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Review Article
Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis: A review of basics
Author: Madhura Jagtap*

*Tata Memorial Hospital, Parel, Mumbai, India

Email: madhurajgtp@gmail.com

Abstract:

Hazard and operability (HAZOP) methodology is a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

technique used worldwide for studying not only the hazards of a system, but also its
operability problems, by exploring the effects of any deviations from design conditions. Our
paper is the HAZOP review intended to gather HAZOP-related literature from books,
guidelines, standards, major journals, and conference proceedings, with the purpose of
classifying the research conducted over the years and define the HAZOP state-of-the-art.

Keywords

HAZOP; Process Hazard Analysis; Hazard identification; Hazardous materials; Review; Pros
& Cons; guide words; exothermic.

(Received 11 Jan 2017, Revised: 05 Feb 2017, Published: 13 Mar 2017)

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Introduction potential hazards and operability problems.

Structure and direction are given to the
A hazard and operability review process by applying standardised
study (HAZOP) is a structured and guide-word prompts to the review of each
systematic examination of a complex node1 .HAZOP, or a Hazard and
planned or existing process or operation in Operability Study, is a systematic way to
order to identify and evaluate problems identify possible hazards in a work
that may represent risks to personnel or process. In this approach, the process is
equipment. The intention of performing a broken down into steps, and every
HAZOP is to review the design to pick up variation in work parameters is considered
design and engineering issues that may for each step, to see what could go wrong.
otherwise not have been found. The HAZOP‟s meticulous approach is
technique is based on breaking the overall commonly used with chemical production
complex design of the process into a and piping systems, where miles of pipes
number of simpler sections called 'nodes' and numerous containers can cause
which are then individually reviewed. It is logistical headache. The HAZOP
carried out by a suitably experienced technique was initially developed to
multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP) during a analyze chemical process systems, but has
series of meetings. The HAZOP technique later been extended to other types of
is qualitative, and aims to stimulate the systems and also to complex operations
imagination of participants to identify and to software systems. [2]

When to perform HAZOP compromise, the HAZOP is usually

carried out as a final check when the
The HAZOP study should preferably be detailed design has been completed. A
carried out as early in the design phase as HAZOP study may also be conducted on
possible - to have influence on the design. an existing facility to identify
On the other hand; to carry out a HAZOP modifications that should be implemented
we need a rather complete design. As a to reduce risk and operability problems. [2]

A Brief History and Evolution of public living nearby. Through the general
HAZOP exchange of ideas and personnel, the
system was then adopted by the petroleum
HAZOP were initially 'invented' by ICI in industry, which has a similar potential for
the United Kingdom, but the technique major disasters. This was then followed
only started to be more widely used within by the food and water industries, where the
the chemical process industry after the hazard potential is as great, but of a
Flixborough disaster in 1974. This different nature, the concerns being more
chemical plant explosion killed twenty to do with contamination rather than
eight people and injured scores of others, explosions or chemical releases. [3] HAZOP
many of those being members of the

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became the industry standard acronym or actions to responsible parties to resolve.

