218639_EASA_ASR_MAIN_REPORT_2018

2018
Disclaimer
The occurrence data presented is strictly for information purposes only. It is obtained from Agency databases
comprised of data from ICAO, EASA Member States, Eurocontrol and the aviation industry. It reflects knowledge
that was current at the time that the report was generated. Whilst every care has been taken in preparing the
content of the report to avoid errors, the Agency makes no warranty as to the accuracy, completeness or curren-
cy of the content. The Agency shall not be liable for any kind of damages or other claims or demands incurred as
a result of incorrect, insufficient or invalid data, or arising out of or in connection with the use, copying or dis-
play of the content, to the extent permitted by European and national laws. The information contained in the
report should not be construed as legal advice. Acknowledgements The authors wish to acknowledge the con-
tribution made by the Member States to thank them for their support in the conduct of this work and in the
preparation of this report.
Photocredits
istock, istock, istock, istock, Patrick Penna, istock, istock, istock, istock, istock, Agustawestand, istock
© European Aviation Safety Agency, 2018

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
PAGE 1
Foreword by the Executive Director

2017 has been an exceptional year for global airline safety, with fewer fatalities than at any time in the industry’s
history. Closer to home, we can see that in all aviation domains across the EASA Member States, the number of
fatal accidents in 2017 has been lower than the average of the previous decade.
However, a regulator never rests on its laurels to ensure that this trend continues as the aviation system develops
to face new challenges such as drones and cyber security risks. Indeed, by the end of January this year, the histor-
ically low figures for global airline safety for the whole of 2017 had already been exceeded. In the EASA Member
States in 2017, there were fatalities in all non-commercial and specialised operation domains, as well as a fatal
accident involving a medical flight that crashed in Italy with the loss of all 6 people on board.
Such accidents demonstrate the need to continuously drive safety improvements across the board, to share les-
sons learned. This is achieved through the safety actions that are identified in the European Plan for Aviation
Safety (EPAS). In partnership with our Member States we are developing a better view of safety and defining
a collective response. Additionally, EASA coordinates beyond Europe at a global level in order to help protect our
citizens when they travel beyond our borders.
The Annual Safety Review will continue to evolve and with the launch of the Data4Safety, big-data programme,
EASA is significantly enhancing the ability of the European Aviation System to be aware of potential safety risks.
With this, we can react more quickly and help people to travel in the safest conditions.
Patrick Ky
Executive Director
PAGE 3
Contents
Introduction 9
How the Safety Review is Produced...................................................................................................9
Chapter Overview..............................................................................................................................11
Typical Structure for Each Chapter....................................................................................................12
The Connection with the European Plan for Aviation Safety.........................................................12
Safety Overview 15
1.1 Global Airline Fatal Accidents....................................................................................................16
1.2 EASA Member States Cross Domain Safety Overview..............................................................17
Aeroplanes 20
2.1 Commercial Air Transport - Airlines...........................................................................................21
2.1.1 Key Statistics.......................................................................................................................................21
2.1.1.1 Phase of flight.......................................................................................................................24
2.1.1.2 Operation type......................................................................................................................25
2.1.1.3 Propulsion type.....................................................................................................................25
2.2 Non-Commercial Complex – Business...................................................................................... 26
2.2.1 Key Statistics.......................................................................................................................................26
2.2.1.1 Phase of flight.......................................................................................................................28
2.2.1.2 Propulsion type.....................................................................................................................28
2.3 Safety Risk Portfolio for Large Aeroplane (CAT-Airlines and NCC-Business)........................... 29
2.4 Specialised Operations...............................................................................................................35
2.4.1 Key Statistics.......................................................................................................................................35
2.4.1.1 Phase of flight.......................................................................................................................37
2.4.1.2 Operation Type.....................................................................................................................37
2.4.2 Safety Risk Portfolio...........................................................................................................................38
2.5 Non-Commercial Operations.................................................................................................... 40
2.5.1 Key Statistics...................................................................................................................................... 40
2.5.1.1 Phase of flight.......................................................................................................................42
2.5.1.2 Operation Type.....................................................................................................................42
2.5.2.1 Categories and ERCS scores 2016-2017...............................................................................43
2.5.2.2 Identified Safety Issues and ERCS scores.............................................................................43
2.5.2.3 The Portfolio........................................................................................................................ 44
2.5.4 Safety Issue Assessments..................................................................................................................46
Rotorcraft 47
3.1 Offshore Commercial Air Transport Rotorcraft........................................................................ 48
3.1.1 Key Statistics...................................................................................................................................... 48
3.2 Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters........................................................................... 54
3.2.1 Key Statistics...................................................................................................................................... 54
3.2.1.1 Phase of flight.......................................................................................................................55
3.2.1.2 Operation type......................................................................................................................56
3.2.1.3 Rotorcraft Type/ Propulsion Type.........................................................................................57
3.3 Specialised Operations...............................................................................................................61
3.3.1 Key Statistics.......................................................................................................................................61
3.3.1.1 Phase of flight.......................................................................................................................62
3.3.1.2 Operation Type.....................................................................................................................63
Annual Safety Review 2018 PAGE 4

3.3.2 Safety Risk Portfolio.......................................................................................................................... 64

3.4 Non-Commercial Operations.................................................................................................... 66
3.4.1 Key Statistics.......................................................................................................................................66
3.4.1.1 Rotorcraft Type/ Propulsion Type.........................................................................................67
3.4.1.2 Phase of flight...................................................................................................................... 68
3.4.1.3 Type of Operation................................................................................................................ 68
Balloons 73
4.1.1 Key Statistics.......................................................................................................................................74
4.1.1.1 Phase of flight.......................................................................................................................75
4.1.2.1 Categories and ERCS scores 2015-2017...............................................................................76
4.1.2.2 Safety Risk Portfolio table....................................................................................................77
Sailplanes 78
5.1.1 Key Statistics.......................................................................................................................................79
5.1.1.1 Phase of flight.......................................................................................................................81
5.1.1.2 Sailplane operation type......................................................................................................82
5.1.2.1 Identified Safety Issues and safety issue analysis............................................................... 84
Aerodromes and Ground Handling 87
6.1 Key Statistics.............................................................................................................................. 88
6.1.1 Number of EASA MS Certified Aerodromes.....................................................................................90
6.2 Safety Risk Portfolio...................................................................................................................91
6.2.1 Key Risk Areas....................................................................................................................................91
6.2.2 Safety Issues.......................................................................................................................................91
6.2.3.1 Operational Safety Issues.....................................................................................................96
6.2.3.2 HF Safety Issues.....................................................................................................................98
6.2.3.3 Organisational Safety Issues.................................................................................................98
ATM/ANS 99
7.1 Key Statistics............................................................................................................................ 100
7.1.1.1 Phase of flight.................................................................................................................... 104
7.1.1.2 Class of airspace..................................................................................................................105
7.2 Safety Risk Portfolio of the ATM/ANS domain....................................................................... 106
7.2.1.1 Key Risk Areas..................................................................................................................... 106
7.2.1.2 Safety Risk Portfolio............................................................................................................107
Appendix 1 - List of Fatal Accidents 110
1.1 Aeroplanes................................................................................................................................111
1.1.1 Commercial Air Transport Airline...................................................................................................111
1.1.2 Non-commercial Complex Business...............................................................................................112
1.1.3 Specialised Operations....................................................................................................................112
1.1.4 Non-commercial Other Than Complex...........................................................................................117
1.2 Rotorcraft................................................................................................................................. 125
1.2.1 Offshore Commercial Air Transport............................................................................................... 125
1.2.2 Other Commercial Air Transport.................................................................................................... 125
1.2.3 Specialised Operations....................................................................................................................126
1.3 Balloons................................................................................................................................... 129
1.3.1 Sailplanes........................................................................................................................................ 130
1.4 Aerodromes and Ground Handling......................................................................................... 134
1.5 ATM/ ANS.................................................................................................................................135
PAGE 5
List of Tables
Table 1. Cross Domain Comparison of EASA MS Aircraft Fatal Accidents and Fatalities, 2007-2017�� 17
Table 2. Cross Domain Comparison of EASA MS Infrastructure Fatal Accidents and Fatalities, 2007-2017�� 18
Table 3. Key Statistics for Commercial Air Transport Airlines, 2007-2017�� 21
Table 4. Key Statistics for Non-commercial Complex Business Operations, 2007- 2017�� 26
Table 5. Key Statistics for Aeroplane Specialised Operations, 2007-2017�� 35
Table 6. Key statistics for non-commercially operated aeroplanes 2007-2017�� 40
Table 7. Key Statistics for Offshore Commercial Air Transport Helicopters, 2007-2017�� 48
Table 8. Key Statistics for Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters, 2007-2017�� 54
Table 9. Key Statistics for Specialised Operations Rotorcraft, 2007-2017�� 61
Table 10. Key Statistics for Non-commercial Rotorcraft, 2007-2017�� 66
Table 11. Key statistics for balloons, 2007-2017�� 74
Table 12. Key statistics for sailplanes, 2007-2017.�� 79
Table 13. Key statistics for aerodromes and ground handling, 2007-2017�� 88
Table 14 Operational aerodromes and ground handling safety issues and problem statements�� 96
Table 15 H uman performance-related aerodromes and ground handling safety issues and
problem statements�� 98
Table 16 Organisational aerodromes and ground handling safety issues and problem statements�� 98
Table 17 Key statistics for ATM/ANS, 2007-2017�� 100

List of Figures
Figure 1. Number of Fatal Accidents and Fatalities Involving Large Aeroplane Passenger and
Cargo Operations, EASA MS and Rest of the World, 2007-2017�� 16
Figure 2. N umber of Fatalities Involving Large Aeroplane Passenger and Cargo Operations Worldwide,
1970-2017�� 16
Figure 3. N umber of Fatal Accidents, Non-fatal Accidents and Serious Incidents by Domain, 2013-2017�� 19
Figure 4. Number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for commercial air
transport airlines, 2007 - 2017�� 22
Figure 5. N umber and rate of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for commercial air
transport airlines, 2013 - 2017�� 22
Figure 6. N umber of accidents and serious incidents by higher and lower ERCS score for commercial air
transport airline operations, 2013 - 2017�� 23
Figure 7. Number of fatalities and serious injuries involving commercial air transport airlines, 2007 - 2017�� 23
Figure 8. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by flight phase for commercial air transport
airlines, 2007 - 2017�� 24
Figure 9. D istribution of accidents and serious incidents by operation type for commercial air transport
airlines, 2007 - 2017�� 25
Figure 10. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type of the aeroplane(s) involved
for commercial air transport airlines, 2007 - 2017�� 25
Figure 11. N umber of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for non-commercial
complex business, 2007 - 2017�� 26
Figure 12. Number of accidents and serious incidents by higher and lower ERCS score for non-commercial
complex business, 2013 - 2017�� 27
Figure 13. Number of fatalities and serious injuries involving non-commercial complex business,
2007 - 2017�� 27
Figure 14. D istribution of accidents and serious incidents by flight phase for non-commercial complex
business, 2007 - 2017�� 28
Figure 15. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type for non-commercial complex
business, 2007 - 2017�� 28
Figure 16. Distribution of key risk areas by frequency and aggregated ERCS risk score for commercial air
transport airlines and non-commercial complex business, 2013-2017�� 29
Figure 17. Distribution of key risk areas by fatalities, number of higher risk occurrences and ERCS risk score
for commercial air transport airlines and non-commercial complex business, 2013-2017�� 30
Figure 18. Safety Risk Portfolio for CAT Airline and NCC Business aeroplane operations showing how
the 5-year occurrence data 2013-2017 relates to safety issues and their outcomes relative to risk
in descending order.�� 32
Figure 19. N umber of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for aeroplane specialised
operations, 2007 - 2017�� 35
Figure 20. A eroplane Specialised Operations Fatalities and Serious Injuries, 2007-2017�� 36
Figure 21. Aeroplane Specialised Operations Accidents and Serious Incidents by Phase of Flight, 2007-2017�� 37
Figure 22. Aeroplane Specialised Operations Accidents and Serious Incidents by Type of Operation,
2007-2017�� 37
Figure 23. D istribution of key risk areas by frequency and aggregated ERCS risk score for aeroplane
specialised operations, 2015-2017�� 38
Figure 24. Safety Risk Portfolio for SPO Aeroplane operations showing how the 3 year occurrence data
2015-2017 relates to safety issues and their outcomes relative to risk in descending order�� 39
Figure 25. Number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for aeroplane
non-commercial operations, 2007 - 2017�� 40
Figure 26. A ccident rates per year in NCO per 1 000 000 movements�� 41
Figure 27. Number of fatalities and serious injuries for aeroplane non-commercial operations, 2007-2017�� 41
Figure 28. NCO accidents per phase of flight 2007-2017�� 42
Figure 29. Main operation types in GA Aeroplane NCO.�� 42
Figure 30. D istribution of key risk areas by frequency and aggregated ERCS risk score for aeroplane non-
commercial operations, 2015-2017�� 43
Figure 31. GA FW NCO Accidents. Safety issues in relation to high and low risk occurrences.��44
Figure 32. Safety Risk Portfolio for General Aviation fixed-wing aeroplane non-commercial operations
showing how the 3 year occurrence data 2015-2017 relates to safety issues and their outcomes
relative to risk in descending order�� 45
PAGE 7
Figure 33. O ffshore Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Fatal Accidents, Non-fatal Accidents and Serious
Incidents, 2007-2017�� 49
Figure 34. Number of fatalities and serious injuries in offshore commercial air transport, 2007-2017�� 49
Figure 35. Offshore Commercial Air Transport Rotorcraft Accidents and Serious Incidents by phase of flight,
2007-2017�� 50
Figure 36. Offshore commercial air transport rotorcraft Key Risk Areas plotted in relation to the
European Risk Classification Score (ERCS) methodology�� 50
Figure 37. Offshore commercial air transport rotorcraft safety issues.�� 51
Figure 38. Safety Risk Portfolio for Off-shore Helicopter operations showing how the 5 year occurrence
data 2013-2017 relates to safety issues and their outcomes relative to risk in descending order�� 52
Figure 39. Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Fatal Accidents, Non-fatal Accidents and Serious
Incidents, 2007-2017�� 54
Figure 40. N umber of fatalities and serious injuries for rotorcraft other commercial air transport, 2007-2017�� 55
Figure 41. Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Accidents and Serious Incidents by phase of flight,
2017 and 2007-2016�� 55
Figure 42. O ther Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Accidents and Serious Incidents by type of
operation, 2017 and 2007-2016�� 56
Figure 43. Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters type of operation and aggregated ERCS risk score,
2007-2017�� 56
Figure 44. Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Accidents and Serious Incidents by Propulsion type,
2017 and 2007-2016�� 57
Figure 45. Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Key Risk Areas�� 58
Figure 46. O ther Commercial Air Transport Rotorcraft safety issues, by higher and lower ERCS risk score,
2013-2017.�� 58
Figure 47. S afety Risk Portfolio for Other CAT Helicopter operations showing how the 5 year occurrence
data 2013-2017 relates to safety issues and their outcomes relative to risk in descending order�� 59
Figure 48. Number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for rotorcraft specialised
operations, 2007-2017�� 61
Figure 49. Number of fatalities and serious injuries for rotorcraft specialised operations, 2007-2017�� 62
Figure 50. Rotorcraft Specialised Operations Accidents and Serious Incidents by Phase of Flight, 2007-2017�� 62
Figure 51. Rotorcraft Specialised Operations Accidents and Serious Incidents by Type of Operation,
2007-2017�� 63
Figure 52. Distribution of key risk areas by frequency and aggregated ERCS risk score for rotorcraft
specialised operations, 2015-2017�� 64
Figure 53. S afety Risk Portfolio for SPO Helicopter operations showing how the 3 year occurrence data
Figure 54. Non-commercially operated rotorcraft Accidents and Serious Incidents, 2007 - 2017�� 66
Figure 55. Number of fatalities and serious injuries in non-commercially operated rotorcraft, 2007 - 2017�� 67
Figure 56. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by rotorcraft propulsion type,
2007-2016 and 2017.�� 67
Figure 57. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight for non-commercially operated
rotorcraft, 2007-2016 and 2017�� 68
Figure 58.Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by operation type for non-commercially operated
rotorcraft, 2007-2016 and 2017�� 68
Figure 59. Non-commercially operated rotorcraft aggregated ERCS risk score by type of operation,
2013-2017.�� 69
Figure 60. N on-commercially operated rotorcraft Key Risk Areas plotted in relation to the European Risk
Classification Score (ERCS) methodology, 2013-2017�� 70
Figure 61. Non-commercially operated rotorcraft safety issues by high and low risk scores, 2013-2017�� 70
Figure 62. S afety Risk Portfolio for NCO Helicopter operations showing how the 5 year occurrence data
Figure 63. Balloon fatal and Non-fatal accidents from 2007-2017�� 74
Figure 64. Fatalities and serious injuries 2007-2017�� 75
Figure 65. Distribution of balloon accidents between flight phases�� 75
Figure 66. Balloon accidents and serious incident key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score.�� 76
Figure 67. S afety Risk Portfolio for Balloon operations showing how the 5 year occurrence data 2013-2017
relates to safety issues and their outcomes relative to risk in descending order�� 77
Figure 68. Sailplane fatal and non-fatal accidents 2007-2017�� 80
Figure 69. Estimated accident rates for Sailplane operations 2014-2017�� 80

Figure 70. Sailplane fatalities and serious injuries 2007-2017�� 81

Figure 71. Number of Sailplane accidents per flight phase�� 81
Figure 72. Distribution of Sailplane accidents per operation type.�� 82
Figure 73. Percentage of Sailplane Fatal Accidents per Safety Issue - EASA dataset 2013-2017�� 83
Figure 74. S ubstantially damaged or destroyed Sailplanes - EASA dataset. Average percentage
per safety issue.�� 84
Figure 75. Sailplanes ERCS Scores plotted per Safety Issue.�� 85
Figure 76. Sailplane Safety Issues split between Higher and Lower Risk base on the ERCS score.�� 85
Figure 77. Aerodrome related fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents, 2007-2017�� 89
Figure 78. Number of fatalities and serious injuries in aerodrome-related accidents 2007-2017�� 89
Figure 79. Number of Aerodromes in scope of Regulation (EU) 139/2014, by EASA Member State.�� 90
Figure 80. Distribution of key risk areas by frequency and aggregated ERCS risk score for aerodromes and
ground handling related accidents and serious incidents, 2015-2017�� 91
Figure 81. Number of ECR occurrences per Aerodromes and Ground Handling Safety Issue – 2015-2017�� 92
Figure 82. Number of occurrences per safety issue and ERCS severity – accidents and serious incidents
2015-2017�� 93
Figure 83. Safety Risk Portfolio for Aerodromes and Ground Handling operations showing how the 5 year
occurrence data 2013-2017 relates to safety issues and their outcomes relative to risk in
descending order�� 94
Figure 84. A TM/ANS related fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year, 2007-2017,
in EASA MS�� 101
Figure 85. R ates of ATM/ANS related accidents and serious incidents per year, 2013-2017, in EASA MS�� 101
Figure 86. Fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents with ATM/ANS contribution per year,
2007-2017, in EASA MS�� 102
Figure 87. R
ates of fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents with ATM/SN contribution
per year, 2013-2017, in EASA MS�� 102
Figure 88. Higher and lower risk scored accidents and serious incidents with ATM/ANS contribution
per year, 2013-2017, in EASA MS�� 103
Figure 89. Fatalities and serious injuries in ATM/ANS related accidents per year, 2007-2017, in EASA MS�� 104
Figure 90. Phase of flight in ATM/ANS related accidents and serious incidents per year, 2007-2017,
in EASA MS��104
Figure 91. Airspace class where ATM/ANS related accidents and serious incidents occurred, 2007-2017,
in EASA MS�� 105
Figure 92. Prioritisation of Key Risk Areas of the ATM/ANS services, 2013-2017, in EASA MS�� 107
Figure 93. Safety Risk Portfolio for ATM/ANS services operations showing how the 5 year occurrence data
PAGE 9
Introduction
EASA would like to welcome you to the 2018 version of the EASA Annual Safety Review. The review has been
published since 2005 and is now in its 13th year. The analysis presented in this review together with the domain-
specific safety risk portfolios provide the data-driven input that supports the decision-making in formulating the
European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS).
This edition provides safety risk portfolios in 11 of the aviation domains analysed and builds on the work of pre-
vious years. As with the previous edition, the ongoing European Safety Risk Management Process, in particular
the valuable input from the Network of Analysts (NoA) and Collaborative Analysis Groups (CAGs), means that
the analysis in this year’s review provides not just a statistical summary of aviation safety in the EASA Member
States (MS) but also identifies the most important safety challenges faced in European aviation today. This analy-
sis drives the development of safety actions for the EPAS and harnesses the experience of both the EASA Member
States (EASA MS) and industry to connect the data with the current and future priorities of the Agency.
How the Safety Review is Produced
Information Sources
The EASA Annual Safety Review is produced by the Safety Intelligence and Performance Department (SM1) of
EASA. The analysis in the review comes from two specific data sources:
• EASA’s Occurrence Database. The main source of data is the Agency’s own database, being accidents and
serious incidents reported to the Agency by Safety Investigation Authorities (SIAs) world-wide, which is
augmented by information collected by the Agency from other sources. In all domains, the data and its
quality is also checked with the EASA MS through the NoA. EASA is grateful for the support of the safety
analysis teams in each EASA MS in developing the Review.
• European Central Repository. The European Central Repository (ECR) is the central database of all occurrenc-
es reported to the competent authorities of the EASA MS, the reporting of which is governed by Reg. (EU)
376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation. This is the primary source
of information that is used to cross-check the accidents and serious incidents in EASA’s own database.
Process for Safety Risk Portfolios
The safety risk portfolios are developed through an iterative process, starting with the data available in EASA’s
occurrence database and in the European Central Repository. This provides the portfolios with a starting list of
the safety issues affecting aviation and an indication of the key risk areas that each safety issue relates to. In ad-
dition to understanding what the safety issues are, they are risk assessed using the European Risk Classification
Scheme (ERCS), as it is soon to be required under Regulation (EU) 376/2014. EASA has begun applying the ERCS
to historical occurrences assessed in this Review and are pleased to provide this additional element in the analy-
sis results. Each occurrence receives an ERCS risk classification and the overall risk level of the safety issue is then
calculated. This is then used to define the risk level of the key risk area.
European Risk Classification Scheme
Regulation (EU) 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation intro-
duced the requirement for common occurrence risk classification at national level. The ERCS provides
a clear understanding of the true risk of an occurrence leading to a fatal accident. The ERCS methodology
measures the risk through a matrix covering 2 dimensions. The vertical axis considers what the severity
would have been if the occurrence being scored had escalated into a fatal accident. This is done by con-
sidering both the size of the aircraft involved and how severe the accident outcome could have been.

Secondly, the horizontal axis measures how close the occurrence was to that fatal accident outcome based
on a weighted barrier model. Therefore the ERCS gives a much better representation of risk that the nor-
mal classifiers of accident, serious incident and incident as it provides a proper estimation of the likely risk.
Using this data input, the draft portfolios are then discussed within the collaborative analysis groups. This en-
sures that the safety issues have been correctly defined and assessed and to add any safety issues that may not
yet be present in the data, such as emerging issues.
Collaborative Analysis Groups (CAGs)
The CAGs are expert groups, responsible for analysing the safety of European aviation. Each CAG works
on a domain and its membership is derived from key stakeholders in the domain. These stakeholders may
come from industry or from EASA’s regulatory partners. Each CAG meets up to three times per year to re-
view available safety information, arrange in depth safety issue analyses and to identify emerging issues.
They monitor the safety performance of their domain and provide feedback on the effectiveness of ac-
tions taken.
PAGE 11
Chapter Overview
This document is split into a number of chapters, each of which covers the different operational domains in the
European Aviation System. The different domains in each chapter cover the areas for which a specific safety risk
portfolio has been developed. The scope of each domain chapter (and corresponding safety risk portfolio) is lim-
ited to the EASA MS, either as the state of operator or the state of registry. For the Aerodrome and ATM chapters,
this scope is limited to the EASA MS as state of occurrence. The chapters of this review cover the following areas:
Chapter 1 Safety Overview
Review of Global Airline Safety: this provides a review of global safety for large commercial air trans-
port aeroplanes.
Cross-domain Safety Overview for EASA MS: This provides an overview of the most important statis-
tics across all the different domains. It helps to identify which domains are likely to need the greatest
focus in the EPAS.
Chapter 2 Aeroplanes
Chapters 2.1-2.3 – Commercial Air Transport: This covers all commercial air transport airline (passen-
ger and cargo operators) operations involving aeroplanes, as well as Non-commercially operated
complex aircraft flown for business operations. The airline and business operations have the same
safety risk portfolio due to the strong commonalities in their safety issues and key risk areas.
Chapter 2.4 – Specialised Operations: This covers all aerial work/ Part SPO operations involving aero-
planes and involves a wide range of different operational activities including aerial advertising, aerial
patrol, agricultural, air shows, parachuting and towing (with glider operations).
Chapter 2.5 – Non-commercial Operations: The chapter covers all non-commercial operations involv-
ing aeroplanes and includes analysis of what would be understood within the traditional definition
of general aviation. The chapter also includes flight training and other non-commercial activities.
Chapter 3 Rotorcraft
Chapter 3.1 – Offshore Commercial Air Transport: This covers operations in the offshore helicopter
domain and includes some initial input on offshore renewable operations in addition to the oil and
gas industry.
Chapter 3.2 – Other Commercial Air Transport: This covers all other commercial air transport opera-
tions involving helicopters such as passenger flights, air taxi and HEMS.
Chapter 3.3 – Specialised Operations: This covers all aerial work/ Part SPO operations involving helicop-
ters and includes an even wider range of different operational activities than the equivalent aeroplanes
chapter, adding Construction/ Sling Load operations and Logging to the categories already mentioned.
Chapter 3.4 – Non-commercial Operations: The chapter covers all non-commercial operations involv-
ing helicopters and includes analysis of what would be understood within the traditional definition
of general aviation. The chapter also includes flight training and other non-commercial activities.
Chapter 4 Balloons: This chapter covers all operations involving hot air balloons.
Chapter 5 Gliders/ Sailplanes: This chapter covers all operations involving gliders and sailplanes.
Chapter 6 Aerodromes and Ground Handling: This chapter covers aerodrome operations that occur within the
EASA MS. Therefore the scope for this chapter is EASA MS as state of occurrence. For the first time
a safety risk portfolio is provided for this domain.
Chapter 7 ATM/ANS: This chapter is EASA MS as state of occurrence and covers ATM/ANS operations. An initial
safety risk portfolio has also been provided for this domain for the first time.

