7941

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 4

The Current and Future Houthi Threat to the Middle East

Michael Knights
Bernstein Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute

Testimony before the UN Security Council

December 30, 2024

Madame President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for the opportunity to brief you today. I am Dr. Michael Knights, the Jill and Jay Bernstein Senior
Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 1 I am a scholar of conflicts in Yemen and recently
completed the first two books of a three-volume history of the post-2015 Yemen war.

My organization, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has undertaken some of the most detailed in-
vestigative work into the threat posed by the Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah.2 Working with a
range of Yemeni and international coauthors, our fieldwork and desk research have produced an interactive
maritime attack tracker3 and four major studies on the Houthi movement,4 all of which can be viewed on The
Washington Institute’s website.5

Today’s emergency session on the current and future threat posed by the Houthi movement is urgently
needed. The Houthis have (with strong Iranian backing and encouragement) exploited the enfeeblement of
the Yemeni government since the Arab Spring of 2011, expanding through military conquests and seizing the
capital, Sanaa, from the internationally recognized government in a September 2014 military coup. 6

Since then, the Houthis have overrun Yemen’s Red Sea ports, and tried to seize the port city of Aden 7 and the
energy hub of Marib.8 With sustained military support from Iran, they remain postured to lunge forward at
any time to snuff out the last strongholds of the internationally recognized government of Yemen. 9

The Houthis are a clan-based military junta whose leaders have (since the 1980s) modeled their movement
on Lebanese Hezbollah.10 Their ideology is supremacist, in favor of their own genealogical caste over all other
Yemenis11—and in their motto, they curse all Jewish people and openly pledge to seek the destruction of Is-
rael and the United States.12

The Houthis are aggressive and expansionist, presenting a multifaceted threat that I will briefly summarize
today. Far from being an isolated, localized movement, they now draw military, intelligence, and financial
support from global partners that include Iran, 13 Hezbollah,14 Iran-backed militias in Iraq,15 the al-Qaeda and
al-Shabab terrorist organizations,16 and reportedly also the Russian Federation.17

The first dimension of threat posed by the Houthis manifests inside Yemen itself. Their movement is docu-
mented by the UN Panel of Experts18 and other authorities and nongovernmental organizations 19 to have
committed gross human rights abuses against the populations under its control: indoctrinating child sol-
diers;20 unlawfully detaining and torturing opponents; 21 and diverting vital humanitarian assistance. 22 They

1
have kidnapped and still detain UN personnel, 23 civil society workers,24 foreign seafarers,25 and staff of diplo-
matic missions.26 Since the 2018 Stockholm Agreement, the Houthis have consistently violated the cease-
fire;27 refused to demilitarize the Red Sea ports, as required under the agreement; 28 violated the UN arms em-
bargo (with Iranian assistance);29 and used drone attacks to prevent the internationally recognized govern-
ment of Yemen from exporting existing oil and gas production that would place desperately needed funds in
the government’s hands.30

This brings me to the second dimension of the Houthi threat—the danger that it poses to regional states in
the Middle East and Africa. Between 2015 and 2021, the Houthis fired more than 430 missiles and more than
850 drones against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 31 Key components of these missile and drone
systems were found by the UN Panel of Experts 32 and by other authorities33 to have been sent to Yemen—
through the UN arms embargo—via Iranian government smuggling networks. 34

The Houthis continue to threaten such attacks in order to force concessions and shape the peace process to
their advantage—most recently on July 7, 2024, when they publicly threatened to attack Saudi Arabia’s ports,
airports, and central bank.35

Following Hamas’s brutal terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the Houthis also intentionally drew
Yemen into the Gaza conflict by firing around 200 missiles and 170 drones at Israel. 36 By attacking Israel, the
Houthis deliberately risked bringing retaliation onto Yemen’s ports, airports, and fuel storage facilities, en-
dangering humanitarian access to Yemen. The Stockholm Agreement was initially motivated by the need to
protect these exact sites, and now the Houthis have squandered half a decade of diplomacy by opening a new
military front against a distant enemy. The current exchange of fire between the Houthis and Israel will surely
worsen in the coming weeks and months, but the Houthis can still choose to end the cycle.

