific uncertainty or incompleteness in their findings and at the
same time, they should not hesitate to fully exploit the predictive power of science,
especially in cases of direct threats like natural disasters or water shortages.” WCS
(ibid) makes the following recommendations. Scientists and scientific institutions
should among others:
• Promote multidisciplinary approaches to research.
• Encourage cooperation between the social and natural sciences.
• Draw lessons from local knowledge systems and aboriginal wisdom.
• Take a realistic range of socioeconomic conditions and effects into account.
• Carefully explain the implications and inherent limitations of their research
findings to the public.
• Fully exploit the predictive power of science and be aware of the limitations of
scientific predictions.
WCS (ibid) reiterates that scientists should be more “proactive in policy mak-
ing.” This could be done by a sort of “science–policy agreement” that would
automatically recognize “the value of scientific advice, but also make clear that
such advice is but one ingredient in decision-making.” Such “contracts can also
define the performance standards by which the inputs of scientists” can later be
evaluated. Scientists can most effectively contribute to consensus finding when the
10.1 Science and Technology 455

involvement is formalized and long-lasting. Macfarlane (2012), newly appointed

head of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, stated the difference in under-
standing between geoscientists and engineers is that so far it is not an established
fact that “nuclear engineers can and do integrate knowledge of Earth processes
adequately.” Moreover more scientific communities should consider adopting an
international code of ethical conduct for scientists, as it has been already been
declared by many international organizations.

10.1.2 International Framework for Science and Technology

European Union
The European Union can serve as a model on the spectrum of how research and
development (R&D) can be successfully organized (UNESCO 1998). Europe is
the second most important scientific power in the world after the United States.
Although the percentage of investment in R&D remained in the European Union
at about 2 % of the GDP for decades, the absolute amount of money spent has,
however, increased significantly. Nevertheless there are quite a number countries
in the Union where the percentage of R&D expenditure is stagnant or has even
fallen. It is a well-known fact that the younger generations in Europe are not that
interested in natural sciences and in engineering that are necessary to keep up the
high standards of European R&D in the future. Therefore many politicians pledge
for an earlier, deeper, and better involvement of natural science in the secondary
curricula in addition to cooperation between universities and industry to provide
target-oriented training to students in laboratories and field studies.
Leading countries in the European Union in basic and applied research
are France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. At the end of the 1990s the
European Union had about 900,000 researchers of whom one third were work-
ing in Germany. The highest percentage of scientists and engineers per labor force
is in Finland with almost 9 %, whereas the European average lies at about 5 %.
Germany follows Finland with almost 8 %, and then France with more than 5 %.
When, however, the amount of scientific publications is compared, then the United
Kingdom leads with almost 10 % of the world total, and Finland contributes less
than 1 %. According to the historical development of science in the European
Union, the main focus lies in basic sciences, but in the United States and Japan the
fields of applied sciences dominate. There has been a shift in orientation towards
marketable products in the European Union on biomedicine, chemistry, and live
sciences in the last decade, yet physics, engineering, electronics, and informatics
are still underrepresented (UNESCO ibid).
European research is increasingly a matter of cross-border cooperation that
can be organized in the form of bilateral cooperation between single researchers
and universities, usually based on personal contacts, or in the form of multilat-
eral cooperation. Such cooperation requires a much higher degree of formalization
456 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

and structuring. A formal scheme for cooperation between research organiza-

tions known as the Associated European Laboratories (AEL) was launched a few
years ago at the initiative of the CNRS. Another frame for R&D cooperation in
Europe is the COST program (COST 2010). COST is an intergovernmental frame-
work allowing the coordination of nationally funded research on a European level.
COST aims at reducing the fragmentation in European research investments and
helps to open the European research area to cooperation worldwide. Since 1971
COST has connected over 30,000 researchers in Europe and beyond through net-
works in all fields of science and technology including the earth science sector
(ESSEM).
There are different models within the European Union to finance R&D. In
Germany, due to its basic law, science, research and education are the main objec-
tives of the federal states, although the national government has created a num-
ber of powerful R&D organizations including The German Science Foundation
(DFG), the Max-Planck Gesellschaft (MPG), the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft (FhG),
and many others, to delineate science and research activities generally. In the
United Kingdom and Scandinavia R&D is financed via specialized organizations
such as the British Research Council. An even stronger state involvement is prac-
ticed in France, Italy, and Spain where large and financially independent organ-
izations are established to outline and carry out R&SD under their auspices. In
France, for instance, about 50 % of the national R&D expenditure is undertaken
via such organizations.
One great challenge in R&D policy in Europe in the last decade was the shift
to more cost-effectiveness of science activities. Financial restrictions in all mem-
ber states forced the governments to reorient research funding. Consequently the
governments established so-called “centers of excellence” that are professionally
organized and based on budget-oriented financing. This shift in paradigm, made
many scientists and engineers complain of a “loss of freedom” yet on the other
hand, the R&D activities are carried out with much more professionalism.
By far the biggest change in R&D in Europe, however, occurred in the field
of connecting (pure) natural science with social and economic impact. Today
societies want to see benefits from the tax money allocated to the science sec-
tor. Especially in the field of environmental protection, climate change, or energy
generation, societies today ask for a higher degree of social responsibility even
from geologists and geophysicists. Moreover, responsibility and ethics in R&D
is emerging as a real topic. Scientists should be educated to an ethical code that
denies misconduct, fraud, and the like. Laboratory experiments should not be
carried out misusing animals, seeds for plants should be developed that are not
(only) oriented towards high productivity but also that their use does not infringe
on other agricultural uses. For example, the use of fossil fuels for power genera-
tion in cases where alternative, renewable sources of energy are available should
not be followed without a deep discussion on the pros and cons. The use of data
for scientific studies of other than the scientist’s own sources should be made clear
and transparent and be fully in line with the stipulations of the law of intellectual
property rights claims.
10.1 Science and Technology 457

Principles for the role of science and technology to achieve sustained develop-
ment of the world’s natural systems were set down in Agenda 21 and are summa-
rized here as far as they concern the sectors of science and technology:
• States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental and developmental policies.
• In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection should
constitute an integral part of the development process.
• States should improve scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific
and technological knowledge by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffu-
sion, and transfer of technology.
• At the national level, each individual should have appropriate access to informa-
tion concerning the environment and be given the opportunity to participate in
decision-making processes.
• States should enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental stand-
ards, management objectives, and priorities should reflect the environmental and
developmental context to which they apply.
• States should develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the
victims of pollution and other environmental damage.
• In order to protect the environment the principle of “precaution” should be
widely applied by states according to their scientific and technical capability.
• Lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
• National authorities should promote the internalization of environmental costs
as laid down in the polluter pay principle.
• Environmental impact assessments should be undertaken as a national instru-
ment for any development activity that is likely to have a significant adverse
impact on the environment.
• States should immediately notify other states of any natural disasters or other
emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on the environ-
ment of those states.
• States should provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to
those potentially affected.
• States on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary environ-
mental effect.
• Knowledge and traditional practices of indigenous people should be considered
in environmental management and natural resources development.

10.1.3 Technological Innovation

According to Malthus (1798), the “increase of population is limited by the means

of subsistence,” meaning that a population can only survive when its access to
natural resources is secured. And as population growth proved exponential, this
458 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

means in our finite world, that the amount of goods to be used must also grow
exponentially too (UNDP 2001). But how will it be possible to provide enough
resources to all? In the last centuries this was first of all achieved by technological
innovations. They are essential for human progress and therefore have been at the
heart of human development since earliest times. Advances in science and tech-
nology and the dissemination of knowledge have become substantial components
to societies. The “revolutionary” advances in digital electronics, in genetic-based
food production, or in decoding the human DNA, have pushed forward the fron-
tiers on how people can use technology to secure a proper livelihood, stimulated
economic growth, and empowered people to participate in their community’s wel-
fare. Today technology has devised tools for improving health, raising productiv-
ity, and facilitating learning and communication. It is furthermore characterized
by its interaction with other types of technologies that altogether form an interna-
tional network of science and technology.
The challenge for technology is tremendous, as today—even more than in for-
mer times—technology forms the basis of human development. The potential but
also the expectations on what technology can provide is overwhelming. But tech-
nology cannot take over its role as driver of human development, rather human
development is a prerequisite for technological innovations. The increase in social
and political freedom, participation, and access to natural and material resources
creates conditions that encourage people’s creativity. A higher level of education
will lead to a higher level of scientific and technical ability. Research and innova-
tions in the last decade created an ever-increasing demand for natural scientists,
information technologists, and science information network managers. The store
of indigenous knowledge and the communication systems invented make scientists
and technologists today globally mobile. Not only in developed countries but also
in developing countries, scientists and technologists now have fast, comprehen-
sive, and cheap access to state-of-the-art science and technology, on information
on finance and business, and are provided with a means for broad skill transfer for
their home country.
However, the rising expectations of the societies regarding technological inno-
vations can only be met if more scientists are engaged in resource management
worldwide followed by better implementation.
Innovations in science and technology alone will not be able to secure social
development as long as there are no simultaneous changes in socioeconomic and
ecological policy to take place. The growing power of commercial interests, the
declining role of governments, and a general retreat of governments from respon-
sibility cannot replace real political solutions. In this sense UNDP (ibid) stated
that the “market is not enough to channel technological development to human
needs” rather than turning technology into a tool for human development. This
automatically requires public risk money investment to create and disseminate
the innovations that societies need. The big difference between industrialized and
developing countries deserves creating technologies that provide especially poor
people with affordable products. One of the steps towards achieving this target is
the international agreement on intellectual property rights. This agreement is seen
10.1 Science and Technology 459

as a cornerstone that can bridge today’s very uneven distribution of intellectual

capacity in poor and rich countries. To achieve fair and efficient global access to
basic scientific knowledge and technologies the establishment of a “world intellec-
tual property clearinghouse” (UNDP ibid) is seen as a major step ahead. By iden-
tifying all relevant intellectual property for a given technology, indicating what is
available for use and how, the clearinghouse could play an important role towards
solving the collective problems in natural resources management. Another instru-
ment to enhance dissemination of knowledge is the promotion of common stand-
ards either on technical innovations or on production technologies. Without them
local markets will not find sustainable access to the world markets.
Advances in science and technology, such as the increase in medical sciences
in the last 100 years, global communication, or satellite images of our planet have
improved vision of the Earth in most of the world’s societies. In the last decade
science broadly initiated growing public awareness in the ecological aspects of life
and on how human activities are presently threatening this environment. It became
clear that if the current consumption of natural resources and increasing stress on
the regional and local environments continues, this will lead to a breakdown of the
natural systems and will diminish a further development of civilization. Science is
now asked to take up its responsibility to design measures to help achieve a sus-
tainable ecological and economic system.
It is foreseeable that the world societies will continue to rely heavily on easy
and open access to natural resources, for example, on sufficient and hygieni-
cally clean water, affordable fossil fuels, and fertile soil. But such resources are,
although available up to now in sufficient quantities are running low. There are
countries that are flooded regularly whereas others are suffering from extended
droughts. Energy is cheap in some countries whereas others can hardly afford it.
The central conflict between the current economic forces and the vision of sustain-
able development can be reconciled also with the help of scientists and engineers.
Science constitutes an important aspect of our cultural domain and historically
played a progressive role in socioeconomic development. Today science and
technology seem to be caught in a cross-fire; it is acknowledged to be a major
instrument of the world economy, but on the other hand, science is increasingly
being called on to produce knowledge and technology that promote environmen-
tally sustainable, people-oriented development and long-term management of
resources. However, to manage such a change often requires fundamental struc-
tural adjustment of policies by the states and also by their societies, for example,
when a country has to reorient its agriculture on cash crops to generate foreign
currency rather than on food crops for local consumption, due to significant budget
problems.
Only when policy makers accept that development decisions must not be based
on political wisdom alone, but also on forward-thinking research and develop-
ment, and when scientists and engineers are open to developing a new vision of
science, can the necessary sustainability of the natural system be achieved, bring-
ing production and consumption into equilibrium. Only when the financing poli-
cies reorient the terms under which research grants are allocated, to be more
460 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

neutral and flexible, and only when scientists are not continually pushed to find
short-term solutions when long-term ones are needed, will the goal for a sustain-
able world get closer.
The time is already overdue for scientists and engineers to direct themselves to
the topic of public good in more detail. This approach has already been intensively
investigated by Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Prize Winner on Economy (Ostrom 1990) and
Hardin (1968). But geoscientists are still reluctant to incorporate their findings into
their work. Hardin points to the fact that many of the social, economic, and eco-
logical problems have no technical solution. Scientists should not “try to win the
game” over the other disciplines but rather help finding a solution. Scientists cannot
always control the application of their findings. However, they have a responsibility
to engage in public dialogue about the implications of scientific findings and to help
distinguish between socially beneficial and socially harmful applications. Often it
will not be possible to solve a problem without relinquishing a stakeholder from his
traditional privileges as the example of a flood retention area cannot be identified
and implemented without interfering with the terms of use of the proprietor.
As many of the problems in risk reduction are acknowledged to be intangible,
many geosciences regarded themselves as unable to contribute to a solution. But
in fact even intangible goods can and are already quantified (tangible) every day
as described in Sect. 7.2, “Valuing Statistical Life.” What is needed is an objec-
tive means of measurement. One of the most striking measures in this regard can
be called “human security” (Scheffran et al. 2012). The way to solve this is by
weighing the values or the variables (Hardin ibid): “The problem is to work out
an acceptable theory of weighting. Synergistic effects, nonlinear variations, dif-
ficulties in discounting the futures, all this is an intellectual problem, but is not
in-soluble.” Following this statement, geoscientists are called on to provide their
expertise and experience to help establish social arrangements that define the role
and responsibility of the different stakeholders in risk reduction. This will defini-
tively lead to some sort of individual coercion, but what is needed is a sense of
societal agreement (“mutual coercion”) (Hardin ibid).