Typical Structure for Each Chapter

Each of the domain chapters in this Annual Safety Review contains specific information which is useful in under-
standing the analysis of that domain. The structure of each chapter is as similar as possible, providing the ability
to compare information in each domain. Such information includes:
Key Statistics: Every chapter starts with a set of key statistics. This provides information on the Tier 1 SPIs for that
domain, which includes details of the number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents. It also
outlines the number of fatalities and serious injuries in the domain. In all cases, the figures for 2017 are provid-
ed followed by comparison with the annual averages over the past 10 years. This helps to provide a reference on
how this year’s performance relates to historical trends. This information is also provided in a graphical format.
Domain Specific Analysis: As every domain has different facets to it, a further analysis of useful domain specific
information is included. For example, within the areas of special operations it is useful to provide information on
the type of operation involved in safety events, while some chapters include an analysis of the type of propulsion.
Safety Risk Analysis: The next part of the analysis, and the most important in each chapter, is the domain safety
risk analysis. This section provides an overview of the relative risk level of each key risk areas, as well as outlin-
ing the high risk safety issues for the domain. The full safety risk portfolio is then provided. These safety risk
portfolios show a snapshot in their development, taken at the point where occurrence data and CAG inputs have
identified the safety issues, but without further consideration of the potential mitigating effects of forthcoming
safety actions or the worsening effects of other circumstances.
The safety risk portfolio tables have 2 axes. Along the top, information is provided on the key risk areas, which
are the most frequent accident outcomes or potential accident outcomes in that domain. In the context of the
safety performance framework, the key risk areas are the Tier 2 safety performance indicators (SPIs) for the do-
main. The key risk areas are, in most cases, ordered on the basis of their risk levels, determined using the ERCS.
On the left hand axis of the portfolio are the safety issues, which relate to the causal and contributory factors to
the key risk areas (accident outcomes). In terms of safety performance, these are the Tier 2+ SPIs. These are prior-
itised on the basis of their high, medium or low risk using ERCS. The occurrences related to the individual safety
issues and are identified by mapping event types in the ECCAIRS taxonomy to each safety issue.
The Connection with the European Plan for Aviation Safety
The European Plan for Aviation Safety
The European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) is a coordinated safety action plan that is prepared by EASA each
year with the support and technical inputs from EASA Member States and aviation stakeholders. It seeks to
further improve aviation safety throughout Europe. The Plan looks at aviation safety in a systemic manner by
analysing data on accidents and incidents. It considers not only the direct reasons, but also the underlying or hid-
den causes behind an accident or incident. Moreover, the Plan takes a longer term view into the future. Although
the Plan is originated from EASA MS, it intends to be a valid reference for all States in ICAO EUR Region.
The EPAS is a key component of the Safety Management System at the European level, and it is constantly be-
ing reviewed and improved. As an integral part of EASA’s work programme, the Plan is developed by EASA in
consultation with the EASA Member States and industry. It is implemented by the EASA Member States on a vol-
untary basis through their State Programmes and Plans. The current EPAS edition covers the 5-year period from
2018 to 2022.
PAGE 13
The Safety Risk Management Process
The EPAS is developed through the European safety risk management (SRM) process, which is defined in 5 clear
and specific steps as shown below:
5. Safety
Performance 1. Identification
Measurement of Safety Issues
4. Implementation 2. Assessment of
and Follow-up Safety Issues
3. Definition and
Programming of
Safety Actions
Identification of Safety Issues: The identification of safety issues is the first step in the SRM process and it is per-
formed through analysis of occurrence data and supporting information from the Collaborative Analysis Groups.
These candidate safety issues are formally captured by the Agency and are then subject to a preliminary safety
assessment. This assessment then informs the decision on whether a candidate safety issue should be included
formally within the relevant safety risk portfolio or be subject to other actions. Advice is taken from the Network
of Analysts1 and CAGs. The output of this step in the process are the domain safety risk portfolios. Within the
portfolios, both the key risk areas and safety issues are prioritised.
Assessment of Safety Issues: Once a safety issue is identified and captured within the safety risk portfolio, it is
subject to a formal safety assessment. These assessments are prioritised within the portfolio. The assessment
process is led by EASA and is supported by the NoA and the CAGs. In addition, group members are encouraged
to participate in the assessment itself; this external support is vital to achieving the best possible results. The re-
sult of the assessment is the production of scenario based bow tie models that help to identify weak controls for
which potential actions can be identified. Together this forms the Safety Issue Assessment (SIA), which provides
potential actions for the EPAS. This is followed by the Preliminary Impact Assessment (PIA), which assesses the
wider implications and benefits of the proposed actions and makes recommendations on the actions to be im-
plemented in the EPAS.
Definition and Programming of Safety Actions: Using the combined SIA/PIA, formal EPAS actions proposals are
then made to the advisory bodies. Once discussed and agreed upon, the actions are then included in the next
version of the EPAS. Prior to publication, the EPAS is approved by the EASA Management Board.
Implementation and Follow Up: The next step in the process involves the implementation and follow-up of the
actions that have been included within the EPAS. There are a number of different types of action within the EPAS.
These include focussed oversight, research, rulemaking and safety promotion.
Safety Performance Measurement: The final stage in the process is then the measurement of safety perfor-
mance. This serves two purposes, firstly to monitor the changes that have resulted from the implementation of
safety actions. Secondly, it also serves to monitor the aviation system so that new safety issues can be identified.
To ensure that there is a systematic approach to the work in this step of the SRM process, a Safety Perfor-
mance Framework has been developed that identifies different tiers of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs). Tier 1
1 See Article 14(2) of REGULATION (EU) No 376/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 3 April 2014 on the
reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation

transversally monitors all the domains and the overview of the performance in each domain. Tier 2 then covers
the key risk areas at domain level, whilst Tier 2+ monitors the safety issues. The Annual Safety Review is the an-
nual review of the Safety Performance Framework. It identifies safety trends, highlights priority domains, key risk
areas and safety issues. From this step the SRM process begins again.
More information on the EPAS can be found here:

https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/safety-management/european-plan-aviation-safety
Safety Overview
1
Safety Overview
1.1 Global Airline Fatal Accidents

This section covers large aeroplane passenger and cargo operations worldwide. The figures below show the
EASA member states’ operators contribution to the number of fatal accidents and fatalities. The relative contri-
bution to the number of fatalities is mainly driven by the size of aircraft and nature of flight (passenger or cargo)
involved. In 2017, there were 9 fatal accidents and 67 fatalities worldwide, the lowest number of fatal accidents
and fatalities since the start of our records in 1970.
´´ Figure 1. Number of Fatal Accidents and Fatalities Involving Large Aeroplane Passenger
and Cargo Operations, EASA MS and Rest of the World, 2007-2017
35 1200
30
1000
Number of Fatal Accidents
25
800
Number of Fatalities
20
600
15
400
10
200
5
0 0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EASA Member States' Operators Rest of the World EASA Member States' Operators Rest of the World
´´ Figure 2. Number of Fatalities Involving Large Aeroplane Passenger and Cargo Operations
Worldwide, 1970-2017
2.500
2.365 fatalities in 1972
67 fatalities in 2017
2.000
1.500
1.000
500
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
PAGE 17
One of the reasons that 2017 had a particularly low number of fatalities in comparison with previous years is
that the highest number of fatalities in a single accident was 39 and the median number of fatalities was 4 per
accident. In comparison, over the previous ten years (2007-2016), the highest number of fatalities in a single ac-
cident was 298 and the median was 8.
1.2 EASA Member States Cross Domain

Safety Overview
For each domain analysed in this Annual Safety Review, the number of fatal accidents and fatalities for 2017 has
been compared with the preceding ten years, 2007-2016. The table reflects the chapter structure and definitions
of the Annual Safety Review. For the aircraft chapters (aeroplanes, rotorcraft, balloons, gliders and RPAS), the def-
inition relates to aircraft operated by an EASA member state AOC holder or registered in an EASA member state.
Both the mean average and the median number of fatalities are shown for the period 2007-2016. This is because
for some aircraft domains the median provides a better representation of the number of accidents per year. This
is typically related to the number of passengers on board aircraft involved in fatal accidents. Gliders usually only
have one person on board and the number of fatal accidents and both the mean and median number of fatalities
are very similar. By contrast, commercial air transport (CAT) airline accidents may involve one or several hundred
fatalities, therefore the annual number of fatalities varies and the mean and median figures are quite different.
It can be seen in Table 1 that the highest number of fatal accidents and fatalities in 2017 occurred in the NCO
aeroplane domain. This domain also has the highest mean number of fatal accidents and the highest mean and
median number of fatalities over the preceding 10 years. By contrast, there were no fatal accidents in CAT-air-
lines, NCC-business, and Offshore CAT rotorcraft in 2017. Of these domains, over the preceding 10 years the
lowest mean number of fatal accidents per year was in CAT-airlines. NCC-business had the lowest number of fa-
talities over the decade, followed by Offshore CAT helicopters.
Table 1. Cross Domain Comparison of EASA MS Aircraft Fatal Accidents and Fatalities, 2007-2017
Aircraft Domain Fatal Accidents Fatal Accidents Fatalities 2017 Fatalities Annual Fatalities Annual
2017 2007-2016 Mean 2007-2016 Mean 2007-2016
Median
Aeroplanes
CAT - Airlines 0 0.9 0 66.4 4
NCC - Business 0 0.5 0 0.6 0
Specialised operations 3 7.3 4 18.1 16.5
Non-commercial
34 50.1 62 92.2 91
operations
Rotorcraft
Offshore CAT 0 0.4 0 1.3 0
Onshore CAT 1 1.7 6 5.4 4
Specialised operations 3 4 4 7.5 6
Non-commercial
3 5.6 7 13.2 12.5
operations
Safety Overview
Aircraft Domain Fatal Accidents Fatal Accidents Fatalities 2017 Fatalities Annual Fatalities Annual
2017 2007-2016 Mean 2007-2016 Mean 2007-2016
Median
Balloons 0 1.2 0 2.1 1
Sailplanes 25 25.4 27 29.5 29.5
A separate table has been used for aerodromes and ground handling and ATM/ANS, reflecting the fact that the
definition here is different: it includes all fatal accidents and fatalities that happened at aerodromes or in air-
space in an EASA member state. Therefore the infrastructure table not only counts fatal accidents and fatalities
that are already in the table for the aircraft chapters, but also some that involve operators or aircraft registered
outside of a member state.
Table 2. Cross Domain Comparison of EASA MS Infrastructure Fatal Accidents and Fatalities,
2007-2017
Infrastructure Fatal Accidents Fatal Accidents Fatalities 2017 Fatalities Annual Fatalities Annual
2017 2007-2016 Mean 2007-2016 Mean 2007-2016
Median
ADM & GH 0 0.7 0 1.7 0.5
ATM/ANS* 1 0.5 6 1.6 0

*The ATM/ANS figures include both ATM/ANS related and contribution accidents. See chapter 7 for further details.
PAGE 19
The graphs below show the number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for each aircraft
domain, providing a visual comparison.
´´ Figure 3. Number of Fatal Accidents, Non-fatal Accidents and Serious Incidents by Domain,
2013-2017
Fatal Accident Non-Fatal Accident Serious Incident
Commercial Air Transport-Airlines Non-Commercial Complex-Business

140 10
and serious incidents
9
Number of accidents
120
and Serious Incidents

Number of Accidents
8
100 7
80 6
5
60 4
40 3
2
20 1
0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Specialised Operations Aeroplanes Non-Commercial Small Aeroplanes

50 600
45
Number of Accidents 500

Number of accidents
40
35 400
30
25 300
20
15 200
10 100
5
0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Offshore Commercial Air Transport Rotorcraft Other Commercial Air Transport Rotorcraft
4 12
Number of accidents
10
Number of Accidents
3
8
2 6
4
1
2
0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Specialised Operations Rotorcraft Non-Commercial Rotorcraft

20 90
18 80

Number of accidents
Number of Accidents
16 70
14 60
12 50
10
8 40
6 30
4 20
2 10
0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Balloons Sailplanes
35 250
30
Number of accidents
200
Number of Accidents
25
20 150
15 100
10
50
5
0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Aerodromes and Ground Handling Air Traffic Management and Air Navigation Services
90 50
80 45
Number of Accidents
40
Number of accidents
70
60 35
50 30
25
40 20
30 15
20 10
10 5
0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Aeroplanes
2
PAGE 21
This chapter covers all aeroplane operations. The chapter is divided in four main sections:
1. EASA MS Air Operators (EASA MS AOC Holders) of airline passenger/cargo with aeroplanes having a max-
imum take-off weight above 5700 kg
2. EASA MS registered complex aeroplanes operating non-commercial operations (NCC) not classified as spe
cial operations (SPO) and with a maximum take-off weight above 5700 kg
3. EASA MS registered aeroplanes or EASA MS AOC Holder performing special operations (SPO) such as air
ambulance, advertisement, photography, etc.
4. EASA MS registered non-complex aeroplanes performing non-commercial operations, having a maximum

take-off weight below 5700 kg and not covered in the sections above.
For each section, the key statistics are presented. For sections 1 and 2, a common safety risk portfolio has been de-
veloped since, despite of the different type of operations, they both have a large amount of commonalities in terms
of risk areas and safety issues. Sections 3 and 4 contains an individual safety risk portfolio covering each domain.
2.1 Commercial Air Transport - Airlines

This section covers the main statistics for the EASA MS Air Operators (EASA MS AOC Holders) of airline passen-
ger/cargo with aeroplanes having a maximum take-off weight above 5700 kg. Data is based on the accidents and
serious incidents collected by the Agency as per Annex 13 investigations or by the active search of those events
from other official sources.
2.1.1 Key Statistics

The key statistics for this domain are in the tables below and include comparison of the number of accidents (fa-
tal and non-fatal) and serious incidents for the 10-year period 2007-2016 and the last year (2017). It also includes
the comparison of the fatalities and serious injuries happened in those accidents between the same timeframe.
Table 3. Key Statistics for Commercial Air Transport Airlines, 2007-2017

Fatal Accidents Non-Fatal Accidents Serious Incidents
2007-2016 total 9 235 792
2017 0 15 99
Fatalities Serious Injuries
2007-2016 total 664 111
2017 0 10
During 2017, there were no fatal accidents involving European CAT AOC Holders and the number of non-fatal
accidents was lower than the average of the previous 10-year period. In 2017, there was an increase in serious
incidents in comparison with the average of the previous 10-year period.
Aeroplanes
´´ Figure 4. Number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for
commercial air transport airlines, 2007 - 2017
140
Number of Accidents or Serious Incidents
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Serious Incident 85 61 68 93 92 83 75 66 60 109 99
Non-Fatal Accident 23 22 16 19 27 34 26 29 23 15 15
Fatal Accident 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 1 0
The rate of accidents has continued to decrease since 2014, although the number of serious incidents remains
higher than usual following a peak in 2016. This peak is the result of the more stringent classification of separa-
tion minima infringements by the Members States Aviation and Safety Investigation Authorities, after the entry
into force of the Regulation (EU) 376/2014.
´´ Figure 5. Number and rate of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for
commercial air transport airlines, 2013 - 2017
CAT Aeroplane Airline
160 16
140 14
Number of Accidents or Serious
Incidents per Million Flights
120 12
100 10
80 8
60 6
40 4
20 2
0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Serious Incident 75 66 60 109 99
Non-Fatal Accident 26 29 23 15 15
Fatal Accident 0 2 1 1 0
Rate per million flights 14 13 11 15 13
The use of the classification of accidents and serious incidents does not necessarily provide an accurate picture
of the risk of those events. As example, a very close near-miss would be classified as a serious incident, while a
collision between ground handling vehicle and an aircraft leading to substantial damages of the later would be
classified as an accident. It is clear that in terms of risk, the serious incident in this example would be higher than
the accident. This is the reason why the Regulation (EU) 376/2014 mandates the development and use of a com
mon risk classification scheme (ERCS) to risk classify all occurrences reported to the European Authorities. The
PAGE 23
main purpose of this risk score is to be able to discriminate between the occurrences with a high and lower as
sociated risk. EASA, together with an expert group composed by relevant European Risk Experts, has developed
the ERCS methodology that will be published by the European Commission in 2018.
Figure 6 shows the intended evolution of the key statistics from the accidents and serious incidents data sup
porting this section toward higher risk and lower risk occurrences. As it can be seen, the data shows a different
pattern than the representation of accidents and serious incidents. This is because of the high risk of the occur
rences classified as serious incidents that, in many cases equals or even exceeds the risk of certain accidents.
´´ Figure 6. Number of accidents and serious incidents by higher and lower ERCS score for
commercial air transport airline operations, 2013 - 2017
140
120
Number of Occurrences
100
80
60
40
20
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Lower Risk 8 5 13 37 11
Higher Risk 93 92 71 88 103
As can be seen in Figure 7, the number of fatalities per year changes substantially, being dependent on the size
and occupancy of the aeroplane that involved in the accident.
´´ Figure 7. Number of fatalities and serious injuries involving commercial air transport
airlines, 2007 - 2017
250
200
Number of Injuries
150
100
50
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total Serious Injuries 2 25 4 6 11 18 8 18 10 9 12
Total Fatalities 1 155 228 0 6 2 0 120 150 2 0
Aeroplanes
2.1.1.1 Phase of flight

The numbers for 2017 show a decrease of accidents and serious incidents in taxi and approach when compared
to the 10 year average. In same period however, accidents and serious incidents occurred during the other flight
phases have increased. The “Unknown/blank” flight phase corresponds to those occurrences where no data was
available and it normally relates to the second aircraft in some of the occurrences (e.g. a general aviation leisure
flight leading to a loss of separation with an airliner, missing information on the specific flight phase for the gen-
eral aviation flight).
´´ Figure 8. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by flight phase for commercial air
transport airlines, 2007 - 2017
45
40
35
Number of Accidents
or Serious Incidents
30
25
20
15
10
0
Unknown/
Standing Taxi Take-off En route Approach Landing Tow Blank
Average 2007-2016 7.9 11 18.8 32.8 19.1 15.6 0.1 4
2017 11 7 19 42 14 19 2 5
PAGE 25
2.1.1.2 Operation type

The numbers for 2017 show a similar distribution between operation types (passenger or cargo) in comparison
to the 10 year average, with a slight increase for the figures in 2017. “Unknown/blank” corresponds to those oc-
currences where no data on the operation type was available and it normally relates to the second aircraft in
some of the occurrences (e.g. loss of separation between an airliner and another aircraft).
´´ Figure 9. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by operation type for commercial
air transport airlines, 2007 - 2017
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Passenger Cargo Unknown/Blank
Average 2007-2016 97 6 4
2017 109 8 3
2.1.1.3 Propulsion type

The split by propulsion type shows an increase in 2017 of the turbofan and turboprop related occurrences with
reference to the 10 year average. The comparison between turbofan and turboprop is in line with the split of air-
craft fleet sizes and its different exposure figures.
´´ Figure 10. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type of the
aeroplane(s) involved for commercial air transport airlines, 2007 - 2017
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Turboprop Turbofan
Average 2007-2016 20.2 87.7
2017 28 92
Aeroplanes
2.2 Non-Commercial Complex – Business

This section covers the safety performance of the EASA MS registered complex aeroplanes operating non-com-
mercial operations (NCC) not classified as special operations (SPO) and with a maximum take-off weight above
5,700 kg. Data is based on the accidents and serious incidents collected by the Agency as per Annex 13 investi-
gations or by the active search of those events from other official sources.

The key statistics for this domain are in the tables below and include a comparison of the number of accidents (fa-
Table 4. Key Statistics for Non-commercial Complex Business Operations, 2007- 2017
2007-2016 total 5 22 49
2017 0 0 5
2007-2016 total 6 3
2017 0 0
During 2017, there were no accidents involving European registered NCC operated aircraft, therefore there were
also no fatalities or serious injuries in 2017. The number of serious incidents remained as the average of the pre-
vious 10-year period. The low numbers probably indicate an incomplete dataset, possibly as a result of the lack
of reporting of occurrences not classified as accidents.
´´ Figure 11. Number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents for non-
commercial complex business, 2007 - 2017
14
12
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Serious Incident 8 2 6 5 6 4 4 4 5 5 5
Non-Fatal Accident 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 3 2 2 0
Fatal Accident 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
PAGE 27
In the same way as in the previous section, Figure 12 shows the split of the accidents or serious incidents by the
ERCS score grouped by higher risk and lower risk. This indicator provides an additional view with a proxy to the
risk of those occurrences.
´´ Figure 12. Number of accidents and serious incidents by higher and lower ERCS score for
non-commercial complex business, 2013 - 2017
8
6
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Lower Risk 0 0 0 3 0
High Risk 6 7 7 4 5
´´ Figure 13. Number of fatalities and serious injuries involving non-commercial complex
business, 2007 - 2017
5
4
Number of Injuries
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Due to the size of the aeroplanes used for the majority of this type of operation, the number of fatalities is sig-
nificantly low.
Aeroplanes

The low numbers in this section prevent any conclusions to be drawn in terms of the flight phase.
´´ Figure 14. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by flight phase for non-
3
0
Standing
Taxi
Take-off
En route
Approach
Landing
Unknown/blank
Average 2007-2016 2017
2.2.1.2 Propulsion type

The split by propulsion type shows that the only propulsion type involved in accidents or serious incidents in
2017 was the turbofan type.
´´ Figure 15. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by propulsion type for non-
8
7
0
Turboprop Turbofan
2017 Average 2007-2016

PAGE 29
2.3 Safety Risk Portfolio for Large Aeroplane

(CAT-Airlines and NCC-Business)
CAT Airlines and NCC Business operations are covered by a single Safety Risk Portfolio due to the similarity of the
main risk areas and safety issues for both operation types, and to the small dataset available for NCC-Business. Those
safety issues which might be only relevant for one of the operation types are highlighted as such when necessary.
The safety risk portfolio for Airline and NCC-business operation provides a summary of the top risk areas and
safety issues of this part of the aviation system. It covers the Tier 2 (Key Risk Areas) and Tier 2+ (Safety Issues) of
the performance framework in each domain. The portfolio is used to prioritise the assessment of safety issues,
to target analysis activities over key risk areas and to prioritise safety actions.
However, the portfolio presented in this section is not yet that safety risk portfolio referred above but the so-
called “data portfolio”. This is the result of the yearly review of the relevant occurrence data to establish the link
between each individual occurrence and the key risk areas and safety issues already listed in the last year’s port-
folio. This is considered an intermediate step towards the final Safety Risk Portfolio.
While the information presented in the data portfolio is relevant and provides an indication of the potential areas
of concern, it is not yet an indication of the main risk areas or safety issues. The data portfolio is used to identify
a reduced number of key risk areas for which an in-depth analysis will be carried out to determine the complete-
ness of safety issues that have contributed to those risk areas and to assess the level of control of over the most
relevant safety issues. This assessment would consider the increase/decrease of exposure to the relevant hazard,
the effectiveness of existing controls and the expected risk reduction by committed safety actions. This analy-
sis integrates the expertise from the CAGs and the EASA operational departments so as to complement the view
provided by occurrence data. The result of this review is the Safety Risk Portfolio that defines the safety priori-
ties for each aviation domain.
The data portfolio uses the aggregated ERCS score to provide and initial ranking of the key risk areas and safety
issue. The figure below plots the high risk occurrences, based on its ERCS risk score, by their associated key risk
areas. It draws in the x-axis the number of those high risk occurrences per key risk area and in the y-axis the ag-
gregated ERCS risk score for each key risk area.
´´ Figure 16. Distribution of key risk areas by frequency and aggregated ERCS risk score for
commercial air transport airlines and non-commercial complex business, 2013-2017
Higher Risk
Runway Excursion Aircraft Upset
Agregated ERCS Score
Injuries/Damages
Security
Ground Collision
Runway Collision Airborne Collision
Obstacle Collision
Aircraft Environment
Taxiway Excursion
Lower Risk Terrain Collision
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Number of Higher Risk Occurrences

Aeroplanes
The figure below provides a similar representation of the key risk areas but it introduces the dimension of fatali-
ties associated to them (y-axis) and shows the aggregated ERCS risk score as the size of the bubbles.
´´ Figure 17. Distribution of key risk areas by fatalities, number of higher risk occurrences
and ERCS risk score for commercial air transport airlines and non-commercial complex
business, 2013-2017
180
Aircraft Upset
160 Ø Aggregated ERCS Score
1; 150 Runway Excursion
140 89; 118
Injuries/Damages
120
Security
100
Runway Collision
80
Airborne Collision
60
40 81; -
11; - 28; 5 69; - 104; -
83; - Ground Collision
20 52; -
1; -
10; - Taxiway Excursion
-20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Terrain Collision