The final dimension of the Houthi threat is global—the antishipping campaign carried out against civilian and
military vessels in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The Washington Institute’s maritime attack tracker 37 re-
cently tallied 106 confirmed Houthi strikes on shipping since November 2023, and the Houthi leadership
boasts of even higher numbers.38 In these unprovoked attacks, the Houthis have sunk two civilian ships; 39
seized and held another, the Galaxy Leader, and its crew; killed at least four merchant seamen; worsened food
security issues in Yemen and the Red Sea;40 inflicted higher shipping costs and consumer prices on the global
economy;41 robbed Egypt of more than $7 billion in canal fees; 42 and greatly increased the risk of an unprece-
dented environmental disaster in the Red Sea.43

Use of the Suez Canal has halved since the attacks began and at least twenty-nine major global shipping com-
panies now sail around the entire African continent, 44 as they were forced to do before the canal’s opening in
1869. Ships and persons from eighty-five countries have thus far been affected, 45 including all the permanent
members of the Security Council and four other current council members—Japan, Malta, South Korea, and
Switzerland.46 In other words, the Houthis have made unprovoked attacks for over a year against most of the
countries on the globe.

As the Houthis can deter the return of shipping by attacking just a handful of vessels each month, they may
view attacks on commercial vessels as an enduring lever that they can utilize at will—to champion a cause, to
gain favor from a great power, or to extort payments and political concessions from regional powers and
shippers. The Houthis thus resemble a knife held against one of the world’s most important trade arteries.

Under these circumstances, it is easy to foresee further grave future implications for global commerce if the
Houthis (1) fail to fundamentally and permanently alter their aggressive and reckless behavior; and (2) are
left in control of the Red Sea littoral, drawing upon the support of Iran and other military suppliers.

In addition to fully enforcing all prior UN resolutions involving the Houthi movement, 47 I therefore urge the
Security Council and its members to do the following:

 Restate the demand in UN Security Council Resolution 2722 that the Houthis “immediately cease” all
attacks on shipping.
 Demand that all Houthi attacks on Israel cease immediately.
 Once again, call upon Iran to cease its documented violations of the UN arms embargo.

2
 Condemn all Houthi threats of force against the internationally recognized government of Yemen and
against regional states, as these military threats distort the UN-backed road map for peace in Yemen,
tilting it in the Houthis’ favor and thus making it less equitable and less sustainable.

Expecting the Houthis to respect the Security Council is pointless, however, unless there are teeth behind our
words. To remove the means by which the Houthis undertake these attacks, the Security Council and its mem-
bers should:

 Strengthen the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM), 48 which is meant to
enforce the arms embargo.
 Prepare UN sanctions on those shippers and flag states that violate UN Security Council resolutions
through bypassing UN inspections, or by failing to allow inspections-at-sea when presented with evi-
dence of arms smuggling using their flagged vessels.
 Call upon all member states to support the efforts of the internationally recognized government of
Yemen to interdict arms smuggled via Yemen’s land border with Oman, and via government-held
ports in Yemen.

Finally, the Security Council and its members should put the Houthis on notice that continued unprovoked
attacks on the world’s nations will progressively have severe consequences for the group’s ability to control
territory in Yemen. To convey this warning, the Security Council should:

 Reaffirm the legitimacy of the internationally recognized government of Yemen, represented by the
Presidential Leadership Council.
 Underline that government’s inherent right to call for international assistance to defend itself from
Houthi aggression.

On behalf of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, I wish to thank the Security Council and its mem-
bers for this opportunity to provide this briefing today.