abbreviation for Hazard and Operability These days the draft report is typically
studies following pioneering work at ICI prepared „on the spot‟ by the
by Trevor Kletz and Ellis Knowlton in the secretary/leader using a laptop PC and
late 1960s and early 1970s. Since then projected on a screen in the meeting room,
Kletz (2006) has kept the methods up to so the team members have an opportunity
date and fresh via new material and (and a duty) to approve what is being
mnemonic illustrations. The procedure recorded. The HAZOP report became a
quickly evolved to use a fairly standard set document with potential legal significance
of keyword combinations to trigger a with the increased focus on HSE following
structured team analysis of new process a number of well publicised accidents in
designs and proposed revamps. Recently the industry. In the 1990s the likelihood-
Crawley et al. 2008 have advocated using severity matrix commonly became used
„guidewords‟ (more, less etc) together with for prioritising issues unearthed during the
„parameters‟ (temperature, pressure etc) study. Safety Integrity Level – SIL reviews
rather than the less precise „keyword‟. were adopted increasingly since the late
Whilst this clarification is welcomed, in 1990s and early 2000s. This technique
the present paper, both terms are used needs more expertise on the part of the
interchangeably – hopefully without leader to achieve a successful review.
compromising the objective. In the 1980s Process Simulation software is now
with the advent of PCs computer software available to help evaluate upset scenarios
was developed to record and review the during the HAZOP study to enable more
excursions, consequences and assign rapid resolution of issues.
Materials & Methods study. For example, a prudent designer
will have allowed for foreseeable
The method is applied to complex variations within the process creating a
'processes' for which sufficient design larger design envelope than just the basic
information is available, and not likely to requirements and the HAZOP will be
change significantly. This range of data looking at ways in which this might not be
should be explicitly identified and taken as sufficient. [1]
the „design intent‟ basis for the HAZOP
For processes plant, the nodes are chosen between "too large and complex" (fewer
so that for each meaningful design nodes, but the team members may not be
intent can be specified and they are able to consider issues within the whole
commonly indicated on piping and node at once) and "too small and simple"
instrumentation diagram (P&IDs) (many trivial and repetitive nodes, each of
and process flow diagram (PFD). The which has to be reviewed independently
extent of each node should be appropriate and documented).
to the complexity of the system and the
magnitude of the hazards it might pose. For each node in turn the HAZOP team
However, it will also need to balance uses a list of standardised guide-words and

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process parameters to identify adequate time is allowed for them to

potential Deviations from the design refresh their mental capabilities.
intent. For each deviation, the team
identifies feasible Causes and The team meetings should be managed by
likely Consequences then decides (with an independent, trained HAZOP Facilitator
confirmation by subsequent risk analysis who is responsible for the overall quality
where necessary) whether the existing of the review, partnered with a dedicated
safeguards are sufficient, or whether Scribe to minute the meetings. "The
an Action to install an additional safeguard success of the HAZOP study strongly
is necessary to reduce the risks to an depends on the alertness and concentration
acceptable level. of the team members and it is therefore
important that the sessions are of limited
The degree of preparation for the HAZOP duration and that there are appropriate
is critical to the overall success of the intervals between sessions. How these
review - 'frozen' design information requirements are achieved is ultimately the
provided to the team members with time responsibility of the study leader."(1)
for them to familiarise themselves with the
process, an adequate schedule allowed for For a medium-sized chemical plant where
the performance of the HAZOP, provision the total number of items to be considered
of the best team members for their role. is 1200 (items of equipment and pipes or
Those scheduling a HAZOP should take other transfers between them) about 40
into account the review scope, the number such meetings would be needed. [2] Various
of nodes to be reviewed, the provision of software programs are now available to
completed design drawings and assist in meetings.
documentation and the need to maintain The main advantage of this technique is its
team performance over an extended time- systematic thoroughness in failure case
frame. The team members may also need identification. The method may be used at
to perform some of their normal tasks the design stage, when plant alterations or
during this period and the HAZOP team extensions are to be made, or applied to an
members can tend to lose focus unless existing facility.

Potential Shortcomings of the hazards. Potential causes of the deviation

Traditional Method [3] are then solicited from the team, followed
by a group assessment of the
The traditional HAZOP process uses a consequences. The adequacy of mitigating
combination of guidewords and parameters measures is then reviewed, and when the
(or keywords) for positive or negative team is concerned that an unacceptable
deviations from normal measured residual risk remains – an action is
operating variables such as temperature, assigned to the appropriate team member.
pressure or level to trigger a team This approach is normally applied to each
brainstorming session for potential