-20
Obstacle Collision
-40
From these two representations, it can be concluded that the key risk areas accumulating higher risk score, based
on the occurrence data used, are Runway Excursion and Aircraft Upset. They concern a high number of higher
risk occurrences and aggregating the highest risk score. At a second stage, it lays the key risk areas of Injuries/
Damages and Security. The first one occurs often leading to high severity outcomes though to a reduced number
of persons (injuries to few crew or passengers). The second one, Security, very much depends on the will and ca
pability to cause harm, considerations not appearing in pure safety risk assessments. Security shows that, while
high risk occurrences associated to it are infrequent (only one confirmed in the last 5 years), it becomes of high
risk due to the lack of efficient barriers to stop it. Runway Collision and Airborne Collision can be considered at
a third stage of importance.
The data portfolio shown here below has been sorted following the risk order given by the aggregated ERCS risk
score of the high risk occurrences related to key risk areas or to safety issues. It is acknowledged that this indi-
cator is still a proxy to the risk, but it is evaluated as a better reference than the pure sorting by the number of
accidents and serious incidents. This indicator will be complemented by the qualitative analysis to estimate the
actual risk by considering the increase/reduction of exposure to the relevant hazards and the expected risk re-
duction of the ongoing safety actions, for both key risk areas and safety issues. This analysis will provide still
a proxy to the risk but it will provide a more consistent ranking.
The safety risk portfolio shows in the upper part, the key risk areas (based on the ERCS score) for the past 5 years.
A key risk area includes both the undesired outcome (accident) and the immediate precursors to those outcomes
(less severe occurrences, normally). In rows, the safety risk portfolio shows a similar spread by safety issues based
on the aggregated ERCS score of those occurrences where those safety issue were present. The dotted grid estab-
lishes the relation between safety issues and key risk areas – it identifies which safety issues contribute to which
(potential) accident outcomes. Dots come from occurrence data.
PAGE 31
Based on the data supporting the portfolio, the following relations between the priority 1 key risk areas and
safety issues can be highlighted:
• Aircraft upset:
›› Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes
›› Approach path management
›› Convective weather
›› In flight icing
›› Handling of technical failures
• Runway Excursion
›› Approach path management
›› Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes
›› Handling of technical failures
The main Key Risk Areas highlighted above are defined by their accident outcome that needs to be prevented
and by its immediate precursors.
• Aircraft upset: It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain following an aircraft upset, but also occur-
rences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended flight parameters, regardless
of whether the flight crew realised the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also in-
cludes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections.
• Runway excursion: It covers materialised runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences
where the flight crew had difficulties maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking
action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft
had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing.
The safety issues identified as the main contributors and highlighted above are defined as follows:
• Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes: It is the inadequate monitoring of the main flight
parameters and automation modes, potentially leading to the upset of the aircraft, runway excursion or
controlled collision with terrain. It covers the relevant SOPs and trainings of the flight crew. It also includes
the considerations related to human factors, especially to the human-machine interface (HMI) of aircraft
systems and indications.
• Approach path management: Ineffective or incorrect management of the approach path (i.e. not stable
and/or compliant) that may lead to go-arounds, hard landings or runway excursion.
• Convective weather: it is the situation where the aeroplane flies within atmospheric convective phenom-
ena, potentially leading to aircraft upset (uncontrolled collision with terrain) and injuries to passengers
or crews. The safety issue covers the main convective phenomena affecting the safe flight, such as con-
vective turbulence, up/down-drafts, wind shear, hail precipitation, lightning and icing. The main threat
posed by this safety issue is the loss of control of the aircraft after being forced out of its flight envelope
by a severe atmospheric phenomenon or after a system failure not adequately handled by the flight crew.
This safety issue may also lead to injuries mainly due to the sudden encounter with turbulences. The safe-
ty issue covers the detection, avoidance and flying-in convective weather during the flight, and all the
support to flight crews to deal with it before (e.g. flight planning, meteorological information) and during
the flight (e.g. on-board detection systems, ATS vectoring). It especially covers the SOPs and training of
the flight crew to maintain or recovering the safe flight. The safety issue also considers the robustness of
the aeroplane to conduct a flight in convective atmospheric conditions, as per its initial certification and
its in-service experience (i.e. continuous airworthiness process).
• Inflight icing: it is the situation where the aeroplane flies within icing conditions, potentially leading to
aircraft upset (uncontrolled collision with terrain) due to ice accretion on the aeroplane. The main threat
posed by this safety issue is the contamination of aircraft surfaces or systems that may severely impact
the performance or controllability of the aircraft. It covers the detection, avoidance and flying-in icing
conditions during the flight, and all the support to flight crews to deal with it before (e.g. flight plan-
ning, meteorological information) and during the flight (e.g. on-board detection systems, de/anti-icing
Aeroplanes
systems). It especially covers the SOPs and training of the flight crew to maintain or recovering the safe
flight. The safety issue also considers the robustness of the aeroplane to conduct a flight in icing condi-
tions, as per its initial certification and its in-service experience (i.e. continuous airworthiness process).
This safety issue partially overlaps with the Convective Weather.
• Handling of technical failures: It is the ineffective handling of a non-catastrophic technical failure by the
flight crew. Technical failures are those not rendering the aircraft uncontrollable and for which the flight
crew are trained to manage them. It includes the human factors playing a role in the realisation and pro
cessing of the failure information and the later reaction of the crew to handle the issue. It covers the
related SOPs and trainings of the flight crew.
´´ Figure 18. Safety Risk Portfolio for CAT Airline and NCC Business aeroplane operations
showing how the 5-year occurrence data 2013-2017 relates to safety issues and their
outcomes relative to risk in descending order.
Perception and Situational Awareness  • •   •  • • •
Monitoring of Flight Parameters and

  • • • •
Automation Modes
Approach Path Management    • •  •
Convective Weather (Turbulence, Hail,

 •  • •
Lightning, ice)
Icing in Flight  •
Mental Health •
Handling of Technical Failures    •  • •
CRM and Operational Communication  • • • • • •
Braking and Steering   • • 
Flight Planning and Preparation   • • • •
Experience, Training and Competence

• • • • •
of Individuals
Runway Surface Condition  •
Crosswind • • • • • •
Deconfliction with Aircraft Not Using


Transponders
ACAS RA Not Followed •
Inappropriate flight control inputs • • • •
Taxi Speed and Directional Control • • 
Knowledge of Aircraft Systems and

 • • •
Procedures
Alignment with wrong runway • • • • • • • •
Fatigue • •
Wake Vortex • •
Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) and Montain

• 
Waves
Entry of Aircraft Performance Data   •
Fumes Effects • • 
PAGE 33
Large Aeroplane - Airlines / NCC Business
Bands of Aggregated ERCS Risk Score (2013-2017) Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 Priority 4
Number of High Risk ERCS Occurrences 89 81 104 1 28 69 83 52 11 10 1
Key Risk Areas (Outcomes and precursors)
Bands of
Taxiway Excursion
Runway Excursion
Airborne Collision
Obstacle Collision
Injuries/Damages
Aggregated
Runway Collision
Ground Collision
Safety Issues
Terrain Collision
ERCS Score
Aircraft Upset
2013-2017
Security
Aircraft maintenance  • •  •
Decision Making and Planning • • • • •
Icing on Ground • • • • •
Slow Rotation at Take-off • •
Airborne Separation RPAS •
Windshear • • •
Baggage and Cargo loading •
False or Disrupted ILS Signal Capture • • • • •
Gastrointestinal Illness •
Transport of Lithium Batteries • •
Handling and Execution of Go-Arounds • • • •
Bird/ Wildlife Strikes •
Personal Pressure and Arousal • •
Supporting Information to the Flight

Crews
Tyre pressure condition
Disruptive Passengers
Effectiveness of Safety Management
Fuel Contamination under evaluation
Laser Illumination Effects under evaluation
Fuel Management under evaluation
Non-Precision Approaches under evaluation
Safety Culture under evaluation
Damage Tolerance to UAS Collisions under evaluation
 A significant number of occurrences • A small number of occurrences

Aeroplanes
2.4 Specialised Operations

This chapter covers Aerial Work and Special Operations (SPO) involving aeroplanes of all mass groups with an
EASA MS State of Registry or State of Operator.

Table 5. Key Statistics for Aeroplane Specialised Operations, 2007-2017

2007-2016 total 73 254 53
2017 3 29 13
2007-2016 total 181 86
2017 4 11
There were 3 fatal accidents in 2017, lower than the average of the preceding decade. However, at 29 the num-
ber of non-fatal accidents was slightly higher than the average of 2007-2016 and the number of serious incidents
was considerably higher than the average of the preceding 10-year period. The number of fatalities in 2017 was
considerably lower than the preceding decade average, whereas the number of serious injuries was slightly high-
er than the 2007-2016 average.
aeroplane specialised operations, 2007 - 2017
PAGE 35
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Serious Incidents 3 0 3 7 9 6 5 4 6 10 13
Non-Fatal Accidents 29 27 34 24 26 24 25 27 24 14 28
Fatal Accidents 7 9 7 9 5 7 7 10 8 4 3
The number of fatal accidents in 2017 was lower than that of any year in the preceding decade. Contrasting-
ly, the number of non-fatal accidents was higher than all but two of the years (2007 and 2009) in the preceding
10-year period.
´´ Figure 20. Aeroplane Specialised Operations Fatalities and Serious Injuries, 2007-2017
60
50
40
Number of Injuries
30
20
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
In line with the number of fatal accidents, the number of fatalities in 2017 was also lower than any year in the
preceding decade. The number of serious injuries in 2017 was higher than all but two years (2008 and 2015) in
the preceding 10-year period.
Aeroplanes

The number of accidents and serious incidents in the standing, take-off and en-route phases were higher in 2017
than the average of the preceding decade. In 2017 there was only one accident/serious incident in the taxi and
approach phases respectively, which was below the average of the preceding decade.
´´ Figure 21. Aeroplane Specialised Operations Accidents and Serious Incidents by Phase of
Flight, 2007-2017
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Standing
Taxi
Take-off
En route
Approach
Landing
Unknown/blank
Average 2007-2016 2017
2.4.1.2 Operation Type

The number of accidents and serious incidents in aerial advertising, parachute drop, photography and towing
was higher in 2017 than the average of the preceding decade. In agricultural and airshow/race the 2017 number
was lower than the preceding 10-year period. There were no aerial patrol accidents or serious incidents in 2017.
´´ Figure 22. Aeroplane Specialised Operations Accidents and Serious Incidents by Type of
Operation, 2007-2017
16
Number of accidents and serious incidents
14
12
10
0
Aerial Advertising
Aerial Patrol
Agricultural
Airshow/Race
Parachute drop
Photography
Towing
Other
Unknown
Average 2007-2016 2017

PAGE 37
2.4.2 Safety Risk Portfolio

The key risk areas for Specialised Operations involving aeroplanes are shown in Figure 23. It can be seen that
aircraft upset is the highest risk and most common type of accident or serious incident involving this domain.
aeroplane specialised operations, 2015-2017
Higher Risk
+
Aircraft Upset
Aggregated ERCS Score
Taxiway/Apron Excursion
Airborne Collision
Ground Damage Terrain Collision
Runway Collision
Aircraft Environment Obstacle Collision in Flight
Runway Excursion
Lower Risk
-
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Number of ERCS scored SPO Aeroplanes occurences 2015-2017
The Safety Risk Portfolio for Specialised Operations Aeroplanes is based solely on occurrence data, since an
SPO Aeroplanes CAG has not yet been established. The Safety Issues and Key Risk Areas are prioritised based
on the cumulative ERCS risk score for accidents and serious incidents in the EASA occurrence repository for the
2015-2017 period.
Strikingly, the highest risk safety issues in this domain all relate to human factors. The absence of an SPO aero-
plane CAG means that these issues are not yet fully defined, but some examples of the human factors issues are
provided here. “Perception and Situational Awareness“, “Human Performance” and “Experience, Training and
Competence of Individuals”, all Human Factors-related issues, are among the top priority issues. One example
of such an occurrence was a parachute jumper who, upon leaving the aircraft, did not notice that his leg had be-
come entangled with a static line that had been used by one of the previous jumpers. As he jumped out, he was
retained by the static line and was hanging approximately four meters below the aircraft, unable to free himself
from the static line. The pilot was also not able to cut the line. The airfield fire services laid out a large area of
foam on the airfield and the aircraft landed in the foamed area with the jumper hanging from it. The jumper re-
ceived minor injuries. Another example is relates to the pre-flight/flight planning phase. A glider towing aircraft
ran out of fuel shortly after releasing the glider, and the pilot carried out a successful forced landing in a field.
It was determined that the fuel starvation was due to the pilot misjudging the amount of fuel needed for carry-
ing out the planned flight.
Aeroplanes
´´ Figure 24. Safety Risk Portfolio for SPO Aeroplane operations showing how the 3 year
descending order
System Reliability  • •  • •
Perception and Situational Awareness • • • • • •
Intentional Low Flying • •
Human Performance • • •
Experience, Training and Competence of

• • •
Individuals
Airborne Separation • 
Flight Planning and Preparation • • • •
Handling of Technincal Failures • • • •
Aircraft Maintenance •
Decision Making and Planning • • • • •
Control of Manual Flight Path • •
Bird and Wildlife Strikes •
CRM and Operational Communications •

• •
Procedures
Personal Pressure and Arousal •
Approach Path Management No data
Crosswind No data
Damage Tolerance to UAS Collisions No data
Development and Application of

No data
Regulations and Procedures
Icing in Flight No data
Icing on Ground No data
2.5 Non-Commercial Operations

This chapter covers General Aviation Non-Commercial Operations involving aeroplanes of mass groups below
5700 kg with an EASA MS State of Registry. Key statistics and an occurrence data based Safety Risk Portfolio (SRP)
are presented. The SRP is enhanced with expertise from operators, manufacturers and National Aviation Author-
ities with the establishment of a GA Aeroplane Collaboration and Analysis Group.
PAGE 39

Table 6. Key statistics for non-commercially operated aeroplanes 2007-2017

2007-2016 total 501 3730 375
2017 34 321 125
2007-2016 total 922 496
2017 62 45
In non-commercial operations with aeroplanes, there were 34 fatal accidents, which continues the downward
trend and is lower than the 10-year average. However, looking at non-fatal accidents it can be seen that from
2016 to 2017 there is close to 12% increase in those accidents. Combined with fatal accidents the increase be-
tween 2016 and 2017 is 7.3%. When looking at the historical data in Figure 25 for fatal and non-fatal accidents
since 2007 it can be observed that the downward trend for the period is 27%.
aeroplane non-commercial operations, 2007 - 2017
600
500
400
Accidents
300
200
100
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fatal Accidents 59 53 59 49 61 45 35 44 50 46 34
Last year EASA published for the first time accidents rates for GA Fixed wing aircraft. These rates were based on
responses from 12 NAAs and estimations made for the rest of the EASA MS. EASA has not received the neces-
sary data for exact calculation of the accident rates but instead based the estimation for 2017 on the average EU
GDP of 2.6%. This is reflected in Figure 26. The number of movements are estimated to have increased in direct
proportion of the GDP as a better economy should affect the whole community and also the pilot’s budget for
flying. This figure will be updated when reliable data is available.
´´ Figure 26. Accident rates per year in NCO per 1 000 000 movements
Aeroplanes
450 70
400
60
Accident rates in NCO per year

350
per 1 000 000 movements

50
Number of Accidents
300
250 40
200 30
150
20
100
10
50
0 0
2014 2015 2016 2017
Non-Fatal Accidents 365 337 283 321
Fatal Accidents 44 50 46 34
Fatal Accident Rate 7.2 7.9 7.2 5.3
Non-fatal Accident Rate 60.8 53.7 45.2 49.9
Number of fatalities have also been significantly reduced compared to the 10-year average but the number of se
rious injuries shows a slight increase when compared to 2016. When looking at the period 2007-2017, it may be
seen that the combined number of fatalities and serious injuries has reduced by 38%.
´´ Figure 27. Number of fatalities and serious injuries for aeroplane non-commercial
operations, 2007-2017
200
180
160
140
Number of Injuries
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

In terms of flight phase in GA FW NCO aeroplanes accidents it can be seen that the most accidents take place
during the landing phase of the flight mostly resulting in runway excursions. The take‑off and en route phases
show that there were fewer accidents last year compared to the 10 year average but the landing phase accidents
increased slightly compared to the 10 year average.
´´ Figure 28. NCO accidents per phase of flight 2007-2017

PAGE 41
250
200
Number of accidents
150
100
50
Unknown
Standing
Taxi
Take-off
En route
Approach
Landing
2017 2007-2016

Most of the accidents occurred during pleasure flights, followed by Flight training/Instructional flights. This can
be considered to be normal as those operation types are the most common within the domain. Apart from that
it should be noted that there is close to 7% increase in flight training accidents compared to the 10 year average.
´´ Figure 29. Main operation types in GA Aeroplane NCO.

350
300
250
Number of Accidents
200
150
100
50
0
Flight Training/Instructional Pleasure
2017 Average 2007-2016
2.5.2.1 Categories and ERCS scores 2016-2017

Aeroplanes
EASA has now risk assessed the GA FW NCO dataset - both fatal and non-fatal accidents using the European Risk
Classification Scheme (ERCS). Figure 30 shows the Key Risk Areas (KRAs) in relation to the number of accidents
vs. the aggregated ERCS score. The figure shows clearly that the KRA showing the highest risk is Aircraft upset.
Runway Excursions are common but have a lower risk of fatalities or serious injuries. Figure 30 therefore indi-
cates where the efforts should lie in terms of action areas in the EPAS.
aeroplane non-commercial operations, 2015-2017
Higher Risk
Aircraft Upset
Airborne Collision
Terrain Collision
Landing on an airfield
Obstacle Collision in flight

Runway Excursions
Undershoot/Overshoot
Ground Collision
Lower Risk
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Injuries
Number of Accidents
2.5.2.2 Identified Safety Issues and ERCS scores

The identified safety issues for the GA FW Safety Risk Portfolio are shown in Figure 31. It was decided this year
to change the presentation of the portfolio and connect the safety issues to the ERCS score.
Figure 31 shows that the safety issue ‘Stall/Spin’ is the most common one. This supports Figure 30 where we see
Aircraft Upset bearing the highest risk. Strongly associated with that safety issue is the ‘Handling of Technical Fail-
ures’ which highlights pilot’s actions that are either precursors or resulting actions to salvage the situation. The
third issue is ‘Airborne Conflict’ this issue shows both actual collisions as well as near-misses. Due to the nature
of the issue it often bares high risk and is therefore high on the list. The fourth safety issue is ‘Loss of control –
Other’. This issue relates to other types of control loss and excludes stalls and spins. Directional control, heading,
pitch and roll are all part of this safety issue. The fifth safety issue touches the operational side where human
factors are often strongly associated with. This is the ‘Flight Planning and Preparation’ issue. This issue includes
events like Flight planning, minimum equipment violation, performance calculation, pre-flight planning, route
planning and loading of the aircraft, weight/balance calculations and weather planning.
PAGE 43
´´ Figure 31. GA FW NCO Accidents. Safety issues in relation to high and low risk
occurrences.
Stall/Spin
Handling of Technical Failure
Airborne Conflict
Loss of Control - Other
Flight Planning and Preparation
Approach Path Management
Crosswind
Fuel Management
Wheels up Landing
Fuel Starvations
Handling and Executioin of Go-Arounds
Misuse of Controls
Turbulence
Under/Overshoot
Control of Manual Flight Path
Icing in Flight
Bird/Wildlife Strikes
Intentional Low Flying
Incorrect Loading
Terrain Collision
UAS Strikes
Deconfliction with IFR/VFR traffic
Icing on Ground
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Number of occurrences
ERCS Higher Risk ERCS Lower Risk
2.5.2.3 The Portfolio

Based on the data above the NCO portfolio can be seen in Figure 31. It should be noted that the portfolio is en-
tirely built upon queries. It should therefore be kept in mind that the data behind the portfolio not fully verified
in terms of validity. It is worth noting that two safety issues have been added. Those are Stall/Spin and Loss of
control (other). Both of these issues focus on take-off, manoeuvring, approach and landing phases of the flight.
It was decided to add these safety issues in, even though the Key Risk Area Aircraft Upset is present as stalls
and spins are the most common types of loss of control and have the highest risk score and therefore should be
addressed as the top priority. It should be noted that in the Stall/spin row a mark can be seen under the KRA Air-
borne Collision. This is unavoidable due to the coding of the occurrences as mid-air collisions tend to result in
loss of control after impact. When looking at the safety issues it can also be seen that ‘Perception and Situation-
al Awareness’, ‘Decision Making and Planning’ and ‘Flight Planning and Preparation’ affect all four KRAs under
Priority 1. Aircraft Upset, Terrain Collision Obstacle Collision and Runway Excursions can all be considered to be
scoring high in the risk assessment. System Reliability contains data on both engine failures and other system
failures on board the aircraft.
Aeroplanes
´´ Figure 32. Safety Risk Portfolio for General Aviation fixed-wing aeroplane non-commercial
operations showing how the 3 year occurrence data 2015-2017 relates to safety issues and
their outcomes relative to risk in descending order
Stall/Spin   
Perception and Situational Awareness      •  • •
Decision Making and Planning     • • •
Flight Planning and Preparation     • • • • •
System Reliability  •     • •
Loss of Control (other)    • •

 •   • • • •
Individuals
Intentional Low Flying • • • •
Handling of Technical Failures  • •  • • •
Airborne Separation 
Bird and Wildlife Strikes • • •
Approach Path Management   •  •
Control of Manual Flight Path  • 
CRM and Operational Communications • • • •  • •
Crosswind  •  •
Fuel Management  • • • •

• •  • •
Procedures
Baggage and Cargo Loading  • • •
Aircraft Maintenance  • • • •  •
Icing in Flight  • • • •
Turbulence  •  •
Deconfliction with IFR/VFR traffic 
Icing on Ground • •
2.5.4 Safety Issue Assessments

One safety issue assessment is currently being performed. The safety issue ‘Deconfliction with IFR/VFR traffic’
has been considered to be producing significant risk in the vicinity of smaller aerodromes. These aerodromes
are holding substantial amount of mixed traffic and are surrounded with airspace class D/E and G. The risk is
found to be too high for omitting it – hence, EASA has launched a safety issue assessment to address the risk.
A collision between a commercial airliner and a GA aircraft would most likely end in a catastrophic event causing
serious implications for both the GA community as well as the commercial domain. The group will provide a re-
port with proposed actions aimed at mitigating the risk in as efficient way as possible. There are several existing
analysis available and the group has been looking at the issue from all angles. The group has used the European
Central Repository (ECR) dataset for reference as we fortunately do not have any accidents stored in EASA’s acci-
dent database between a GA aircraft and a Commercial Airliner. The ECR contains to a large extent incident data
from the national authorities. The data for the Deconfliction with IFR/VFR in Figure 31 does therefore not reflect
the risk correctly as that figure is based on accidents from the EASA dataset.
PAGE 45
Other safety issue assessments have not been launched. However, the information shown above provides a di-
rection on where to focus the Community’s efforts.
Rotorcraft
Rotorcraft
This chapter covers all rotorcraft operations and it is divided into four sections. The first
section covers offshore operations and the second section covers all other commercial air
transport helicopter operations. The scope in these two sections being helicopter operations
involving an EASA Member State Air Operator Certificate (AOC) Holder. The third and fourth
sections cover Specialised Operations (Part SPO)/aerial work operations and Non-Commer-
cial Operations, respectively, involving “certified” helicopters of all mass groups with an
EASA MS as State of registry or as State of operator.
Each section provides details on key statistics, an overview of key risk areas and safety risk
portfolio and discusses possible safety priorities in support of the European Plan for Avia-
tion Safety.
3
Rotorcraft
3.1 Offshore Commercial Air Transport

Rotorcraft
The key statistics in Offshore rotorcraft operations involving an EASA MS AOC Holder are provided below.

the comparison of fatalities and serious injuries happened in those accidents between the same timeframe.
Table 7. Key Statistics for Offshore Commercial Air Transport Helicopters, 2007-2017
2007-2016 total 4 8 13
2017 0 0 2
2007-2016 total 13 6
2017 0 0
There have been 2 serious incidents and no fatal or non-fatal accidents in offshore helicopter operations in 2017.
The number of serious incidents in 2017 is higher than the average for the 10 year period previous to 2017. Prior
to 2017, there have been one fatal accident which involved the loss of an Airbus Helicopters EC225 Super Puma
in Norway on 29 April 2016 and another fatal accident in 2013 involving the loss of EUROCOPTER AS332 Super
Puma.
The number of fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents is shown below, covering the period
2007-2017. It can be seen that the number of these occurrences has remained relatively stable over the period
analysed.
PAGE 49
´´ Figure 33. Offshore Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Fatal Accidents, Non-fatal
Accidents and Serious Incidents, 2007-2017
6
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Serious incidents 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 0 0 2
Non-fatal accidents 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 0
Fatal accidents 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
There were no fatalities or serious injuries in offshore helicopter operations in 2017.
´´ Figure 34. Number of fatalities and serious injuries in offshore commercial air transport,
2007-2017
18
16
Number of Fatalities or Serious njuries
14
12
10
0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
The low number of accidents and serious incidents in this domain prevents any conclusions from being drawn
regarding the phase of flight. However, the figures are presented below for information.
Rotorcraft
´´ Figure 35. Offshore Commercial Air Transport Rotorcraft Accidents and Serious Incidents
by phase of flight, 2007-2017
3
0
Standing Taxi Take-off En route Manoevring Approach Landing Unknown
2007-2016 Avg 0.1 0.2 0.1 1 0 0.3 0.4 0.4
2017 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0

The safety risk portfolio for offshore helicopter has been developed with the support of the Offshore Helicopter
Collaborative Analysis Group (CAG). The safety risk portfolio provides a summary of key risk areas and associ-
ated safety issues identified in accidents and serious incidents that happened from 2013 and 2017 in offshore
operations.
´´ Figure 36. Offshore commercial air transport rotorcraft Key Risk Areas plotted in relation to
the European Risk Classification Score (ERCS) methodology
Higher Risk
+
Aircraft Upset
Ground Damage Obstacle Collision in Flight
Lower Risk
-
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
PAGE 51
The main key risk areas in offshore helicopter operations are Aircraft Upset, Obstacle Collision in Flight and
Ground Damage. Aircraft Upset (Loss of Control) is the largest key risk area for offshore operations and includes
two fatal accidents and 17 fatalities, 1 non-fatal accident and 2 serious incidents. Obstacle Collision in Flight is
the second largest key risk areas for offshore and has been identified in 2 serious incidents reported in 2017 as-
sociated with landing on a wrong deck. Ground Damage key risk area includes a non-fatal accident during taxi
where the helicopter main rotor blades hit the side of a parked truck.
The safety risk portfolio lists the safety issues that contribute to the key risk areas, based on the number of high
risk occurrences and their aggregated risk score. The key risk areas are listed at the top of the safety risk portfo-
lio and prioritised based on the number of high risk occurrences.
For each safety issue listed in the safety risk portfolio information is provided on the number of high risk occur-
rences and their aggregated risk score, which is further distributed by the key risk areas to which the safety issue
had contributed in terms of both number of high risk occurrences and aggregated risk score.
In this way, it can be easily assessed to which key risk area a safety issues is more relevant for, as well as to prior-
itize safety issues within a key risk area.
´´ Figure 37. Offshore commercial air transport rotorcraft safety issues.