1 The mission of The Washington Institute is to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in
the Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them. The Institute is a 501(c)3 not-for-profit organization that is
funded solely by the philanthropy of U.S. private citizens.
2 For a full listing of our publications on the Houthi threat since 2009, see our website search engine result, available here

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis?keyword=Houthi&page=0.
3 The Washington Institute’s tracker—“Tracking Maritime Attacks in the Middle East Since 2019”—is produced by Noam

Raydan and Farzin Nadimi and is available here: https://storymaps.arcgis.com/sto-


ries/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be. The Washington Institute’s Maritime Spotlight platform is available at
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/series/maritime-spotlight.
4 See Michael Knights, “The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 8 (2018);

Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, and Casey Coombs, “The Houthi Jihad Council: Command and Control in ‘the Other
Hizballah,’” CTC Sentinel 15, no. 10 (2022); Michael Knights, An Heir and a Spare? How Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah”
Could Change Iran’s Deterrent Calculus, Policy Note 142 (Washington Institute, 2023); and Michael Knights, “A Draw Is a
Win: The Houthis After One Year of War,” CTC Sentinel 17, no. 9 (2024).
5 The website can be found here: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/.
6 See Danya Greenfield, “Yemen’s Coup in All But Name,” Atlantic Council, January 23, 2015. Also see Michael Knights and

Farzin Nadimi, “Yemen’s ‘Southern Hezbollah’ Celebrates Coup Anniversary in Deadly Fashion,” PolicyWatch 3790, Wash-
ington Institute for Near East Policy, September 28, 2023.
7 This episode of the war is the subject of my 2023 book, 25 Days to Aden: The Unknown Story of Arabian Elite Forces at

War.
8 This episode of the war is the subject of my 2024 book, The Race for Mukalla: Arabian Elite Forces and the War Against

al-Qaeda.
9 See “Houthi Aggression and a Roadmap for Peace in Yemen,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 4,

2024.
10 See Barak Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenome-

non (RAND, 2010); Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (Oxford University
Press, 2017); Abdullah Hamidaddin, ed., The Huthi Movement in Yemen: Ideology, Ambition and Security in the Arab Gulf
(King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 2022); and Knights, Gabarni, and Coombs, “The Houthi Jihad Coun-
cil.”
11 Most key Houthi leaders until today are Saada—collectively, Ahl al-Bait, who claim descent from the Prophet Muham-

mad—thus seeing themselves as superior to other Yemenis and the only caste fit for leadership. Brandt, Tribes and Poli-
tics in Yemen.

3
12 Since 2001, the Houthi slogan (the Scream, or al-Sarkha) has been: “Death to America / Death to Israel / Curse upon the
Jews / Victory to Islam.”
13 For a detailed visual guide to Iranian support, see U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iran: Enabling Houthi Attacks

Across the Middle East,” February 2024, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publica-


tions/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf.
14 See Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen.
15 Adnan al-Jabarni, “A New Axis: Strategic Coordination Between the Houthis and Iraqi Factions,” Sanaa Center for Strate-

gic Studies, July 15, 2024. See also “Hamas, Houthis Open Offices in Iraq,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Septem-
ber 17, 2024.
16 “Letter Dated 11 October 2024 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council:

Relationship Between Houthis and the Terrorist Organizations al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula and al-Shabaab,” 24–25.
Also see Katie Bo Lillis, Kylie Atwood, and Natasha Bertrand, “U.S. Intelligence Assesses Houthis in Yemen in Talks to Pro-
vide Weapons to al-Shabaab in Somalia, Officials Say,” CNN, June 11, 2024. Also see “Houthis Continue Regional and Global
Expansion, Networking with Terror Groups and State Sponsors of Terrorism,” Soufan Center, November 5, 2024.
17 John Irish, Parisa Hafezi, and Jonathan Landay, “Exclusive: Iran Brokering Talks to Send Advanced Russian Missiles to

Yemen’s Houthis, Sources Say,” Reuters, September 24, 2024. Also see “Russia Provides Targeting Support to Houthi At-
tacks on Commercial Shipping,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, October 26, 2024.
18 “Letter Dated 11 October 2024: Acts That Violate International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights

Law,” 34–39.
19 To give one example of many, Amnesty International, “Yemen: Huthis Must Stop Executions and Release Dozens Facing

LGBTI charges,” Amnesty International, February 9, 2024.