10.1.4 Acceptance of Technology

Based on studies in sociology it seems that there has been a significant change in
western societies on how the people address technology (Hennen 1994). It turned
out that today it is getting more and more difficult for the political sector to wean
westernized societies from the comforts of technology. The change in acceptance
has led to the assumption that in modern societies former controversies on social
and economic strategies are replaced by a debate on the achievements of technol-
ogy, although it is acknowledged that both sectors are closely interlinked. After
having achieved quite a sustainable level of provision of goods in these coun-
tries, the “nature issue” developed in the 1970s that still dominates the debate.
But the controversy nevertheless reveals that there is a great deal of uncertainty
10.1 Science and Technology 461

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in the societies that runs along the path of “how modern technology will affect
the people.” The study on acceptance of technology in Germany (Hennen ibid.)
revealed that since the 1960s, the then quite positive acceptance of technology
has diminished in general. The prevalent acceptance, for instance, of the use of
nuclear energy for power generation has, although not refusing the technologi-
cal advances, has been replaced by a tendency for critical distance. It turned out
that technology is less accepted when it is seen in the context of globally inter-
connected companies and types of technology that are not transparent to soci-
ety, whereas technologies that are applied in daily use are welcomed, especially
when they serve the purposes of medical safety. Figure 10.1 illustrates this find-
ing. Regarding the same radiation exposure dose (middle radiation) from nuclear
power plants and from X-ray diagnostics, the acceptance of society is completely
different. Although waste from medical treatment is cognitively related to health
and thus enjoys broad acceptance, waste from nuclear power generation (although
having the same radiation dose) is highly objected to.
A similar finding was made by the University of Bremen in a study on how the
inhabitants of the cities of Hamburg and Bremen perceive different organizations’
policies in regard to flood risk reduction measures (Fig. 10.2). It turned out the
people place the hierarchically organized authorities and the political parties into
the sectors of “traditional welfare” and “security,” but they feel such organizations
fail to address the risk and general policy critics-related sectors. This assessment
makes clear that the people’s obvious fears were only addressed by the alterna-
tive political groups, whereas the mandated organizations such as the technical
services agencies are placed somewhere in between. The study moreover revealed
that there is no difference in the people’s perception on this in the cities.
462 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

Fig. 10.2  Perception of inhabitants of the cities of Hamburg and Bremen on flood risk reduction
measures (Based on: ARTEC 2007)

The surveys moreover revealed that people clearly distinguish between posi-
tive or negative effects of consequences from technology. When asked whether
technology secures labor and income, more than 90 % answered the question with
“Yes” (Hennen ibid). The German level of acceptance of technology is more or
less the same as in other industrialized countries. For instance, in Japan technol-
ogy is not seen a priori as good; although more than 50 % see it as a guarantee for
labor opportunities. The study concluded that there are indications that the contro-
versial debate on technology is unavoidable the more political decisions depend on
the state of science and technology, which consequently raises the question of the
legitimacy of technology. It sees furthermore that the heightened debate on tech-
nology acceptance is more an outcome of the increased expectations of the public
from politics than an expression of technology refusal.

10.1.5 Code of Conduct

All research and investigations in science and technology and the pursuance of
the implementation of the findings are agreed to be conducted upon an interna-
tional obligation to three basic ethical principles. This ethic codex was originally
10.1 Science and Technology 463

established for the medical science sector (CIOMS 2002) in accordance to the
Human Rights Charter, but in its true meaning, it also found application in the
natural science sector in general. It can also be directly applied for geoscience
engagement in natural disaster risk reduction management. The principles are:
• Respect for human beings
• Self-determination
• Social benefit
• Nonmaleficence
• Equality and justice
In 2007 the US Geological Survey (USGS 2007) enacted a policy for “scientific
integrity” for ensuring such integrity in the conduct of scientific activities and pro-
cedures for reporting, investigating, and information dissemination. The policy
transcribed the US Federal Policy on Research Misconduct as a binding regulation
for all USGS employees. With this document the USGS employees commit them-
selves to respect unrestrictedly the integrity of science. A series of “rules” have
been decreed that are to be agreed to by every employee and that are summarized
below to:
• Contribute the best, highest quality scientific information.
• Honestly, objectively, thoroughly, and expeditiously process data.
• Fully disclose all research methods used and available data.
• Respect confidentiality and proprietary information.
• Not engage in falsification or plagiarism.
• Be constructive in criticism, participate in peer reviews.
• Be diligent in creating, using, preserving, documenting, and maintaining data.
• Establish quality assurance and quality control programs.
• Comply with federal law relating to security of confidential and proprietary
data.
• Follow appropriate reporting standards.
• Respect the intellectual property rights of others.
• Differentiate among facts, opinions, hypotheses.
• Be responsible for the quality of data and for the integrity of conclusions.
USGS commits itself to pursue any allegation of scientific misconduct either
caused by its employees or by others in a timely, open, and neutral manner. The
prosecution of the alleged misconduct will follow a consensus-based process and
will be based on three criteria:
• Significant departure from accepted practices of the relevant research
community.
• The misconduct is committed intentionally or knowingly or recklessly.
• The allegation is proven by a preponderance of evidence.
The Max Planck Society (MPG) established in 2009 a set of “Rules of Good
Scientific Practice” in order to define the ethical and moral bases for scientific
activities carried out under their auspices (MPG 2009). The rules are fully in line
464 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

with the recommendations given by the German Science Foundation (DFG 1998).
They are binding on all persons active in research work at the Max Planck Society
to observe scientific honesty and the principles of good scientific practice.
Good scientific practice is generally summarized as:
• Precise observance of scientific discipline
• Honesty and transparency in acquiring, selecting, and processing data
• Clear and comprehensible documentation of the methods employed and results
achieved
• Storage of primary data for 10 years
• Systematic scientific skepticism
• Reproducibility of results
• Activity and analysis according to the standards of good scientific practice
• Systematic alertness to any possible misinterpretations
• Avoidance of overgeneralization
• No hindrance to the scientific work of others
• Openness to criticism
• Publication on principle of research results
• Fair evaluation and citation of any literature used
• Honesty in the recognition of the contributions of colleagues
Scientific misconduct is basically when false statements are made knowingly or as
a result of gross negligence, when intellectual property of others is infringed upon,
or when others’ research work is impaired in some other way. The following list
outlines the main aspects of misconduct:
• Fabrication of data and falsification of data
• Non- or selective reporting
• Rejection of unwanted results
• Manipulation of a representation or illustration
• Incorrect statements
• Unauthorized exploitation (plagiarism)
• Misappropriation (expert opinion, research methods, theft of ideas)
• Usurpation of scientific authorship or coauthorship
• Unauthorized publishing
• Sabotage of research work (including damaging, destroying, or manipulating
experimental arrangements, equipment, documents, hardware, software)
Similar codes of conduct exist, for example, in Australia, the United Kingdom,
and Canada. In Australia the Department of Mines and Petroleum (DMP) is com-
mitted to operating as a “competent, ethical, transparent and accountable organi-
zation which provides a satisfying, safe, and equitable work environment for its
employees.” DMP’s code thus provides a clear framework for the standards of
behavior and ethical decision making with which all DMP employees are bound
to comply. Since 2006, DMP has provided all employees with specific training to
create awareness of accountable and ethical decision making for all employees.
The Canadian “Code of Ethics” reiterates the point that its “professionals must be
10.1 Science and Technology 465

qualified by trained by training and experience for the work they do and they must
know the limits of their knowledge” (VanDine 2011).
In 2002 the Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC) published recom-
mendations based on the “California Seismic Hazard Mapping Act” (SHMA)
as a companion to the California Building Code, that clearly define the role and
function of engineering geologists and geotechnical engineers in investigating the
country’s seismic hazards and slope stability (SCEC 2002). The purpose of the
Act is to protect public assets and the people from the effect of ground shaking,
liquefaction, landslides, or other ground failures as well as from risks caused by
earthquakes. The Act furthermore stipulates that the “site investigation report must
be prepared by a certified engineering geologist or registered civil engineer.” The
experts must have proven expertise in the subject, must hold an university degree
in the related disciplines, and must have several years’ experience in the field
of seismic hazard evaluation and mitigation. The expert has to have a certifica-
tion as engineering geologist or be registered as a civil engineer by the State of
California. Moreover the final report must be reviewed by a certified soil engineer-
ing geologist according to the SCEC (2008).
The Act further stipulates that each investigation has to be carried out by both
geologists and civil engineers together in order to have both disciplines integrated
to provide a broader based assurance in the finding and the recommendations.
Furthermore the investigations have to be carried out under the “supervision of
licensed professionals with many year[s] experience in the field.” The involvement
of both engineering geologists and geotechnical engineers is seen as a prerequi-
site to ensure that the hazards are properly identified, assessed, and mitigated. The
recommendation even goes far beyond this general specification. It defines that an
engineering geologist should investigate the subsurface structure of hillside areas
and provide an appropriate input to the geotechnical engineer with respect to the
potential impact of the subsurface geologic structure, stratigraphy, and hydrologic
conditions on the stability of the slope. The assessment of the subsurface stratig-
raphy and hydrologic conditions of sites when underlain solely by alluvial materi-
als should be performed by the geotechnical engineer, and the shear strength and
other geotechnical earth material properties should be evaluated by the geotechni-
cal engineer. The geotechnical engineer should perform the stability calculations.
In order to identify the ground motion parameters, analysis may be provided by
either the engineering geologist or geotechnical engineer, or a registered geophysi-
cist competent in the field of seismic hazard evaluation.
Another type of code of conduct, for instance, is the “code of conduct of flood
risk” of the Law Society of England and Wales (BLS 2014) that defines how
solicitors should manage a lawsuit regarding a flood event. In this regulation it
is reiterated that solicitors are not qualified to give advice on flood risk or inter-
pret technical flood reports. In order to gain scientifically profound, reproducible,
and neutral information on the risk from floods, the code proposes to commission
specialists to provide the required information. In general the code points to con-
tacting nationally authorized and mandated organizations such as the agencies for
environment, water resources, and land use planning. Flood risk surveys have been
466 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

developed by government institutions and by specialized private companies. The

Law Society recommended using these standard templates for assessing the flood
risk that in addition also inform about steps that can be taken to mitigate exposure
to flood damage.

10.2 Geoscientists in Disaster Risk Reduction Management

When we accept that only by integrating natural sciences and social sciences,
can the demand of the population at risk for a safer life be served optimally, we
have to accept that the three groups have their specific claim in finding a solution.
But it is exactly these different interests, viewpoints, expertise, and experience
that aggregate to a comprehensive risk management and that make stakeholders
become partners in change management and the recognition that natural disaster
mitigation is a political process although it has a scientific and technical evidence-
based basis.
For a natural scientist a hazard is just a natural phenomenon: a dormant vol-
cano, an area susceptible to landslides, or a region often exposed to hailstorms.
After investigating the area and having analyzed the cause–effect relationship of
natural hazards and vulnerability factors, the scientists normally publish the find-
ings in related publications. From this moment on she sees herself too often no
longer part of the risk management process. The population at risk, however, per-
ceives the natural hazard as a potential threat to their livelihood. According to pre-
vious experience (either personal or from hearsay), they know this hazard may
turn out to become a disaster. Automatically those risk exposed try to assess the
risk. Their central aim is to maintain their social and economic life not endangered
by the threat. Moreover there is in general no functional relationship established
between the risk exposed and risk assessors. The third stakeholder in the issue is
the state. Other than natural scientists and the risk exposed, it is his intention to
maintain the existing social and economic order of the entire society. It has, there-
fore, introduced different intervention levels: local level, provincial level, and on
the national level to work out specific risk reduction strategies and their respective
implementation. To achieve this the state has implemented a series of appropri-
ate instruments. One of many concepts, for instance, is to set the legal framework
to institutionalize hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessment whereas others are
implementing awareness-raising campaigns or incorporating the population into
the local disaster risk-management decision making.
As in the environmental sector, the task of geoscience is also cross-cutting and
interdisciplinary in disaster risk management. And it is just this transboundary
nature that makes this sector a real challenge. Either by identifying areas at risk or
by working out risks preventing countermeasures on rockfall, hazards, or whether
geoscience is involved in agenda setting in spatial and regional planning, its exper-
tise is finally targeted at rendering services to make people less exposed to natural
disaster threats. In this sense the geo-related evidence is the starting point for any
10.2 Geoscientists in Disaster Risk Reduction Management 467

development planning and is thus indispensable to reach a higher level of human

security. As being a part of the cause–effect related decision-making process, geo-
scientists’ decisions to refrain from taking “political” responsibility will not be
accepted by the public. Otherwise risk-affected ones as well as political levels will
lose confidence in their expertise. Geoscientists cannot deny this involvement by
saying, “I am only providing the facts but drawing assumptions from them is for
others,” will be accepted by society. Nevertheless, geoscientists are not to make
decisions, but are expected to take up their part in the decision-making process, by
providing evidence and facts and proposing solutions, thus contributing to finding
the right solutions
But geoscientific expertise is not only asked for in dealing with the “classical”
geotectonically related natural disasters, but the broad range of climatological and
meteorological disasters have a significant component that deserves geoscientific
expertise. Entering into this sector gives the geosciences a different definition from
what it was for centuries. For a long time, geosciences were defined as a “histori-
cal descriptive science,” defining it to be a science investigating geological facts
and deriving from them purely nature-related cause–effect relationships. With
the oil-crisis in the 1970s and even more severely after the “water crisis” in the
1990s, societies were asking for information on how to settle the daily demand.
This request brought geoscience into the situation to bridge historically acquired
knowledge with social and economic problems of today. With climate change,
solving this societal demand gained even stronger momentum. This also applies to
disaster risk management; especially when we consider that the ongoing changes
in climate will lead to more frequent and more extreme disasters that will be a
threat to more people. This paradigm of a “multilevel assessment” approach, how-
ever, does not lead away from classical geoscience. It only pledges for a geosci-
entist to be involved at different levels of societal, ecological, and political action.
Still we need—without any doubt—classical geoscientific investigations, anal-
ysis, and mapping. But today geology is asked to go a step further by transfer-
ring gained expertise to regions that are not investigated in such detail, in order
to help to define technically implementable countermeasures. Societal demand
even goes beyond this demand. Today, geologists are requested to enter into politi-
cal decision-making processes and are asked to become “technical advisors” that
assist the political decision makers by implementing political decisions to reach a
higher degree of resilience of otherwise risk-exposed populations. This demands
that the geologist on one hand to stay natural while being open to the societal and
economic question. The geosciences, as described above, are and have to be taken
as an integral part of the economic risk assessment our societies are facing daily.
The geosciences are not the ones that create such hazards and risks, but it is their
task to identify risk situations, work out effective countermeasures for risk mitiga-
tion, and also to be moderators between the population at risk and the technical
prevention measures. Following the above discussion this book strongly pledges
that also “natural science-oriented” disaster risk assessment has to comprise a dis-
tinct social component: a conceptual approach that is nowadays named “system-
atic risk” (Klinke and Renn 2006). The term risk “denotes the embeddedness of
468 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

any risk to human health and the environment in a larger context of social, finan-
cial and economic risks and opportunities. Systematic risks are at the crossroad
between natural events, economic, social and technological development and
political actions.” These new interrelated risk fields also require a new form of
risk analysis, in which data from different risk sources are either geographically
or functionally integrated into one analytical perspective. Systematic risk analy-
sis requires a holistic approach to hazard identification, risk assessment, and risk
management.
Figure 10.3 gives an impression of an example of disaster risk insurance on
how the different stakeholder groups define their specific interest and how these
interests are interconnected. The natural scientist sees her role in analyzing the
hazard situation. Second, the insurance company sees its interest in insuring risk
but can only realize this when the company is prospering, briefly stated, “not to
make losses.” The individual has to understand the hazard and risk to which he is
exposed. When the scientific information covers his inflation demand, than he will
be inclined to take the self-help approach. The states’ interest is having a function-
ing social system: in order to secure the livelihood of the society he has to create a
regulatory framework conducive to the private sector (“to make profit”) but also to
the individual for risk prevention at an affordable premium scale.

