COALITION GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN:

AN ASSESSMENT OF DILIVERENCE (2008-13)

SUPERVISOR:

DR. LUBNA KANWAL

SUBMITTED BY:

MUHAMMAD MUBEEN GOHAR

Ph.D Scholar
Roll No. PKS-14-02
Session: 2014-2016 (B)

DEPARTMENT OF PAKISTAN STUDIES

BAHAUDDIN ZAKARIYA UNIVERSITY, MULTAN

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Introduction:

A coalition government consists of two or more parties who must compromise on principles and
share a mandate. This mostly occurs due to a single party unable to gain a majority of seats in
parliament. Coalitions are mostly formed through elections but coalition governments can also
occur in times of national difficulty, such as in WWII from 1931-1940. Coalition governments
arguably divide opinion, but those in favour of proportional representation believe it can lead to
consensus politics, and it is also seen by many as the more favourable option in times of national
crisis, moreover, coalitions can also be better than having a minority government. However,
many believe that they are undemocratic and can lead to drastic policies being put through, upon
a mandate that was not agreed on, with problems also on proportionality.

The distinction between single party and coalition government

The differences between single party and coalition governments raise a host of important
questions. These tend to contrast the identifibility, clarity and capacity to govern of single party
administrations with the representativeness and fairness of coalition administrations. (Powell,
2000: 3-20) The United Kingdom has, for a long time, been one of the main exemplars of the
‘majoritarian’ system of democracy. The principal feature of this model is that executive power
tends to be held by a single party and not shared between parties (Lijphart, 1999). By
contrast, governments in many other countries are formed by two or more parties in coalition. It
is true that, for a significant part of the twentieth century, the UK has been governed by
coalition administrations. But this experience has always taken place in the context either of
wartime or economic crisis or as a prelude to mergers between political parties (Bogdanor,
1983: 10-12). Two or more parties have never come together to share power outside these
circumstances.

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Coalition Governments in Pakistan:
Forming political alliances is a process of organizing parties collectively in pursuit of a common
goal or objective. The elements or actions that entail this process include among others the
pooling of resources, forming binding commitments and an agreement on the distribution
arrangement of the product that may result from achieving this goal. A political alliance is a
“temporary combination of groups or individuals formed to pursue specific objectives through
joint action”. In other words; it is “the union of different political parties or groups for a
particular purpose, usually for a limited time.
Party alliances may be forged either by giving serious considerations to ideological positions of
respective parties on political chessboard or by ignoring them altogether. The precise actors that
make up such political alliances consist mainly of individual legislators and political parties
seeking purposely to control the executive. But this does not mean that alliances are not forged
for any other purpose. They are also formed to safeguard the interests of smaller parties by
providing them representation in the legislature, to overthrow a government, to protect the
opposition from the repression and pressure of the government or to struggle for
democratization.
In multi-party systems no single party can win a majority of seats. The necessary majority forms
of political alliance may normally occur in two ways. One, pre-electoral alliance occurs before
the elections and is made openly with the goal of informing the public about what the parties will
do if they win enough seats. Two, post-electoral alliance formed after the elections when the
final distribution of seats or votes is known. In this case no explicit information about coalition
membership or leadership is given to the public before elections. This type of alliance may
also occur when the previous government has failed but new elections have not been called.
In such situations bargaining occurs between different parties capable and interested in
potentially forming a governmental alliance.
Alliances are also structured by smaller parties in post-colonial states purely for
the sake of their survival. In countries where dominant party system emerges the smaller
parties enter into alliances to increase the chances of their success in elections. Thus, they
send a message to the electorate that they are alternate to the incumbent. India and Ireland
have been ruled by dominant parties for quite long time. Their positions were finally
challenged by coalitions of smaller parties. During the first few years the Muslim League

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also enjoyed the dominant party status in Pakistan.
Alliances between parties vary greatly in form and degree. Some are short-lived and
unorganized while others are strongly organized and lasting. Organized and lasting
alliances, usually formed by ideologically identical parties, may stay intact for quite long
time by preserving their unity in all situations. The unorganized alliances, product
of ideologically distant parties, disintegrate soon as a result of confusion and clash of
interests between the allied parties. The former type of alliance portrays itself as a durable
and stable body while the latter type presents itself as a fragile and ephemeral entity.

