Learning Task 3

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This focuses on Max Frischeisen-scientific Köhler's philosophy, which he created in

opposition to the Neo-Kantians. Frischeisen-Köhler took inspiration from both Wilhelm


Dilthey, his professor, and Edmund Husserl. I look at Frischeisen-critique Köhler's of
Southwestern Neo-Kantianism and Marburg in the first four sections. This argument is
based on the idea that reality enters cognition as a totally autonomous part that
cognition must recognise and can never create from inside its own inherent lawfulness.
In the fifth section I focus on Frischeisen-Köhler’s “phenomenology”. His main thesis is
that reality is experienced as such in action in such a way that our consciousness of
reality does not stem from theoretical considerations about the hypothetical causes of
our sensations but from our transactions in the world as agents.

Science is thus founded on this pre-scientific experience of reality. I end by offering a


phenomenological critique of Frischeisen-division Köhler's between individual
subjectivity and consciousness as a whole. The methodical examination of experience
through phenomenological analysis, which is not introspective, captures the actual
experience of an already embodied and placed subject in the world. Thus, psyche or
consciousness is seen to have a (intersubjective) life-world that enables
communication and the sharing of emotions, moods, and experiences. These are
neither "within" nor "outside," but they inscribe us into the world and therefore disclose
the world to us. It is through this that we are given to ourselves as sentient,
communicative creatures. Affective states cannot exist independently of our reality as a
whole or the environment in which we perceive them. They are inextricably linked to
both of these elements of our psyche. They are constantly presented to us as
occurrences that have meaning, and in these coordinates, they organize our overall
experience of the world and of ourselves. As such, they cannot be distinguished from
our senses, our thoughts, or our urges to take action. Affective states manifest in the
interactive (inter)space of human behavior in social circumstances. Emotions and
moods differ fundamentally structurally from one another.
I consider the dominant term in his work and argue that the only type of consciousness
that fits Nietzsche's characterization of this dominant term is self-consciousness
(consciousness). Second, in the light of Nietzsche's treatment of perception and
sensation, we should conclude that he regards each of these types of states as a
specific kind of consciousness distinct from the unconscious. Two additional types of
consciousness are called perceptual consciousness (P-consciousness) and qualitative
consciousness (Q-consciousness). I conclude my essay with some remarks on how
these three different types of consciousness might be related in Nietzsche's paintings.

The main currents in the investigation of monomodal, polymodal and intermodal modes
of perception in philosophy, psychology and linguistics are analyzed. The sensory
reflection of objective reality is represented by two different attitudes of our
consciousness towards the subject: sensation and perception. The first traces of the
close connection between the study and knowledge of these phenomena are found in
the works of ancient philosophers. In addition to the philosophical development of the
idea, the interplay of the five sensory modalities was demonstrated. This fact is
supported by various studies by psychologists, further researching perceptual modes in
their multimodal and intermodal symptoms. All this formed the basis of the linguistic
study of worldviews and their reflections as they relate to perception. However, the
current results of linguists do not form a coherent idea of ​this linguistic worldview
fragment in general, and the English worldview in particular.

Source: February 2016


● Philosophia Scientiae 20(20-1):119-142
DOI:10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1158

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