20 “Letter Dated 11 October 2024: Acts That Violate,” 34–39.
21 “Letter Dated 11 October 2024: Acts That Violate,” 34–39.
22 “Letter Dated 11 October 2024: Obstruction of Access to, and Delivery and Distribution of, Humanitarian Assistance,”

pp. 39-40.
23 “Letter Dated 11 October 2024: Arbitrary Detention and Enforced Disappearance,” 37.
24 “Letter Dated 11 October 2024: Arbitrary Detention and Enforced Disappearance,” 37.
25 “Letter Dated 11 October 2024, Annex 31: Hijacking by the Houthis of the Galaxy Leader on 19 November 2023,” 2,

126–30.
26 See 15 October 2024 S/PV.9748—the Security Council’s monthly meeting on Yemen.
27 Ceasefire violations are detailed in each UN Panel of Experts report. See “Letter Dated 11 October 2024, Annex 25:

Houthi Military Escalation,” 105–6.


28 Elana DeLozier, “The Hodeida Redeployment Plan: A Slow Start in Yemen,” PolicyWatch 3085, Washington Institute for

Near East Policy, February 26, 2019.


29 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iran: Enabling Houthi Attacks.”
30 “Houthis Attack Yemeni Oil Terminal in Latest Assault,” Al Jazeera, November 22, 2022.
31 Reuters, “Houthis Have Fired 430 Missiles, 851 Drones at Saudi Arabia Since 2015,” December 26, 2021.
32 See the full listing of Panel of Experts reports, all of which detail Iranian provision of arms to the Houthis, in violation of

the 2015 UN arms embargo: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/sanctions-committee-docu-


ments/?ctype=Yemen&cbtype=yemen.
33 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iran: Enabling Houthi Attacks.”
34 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Iran: Enabling Houthi Attacks.”
35 “Houthis Threaten Saudi Arabia with Attacks on Airports, Oil Installations,” Arab Weekly, July 9, 2024. The Houthi

leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, threatened: “We will target banks for banks, Riyadh airport for Sana’a airport, and ports for
ports.”
36 Emanuel Fabian, “Houthi Drone Crashes in South as Terror Group Said to Brace for Major Israeli Attack,” Times of Is-

rael, December 25, 2024.


37 Noam Raydan and Farzin Nadimi, “Houthi Shipping Attacks: Patterns and Expectations for 2025,” Washington Institute

for Near East Policy, December 16, 2024. Also see Raydan and Nadimi, “Tracking Maritime Attacks in the Middle East
Since 2019.”
38 “Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, September 6, 2024.
39 Matthew Miller, “Houthi Sinking of Merchant Ships in the Red Sea,” U.S. Department of State, June 20, 2024.
40 “Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea,” Congressional Research Service.
41 “Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea,” Congressional Research Service.
42 Ian Lewis, “Red Sea Crisis Costs Egypt $7bn as Suez Canal Revenues Plummet,” TradeWinds, December 27, 2024.
43 Agence France-Presse, “Sinking of Rubymar in Red Sea Poses Grave Environmental Risks, Experts Warn,” March 5,

2024.
44 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Houthi Attacks Placing Pressure on International Trade,” April 5, 2024.
45 DIA, “Houthi Attacks Placing Pressure.”
46 DIA, “Houthi Attacks Placing Pressure.”
47 On January 10, 2024, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2722, calling on the Houthis to cease attacking com-

mercial vessels and to release the Galaxy Leader and its crew.
48 Established under UN Security Council Resolution 2216 and renewed annually, the Resolution 2140 Yemen sanctions

regime was renewed on November 13, 2024, under S/RES/2758. See https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-docu-
ments/yemen/.

You might also like