Software and Configuration
CRM and Operational Communication
Development and Application of Regulations and Procedures
Perception and Situational Awareness
Flight Path Management
System Component Failures
Experience, Training and Competence of Individuals
Helideck Operations
Navigation and Airspace Knowledge
Wrong Deck Landing
Aircraft Maintenance
Airworthiness Management
Human Performance
Knowledge of Aircraft Systems and Procedures
Personal Pressure and Arousal
Decision Making and Planning
Handling of Technical Failures
Use of Operationally Ready Safety Systems for Helicopters
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
• Aircraft Upset
›› Software and Configuration
›› Systems Failures
›› Flight Path Management
›› Perception and Situational Awareness
›› Experience, Training and Competence of Individuals
• Obstacle Collision
›› CRM and Operational Communication
›› Flight Planning and Preparations
›› Wrong Deck Landings
›› Helideck Operations
Rotorcraft
The safety issues listed in the safety risk portfolio that were not identified in high risk occurrences are included
for safety performance monitoring purposes as they were identified during the meetings of the Offshore CAG.
´´ Figure 38. Safety Risk Portfolio for Off-shore Helicopter operations showing how the 5 year
descending order
Software and Configuration 6  •
CRM and Operational Communication 5  •
System Component Failures 4 
Flight Path Management 4 
Flight Planning and Preparation 4 • 
Perception and Situational Awareness 4  •

4  • •

3 
Individuals
Airworthiness Management 2 
Aircraft Maintenance 2 
Wrong Deck Landing 2 
Navigation and Airspace Knowledge 2 
Helideck Operations 2 
Use of Operationally Ready Safety Systems

1 
for Helicopters
Handling of Technical Failures 1 
Decision Making and Planning 1 
Personal Pressure and Arousal 1 

1 
Procedures
Human Performance 1 
Emergency/Crash Locator Devices 0
Damage Tolerance to UAS Collisions 0
Intentional Low Flying 0
Airborne Separation 0
Downwash 0
Icing in flight? 0
Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid 0
Degraded Visual Environment 0
Bird/Wildlife Strikes 0
Safety Culture 0
Effectiveness of Safety Management 0
Ground handling 0
PAGE 53
3.2 Other Commercial Air Transport

Helicopters
The key statistics are provided below for operations involving commercial air transport rotorcraft other than off-
shore operations and with an EASA MS AOC.

Table 8. Key Statistics for Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters, 2007-2017
2007-2016 total 17 46 14
2017 1 4 6
2007-2016 total 54 39
2017 6 3
´´ Figure 39. Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Fatal Accidents, Non-fatal Accidents
and Serious Incidents, 2007-2017
14
12
Number of accidents or serious incidents
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fatal accidents 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 1 2 3 1
Rotorcraft
There was one fatal accident in 2017, the AW139 accident in Campo Felice, Italy during HEMS operations. Over-
all, the number of fatal accidents in 2017 had decreased compared to 2016 and 10 year average. The number of
non-fatal accidents have increased slightly in 2017 compared to 2016 but it is below the 10-year average. For se-
rious incidents, the numbers doubled in 2017 compared to 2016 but they are well below the 10-year average.
The number of fatalities in other CAT helicopter operations are slightly above the median for 2007-2016 where-
as the number of serious injuries have decreased. Overall, the number of fatalities and serious injuries have not
changed substantially between 2007 and 2017.
´´ Figure 40. Number of fatalities and serious injuries for rotorcraft other commercial air
transport, 2007-2017
10
Number of fatalities or serious injuries
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Serious injuries 1 6 4 5 4 4 4 1 7 3 3
Fatalities 8 4 4 8 6 6 0 2 7 9 6
´´ Figure 41. Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Accidents and Serious Incidents by
phase of flight, 2017 and 2007-2016
5
0
Standing Taxi Take-off En route Manoevring Approach Landing Unknown
2007-2016 average 0.4 0 1 2.5 0.8 0.8 1.9 0.3

2017 0 0 2 4 3 0 0 2
PAGE 55
Most of the accidents and serious incidents in 2017 happened during the en route and manoeuvring phases of
flight, and in comparison with 10 year average the numbers are well higher.
3.2.1.2 Operation type
type of operation, 2017 and 2007-2016
7
0
Airline Air Taxi HEMS Sightseeing Other/ Unknown
2007-2016 Average 0.3 2.4 2.8 1.4 0.8
2017 0 2 6 2 1
The highest number of accidents and serious incidents in 2017 have been in HEMS followed by Air Taxi and Sight-
seeing types of operation.
´´ Figure 43. Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters type of operation and aggregated
ERCS risk score, 2007-2017
Higher Risk HEMS

ERCS Aggregated Risk
Sightseeing Air Taxi
Other/Unknown
Airline
Lower Risk
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Figure 43 provides information regarding the aggregated risk score of high risk occurrences of the different op-
eration types falling in the scope of this section that happened from 2007 – 2017. As it can be observed HEMS
Rotorcraft
operations have the highest aggregated risk score and highest number of high risk occurrences too, followed by
Air Taxi and Sightseeing operation types.
EASA has already started an analysis activity into HEMS operation in collaboration with industry and Network of
Analysts to support decision-making in the context of the SRM process.
3.2.1.3 Rotorcraft Type/ Propulsion Type
Propulsion type, 2017 and 2007-2016
10
9
0
Reciprocating engine Turboshaft
2007-2016 Average 1.8 5.9
2017 2 9
There have been a higher number of accidents and serious incidents involving turboshaft equipped helicopters
then those with a reciprocating engine. For both propulsion types the number of accidents and serious incidents
are above the 10 year average.

The safety risk portfolio for other CAT helicopter has been developed based on the analysis of accidents and seri-
ous incidents that happened from 2013 to 2017. Similar to the offshore helicopter safety risk portfolio it provides
details of key risk safety areas and associated safety issues prioritised based on the number of high risk occur-
rences assessed using the ERCS methodology.
Aircraft Upset, Obstacle Collision inflight and Terrain Collision are the main key risk areas for other CAT helicop-
ters based on the aggregated risk score and number of high risk occurrences that covers 2013 – 2017 period.
PAGE 57
´´ Figure 45. Other Commercial Air Transport Helicopters Key Risk Areas
Higher Risk
+
Terrain Collision
Aggregated ERCS score
Aircraft Upset
Obstacle Collision in Flight
Ground Damage
Airborne Collision
Lower Risk
-
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
The main key risk areas in terms of aggregated risk score and number of high risk occurrences covering
2013 – 2017 are Aircraft Upset, Terrain Collision and Obstacle Collision inflight.
´´ Figure 46. Other Commercial Air Transport Rotorcraft safety issues, by higher and lower
ERCS risk score, 2013-2017.
Rotorcraft

Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid
System Component Failures
Airborne Separation
Degraded Visual Environment
Landing site Operations
Human Performance
Downwash
Emergency/Crash Locator Devices
Safety Culture
Icing in flight
Damage Tolerance to UAS Collisions
Safety Issues
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Higher Risk Lower Risk

PAGE 59
• Aircraft Upset
›› Handling of Technical Failures
›› Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid
›› Intentional Low Flying
• Terrain Collision
›› Decision Making and Planning
›› Degraded Visual Environment
´´ Figure 47. Safety Risk Portfolio for Other CAT Helicopter operations showing how the
5 year occurrence data 2013-2017 relates to safety issues and their outcomes relative to
risk in descending order
Perception and Situational Awareness 15 •  •
Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid 12  •
Flight Path Management 10  •

6  •
Individuals
Systems Failures 6  •
Decision Making and Planning 4 • 
Degraded Visual Environment 4 • 
CRM and Operational Communication 4 • 
Software and Configuration 4 • • 

4  •
Airborne Separation 4 
Navigation and Airspace Knowledge 3 • 
Personal Pressure and Arousal 2 
Intentional Low Flying 2 
Flight Planning and Preparation 1 
Landing site Operations 1 
Emergency/Crash Locator Devices 1 

Rotorcraft
Other CAT Helicopters
Higher Risk ERCS Occurrences (2013-2017) 17 9 7 4 1 0 0 0 0
Safety Issues Key Risk Areas (Outcomes and precursors)
Unsurvivable Aircraft
Bands of
Airborne Collision
Obstacle Collision
Aggregated
Runway Collision
Ground Damage
Terrain Collision
#HRO ERCS
Aircraft Upset
Environment
Safety Issues
Excursions
ERCS
Injuries
Risk Score
(2013-2018)

1 
for Helicopters
Bird/Wildlife Strikes 1 

1 
Procedures
Human Performance 1 
Downwash 1 
Aircraft Maintenance 0
Damage Tolerance to UAS Collisions 0
Icing in flight 0
Safety Culture 0
3.3 Specialised Operations

This chapter covers Special Operations (Part SPO) involving helicopters of all mass groups with an EASA MS State
of Registry or State of Operator.

Table 9. Key Statistics for Specialised Operations Rotorcraft, 2007-2017

PAGE 61
2007-2016 total 40 164 15
2017 3 12 5
2007-2016 total 75 71
2017 4 5
The number of fatal accidents in 2017 was slightly lower than the average of the preceding decade, the number
of non-fatal accidents was lower than the average of 2007-2016, while the number of serious incidents was con-
siderably higher than the average of the preceding 10-year period. The number of fatalities in 2017 was lower
than the preceding decade average, whereas the number of serious injuries was slightly lower than the 2007-
2016 average.
rotorcraft specialised operations, 2007-2017
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fatal Accidents 4 3 7 6 8 6 3 0 2 1 3
The four fatalities in 2017 was the highest total number of fatalities since 2013, although from 2007 up to and
including 2013 the number of fatalities have been 4 or higher per year. Overall, the number of fatal or serious in-
juries has decreased across the period analysed.
´´ Figure 49. Number of fatalities and serious injuries for rotorcraft specialised operations,
2007-2017
Rotorcraft
35
30
25
Number of Injuries
20
15
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

The number of accidents and serious incidents in the en-route and approach phases was higher in 2017 than
the average of the preceding decade. The number of accidents and serious incidents in the take-off and ma-
noeuvring phases were lower in 2017 compared with the average of 2007-2016. In 2017 there was one accident/
serious incident in the taxi (air taxi) phase, in the preceding decade no such accidents/serious incidents occurred.
In the standing phase, no accidents or serious incidents occurred in 2017.
´´ Figure 50. Rotorcraft Specialised Operations Accidents and Serious Incidents by Phase of
Flight, 2007-2017
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Standing
Take-off
En route
Manoeuvring
Approach
Landing
Taxi
Unknown/
blank
Average 2007-2016 2017

The number of accidents and serious incidents in aerial patrol, aerial survey, airshow/race, construction/sling
load, logging and other was higher in 2017 than the average of the preceding decade. In photography the 2017
number was lower than the preceding 10-year period. There were no aerial observation accidents or serious in-
cidents in 2017.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Aerial
Observation
Aerial Patrol
Operation, 2007-2017
Aerial Survey
Agricultural
Airshow/Race
Average 2007-2016
Construction/
Sling load
2017 Logging
Photography
Towing
Other
´´ Figure 51. Rotorcraft Specialised Operations Accidents and Serious Incidents by Type of
Unknown
PAGE
63
Rotorcraft

The Safety Risk Portfolio for Specialised Operations rotorcraft is based only on occurrence data, since an SPO
Helicopters CAG has not been established. The Safety Issues and Key Risk Areas are prioritised based on the cu-
mulative ERCS risk score for accidents and serious incidents in the EASA occurrence repository for the 2015-2017
period.
The key risk areas with the highest risk and highest number of occurrences involving specialised operations ro-
torcraft were Obstacle Collision In-flight and Aircraft Upset.
rotorcraft specialised operations, 2015-2017
Higher Risk
+

Taxiway/Apron Excursion Terrain Collision Aircraft Upset
Runway Collision
Unsurvivable Aircraft Environment
Ground Damage
Airborne Collision
Runway Excursion
Lower Risk
-
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Number of higher risk occurrences 2015-2017
• Obstacle Collision In-flight:

›› Intentional low-flying,
›› Helicopter obstacle see and avoid.
• Aircraft Upset:
›› System reliability.
PAGE 65
´´ Figure 53. Safety Risk Portfolio for SPO Helicopter operations showing how the 3 year
descending order
Intentional Low Flying  • •
Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid  • •
Perception and Situational Awareness • • • •
Control of the Helicopter Flight Path and

• •
Use of Automation
System Reliability  •
Flight Planning and Preparation •
Human Performance • •
Handling of Technincal Failures •
Decision Making and Planning •
Airborne Separation •
CRM and Operational Communications •
Aircraft Maintenance No data
Approach Path Management No data
Bird and Wildlife Strikes No data
Damage Tolerance to UAS Collisions No data
Degraded Visual Environment No data

No data

No data
Individuals

No data
Procedures
Personal Pressure and Arousal No data

Rotorcraft
3.4 Non-Commercial Operations

The key domain statistics for non-commercial operations involving certified helicopters registered in an EASA MS
or for which an EASA MS is the State of Operator are provided below.

Table 10. Key Statistics for Non-commercial Rotorcraft, 2007-2017

2007-2016 total 56 376 27
2017 3 22 8
2007-2016 total 132 58
2017 7 11
´´ Figure 54. Non-commercially operated rotorcraft Accidents and Serious Incidents,

2007 - 2017
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fatal accidents 7 4 10 6 5 3 6 8 2 5 3
There has been a decrease in the number of fatal accidents in 2017 compared to 2016 and the 10 year aver-
age. There were also fewer non-fatal accidents and serious incidents in 2017 compared with 2016 and 10-year
average.
PAGE 67
´´ Figure 55. Number of fatalities and serious injuries in non-commercially operated

rotorcraft, 2007 - 2017
30
Number of fatalities and Serious Injuries
25
20
15
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Serious injuries 11 11 3 7 8 0 2 6 4 6 11
Fatalities 26 10 17 15 9 7 17 22 2 7 7
The number of fatalities was also lower in 2017 compared to the 10 year average, and there is a higher number
of serious injuries in 2017 compared to 2016 and previous 10 year-average. The number of fatal and serious in-
juries for non-commercially operated rotorcraft changes each year. Although the number of fatal injuries in the
last three years has been lower in general than the ten year period, no overall trend could be identified.
3.4.1.1 Rotorcraft Type/ Propulsion Type
´´ Figure 56. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by rotorcraft propulsion type,
2007-2016 and 2017.
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
Reciprocating Turboshaft
2007-2016 Average 30.2 15.6
2017 13 20
Rotorcraft
In 2017 there were fewer accidents and serious incidents involving rotorcraft with reciprocating engines than
turboshaft engines. However, based on the 2007-2016 average, the number of accidents and serious incidents
involving reciprocating engine helicopters was higher than the average for turboshaft.
´´ Figure 57. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by phase of flight for non-
commercially operated rotorcraft, 2007-2016 and 2017
14
12
10
0
Standing Taxi Take-off En route Manoeuvring Approach Landing Unknown
2007-2016 Average 1.5 3.3 8 10.1 6.2 3.8 11.7 1.3
2017 1 1 8 7 1 2 10 3
The highest number of accidents and serious incidents occurred during the take-off, en-route and landing
phases of flight. There is a significant decrease in 2017 in the number of accidents and serious incidents during
enroute and manoeuvring compared to the 10-year average.
3.4.1.3 Type of Operation
´´ Figure 58. Distribution of accidents and serious incidents by operation type for non-
commercially operated rotorcraft, 2007-2016 and 2017
25
20
15
10
0
Flight
Pleasure Training/ Other/Unknown Business Relocation Test Flight
Instructional
2007-2016 Average 19.6 15.3 4.7 2.8 2.6 0.9
2017 7 10 7 6 0 3
PAGE 69
Most accidents and serious incidents occurred in 2017 have happened during Flight Training/Instructional and
Pleasure types of operations, and they are below the 10-year average.
´´ Figure 59. Non-commercially operated rotorcraft aggregated ERCS risk score by type of
operation, 2013-2017.
25
Pleasure
Business
20
15 Flight
Training/Instructional
10 Other/Unknown
Relocation Ø Aggregated ERCS score

Test Flight
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Number of High Risk Occurrences
Figure 59 provides information regarding the aggregated risk score of high risk occurrences of the different op-
eration types falling in the scope of this section that happened from 2013 – 2017. It can be seen that there are
more high risk occurrences in Flight Training/Instructional operation type then in Pleasure but Flight Training/In-
structional has a lower aggregated risk score than Pleasure operation type.

The safety risk portfolio for non-commercial helicopter operations has been developed based on the analysis
of accidents and serious incidents that happened from 2013 to 2017. It provides details of key risk safety areas
and associated safety issues prioritised based on the number of high risk occurrences assessed using the ERCS
methodology.
Aircraft Upset, Obstacle Collision inflight and Terrain Collision are the main key risk areas non-commercial
helicopter operations based on the aggregated risk score and number of high risk occurrences that covers
2013 – 2017 period.
Rotorcraft
´´ Figure 60. Non-commercially operated rotorcraft Key Risk Areas plotted in relation to the
European Risk Classification Score (ERCS) methodology, 2013-2017
Higher Risk
+ Aircraft Upset (Loss of Control)
Terrain Collision
Aggregated ERCS score
Runway Collision Airborne Collision
Environment
-20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

Lower Risk
-
Number of High Risk Occurrences
´´ Figure 61. Non-commercially operated rotorcraft safety issues by high and low risk scores,
2013-2017

Systems Failures
Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid
Degraded Visual Environment
Weather(Wind)
Landing Site Operations
Airborne Separation
Human Performance
Icing in flight (Carburettor Icing)
Safety Culture
Emergency/Crash Locator Devices
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
ERCS Higher Risk Occurences ERCS Lower Risk Occurrences

PAGE 71
• Aircraft Upset
›› Knowledge of Aircraft Systems and Procedures
›› Degraded Visual Environment
›› Navigation and Airspace Knowledge
›› Landing Site Operations
• Terrain Collision
›› Navigation and Airspace Knowledge
›› Decision Making and Planning
´´ Figure 62. Safety Risk Portfolio for NCO Helicopter operations showing how the 5 year
descending order
Flight Path Management 139  • •
Perception and Situational Awareness 56  • • •
Systems Failures 53  • •

44  •
Individuals

29  •
Procedures
Decision Making and Planning 27  • •
Flight Planning and Preparation 25  • •
Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid 22  •
Degraded Visual Environment 17  • •
Weather(Wind) 13  •

12  •
Aircraft Maintenance 11 
Landing Site Operations 10  • • •
Navigation and Airspace Knowledge 9  • • •
CRM and Operational Communication 8  • •
Personal Pressure and Arousal 7  •
Airborne Separation 6 
Rotorcraft
NCO Helicopters
Higher Risk ERCS Occurrences (2013-2017) 152 18 11 6 1 1 1 0 0
Bands of Aggregated ERCS
Risk Score (2013-2017)
Airborne Collision
Obstacle Collision
#HRO
Runway Collision
Ground Damage
Terrain Collision
Safety Issues
ERCS
Aircraft Upset
Environment
Excursions
Injuries
Human Performance 5  • •
Intentional Low Flying 4 •  •
Icing in flight (Carburettor Icing) 3 
Software and Configuration 2 

2 
for Helicopters
Effectiveness of Safety Management 2 
Emergency/Crash Locator Devices 1 
Bird/Wildlife Strikes 1 
Safety Culture 1 

Balloons
4
Balloons
This chapter covers balloon operations where the state of registry was an EASA MS. The Balloon Collaborative
Analysis Group was the first CAG to be established and met for the fourth time in 2018. It has already proven the
concept of CAGs. The group has reviewed all the fatal accidents and to some extent the non‑fatal accidents last
five years. The group is combination of industry, manufacturer and NAAs providing an excellent source of inside
knowledge and expertise for the deeper analysis of the accidents. The identified safety issues in relation to the
available data are seen to give an accurate picture of the safety within the hot air ballooning industry today. The
future work of the CAG will be to risk assess the balloon accidents and further support the EASAs SRM process.

Table 11. Key statistics for balloons, 2007-2017

2007-2016 total 13 186 16
2017 0 17 2
2007-2016 total 21 192
2017 0 15
2017 was a good year for balloon operations. No fatal accident occurred and number of non-fatal accidents have
reduced. There were two serious incidents in 2017, which is in line with historical data.
´´ Figure 63. Balloon fatal and Non-fatal accidents from 2007-2017

35
30
25
Number of Accidents
20
15
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fatal Accidents 0 1 0 0 3 3 1 2 2 1 0
There were no fatal injuries in 2017. Number of serious injuries also decreased, or from 19.2 on average for the
time period 2007-2016 to 15 in 2017.
PAGE 75
´´ Figure 64. Fatalities and serious injuries 2007-2017

50
45
40
35
Number of Injuries
30
25
20
15
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Using the same dataset it can be seen that most balloon accidents occur during the landing phase of the flight.
The average from 2007-2016 shows that 72% of the accidents happen during landing but last year that percent-
age dropped to 63%.
´´ Figure 65. Distribution of balloon accidents between flight phases

16
14
12
10
% Distribution
0
Standing Take-off En route Approach Landing
2017 Average 2007-2016

Balloons
4.1.2.1 Categories and ERCS scores 2015-2017

By using the European Risk Classification Scheme (ERCS) EASA has now risk assessed five years of balloon ac-
cidents and serious incidents. Figure 66 shows that the Key Risk Areas bearing the highest risk are Balloon
Landings and Obstacle Collision in Flight. When reviewing the data it can be seen that collisions with power
lines and hard landings are the events that tend to cause injuries in ballooning operations. The causes of power
line collision are mainly lack of information, position of the sun causing difficulty to spot the lines, fog or wind
gusts. Main causes for hard balloon landings causing injuries are mainly wind gusts or downdrafts, passengers
not ready for the impact or they have a weak bone that gives in during touch down.
´´ Figure 66. Balloon accidents and serious incident key risk areas by aggregated ERCS score.
Higher Risk
+
Balloon Landings
Aggregated ERCS Numerical Score
Ground Damage
Runway Collision
Terrain Collision
Aircraft Upset

Airborne Collision
Lower Risk
-
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
PAGE 77
4.1.2.2 Safety Risk Portfolio table

Figure 67 provides us with the Safety Risk Portfolio (SRP) for balloon operations. The portfolio is fully data driv-
en. The safety issues have been ordered by aggregated ERCS scores and they are then marked accordingly with
the appropriate priority. The same goes with the Key Risk Areas.
Based on the coding of the occurrences, the priority one safety issues are Decision Making and Planning and
Presence and Use of Pilot Restraints.
´´ Figure 67. Safety Risk Portfolio for Balloon operations showing how the 5 year occurrence
data 2013-2017 relates to safety issues and their outcomes relative to risk in descending
order
Decision Making and Planning  • •
Presence and Use of Pilot Restraints  • • •
Perception and Situational Awareness • • • • •
Control of Manual Flight Path • • •
Flight Planning and Preparation  • • •
Turbulence • • •
Airborne Separation •
Approach Path Management • • •
Fuel Systems • •
Sailplanes
5
PAGE 79
Sailplanes in the GA domain differ somewhat from other General Aviation applications. This has to do with how
gliding is performed. In other domains you jump on board your aircraft and you start flying but that is not so sim-
ple with sailplanes – unless you are flying a motor glider of course. Sailplane operations depend on teamwork.
You will not go anywhere unless you have a team around you that makes sure that you are safely towed into
the air. This added operational complexity has provided the gliding community with a collaborative team spirit
and a cohesive atmosphere for safety. The gliding community with the leadership of the European Gliding Union
(EGU) has been active in EASA’s work on the new Sailplane OPS and FCL rules and has provided EASA with valu-
able input and insight into sailplane operations. The analysis that EGU with the diligent support from the British
Gliding Association (BGA) has provided insight on where the risks are and what they should be called so as to be
of the best use for the gliding community.
This chapter covers Sailplane operations where the state of registry is an EASA MS using EASA’s accident dataset.

Table 12. Key statistics for sailplanes, 2007-2017.

2007-2016 total 254 1992 55
2017 25 138 18
2007-2016 total 295 336
2017 27 20
For Sailplanes, there was an increase of fatal accidents in 2017 with 25 fatal accidents causing 27 fatalities. The
number of nonfatal accidents was substantially lower than the 10-year average with 138. There was a significant
decrease in the number of serious injuries. A detailed picture showing the historical fatal and non-fatal acci-
dent development can be seen in Figure 55 and fatal and serious injuries in Figure 70 below. It can be seen that
number of fatal accidents have been very stable through the last decade. However, the overall trend in terms of
number of accidents is decreasing.
Sailplanes
´´ Figure 68. Sailplane fatal and non-fatal accidents 2007-2017

300
250
200
Number of Accidents
150
100
50
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fatal Accidents 30 27 28 25 30 30 20 18 26 20 25
There are no accurate figures available on number of movements. However, by using the available data report-
ed by NAAs in 2016 and a joint survey performed by AOPA and EASA in relation to fleet size and estimation of
movements and use that data to estimate for the rest of the EASA MS it is possible to estimate number of flights
from 2014-2016. It was decided to use the average EU GDP increase of 2.6% from 2016 to 2017 to estimate the
movements for 2017.
´´ Figure 69. Estimated accident rates for Sailplane operations 2014-2017
250 9.0
8.0
200 7.0 Accidents per 100 000 movements
Number of Accidents
6.0
150
5.0
4.0
100
3.0
50 2.0
1.0
0 0.0
2014 2015 2016 2017
Non-Fatal Accidents 189 189 173 138
Fatal Accidents 18 26 20 25
Fatal Accident Rate 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.0
Non-fatal Accident Rate 7.7 7.7 7.5 5.7
It should be noted that the rates displayed in the Figure 69 are estimated for all EASA MS. It should also be not-
ed that accidents rates are different between individual EASA MS. This is in particular evident when comparing
geographically where the accidents occurred. Number of fatal accidents are higher in the Alpine area than in
areas with lower or more even landscape. The duration of the flights are also longer in the mountainous areas
than in the lower parts of Europe where the number of movements is higher but the duration of each flight is
much shorter.
PAGE 81
The fatal accident rate is relatively stable over the four year period but then non-fatal accident rate is dropping
in 2017. As the exposure data is very fragmented it is impossible at this time to provide an accident rate map of
Europe. NAAs, flight clubs and associations are encouraged to both collect and share aggregated exposure data
with EASA to enable better overview of the current situation.
There were 27 fatalities in sailplanes in 2017, which is in line with the figures over the preceding decade. The
number of serious injuries in 2017 was the lowest in the time period analysed. As can be seen in Figure 56
a downward trend from 2007 to 2017 is evident.
´´ Figure 70. Sailplane fatalities and serious injuries 2007-2017

80
70
60
Number of Injuries
50
40
30
20
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

In terms of flight phase the majority of the glider/sailplane accidents occur during the landing phase of the flight.
Either it is a landing on an airfield or an off-field landing due to loss of lift. It is mostly perception of the situation
which causes hard landings and/or ground loops. It should be noted that Figure 71 contains all landings both on
airfield and off-field landings. During takeoff it is often a wing touching ground during a winch launch, during
climb it is loss of control during the winch launch.
´´ Figure 71. Number of Sailplane accidents per flight phase

90
80
70
Number of accidents
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Take-off Climb Manoeuvring Landing
2017 Average 2007-2016

Sailplanes
When looking at the landing phase specifically it can be seen that over 70% of the landing accidents are during
Level-off/touch down or during landing roll at the airfield. Last year 30% were attributed to off-field landings
where the aircraft landed outside the airfield perimeter. As the event type ‘Off-field landing’ is relatively new it
does not give a perfect picture. It can be assumed that some of the ‘Level-off/touchdown’ event types have oc-
curred during an off-field landing.
5.1.1.2 Sailplane operation type

Figure 72 shows that the main operation types on Sailplanes are pleasure flying and instructional flights.
´´ Figure 72. Distribution of Sailplane accidents per operation type.