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pipe linking major items of equipment in Node (from the same root as knot) should
turn until the entire scope of the study has strictly refer to the point of interconnection
been covered. In this standard approach of (for example) branches of a piping
two potential drawbacks are apparent: network.) Repeatedly arriving at the same
scenarios can lead to some tiredness or
(I) a given hazardous scenario often has boredom on the part of team members, and
multiple symptoms and is therefore it means that time and human resource are
reached via several deviation guidewords not used as effectively as possible. Some
or keywords. For example, a loss of creativity may be lost as a result.
coolant flow to a column reflux condenser Recognition of these drawbacks prompted
can and will lead to increasing temperature the author to consider how the Hazop
and pressure, falling level in the reflux process might be modified in order to
drum and loss of overhead purity. Each of minimise repetition and perhaps increase
these deviations will eventually lead the creativity, whilst retaining the benefits of a
team to the same root cause. thorough review. Using the proposed new
(II) The way that the process is subdivided concept, the system under consideration is
into relatively small piping sub-systems, exposed to a small number of generic
sometimes called „nodes‟ means that disturbances in turn and assessed for their
adjacent sections may be affected by the feasibility. Where the disturbance is
same upset – again leading to possible, all potential causes that the team
repetitiveness, and slowing progress. can identify are listed followed by their
Minimising this currently depends on the likelihoods. The consequences of the
skill of the HAZOP leader. (The common disturbance and the severity of these
use of the term „node‟ in HAZOP jargon consequences are then defined. Existing
for a section of pipe linking major mitigating measures are then applied to
equipment is an unfortunate misnomer. assess whether the net overall risk ¼
(likelihood severity) is acceptable or not.

Overview of New Perspective for a pipe linking major equipment items [1],
HAZOP Procedure define a system of piping and equipment
items which are interconnected in normal
There are two ways in which I believe the operation and which has a common
HAZOP process can potentially be mechanical design pressure, and typically
simplified and a thorough review of a similar normal operating pressure. At
potential risks achieved with less time and steady state this system can be envisaged
effort. It will be seen that these two as an envelope through whose boundaries
proposed changes are complementary. material and energy pass, without any net
(I) The definition of each sub-system change in the material or energy content of
under consideration by the team. Instead of the envelope.

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(II) Introduce alternative deviation c. More Energy ¼ Positive changes in

keywords based on the steady state energy content of
the envelope or any of its
a. More material ¼ Positive changes component parts.
in the steady state material balance d. Less Energy ¼ Negative changes in
for the envelope or any of its the steady state energy content of
component parts. the envelope or any of its
b. Less material ¼ Negative changes component parts.
in the steady state material balance
for the envelope or any of its
component parts.
mitigating factors – if any. Note that the
change in total energy content of the
For each keyword, list and enumerate the material within a system as a direct
local causes of the change, their consequence of the change in material
consequences, any knock-on effects content itself is a trivial case.
(perhaps in other linked systems) and
appropriate parameters which apply to the
design intent. These are general words
Guide words and parameters [1] such as Flow, Temperature, Pressure, and
In order to identify deviations, the team Composition. The current standard notes
applies a set of Guide Words to each node that Guide words should be chosen which
in the process. To prompt discussion, or to are appropriate to the study and neither too
ensure completeness, it may also be specific (limiting ideas and discussion) nor
helpful to explicitly consider too general (allowing loss of focus).
A fairly standard set of Guide Words is given in Table 1 as follows:

Guide Word Meaning

NO OR NOT Complete negation of the design intent
MORE Quantitative increase
LESS Quantitative decrease
AS WELL AS Qualitative modification/increase
PART OF Qualitative modification/decrease
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intent
OTHER THAN / INSTEAD Complete substitution
EARLY Relative to the clock time
LATE Relative to the clock time
BEFORE Relating to order or sequence
AFTER Relating to order or sequence
Table 1 Set of Guide words for HAZOP

HAZOP-type studies may also be carried applicable [3] or by considering the

out by considering applicable guide words parameters associated with plant elements
and identifying elements to which they are
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and systematically applying guide words interpretations of them is given in Table 2

to them. as follows.