Fig. 10.3  Stakeholder interest in disaster risk management (Example: risk insurance; own graph)
10.2 Geoscientists in Disaster Risk Reduction Management 469

Fig. 10.4  Triangular diagram describing the position where different stakeholders in disaster
risk management are positioned (Own graph)

To make this interrelation a bit more clear the different “stakeholders” can be
entered into a triangular diagram (Fig. 10.4). The diagram identifies where they
are positioned in the context of disaster risk management. The positions of the dif-
ferent actors are given for the examples (a) hazard assessment, (b) national disas-
ter law, (c) local disaster mitigation (strategy) (d) the integration of the population
at risk in the political decision, and (e) campaigns for awareness raising. It can be
clearly seen from the diagram that even the extreme position of “scientific hazard
assessment” far out at the triangle’s tip is influenced by the legal aspects as well
as by the population at risk. A hazard assessment that does not reflect such influ-
ence will not be able to provide a meaningful contribution to a sustainable risk
management. Awareness campaigns are positioned near the “participation of social
group’s” tip. But every awareness raising needs reliable information to increase
disaster resilience and can only be implemented within the existing legal risk
reduction framework. A law of risk reduction, however, requires scientific input
but also has to reflect the social, economic, and cultural situation of the society in
general. A local (or national) strategy for disaster risk reduction, when success-
fully implemented, will find itself positioned right in the middle of the triangular
diagram.
Wisner et al. (2004) created a model that describes the dynamic interdepend-
ence of the different stakeholders (Disaster Pressure and Release Model). The
model explains how different trigger levels (root causes): the changing livelihood
conditions (dynamic pressure) and the socioeconomic situation of the population
at risk (unsafe condition) collide with the natural setting (hazards) to become dis-
asters. The model is widely used in risk management as it can shed light on the
interaction of the different trigger causes that make up a disaster.
470 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

In general the root causes can be distinguished into three different elements:
• Nature: describing the naturally given conditions that result from processes in
the Earth’s crust (plate tectonics) or from climate change (sea-level rise).
• Legal order: defining the organizational framework a society has given itself to
govern societal life.
• Population at risk: describing those who are directly exposed to a hazard; they
are in many cases not responsible for and are not able to mitigate the adverse
impact without help.
The geoscience responsibility in natural disaster management is to foster a shift
in paradigm from a reactive evidence-based management to a proactive science-
based management. This means that disaster risk management is no longer ori-
ented towards rescue and relief but towards putting disaster prevention in the
focus. The IRGC’s risk governance framework (IRGC 2010) therefore points to
the fact that science-based disaster management has to be based on experience and
expertise to assess the probable impacts of future events properly. Risk manage-
ment should be concentrated no longer on an assessment of what type of hazard
may occur, where, and to what severity, but to have the population at risk in focus.
Geosciences thus have to realize that they are partners in this deal, although an
indispensable one but the focus on securing livelihood is more than a matter of
social scientists and economists IRGC (ibid). Managing risks requires both the
geoscience sector and the social sector that must work together to take care of the
different aspects of risk. The often prevailing separation in risk management in
administering the impact and the scientific assessment of the natural root causes is
not practical. The gap has to be bridged in order to bring disaster risk management
out of the corner of pure actions. Risk management will only be successful when
it integrates all different scientific sectors. Essential for a sustainable risk gov-
ernance framework is to gain a thorough understanding of a risk and to develop
options for dealing with it. Therefore IRGC’s risk governance framework distin-
guishes between analyzing and understanding a risk and deciding what to do about
it. This distinction reflects IRGC’s strategy for the clear separation of the respon-
sibilities for risk appraisal and risk management as a means of maximizing the
objectivity and transparency of both activities. Those responsible for both should
be jointly involved in the framework’s other elements: pre-assessment, characteri-
zation, and evaluation and communication.
The task of the geoscientists in natural disaster management can be distin-
guished into a sector that is dominated by pure and traditional scientific orienta-
tion, and a sector where the scientific findings are taken up for technical and
economically oriented activities, and finally into a sector where scientific find-
ings are transformed into practical development decisions (advisory services).
Figure 10.5 shows an example of how the different objectives are interwoven and
that the advisory and applied sector especially depend substantially on geoscien-
tific expertise. Although not be a part of the transform sector, traditional natural
science in natural disaster management has to be aware that its objectives will lead
to a series of forthcoming activities that finally are aimed at increasing societal
10.2 Geoscientists in Disaster Risk Reduction Management 471

Fig. 10.5  Development path indicating how the scientific sector contributes to socioeconomic
development decisions (Own graph)

resilience, thus defining a development path (red arrow). The path describes that
even pure scientifically oriented activities might be of use for political develop-
ment decisions. It is thus obvious that therefore the geoscientist has been aware
that his activities in courses of development will leave the facts-dominated scien-
tific realm and will more and more be taken up in the sector of advisory services.
The political decision makers deserve that input in order to make their decisions.
This nevertheless defines on the other hand the role of natural scientist to not
become the decision maker himself, but that be aware that his findings are being
used (see Sect. 2.2). This emphasizes that politicians, planning, and implementing
authorities should be aware of the potentials and expertise the natural scientists
are able to provide and that they should not try to make their decisions purely on
political will and targets.
When we accept that scientists and engineers have a distinct role in the inten-
tion of society to increase its resilience from natural disasters, we have to define
how the scientists should take up their responsibility in transferring scientific and
technical information to their partners, or better, to those who depend on such
information. Scientists acting in this sector should be aware that she has different
fields to act in that are differently defined although their fields are highly intercon-
nected and interrelated. Figure 10.6 describes the main fields of intervention a sci-
entist has to venture in the intermediation of scientific knowledge. But moreover
all the fields she is in should be acknowledged. Society will neither accept a scien-
tist’s restriction purely in the science sector, nor will it be possible just to choose
472 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

Fig. 10.6  The role of the

scientist in intermediation
of scientific knowledge in
disaster risk management
(Own graph)

one or two of them. Her function is to be scientist, advisor, and mediator. In gen-
eral this function is further defined to be representative of a state, a public entity,
or a private company. And in very many situations she is asked to provide the nec-
essary financial, technical, and operational resources for the risk assessment and
the implementation of the reduction measures with the people.

10.3 Final Remarks

Statistics have proved (see Sect. 3.4) that natural disaster events are increasing and
are increasingly affecting more people. The main reasons for this are the general
increase in population (especially in developing countries resulting in a poverty
migration into regions that are unsuitable for settling) thus bringing many societies
to the brink of social catastrophes. Moreover the population increase is accom-
panied with the accumulation of economic assets and technology in hazardous
regions, even in countries that are not that advanced. A further driving force to
more risks of disasters is the change in climate conditions. All these factors force
the people to more and more go into areas that have formerly not been settled and
that are according to their risk exposure not suitable for settlement. These cir-
cumstances lead to an increase in risk from natural hazards and pose the great-
est challenge for societies. To be able to cope with the envisaged increasing risks,
societies are demanding measures, instruments, and organizational frameworks to
make their living safer. In this regard societies are especially addressing the natu-
ral scientists and civil engineers to analyze the root causes for the disasters and to
find and work out appropriate mitigation strategies. Together with the authorities,
10.3 Final Remarks 473

scientists and engineers are asked to implement these measures accordingly. In

this context WBGU (1999) stated that the option, “Refrain from benefits in order
to minimize/avoid risk” is theoretically possible but will in practice not be achiev-
able. Rather the opposite approach is favored: take up the challenge and derive
from the disaster impacts technologies and mitigation strategies that make soci-
eties capable of coping with the harmful threats. In this respect the geosciences
have an obligation to deliver implementable mitigation measures. Therefore in
order to better address societal demand, the geosciences should take the position
of the people at risk as the starting point for their investigations and not bow to
geological analysis under the disaster paradigm. This does not mean that “science”
should be underrated in its ability to master the challenge, but it will rather help
to focus on the “real” problems. With rational, reasonable, and reliable analysis
and recommendations the geoscience sector will take its responsibility in disaster
prevention. But on the other hand this needs a framework that is inducive to sci-
ence. The official sector has the obligation to allocate necessary financial means
and an organizational and time framework allowing scientific investigations at the
required intensity. But scientists are in a certain dilemma in this aspect. Natural
disasters occur every day and thus need answers at short notice. But in-depth
investigations often require time spans of at least many years. Thus the scientists
and engineers must be courageous enough in some situations just to assess a disas-
ter based on their although limited but ad hoc available knowledge and not evade
the responsibility by transferring the problem to future findings. The excuse of
lack of appropriate knowledge is often perceived by the decision makers and the
risk affected as science backing out of its responsibility. The geosciences should
furthermore be made an equal partner in disaster risk management. And the com-
plexity of natural phenomena and social implication will not be solved by one dis-
cipline alone. There must be a shift in paradigm: natural scientists must be open
to issues beyond their original disciplines and on the side of the decision-making
sector to acknowledge that nature issues are a substantial and integral part of every
disaster resilience strategy.
It is a fact that all over the world the population at risk is more and more
demanding of the political decision-making levels to set up and operate mitigation
measures that are sustainable in reducing society’s disaster exposure. Regarding
the threats society is exposed to, risk assessments are required that enable the soci-
ety to develop effective prevention measures in order to increase societal resil-
ience. But asking authorities to do the “necessary” is one side of the coin. The
other side is that the populations at risk themselves are taking over their respon-
sibility for a safe future. Thus there is a great demand in societies to share the
risks between the social groups equally and fairly. This requires that all social
groups develop the same vision on who shall be protected, to what extent, and
how to distribute the burden of risk prevention within the society. It is a common
understanding that in case of an emergency, the individual assess his personal
risks in general based on former risk experience. Therefore those heavily affected
have a different perception of the risk than those far off. Nevertheless they have
to share the burden. There is only one solution to this dilemma, all groups of
474 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

society have to develop the same vision of what is seen as risk and what is not
(see Sect. 2.2). Such a consensus is what Beck postulated as a “society of risk”
or what has also been described as a “culture of risk.” A culture of risk requests
all sectors of society to do their best in order to increase the societal risk-coping
capacities. It requests from all nations a stronger involvement of disaster risk
management in political decision making than experienced today. Best practice
examples proved that prevention by technical countermeasures is seen one of the
best means to safeguard people and economic values from the impact of disas-
ters. But not only technical countermeasures are substantial, rather it proved that
nonstructural, organizational, and managerial aspects of risk management such as
risk-oriented special planning or awareness-raising campaigns with the popula-
tion at risk are identified to be of high effectiveness. Moreover a culture of risk
also demands from the industrialized countries to take over their responsibilities,
at first to reduce their CO2-emissions, in order to reach a worldwide level of 2 %
increase in greenhouse gas emissions, as agreed upon in the many United Nations
climate conferences. But risk prevention is a matter of costs. Many studies and
especially that of Dilley et al. (2005) proved that every dollar spent for increasing
disaster resilience prevents damages of at least US$5. Therefore in the long-term
risk financing saves a nation’s value. But such an understanding has not yet fully
developed in every nation.
Although a multitude of risk reduction strategies are at hand and proved their
prevention potential, it is nevertheless a known fact that it is not possible to make
a society risk-proof against each and every disaster. On the other hand waiting for
a disaster to occur is rejected as an unethical approach. The fundamental dilemma
is that human activity is generally accompanied with unintended implications and
simultaneously it will not be possible to settle these demands without interfering
with the natural system (WBGU 1999). And human development has a history of
learning from failures (disasters, catastrophes). The acceptance of a baseline of
risk and the knowledge of how to prevent unacceptable risk is the challenge of
today.
The only way to make the public and the political decision makers aware of
risks is by indicating the loss reduction potential of prevention and by simulta-
neous valuing the increase in welfare. Risk managers therefore have to monetize
the investment spent for prevention and to compare this with the savings from the
level of resilience that is envisaged to be achieved. Furthermore any risk reduction
effort will not be successful when there is no similar perception on what a risk is
by the individual or the societal groups as well as by the authorities. Only when
all groups share the same risk perception, will it be possible to define the common
levels of resilience to be envisaged. Next is to reach a consensus on the willing-
ness to pay for the increased coping capacities. This can only be achieved by a
dialogue process in which the population at risk has to be involved from the very
beginning and that cannot be left to risk managers and politicians only. Finding
consent needs reliable, sound, and technically and scientifically based data and
information on the different risk types and an evaluation instrument that enables
the participants to compare the different disaster impacts. As a result, a ranking
10.3 Final Remarks 475

of disaster types defines what kind of disaster, at which location, and to what
extent, should be mitigated in order to secure an optimal investment of the nor-
mally small budgets. And it furthermore enables the authorities to comply with the
German national law’s request to assure the same living conditions, to secure life
and social welfare all over Germany. But it is also an instrument that helps to ask
for the individual’s personal engagement.
In the course of the climate change debate and the increasing world popula-
tion, a discussion is coming up on how losses and victims will develop from natu-
ral disasters. It seems obvious that the population increase itself will not be the
factor that will matter, but rather that the trend of poverty migration into the big
megacities will be getting stronger. In search of labor and improved living condi-
tions these migrants just deteriorate the already difficult living conditions. Being
the last in the chain in the search for living quarters they are forced to settle areas
that are, from their geological and geomorphological pattern, not suitable for liv-
ing, a behavior that just increases the hazard exposure. A similar outcome is envis-
aged from the changing climate. Holzer and Savage (2013) in a comprehensive
study came to the conclusion on the future risk from earthquakes for people and
their living environment that “More people will die from earthquakes even when
the statistical occurrence of earthquake remained more or less constant over the
centuries.” The study analyzed earthquakes with death tolls of more than 50,000
from the time span since 1500 AD. Comparing those events to estimates of world
population, they found that the number of catastrophic earthquakes has increased
as population has grown. After statistically correlating the number of catastrophic
earthquakes in each century with world population, they predict that total deaths in
the century to come could more than double to approximately 3.5 million people if
world population grows to 10 billion by 2100 from 6 billion in the year 2000. The
study underscores the need to build residential and commercial structures that will
not collapse and kill people during earthquake shaking.
Although benefits from science and technology to humanity are undoubt-
edly unparalleled in the history of the human species, the influence of science
on people’s lives is growing. But as on the other hand many of the scientific
achievements turned out to be harmful and revealed negative long-term effects,
a considerable measure of public mistrust in science and technology developed.
Especially in marginalized societies there is a growing belief that many of them
will suffer from such (direct or indirect) consequences of technical innovations,
that from their viewpoint are beneficial only to a privileged minority. Scientists
should reflect on the social consequences of the technological applications or dis-
semination inasmuch as the power of science to bring about change places a duty
on scientists to proceed with great caution both in what they do and what they say.
Even when scientists discuss a “comprehensive” insight to a problem, their state of
knowledge will in any case be partial. Thus they have to explain to the public and
policy makers about the degree of scientific uncertainty or incompleteness in their
findings (L’Aquila, Italy; see: Chap. 1). At the same time, though, they should not
hesitate to fully exploit the predictive power of science. The impact of technologi-
cal interventions on individual people, communities, and the environment must be
476 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

carefully considered. To do this, science needs to become more multidisciplinary

and its practitioners should continue to integrate social and natural sciences (see
Sect. 2.2).
The World Conference on Science (WCS 1998) summarizes this call to the sci-
entists as follows:
[A] major challenge for global science is to find institutional arrangements conducive
to address the multi-faceted problems. The large number of international networks and
programs, reflects either the great demand in scientific communication but also reveals a
certain narrowness of the established scientific institutions and the lack of strategic, inte-
grated support by national governments in areas like global change or international aid.
What is needed is the formation of true international partnerships that allow scientists in
different disciplines and countries to fully support each other’s aims and share resources
and management duties to mutual advantage.

