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    sabahat shireen

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    Summary

    Extortion-A Voracious prosocial strategy


    Manfred Milinski

    Extortioners use conditional cooperative strategy withbias to their own advantage they respond
    to each D with D, and to C in slightly more than 50% of the cases with C, otherwise with D. The
    partner can maximise his gain only by CeC interactions, thus playing finally 100% C. Y learns that
    his D is always answered by a D, but a C is most often answered by a C. Only by playing C, Y can
    earn from Ce C. Y can earn the maximum by always playing C, to meet all of X's about 60% answ
    ers to C with C; cooperative answers may be just above 50%, that is, strong extortion, or much l
    arger than 50%, that is, mild extortion, it may have.
    Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in symmetric games An obvious first ex
    perimental step to study the extortion strategy would be to explore the performance of such
    strategies against humans.In mild extortion the extortionate strategy responds with a higher pr
    obability of C to the human player's C than in strong extortion.
    Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded Human players
    accede to a computer playing extortion for some time till they punish the extortioner by playing
    D, sacrificing their small gain for tearing down the extortioner's larger gain, which could not
    coerce the computer.Extortionate behaviours paid off, as can be shown in the treatment with r
    eplacement by comparing the extortioners with the nonextortioners: double Current Opinion in
    Psychology 2022, The long
    standing belief that evolved social strategies can be only nice and cooperative has been challen
    ged by Press and Dyson's finding of the new ZD strategies for the Prisoner's Dilemma, for exam
    ple, the unbeatable extortion strategy enforcing cooperation up to 100% just by responding wit
    withh C to C slightly more often than 50%. To increase their own payoff, coplayers need to acce
    de to extortion providing the extortioner with a much higher payoff.
    Players can only escape extortion through costly 'punishing' the extortioner by playing D, sacrifi
    cing their small gain for tearing down the extortioner's larger gain.
    Formal proof of the ZD strategy 'generous' and its evolutionary stability in a negative frequency
    dependent equilibrium with the ZD extortion strategy, i.e. 'generous' spreads when 'extortion' h
    as become so numerous that extortioners lose on average from meeting other extortioners

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