The overview of commonly used guide

word - parameter pairs and common
Parameter More Less None Revers As well Part of Other than
/ e as
Guide
words
Flow High Low flow No reverse deviating contami deviating material
flow flow flow concentr nation
ation
Pressure High Low vacuu Delta-p explosion
pressure pressure m
Temperatu High Low
re temperatu temperature
re
Level High Low level No Different
Level level level
Time too long / too short / seque Backw Missing Extra Wrong time
too late too soon nce ards actions actions
step
skippe
d
Agitation Fast Slow No
mixing mixing mixin
g
Reaction fast slow no unwanted
reaction / reaction reactio reaction
runaway n
Start-up / too fast Too slow Actions Wrong recipe
Shut-down missed
Draining / Too long Too short none Deviatin Wrong
Venting g timing
pressure
Inertising High Low none contami Wrong material
pressure pressure nation
Utility failure
failure
(instrument
air, power)
DCS failure
failure
Maintenan None
ce
Vibrations Too low Too high none Wrong frequency

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The role of labelling in HAZOP [4] performed. Bad data will ruin the
usefulness of any monitoring system.
In the complex processes where the
HAZOP approach is most effective, the Opening the wrong valve, or cutting into
size and intricacy of the system can be the wrong pipe, have often been the causes
overwhelming. Analysis and maintenance, of serious accidents. That‟s why the
as well as ordinary, day-to-day operation, ANSI/ASME A13.1 standard is so widely
require workers to navigate these systems. used for labelling pipe systems; it requires
To allow effective work, system clear, bold labels in a highly-visible
components such as pipes, valves, placement scheme.
instruments, and vessels must be identified
and labelled. Where hazardous chemicals are used as
part of the process, OSHA’s HazCom
Often, safely maintaining a system will labelling rules apply. The rules are meant
require monitoring. When measurements to give workers the information they need
must be taken at the same point in a to be safe, and effective labelling serves
system, it makes sense to clearly mark that that goal.
point with an indication of the test to be

The HAZOP Study Process Objective of carrying out a HAZOP study:

HAZOP study is to carefully review a  To check a design

process or operation in a systematic
manner to determine whether deviations  To decide whether and where to
from the design or operational intent can build
lead to undesirable consequences. This
 To decide whether to buy a piece
technique can be used for continuous or
of equipment
batch processes and can be adopted to
evaluate written procedures. The HAZOP  To obtain a list of questions to put
team lists potential causes and to a supplier
consequences of the deviation as well as
existing safeguards protecting against the  To check running instructions
deviation. When the team determines that
 To improve the safety of existing
inadequate safeguards exist for a credible
facilities.
deviation, it usually recommends the
action be taken to reduce the risk. [5]

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Form a HAZOP Team specialists as needed. These should not be

“newbie,” but people with experience,
To perform a HAZOP, a team of workers knowledge, and an understanding of their
is formed, including people with a variety part of the system. The key requirements
of expertise such as operations, are an understanding of the system, and a
maintenance, instrumentation, willingness to consider all reasonable
engineering/process design, and other variations at each point in the system.
Team member and responsibilities [2] 5. Trigger the discussion using guide-
words and parameters
HAZOP team leader 6. Follow up progress according to
Responsibilities: schedule/agenda
7. Ensure completeness of the
1. Define the scope for the analysis analysis
2. Select HAZOP team members
3. Plan and prepare the study The team leader should be independent
4. Chair the HAZOP meetings (i.e., no responsibility for the process
and/or the performance of operations)

HAZOP secretary 3. Process engineer

4. Instrument/electrical engineer
Responsibilities: 5. Safety engineer
1. Prepare HAZOP worksheets Depending on the actual process the team
2. Record the discussion in the may be enhanced by:
HAZOP meetings
3. Prepare draft report(s) 1. Operating team leader
2. Maintenance engineer
HAZOP team members 3. Suppliers representative
The basic team for a process plant will be: 4. Other specialists as appropriate

1. Project engineer
2. Commissioning manager
3. Description of the HAZOP
approach
HAZOP meeting 4. Presentation of the first node or
Proposed agenda: logical part of the operation
5. Analyze the first node/part using
1. Introduction and presentation of the guide-words and parameters
participants 6. Continue presentation and analysis
2. Overall presentation of the (steps 4 and 5)
system/operation to be analyzed 7. Coarse summary of findings

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Focus should be on potential hazards as well as potential operational problems