After independence the Muslim League’s lack of experience to run democratic institutions
and policy of marginalization of certain key political figures produced many disgruntled

elements that formed opposition. The failure of League to satisfy the masses and
sidelining those who were opposed to its policies cost her heavily. She lost some very
capable and influential leaders along with their supporters. Suhrawardy was one of those
skilful and popular leaders who felt that the League’s ruling clique had failed to
accommodate political aspirants to play their role in national politics. Soon he obtained
the central position as leader of the opposition in both wings of the country. Most
important disgruntled figures that joined him in those early days included Pir of Manki,
Ghulam Muhammad Khan of Lundkhwar and Pir Zakori from NWFP, Nawab Mumdot and
Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan from Punjab, Mehmud-ul-Haq Usmani from Sindh and
Maulana Bhashani, Ataur Rehman Khan and Mujeeb-ur-Rehman from East Bengal. This led
to the formation of All Pakistan Awami Muslim League, which later became a popular
political party of opposition.
It is often observed that, governments formed on coalition partners whether at National level or
in provinces in Pakistan remain busy in safeguarding their coalition governments rather than
doing their actual job of delivering on public services to people. From 2002 to onward till 2013
General Elections, all governments save few at center and in provinces were coalition
governments. The basis of coalition governments is in multiparty system of elections in Pakistan.
As against two party system prevailing in different democratic countries such as USA, Jamaica,
and Malta, in multiparty system, citizens have different choices of political parties and individual
independent candidates to elect a candidate of their choice. This practice is delivering good

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democratic trends in countries such as Germany, India, Finland, Brazil, Japan, New Zealand,
Pakistan, and so on and so forth. It is also observed that despite the fact that in some countries
with multi-party system, two major political parties remain in power largely by turns. For
instance, in UK, Germany, India, and also in Pakistan only major political parties forms
governments. In Pakistan, similar exercise is being observed since 1970 and two political parties
such as Pakistan Peoples Party and Pakistan Muslim League with different flavours remained in
power. However, the politics of conflict prevailing in 90s ended and political parties started
forming coalition governments even with political rivals. The best example of this practice is
observed in 2008, and 2009 when Peoples party formed coalition governments with PML-N and
then PML-Q. However, the drawback of this practice was observed that such coalitions were
based on give and takes. The governments now remain busy in protecting their coalition partners
in any cost. Based on this fact people have now started blaming that these two parties have made
collusion to form governments in alternate turns and intend not to deliver public services. The
practice of coalition government will remain in Pakistan under multiparty system until there is
made changes in system.

Theories of Coalition Government:

The first set of theories on coalition politics like the Power Maximization and the
Policy Based theories are specifically concerned with coalition experiments and trace
their nature. The second set of theories viz. the Electoral Systems theory and The Social
Cleavage theory primarily deals with theories of the party system. The inclusion of the
second set is pertinent because it is insufficient to analyze the complexity, dynamism and
plurality of Indian coalition era singularly rather restrictive Western theorization. Since the
scope of the present study extends to the broad study of the impact upon the federal
nature of Pakistan polity, the resultant theoretical vastness is unavoidable.
The two theoretical sets adopt different approaches to coalitions and within each set the
two theories present opposing perspectives on coalitions as discussed in the following
text.

Power Maximization and Policy Based Theories:

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Power maximization theories predict minimum winning coalitions; while policy based
theories predict minimum connected winning coalitions. The basic underlying idea
is that in coalitions formed under compulsions of power, each party within the
coalition would be indispensable to the formation/survival of coalition. This is because
lesser the number of parties sharing the coalition, larger the payoffs guaranteed to each
member. On the other hand, policy based coalitions celebrate the coming together of
likeminded political parties - which lie adjacent on the ideological scale and are at least
not incompatible on major issues. This reduces the number of coalition partners and hence,
restricts the number of total coalition partners in the government.
One of the most intriguing questions in theoretical analysis of coalition situation remains as
to why do hung parliament situations across the globe, fail to produce minimum winning
power theory or minimum connected winning policy theory coalitions. This is an
anomaly which requires us to discuss the two set of theories in detail in order to derive a
deeper understanding of the reasons behind such aberrations or to disqualify the
non existence of (the limited set of) predicted patterns as aberrations.