180
160
140
120
%Distribution
100
80
60
40
20
0
Airshow/Race Flight Training/Instructional Pleasure
2017 Average 2007-2016

PAGE 83

The main Key Risk Areas (KRAs) used in other domains within this report have been omitted and Safety Issues
(SIs)/Accident Categories have been used instead in this joint analysis done by EGU/BGA and EASA. It is well worth
noting that these safety issues or accident categories are formed by the apparent immediate cause of the acci-
dent. It should also be noted that the ‘In Motor Gliders/Tugs’ safety issue, contains accidents that can only occur
on a powered aircraft.
´´ Figure 73. Percentage of Sailplane Fatal Accidents per Safety Issue - EASA dataset
2013-2017
Collision with Hill
Incomplete winch launch
Stall/Spin
Other flying
Mid-air collision
Aerotow
Safety Issues
Glider Integrity
Medical
Undershoot/Overshoot
Technical
Off-Field landing
Control Misuse
Motor glider/Tugs
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
% of Fatal Accidents
Figure 74 shows us the fatal accidents being mapped onto the safety issues. It should be noted that of 108 fatal
accidents from 2013-2017 there were 15 occurrences where there was no information available to determine the
immediate cause of the accident. The largest killers are:
• Collision with hill: Alpine flying is popular but very unforgiving. The strong winds that form around the
mountains can be deadly.
• Winch launches: During the take-off run the aircraft swerves due to wing tip hitting the ground, angle of
attach is to high causing structural overload or stall, or pilot loses control due to incomplete winch launch.
• Stall/spin: Loss of control is a big part of the picture when it comes to winch launches but also during the
approach and landing phases of the flight.
• Mid-Air collisions: Searching for thermal lift with other sailplanes at the same time and approaching an
airfield where communication is minimal or non-existent increases the risk of mid-air collisions.
The ‘Other flying’ safety issue contains 3 structural overload during flight, 1 aerobatics accident, 1 dive into the
ground, 1 unexplained loss of control and 1 suicide. The Glider Integrity issue relates to the ‘Pre-flight planning
and preparation’ used in the last version of the portfolio including assembly of the Sailplane before flight.
Sailplanes
´´ Figure 74. Substantially damaged or destroyed Sailplanes - EASA dataset. Average

percentage per safety issue.
Off-Field Landing
Landing on Airfield
Incomplete winch launch
In motor gliders/tugs
Stall/Spin
Under/Overshoot
Misuse of Controls
Mid-Air Collision
Aerotow
Ground Collisions
Collision with Hill
Glider Integrity
Wheel Up Landing
Airfield
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
% of Substantially Damaged Sailplanes
Considering Figure 74 it shows accidents where sailplanes suffered substantial damage or were considered to be
damaged beyond repair. The main Safety Issues are:
• Off-field landings: Landings in an unfamiliar territory – crop fields and other agricultural areas where it
can be difficult to determine the quality of the designated landing field from above.
• Landing on airfield: The second Safety Issue involves landings at airfields. This includes the hard and
bounced landings, causing a swerve or a runway excursion.
• Incomplete winch launches: This type of take-offs requires a good coordination between the pilot and
the ground crew. Too high angle of attack or incorrect adjustments for the winch can cause unexpected
and unintended results for the people involved.
• In motor gliders/Tugs: These are occurrences that can only occur to motorised sailplanes e.g. involving
engine failures.
• Stall/spin: Loss of control is the cause of many of the fatalities. Actions are needed to address these
accidents.
• Under/overshoot: This Safety Issue involves unstable approaches, speed and approach control in general.
5.1.2.1 Identified Safety Issues and safety issue analysis

The EASA dataset for 2015-2017 has been risk scored according to the European Risk Classification Scheme (ERCS.
This allows a comparison of the key risk area and the aggregated ERCS risk score, identifying the highest risk and
most commonly occurring key risk area accidents.
PAGE 85
´´ Figure 75. Sailplanes ERCS Scores plotted per Safety Issue.

Higher Risk
+
Stall/Spin
Mid - Air Collision

Collision with Hill
Off - field Landing

Obstacle Collision in flight
Ground Collision
Lower Risk Aerotow Winch launch Landing on an airfield

-
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Glider Integrity Undershoot/Overshoot
Number of Accidents
Figure 75 displays the aggregated risk vs. the number of accidents in Sailplane operation. Note that the scale of the
risk is not visible as the actual risk score is not relevant. The figure shows quite clearly that the attributed risk in oc-
currences involving a stall or a spin resulting in a fatality or serious injury is quite high. On the other hand the figure
shows also that in spite of high number of accidents the risk of a fatality or serious injury is very low. Both the Off-
field landing and Landing on an airfield issues are very low in risk. Collision with Hill is showing a clear distinction
in terms of risk but other safety issues show low risk but also with fewer accidents behind them.
´´ Figure 76. Sailplane Safety Issues split between Higher and Lower Risk base on the
ERCS score.
Landing on airfield
Off-Field Landings
Incomplete Winch Launches
Stall/Spin
Misuse of Controls
Under and Overshoot
Aerotow
Collision with Hill
Motor Gliders and Tugs
Glider Integrity
Mid-Air Collision
Wheel up Landings
UAS Strikes
Bird/Wildlife Control
Medical
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Number of Accidents

Sailplanes
Figure 76 gives us a different perspective. The higher risk occurrences are the yellow and red areas in the risk ma-
trix where the lower risk areas are green. The safety issues ‘Landing on airfield’ and ‘Off-field landings’ contain
many occurrences resulting in both higher and lower risk occurrences. The higher risk occurrences are not high
enough to push them up the scale in Figure 75 as fatalities and serious injuries are few. The main outcome of
the high risk accidents are substantial damage of the sailplane involved. It can also be observed that ‘Incomplete
Winch Launches’ has much fewer lower risk occurrences. This implies that both damage and injuries are more
severe in that type of accidents. The safety issue ‘Stall/Spin’ has fewer still lower risk accidents but the number
of fatalities are much higher. This explains why Stall/spin is so high in Figure 75.
Aerodromes and Ground
Handling
6
Aerodromes and Ground Handling
This chapter covers aerodrome operations, with the scope being the EASA Member States as State of Occurrence.
Data is fetched from the EASA database (accidents and serious incidents) as well as the European Central Repos-
itory. It is worth noting that the accidents and serious incidents in this Chapter are those related to Aerodrome
operations in a general context, which means that the aerodrome itself may or may not have had a contribution
to the given occurrence, but it may have a role in preventing similar occurrences in the future.
The data in this chapter differs from previous years’ Annual Safety Review; this is because the scope of the data
extraction from the database has changed. The data is now only extracted based on aerodrome related event
types and non-airborne flight phases in the ECCAIRS taxonomy.
A Safety Risk Portfolio for Aerodrome and Ground Handling operations is also provided. This has been developed
with the support of the Aerodrome and Ground Handing Collaborative Analysis Group (CAG). The CAG is lead by
the Agency and has members from airports, airlines, national authorities, international organisations and unions.
6.1 Key Statistics

Table 13. Key statistics for aerodromes and ground handling, 2007-2017
2007-2016 total 7 475 90
2017 0 35 8
2007-2016 total 17 36
2017 0 4
There were no fatal accidents related to aerodrome and ground handling operations in 2017. The number of non-
fatal accidents were 35, which is less than the average of the preceding decade, which was 47.5.
PAGE 89
´´ Figure 77. Aerodrome related fatal accidents, non-fatal accidents and serious incidents,
2007-2017
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fatal Accidents 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 1 1 0 0
The figures for the past three years (2015-2017) represent a return to more normal accident and serious incident
levels after a peak between 2012 and 2014.
´´ Figure 78. Number of fatalities and serious injuries in aerodrome-related accidents

2007-2017
18
16
14
12
Number of Injuries
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
With the exception of 2014, the number of fatalities and serious injuries in aerodromes and ground handling
have not exceeded 7 in any year in the past decade. However, in 2014 8 people were killed and a further two
were seriously injured in a single accident in Finland when the aircraft’s right wing broke shortly after take-off.
6.1.1 Number of EASA MS Certified Aerodromes

Regulation (EU) 139/2014 lays down the requirements for the certification of aerodromes in the EASA Member
States. At time of publication, there are 577 aerodromes in the scope of the regulation. 438 of these have been
certified and 118 have been granted an exemption in accordance with Article 5 of the regulation.
´´ Figure 79. Number of Aerodromes in scope of Regulation (EU) 139/2014, by EASA Member
State.
France 53 108
Germany 26 57
Norway 1 49
United Kingdom 3 42
Italy 7 42
Sweden 4 40
Spain 1 36
Greece 2 32
Finland 0 24
Romania 0 16
Poland 1 15
Portugal 3 14
Denmark 4 14
Ireland 1 9
Croatia 1 9
State
Switzerland 3 8
Netherlands 3 7
Austria 1 7
Slovakia 1 6
Hungary 2 6
Belgium 1 6
Czech Republic 0 5
Bulgaria 1 5
Iceland 0 4
Estonia 0 4
Slovenia 23
Lithuania 0 3
Latvia 02
Cyprus 02
0
Malta 1
Luxembourg 01
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Number of aerodromes
Exempted Art 4(3b) & Art 14 Aerodromes in the scope
Of the 577 aerodromes in the scope of Regulation (EU) 139/2014, the Agency has, at time of publication, received
traffic data (number of passengers and number of cargo movements) for 490 aerodromes for 2016. The Agency
has also received traffic data for 2017 from 326 of those aerodromes. Those 326 aerodromes had a total of just
over 800 million passengers and 286 000 cargo movements in 2017, an increase in passenger numbers by 6.6%
and an increase in cargo movements by 3.6% compared to 2016. The highest increase in passenger numbers for
an individual aerodrome was just under 4.9 million passengers, which for that aerodrome was an increase of
7.7%. The highest decrease in passenger numbers for an individual aerodrome was just over 793 000 passengers,
which for that aerodrome was a decrease by 3.7%. The highest increase in cargo movements for an individual aer-
odrome was 2327 movements, which for that aerodrome was an increase of 8.2%. The highest decrease of cargo
movements for an individual aerodrome was 681 movements, which for that aerodrome was a decrease by 15.1%.
PAGE 91
6.2 Safety Risk Portfolio

The Aerodromes and Ground Handling Safety Risk Portfolio has been developed by EASA and the Aerodromes
and Ground Handling Collaborative Analysis Group (CAG). The CAG was launched in March 2017.
In the Aerodromes and Ground Handling scope, EASA has reviewed the accidents and serious incidents for 2015,
2016 and 2017 with regards to risk. All accidents and serious incidents within the scope have been risk assessed
using the European Risk Classification Scheme methodology, and have been given an ERCS score.
6.2.1 Key Risk Areas

The ERCS review of the Key Risk Areas is presented below.
aerodromes and ground handling related accidents and serious incidents, 2015-2017
Higher Risk
+ Ground Damage
Aircraft Upset
Terrain Collision
Runway Excursion

Airborne Collision
Runway Collision
Lower Risk
-
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Number of ERCS - scored Aerodrome and Ground Handling - related Occrrences 2015-2017
The most common Key Risk Area for Aerodrome and Ground Handling related accidents and serious incidents is
Ground Damage, followed by Aircraft Upset and Runway Excursions.
6.2.2 Safety Issues

The safety issues in the Aerodrome and Ground Handling domain have been identified by the Aerodrome and
Ground Handling CAG. They are derived from occurrence data from the EASA occurrence repository and the Eu-
ropean Central Repository (ECR), as well as the operational expertise provided by the members of the CAG. The
wording of the safety issues have been reviewed by the CAG as well as coordinated across other domains. Where
possible, ECCAIRS queries have been constructed for each safety issue in order to identify the occurrences asso-
ciated with each safety issue.
The table below shows the number of occurrences in the ECR for each safety issue (where an ECCAIRS query was
possible). One occurrence can be included in more than one safety issue.
´´ Figure 81. Number of ECR occurrences per Aerodromes and Ground Handling Safety
Issue – 2015-2017
Baggage and Cargo Loading in Passenger Aircraft

Condition and Serviceability of Airport Operating Environment
Human Performance
Control of airside works
Coodination and Control of Turnrounds
Dangerous Goods Handling and Lithium Batteries
Control of Passengers on the Apron
Parking and Positioning of Aircraft
Fuelling Operations
Operation of Vehicles (and Other Motorised GSE)
Aircraft movement under its own power
Pushback Operations
Load Sheets and Other Documentation/ Systems
Operation of Air Bridges/Passenger Boarding Bridges (PBB)
Design and Serviceability of Vehicles (Motorised GSE)
Safety Issues
Design and Serviceability of Ground Equipment (Non-Motorised)

Aircraft towing
Positioning and Securing of Ground Equipment
Ground Operations in Adverse Weather Conditions
Cargo Loading in Cargo Aircraft
Jet Blast
Aerodrome Design and Layout
Commercial Pressures
Ground Staff Movement Around Aircraft
Operation of Ground Equipment (Non-Motorised)
Fatigue
Unreported Events
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000

ECR Number of Occurrences
Baggage and Cargo Loading in Passenger Aircraft is the top safety issue based on number of occurrences in the
ECR. It was also identified as the top safety issue of concern by the members of the Aerodromes and Ground Han-
dling CAG. Therefore it has been selected as the first issue for assessment in the Safety Risk Management (SRM)
Process and this assessment was started in 2017.
The second issue to be assessed in the SRM process will be Ground Staff Movement Around Aircraft. The num-
ber of ECR occurrences for this safety issue is low, this is however a function of the ECCAIRS taxonomy not
having event types to clearly capture such risks, in combination with under-reporting from ground handling
organisations.
PAGE 93
The ERCS review of the accidents and serious incidents for each Safety Issue is presented below.
´´ Figure 82. Number of occurrences per safety issue and ERCS severity – accidents and
serious incidents 2015-2017
Aircraft movement under its own power

Condition and Serviceability of Airport Operating Environment
Human Performance
Positioning and Securing of Ground Equipment
Coodination and Control of Turnrounds
Operation of Ground Equipment (Non-Motorised)
Control of airside works
Aircraft towing
Aerodrome Design and Layout
Operation of Vehicles (and Other Motorised GSE)
Commercial Pressures
Fuelling Operations
Safety Issues
Parking and Positioning of Aircraft

Baggage and Cargo Loading in Passenger Aircraft
Design and Serviceability of Vehicles (Motorised GSE)
Ground Operations in Adverse Weather Conditions
Design and Serviceability of Ground Equipment (Non-Motorised)
Ground Staff Movement Around Aircraft
Operation of Air Bridges/Passenger Boarding Bridges (PBB)
Jet Blast
Fatigue
Load Sheets and Other Documentation/ Systems
Pushback Operations
Dangerous Goods Handling and Lithium Batteries
Cargo Loading in Cargo Aircraft
Unreported Events
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Higher Risk means occurrences that were given a red or amber score, Lower risk refers to occurrences that were
given a green score.

The Safety Risk Portfolio presented below is purely based on occurrence data, mainly accidents and serious inci-
dents, in the EASA occurrence database for 2015-2017. When the European Risk Classification Scheme (ERCS) is
fully implemented, it will be possible to make such an analysis on incident data in the European Central Reposi-
tory, which will be more useful.
´´ Figure 83. Safety Risk Portfolio for Aerodromes and Ground Handling operations showing
how the 5 year occurrence data 2013-2017 relates to safety issues and their outcomes
relative to risk in descending order
Aircraft movement under its own power  • • 
Decision Making and Planning •  • • •
Fuelling Operations • • •
Coodination and Control of Turnrounds • • •
Perception and Situational Awareness •
Human Performance •
Condition and Serviceability of Airport

   • •  •
Operating Environment

•   • • •
Individuals
CRM and Operational Communication • • • •
Personal Pressure and Arousal •
Positioning and Securing of Ground

•
Equipment
Aerodrome Design and Layout • • • • •
Aircraft towing  •
Commercial Pressures • •
Control of airside works • • • • •
Design and Serviceability of Vehicles

• •
(Motorised GSE)
Design and Serviceability of Ground

•
Equipment (Non-Motorised)
Operation of Air Bridges/Passenger

•
Boarding Bridges (PBB)
Baggage and Cargo Loading in Passenger

•
Aircraft
Dangerous Goods Handling and Lithium

Batteries
Load Sheets and Other Documentation/

•
Systems
Operation of Ground Equipment

•
(Non-Motorised)
Operation of Vehicles (and Other Motorised

•
GSE)
PAGE 95
ERCS scored Occurrences (2015-2017) 103 20 23 10 3 5 1 10 1
Key Risk Areas
Obstacle Collision in
Runway Excursion
Airborne Collision
Runway Collision
Ground Damage
Terrain Collision
Safety Issues Priority
Taxiway/Apron
Aircraft Upset
Environment
Excursion
Flight
Parking and Positioning of Aircraft •
Ground Staff Movement Around Aircraft •
Pushback Operations •
Ground Operations in Adverse Weather

• •
Conditions
Jet Blast •
Fatigue • •
Bird/Wildlife Control •
Cargo Loading in Cargo Aircraft No data
Unreported Events No data
The Aerodromes and Ground Handling CAG has given each Safety Issue a problem statement, to further specify
what needs to be addressed. These are presented in the tables below, in alphabetical order.
6.2.3.1 Operational Safety Issues
Table 14 Operational aerodromes and ground handling safety issues and problem statements
Aircraft movement under its own power The management, handling or coordination of aircraft movement under
its own power may lead to damage and/or injuries.
Aircraft towing The management, handling or coordination of towing operations may

lead to damage and/or injuries.
Apron/Stand Design and Layout Apron/Stand design and layout problems that may induce the potential
for collisions, aircraft damage, and injuries. Continuous monitoring of
occurrences related to Aerodrome Design and Layout.
Baggage and Cargo Loading in Passenger Inadequate management or handling of the baggage and cargo loading
Aircraft process that may lead to ground damage or other safety effects.
Bird/Wildlife Control The control of birds and wildlife that may lead to either damage or loss
of control.
Cargo Loading in Cargo Aircraft The management or handling of the cargo loading process that may lead
to ground damage or other safety effects.
Condition and Serviceability of Airport The management of the condition and serviceability of the airport
Operating Environment operating environment including maintenance of ATM/CNS Equipment,
Aerodrome Surfaces, Visual Aids, Markings/Signage, Lights, Snow/Ice
Removal, FOD control and Other Infrastructure.
Control of airside works The supervision, coordination and control of airside works may lead to
damage and/or injuries.
Control of Passengers on the Apron Control of passengers on the apron or any other operational area of the
aerodrome or airport.
Coodination and Control of Turnrounds The management, handling or coordination of the turnaround process.
Dangerous Goods Handling and Lithium Fires involving lithium batteries and/or other dangerous goods, both
Batteries in the aircraft cabin or hold areas, followed by the potential inability to
extinguish any subsequent fire to prevent injuries or an Unsustainable
Aircraft Environment.
Design of Air Bridges/Passenger Boarding Design of air bridges that may lead to ground collisions or injuries.
Bridges (PBB)
Design of Ground Equipment Design of non-motorised airport ground support equipment including
(Non-Motorised) steps, baggage trollies/dollys may lead to damage and/or injuries.
Design of Vehicles (Motorised GSE) Design of motorised airport ground support equipment including belt
loaders, baggage trucks, catering trucks, fuel bowsers and pushback
equipment etc. may lead to damage and/or injuries.
Emergency/abnormal operations The supervision, coordination and control of emergency/abnormal

operations may lead to damage, injuries, and/or impaired responses to
emergencies.
Emerging technologies
Fuelling Operations The management and handling of the refuelling process and its
coordination/oversight.
Ground Operations in Adverse Weather Negative effects of adverse weather on ground operations including low
Conditions visibility, high winds, thunderstorms, and extremes of temperature etc.
Ground Staff Movement Around Aircraft Unsafe movement of personnel takes place around an aircraft while
engines are running or an aircraft is about to move (anti-collision beacon
on) or within extended danger zones during cross-bleed engine starts.
Handling of Passengers with Reduced Handling of passengers with reduced mobility may lead to injuries.
Mobility
PAGE 97
Safety Issue Title Safety Issue Problem Statement

Jet Blast The management of ground running or taxi patterns lead to injuries or
damage due to jet blast.
Load Sheets and Other Documentation/ Errors and omissions in load systems and documentation or systems for
Systems recording loading of aircraft.
Operation of Air Bridges/Passenger The operation of air bridges that may lead to ground collisions or
Boarding Bridges (PBB) injuries.
Operation of Ground Equipment Operation of non-motorised ground equipment that may lead to ground
(Non-Motorised) collisions or injuries.
Operation of Vehicles (and Other Motorised The operation of vehicles/motorised ground equipment that may lead to
GSE) ground collisions or injuries.
Parking and Positioning of Aircraft The marshalling, parking or positioning of aircraft that may to lead to
damage or injuries. This includes problems with visual parking aids. This
also includes stand allocation.
Positioning and Securing of Ground The positioning or inadequate securing of ground equipment such as
Equipment baggage trolleys/dollys, ULDs etc. or steps that may be blown around
the apron in bad weather.
Pushback Operations The management, handling or coordination of the pushback may lead to
damage and/or injuries.
Runway/Taxiway Design and Layout Runway/Taxiway design and layout problems that may induce runway
incursions or the potential for collisions and aircraft damage. Continuous
monitoring of occurrences related to Aerodrome Design and Layout.
Servicability of Air Bridges/Passenger Servicability and maintenance of air bridges that may lead to ground
Boarding Bridges (PBB) collisions or injuries.
Servicability of Apron/Stand Servicability and maintenance of aprons/stands that may lead to

collissions, damage, and/or injuries.
Servicability of Runways/Taxiways Servicability and maintenance of runways/taxiways that may lead to

collissions, damage, and/or injuries.
Serviceability of Ground Equipment Servicability of non-motorised airport ground support equipment

(Non-Motorised) including steps, baggage trollies/dollys may lead to damage and/or
injuries.
Serviceability of Vehicles (Motorised GSE) Servicability of motorised airport ground support equipment including
belt loaders, baggage trucks, catering trucks, fuel bowsers and pushback
equipment etc. may cause damage and/or injuries.
Terminal Design and Layout Terminal design and layout problems that may induce the potential
for collisions, aircraft damage, and injuries. Continuous monitoring of
occurrences related to Aerodrome Design and Layout.
Transition of service contracts The transition of the ground handling operations between service
providers might induce damage and/or injuries.
Unreported Events Events go unreported due to fear of repercussions/lack of training etc.