Identify Each Element and its if the pressure was unexpectedly low?
Parameters Would the rate of change in pressure
(delta-p) pose its own problems here?”
The HAZOP team will then create a plan Don‟t forget to consider the ways that each
for the complete work process, identifying element interacts with others over time; for
the individual steps or elements. This example, “What would happen if the valve
typically involves using the piping and was opened too early, or too late?”
instrument diagrams (P&ID), or a plant
model, as a guide for examining every Identify Hazards and Failure Points
section and component of a process. For
each element, the team will identify the Where the result of a variation would be
planned operating parameters of the danger to workers or to the production
system at that point: flow rate, pressure, process, you‟ve found a potential problem.
temperature, vibration, and so on. Document this concern, and estimate the
impact of failure at that point. Then,
Consider the Effects of Variation determine the likelihood of that failure; is
there a realistic cause for the harmful
For each parameter, the team considers the variation? Evaluate the existing safeguards
effects of deviation from normal. For and protection systems, and evaluate their
example, “What would happen if the ability to handle the deviations that you‟ve
pressure at this valve was too high? What considered.
Results 5. Finalised HAZOP study work
sheets together with reports from
Final report each study session including a list
When the HAZOP study is completed, a of participants.
final report will be prepared. The 6. Annotated copies of drawings
minimum requirements for the report are together with supporting
as follows: [6] documentation which were used
during the examination.
1. Description of applied procedures 7. Recommended revisions of
and HAZOP technique drawings and documents (or part
2. Summary and description of thereof if more convenient) which
approved HAZOP show modifications, identified as
recommendations. necessary as a result of the HAZOP
3. Summary of operational study.
recommendations and limitations. 8. Changes proposed by the HAZOP
4. List and description of drawings team, but not accepted, and the
and related documents studies. reasons why the proposed changes
were rejected.

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HAZOP Pros [6] 8. The HAZOP study led by

independent person.
1. The HAZOP process is a 9. HAZOP study results are recorded.
systematic examination. 10. For team members the process is
2. The team approach to a HAZOP easily learned and performed.
makes it a multidisciplinary study. 11. A HAZOP does not require
3. The HAZOP team utilizes considerable technical expertise for
operational experience. technique formulation.
4. The process covers safety as well 12. As a systematic process it provides
as operational aspects. rigor for focusing on system
5. Solutions to the problems elements and hazards.
identified may be indicated. 13. The HAZOP process is a team
6. HAZOPs consider operational effort with many viewpoints.
procedures. 14. Commercial software is available
7. HAZOPs cover human errors. to assist in HAZOP analysis.

HAZOP Cons [6] 3. Training is essential for optimum

results, especially for the
1. A HAZOP focuses on single events facilitator.
rather than combinations of 4. HAZOPs are typically very time
possible events. consuming and thus expensive.
2. The HAZOP focus on guide-words
allows it to overlook some hazards
not related to a guide-word.

Discussion [6] address the real cause and still result in a

subsequent accident. Many accidents have
HAZOP is a hazard identification occurred because small local modifications
technique which considers system parts had unforeseen knock-on effects
separately and systematically examines the elsewhere. While this problem can be
effects of deviations on each part. overcome by carrying forward the
Sometimes a serious hazard will involve implications of deviations from one part to
the interaction between a numbers of parts another, in practice this is frequently not
of the system. In these cases the hazard done. As with any technique for the
may need to be studied in more detail identification of hazards or operability
using techniques such as event tree and problems, there can be no guarantee that
fault tree analyses. Many systems are all hazards or operability problems will be
highly inter-linked, and a deviation at one identified in a HAZOP study. The study of
of them may have a cause elsewhere. a complex system should not, therefore,
Adequate local mitigating action may not depend entirely upon a HAZOP. It should

