Judge Torres Order
Judge Torres Order
Judge Torres Order
recently published interview of Plaintiff on NBC News. ECF Nos. 46, 46-1; see also ECF No.
52. In the interview, Plaintiff, speaking anonymously, explained her allegations against
Defendants and her reasons for coming forward now. See generally ECF No. 46-1. Carter’s
lawyer points to the interview—in which Plaintiff admitted to inconsistencies in her story—as
evidence that Plaintiff’s claims have “no factual basis whatsoever.” ECF No. 46 at 2. He also
argues that Plaintiff’s counsel violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) by “fail[ing] to
undertake a reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing the complaint” and failing to seek
admission pro hac vice to this Court. Id. Carter’s attorney requested an expedited briefing
schedule for a motion to strike the first amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 11(c)(2) and 12(f).1 Id. at 3.
The next day, Carter’s counsel submitted yet another filing: a motion for an emergency
order directing the preservation of evidence and striking the amended complaint under Rule
12(f). ECF Nos. 47–49.
In deciding whether a plaintiff may proceed anonymously, courts balance “the plaintiff’s
interest in anonymity” against “both the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the
defendant.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second
Circuit has laid out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered:
(1) whether the litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and of a
personal nature;
(2) whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to
the party seeking to proceed anonymously or even more critically, to innocent
non-parties;
(3) whether identification presents other harms and the likely severity of those
harms, including whether the injury litigated against would be incurred as a
result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity;
(4) whether the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of
disclosure, particularly in light of h[er] age;
(5) whether the suit is challenging the actions of the government or that of private
parties;
(6) whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to press h[er]
claims anonymously, whether the nature of that prejudice (if any) differs at
any particular stage of the litigation, and whether any prejudice can be
mitigated by the district court;
(7) whether the plaintiff’s identity has thus far been kept confidential;
(8) whether the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring the
plaintiff to disclose h[er] identity;
1
Plaintiff’s lawyer has since responded, arguing that a Rule 11 motion would not be appropriate here. See generally
ECF No. 50.
2
(9) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or
otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigants’
identities; and
(10) whether there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting the
confidentiality of the plaintiff.
Id. at 190 (cleaned up) (citations omitted). A court “is not required to list each of the factors or
use any particular formulation as long as it is clear that the court balanced the interests at stake in
reaching its conclusion.” Id. at 191 n.4.
Here, the weight of the factors tips in favor of allowing Plaintiff to remain anonymous, at
least for this stage of the litigation.
Nevertheless, at this exceedingly early stage in this case, the factors counseling against
disclosure outweigh those that counsel in favor. Cf. Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 222,
226 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (requiring the plaintiff to identify herself as the case approached trial).
3
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed anonymously is GRANTED. Plaintiff is advised that,
because the balance of these factors will certainly shift as this case proceeds, especially if and
when the parties engage in discovery in earnest, the Court intends to revisit this decision at a
future date.
Since Carter’s attorney first appeared in this case seventeen days ago, he has submitted a
litany of letters and motions attempting to impugn the character of Plaintiff’s lawyer, many of
them expounding on the purported “urgency” of this case. See, e.g., ECF No. 38 at 1–2
(describing Plaintiff’s counsel as “self-promoting” and accusing him of “extort[ion]”); ECF
No. 41 at 1 (requesting to be heard “on an expedited basis” and accusing Plaintiff’s counsel of
“exploiting the legal process to generate media attention”); ECF No. 42 at 1 (asserting that
Plaintiff’s counsel “seeks only to benefit himself”); ECF No. 46 at 3 (requesting the shortening
of a deadline “from 21 days to 1 day”); ECF No. 48 at 11, 15 (describing Plaintiff’s counsel as
willing “to blatantly violate th[e] core ethical obligation[s] of all attorneys” and requesting a
hearing on a motion the following day).
Lastly, although Carter’s attorney is entitled to file a Rule 11 motion without first seeking
leave of court, see Individual Practices ¶ 3.A, the Court discourages this approach. If he still
intends to serve Plaintiff with a motion for sanctions, the Court denies his request to shorten the
safe harbor provision contained within Rule 11(c)(2) from 21 days to 1 day. See ECF No. 46 at
3.
2
On the merits, Carter’s motion to strike is denied. Motions to strike under Rule 12(f) “are generally disfavored”
and will be granted “only if there is strong reason to do so.” Abdou v. Walker, No. 19 Civ. 1824, 2022 WL
3334700, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2022) (citation omitted). Carter’s motion, which summarily asserts that
Plaintiff’s claims are “baseless” and “salacious,” does not clear that high bar. ECF No. 48 at 14.
4
Carter’s motion to strike the amended complaint under Rule 12(f) is DENIED. By
January 10, 2025, Plaintiff shall file her response to Carter’s motion for an order directing the
preservation of evidence. By January 17, 2025, Carter shall file his reply, if any.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 32, 37,
40–41, and 46.
SO ORDERED.