For damage to composite structures there might be more significant
damage not visible.
Worker Fatigue leading to Human Error Inability to recruit and retain ground handling staff is leading to staff
shortages, long working hours and an ageing workforce.
In the long term, if left unchecked, commercial growth & expectations
will exceed human resources, resulting in unsustainable operations with
possible safety critical impact on flight safety due to human error.
6.2.3.2 HF Safety Issues
Table 15 Human performance-related aerodromes and ground handling safety issues and
problem statements
CRM and Operational Communication Ineffective CRM and communication, including Language Proficiency,
Use of Standard Terminology, Hand Signals, Visual Communication,
Distraction from outer sources (ex. Mobile Phones).
Decision Making and Planning Incorrect planning and decision making by individuals.
Experience, Training and Competence of Individuals (all types of actors) have insufficient experience, training or
Individuals competence to perform the duties that they have been assigned.
Fatigue Inability of individuals to perform to their best due to fatigue.
Perception and Situational Awareness Incorrect perception and inadequate situational awareness of
individuals.
Personal Pressure and Arousal Inability of individuals to perform to their best due to pressure or lack
of/excessive arousal. Problems typically arise during periods of intense
workload such as the turnround.
Weather Effects Inability of individuals to perform to their best due to the effect of
weather.
Human Performance Combining all of the above HF safety issues to address the ability of
individuals to meet the human performance needs for a specific task
or duty for reasons such as arousal, fatigue, repetitive processes and
weather.
6.2.3.3 Organisational Safety Issues
Table 16 Organisational aerodromes and ground handling safety issues and problem
statements
Commercial Pressures Commercial pressures (e.g. Seasonal Workforce/Contracts/On-Time
Performance/Non-Aviation Regulations) have an effect on Safety.
Effectiveness of Safety Management Lack of or Ineffective implementation of Safety Management Systems.
Safety Culture Inadequate Safety Culture in all levels of the organisation (Including
Senior Leadership Role in Safety)
ATM/ANS
7
ATM/ANS
This Chapter covers accidents and serious incidents related to the provision of ATM/ANS services in the EASA
Member States and the analysis thereof. The analysis includes accidents and serious incidents extracted from the
EASA’s Occurrence Database which occurred within an EASA MS as State of Occurrence, involving at least one
CAT, either fixed wing airplane with MTOW of 2,250 kg or above, or small (CS-27) or large (CS-29) helicopter. It
should be noted that, contrary to previous years, CAT helicopter operations have been included in the statistics
of this Chapter. As a result, figures of accidents and serious incidents included in previous editions of the Annu-
al Safety Report may not be coherent to the figures in this edition.
It is worth noting that the accidents and serious incidents mentioned in this Chapter are those related to the pro-
vision of ATM/ANS services, which means that the ATM system may or may not have had a contribution to the
given occurrence, but it may play a role in preventing or ameliorating similar occurrences in the future. These
are named as “ATM/ANS related”. Among them, there are occurrences where the ATM/ANS provision of servic-
es was a factor contributing to the occurrence, or at least the ATM/ANS services played a role in aggravating the
occurrence encountered by the aircraft. These events are usually known as events with “ATM/ANS contribution”.
In the chapter, these two types of events are distinguished when necessary.
The ATM/ANS Collaborative Analysis Group (CAG) launched in 2017 has developed an initial ATM/ANS Safety Risk
Portfolio identifying Key Risk Areas and main Safety Issues in relation to the ATM/ANS provision of services. The
group is working to analyse the safety issues identified and updating the portfolio on regular basis. The chapter
introduces the initial ATM/ANS safety risk portfolio and the major candidate safety issues identified by the group
and the prioritisation based on the analysis of accidents and serious incidents collected in the EASA database.
The Safety Issues will be later completed by the ATM/ANS group with expert advice and additional occurrence
data analysis from other sources (e.g., European Central Repository) as to prioritise the safety issue assessments
and derive actions that will be included in the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS).
7.1 Key Statistics

The figures are split into ATM/ANS related and ATM/ANS contribution.
Table 17 Key statistics for ATM/ANS, 2007-2017

ATM/ANS ATM/ANS ATM/ANS ATM/ANS ATM/ANS

ATM/ANS related
related contribution contribu-tion related contribution
2007-2016 total 5 0 61 13 347 143
2017 1 0 2 0 25 5
ATM/ANS related ATM/ANS contribution ATM/ANS related ATM/ANS contribution
2007-2016 total 16 0 48 2
2017 6 0 2 0
Table 17 shows that there were no accidents with contribution from ATM/ANS services provided in EASA MS
in 2017. Fatal accidents with ATM/ANS contribution remains cero for the last ten-year period, and the non-fa-
tal accidents (cero) and serious incidents (five) were lower than the average in previous ten-year period. One
PAGE 101
fatal accident and three non-fatal accidents ATM/ANS related occurred in 2017. The total number of non-fatal
accidents and the number of serious incidents ATM/ANS related in 2017 remains lower than the average of the
preceding ten-year average period.
Figure 84 illustrates the evolution of accidents and serious incidents throughout the last decade. During the last
three years, fatal accidents with some relation to ATM/ANS have happened. These accidents involved helicop-
ters (see Appendix 1.5) as the last accident with ATM relation that involved a CAT fix-wing aeroplane occurred
in 2012.
´´ Figure 84. ATM/ANS related fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents per year,
2007-2017, in EASA MS
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fatal Accidents 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 1
Figure 85 depicts that the rate of ATM/ANS related accidents (fatal and non-fatal) per millions of IFR controlled
flight hours continues decreasing since the plateau reached in 2014. The rate of serious incidents, despite the
steady increase of flight hours, does not show a constant trend.
´´ Figure 85. Rates of ATM/ANS related accidents and serious incidents per year, 2013-2017, in
EASA MS
50 4
45
40
3
35
30
25 2
20
15
1
10
5
0 0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Serious Incidents 28 30 21 37 25
Non-Fatal Accidents 4 9 8 5 2
Fatal Accidents 0 0 2 1 1
Serious incident rate 2.2 2.3 1.6 2.7 1.8
per million flights
Accident rate 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.2
per million flights
ATM/ANS
Figure 86 illustrates that, when restricting on those occurrences with some level of contribution of the ATM/ANS
services, no accidents, either fatal or non-fatal, have occurred in the last two years, with no fatal accident in the
last decade.
´´ Figure 86. Fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents with ATM/ANS contribution
per year, 2007-2017, in EASA MS
30
25
20
15
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fatal Accidents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The decreasing trend in the last 5 years is also observed in the rate of both the accidents and serious incidents
with ATM/ANS contribution, as Figure 87 illustrates.
´´ Figure 87. Rates of fatal and non-fatal accidents and serious incidents with ATM/SN
contribution per year, 2013-2017, in EASA MS
Accidents and Serious incidents with ATM/ANS contribution
20 2.0
18 1.8
16 1.6
14 1.4
12 1.2
10 1.0
8 0.8
6 0.6
4 0.4
2 0.2
0 0.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Serious Incidents 16 13 11 14 5
Non-Fatal Accidents 2 2 1 0 0
Fatal Accidents 0 0 0 0 0
Accident rate
per million flights 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Serious incident rate 1.3 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.4
per million flights
The statistics of accidents and serious incidents does not necessarily represent an accurate picture of the risk
of past events, as each occurrence of the same kind may bear a different risk, and even some accidents may be
PAGE 103
considered to bear lower risk than some serious incidents. For example, a near-miss involving an aircraft with the
TCAS unserviceable would be classified as a serious incident, while a collision between a ground handling vehicle
and an aircraft would be classified as an accident. However, based on the potential credible worse consequenc-
es of both events, the serious incident notionally would bear higher risk that the accident described. This led the
Regulation (EU) 376/2014 to consider the development a common risk classification scheme (ERCS) to risk classify
all occurrences reported to the European Aviation Authorities, which will be finalised and published in 2018. The
main purpose of this method is to associate a risk score to each occurrence store in the EASA’s database. Even
though the ERCS material is not finalised and published, EASA has applied the classification to the occurrences as
from 2013. Figure 88 shows the distribution of aggregated higher and lower risk events with ATM/ANS contribu-
tion in the last 5 years. The decreasing trend of risk of events is observed as indicated by Figure 87 based on the
absence of accidents in 2016 and 2017, but the indication that the serious incidents that occurred in 2016 and
2017 had a greater proportion of higher risk suggests that performance of the system can be further improved
and that effort should still be dedicated towards this objective.
´´ Figure 88. Higher and lower risk scored accidents and serious incidents with ATM/ANS
contribution per year, 2013-2017, in EASA MS
20
18
Number of Accidents & Serious incidents
16
14
12
10
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Lower Risk 3 3 5 4 1
Higher Risk 15 12 7 10 4
With regards to fatalities and injuries, Figure 86 shows that the number of fatalities and serious injuries in events
where there was ATM/ANS contribution was zero in 2017, while Figure 89 shows that within the ATM/ANS- relat-
ed occurrences, the number of fatalities and serious injuries in 2017 were 6 and 2, respectively.
As it can be seen in Figure 89 below, the number of fatalities per year in ATM/ANS related accidents does not fol-
low a clear pattern, depending on the size of aircraft involved in the reduced number of accidents that occurred
only in some years of the period under analysis, which corresponds to only CAT helicopters involved in ATM/ANS
related accidents in the last three years.
ATM/ANS
´´ Figure 89. Fatalities and serious injuries in ATM/ANS related accidents per year, 2007-2017,
in EASA MS
14
12
10
Number of Injuries
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

With regard the flight phase, the majority of ATM/ANS-related accidents and serious incidents took place during
the En-Route and Approach phases, followed by Take-off, Taxi and Landing phases. By comparing the percent-
ages of flight phase distribution in 2017 data with the 2007-2016 average, differences are not remarkable and
follow the same distribution, with small increase in the proportions of events in En-route and Approach phases.
“Unknown/blank” corresponds to those occurrences where no data is available for one or both aircraft involved
in the event. This proposition has decreased, which indicates a better and more complete coding of event in the
database.
´´ Figure 90. Phase of flight in ATM/ANS related accidents and serious incidents per year,
2007-2017, in EASA MS
16
14
12
10
0
Unknown/
Standing Taxi Take-off En route Approach Landing
Blank
Average 2007-2016 0.5 6 7.7 13.4 13.5 3.5 3.3
2017 0 3 4 10 9 2 1
PAGE 105
7.1.1.2 Class of airspace

The airspace class where the ATM/ANS related accidents and serious incidents occurred is shown in Figure 91.
It is worth noting that the majority of events do not contain information about the type of airspace class where
the service was provided. This information is very relevant to the service provided (e.g. separation provision, in-
formation service, etc). Even though the proportion of events in class D seems to have increased, and those in
class C to have decreased, the number of events coding the airspace class is too small,three and one respective-
ly, to reach any conclusion in the trend.
´´ Figure 91. Airspace class where ATM/ANS related accidents and serious incidents occurred,
2007-2017, in EASA MS
40
Number of accdeints and serious incidents
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
A B C D E G Blank
2007-2016 Average 1 0 4.3 1.7 0.3 0.2 33.5
2017 0 0 1 3 0 0 23
ATM/ANS
7.2 Safety Risk Portfolio of the ATM/ANS

domain
This section describes the top risk areas and the major safety issues of concern in the ATM/ANS domain that can
be derived from the occurrence data available in the EASA database, i.e. using analysis of accidents and serious
incidents. These top risk areas and safety issues are collected in the form of a safety risk portfolio for the ATM/
ANS services. In a nut shell, the analysis of these occurrences has been used to populate a list of indicators (Key
Risk Areas and Safety Issues) of the performance framework in the ATM/ANS domain. The portfolio is later used
to prioritise the assessment of safety issues, to target analysis activities over key risk areas and to prioritise safe-
ty actions, involving various ATM/ANS partners in the recently set-up ATM Collaborative Analysis Group, which
includes ANSPs, Aviation Authorities, Eurocontrol, organisations of aviation professionals, and the like.
It is worth noting that the ATM safety portfolio that is described below is a snapshot of the risks beard by past
events derived by the limited data analysed, i.e. accidents and serious incidents. This is considered an interme-
diate step towards the final ATM/ANS Safety Risk Portfolio. The incorporation of additional occurrence data not
analysed by the Aviation Safety and Investigation Authorities, e.g., occurrences reported to the European Cen-
tral Repository or occurrences analysed by the SMS of organisations providing ATM/ANS services, may change
the risk picture shown here, helping identify additional precursors of accidents and making the analysis more
proactive. In addition, the safety risk portfolio may add other criteria, based on qualitative expert judgement of
the ATM CAG members and the EASA Operational Departments that consider, for example, the effectiveness of
existing controls and barriers and the expected risk reduction by already agreed safety actions. This will help
close the gap of risks that are not observable in the data sample. By adding this additional information, the safe-
ty risk portfolio may change both in terms of additional safety issues and a different prioritisation for analysis
of safety issues.
7.2.1.1 Key Risk Areas

To identify the top Key Risk Areas in the ATM/ANS domain, the ATM/ANS related accidents and serious incidents
of the last 5 years were assesses, risk classified using the draft common risk classification scheme (ERCS), and the
ERCS risk scores aggregated. The results are illustrated in Figure 92. The figure depicts the number of higher risk
occurrences per key risk area in the x-axis and the aggregated ERCS risk score of those higher risk occurrences
for each key risk area, which is used as a proxy of the safety risk associated to that area. It shows that the top Key
Rey Risk Areas in the ATM/ANS domain are, not surprisingly, Airborne Collision and Runway Collision, which are
ranked higher in the aggregated ERCS score and frequency of occurrences. In a second layer of priority, the Key
Risk Areas of Runway Excursion, Terrain Collision and Injuries are placed. Finally, a third layer of priority includes
the rest of risk areas (i.e., Ground Collisions, Aircraft Upset, Technical Failures, Obstacle Collisions and Security).
The top Key Risk Areas highlighted above are defined by their accident outcome to be prevented and by the im-
mendiate precursors of that accident outcome:
• Airborne Collision: it includes occurrences involving actual or potential airborne collisions between air-
craft while both aircraft are airborne and between aircraft and other controllable airborne objects (which
excludes birds and wildlife). This includes all separation-related occurrences regardless the cause, AIRPROX
reports and genuine TCAS/ACAS alerts. It does not include false TCAS/ACAS alerts caused by equipment
malfunctions or loss of separation with at least one aircraft on the ground, which may be coded as Run-
way or Movement Area Collision if the occurrence meets the criteria.
• Runway Collision: it includes all occurrences involving actual or potential runway collisions between an
aircraft and other aircraft, vehicle or person that occurs on the runway of an aerodrome or other predes-
ignated landing area. This includes occurrences involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or
person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. It does not
include occurrences involving wildlife on the runway.
PAGE 107
´´ Figure 92. Prioritisation of Key Risk Areas of the ATM/ANS services, 2013-2017, in EASA MS
Higher Risk Airborne Collision

+
Runway Collision
Runway Excursion
Taxiway Excursion
Terrain Collision
Technical Failure
Aircraft Upset
Injuries/Damages
Lower Risk Ground Collision
-
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Obstacle Collision
Security Number of ATM-related Occrrences with Higher Risk value in the ERCS matrix
7.2.1.2 Safety Risk Portfolio

The safety risk portfolio derived from the sample of ATM/ANS related accidents and serious incidents in the last
five years is shown in Figure 93. It shows the ranking of safety issues given by the aggregated ERCS risk score of
the higher risk occurrences related to the safety issues. This indicator is used as proxy of the risk posed by the
safety issue, but it is evaluated as a better reference than the pure sorting by the number of accidents and serious
incidents. The risk priority is depicted notionally with coloured bands from red (higher priority) to blue (lower
priority). The number of occurrences higher risk ERCS scores are indicated in the table too. The ranking is being
further modified by inputs from the ATM CAG group and EASA Operational Departments.
The top row of the table include the key risk areas ranked by the aggregated ERCS score, as indicated previously.
The risk priority is depicted notionally with coloured bands from red (higher priority) to blue (lower priority). The
number of occurrences with higher risk ERCS scores are indicated in the table above each Key Risk Area too. The
“•” symbol indicates that an observed occurrence contained a certain safety issues and was associated to a key
risk area areas, i.e. it identifies which safety issues contribute to which (potential) accident outcomes. When the
symbol “•” is used means that the majority of occurrences of the safety issue contributes primarily with that key
risk areas, in other words with that (potential) accident outcome. Where no symbol is indicated means that no
occurrence was found linked to the safety issue and the concerning risk area.
The safety issues with higher risk scores identified in Figure 93, based on the used data sample, are defined as
follows:
• Deconfliction IFR vs VFR flights. It involves ineffective deconfliction of IFR vs VFR flights in an airspace
class where IFR-VFR are not provided (i.e., class D, E, and G), which may lead to airproxes and ultimately
to airborne collision.
• Airspace Infringement. Airspace infringement occurs when an aircraft enters notified airspace without
previously requesting and obtaining clearance from the controlling authority of that airspace, or enters
the airspace under conditions that were not contained in the clearance.
• Undetected Occupied runway. It involves runway incursions with aircraft landing/taking-off and the ATC
missing that the runway is occupied by a vehicle or aircraft that had received a clearance to be on the
runway.
ATM/ANS
• ACAS RA not followed by the pilot. It involves encounters where the TCAS system installed on board of
aircraft triggered a Resolution Advisory message and one of the aircraft’s flight crew (or both) did not fol-
low the instruction given by the TCAS to resolve the conflict and avoid the mid-air collision.
• Provision of weather information (wind at low height). In involves inaccurate or missing wind-relat-
ed information provided to the crew by ground (e.g., tail wind on ground, gusts) during the approach
phase, which may lead to increase of non-stabilised approaches and thus increasing the risks of runway
excursions.
It is worth noting that this ranking and the list of safety issues in the safety risk portfolio may vary when addi-
tional occurrence data, i.e. other than accidents and serious incidents, are added and/or when complemented
with qualitative criteria evaluated by the ATM CAG and EASA operational departments. One example of special
interest of additional criteria considered may be to prioritise safety issues that involve not only ATM/ANS relat-
ed occurrences, but those that have contribution from the ATM/ANS services, and therefore, where the ATM/ANS
has greater managerial control to mitigate the risks.
´´ Figure 93. Safety Risk Portfolio for ATM/ANS services operations showing how the 5 year
descending order
Deconfliction IFR/VFR 10 
Airspace infringement 6 
Undetected occupied runway 13 • 
ACAS RA not followed 5  •
Wind information (wind at low

9 • 
height)
Deconfliction with aircraft operating

4  •
without transponder
High energy runway conflict 7  • •
Provision of weather information

(turbulence/windshear/convective 20 • •  •
weather)
Conflict detection with closest

12 
aircraft
Integration of RPAS/Drones 4 
Landing/take-off without clearance 3 • 
ATM influence on the non-stabilised

4  •
approaches
Failure of Navigation service 1 • •
Level Bust 4  • •
Failure of Surveillance service 2 • •
Coordination/handling of pushback 1 
Failure of Air/Ground
1 • •
communications
Ground Operations in Adverse

0
Weather Conditions
Cybersecurity 0
PAGE 109
ATM/ANS SERVICES
Higher Risk ERCS Occurrences (2013-2017) 72 29 17 4 19 12 9 5 1 0 0

Bands of
Aggregated
#HRO ERCS
Taxiway Excursion
Runway Excursion
Obstacle Collision
Injuries/Damages
Runway Collision
Airborn Collision
Ground Collision
Technical Failure
Terrain Collision
Safety Issues
ERCS
Aircraft Upset
Risk Score
Security
(2013-2018)
New technologies and automation

0
(e.g. rTWR, SWIM)
Safety Culture 0
Understanding and monitoring

system performance 0
interdependencies

Appendix 1 -
List of Fatal Accidents
PAGE 111
1.1 Aeroplanes
1.1.1 Commercial Air Transport Airline

Local date State/area of Location Aeroplane Headline
occurrence
25/01/2007 France AD Pau (64) FOKKER - F27 - 100 Loss of control during take-off due
to ice contamination, collision with
a vehicle at the crash.
20/08/2008 Spain Madrid MCDONNELL DOUGLAS Loss of control on take-off from

Madrid Barajas, due to incorrect
take-off configuration and disabled
warning. Post-crash fire.
01/06/2009 South Près du point AIRBUS - A330 - 200 Loss of control during cruise due
Atlantic TASIL to incorrect handling of technical
Ocean failure. Aircraft crashed into the
sea.
10/02/2011 Ireland Cork Apt SWEARINGEN - SA227 - BC Loss of control during landing
EICK below weather minima. Impacted
runway inverted
11/11/2012 Italy Roma AIRBUS - A320 Loading crew caught between

Fiumicino loader and baggage door during
Airport aircraft ground handling operation.
24/07/2014 Mali 80 km south- DOUGLAS - DC9 - 80 - 83 Loss of control due to incorrect

east of Gossi engine power. Anti-icing system
not activate leading to the blockage
of the engine pressure sensor by
ice crystals. Aircraft stalled and
crashed.
20/10/2014 Russian UUWW DASSAULT - FALCON 50 - EX Aircraft collided with a snowplough

Federation (VKO): vehicle during take-off run. Aircraft
Moskva/ was destroyed by fire.
Vnukovo
24/03/2015 France Prads-Haute- AIRBUS - A320 - 200 - 211 First officer alone in the cockpit,
Bléone initiated a rapid descent - Aircraft
impacted mountainous terrain
08/01/2016 Sweden Oajevágge BOMBARDIER - CL600 2B19 IRU malfunction - Crew spatial
disorientation - Loss of control -
Aircraft crashed on a mountainous
terrain
Appendix 1 - List of Fatal Accidents
1.1.2 Non-commercial Complex Business

occurrence
26/12/2007 Kazakhstan Almaty CANADAIR - CL600 2B16 - 600 - 604 Loss of control after take-off due
Airport (ALA) to ice contamination on the wings.
Wing-anti-ice not ON
14/02/2010 Germany Reinhardts- CESSNA - 550 - NO SERIES EXISTS During climb the crew performed
dorf- an aerobatic manoeuvre and lost
Schöna control of the aircraft. Aircraft
disappeared from radar screen at
FL250.
24/09/2012 United States San Francisco GULFSTREAM - GV Truck collision with stationary
CA aircraft
10/12/2012 Cyprus Larnaca CESSNA - 750 - NO SERIES EXISTS A service vehicle struck the right
wingtip, vehicle driver trapped
29/04/2013 Congo, FZAA (FIH): DASSAULT - FALCON 900EX Runway incursion by a person
Democratic Kinshasa/ during take-off. Aircraft hit the
Republic of N'djili person
the
1.1.3 Specialised Operations

Local date State/area of Location Aircraft make/model Headline
occurrence
2007-03-11 United HEADCORN DE HAVILLAND - DHC2 - III Aircraft failed to get airborne
Kingdom AIRFIELD, during take-off run
KENT
2007-03-17 Italy Campo dei MAULE - MXT7 – 180, PZL Loss of control and subsequent
Fiori (Varese) BIELSKO - SZD55 crash after glider release
2007-08-07 Spain SANTA PIPER - PA36, PIPER - PA36 - 285 Mid-air collision between two
AMALIA aircraft
(BADAJOZ)
2007-08-13 Czech LKHC OTHER Loss of control and subsequent

Republic crash, post-impact fire
2007-09-01 Poland MATZ EPRA ZLIN - Z526 - AFS, ZLIN - Z526 - F Airshow midair collision.
2007-09-25 Romania near DIAMOND - DA42 Propeller control failure -

Vaideeni uncommanded IFSD, spin and crash;
Overweight.
2007-12-06 France Enroute NORTH AMERICAN - T6 - G North American T6 - Flew Into the
Ground During Aerobatics - 2 POB -
2 Killed
2008-01-11 Slovenia Trbovlje ANTONOV - AN2 Aircraft crashed into mountain

during low visibility conditions
2008-04-26 Germany Eisenach- ZLIN - Z37 Runway excursion after aborted

Kindel take-off at airshow, aircraft
impacted spectators
PAGE 113

occurrence
2008-05-10 Romania Ulmeni PZL OKECIE Aircraft crashed during crop
spreading operation, post-impact
fire
2008-05-14 Bulgaria Topoli LET Collision with power lines during

village, near manoevering at low height
LBWN
2008-05-30 Spain near Lillo PILATUS - PC6 In flight structural failure in

y Villatobas turbulence
2008-06-14 France Connantre PIPER - PA38 Loss of control in flight, collision

(51) with the ground during an air race
2008-06-14 France Castres (81) OTHER Loss of control during practice for
airshow
2008-06-28 Spain Sa Pobla OTHER COLLISION WITH TERRAIN

(Illes Balears)
2008-08-12 Italy località Val PIPER - PA18 - 150 Piper PA18-150 - Loss of control in
Vibrata, flight and ground impact- 1POB -
Corropoli, 1OB Fatal - A/C Destroyed
Teramo
2009-06-20 Czech 200 m left LET Loss of control uring parachute

Republic RWY 24, operations
LKCR
2009-07-08 United Bishop PERCIVAL Mechanichal engine failure and in-

Kingdom Norton flight fire
(Lincolnshire)
2009-07-18 Hungary LHDK ZLIN - Z42 Crash when performing low-level

aerobatics
2009-08-14 Portugal Evora - Bairro BEECH - 99 Loss of control during single-engine

de Almeirim go-around
2009-08-23 Germany Erpfental CESSNA - F182, ROBINSON - R44 Mid-air collision between aeroplane
near and helicopter near airshow
Ellwangen
2009-09-06 Italy LIPO Airport MUDRY - CAP10 Aircraft impacted on ground during
aerobatic manouver.
2009-10-09 Italy Canevare PARTENAVIA - P68 Loss of control inflight

(Modena)
2010-05-28 Czech LKTO OTHER Aircraft crashed shortly after

Republic takeoff
2010-05-29 Spain Aldeanueva PIPER - PA25 STALL DURING FLIGHT

de
Barbarroya
(To)
2010-06-19 United Methley EXTRA - EA300 Aircraft crashed while performing

Kingdom Bridge (West an aerobatic display
Yorkshire
2010-08-17 Spain Aerodr. OTHER COLLISION WITH TERRAIN DURING

Casarrubios ACROBATIC MANOEUVRE
del Monte
2010-09-04 United Near Ryde, MOONEY - M20, VANS - RV4 - Mid air collision during Merlin
Kingdom Isle of Wight UNDESIGNATED SERIES Trophy Air Race

occurrence
2010-09-05 Germany Lauf- OTHER Collision with airshow spectators
Lillinghof during take off roll
2010-09-19 Germany Warngau EXTRA - EA300, OTHER Mid-air collision during airshow
(Miesbach)
2010-10-02 France Les Moëres CESSNA - F172 - M, Aveko VL3B Cessna F172 & Aveko VL3B - Midair
Collision - 4POB - 2OB Fatalities -
2OB Minor - F172 Substantial
damage - Aveko Destroyed
2010-10-12 Spain Navarra ROBIN - DR400 COLLISION WITH TERRAIN DURING

CRUISE
2011-01-11 Italy Airport LIRG ROBIN - DR400 - 180R Robin 400 180R while towing
a glider in the take off phase
crashed. The pilot of the airplane is
killed.
2011-06-02 Netherlands EHTE CESSNA - F172 The aircraft crashed after pick up of
a banner
2011-06-18 Poland Plock - Wisla CHRISTEN - EAGLE II Crash during aerobatics over river
River
2011-07-04 France AD Dijon- SOCATA Stalling of towing aircraft after

Darois (21) glider release
2011-08-30 Poland Nowy Targ PZL OKECIE Loss of control during approach and
subsequent crash with post-impact
fire
2012-04-28 Germany Alkersleben ZLIN - Z226 A/C touched the ground after
a formation flight
2012-05-05 France AD Buno PIPER - PA25 - 235, SLINGSBY - T31 Mid-air collision between a glider
Bonnevaux and an aeroplane above runway
(91)
2012-06-17 Romania Banesti, OTHER Collision with power cables on

Prahova approach and subsequent crash and
post-impact fire
2012-07-22 France AD Couhé OTHER Loss of control and subsequent