Power Theory:

The major theorists in this tradition are these of Riker Gamson, and Dodd. According to
Riker ‘minimum winning coalitions’ may be defined as a coalition in which each party is
indispensable to the coalition's prospect of winning a simple majority of seats. In such
coalitions, each member's share of the payoff is maximized. This is called the size
principle. Size principle theories can have variants because there can be more than one
minimum winning coalition in many distributions of seats. Therefore, one can have
variants of minimum winning coalitions such as minimum size coalitions in which the
number of legislators of the winning coalition is minimized to a number just enough to
win a majority, or minimum- number- of parties’ coalition in which the number of
coalescing parties necessary to win a majority is minimized.
An important corollary of size principle theories is that pivotal parties are especially

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strongly placed to extract rewards disproportionate to their size, particularly those that
can threaten to leave and enable the formation of an alternative coalition in which they
are also pivotal. Thus, in certain circumstances, very small parties which are pivotal to
coalitions can extract disproportionate rewards and hold much larger partner and parties
to ransom.
Riker-Dodd theory is generally applicable to multi-party parliaments because the
important constituents of this theory - the bargaining conditions and cabinet
coalition status can be perceived more clearly. It may also be applied to the parliaments
which have dominant one party majority rule, in which case the single party formed
cabinet can be considered as essentially a minimum winning cabinet. It has both a low
level of bargaining constraints and high information certainty and is also more durable.

Policy Based Theories:

Policy-based theories, on the other hand, predict minimum connected winning

coalitions, i.e., coalitions that are composed of member parties adjacent on the ideological
scale and at least are not incompatible on major issues, thus, minimizing the coalitions
ideological span, and within this limiting condition, the minimum number of parties needed
for a majority.
Policy based theories were developed by later game theory proponents. This
theory assumes that parties that are congenial in policy terms can only make coalitions.
They need to share elements of ideological similarity or what Robert Axelrod stated -
successful coalition should consist of parties that are spatially connected, i.e.,
ideologically similar. The empirical evidence available on comparative literature on
coalition politics stands to support policy based theories, not merely for the sake of
compatibility of coalition formation, but also far more importantly, for coalition
longevity.

Robert Axelrod, Abram De Swaan, Michael Leiseison and Seven Groennings are some
of the theorists belonging to this school of thought. In short, policy based theory
postulates that coalition cabinets, realistically speaking, must agree on a package of

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proposed government policies. This is so because policy is an intrinsic end value for itself
rather than as an instrument used by the politicians to gain office. Thus, through this
theory the role of cleavage conflict in coalition formation is highlighted. Also, it
is suggested that parties must seek to minimize the policy range between themselves and
their partners. A variant of this is the minimal policy range coalition, one that minimizes
the policy distance between the coalition’s extremes.
Indeed, policy based theories of coalitions have been extended to see coalition formation not as
an episodic event but as a stage in a continuous cycle of elections, government formation, policy
implementation and all such activities in which party competition takes place. Empirical
evidence from the comparative literature on coalition politics tends to weigh in favour of policy
based theories. Hence, often the stress is on the element of compatibility for coalition formation
and even more for coalition.
Another way of looking at power maximization and policy-based theories is the one which
divides the motivations of politicians and the political cultures of societies into opportunistic and
partisan politics. A society's politics is said to be opportunistic if the pursuit of political office is
primarily for the fruits of power of the office for one’s own sake. Partisan politics, on the other
hand, is the one where the pursuit of office is for changing public policy in the direction desired
by the contestant party's ideology and social constituency. Likewise, manipulation of policy
whilst in office to serve the purpose of getting reelected (the ultimate goal of a political party) is
the characteristic feature of opportunistic parties and politicians.