Human beings tend just to react to the various challenges of nature rather than
to look into the future, based on experience. There is a nice story of a fire bri-
gade that dug a water well after the house has caught fire, a typical sign of mere
helplessness, an action that replaces the lack of preparedness and prevention. The
relationship between the perception of a natural hazard and appropriate prevention
as well as providing relief in the aftermath of disaster both addresses the social
and official risk behavior. The responsibility of natural scientists, technicians, and
emergency managers therefore has to be at the cross-point between purely techni-
cal matters and social implementation and has to be oriented to develop a culture
of prevention rather than a culture of relief.
The multitude of reports and statistics available on natural disasters proved
that natural disasters although generated by natural processes are not the sole
origin of damage and loss of lives, but a combination of natural, social, and eco-
nomic causes. Generally speaking, to become a victim from a natural disaster is
strongly linked with poverty. Poverty is a result of social, economic, and cultural
vulnerability. Those who cannot afford living in safe places are forced to settle,
for instance, in poorly constructed shelters on steep slopes around the megacities,
regions not suitable for sustained living, whereas those who can afford an alter-
native living have significantly lower exposure to threats from natural disasters.
Natural scientists and engineers, when dealing with disaster management there-
fore are called on to address this dichotomy, even if many of them feel this sector
lies beyond their traditional responsibility. Figure 10.7 gives an impression of how
strongly poverty and disaster exposure are correlated. The figure correlates the
annual death toll for all disasters against the death toll in relation to the population
and compared this with the Human Development Index (UNDP 2004). Although
the data show a large variation, the shaded envelope, however, indicates a clear
relationship of poverty and mortality risk from disasters.
The task for scientists in natural disaster risk management is to analyze the com-
plex system of nature and to work out recommendations that define the root causes
of hazards and disasters, thus providing reliable facts for political decision making
to develop strategies for the way out. But scientists are fulfilling this demand in a
somewhat restricted manner. Their traditional focus on information dissemination is
10.3 Final Remarks 477

Fig. 10.7  Disaster-related mortality risk and human development (Based on Mutter 2005)

still too much supply-driven. But science-related information policy has to become
more society-driven. Science in regard to assessing natural disasters is moreover
based on measuring the frequency and severity of a particular event. Thus science
sets in when the event has taken place. But natural disaster risk management is a
process that requires information and recommendations on the probability of future
events. This calls on scientists to develop a dynamic risk modeling instrument with
roots in exact monitoring but allowing for a prediction of the future. The changing
climate conditions, the increase in world population, the increase in poverty migra-
tion, as well as the change in Asian food habits from a cereal base to a meat base are
dynamic elements that have multifold repercussions on natural disaster risk expo-
sure. More and longer time series for data interpretation on disaster events are nec-
essary, for instance, on earthquakes. Many of them are too short for drawing reliable
future scenarios. Moreover often today data acquisition is based on highly different
instruments and measuring standards, and often local structures are not in place for
a centralized collection of data at a national level. Thus not all over the world is the
time of an earthquake onset measured in universal time, but in local time. The den-
sity of the data acquisition networks is locally that scarce that it cannot claim to be
international, forcing scientists to resort to similar data, but not from the area. Even
in strong economies such as the United States, for instance, the instrumental net-
work for monitoring volcanoes does not comply with the quality levels the country
has set for itself. Only a few of the volcanoes rated most dangerous are monitored to
478 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

the standard USGS deems necessary. At the international level many of the seismic
monitoring instruments in use are 50–100 years old and no longer fulfill the techni-
cal standards required for an international compatibility, such as in Indonesia, where
seismic instruments are located at easily accessible places and often around univer-
sity cities. Such a network leaves large parts of the world not covered by modern,
reliable, and comparable monitoring. Furthermore the interpretation of the measure-
ments is lacking internationally agreed-upon standardization and harmonization.
An international initiative is necessary to define for each of the natural disasters a
binding interpretation procedure, “enhancing global indexing of and vulnerability
enabling more and better intercountry and interregional comparison” (UNDP 2004).
Only that will allow us to correlate and compare the findings for the sake of all of
us. What is lacking is an international task force for a rapid assessment of damages
that has to begin its duties right after the disaster has taken place. The days after
bring much more information on the impact. When the bulldozers have cleared
the rubble it is often too late to identify clearly the level of amplification the peak
ground acceleration underwent by the (poor) structural conditions. Such a task force
would be best institutionalized under the auspices of the United Nations. But also an
initiative by the European Union would be of much help to increase resilience.
Sachs (2005) emphasized that not enough has been done to combine science
expertise and ethical commitment. Natural science, economics, and social sciences are
still “running more or less parallel” to each other and are not interlinked to the degree
necessary. He pledged to combine “scientists, engineers, public health specialists,
sociologists and economists with an ethical commitment to attend the poverty prob-
lems of the world.” This requires the expertise of “scholars and scientists and com-
mitted practitioners from across the range of human knowledge.” Synergies between
natural sciences and social and economic development are currently underutilized.
The area where both natural scientists and socioeconomists meet is a transition
zone where questions are raised on the natural root causes for disasters and their
respective input on the population. In this zone questions have to be answered how
a society can be made disaster resilient (Fig. 10.8). Moreover, in the course of
implementation new questions arise leading to a cycle of interaction between these
two sectors.

Fig. 10.8  Natural science

and development decision-
making cycle (Own graph)
10.3 Final Remarks 479

Moreover the natural scientists that are working in disaster risk management are
today already strongly interconnected and embedded into multifold networks so
they no longer work alone. The international monitoring networks require and pro-
vide a permanent exchange of ideas, knowledge, and expertise. And this level of
interrelation will deepen further. The increasing amount of natural disasters to occur
worldwide and especially in the course of climate change, will affect the developing
countries much more than other nations and will result in strongly increasing casu-
alties. This perspective calls for strengthening the international exchange of experi-
ence and expertise as shown in Fig. 10.8. The state of the art of disaster mitigation
today allows answering most of the questions. The main obstacle seen is how the
authorities are implementing the solutions worked out. But science and politicians
very often do not regard in their solution finding, the experience of local specialists
and that of the disaster-affected people. What is required is a much closer and inter-
disciplinary cooperation between these stakeholder groups.
Experiences gained by the disaster managers from a certain region will simulta-
neously increase the overall state of knowledge that can be applied elsewhere. For
example, on the occasion of the volcano eruption of Mt. Pinatubo (Philippines),
PHIVOLCS and USGS started monitoring the volcano right after the first signs of
unrest, months before the actual eruption. Both organizations sent out a group of
geophysicists, volcanologists, and geologists to monitor all signs of the volcanic
activity until months after Mt. Pinatubo calmed down. This early start and the long
duration analysis make Mt. Pinatubo one of the best analyzed volcano eruptions in
history (Newhall and Punongbayan 1996). Another example is that of the Koceali
earthquake in northern Turkey (1999) where geophysicists from USGS and their
colleagues from Turkey analyzed the earthquake event in great detail. A great
amount of geoscientific data especially on liquefaction was collected that allowed
a detailed and convincing analysis of the quake origin and its impact. The assump-
tions drawn moreover were applied to analyzing the San Andreas Fault Zone that
is tectonically very similar to the North Anatolian Fracture Zone. These two exam-
ples show how in the future cooperation between scientists from different coun-
tries can be joined to both sides’ benefit.
Natural scientists are called upon to be open to address the needs of risk-
exposed people by joining the Munich Re Insurance Company sponsored
“Hohenkammer-Charta” that describes how risk reduction can be better addressed
in future. The Charta was declared in 2005 when the Munich Re Insurance com-
pany gathered celebrity scientists, politicians, economists, and also representatives
of risk-exposed societies to outline the main challenges for sustainable risk mitiga-
tion (Munich Re 2005). Among the issues listed, all stakeholders were called to
“enter into a dialog between the risk affected and the political decision makers in
order to derive at the same understanding of the problems and solutions” in disas-
ter risk management. Such a “dialog can only be successful when all stakehold-
ers: politicians, economists, scientists and the populations at risk combine their
expertise, experience and form public private partnership. Governments are called
on to provide issue-related legal, economic or social incentives to foster local risk
reduction.”
480 10 Responsibility of Geoscience in Natural Disaster Risk Management

The challenges from natural disasters are being addressed by many different
governments and donor agencies. However, in order to achieve sustainable devel-
opment these challenges are increasingly recognized as being interconnected
(wicked problems). And there is a common understanding that socioeconomic
improvements should not be achieved at the cost of environmental degradation or
by leaving specific groups of a society without proper protection. Societies that
have risks from natural disasters significantly reduced result in improved human
well-being and social equity. Achim Steiner from UNEP emphasized on the occa-
sion of launching UN REDD + Programme (UNREDD 2014) that what is needed
is “to create the enabling conditions to succeed from good governance and sus-
tainable financial policies to (arive at an) equitable distribution of benefits.” This
request also holds true for natural disaster risk management. When all stake-
holders are aware of the potential of synergies that can be made from intertwin-
ing social and natural sciences, the necessary transition will be accelerated. To be
successful the transition needs an enabling political environment that includes ele-
ments such as good governance, law enforcement, sustainable supporting financial
mechanisms, and an equitable distribution of benefits. Moreover the integration of
all stakeholders is required to provide innovative ideas for supporting a resilient
development and can help to develop and institutionalize certified standards on
risk reduction to safeguard the society, can lead to institutional reforms, regula-
tions, and norms, and include public education campaigns. Quantifying the ben-
efits can help to specify the opportunity costs of prevention measures and thus can
underline the benefits of disaster prevention for social and economic development.
The more groups that participate in the decision process the better the tradeoffs
of the money spent for prevention will be understood. One important measure to
increase acceptance of the required changes is to initiate research on the quan-
tification of the costs of inaction. The “Zero-Option” model, an increased coor-
dination of cross-sectoral planning and resource management will create a solid
foundation for the general goals of natural disaster risk management.
The described and listed instruments, initiatives, and experiences have all
proved their capability to change the behavioral attitude of a society in order to
come from a “culture of riskˮ to a “culture of prevention.”

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Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard,
Vulnerability, and Risk

Since the UNISDR publication Living with Risk (2004) the terms that are in use
in disaster risk management have been standardized and harmonized to a certain
degree. In the following a list of terms is given that have been collected from
well-known world leading organizations in disaster risk management, mainly
from UNISDR (2009) and from publications made by UNDRO-UNOCHA,
UN-ISDR, UNEP, UN-EHS, Australian Emergency Management Agency (EMA),
Federal Emergency Management Agency of America (FEMA), and the Springer
Encyclopedia of Natural Hazards.
Although we have now reached a certain level of harmonization there are many
glossaries published that indicate for many of the terms a larger band of inter-
pretation. The list is a selected choice of terms and outlines the sometimes large
definition variations and also indicates that many of the terms have changed their
definition in the course of time. The UNISDR (2004) publication gives each of the
terms special comments. The list below moreover presents a number of different
definitions that will be helpful to better understand the true meanings of the terms.
It is, however, recommended for the sake of a common international understand-
ing, to make use of the definitions published under UN-ISDR whenever possible.
Adaptation

Adjustment in natural and/or human systems to a new or changing environment

that exploits beneficial opportunities and moderates negative impacts.
The adjustment in natural or human systems is in response to actual or expected
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities. This definition mainly addresses the climate change topic but also
holds true as an application to nonclimatic factors such as soil erosion or surface
subsidence. Adaptation can occur in autonomous fashion, for example, through
market changes, or as a result of intentional adaptation policies and plans. Many
disaster risk reduction measures can directly contribute to better adaptation.