Vérac (86) crash during airshow
2012-09-07 Italy Di Fioranello CESSNA - 402 Aircraft impacted terrain during

street 163, aerial work operations - aerial
Rome photography
2012-09-09 Germany Backnang- ROBIN - DR400 - 180R Avions Robin DR400 - Loss of
Heiningen control during take off as A/C fell
into the vortex generated by the
preceding a/C flying - 4POB - 3OB
Fatalities - 1OB Serious
2012-10-22 Netherlands EHAA DIAMOND - DA40, GENERAL Mid air collision during photo
AVIA - F22 flight - POB 2 on each aircraft -
2 fatalities - 2 serious injuries - both
aircraft destroyed
2013-03-09 Czech 600m ZLIN - Z37 - A Aircraft collided with trees in IMC
Republic N Srbce
(Chrudim)
PAGE 115

occurrence
2013-05-05 Spain Madrid- HISPANO AVIACION - HA200 - D Aircraft crashed during airshow
Cuatro
Vientos
Airport
(LECU)
2013-05-08 Netherlands Egmond aan OTHER - Not mapped Ditched in north sea near Egmond
Zee, Noord-
Holland
2013-06-01 Sweden Söderhamn SAAB - 91 Engine failure during airshow due

Airport to loose spark plugs
2013-06-29 Germany Eberswalde- ZLIN - Z526 - AFS Aircraft crashed during aerobatics
Finow
2013-06-30 Sweden Near GRUMMAN - GA7 Crash in a field after reported

Veberöd, engine problems
Sweden
2013-10-19 Belgium Gelbressee PILATUS - PC6 Abrupt maneuver - left wing

structural failure due to
a significant overload - A/C out of
control crashed into a ploughed
field
2014-04-20 Finland 2 km from OTHER During climb, right wing broke due
Jämijärvi to a fatigue failure - aircraft entered
airfield EFJM, a spin, crashed and caught fire -
Satakunta 11POB - 8OB Fatalities
2014-05-08 Latvia EVLA - Liepaja PITTS - S2 - B Pitts S-2B Special - Aircraft crashed
during aerobatic routine - 1POB -
1OB Fatal - A/C Destroyed
2014-05-10 Italy Ceriano OTHER Aircraft crash during

Laghetto a demonstrative flight, two persons
(Monza died.
province)
2014-06-06 Czech near TECNAM - P92 Crashed shortly after take off whilst
Republic Krizanov glider towing. Glider disconnected
airfield, LKKA and landed safely - 1POB - 1OB
Fatal - A/C Destroyed
2014-06-23 Germany Near LEARJET - 35 - A, OTHER - Military Collision of two A/C in flight, one
Olsberg-Elpe military - 3POB - 2OB Fatally Injured
2014-07-05 Poland Topolów PIPER - PA31P Piper PA-31 Navajo - Engine

district My- problems during climb-out, loss of
kanów, height and collision with ground.
Czesto- A/C Destroyed by post-impact
chowskas- fire - 12POB - 11OB Fatal -1OB
treet No Serious - A/C Destroyed
36; near
Czestochowa
2014-07-19 Czech 1 NM S LKKM ZLIN - Z526 - F The aircraft entered an inverted

Republic spin and impacted the ground
2014-09-13 France At FL110 CESSNA - U206 - F Parachute opened upon parachutist

AD Tarbes leaving the aircraft, parachute
Laloubère struck the tail of the aircraft and
damaged part of the stabilizer,
loss of control of aircraft and
subsequent crash

occurrence
2014-09-21 Italy near Venezia OTHER - Not mapped XtremeAir Xtreme 3000 - Aircraft
Lido Airport crashed during aerobatics
performance - 1POB - 1OB Fatal -
A/C Destroyed
2014-09-28 Italy Colle di Val PITTS Pitts 12 - Aircraft fell during

d’Elsa, Siena aerobatic maneuvers - 2POB - 2OB
Fatalities - A/C Destroyed
2015-05-30 France Blois STAMPE - SV4 - C During aerobatics session the

aircraft entered into spin after
a half loop maneuver - Aircraft
crashed
2015-05-31 Adriatic Sea Tortoreto, VANS - RV8 - A, VANS - RV7 Collision of two aircraft in flight
Alba during an air show
Adriatica (TE)
2015-08-01 United near Oulton OTHER - Military Flight into terrain during airshow
Kingdom Park
2015-08-01 Romania Stancuta, PZL MIELEC - AN2 - R Aircraft crashed shortly after
Braila county take-off.
2015-08-20 Slovakia Cervený LET - L410 - UVP, LET - L410 Mid-air collision during en-route.
Kamen Both aircraft were performing
parachute dropping operations.
2015-08-22 United near EGKA - HAWKER - HUNTER - T7 - T7 Aircraft crashed on a road during
Kingdom Shoreham an air show.
Airport
2015-08-23 Switzerland Dittingen 2x COMCO IKARUS - IKARUS C42 - B Mid-air collision during airshow
LSPD
2015-08-30 Austria Airfield PITTS - S2 - B Loss of control during Aerobatic

Friesach Hirt, show with A/C crashed
Carinthia
2016-05-20 Germany Rodigast PZL OKECIE - PZL101 Loss of control and subsequent
crash into forest
2016-06-11 Italy Cecina PILATUS - PC6 Parachutists reserve parachute

opened prematurely. Parachutist
hit the RH stabilizer - structural
damage in flight and crash.
2016-06-19 Portugal Canhestros PILATUS - PC6 In-flight fuselage breakup due to

material fatigue
2016-09-18 Hungary Gödöllo PIPER - PA28 - 140, CESSNA - 182 - D Two aircraft collided with each
Arboretum other in the vicinity of LHGD. 4 POB,
4 fatalities
2017-08-15 Spain Near the 55 PIPER - PA36 - 375 Bird strike followed by crash during
kilometer fumigation work in a rice field (low
point of altitude operation)
N-340 road
2017-09-03 Italy Pontinia CESSNA - 182 - P Loss of control inflight - crash and
fire.
2017-09-16 Slovakia LZPE ZLIN - Z37 - C Loss of control and crash

PAGE 117
1.1.4 Non-commercial Other Than Complex

The list below provides information on all fatal accidents occurring within NCO for the past 3 years.
03/01/2015 United Blackwood ALPI AVIATION - PIONEER400 Engine failure at approach, aircraft
Kingdom Forest, near crashed in woodland.
the EGHP
18/01/2015 Germany Rech- PIPER - PA24 - 260 Aircraft crashed into a garage
berghausen
26/01/2015 Germany Dannenfels PIPER - PA30 Aircraft crashed killing the pilot
18/02/2015 France Colombier ROBIN - DR400 - 160 Aircraft impacted the top of a tree
and crashed in adverse weather
conditions
23/02/2015 Switzerland Proche AD ROBIN - DR400 - 140B Aircraft crashed near the airfield
Yverdon shortly after the take-off
11/03/2015 France Vrigny ROBIN - DR400 - 120 Loss of Control on Approach -

Aircraft crashed to the ground
03/04/2015 Germany Witzenhausen PIPER - PA28 Aircraft crashed into a Forrest
04/04/2015 United Near Loch PIPER - PA28 - 140 Aircraft crashed into mountainous
Kingdom Etive, Oban, terrain
Argyll and
Bute
12/04/2015 Germany Oldenburg - CESSNA - F172 - N A/C hit trees and crashed into the
Hatten ground
15/04/2015 Germany Moosburg BOLKOW - BO207 Controlled flight into terrain
22/04/2015 United EGSV:OLD OTHER Aircraft crashed while practising

Kingdom BUCKENHAM aerobatics. One POB, fatally
injured.
03/05/2015 United West of BEECH - 55 - 95B55 Flew into terrain on approach

Kingdom Abernyte,
near Dundee
21/05/2015 France Saint- ROBIN - DR400 - 140B Engine power loss and loss of
Laurent- control during initial climb, Aircraft
Blangy crashed and caught fire
21/05/2015 Bulgaria LBLS OTHER Accident with airplane RALLY 105,

reg. marks LZ-GVG, while taking-off
from Lesnovo airfield.
26/05/2015 Sweden Skå-Edeby OTHER Destroyed aircraft, Steen Skybolt -

one fatality
26/05/2015 Portugal Next to the OTHER Loss of control during base

football approach - Spiral dive - aircraft
field of crashed
Água Longa,
SANTO
TIRSO.
26/05/2015 France Remoray- CEA - DR380 Collision with high terrain in

Boujeons adverse weather conditions with
fog
Date State of Location of Make/Model Summary

Occurrence Occurrence
06/06/2015 Italy AVIOSU- UNKNOWN The engine failed and the aircraft
PERFICIE hit the ground about 270 meters
“ALVARO from the runway threshold
LEONARDI” -
TERNI
07/06/2015 Croatia Zvekovac VANS - RV7 - A Accident report - Airplane below

2250 kg
23/06/2015 Germany Holzminden JABIRU - J430 Aircraft hit tree tops and then
impacted the ground
25/06/2015 Croatia Split LAKE - LA4 - 200 Accident report - Airplane below
2250 kg
26/06/2015 Lithuania Alytus YAKOVLEV - YAK55 Akrobatinio skrydzio metu nukrito

lektuvas
28/06/2015 Aviosuper- RUTAN Incidente aereo aeromobile marche

ficie “Alvaro D-EESY
Leonardi” -
Terni
30/06/2015 Germany Egelsbach DIAMOND - DA20 - A1 Take-off collision with power lines
01/07/2015 France Treilles PIPER - PA28 - 181 Collision with high terrain during
cruise affected by adverse weather
conditions. Post-crash fire
18/07/2015 Sweden ESGF VANS - RV6 - A Loss of control in flight
30/07/2015 Germany Villingen- EXTRA Loss of control in climb phase

Schwennin-
gen
02/08/2015 France AD Marennes BRANDLI - BX2 Aborted landing, Aircraft collided

first with the vegetation then struck
the ground.
05/08/2015 Switzerland Hundwil/AR SKYSTAR - KITFOX Aircraft crashed into a forest
09/08/2015 Iceland DE HAVILLAND - DHC2 Aircraft collided with a mountain

during flight. Fatal accident;
1 fatality
12/08/2015 Spain Robledillo de ZENAIR - CH640 Aircraft fell to the ground during
Mohernando the base leg.
Airfield
(Término
municipal de
Malaguilla)
17/08/2015 United Newquay PIPER - PA34 - 220T Aircraft crashed during go-around.
Kingdom Airport
04/09/2015 United Hinton in CESSNA - 150 - F Loss of control during go-around

Kingdom the Hedges after bounced landing
Airfield
05/09/2015 France AD BRUGGER - MB2 Aircraft crashed shortly after

Haguenau take-off.
05/09/2015 Sweden Brattsfor- YAKOVLEV - YAK42 Accident YAK52two fatally injured

sheden
08/09/2015 Belgium Celles OTHER Aircraft impacted the ground at

a low horizontal / high vertical
speed.
PAGE 119

08/09/2015 Spain Toses PIPER - PA28 - 181 Aircraft crashed into a mountain.
10/09/2015 Germany Können BEECH - 24 Aircraft crashed into a field due to

unknown circumstances. 1 POB,
1 fatality
16/09/2015 Germany Mechernich- PIPER - PA28 - 161 Crew abandoned the aircraft during
Bergheim enroute. Aircraft crashed and
caught fire.
20/09/2015 Switzerland Muhen/AG NEW GLASAIR - GLASAIR SUPER Collison with a car during
II - RG emergency landing in Muhen/AG
26/09/2015 Germany Sandstedt CESSNA - F172 Collision in Flight causing one

aircraft to lose control and crash.
4 POB, 3 fatalities.
03/10/2015 United Near BEECH - 200 - B200 Aircraft crashed shortly after
Kingdom Chigwell take-off
08/11/2015 Austria Ma. Rojach BREEZER Aircraft crashed during low flying.
2 POB, 2 fatalities
08/11/2015 Slovenia near TL ULTRALIGHT - TL2000 STING Ultralight aircraft crashed shortly
Slovenske after take-off. Ballistic Recovery
Konjice System activated but parachute
Airport didn’t fully open.
12/11/2015 Iceland Kapelluhraun TECNAM - P2002 - JF A/C crashed - during familiarization

training flight
03/12/2015 United EGNH (BLK): ROCKWELL - 112 - B Aircraft reported missing over sea.
Kingdom Blackpool One POB, missing.
03/12/2015 Austria Mengeš PIPER - PA28R - 201 Aircraft crashed. Pilot reported
having problem during the
approach.
04/12/2015 France La Bresse ROBIN - DR400 - 140 Aircraft collided with mountainous
terrain in adverse conditions not
favourable to VFR flight
06/12/2015 France Peypin PIPER - PA28 - 161 Loss of visual references - aircraft
d’Aigues crash on a mountainous terrain
24/12/2015 Spain Ronda SOCATA - TB9 Aircraft crashed and consumed by

post-crash fire.
04/01/2016 Netherlands North See, CIRRUS - SR20 Unintended flight in IMC, loss of
4.5 NM west control and crash to the sea. 1 POB,
from Schoorl 1 fatality
16/01/2016 Spain Serranía SOCATA - TB20 Bird strike - left wing partial
de Cuenca detachment - aircraft crashed and
Natural Park caught fire. 4 POB, 4 fatalities
09/02/2016 Spain near Beas de CESSNA - 172 - P Aircraft asked a flight path
Segura deviation due to bad weather
before crash. 1 POB, 1 fatality
21/02/2016 France near AD JODEL Loss of control during initial climb,

Vinon aircraft crashed. 1 POB, 1 fatality
25/02/2016 France Saint-Héand EXTRA - EA300 - 200 Collision with high level terrain
due to adverse weather conditions.
1 POB, 1 fatality

28/02/2016 Hungary 5km SW from CESSNA - FA152 Aircraft crashed in bad weather
Agostyán, conditions. 1 POB, 1 fatal, 1 serious
Tata injury
20/03/2016 Ireland EIAB - OTHER Aircraft crashed while executing

Abbeyshrule rolls. 1 POB, 1 fatality
25/03/2016 Hungary Dány térsége TECNAM - P2002 - JF Aircraft crashed due to unknown
reasons. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
30/03/2016 Spain Perales de CESSNA - 172 - R A bird strike, wing separation in

Tajuña flight and a crash. 3 POB, 3 fatalities
01/04/2016 Poland Chmielewo TECNAM - P2002 Aircraft lost control and collided
with terrain on a steep angle.
2 POB, 2 fatalities
01/04/2016 France Sondernach ROBIN - HR100 - 210D Aircraft crashed and caught fire.
The aircraft impacted the ground
with a significant pitch down
attitude. 1 POB, 1 fatality
20/04/2016 Czech near LKST - CESSNA - 150 Aircraft lost control and crashed
Republic Strakonice into a meadow. 1 POB, 1 fatality
30/04/2016 United Whitwell-on- SLINGSBY - T67 - MII Loss of control in flight - Aircraft
Kingdom the-Hill crashed into a field. 2 POB,
2 fatalities
05/05/2016 Germany Grafenau- MORANE SAULNIER - MS893 - E Aircraft collision with the ground
Lichteneck due to unknown reasons. 1 POB,
1 fatality
06/05/2016 Austria near LOAN - RANS - S12 Aircraft spin and crash during flight
Wr.Neustadt around the aerodrome. 2 POB,
/ Ost 2 fatalities
19/05/2016 Spain Arbizu ROBIN - DR400 - 180 Aircraft crashed due to bird strike.
3 POB, 3 fatalities
01/06/2016 France Coëx VANS - RV4 Engine shut-down in flight and

crash. 2 POB, 1 fatal, 1 serious
injury
09/06/2016 United Near COMCO IKARUS - IKARUS C42 - FB80 Aircraft crashed into the sea
Kingdom Cushendun, for unknown reasons. 2 POB,
2 fatalities
03/07/2016 Germany Mosbach OTHER Loss of Control during take-off.

1 POB, 1 fatality
05/07/2016 Spain LECU - CIRRUS - SR22 Aircraft crash at the aerodrome

Madrid during touch and go landing.
/ Cuatro 2 POB, 2 fatalities
Vientos
08/07/2016 United 1 nm north YAKOVLEV - YAK52 After loss of engine power and
Kingdom of Dinton, unsuccessful forced landing due to
Wiltshire late decision A/C crashed in field.
2 POB, 1 fatal, 1 serious injury
10/07/2016 Austria LOWZ:Zell PIPER - PA28 - 161 Aircraft not able to maintain climb
am see due to low speed during take-off
and stalls followed by crash. 4 POB,
1 fatal, 3 serious injuries
PAGE 121

03/08/2016 France LFCV - JODEL Crash after unsuccessful landing.
Villefranche 1 POB, 1 fatality
de Rouergue
06/08/2016 United English PIPER - PA28 - 161 Engine problem reported - most
Kingdom Channel, 1 likely carburettor icing, aircraft
mile from ditched and sank. 1 POB, 1 fatality
Winchelsea
15/08/2016 France LFNE - Salon EXTRA - EA300 - 200 Unconsciousness during a training
/ Eyguieres flight in aerobatics and crash.
1 POB, 1 fatality
25/08/2016 France Saint- JODEL - D11 Loss of control during the initial
Rémy de climb - Aircraft crashed and caught
Maurienne fire. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
01/09/2016 Slovenia near Cezsoca PIPER - PA28 - 161 Aircraft crashed due to unknown
circumstances. 3 POB, 3 fatalities
01/09/2016 Germany Herlazhofen ROBIN - DR400 - 140B Aircraft crashed after engine
failure. 3 POB, 3 fatalities
03/09/2016 Germany Dierdorf OTHER Aircraft crashed due to unknown

circumstances. 1 POB, 1 fatality
04/09/2016 Germany Stettiner Haff SOCATA - TB20 Aircraft crashed into the ocean.
3 POB, 3 fatalities
04/09/2016 Poland Wrocanka VANS - RV6 Loss of control shortly after take-
off. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
05/09/2016 Bulgaria LBDB:DOLNA TECNAM - P92 Aircraft collided with high

BANYA voltage wires and crashed. 2 POB,
(AIRFIELD) 2 fatalities
06/09/2016 Spain Close to ROBIN - DR400 - 180 On a long visual flight the AC came
Villanueva down at a meadow close to the
del Condado village buildings. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
village
(León - Spain)
14/09/2016 Austria near Sankt AQUILA - AT01 Collision with cableway. 1 POB,
Anton, Steiß- 1 fatality
bachtal
(Vallugabahn)
18/09/2016 Hungary Gödöllo PIPER - PA28 - 140 Two aircraft collided with each
Arboretum other in the vicinity of LHGD. 4 POB,
4 fatalities
27/09/2016 France Saint VANS - RV8 Loss of control at low altitude.

Ambroix A/C crashed and caught fire. 2 POB,
2 fatalities
02/10/2016 United near Topcroft NORTH AMERICAN - P51 - D Aircraft crashed into a tree during
Kingdom Farm Airstrip aborted landing. 2 POB, 1 fatal,
1 seriously injured
04/10/2016 Slovakia near LANCAIR - 360 Probable hypoxia of the pilot

Jakubovany and icing of the airframe. 1 POB,
1 fatality
15/10/2016 Romania Luncani, Cluj CESSNA - 182 Skydiver’s parachute was deployed
County while he was inside the aircraft
and fell to the ground unconscious.
1 fatality

16/10/2016 Greece east of CESSNA - 172 - P Aircraft crashed into mountain.
Kalabryta 2 POB, 2 fatalities
17/10/2016 United near CESSNA - F150 - M Aircraft crashed after take-off.

Kingdom EGSN - Bourn 2 POB, 1 fatal, 1 seriously injured
24/11/2016 Poland EPZP - PIPER - PA31 - 350 Premature LG retraction and crash
Zielona Góra during take-off. 1 POB, 1 fatality
25/11/2016 France Jarsy SOCATA - TB20 Aircraft collision with mountain

due to unintended flight into IMC.
2 POB, 2 fatalities
04/12/2016 United over CESSNA - 150 - L Mid-air collision powered ACFT and
Kingdom Lubenham glider; Glider crashed killing the
pilot.
07/12/2016 France AD Bale- PIPER - PA34 - 200T Collision with the ground during
Mulhouse landing - fire. 1 POB, 1 fatality
19/12/2016 Germany Garz TECNAM Aircraft crashed into the forest for
unknown reasons. 1 POB, 1 fatality
15/01/2017 United Near Aston PIPER - PA30 Aircraft flying at low altitude in IMC
Kingdom Rowant condition, crashed into woodland.
Nature 1 POB, 1 fatality
Reserve
15/01/2017 Spain near LEMT - TECNAM - P2002 Aircraft crashed into a field in
Casarrubios a high nose down attitude. 2 POB
Del Monte 2 fatalities.
02/02/2017 Germany Melle DIAMOND - DA20 - A1 Aircraft collided with a wind

turbine. 1 POB, 1 fatality.
20/02/2017 Guadeloupe Petit Bourg PIPER - PA28 - 161 Airplane crashed into a building.
1 POB, 1 fatality
27/03/2017 Ireland Clon- RUTAN - LONGEZ Aircraft crashed in a field due to

coskoran, engine failure. 1 POB, 1 fatality
near Dun-
garvan Co.
Waterford
09/04/2017 France AD Chelles EVEKTOR AEROTECHNIK Bounced landing, the student pilot
Le Pin lost the aircraft’s control after
initiating a go/around. The aircraft
crashed in a field. 1 POB, 1 fatality
14/04/2017 Italy Dovera (CR) TECNAM - P92 A/C crashed on the ground during
VFR flight. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
17/04/2017 Portugal Cascais PIPER - PA31T Aircraft stalled during take-off and
crashed to the buildings. 4 POB,
4 fatalities
29/04/2017 Spain Canillas de SOCATA - TB20 Direct impact against the terrain.
Aceituno 3 POB, 3 fatalities
25/05/2017 United 2 miles north PIPER - PA28R - 201 Aircraft lost from radar, wreckage
Kingdom of Skipness, found in water. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
Kintyre
28/05/2017 United Apperknowle EUROPA A/C partial loss of power as a result

Kingdom of fuel vapour disrupting fuel
supply to engine during take-off
followed by crash in adjacent field.
1 POB, 1 fatality
PAGE 123

18/06/2017 United Spanhoe AUSTER Aircraft descended into a field
Kingdom Airfield, of crops near the airfield. 2 POB,
Northamp- 1 injury 1 fatality.
tonshire
26/06/2017 Czech LKHD: PIPER - L4 - J Aircraft crashed shortly after take-

Republic Hodkovice off. 2 POB, 1 fatality, 1 serious
injury.
05/07/2017 Switzerland near LSGN - CZECH SPORT - PS28 Pilot lost control after take-
Neuchatel off during initial climb. 2 POB,
2 fatalities
19/07/2017 Finland near PIPER - J3C - 65 - 65 The aircraft crashed into a forest
Haalatvantie during final approach in bad
weather condition. 1 POB, 1 fatality
21/07/2017 Poland EPML OTHER Loss of control shortly after take-

off - 2 POB - 2 fatal injuries
28/07/2017 Poland EPLL CESSNA - 152 Aircraft collided with trees during
approach. 1 POB, 1 fatality
01/08/2017 Norway Oppland AQUILA - AT01 Aircraft crashed into mountain.

county 1 POB, 1 fatality
02/08/2017 Portugal Praia de CESSNA - 152 Forced landing on the beach due to
São João da engine failure. Aircraft collided with
Caparica pedestrians. 2 POB 2 fatal injuries
on ground
04/08/2017 Switzerland Diavolezza/ PIPER - PA28 - 181 Collision with high terrain. 3 POB,
GR 3 fatally injured
08/08/2017 Germany Bodensee / PIPER - PA46 The aircraft crashed into the Lake
Mainau Bodensee north of Konstanz. 2 POB
2 fatalities
19/08/2017 Romania Valcica OTHER Aircraft crashed due to unknown

village, Iasi reasons. 2 POB, 1 fatally injured,
county 1 seriously injured
20/08/2017 Switzerland Alp PIPER - PA28 - 161 Aircraft collided with terrain. 3 POB
Tsanfleuron, and 3 fatalities
Savièse VS
22/08/2017 Norway near PITTS - S2 - B Pilot lost the aircraft control while
Holmestrand performing aerobatics manoeuver
and crashed. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
26/08/2017 United EGHA: DE HAVILLAND - DH82 - A Crashed shortly after take-off.

Kingdom Compton Aircraft destroyed. 2 POB fatally
abbas injured.
27/08/2017 Germany Moormeer MORANE SAULNIER - MS883 Collision with the ground due to
land unknown circumstances. 1 POB
1 fatality
09/09/2017 Italy Salussola (BI) PIPER - PA34 Aircraft crashed on the ground
during VFR approach in poor
weather conditions. 1 POB 1 fatality
11/09/2017 United Wolferton, PIPER - PA28RT - 201 Rough running engine and
Kingdom Norfolk electrical fire followed by Mayday
call by pilot. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
12/09/2017 France Ghisonaccia DIAMOND - DA42 Aircraft crashed due to unknown

reasons. 4 POB 4 fatalities.

12/09/2017 Switzerland Braunwald/ MOONEY - M20K Aircraft crashes in high terrain -
GL 2 POB - 2 fatally injured - Aircraft
destroyed.
19/09/2017 Norway near ENHA - VANS - RV4 Loss of control on approach, spin
Hamar / and crash. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
Stafsberg
28/09/2017 United Wolvey, EUROPA - EUROPA On landing, runway excursion

Kingdom Warwickshire through hedge. Damage:
Substantial. 2 POB, 2 fatal injuries.
05/10/2017 Portugal Olhão: KOLB - TWINSTAR - III Aircraft stalled shortly after take-
Quelfes off. 1 POB, 1 fatality
17/11/2017 United near CESSNA - 152 Aircraft Mid-air collision between

Kingdom Waddesdon a Cessna and a Guimbal helicopter
fatal injuries. 2 POB, 2 fatalities
PAGE 125
1.2 Rotorcraft
1.2.1 Offshore Commercial Air Transport

Local date State/area of Location Helicopter Headline
occurrence
01/04/2009 United Near AEROSPATIALE – AS332 - L2 Loss of control inflight due to main
Kingdom Peterhead, rotor gearbox failure
Scotland
11/07/2011 Myanmar Yetagon SIKORSKY – S76 - C Power loss during take-off.