Coalitions and Electoral Systems Theory:

As the name suggests this theory postulates that there are different implications for the likelihood
as well as the behavioural characteristics of coalition governments under the proportional
representation and plurality ruled electoral systems. Accordingly, this is termed as a regime level
attribute of coalition government. In brief, the main argument is as follows: In PR systems,
parties get seats in proportion to their votes so these systems are more prone to throw up
coalition governments. This is so because in general, no single party gets half the votes necessary
for half the seats. At the same time it highlights a reality absolutely critical to coalition behavior
and stability, i.e., any coalition at the best is only second best situation for every major political

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party. Thus, each party during the coalition’s lifetime will seek to position itself to improve its
vote and seat share in the next election. As a result, conflict is built into coalition. Thus, in every
coalition there is jockeying for long-term electoral gains along with short-term maximization of
power among its members.
The implications of electoral system theory for the plurality rule electoral system are quite
different. In these systems coalitions tend to be rare due to seat-vote disproportionality in which
plurality suffices for a legislative majority. Therefore, the dynamics prevailing is quite different
from the one operative under the PR systems. Thus, there is the inevitable competition for long
term electoral gains (increased vote share) as well as short term power maximization.
Competition and suspicion among the coalition partners is likely to be much more intense
because a small swing in popular support can hugely increase or alternatively decimate a party in
terms of seats, potentially either putting it in power on its own or destroying any chance of it
being in the government.

The electoral systems theory as a result predicts coalitions in PR systems to be fairly stable. This
is because at least partly, in the inevitable jockeying for increased vote share in the next election,
the member parties are not under the fear that a swing will dramatically reduce their seat strength
due to the proportionality rule and also because there is an improbability of huge swings in this
system.
For the Plurality Rule system the Electoral Systems theory however has some important
implications which are applicable to India as well. Some of those are being mentioned here.
Firstly, the instability and short-lived character of coalitions in plurality rule systems like those
of India is due to the incentives created by the structural characteristics of such systems. Where
politics is substantially about access to state resources (power for power's sake), the possibility of
being politically wiped out would matter much more. In such a situation, coalitions and minority
governments tend to be unstable, with strong incentives for members or external supporters, who
perceive them self to the losing strength to terminate the arrangement or constantly blackmail the
government about withdrawing support.
Secondly, the plurality-rule system tends to encourage minority governments rather than
majority coalitions. This is so because the seat-vote disproportionality causes greater electoral
volatility in terms of seats. As a result, there is a greater incentive for major opposition parties

9
keeping the longer time horizon in mind to stay in the opposition or at best be external supporters
of a minority government or a coalition government. By this, they hope to remain unaffected by
this policy record (of failure) to present themselves as a credible alternative in the next election.
Thus, the regime-level attribute of the plurality system sharply differentiates coalition formation
and behavior in the Indian case from cases based on P.R systems and provides powerful support
to the extension of coalition theory to 'party competition as a whole’ looking at the impact of
elections on the politics of coalition and on future elections. It also looks at the impact of the
politics of coalitions on elections and future government formations.
Thirdly, in the plurality rule system aggregation imperatives tend to give incentives to politicians
to form indiscriminate, non-programmatic, purely power-oriented, pre-electoral coalitions or
even seat adjustments. These arrangements are criticized for being only partial and not true
coalitions. This occurrence is explained because of an imperative of winning the single largest
number of votes under the plurality rule at the constituency level as well as at more aggregated
levels. As a result, this leads to indiscriminate pre-electoral coalitions as well as government
formation, which are many a times ideologically incoherent and conflict ridden, hence, unstable
coalitions or minority governments. Another moot point is when party identity and organization
is weak and client-oriented, there are strong incentives to split parties and engineer defections.
The electoral systems theory despite being very elaborate and comprehensive is however not able
to explain all the peculiarities of the Indian scenario. The non-suitability of the Duverger’s law
can be cited as an example. According to this law, Plurality System tends to favour a two-party
system. To explain the law in short: two factors are suggested for the emergence of a two-party
system, viz., first, a mechanical reason where parties exploit electoral voting system to their
advantage and second, a psychological reason where voters do not ‘waste’ their votes on
candidates of those parties which are unlikely to win. This law is however not sufficient to
explain the case of economically backward and yet politically highly mobilized regions of India
such as the States of U.P. and Bihar. In these two states the preferences of the elite section of
society does not influence rest of the society. The recent elections in Bihar present the reality of
multi-party system and fractured verdicts.