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 483

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2
484 Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk

Awareness
The extent of common knowledge about disaster risks, on the factors that lead to
disasters and the actions that can be taken individually and collectively to reduce
exposure and vulnerability to hazards. Public awareness is a key factor in effective
disaster risk reduction. Its development is pursued, for example, through the devel-
opment and dissemination of information through media and educational channels,
the establishment of information centers, networks, and community or participa-
tion actions, and advocacy by senior public officials and community leaders.
Catastrophe
A serious disruption of functioning of a community, causing widespread human,
material, economic, or environmental losses that exceed the ability of the com-
munity to cope with using its own resources. A great catastrophe is defined
if the event results in a death toll of >2000, the number of injured and home-
less >200,000, the total economic loss exceeds 5 % of the GDP or the country
appealed for external help.
Coping capacity
Positive factors that increase the ability of people and the society they live in to
cope effectively with hazards that increase their capability and capacity to with-
stand or otherwise reduce their susceptibility from natural hazards.
The ability of people, organizations, and systems, using available skills and
resources, to face and manage adverse conditions, emergencies, or disasters. The
capacity to cope requires continuing awareness, resources, and good management,
both in normal times as well as during crises or adverse conditions. Coping capac-
ities contribute to the reduction of disaster risks.
Climate change
A statistically significant variation in either the mean state of the climate or in its
variability, persisting for an extended period (typically decades or longer). Climate
change may be due to natural internal processes or to external forcing, including
changes in solar radiation and volcanic eruptions, or to persistent human-induced
changes in atmospheric composition or in land use.
Critical infrastructure
The primary physical structures, technical facilities, and systems that are socially,
economically, or operationally essential to the functioning of a society or commu-
nity, both in routine circumstances and in the extreme circumstances of an emer-
gency. Critical facilities include such things as transport systems, air and sea ports,
electricity, water, and communications systems, hospitals and health clinics, and
centers for fire, police, and public administration services.
Cumule
A disaster event can be the result of many different effects, that all are generated
by one single root cause. The cumule is the addition of all the different effects.
Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk 485

Disaster
Severe alteration in the normal functioning of a community or a society due to
hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social conditions, leading
to widespread adverse human, material, economic, or environmental effects that
require immediate emergency response to satisfy critical human needs and that
may require external support for recovery.
A serious disruption to community life that threatens or causes death or injury
in that community and/or damage to property which is beyond the day-to-day
capacity of the prescribed statutory authorities and which requires special mobi-
lization and organization of resources other than those normally available to those
authorities.
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing
widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses that exceed the
ability of the affected community/society to cope using its own resources.
Early warning
Provision of timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that
allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk
and prepare for effective response.
Elements at risk
Inventory of people, houses, roads or other infrastructure that are exposed to the
hazard.
Emergency
A present or imminent event that requires prompt coordination of actions concern-
ing persons or property to protect the health, safety, or welfare of people, or to
limit damage to property or the environment.
Emergency management
A range of measures to manage risks to communities and the environment; the
organization and management of resources for dealing with all aspects of emer-
gencies. Emergency management involves the plans, structures, and arrangements
established to bring together the normal endeavors of government, voluntary, and
private agencies in a comprehensive and coordinated way to deal with the whole
spectrum of emergency needs including prevention, response, and recovery.
The management of emergencies concerning all hazards, including all activities
and risk management measures related to prevention and mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery.
Emergency service
An agency responsible for the protection and preservation of life and property
from harm resulting from incidents and emergencies. Syn. “emergency services
authority” and “emergency service organization”.
486 Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk

Exposure
In the context of vulnerability to climate change, refers to the climate-related
stressors that influence particular systems, and can include stressors such as
droughts (e.g., in the context of water resources, agriculture, forestry) or sea-level
rise (e.g., coastal flooding, habitat loss).
People, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that are
thereby exposed to potential losses. Measures of exposure can include the num-
ber of people or types of assets in an area. These can be combined with the spe-
cific vulnerability of the exposed elements to any particular hazard to estimate the
quantitative risks associated with that hazard in the area of interest.
Extreme weather event
An event that is rare at a particular place and time of year. Definitions of “rare”
vary, but an extreme weather event would normally be as rare as or rarer than the
10th or 90th percentile of the observed probability density of weather events.
Frequency
A long-term average time-rate of an event in a given time duration.
The number of occurrences of an event in a defined period of time.
Geoengineering
Deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment as a strategy to
counteract anthropogenic climate change.
Greenhouse effect
Trapping and buildup of infrared radiation (heat) in the atmosphere (troposphere)
near the Earth’s surface. Some of the heat flowing back towards space from
Earth’s surface is absorbed by water vapor, carbon dioxide, ozone, and several
other gases in the atmosphere and then reradiated back toward Earth’s surface. If
the atmospheric concentrations of these greenhouse gases rise, the average tem-
perature of the lower atmosphere will gradually increase.
Greenhouse gas
Any gas that absorbs infrared radiation (heat) in the atmosphere. Greenhouse
gases include, but are not limited to, water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide, chlorofluorocarbons, hydro chlorofluorocarbons, ozone, hydro fluorocar-
bons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.
Hazard
A source of potential harm or a situation with a potential to cause loss; a potential
or existing condition that may cause harm to people or damage to property or the
environment.
A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon, or human activity
that may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic
Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk 487

disruption, or environmental degradation. Hazards can include latent conditions

that may represent future threats and can have different origins: natural (geologi-
cal, hydrometeorological, and biological) and/or induced by human processes
(environmental degradation and technical hazards). Hazards can be single, sequen-
tial, or combined in their origin and effects. Each hazard is characterized by its
location, intensity, and probability.
A potential threat to humans and their welfare that can vary in terms of magni-
tude as well as in frequency, duration, area extent, speed of onset, spatial disper-
sion, and temporal spacing.
A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon, or human activity that
may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disrup-
tion, or environmental degradation.
Hazard analysis
Identification, studies, and monitoring of any hazard to determine its potential
origin.
Hazard (geological)
Geological hazards include internal Earth processes of tectonic origin, such as
earthquakes, geological fault activity, tsunamis, volcanic activity and emissions, as
well as external processes such as mass movements (landslides, rockslides, rock-
falls, avalanches, surface collapses, and debris and mudflows).
Hazard occurrence probability
Probability of occurrence of a specified natural hazard at a specified severity level
in a probability-specified future time period.
The probability of occurrence of a specified natural hazard at a specified sever-
ity level in a specified future time period, elements at risk, an inventory of those
people or artifacts that are exposed to the hazard and vulnerability, or the degree of
loss to each element should a hazard of a given severity occur.
Hazardous physical event
Events that may be of natural, socionatural (originating in human degradation or
transformation of the physical environment), or purely anthropogenic origins and
that have the potential to deteriorate living conditions and pose a threat to the peo-
ple (see: Tobin and Montz 1997; Wisner et al. 2004).
Hazard physical exposure
The total number of technical, material, and ecological elements at risk, or an
inventory of those people or even (old) artifacts exposed to the hazard.
Human system
Any system in which human organizations play a major role. Often, but not
always, the term is synonymous with “society” or “social system,” for example,
agricultural system, political system, technological system, or economic system.
488 Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk

Human–natural system
Integrated systems in which human and natural components interact, such as
the interaction between socioeconomic and biophysical processes in urban
ecosystems.
Hydrologic cycle
The flow of water through the Earth system via the processes of evaporation, verti-
cal and horizontal transport of vapor, condensation, precipitation, and the flow of
water from continents to the ocean.
Hydrologic systems
The systems involved in the movement, distribution, and quality of water through-
out Earth, including both the hydrologic cycle and water resources.
Land use
The total of arrangements, activities, and inputs undertaken in a certain land
cover type. The term land use is also used in the sense of the social and eco-
nomic purposes for which land is managed (e.g., grazing, timber extraction, and
conservation).
Likelihood
The chance of an event or an incident happening, whether defined, measured, or
determined objectively or subjectively.
Mitigation
Actions taken to reduce the impact of disasters in order to protect lives, property,
and the environment, and to reduce economic disruption.
Measures taken in advance of a disaster aimed at decreasing or eliminating its
impact on society and the environment.
Structural and nonstructural measures undertaken to limit the adverse impact of
natural hazards, environmental degradation, and technical hazards.
An intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases
and other climate warming agents. This intervention could include approaches
devised to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere; to enhance
their removal from the atmosphere through storage in geological formations, soils,
biomass, or the ocean.
Monitoring
A scientifically designed system of continuing standardized measurements and
observations and their evaluation. Monitoring is specifically intended to continue
over long time periods.
Mortality
The number of fatalities divided by the number of people exposed.
Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk 489

Natural Hazards
A source of potential harm originating from a meteorological, environmental, geo-
logical, or biological event.
Preparedness
Measures to ensure that, should an emergency occur, communities, resources. and
services are capable of coping with the effects; the state of being prepared.
Activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to the
impact of disasters, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings
and the temporary removal of people from a threatened location.
The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional
response and recovery organizations, communities, and individuals effectively to
anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent, or cur-
rent hazard events or conditions. Preparedness action is carried out within the
context of disaster risk management and aims to build the capacities needed to
manage efficiently all types of emergencies and achieve orderly transitions from
response through to sustained recovery. This must be supported by formal institu-
tional, legal and budgetary capacities.
Prevention
Measures to eliminate or reduce the incidence or severity of emergencies.
Activities to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards and
related environmental, technological, and biological disasters.
Probability
Frequency with which an event occurs given a long sequence of identical and
independent trials in playing dice.
In statistics, a measure of the chance of an event or an incident happening.
Recovery
The coordinated process of supporting emergency-affected communities in recon-
struction of the physical infrastructure and restoration of emotional, social, eco-
nomic, and physical wellbeing.
The restoration and improvement wherever appropriate of facilities, liveli-
hoods, and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts
to reduce disaster risk factors. The recovery task of rehabilitation and reconstruc-
tion begins soon after the emergency phase has ended, and should be based on
pre-existing strategies and policies that facilitate clear institutional responsibilities
for recovery action and enable public participation. Recovery programs, coupled
with heightened public awareness and engagement after a disaster, are a valuable
opportunity to develop and implement disaster risk reduction measures.
490 Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk

Remote sensing
The technique of obtaining information about objects through the analysis of data
collected by instruments that are not in physical contact with the object of inves-
tigation. In a climate context, remote sensing is commonly performed from satel-
lites or aircraft.
Resilience
The capacity of a system, a community, or a society to resist or absorb the nega-
tive impact of a disaster in order to regain an acceptable level in functioning
and structure of the society after it has been exposed to external stress. In addi-
tion resilience determines the capability of a social system to organize itself or to
increase its capacity for adaptation to future hazardous situations and includes the
capacity to create foresight to defend external pressure.
The ability of a system to recover its capacity to function after a disturbance.
The capacity of a system, community, or society to adapt to disruptions result-
ing from hazards by persevering, recuperating, or changing to reach and maintain
an acceptable level of functioning.
The ability of a system, community, or society exposed to hazards to resist,
absorb,
accommodate to, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and effi-
cient manner.
The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retain-
ing the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organi-
zation, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change.
The capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergo-
ing change.
The ability of countries, communities, and households to manage change by
maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses, such
as earthquakes, drought, or violent conflict, without compromising their long-term
prospects.
The starting point for reducing disaster risk and promoting a culture of disaster
resilience that lies in the knowledge of the hazards and the physical, social, eco-
nomic, and environmental vulnerabilities to disasters that most societies face.
Response
Actions taken in anticipation of, during, and immediately after an emergency to
ensure that its effects are minimized, and that people affected are given immediate
relief and support
Risk
The likelihood of harmful consequences arising from the interaction of hazards, com-
munities, and the environment; the chance of something happening that will have an
impact upon objectives. It is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood; a
measure of harm, taking into account the consequences of an event and its likelihood.
Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk 491

The probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, inju-

ries, property, livelihoods, economic activity disrupted, or environment damaged)
resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulner-
able conditions. Conventionally risk is expressed by the notation:
• Risk = Hazard × Vulnerability: Coping Capacity
The term risk refers to the expected losses from a particular hazard to a specified
element at risk in a particular future time period. Loss may be estimated in terms
of human lives, buildings destroyed, or in financial terms.
The combination of the likelihood and the consequence of a specified hazard
being realized; refers to the vulnerability, proximity, or exposure to hazards, which
affects the likelihood of adverse impact.
An abstract concept closely related to uncertainty with different definitions in
different disciplines. In disaster risk reduction, risk is considered a function of
hazard, exposure, vulnerability, and values of elements at risk.
Risks are mental “constructions;” they are not real phenomena but originate in
the human mind.
Risks are abstract and cannot be managed; only the outcome can be managed.
Risks may have impact far beyond the initial incident location due to the inter-
woven network of the nation’s critical infrastructure.
Risks have the potential of being exacerbated by changes in environmental con-
ditions and failing infrastructure.
Risk acceptance
The level of potential losses that a society or community considers acceptable
under the prevailing social, economic, political, cultural, technical, and environ-
mental conditions. In engineering terms, acceptable risk is also used to assess and
define the structural and nonstructural measures and systems to a chosen tolerated
level.
Risk assessment
A process to determine the nature and extent of risk by analyzing potential haz-
ards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that could pose a potential
threat or harm to people, property, livelihoods, and the environment on which they
depend. The process of conducting a risk assessment is based on a review of both:
the technical features of hazards such as their location, intensity, frequency, and
probability; and an analysis of the physical, social, economic, and environmental
dimensions of vulnerability. The risk assessment does so while taking into particu-
lar account the coping capabilities pertinent to the risk scenarios.
A risk assessment method that assigns statistical values to risks.
Risk Communication
The imparting, exchanging, and/or receiving of clear, credible, and timely infor-
mation about the existence, nature, form, likelihood, severity, acceptability, treat-
ment, or other aspects of risk to improve decision making in risk management.
492 Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk

Risk communication is carried out among public authorities, risk assessors, risk
managers, the public, and all other interested parties. It is intended to achieve a
better understanding of risks and risk management.
Risk Identification
The process of finding, recognizing, and recording risks.
Risk Management
The use of policies, practices, and resources to analyze, assess, and control risks to
health, safety, environment, and the economy.
Consists of identifying and deterring threats, reducing vulnerabilities, and mini-
mizing consequences.
Process of identifying, analyzing, assessing, and communicating risk and man-
aging it considering associated costs and benefits of any actions taken.
Risk Perception
A stakeholder’s view of a risk. Risk perception reflects the stakeholder’s needs,
issues, knowledge, beliefs, and values.
Risk Profile
A description of an entity’s existing management practices, common vulnerabili-
ties, tolerance, and key interdependencies concerning its particular risks, as well as
an assessment of their relative likelihood, consequences, and priority.
Risk Tolerance
The willingness of an organization to accept or reject a given level of residual risk.
Risk tolerance may differ across an organization, but must be clearly understood
by those making risk-related decisions.
Scenario
A coherent description of a potential future situation that serves as input to more
detailed analyses or modeling. Scenarios are tools that explore, “if…, then….”
statements, and are not predictions of or prescriptions for the future.
Sensitivity
The degree to which a system is affected, either adversely or beneficially, by cli-
mate-related stimuli. The effect may be direct or indirect.
Severity
A measure of the disaster impact = loss value.
Stakeholders
Individuals or groups whose interests (financial, cultural, value-based, or other)
are affected by climate variability, climate change, or options for adapting to or
Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk 493

mitigating these phenomena. Stakeholders are important partners with the research
community for development of decision support resources.
Storm surge
The temporary increase, at a particular locality, in the height of the sea due to
extreme meteorological conditions (low atmospheric pressure and/or strong winds).
Structural/nonstructural measures
Structural measures are physical, technical, and structural measures to increase the
physical capacity to withstand a disaster impact.
Nonstructural measures concern the regulatory and organizational setup for
implementing disaster mitigation activities.
Susceptibility
Capacity for taking, receiving, being affected by, or undergoing of an entity by
external impression, impact, or influence.
How the characteristic of an entity is influenced by or interacts with external
factors that may change them in a way that the result may not be neutral or ben-
eficial, but may result in adverse events (injuries, degradation, deterioration, etc.).
Sustainability
Balancing the needs of present and future generations while substantially reducing
poverty and conserving the planet’s life support systems.
Sustainable development
Development that meets the needs of current generations without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
Synoptic
Pertaining to motions of whole weather systems, on spatial scales of hundreds to
thousands of kilometers and timescales on the order of a few days.
System
Integration of interrelated, interacting, or interdependent components into a com-
plex whole.
Threat
The presence of a hazard and an exposure pathway.
Threshold
A point in a system after which any change that is described as abrupt is one
where the change in the response is much larger than the change in the forcing.
The changes at the threshold are therefore abrupt relative to the changes that occur
before or after the threshold and can lead to a transition to a new state.
494 Annex A: Glossary of Definitions of Hazard, Vulnerability, and Risk