Oil Rig, Helicopter capsized during ditching
Andaman
Sea
23/08/2013 United Samburgh AEROSPATIALE – AS332 - L2 Loss of control during approach to

Kingdom Airport land at Sumburgh Airport. Crashed
into the sea
29/04/2016 Norway near Turøy EUROCOPTER – EC225 - LP Loss of control inflight due to main
rotor gearbox failure
1.2.2 Other Commercial Air Transport

occurrence
02/06/2007 Italy Villa Vomano ROBINSON - R44 Collision with power lines during
(Teramo) sightseeing flight
03/08/2007 United Kendal ROBINSON - R44 Loss of control inflight in poor

Kingdom (Cumbria) weather conditions
02/03/2008 Antarctica nr Neumayer EUROCOPTER - BO105 - CBS4 Helicopter crash during research
II mission
31/07/2008 Hungary Near EUROCOPTER - EC135 Loss of control following power loss
Bankháza- during HEMS operations
Kiskun-
lacháza
17/02/2009 Poland Jerostow PZL SWIDNIK - MI2 Loss of control during HEMS flight
14/08/2009 France Dangé Saint ROBINSON - R44 Loss of control during sightseeing
Romain (86) flight
27/01/2010 Norway Horten ROBINSON - R44 Loss of control in poor visibility

conditions
28/10/2010 Antarctica A 53 NM AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Loss of control due to loss of visual

de Dumont references in whiteout conditions
d’Urville
04/07/2011 Norway Dalamot AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Loss of control following abrupt

manoeuvring

occurrence
09/11/2011 Italy Italy AEROSPATIALE - AS365 - N3 Collision with wind turbine during
HEMS operations
08/04/2012 Niger Niger AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - BA Helicopter crashed in for as yet

unknown reason
14/01/2014 Norway Near EUROCOPTER - EC135 - P2 Collision with power lines during
Solihogda, HEMS operations
Norway
31/07/2015 Italy Pizzo Zocca AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Terrain collision during flight in
di val Masino adverse cloud condition
(Sondrio)
17/07/2015 Slovakia Hornád AGUSTA - A109 - K2 Collision with power cables during
canyon - en-route HEMS operations
Slovenský Raj
02/06/2016 Moldova Haragis EUROCOPTER - EC135 - T2 Helicopter crashed in a wood for as

yet unknown reason
07/09/2016 Slovakia Strelníky BELL - 429 Terrain collision during HEMS

operations in mountainous area.
08/09/2016 Austria Carinthia, ca. ROBINSON - R66 Terrain Collision in mountainous

2346 m area
24/01/2017 Italy Campo Felice AGUSTA - AW139 Collision with mountain slope
during HEMS operations.
1.2.3 Specialised Operations

occurrence
2007-07-12 Ireland Ballynacally, AEROSPATIALE - AS350 Engine failure and subsequent crash
County Clare
2007-07-20 Austria Gusswerk/ AEROSPATIALE - AS332 Ground staff fatally injured by sling
Steiermark load
2007-08-09 Italy Marina di ROBINSON - R22 Helicopter loss of control and

Camerota subsequent crash in water
2007-10-11 Germany Tegernsee BELL - 206 Filming flight over lake, rotor
downwash capsized a canoe, one
canoe occupant drowned
2008-01-07 Germany Zuzenhausen BELL - 206 Helicopter crashed in a forest

during bad weather conditions
2008-07-03 Slovakia near Brusno MIL - MI8 Engine failure and subsequent crash
2008-09-27 Denmark Kirke Såby ROBINSON - R22 Fatal helicopter accident - vortex
ring
2009-02-04 Norway Rostadalen AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Helicopter accident during low

flying in degraded visibility
2009-02-10 Hungary Csepeli ROBINSON - R44 Helicopter ditched in river

szennyvíz
tisztító
PAGE 127

occurrence
2009-06-20 France Bregnier- AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B2 Helicopter loss of control and
cordon (01) subsequent crash
2009-08-23 Germany Erpfental ROBINSON - R44, CESSNA - F182 Mid-air collision between aeroplane
near and helicopter near airshow
Ellwangen
2009-09-02 Switzerland Fully/VS AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Flight assistant on ground killed by

falling wall during hovering of the
helicopter
2009-09-07 Italy Val d’Aosta AEROSPATIALE - SA315 Rotor strikes rocks on ground
2009-10-09 France Domjulien AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Collision with trees and ground due
(88) to adverse weather conditions
2010-06-27 Netherlands Maasvlakte, EUROCOPTER - EC130 Loss of control during hover

Rotterdam
2010-07-23 Austria Gahbuhel BELL - 204 - B Tail rotor collision with tree during
sling load operation
2010-07-31 France Bormes-les- AEROSPATIALE - AS350 Vibrations during landing, hard

Mimosas (83) landing
2010-08-04 French 2 Nm S-E AEROSPATIALE - AS350 Collision with vegetation during

Guyana Croisée sling load mission
d’Apatou
2010-08-08 Belarus Minsk- HUGHES - 369 - H - HS Accident during low level aerobatic
Barawaja flight manoeuvres
2010-08-17 Algeria Benbakhta, AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Loss of control and subsequent

wilaya de crash
Boumerdes
2011-03-08 United Honister AEROSPATIALE - SA341 - G Aircraft missing - later found

Kingdom Slate Mine, crashed in valley
Seatoller
2011-04-26 Italy 1.3 NM S-SE ROBINSON - R22 Helicopter R22 Accident - CFIT
of Sulmona during aerial work
(AQ)
2011-06-07 Spain Quincoces de BELL - 407 Helicopter crash in mountainous

Yuso area and post-impact fire
2011-06-15 Andorra Pleta de AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Helicopter crash durirng sling load
Juclar operation
(Canillo)
2011-06-25 Italy Cison di SCHWEIZER Helicopter impacts cables during

Valmarino aerial work
(TV)
2011-08-05 Italy Cogolo di AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 collision with obstacles during

Pejo (Trento) aerial work
2011-09-14 France Vallorcine AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Collision with cable car cable, post-
(74) impact fire
2011-10-18 Belgium 10km from EUROCOPTER - EC120 Crashed during aerial work
Liege
2012-01-11 Norway Mosjøen ROBINSON - R44 Helicopter crashed into ground

SE of during reindeer herding.
2012-03-12 Martinique Le Lorrain BELL - 47 Collision with power lines and

subequent post-impact fire

occurrence
2012-03-14 Gabon near Iguela BELL - 212 Collision with obstacles during sling
load operation
2012-04-06 Belgium Huy ROBINSON - R22 Collision with cable in hover
2012-06-29 Germany Lieser, nahe HUGHES - 369 - D Collision with powerline
2012-09-09 Germany Roßfelder EUROCOPTER - EC120 - B Loss of control during an airshow -

Glider 1 Ground fatality, 3 Ground injuries,
Airfield 2 OB injuries
2013-06-29 Switzerland Switzerland AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B2 Crash due to loss of control caused
by a previous rotor strike
2013-11-12 France Saint-Chaffrey AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Helicopter crash after hitting

a cable of a chairlift
2013-12-18 Portugal near EUROCOPTER - EC120 - B Helicopter collision with power

Monchique lines and crash.
2015-07-14 Switzerland Guggig- AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Aircraft crashed in a mountainous

letscher, snow-covered area during aerial
Lauterbrun- work mission
nen
2015-12-31 Réunion Rempart du AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Aircraft turned back due to bad
Maïdo weather conditions and crashed
shortly afterwards.
2016-05-19 Bulgaria Gylovtsa KAMOV - KA26 Fatal accident - collision with power
village, lines
Nesebar
2017-05-13 Switzerland Petersgrat AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B2 While landing in a mountainous

area, the helicopter overturned
onto its side and rolled over.
2017-06-23 Greece Scinias of MD HELICOPTER - 369 - E - E Helicopter crashed at marathonas

Marathonas area during low flying due to
area wetland collision with electrical power lines
2017-09-26 Sweden Högheden MD HELICOPTER - 369 Fatal helicopter accident during

positioning flight
PAGE 129
1.3 Balloons
29/08/2008 Germany Bobenheim SCHROEDER - FIRE BALLOONS G Uncommanded balloon lift off after
landing. Two passenger fell from
the basket one fatal injury.
01/01/2011 United Midsomer CAMERON - O120 Balloon deflated during flight and
Kingdom Norton fell to the ground
22/04/2011 Belgium Oudenburg KUBICEK - BB37 - N Flight initiated in spite of poor

weather forecast. High speed
landing caused the basket to flip
180 degrees
25/06/2011 Switzerland Fisibach/AG WORNER Loss of control of a balloon and

hard landing
13/05/2012 France Charly-sur- SCHROEDER Collision with a power line during

Marne (02) a first flight
19/08/2012 France Feings(41) CAMERON Cameron Balloons Z-750 - Hard

landing, One passenger was ejected
and hit by the basket - 34 POB -
1 OB Fatal - No damage
23/08/2012 Slovenia Ljubljana LINDSTRAND - LBL600C Lindstrand LBL600C - Hot air

marshes balloon crash in storm - 32POB -
6OB Fatalities - 12OB Serious - 14OB
Minor - A/C Destroyed
06/08/2013 Switzerland Haut- CAMERON - Z105 Collision of balloon with power line
Intyamon/
FR
05/10/2014 France Cazes SCHROEDER - FIRE BALLOONS G Precautionary bounced

Mondenard landing - basket flipped on its side -
(82) fire - evacuation - 10POB - 1OB
Fatal - 2OB Serious - 7OB Minor -
A/C Destroyed
05/10/2014 France Lauzerte SCHROEDER - FIRE BALLOONS G Balloon basked tipped over and fire
broke out
12/07/2015 Spain Vilanova del ULTRAMAGIC - S160 Balloon basket impacted against
Cami the top of a metal fence on final
approach, basket overturned,
expulsion of some occupants
included pilot - pilot died
08/10/2015 Italy Montescagli- SCHROEDER - FIRE BALLOONS G Balloon forced landing after hitting
oso (MT) power line
05/01/2016 France Aurel ULTRAMAGIC - M120 Fall of a person gripped on the

outside of the basket during
take-off.
1.3.1 Sailplanes
occurrence
06/04/2015 Sweden 10 km SSE GROB - G103C - TWIN III SL - TWIN Loss of control during wave flight
Nikkaluokta III SL (in cloud), glider destruction in
flight. Pilot bailed out, the student
was killed.
12/04/2015 Germany Oschatz SCHEIBE - LSPATZ 55 Wing hit the Ground during
Take Off - the glider swerved and
overturned.
29/04/2015 France La Piarre GLASER DIRKS - DG800 Breakage of airbrakes control

during a mountain flight,
autorotation, collision with terrain.
02/05/2015 Germany Bad Münder, SCHEMPP HIRTH - NIMBUS 3 Glider stalled and crashed into
Bakede a forested area.
18/05/2015 Austria Near Airfield GLASER DIRKS - DG300 Mid-air collision. One of the two
Hohenems, aircraft crashed into the mountain
Vorarlberg rocks and caught fire. The other
aircraft returned to the airfield and
landed safely.
28/05/2015 Germany Bartholomä SCHEMPP HIRTH - JANUS Glider crashed into the Ground
during a winch launch.
05/06/2015 Italy Monte SCHEMPP HIRTH - VENTUS 2CM Glider crashed on a mountain slope.
Terlago (TN)
07/06/2015 Hungary LHEM OTHER Two Sailplanes collided during

approach. One Sailplane broke and
crashed. 2 POB - 2 fatalities. The
other glider managed to land.
14/06/2015 United Aston Down SCHLEICHER - K8 - B A Glider Crashed into roof of

Kingdom Airfield building – Suicide.
01/07/2015 Switzerland Klosters- ROLLADEN SCHNEIDER - LS8 - 18 Glider accident in Klosters-Serneus/

Serneus/ GR.
GR
03/07/2015 Austria Seiten- PILATUS - B4 - PC11 The sailplane hit the ground after
stetten, NÖ an aerobatic manoeuvre (ARF
2015-008).
13/07/2015 France Eygliers PIPISTREL Loss of control in flight, the

Sailplane collided with the ground.
02/08/2015 France Saint-André SCHEMPP HIRTH - VENTUS C Collision with the mountain side.
The glider wreckage has been
found at 2700m of altitude.
03/08/2015 Croatia Donji Lapac., Glider found crashed - POB 1, 1 fatal

area Kruge injury.
06/08/2015 Germany Füssen ROLLADEN SCHNEIDER - LS8 The Glider lost control and crashed
in a forested area
06/08/2015 Romania MUCHIA OTHER Aircraft crashed in a mountain area.

CHEII, Wreckage found several months
Masivul after the accident flight.
Postavarul
PAGE 131

occurrence
11/08/2015 Poland ATZ EPPL PZL BIELSKO - SZD50 - 2 Glider collided with a winch cable
and crashed.
11/08/2015 France Embrun ROLLADEN SCHNEIDER - LS1 Glider collided with trees and
crashed to the mountain.
12/08/2015 Italy Col FERRET SCHEMPP HIRTH Motor glider crashed against
a mountain slope.
20/08/2015 Germany Purkshof GLASER DIRKS - DG100 Glider disconnected the rope during
towing and crashed on the runway.
23/08/2015 Spain 1NM to PIPISTREL Pilot incapacitation in

Sevilla flight - Passenger took the controls -
airport (LEZL) Aircraft crashed and caught fire.
24/09/2015 Norway Hatten SCHLEICHER - ASW24 Aircraft crashed. The pilot bailed
mountain, out the aircraft before the crash at
Lesja low altitude and was killed when
municipality hit the ground.
26/09/2015 Denmark 5 km øst SCHLEICHER - ASW24 From level flight the aircraft
for EKRS: suddenly pitched nose down and
Ringsted hit the ground in a steep nose down
attitude. The pilot died and the
glider was destroyed.
03/10/2015 Poland Miedzy- PZL BIELSKO - SZD48 - 3 Glider entered spin after a long
brodzie flight and crashed.
Zywieckie
13/12/2015 Germany Koblenz- OTHER TMG collided with a communication

Winningen tower during a flight in fog.
24/12/2015 Namibia Stryfontein SCHEMPP HIRTH - VENTUS CM Powered Glider crashed, no details
Farm available.
03/01/2016 Germany Near Kamp DIAMOND - HK36 - R Aircraft crashed during a go-
Lintfort around - 1 POB 1 fatality.
Airfield
(EDLC)
26/03/2016 France Seillans OTHER - Generic Pilot incapacitated due to a medical

condition - Loss of Control, Collision
with Trees and Terrain.
03/04/2016 Austria 3,3 kmNorth SPORTINE AVIACIJA - LAK19 Glider entered spin and crashed
from LOGL - into terrain. 1 POB - 1 fatality.
Lanzen-
Turnau
03/04/2016 Austria Kötschach GLASER DIRKS - DG400 Glider crashed into a mountain -
Mauthen 1 POB, 1 fatality.
16/04/2016 Poland EPST PZL BIELSKO - SZD9 Glider crashed into the ground after
winch cable was released. 1 POB
1 fatality.
20/04/2016 Slovakia Lysá Polana SCHLEICHER - ASW27 - 18E Competition flight - loss of height
below safe altitude - abrupt
manoeuvre - The aircraft stalled and
crashed with a nose down attitude.
1 POB 1 fatality.
03/05/2016 Germany Bautzen PIK - PIK20E - NO SERIES EXISTS Crash on Approach during glider
competition.

occurrence
04/05/2016 Slovenia Near Airport GLASER DIRKS - DG800 Glider accident. Suspected pilot
LJSG incapacitation. 1 POB 1 fatality.
21/05/2016 Switzerland Montricher GLASER DIRKS - DG400 Glider collides with trees and
LSTR crashes. 1 POB 1 fatality.
29/05/2016 Germany Rhede/ LET - L23 Glider crashed into a field under
Emsland unknown circumstances. 2 POB
1 fatality.
19/06/2016 Germany Bramsche SCHEMPP HIRTH Loss of control during approach

causing the aircraft to enter spin.
1 POB 1 fatality.
22/06/2016 France Authon SCHEMPP HIRTH Loss of control followed by collision

with terrain - during training flight
en route.
06/07/2016 Switzerland Lenk/BE GLASER DIRKS - DG800 Glider collides with elevated
terrain. 1 POB 1 fatality.
21/07/2016 United Bradley SCHLEICHER - ASW27 Loss of control in-flight, leading to

Kingdom ground impact. 1 POB 1 fatality.
09/08/2016 Germany Lüsse SCHLEICHER - ASW27 Glider fell to the ground during
winch launch take-off. 1 POB
1 fatality.
27/08/2016 France Sauto SPORTINE AVIACIJA - LAK17 - A Collision with a cable/wire followed
by crash. 1 POB 1 fatality.
10/09/2016 Germany Großrück- SCHLEICHER - ASK21 Two aircraft -glider and an ultralight
erswalde collided close to the threshold. Pilot
of the ultralight died.
14/09/2016 Switzerland L’Isle/VD BINDER Glider lost control entered a vertical

dive and crashed. 2 POB 2 fatalities
04/12/2016 United over CESSNA - 150 - L Mid-air collision powered ACFT and
Kingdom Lubenham glider; Glider crashed killing the
pilot.
04/12/2016 United Brentor SCHLEICHER - ASW24 Glider winch launch failed. Pilot
Kingdom was not able to land safely due to
downdraft. 1 POB 1 fatality.
19/03/2017 France Le Vernet GLASER DIRKS - DG1000 - M Collision with trees and ground.
2 POB 1 fatality 1 serious injury.
29/03/2017 France LFLE - SPORTINE AVIACIJA - LAK17 - A Glider crash during winch launch
Chambéry / take-off. 1 POB 1 fatality.
Challes-les-
Eaux
08/04/2017 United Currock Hill PZL BIELSKO - SZD55 - 1 Glider elevator not connected -
Kingdom airfield glider crashed on aero tow. 1 POB
1 fatality.
08/04/2017 Germany Eschbach SCHLEICHER - ASW24 - E Glider Crashed into Industrial Area.
1 POB 1 fatality.
12/04/2017 France Valdeblore SCHLEICHER - ASW22 Glider lost control - rolled onto its
side and crashed into the ground.
1 POB 1fatality.
03/05/2017 Poland EPJL PZL BIELSKO - SZD30 Glider made a steep climb then
rolled and crashed during a winch
launch. 1 POB 1 fatality.
PAGE 133

occurrence
06/05/2017 Germany Mannheim SPORTINE AVIACIJA - LAK17 Glider spin shortly after release from
winch-launch followed by crash.
14/05/2017 France Near to AD SCHEMPP HIRTH - CIRRUS The glider collides with the ground
Auch shortly after release.
20/05/2017 Hungary Nyíregyháza PZL BIELSKO - SZD30 Glider crash for unknown reasons.
10/06/2017 Italy Riva GLASFLUGEL - MOSQUITO Glider collided the terrain below
Valdobbia mountain tip.
(VC)
11/06/2017 Italy Novi Ligure OTHER Glider lost wing during aero tow
and crashed in city centre
15/06/2017 Austria near GLASER DIRKS - DG600 Glider lost control and crashed in
Karlhöhe a mountainous area.
16/06/2017 Hungary LHTL SCHEIBE - SF25 - C Motorized sailplane lost control and
crashed during training exercise.
2 POB 2 fatalities.
18/06/2017 Germany Purkshof GROB - G102 - ASTIR CS Wing tip of the Glider hit ground
during winch launch causing it to
overturn. 1 POB 1 fatality.
24/06/2017 Germany Bartholomä- GROB - G103 - TWIN ASTIR Glider lost control while searching
Amalienhof for lift and fell to the ground. 1 POB
1 fatality.
13/07/2017 United Near DIAMOND - HK36 - TC Aircraft crashed into a field due
Kingdom Brimslade to unknown circumstances. 2 POB
Farm 2 fatalities.
13/07/2017 Hungary Pirtó SCHLEICHER - ASW27 - 18E Glider crashed due to loss of
control. 1 POB. 1 fatal injury.
14/07/2017 France Val des Prés SCHEMPP HIRTH - VENTUS C Glider collided with elevated terrain
due to unknown circumstances.
1 POB 1 fatality.
17/07/2017 France LFOV CENTRAIR - 101 - A Glider impacted the ground during
(LVA): Laval winch launch take-off
Entrammes
04/08/2017 Germany Rädicke SCHLEICHER - ASW24 - E Glider was found crashed on a field.
Loss of control suspected. 1 POB
1 fatality.
13/08/2017 Switzerland Villavolar GLASER DIRKS - DG800B The glider crashed onto a steep
pasture and was destroyed upon
impact.
27/08/2017 Croatia Sinj - GROB - G103 - TWIN ASTIR Sailplane crashed below
Kamešnica a mountain ridge. 2 POB. 1 Fatality
and 1 Seriously injured.
30/08/2017 Poland EPBC PZL BIELSKO - SZD50 - 3 Glider accident (crash) – spin after
Warszawa the safety latch of the winch cable
Babice / ATZ broke while winch launching.
EPBC
10/09/2017 Germany Hockenheim ROLLADEN SCHNEIDER - LS8 Glider stalled during winch
launching. 1 POB 1 fatality.
14/10/2017 Switzerland Davos/GR ROLLADEN SCHNEIDER - LS8 - 18 Glider crashed in ca 2500 meter
altitude in mountainous area.
Circumstances unknown. 1 POB
1 fatality.
1.4 Aerodromes and Ground Handling

2007-01-25 France AD Pau (64) FOKKER - F27 - 100 Loss of control during take-off,
collision with a vehicle.
2010-07-25 Spain Aeródromo OTHER Gyroplane collided with person

Casarrubios during taxi
del Mont
2012-05-05 France AD Buno PIPER - PA25 - 235, SLINGSBY - T31 Mid-air collision between a glider
Bonnevaux and an aeroplane above runway
(91)
2012-11-11 Italy Roma AIRBUS - A320 Loading crew caught between

Fiumicino loader and baggage door
Airport
2012-12-10 Cyprus Larnaca CESSNA - 750 - NO SERIES EXISTS A service vehicle struck the right
wingtip, vehicle driver trapped
2014-04-20 Finland 2 km from OTHER During climb, right wing broke due
Jämijärvi to a fatigue failure - aircraft entered
airfield EFJM, a spin, crashed and caught fire -
Satakunta 11POB - 8OB Fatalities
2015-12-24 Spain Ronda SOCATA - TB9 Aircraft crashed and consumed by

post crash fire, incorrect fuel used
PAGE 135
1.5 ATM/ ANS

02/08/2012 Spain Santiago CESSNA - 500 Unstabilized approach: Aircraft
Airport crashed on approach in heavy fog
(LEST) condition.
30/09/2012 Austria Ellbögen, CESSNA - 414 Aircraft crashed in wooded terrain

Tirol in IMC weather conditions. Aircraft
not airworthy and overloaded -
17/07/2015 Slovakia Hornád AGUSTA - A109 - K2 Helicopter crashed on a river bank

canyon - after strike with power cables
Slovenský Raj during en-route EMS mission
31/07/2015 Italy Pizzo Zocca AEROSPATIALE - AS350 - B3 Helicopter ontrolled flight into
di val Masino mountain peak obscured by clouds
08/09/2016 Austria Carinthia ROBINSON - R66 Helicopter crash in a mountainous

area
24/01/2017 Italy Campo Felice AGUSTA - AW139 Helicopter crashed into a mountain
(AQ) slope during a medical emergency
flight.
European Aviation Safety Agency
Safety Intelligence & Performance
Department
Postal address
Postfach 10 12 53
50452 Cologne
Germany
Visiting address
Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3
50668 Cologne
Germany
Tel. +49 221 89990 - 000

Fax +49 221 89990 - 999
Mail info@easa.europa.eu
Web www.easa.europa.eu

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2018

© European Aviation Safety Agency, 2018

Foreword by the Executive Director

3.3.2 Safety Risk Portfolio.......................................................................................................................... 64

How the Safety Review is Produced

Process for Safety Risk Portfolios

European Risk Classification Scheme

Collaborative Analysis Groups (CAGs)

Chapter 1 Safety Overview

Typical Structure for Each Chapter

The Connection with the European Plan for Aviation Safety

The European Plan for Aviation Safety

The Safety Risk Management Process

More information on the EPAS can be found here:

1.1 Global Airline Fatal Accidents

1.2 EASA Member States Cross Domain

CAT - Airlines 0 0.9 0 66.4 4

NCC - Business 0 0.5 0 0.6 0

Specialised operations 3 7.3 4 18.1 16.5

Offshore CAT 0 0.4 0 1.3 0

Onshore CAT 1 1.7 6 5.4 4

Specialised operations 3 4 4 7.5 6

Balloons 0 1.2 0 2.1 1

Sailplanes 25 25.4 27 29.5 29.5

ADM & GH 0 0.7 0 1.7 0.5

ATM/ANS* 1 0.5 6 1.6 0

Fatal Accident Non-Fatal Accident Serious Incident

Commercial Air Transport-Airlines Non-Commercial Complex-Business

and Serious Incidents

Specialised Operations Aeroplanes Non-Commercial Small Aeroplanes

Number of Accidents 500

Specialised Operations Rotorcraft Non-Commercial Rotorcraft

and Serious Incidents

4. EASA MS registered non-complex aeroplanes performing non-commercial operations, having a maximum

2.1 Commercial Air Transport - Airlines

2.1.1 Key Statistics

Table 3. Key Statistics for Commercial Air Transport Airlines, 2007-2017

2007-2016 total 9 235 792

Fatalities Serious Injuries

2007-2016 total 664 111

Serious Incident 85 61 68 93 92 83 75 66 60 109 99

Higher Risk 93 92 71 88 103

2.1.1.1 Phase of flight

Average 2007-2016 7.9 11 18.8 32.8 19.1 15.6 0.1 4

2.1.1.2 Operation type

2.1.1.3 Propulsion type

Average 2007-2016 20.2 87.7

2.2 Non-Commercial Complex – Business

2.2.1 Key Statistics

Fatalities Serious Injuries

Total Serious Injuries 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2.2.1.1 Phase of flight

2.2.1.2 Propulsion type

2017 Average 2007-2016

2.3 Safety Risk Portfolio for Large Aeroplane

Lower Risk Terrain Collision

Number of Higher Risk Occurrences

-20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Terrain Collision

Monitoring of Flight Parameters and

Approach Path Management    • •  •

1.2 EASA Member States Cross Domain

2.3 Safety Risk Portfolio for Large Aeroplane