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Social Cleavage Theory:

Social cleavages theory helps to explain few features of the Indian complexity. It implies that the
party system reflects the principal cleavages in society, e.g., those in ‘ethno-culturally
homogeneous industrialized societies’ and that the cleavages between the labour and capital are
reflected through parties being positioned on a Left-Right spectrum'. In brief, this theory predicts
a high cognizance relation between political parties and social cleavages in deeply segmented
societies. This theory shall be useful in the explanation of the ‘social essence’ of the Indian
coalitional reality because it underlines the belief that politics is a mirror reflection of the society.
Since the coalition era has come to stay Indian political arena, it is essential to understand the
nature of this political development which has deep socio-cultural and economic implications.

Statement of the Problem:

Pakistan’s 70 years of independence have been characterized by great instability, repeated

recourse to extra-constitutional methods and a high level of arbitrariness in the conduct of the stat
apparatus. The main objective of the present study is to explain why the Pakistani state thus far
has failed to exercise power in a manner consistent with dignity, prosperity and security of its
citizens and act in its own enlightened self interest. Pakistan s a continental bureaucratic empire
an administrative state in which the executive function is structural as well as a normative
imperative. After independence the Muslim League’s lack of experience to run democratic
institutions and policy of marginalization of certain key political figures produced many
disgruntled elements that formed opposition. The failure of League to satisfy the masses
and sidelining those who were opposed to its policies cost her heavily. She lost some very
capable and influential leaders along with their supporters. Suhrawardy was one of those
skilful and popular leaders who felt that the League’s ruling clique had failed to
accommodate political aspirants to play their role in national politics. Soon he obtained
the central position as leader of the opposition in both wings of the country. Most
important disgruntled figures that joined him in those early days included Pir of Manki,
Ghulam Muhammad Khan of Lundkhwar and Pir Zakori from NWFP, Nawab Mumdot and

11
Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan from Punjab, Mehmud-ul-Haq Usmani from Sindh and
Maulana Bhashani, Ataur Rehman Khan and Mujeeb-ur-Rehman from East Bengal. This led
to the formation of All Pakistan Awami Muslim League, which later became a popular
political party of opposition.
On 30 November 1967, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), an Islamic socialist party, was
founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928 - 1979). The PPP ran in the 1970 general election on
a socialist agenda of Roti, Kapra, Makan (Food, clothes, shelter). It supported ties with China
and ruled Pakistan after the separation of Bangladesh in an Indian-led war in 1971. After first
parliamentary term, the PPP succeeded at the Pakistani general election of 1977. Under Benazir
Bhutto, the PPP became a secular party that promoted privatization in order to secure funding
from the US and the World Bank. From March 2008 to March 2013, it was leading party of
ruling coalition. The so-called first ‘full term’ of a ‘democratic government’ in country’s history
– the major achievement that PPP-led coalition government’s leadership boasts about – was
fraught with mismanagement, and criminal negligence on issues of national importance. Over
these years, PPP leadership remained preoccupied with keeping its rule intact for which it played
in the hands of its junior coalition partners MQM, ANP and PML-Q and other pressure groups
from time to time.
Constitutional reforms and other achievements
The most shining achievement of the ruling coalition was the removal of anomalies from the
constitution and its restoration to almost to its original shape of 1973. Under the 18th
Constitutional Amendment the government has given much demanded provincial autonomy to
the provinces by abolishing the Concurrent List from the constitution. Another major
achievement was unanimous passage of the 7th National Finance Commission Award, which was
long overdue. This step gave new strength to the federation. PPP’s claim of pursuance of ‘policy
of reconciliation’ also hold water as its being without even simple majority in the National
Assembly and at times being at verge of collapse, the PPP not marched toward completion of its
government tenure but also passed a considerable number of pieces of legislation with consensus.
Moreover, the claim that PPP leadership started a healthy tradition by shunning politics of
victimization and vendetta is also largely true. It rightly claims that no case against political
opponents was framed during its current term in power. PPP’s argument that it assumed power
when the country’s economy was in shambles and the whole world was in the grip of a huge