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be used as a compliment to other suitable

techniques. It is essential that other Case Study [7]
relevant studies are coordinated within an Example Exothermic Reaction System
effective overall safety management A reactor system is shown in the Figure 1
system. The success of a HAZOP study to which the HAZOP procedure can be
depends greatly on the ability and applied. This reaction is exothermic, and a
experience of the study leader and the cooling system is provided to remove the
knowledge, experience and interaction excess energy of reaction. If the cooling
between team members. HAZOP only flow is interrupted, the reactor temperature
considers parts that appear on the design increases, leading to an increase in the
representation. Activities and operations reaction rate and the heat generation rate.
which do not appear on the representation The result could be a runaway reaction
are not considered. with a subsequent increase in the vessel
pressure possibly leading to a rupture of
Conclusion [6] the vessel. The temperature within the
An important benefit of HAZOP studies is reactor is measured and is used to control
that the resulting knowledge, obtained by the cooling water flow rate by a control
identifying potential hazards and valve.
operability problems in a structured and Performing a HAZOP on this process with
systematic manner, is of great assistance in the assigned task of considering runaway
determining appropriate remedial reaction episodes would lead to a
measures. While a HAZOP is not completed form such as that shown in the
appropriate in all circumstances one of the Figure 1. The process is already small
major benefits that can be used to help enough to be considered a single section.
justify the cost and time investment is that Four study nodes are cooling water line,
it also helps to avoid operating problems stirring motor; monomer feed line, and
and can thus provide a clear return on the reactor vessel.
investment beyond the reduction in
hazards.

1. Installation of a cooling water flow

meter and low flow alarm to
provide an immediate indication of
cooling loss.
2. Installation of a high temperature
alarm to alert the operator in the
event of cooling function loss.
The HAZOP analysis would reveal the 3. Installation of a high temperature
following potential process modifications: shutdown system, that would
automatically shutdown the process

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in the event of a high reactor reactor to prevent the reactor

temperature. The shutdown contents from flowing upstream
temperature would be higher than and to prevent the backflow in the
the alarm temperature to provide event of a leak in the coils.
the operator with the opportunity to 5. Periodic inspections and
restore cooling before the reactor is maintenance of the cooling coil to
shutdown. insure its integrity.
4. Installation of a check valve in the 6. Evaluation of the cooling water
cooling line to prevent reverse source to consider any possible
flow. A check valve could be interruption and contamination of
installed both before and after the the supply.

In the event that the cooling water system considered. The numbering system used is
fails (regardless of the source of the a number-letter combination. The second
failure), the high temperature alarm and column lists the study node considered, the
emergency shutdown system prevents a third column the process parameter, and
runaway. The review committee the fourth column the deviations (guide
performing the HAZOP decided that the words). For example, the designation “1A”
installation of a back-up controller and would designate the first study note
control valve was not essential. The high “Cooling Coils” and the first guide word
temperature alarm and shutdown system “NO” and the process parameter is
prevents a runaway in this event. “Flow”. The designation “1B” is applied to
Similarly, a loss of cooling water source or the same study note (i.e. “Cooling Coils”)
a plugged cooling line would be detected for the same process parameter “Flow”,
by either the alarm or emergency but the guide word is “MORE”.
shutdown system. The review committee The next 3 columns are the most important
suggested that all cooling water failures be results of the analysis. These are the
properly reported. In the event that a possible causes of the deviation in the
particular cause occurs repeatedly then process parameter, the possible
additional process modifications are consequences, and actions required.
warranted. This example demonstrates that the
The basic form for the Hazop of this number of process changes suggested is
system is shown in the Table 3. quite numerous although only a single
The first column, denoted “Item”, is used process intention is considered.
to provide a unique identifier for each case

Table 3

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References

1. British Standard BS: IEC61882:2002 Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP

studies) - Application Guide British Standards Institution. "
2. Marvin Rausand & Arnljot Hoyland „System Reliability Theory; modes, statistical
methods & applications‟ (2nd ed), Wiley, Newyork 2004 – 3 / 44
3. 3.David Journal of Chemical Engineering 2009 Symposium Series No. 155 Hazards
XXI
4. Brian McFadden. Solutions for safety & visual communication. Published by graphic
products. December 14, 2016.article on „What is HAZOP‟.
5. Presentation transcript on theme: "Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). I
suppose that I should have done that HAZOP Study!" Published by Rebecca Holt;
2016
6. David Gossman, A Gossman consulting, Inc. Publication March 2009, GCI TECH
NOTES Volume 14, Number 1.
7. Process Risk Seminar 22nd December 2009, workshop session, presentation on
HAZOP case studies. Published by Belinda Spencer.

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