Trust/confidence
Trust = sharing the same values; confidence = having “trust” in the performance
competence of an organization.
Uncertainty
An expression of the degree to which a value (e.g., the future state of the climate
system) is unknown. Uncertainty in future climate arises from imperfect scientific
understanding of the behavior of physical systems, and from an inability to predict
human behavior.
Vulnerability
A set of conditions and processes resulting from physical, social, economic, and
environmental factors, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the
impact of hazards.
Reflects the range of potentially damaging events and their statistical variability
at a particular location.
The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse
effects of climate and global change, including climate variability and extremes, as
well as climate change in conjunction with other stressors.
From 1991 until today the focus on vulnerability has shifted from:
Potential damages: Vulnerability is expressed as the degree of expected damage as
a function of hazard intensity (UNDRO 1991)
to
People’s capacity to recover: Represents the interface between exposure to the
physical threats to human well-being and the capacity of people and communities
to cope with the those threats (UNEP 2002)
to
Factors that make a society vulnerable: The conditions determined by physical,
social, economic, and environmental factors or processes, which increase the sus-
ceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards (UNISDR 2004)
to
The system‘s capability to absorb risks: The extent to which the risk-absorbing
system reacts to stress (The International Risk Governance Council 2005)

Vulnerability Assessment
The process of identifying and evaluating vulnerabilities, describing all protective
measures in place to reduce them and estimating the likelihood of consequences.
Weather
The specific condition of the atmosphere at a particular place and time. It is mea-
sured in terms of parameters such as wind, temperature, humidity, atmospheric
pressure, cloudiness, and precipitation.
Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency
Management Agencies

Australia

Australian Emergency Management Institute

In order to prevent Australian communities from losses caused by disasters, the
Council of Australian Governments (COAG 2004) adopted a whole-of-nation
resilience-based approach to disaster management. Subsequently in 2011, the
Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management Committee (ANZEMC 2014)
developed the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR). The strategy rec-
ognizes that a national, coordinated, and cooperative effort is needed to enhance
Australia’s capacity to withstand and recover from emergencies and disasters.
It will be executed by a newly established National Emergency Management
Committee that includes experts from commonwealth, state, and territory and
local governments. Disaster resilience is defined as the collective responsibility
of all sectors of society, including all levels of government, business, the nongov-
ernment sector, and individuals. The strategy furthermore stipulates the collective
incorporation of the principles of disaster resilience into all sectors of public life.
The key messages of the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience are:
• Disasters will happen.
• Disaster resilience is a government’s as well as an individual’s business.
• All sectors of society have a role to play and should be prepared.
• Connected communities are resilient communities.
• Every Australian should know how to prepare for any natural disaster.
• Individuals should get ready to reduce the effects of future disasters.
• Individuals as well as official risk assessors should learn from experience.
The strategy stated that if public and private sectors work together with a united
focus and a collective but shared sense of responsibility, they will be far more
effective than the individual efforts of any one sector. The NSDR is the first step in
a long-term, evolving process to deliver sustained behavioral change and enduring

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 495

U. Ranke, Natural Disaster Risk Management,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20675-2
496 Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies

partnerships that are essential to building disaster-resilient communities. It is

expected that state, territory, and local governments will use the NSDR to inform
local action and business and community leaders, as well as the not-for-profit sec-
tor are also encouraged to embrace this approach. Strengthening Australia’s disas-
ter resilience is not a standalone activity that can be achieved in a set timeframe,
nor can it be achieved without a joint commitment and concerted effort by all sec-
tors of society. But it is an effort that is worth making, because building a more
disaster-resilient nation is an investment in our future. Exercising in a multiagency
environment is an integral part of preparedness. It allows organizations to prac-
tice working together in a simulated environment. A needs-based, objective-driven
approach delivers exercise outcomes that can be effectively used to assess policies,
procedures, and systems as part of a continual improvement and/or regulatory pro-
cess. To design multiagency emergency management exercises, it is important to
understand the structured exercise management process, which includes concept
development, planning, conducting, and evaluating.
The role of government is to strengthening the nation’s resilience to disasters
by:
• Developing and implementing effective, risk-based land management and spa-
tial planning
• Developing and carrying out a nationwide hazard assessment
• Developing and implementing disaster prevention and mitigation based on the
risk assessment
• Effective information of the population at risk about how to assess their particu-
lar risks and how to reduce exposure and vulnerability to hazard
• Ensuring the most effective disaster response from emergency services and
volunteers
• Supporting individuals and communities to prepare for extreme events
• Supporting communities to recover quickly from devastation and to learn, inno-
vate, and adapt in the aftermath of disastrous events
The role of individuals follows the vision that disaster resilience is in general
based on individuals. They should take their share of responsibility for preventing,
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. In order to strengthen
their coping capacities the strategy emphasizes that they should be provided with
specific and locally adoptable disaster risk reduction guidance, with technical and
scientific resources, and with organizational means to administer disaster reduc-
tion activities at the community level. The disaster resilience of people and house-
holds can significantly increase by active planning and preparation for protecting
life and property, based on awareness relevant to their locality. It is also increased
by knowing and being involved in local community disaster or emergency man-
agement arrangements, and for many being involved as a volunteer.
The role of nongovernment organizations and volunteers is defined in the strat-
egy as to be at the forefront of strengthening disaster resilience in Australia. The
dedicated work of these agencies and organizations is acknowledged as critical to
helping communities to cope with and recover from a disaster. It is to them, that
Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies 497

Australians often call for support or advice. The strategy appreciates the role non-
governmental organizations and volunteers have as partners to spread the disaster
resilience message and to find practical ways to strengthen disaster resilience in
the communities they serve.
In order to strengthen Australia’s risk reduction capacity the Australian
Emergency Management Institute (AEMI) was established and mandated as the
Centre of Excellence for knowledge and capability development in national emer-
gency management. As a part of the Attorney-General’s Department, Emergency
Management Australia division, AEMI provides a range of education, training,
professional development, information, research, and community awareness ser-
vices to the nation and our region. In executing the national strategy AEMI has
been given a significant role in building the capacity and professionalism of the
emergency management sector in Australia. The institute supports broaden-
ing the national security capability by a number of educational and awareness-
raising activities: the most prominent is the Advanced Diploma of Public Safety
“Emergency Management,” a nationally accredited and professional develop-
ment program. Moreover AEMI hosts a range of workshops based on the national
research and innovation agenda agreed by the Australia-New Zealand Emergency
Management Committee.

Canada

Public Safety Canada (PS)

Public Safety is the national Canadian agency that was created in 2003 with the
responsibility for protecting Canadians and helping to maintain a peaceful and
safe society. Public Safety Canada is mandated to coordinate all disaster and emer-
gency management in order to ensure national security and safety, from natural
disasters to crime and terrorism. Formerly known as Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness Canada (PSEPC 2014), PS is legally incorporated in the federal
Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. All together PS agen-
cies have an annual budget of $6 billion and more than 52,000 employees working
in every part of the country.
The department is in many ways similar to the US Department of Homeland
Security and covers in addition to natural disaster and emergency management,
the responsibilities for the Canada Border Services Agency, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the National Parole
Board, and the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency
Preparedness (OCIPEP). PS is the national hub of the national emergency manage-
ment system and serves as the center for monitoring and coordinating the federal
response to an emergency. The network of 11 regional offices provides day-to-day
regional operational support to the Government Operations Centre. The risk reduc-
tion efforts in Canada are implemented according to the shared responsibilities
498 Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies

of the federal governance structure (national–provincial–territorial) that assigned

each of the administrative levels specific mandates to ensure the development of
sustainable and resilient communities.
Geographically Canada borders on three oceans, stretches across six time
zones, encompasses mountains, plains, forests, and tundra. With all its landforms
and weather types, the possibilities of severe weather and geological events are
a constant reality. Canada hosts weather patterns that range from Arctic cold to
heat waves, with precipitation that is seemingly endless, to droughts. The geo-
logical situation favors the occurrence of all kinds and types of natural hazards
that regionally can lead to risks for people and their livelihood. As in all over the
world, also in Canada the frequency of natural disasters is increasing, leading to
significant personal, material, and economic strain on individuals, communities,
and the fiscal capacity of all levels of government. The historic disaster record
of Canada reveals the regular occurrence of blizzards, earthquakes, floods, hail-
storms, icebergs, sea ice, landslides, and mass movements as well as snow ava-
lanches, tornados, tsunamis, storm surges, and volcanic eruptions.
The PS emergency management structure comprises four interdependent risk-
reducing functions: prevention/mitigation, preparedness, response, and recov-
ery, and has therefore laid down its disaster management principles in “Canada’s
National Disaster Mitigation Strategy.” This strategy was developed collaboratively
by the federal, provincial, and territorial governments, sets out a comprehensive,
multidimensional approach that anticipates joint contributions, community-based
partnerships, and national-level initiatives. It is based on the agreed-upon vision of
all national and provincial stakeholders, that mitigation should play the central part
of the emergency management framework. The strategy emphasizes the common
vision for disaster mitigation activities in Canada, it integrates disaster mitigation
into Canada’s emergency management framework, and it identifies primary actions
that will be undertaken by federal, provincial, and territorial partners to support
implementation of the national strategy. Moreover it recognizes that to reach full
implementation, the national strategy will require a long-term effort. Through the
implementation of the National Disaster Mitigation Strategy, disaster risk reduc-
tion of individuals, communities, and infrastructure can be achieved.
The prevention and mitigation strategies as defined by the National Strategy
will reduce or prevent disasters, losses, and emergency response and recovery
costs that would otherwise be incurred. Experience with risk reduction in Canada
and other countries clearly demonstrates that mitigation actions provide signifi-
cant return on investment. For example, benefit–cost ratios for flood prevention
measures in Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom are 3:1, 4:1,
and 5:1, respectively. Already in 1960 Canada invested CN$63.2 million in the
Manitoba Red River Floodway and has thus saved an estimated CN$8 billion in
potential damage and recovery costs. Especially by specified mitigation measures,
it is envisaged that Canada's built environment (e.g., public utilities, transportation
systems, telecommunications, housing, hospitals, and schools) can be improved to
withstand the adverse impacts of natural forces.
Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies 499

The goal of the National Disaster Mitigation Strategy is:

To protect lives and maintain resilient, sustainable communities by fostering
disaster risk reduction as a way of life.
The principles reflect the essence of what the National Disaster Mitigation
Strategy aims to achieve and how it should be developed. The principles are:
• Preserve Life—protect lives through prevention
• Safeguard Communities—enhance economic and social viability by reducing
disaster impacts
• Fairness—consider equity and consistency in implementation.
• Sustainable—balance long-term economic, social, and environmental
considerations
• Flexible—be responsive to regional, local, national, and international perspectives
• Shared—ensure shared ownership and accountability through partnership and
collaboration
The PS set up the Canadian Disaster Database (CDD) that today contains detailed
disaster information on more than 900 natural, technological, and conflict events
that have happened since 1900. The CDD tracks “significant disaster events”
which conform to the Emergency Management Framework for Canada definition
of a “disaster” and meet one or more of the following criteria:
• 10 or more people killed
• 100 or more people affected/injured/infected/evacuated or homeless
• An appeal for national/international assistance
• Historical significance
• Significant damage/interruption of normal processes such that the community
affected cannot recover on its own
The database describes where and when a disaster occurred, the number of inju-
ries, evacuations, and fatalities, as well as a rough estimate of the costs. As much
as possible, the CDD contains primary data that are valid, current, and supported
by reliable and traceable sources, including federal institutions, provincial/terri-
torial governments, nongovernmental organizations, and media sources. Data are
updated and reviewed on a semi-annual basis.

Germany (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster

Assistance)