12
financial crisis is true. But its claim that it did as much for the welfare of the masses as it could
by remaining within its economic limitation, can be disputed. They also recount the
unprecedented floods devastations in 2010 and massive rains in 2011, which had inundated most
parts of Punjab and Sindh, and say they did not roll back their economic reforms and welfare
agenda despite these challenges and refer to various programmes launched for the poor like
Benazir Income Support Programme and Pakistan Baitul Maal.

Hypothesis:

How did the coalition government fulfill the political attitude of the people regarding the
manifesto of the party as well as to fulfill the demand of the coalition partners?

Scope and Significance of the Study:

The research work should mainly focus on the coalition government and assessment of
deliverance in Pakistan from 2008 to 2013. The empirical study will help to define different
aspects of study reports, presentations, papers, books and other publications will be used to build
the theory and examine different variables of research theory.

Methodology:

The nature of the research is qualitative that is based on theoretical generalizations about the
coalition government. This qualitative mode of research is descriptive and explanatory while
focusing on the interpretive method of research. The present study tries to deal with facts and
patterns of behaviors and structures that modify them when people are placed in positions of
powers.

Literature Review:

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A good number of scholarly works have been written on political parties and coalition
governments during the 20th century based on the experiences of Britain and the European
countries. But the classical works have been mostly based in favour of single-party majoritarian
governments and they have regarded multi-party. More objective and comparative transnational
studies appeared towards end of the century and they seemed to take the coalition phenomenon
as natural and related to political culture. The growth of the scientific interest in the study of
European Coalition politics led to the development of two approaches; the European politics
tradition and the game-theoretic tradition. The Chief Contributor to the latter tradition has been
William Riker who’s Theory of Coalitions (1962) has become the source of the theory of
minimum winning Coalition.
The major sources upon which this study draws include the declassified cabinet record held by
the National Documentation Centre and Cabinet Secretariat Library in Islamabad, private papers,
interviews, State Reports and publications, as well as memoirs, books and academic studies. An
important drawback in the published sources about Pakistan is that their focused is primarily on
politics or policy and the sources upon which they are themselves based or the public statements
and posturing of important players. When it comes to memoirs or other firsthand accounts,
practically all of them engage in self justification and generalizes from personal experience. It is
interesting to contrast their perspectives with official record or with assessment made by the
commissions and committees constituted to submit reports on the administrations during their
period of associations with the political executives. For instance Barbara Hinckley has
categorized the major approaches to the coalition study in three broad classes, e.g. the social
psychological approach, game theoretic approach and the empirical political approach.
The most important contribution of the game theory to the study of coalition politics is size
Theory or Size principle. Riker says: "In n-person, zero sum games, where side payments are
permitted, where players are rational and where they have perfect information, only minimum
winning coalitions occur. Here, n-person means that number of persons participating in a game
should be more than two. Zero sum condition implies that loss and gains of the participating
players are equal. Rationality conditions mean that all players are rational beings and will
therefore try to maximize their gains and minimize losses. Condition of perfect information
implies the knowledge regarding the move, counter move, pay offs, and bargaining alternatives
of the players.