The protection of the population at risk in Germany lies according to the

Constitution (§70) in the sovereignty of the 16 German federal states and com-
prises disaster mitigation as well as prevention measures. In order to strengthen
the efficiency of the mitigation and prevention efforts both, the federal states and
the central government established the central command in risk management
500 Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies

in times of natural and man-made catastrophies: the Federal Agency of Civil

Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und
Katastrophenvorsorge (BBK 2008). The agency is commissioned with the classical
set of civil protection duties including hazard assessment and awareness raising of
the risk-exposed population, including warning and information. The agency orga-
nizes relief, rescue, and mitigation activities that are to be implemented together
with the authorities at local levels. In order to raise synergies at the national and
local level, the agency has built a Mutual Crisis Management Center (GMLZ)
and the central German Crisis Information System (deNIS), where information
on disastrous or crisis-affected regional situations is gathered and evaluated at the
local as well as national and international level. With the GMLZ and deNIS, the
agency coordinates and operates the crisis response activities of the federal states
and renders technical assistance on demand. The agency furthermore is highly
involved in prevention planning, disaster emergency management education and
training, as well as in disaster research mainly in disaster medical assistance.
In Germany the implementation of rescue and relief operations is organized in
general by volunteer organizations such as the Technical Help Services (THW),
local fire brigades, and several other organizations rendering medical and humani-
tarian assistance including the Red Cross, Malteser Hilfsdienst, and others. The
federal government covers the expenditures for the equipment and running costs
for risk mitigation activities according to the Federal Law on Civil Protection and
Catastrophe Assistance (§11,1). In Germany there is a long-standing tradition of
volunteer assistance in crisis response. More than 80,000 mostly young people
committed themselves under the auspices of the agency alone in the THW (2014)
to help in times of crisis. Due to standardized training and nationwide standard-
ized equipment, the volunteers of THW can be employed at very short notice.
THW also provides technical–humanitarian aid outside Germany. At almost all
major disasters worldwide THW was present to support the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) with development.
In the aftermath of World War II sirens were installed as the state’s only oper-
ated means of information in case of a crisis. The flood events along the Elbe and
Oder rivers revealed that system was well functioning. Together with the radio
and TV stations, information was disseminated to the public early and compre-
hensively. Nevertheless it was found that a new form of information dissemination
should be introduced in order to secure very fast communication all over the coun-
try. A satellite-based information system (SatWas) was established that enables
the agency to communicate information in case of a crisis very quickly. Since its
introduction in the year 2000 the BBK Crisis Center in Bonn and the 16 federal
state crisis centers, the main TV stations, and all major radio stations are opera-
tionally harmonized for immediate and comprehensive information transmission.
The many disaster events of the last years with their enormous economic
losses and the comparably high death toll have demonstrated how vulnerable even
modern societies such as Germany are still today. In response to that the Federal
Ministry for the Interior invented in 2002 together with the German federal states
Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies 501

a new strategy to reduce the risk from disasters in Germany. The strategy stipu-
lates emergency management as a joint responsibility of national as well as fed-
eral and local governments. One of the many pillars of the strategy is to carry out
regular joint emergency management exercises (LÜKEX) in order to optimize the
protection of the population based on various threat scenarios. LÜKEX exercises
are understood as “strategic exercises” that primarily aim at the strategic decision-
making level of the national and federal administrations, in particular the inter-
ministerial crisis staffs and the political-administrative staffs. The main objective
is to improve the common response capacity and to promote the development of a
coordination and decision-making culture in crisis management organizations. The
LÜKEX exercises deal with varying combinations of federal authorities, provid-
ers of critical infrastructure, relief organizations, and other NGOs. Five strategic
LÜKEX exercises have been carried since 2004, based on the following scenarios:
• LÜKEX 04: Extreme winter weather conditions with extensive electric power
failure
• LÜKEX 05: Terrorist attacks in connection with the 2006 FIFA World Cup
• LÜKEX 07: Global influenza pandemic
• LÜKEX 09/10: Terrorist threat involving conventional explosives, chemical and
radioactive weapons (dirty bomb)
• LÜKEX 11: Security of information technology threatened by massive
cyberattack
The wide range of participants and the meanwhile long-standing tradition resulted
in an increased trust of the participants and have helped to improve crisis manage-
ment in real national crisis situations.
The threats exposing Germany daily to the different hazards are steadily moni-
tored and interpreted at the Federal Emergency Assessment Center (GMLZ). The
center’s main target is to collect, assess, and forecast identified risk scenarios. The
center than disseminates the information to the local authorities. For an appropri-
ate and immediate response to the population on risk events the Federal Office of
Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance has established the information system
“deNIS” that collects all relevant data on hazards, disasters, and ermergency cases
and renders information direct and online to the authorities and population.
On the occasion of the flood in 2013 in the Upper Elbe of the Danube region
private initiatives started using the networks to disseminate information and
requests for help. In the cities of Passau and Leipzig (Germany) the initiatives
were able to reach more than 100,000 supporters and private helpers within two
days. Technical developments such as the Internet today make a new kind of sup-
port possible that was not even thinkable years ago: the use of social networks
such as Twitter or Facebook in case of disasters. The social networks detailed the
locations where helping hands were needed, where to fill sandbags, or where to
clear flooded houses of rubbish and to help transport equipment or personnel to
certain locations. Even the local authorities acknowledged the support and inte-
grated the initiatives into their rescue operations and were thus able to reach and
mobilize more private helpers than ever before in similar events.
502 Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies

European Union (European Commission’s Humanitarian

Aid and Civil Protection Directorate General (ECHO)

The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Directorate

General (EU-ECHO 2014) provides rapid and effective support to victims of
disasters beyond the European Union’s borders. ECHO has therefore in 1996
launched a specific program “DIPECHO” (Disaster preparedness dedicated to
disaster preparedness). The importance of disaster preparedness is clearly recog-
nized in ECHO’s mandate and in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid
adopted in 2007. Disaster preparedness has been placed high up on the agenda
for Good Humanitarian Donorship agreed-upon in 2003 in Stockholm. ECHO
strongly supports all international efforts, including those coordinated by the
United Nations, to increase disaster risk reduction worldwide. ECHO has actively
participated in the development of the “EU Strategy Supporting Disaster Risk
Reduction in Developing States” adopted in February 2009. This strategy com-
mits the European Union to integrate disaster risk reduction effectively into every
EU development and humanitarian policy. It obligates advocating the European
Commission, the European Union member states, national governments, interna-
tional financial institutions, and other development partners to ensure that disaster
risk reduction becomes an integral part of sustainable development policy. ECHO
especially contributed to formulating the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015
and participated strongly in establishing the International System for Disaster
Reduction (ISDR). During the United Nations sessions of the Global Platform
for Disaster Risk Reduction, ECHO actively supported its strategy in Community
Based Preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRM).
The DIPECHO program focuses on highly vulnerable communities living
in some of the most disaster-prone regions of the world and is targeted on sav-
ing lives, providing relief, and rendering assistance to natural disaster vulnerable
groups by people-oriented preparedness measures at the national or regional level.
Moreover it comprises specific measures to complement strategies in disaster-
affected countries, that enable local communities and institutions to better prepare
for, mitigate, and respond adequately to natural disasters. The programs are tar-
geted to increase local resilience and reduces their vulnerability by enhancing the
coping capacities. DIPECHO projects are implemented through a wide range of
partners, including local organizations that provide access to the most marginal-
ized and vulnerable people. They typically emphasize training, capacity-building,
awareness-raising, establishment or improvement of local early-warning systems,
and contingency planning. There are numerous examples where community-based
preparedness measures enable the communities to be better prepared to save their
own lives and their livelihoods when disasters strike. As any other relief provided by
ECHO, DIPECHO projects are carried out by European-based aid agencies in close
cooperation with UN organizations and local NGOs and national authorities. The
best results are only achieved when there is effective cooperation between citizens,
civil society groups, and local, regional, and national authorities.
Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies 503

Since the launch of the DIPECHO program in 1996, ECHO has invested more
than €255 million in disaster preparedness. The program had been expanded over
the years and now covers eight disaster-prone regions: the Caribbean, Central
America, South America, Central and South Asia, Southeast Asia, Southern
Africa, and Southwest Indian Ocean and Pacific Region. The projects funded by
the program include simple preparatory measures, often implemented by the com-
munities themselves.
ECHO’s contribution to disaster preparedness goes well beyond the DIPECHO
program as many of ECHO’s major humanitarian programs include disaster pre-
paredness or mitigation of disaster impacts. ECHO acknowledges that disaster risk
reduction is a long-term challenge and is therefore encouraging other stakehold-
ers to integrate disaster risk reduction systematically in their strategies. Especially
post-disaster emergency responses are seen to comprise significant risk reduction
elements.
United Nations
Centre de Recherches Epidemiologiques et des Disastres (CRED-EMDAT), The
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED 2014), was estab-
lished in 1973 with the aim of providing standardized data compilation, valida-
tion, and analysis on natural and man-made disasters. The center is located within
the School of Public Health of the Univerity of Catholique de Louvain in Brussels
(Belgium). CRED activities focus on humanitarian and emergency situations with
major impacts on human health. This includes all types of natural disasters such
as earthquakes, floods, windstorms, famines, and droughts; and man-made disas-
ters creating mass displacement of people from civil strife and conflicts as well as
the burden of disease arising from disasters and complex emergencies. CRED also
undertakes research in the broader aspects of humanitarian crises, such as human
rights and humanitarian law, socioeconomic and environmental issues, early warn-
ing systems, the special needs of women and children, and mental health care.
According to its charter as a nonprofit institution CRED provides free and
open access to its data through its website. The center has become a World Health
Organisation Collaborating Centre in 1980. Since then, it has increased its inter-
national network substantially and became a collaborative partner with the UN
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-DHA) and mainly with all leading
disaster relief and emergency management organizations of the world, such as
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA-USAID), the European Union
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), or the International Federation of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent, as well as with nearly all nongovernmental agencies. In addi-
tion, the center has established a dense network with a great majority of interna-
tional academic institutions. Systematic collection and analysis of disaster-related
data provide invaluable information to governments and agencies in charge of
relief and recovery activities. It also aids the integration of health components into
development and poverty alleviation programs. However, there is a lack of interna-
tional consensus regarding best practices for collecting these data. Together with
the complexity of collecting reliable information, there remains huge variability
504 Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies

in definitions, methodologies, tools, and sourcing. EMDAT provides an objective

basis for vulnerability assessment and rational decision making in disaster situ-
ations. For example, it helps policymakers identify disaster types that are most
common in a given country and have had significant historical impacts on specific
human populations. In addition to providing information on the human impact of
disasters, such as the number of people killed, injured, or affected, EMDAT pro-
vides disaster-related economic damage estimates and disaster-specific interna-
tional aid contributions.
CRED’s activities cover applied research, the development of management tools,
logistics, and training on all disaster risk management-related topics. CRED enjoys
political and financial autonomy and flexibility which allows it to respond rapidly
to situations and to maintain a variety of activities in agreement with the developing
needs of its field. Its location in Brussels moreover allows active links with different
European Commission programs. The center organizes courses and workshops all
over the world on different disciplines such as medical and public health fields (epi-
demiology, planning, environment, biostatistics), disaster database management,
medical anthropology, nutritional sciences, and documentation as well as mass
communication. The working languages of the staff are French and English.
One of CRED’s core products is the Emergency Events Disaster Database
(EMDAT). EMDAT is the only public domain natural disaster database, next to
the two other global private sources of Sigma from Swiss Reinsurance Company
and NatCat from Munich Reinsurance Company. The database main objective is
to serve the purposes of humanitarian action at the national and international lev-
els in all sectors of disaster management to rationalize decision making for disas-
ter preparedness, as well as provide an objective base for vulnerability assessment
and priority setting. For example, it allows one to decide whether floods in a given
country are more significant in terms of its human impact than earthquakes or
whether a country is more vulnerable than another for computing resources.
Today CRED has cooperation agreements with 129 countries and specific insti-
tutions worldwide and has become in the course of time the official provider for
statistical data on natural disasters worldwide. EMDAT contains essential core
data on the occurrence and effects of over 16,000 mass disasters in the world from
1900 to present. The database today comprises more than millions of data million
pieces of information on disasters. Data are only entered when information has
been transmitted to them by the collaborating governments and agencies and when
they fulfill at least one of the following criteria:
• 10 or more people reported killed
• 100 people reported affected
• A call for international assistance
• Declaration of a state of emergency has been given
The EMDAT database contains disaster profiles on all countries of the world for
the 10 main natural disasters, including a summary of events from 1900 to 2014.
Separate profiles for natural and technological disasters exist. The “Disaster
Profile” provides data specified according to the main disaster types from droughts
Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies 505

to wildfire. The “Disaster List” gives data that allows the generation of a list of
disaster events for a particular country and region and a certain period of time.
In addition to providing information on the human impact of disasters CRED
also runs a number of different databases and research activities, including:
• CE-DAT (Human Impact of Complex Emergencies). The database provides
access to a series of health indicators, as an essential source of nutritional,
health, and mortality data.
• emBRACE (Building Resilience Amongst Communities in Europe) that aims to
elaborate a European-wide conceptual framework of disaster reduction. It devel-
ops a conceptual and methodological approach to clarify how the resilience
capacity of a society confronted with natural hazards and disasters can be char-
acterized, defined, and measured by specific indicators.
• EM-BIB (Emergency Management Bibliography Database) was established in
1988 and contains more than 15,000 documents, articles, and books on disaster
and conflict-related topics.
• MICRODIS (Integrated Health Social and Economic Impacts of Extreme
Events—Evidence, Methods and Tools) was envisioned to improve the under-
standing of health vulnerabilities and risk factors for disaster impacts.
• MICROCON (Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict), analyzes violent con-
flicts of the world by an in-depth, micro-level analysis of the conflict cycle.
In addition to the EMDAT database, CRED publishes a series of different jour-
nals and press releases. The most prominent are the newsletter CRED Crunch pub-
lished biannually about the general disaster situations of the world. Meanwhile
more than 30 such newsletters have been published, or special country risk profiles
given in the CE-Dat Spotlights or the CE-Dat Scene.

United States of America

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Based on the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Department of Homeland Security
was established in 2002 to integrate all organizations related to national security into
a single agency (FEMA 2014). Establishing the DHS was the largest US govern-
ment reorganization in 50 years. The department has three primary objectives:
To prevent terrorist attacks within the United States
To reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism
To minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur
DHS officially began operation early in 2003 and established a multicolor-coded
“Terrorism Risk Advisory Scale” to provide a comprehensive and effective means
to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to federal, state,
and local authorities and to the American people. The Department of Homeland
506 Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies