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Lawrence C. Dodd challenges the time-old theory that a durable Cabinet (Coalitions in
Parliamentary Government, 1976) requires a majority party government and argues for a
fundamental alternation in the existing conceptions. Vernon Bogdanor (Coalition Government in
Western Europe (ed), 1983) describes the working of coalition governments in the democracies
of Western Europe. The influence of coalition politics on Cabinet, Parliament policy outputs, etc.
are studied here in the context of countries like West Germany, Norway Sweden, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Ireland. Lan Budge and Hans Keman (parties and Democracy-
Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in twenty States, 1990) analyze the actual
behavior of some four hundred governments in twenty post-war democracies and try to find
questions relating to the formation of governments, distribution of portfolios and how parties
influence policy. Michael Laver and Norman Schoefield (Multy Party Government the Politics
of Coalition in Europe, 1990) have tried to reconcile the theoretical approaches to the study.
Their work offers an accessible approach those bridges the distance between the `European
Politics‟ and `game theory‟ tradition of political science.
M.B. Naqi in his book “Pakistan at Knife’s Edge” presented the role of PPP Government during
2008-13. In this book the authors had tried to explain the hurdles faced by Prime Minister
Yousuf Raza Gilani as head of the government. The authors had briefly examined the General
Elections as well as the Presidential Elections 2008.
Kamila Hayat in her book “Journey to Democracy” argued that some people familiar to the
political scenario of Pakistan commented, “No one can break the PPP-PML-N alliance, even
though based on too much mistrust, because they have no other option but to stick together at this
critical juncture. “They are moving forward according to the script and nothing is out of the
script so far. PPP-PML-N alliance is tuned well and they know reality on the grounds and there
unity can help them a lot to fight the mighty establishment.”
Between the history of politics and the politics of history little efforts has been made to explain
the actual behavior of the state apparatus and the structure through power has been exercised in
Pakistan. What has been attempted is by way of ‘Development’ or “Democratic’ change /
transformation and is heavily influenced by American patronage and tutelage.

Scheme of Study:

15
This research work has been divided into the following chapters. Every chapter will build with
various aspects of topics.

CHAPTER: 1 Introduction

CHAPTER: 2 History of Coalition Government in Pakistan

CHAPTER: 3 Formation of Coalition Government 2008-2013

CHAPTER: 4 Assessment of Deliverances

CHAPTER: 5 The Coalition Agreements and Managing Coalition

Government.

CHAPTER: 6 Conclusions

Selected Bibliography:

Arter, David (1999) Scandinavian Politics Today, Manchester: Manchester University

Press

Ashdown, Paddy (2001) The Ashdown Diaries, Volume 2: 1997-1999, Allen Lane:
The Penguin
Press
Bale, Tim and Christine Damm (forthcoming) ‘Is the Grass Really Greener? The
Rationale and
Reality of Support Party Status: A New Zealand Case Study’, Party Politics
Bara, Judith and Ian Budge (2001) ‘Party Policy and Ideology: Still New Labour?’, in
Pippa
Norris, ed, Britain Votes 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Bergman, Torbjörn (1993) ‘Formation Rules and Minority Government’, European
Journal of
Political Research, 23, 55-66
Bergman, Torbjörn (2000) ‘Sweden: When Minority Cabinets are the Rule and
Majority
Coalitions the Exception’, in Müller and Strøm, 2000
Birch, Anthony H. (1984) ‘Britain’s Impending Constitutional Dilemmas’,
Parliamentary Affairs,
37:1, 87-101
Blackburn, Robert (1996) The Electoral System in Britain, Basingstoke: Macmillan
Blondel, Jean (1993) ‘Individual Ministers and their Role in Cabinet Decision Making’,
in

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Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 1993
Blondel, Jean and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, eds (1993) Governing Together: The
Extent and
Limits of Joint Decision Making in Western European Cabinets, Basingstoke:
Macmillan
Blondel, Jean and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (1993a) ‘Introduction’, in Blondel and
Müller-
Rommel, 1993
Bogdanor, Vernon, ed (1983) Coalition Governments in Western Europe, London:
Heinemann
Bogdanor, Vernon (1983a) ‘Conclusion’, in Bogdanor, 1983
Bogdanor, Vernon (1983b) Multi-Party Politics and the Constitution, Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press
Boston, Jonathan (1998) Governing Under Proportional Representation: Lessons
from Europe,
Victoria University of Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies
Boston, Jonathan (1999) ‘Enhancing Political Certainty and Government Durability
under
MMP: The Constitutional Options’, in Governing Under MMP: The Constitutional and
Policy
Challenges, Policy Paper 1, Victoria University of Wellington: Institute of Policy
Studies
Boston, Jonathan (2000) ‘Forming the Coalition Between Labour and the Alliance’, in
Boston et
al, 2000
Boston, Jonathan and Elizabeth McLeay (1997) ‘Forming the First MMP Government:
Theory,
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