Security is headed by the Secretary of Homeland Security who is appointed by the

president of the United States with the consent of the United States Senate.
Within the department several component agencies and internal divisions are
consolidated, among them the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The agency was originally created by President Carter and dedicated to manag-
ing natural disasters. FEMA’s primary purpose is to coordinate the response to
natural, technical, or other man-made disasters that occur in the United States,
including external territories such as Puerto Rico. The main rationale for FEMA to
deliver its services is that the local or federal state authorities declare themselves
not capable of coping with the disaster. As delineated in the National Response
Plan, emergency response and planning is first and foremost a local government
responsibility. When local government declares itself not able to cope with the
diasters, it requests additional resources from the county level; if this capacity is
exhausted, then from the state and then the federal government. For FEMA to take
over, the governor of the state in which the disaster occurs must officially declare
a State of Emergency and formally request FEMA to respond to the disaster. The
only exception to the state’s gubernatorial declaration requirement occurs when an
emergency and/or disaster takes place on federal property or to a federal asset.
FEMA supported the nation in some of its former greatest crises. FEMA per-
sonnel have been engaged during the great Midwest floods of 1993, the Northridge
earthquake in 1994, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, as
well as during the many hurricanes and flood disasters. FEMA has its headquar-
ters in Washington, DC, and also runs 10 regional offices located throughout the
country. These offices work closely with other federal agencies, strategic partners
and tribal, state, and local officials in their regions. The annual budget of DHS is
about US$50 billion of which about US$7 billion are allocated to FEMA, the big-
gest single budget provision. FEMA’s core mission is to prepare the United States
for every kind of disaster. It aims to reduce the loss of life and property and to
improve the capability to prevent and mitigate all hazards. FEMA wants to be the
first responder in an emergency case. The agency defines emergency management
as “the governmental function that coordinates and integrates all activities neces-
sary to build, sustain and improve the capability to prepare for, protect against,
respond to, recover from, or mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters,
acts of terrorism or other man-made disasters.” As of November 2007, FEMA has
responded to more than 2700 presidentially declared disasters.
Recognizing the specific commonalities between natural hazard preparedness
and civil defense activities (known as the “dual-use approach” to emergency pre-
paredness planning and resources, FEMA developed the Integrated Emergency
Management System, an all-hazards based on preparedness, response, recovery, and
mitigation, and which provided direction, control, and warning systems common to
the full range of emergencies from small isolated events to the ultimate emergency.
FEMA enacted the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), a conceptual
guide to ensure nationwide coordination and recovery planning at all administra-
taive levels before a disaster, and defines how to work following a disaster. Within
the framework for the first time, all national agencies and administrations were
Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies 507

coordinated, leadership, roles, and responsibilities defined and recovery planning

before a disaster happens clearly assigned. It outlines how important state, local,
and tribal leadership and participation of community members in decision making
and coordinated engagement of organizations is critical for successful recovery. The
framework emphasis is on core principles, such as individual and family empower-
ment and partnership and inclusiveness. To serve disaster victims and communities
more quickly and effectively, FEMA builds on experience, applies lessons learned
and best practices from field operations, gathers feedback from many sources, and
constantly strives to improve upon its operational core competencies. FEMA estab-
lished an Emergency Management Institute located in Emmitsburg, Maryland.
Together with the National Fire Academy (NFA) both organizations meanwhile
have trained more than 7000 residential students each year and thousands more in
the field and through distance-learning courses. In pursuing the strengthening of the
capacity to mitigate future disasters, FEMA is financing the acquisition of strategic
buyouts of, for instance, high flood risk properties or is allocating funds and advo-
cacy to encourage communities to adopt better building practices and codes.
But on the occasion of the most costly natural catastrophe of the United States,
the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA did not perform according to its own
vision and mission, creating an emergency situation that was later described
a “failure of state.” In the aftermath FEMA was heavily criticized for its slow
response and inability to coordinate its efforts with other federal agencies’ relief
organizations. The criticism focused primarily on administrative mismanagement
and the great lack of preparation in the relief efforts: for instance, many victims
were left in New Orleans without water, food, or shelter, or the deaths of several
citizens by thirst, exhaustion, and extensive violence by officials and as well as
from bandits. Within days a general public debate arose about the local, state, and
federal government’s role in the response to the storm. This led the government to
enact the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act signed by the president in October
2006. The Act substantially reorganized FEMA to become a “new” authority.
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 created a “New
FEMA.” With an expanded mission more responsibility of homeland security pre-
paredness was given to the regions. The new FEMA leads and supports the nation
in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness,
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. FEMA is forward-leaning, able,
agile, and reliable. Businesslike in its approach, FEMA inspires public trust and
workforce pride. Through timely information, resources, tools, and technical assis-
tance, FEMA is helping families and communities overcome all hazards—natural
and man-made—and helping America build an overall culture of preparedness.

Switzerland
Swiss Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP)
The Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP 2014) supports the cantons
and municipalities as well as the partner organizations in their civil protection
508 Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies

activities in the Swiss Confederation. With the creation of the FOCP in 2003,
all areas of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, and
others that are specialized in civil protection issues were grouped together. This
restructuring reflects the growing importance of civil protection that integrates
emergency management, protection, rescue, and relief systems. On January 1st,
2004, the Federal Council enacted the new “Federal Law on Civil Protection
and Protection and Support” (BZG) that was agreed with 80 % of the votes by
the Swiss citizens through a special referendum. The FOCP has around 300
staff and offices are spread over several locations. The FOCP headquarters with
the National Divisions of Planning and Coordination, Training, Infrastructure,
and Support is located in Berne. The partner organizations of FOCP are the can-
tonal police, the fire service, health service, and technical service of the different
communities.
As Switzerland is periodically affected by natural and technical disasters that
threaten the general population and its livelihood or at least impose significant
constraints on everyday life, dealing with catastrophes and emergencies poses a
great challenge to the national and cantonal administrations. FOCP therefore iden-
tifies, analyzes, and evaluates all potential hazards and risks based on probability
of occurrence and the extent of damage following an integrated risk management
strategy. The findings are to provide the basis for planning prevention measures
and to delineate emergency provisions for coping with catastrophes and emergen-
cies. The results are regularly made public in the form of emergency bulletins and
are often laid down in maps that display the potentially hazardous regions. In civil
protection, integrated risk management is understood as the systematic approach
to cope with hazards and emergencies by using well- balanced measures of pre-
paredness, response, and recovery.
The concept of integrated risk management carried out by FOCP encompasses
prior to an disaster event:
• Assessment of hazards
• Evaluation of risks
• Planning of risk reduction measures
• Provision of advisory services and technical support
In case of an emergency:
• Planning and implementation of rescue and relief operations
• Planning and implementation to support the reconstruction and recovery phase
One of the partners of FOCP is the world-famous Swiss Institute for Snow and
Avalanche Research (SLF) that for decades has been engaged in research on snow,
natural hazards, avalanches, permafrost, and the mountain ecosystems as well as
the analysis of climate and environmental changes. SLF is active in both basic and
applied research targeted at developing practical instruments for national and can-
tonal authorities, industry, and the general public that can be used to manage the
risk associated with natural hazards mostly derived from snow. In close connection
Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies 509

with its research activities SLF also offers a range of services. These include con-
sulting, expert opinions on avalanche accidents and avalanche protection, and the
development of warning systems for natural hazards in the Alps. The best-known
service is the avalanche bulletin or warning report for the Swiss Alps, which is
published twice daily in wintertime. SLF employees furthermore teach at the
University of Zurich (ETH) and various universities in Switzerland and abroad,
and provide basic and further training for safety experts.
One of the main research fields of SLF is to improve knowledge of snow ava-
lanches. As they constitute a type of very fast-moving mass movement, they often
cause serious property damage and loss of life. Most snow avalanches are released
from slopes steeper than about 30°, or are triggered by snow loading due to wind,
by a temperature change, or are even triggered artificially, for example, by skiing.
As it is so far not possible to predict the exact location, time, and extent of an ava-
lanche event, SLF is carrying out extensive research on snow to better understand
the underlying formation processes of avalanches in order to improve avalanche
prediction. The research activities include the following topics:
• Snow failure and avalanche initiation
• Fracture mechanics of snow
• Snow slope stability and stability tests
• Critical snowpack layering
• Monitoring of instabilities on a slope
• Spatial variability of snowpack properties and its relevance for avalanche
formation
• Precursor signals using seismic instruments
• Upward-looking radar technology
• Formation of wet-snow avalanches
• Modeling snowpack instability with the snow cover model SNOWPACK
• Stability evaluation and avalanche forecasting
SLF publishes regular bulletins and brochures on the snow and avalanche situ-
ation of Switzerland, especially the weekly Bulletin on Avalanche that was first
published in 1954. The bulletin indicates on a scale from one to five a forecast
on the snow avalanche hazard distribution. The scale is now standardized Europe-
wide and is also adopted in the United States and Canada. The bulletin addresses
public authorities (snow avalanche security services, public health services) but
also the public that is exposed to snow avalanche threats as well as recreation-
ists. The intention of the bulletin is to drop the fatalities of the present approxi-
mately 25 snow avalanche events every year, of which 90 % are recreationists.
SLF further operates a Web-based, interactive avalanche prevention platform.
With the bulletin SLF raises awareness on the avalanche danger that prevails out-
side marked and open pistes, offers a wealth of information on the subjects of ava-
lanche science and avalanche prevention, and contains a new tour planning tool
(White Risk).
510 Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies

Volcanic Ash Advisory Center (VAAC)

On June 24th, 1982 a British Airways B747 flight was on the route from London
to New Zealand, crossing the Indonesian Archipelago when at about 10,000 m
height passed volcanic ash from the eruption of the nearby Mt. Gulanggung (Java).
First the cockpit crew noted a gleaming light outside the aircraft’s windscreen.
Then smoke began to accumulate in the passenger cabin, that had a strong odor
of sulphur. Passengers noted that the engines were unusually bright, with light
shining forward through the fan blades. One engine after other began to flame out.
The reason for the failure was not immediately apparent to the crew or ground
control. The aircraft was diverted to Jakarta and while gliding downwards finally
succeeded in restart all four engines, allowing the aircraft to land safely. The glid-
ing of the aircraft entered into the Guinness Book of Records as the longest glide
of a commercial aircraft ever. Nine days later a Singapore Airlines flight passing
the same ash cloud was also forced to shut down three of its four engines. Post-
flight investigation revealed that the aircraft flew through a cloud of volcanic ash.
The ash particles sandblasted the windscreen and clogged the engines. As the ash
entered the engines, the mineral ash particles melted in the turbine (combustion
temperature is 1400 °C and thus about 200 °C hotter than the solidus tempera-
ture of volcanic glass) and recrystallized on the turbine blades. A nearly identi-
cal incident occurred in December 1989 when a KLM flight from Amsterdam to
Anchorage encountered the ash plume of the Mt. Redout volcano, Alaska.
Following these incidents a network of Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAAC
2014) was set up in the 1990s by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), an agency of the United Nations to increase air traffic safety. Nine cen-
ters were installed all over the world, each one focusing on a particular geographi-
cal region, to assess the danger to commercial aviation from ash clouds and thus
to alert pilots early to divert their flight around the cloud. In order to develop an
integrated volcanic ash observing system the centers are established with national
meteorological offices, for instance, in Britain (British Met Office), the United
States (NOAA), or France (Meteo France) and others. There experts steadily mon-
itor all available observations on volcanic activities such as from satellite, radar,
lidar, and aircraft and continuously measure the volcanic ash concentration lev-
els using aerosol radio sondes. The experts are responsible for coordinating and
disseminating information and forecasting the ash cloud’s dispersion. An accurate
assessment of the height of the initial eruptive volcanic ash plume is critical for
predicting the subsequent trajectory of a volcanic ash plume. Traditional weather
radar technology is able to provide such an assessment, because volcanic ash in
the eruptive plume is highly reflective. The experts further use the volcanic infor-
mation bulletins rendered by the Smithsonian Institution and the USGS. The cen-
ters provide a real-time assessment of the horizontal and vertical extent of volcanic
ash and on the possible associated volcanic ash concentration levels. Moreover the
pilots are called on to report immediately to the centers on every sign of height-
ened volcanic activity, especially upon detection of a sulphur smell in the cabin
Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies 511

as volcanoes are the only sources of large quantities of sulphur gases at cruise
altitudes. Thus both SO2 and H2S are indicators of volcanic activity even if no
other signs are detectable or reported. The issuance of an alert follows an interna-
tionally standardized procedure (see Sect. 2.1) based on a specific color code that
gives the alert levels from green (normal) to red (eruption imminent). The alert
communication moreover comprises information on the name of the volcano, the
country, location, and crater elevation, the source of the information, such as satel-
lite or pilot observation, details of the eruption including time of day in universal
time and date of the eruption, details of the ash cloud including the flight level and
size, details on the current movement of the ash cloud and the expected ash cloud
trajectory.

Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC), Hawaii

During the early morning of April 1st, 1946, an earthquake of magnitude 7.4
occurred in an area of the Aleutian Trench located approximately 90 miles south
of Unimak Island (Aleutian Island chain). During the earthquake, a large sec-
tion of seafloor was tectonically uplifted along the subduction fault generating a
large, Pacific-wide tsunami. Well-documented accounts of the tsunami come from
Scotch Cap, located on Unimak Island, and from the Hawaiian Islands. The tsu-
nami wave reached a height of about 40 m at the Uminak coast, destroyed a Coast
Guard lighthouse, and killed the five lighthouse men. Five hours later the first
tsunami waves reached the islands of Hawaii in the middle of the Pacific Ocean.
The complete destruction of the lighthouse made any information dissemination
on the event impossible. Thus the tsunami hit the islands without prior warning.
The tsunami wave heights reached an estimated maximum of 15 m on the dif-
ferent islands. They inundated the coast region for some 100 m inland in some
locations and produced extensive destruction along the shorelines of the Hawaiian
Islands, especially at Hilo harbor, on the big island of Hawaii. There the entire
city’s waterfront was destroyed. In total 159 people were killed. Impressive photos
and an amateur movie had documented the wave front and the intensive destruc-
tion at Hilo harbor. In addition to Hawaii other coasts of the United States were
also strongly affected by the tsunami. So the community of Taholah, Washington
State was struck by an approximate 1 m surge; Coos Bay, Oregon, reported a 3-m
wave. The tsunami was also noticed in Santa Barbara and farther down to the Los
Angeles area. The tsunami crossed the Pacific, producing waves up to 10 m high
in some locations at the Marquesas Islands in French Polynesia, and even had the
power to damage fishing boats in Chile.
Following the 1946 earthquake cum tsunami, the Pacific Tsunami Warning (PTWC
2014) was established in 1949 on Ewa Beach, on the island of Oahu (Hawaii). The
Center is one of two Tsunami Warning Centers that are operated by United States
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). PTWC is part of an
International Tsunami Warning System (ITWS) and serves as the operational center for
512 Annex B: International Disaster and Emergency Management Agencies

the Pacific Ocean. The other tsunami warning center is the National Tsunami Warning
Center (NTWC) in Alaska, serving all coastal regions of Canada and the United
States, the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. The function of PTWC is car-
ried out under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) and the International Oceanographic Council (IOC) running
the International Coordination Group for the Pacific Tsunami Warning System.
In the aftermath of the deadly tsunami of the Indian Ocean in 2004 PTWC has
extended its area of investigation and today includes the entire Indian Ocean and
the Caribbean into its warnings. In 2004 PTWC did not immediately gave a warn-
ing to the Indian Ocean riparian, although their instruments indicated a severe and
tsunamogenic earthquake, as this area was not their responsibility. When a warn-
ing was released later it was too late. Nevertheless even if the warning had been
disseminated in time, there would not have been enough time to evacuate the peo-
ple at risk, as the tsunami traveled the distance from the epicenter to the shoreline
of Sumatra within 15 min.
The PTWC uses the international grid of seismic data networks as its starting
point. When an earthquake is generated with a magnitude higher than 5.0 and the
plate tectonic situation of the area favors the generation of a tsunami, the regional
network of tide gauges is used to pinpoint the occurrence. Then based on the
regional oceanographic data (seabed morphology, ocean tides, etc.) the possible
tsunami track is calculated. The interpreted forecast of the future of the tsunami
is then issued to emergency managers and other officials, to news media, and the
public all around the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean. In addi-
tion to the international seismic grid, NOAA has deployed more than 30 of its
own sea bottom tsunami detection buoys that are placed on the Pacific Ocean floor
(DART buoys = Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami). Each station
consists of a sea-bed bottom pressure recorder that detects the passage of a tsu-
nami and transmits the data via acoustic modem to the PTWC headquarter in Ewa
Beach. The system has meanwhile demonstrated its usefulness and has consider-
ably improved the forecasting and warning of tsunamis in the Pacific Ocean.

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