IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE EIGHTEENTH JLlDlClAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL ACTION GMAC

MORTGAGE, LLC, Plaintiff, CASE NO.: 2010CA4303 DIVISION: K

FRANCESCO CIPOLLA, et al. DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE COMES NOW, the Defendants, Francesco Cipolla and Monica H. Cipolla, by and through undersigned counsel and pursuant to Florida Rules of Evidence and hereby requests this Honorable Court to take Judicial Notice as follows: 1. Defendants request that this court take judicial notice of the below referenced matters relying upon the following Code for such request: Florida Evidence Code 90.202; Matters which may be judicially noticed.--A court may take judicial notice of the following matters, to the extent that they are not embraced within s. 90.201: (6) Records of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United States or of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States. (1 1) Facts that are not subject to dispute because they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. (12) Facts that are not subject to dispute because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned.
Page 1 of 5

Florida Evidence 90.203 Compulsory judicial notice upon request.--A court shall take judicial notice of any matter in s. 90.202 when a party requests it and: (1) Gives each adverse party timely written notice of the request, proof of which is filed with the court, to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet the request. (2) Furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. 2. Defendants request that this Court take Judicial Notice of the following: a. Deposition of Jeffrey Stephan taken June 7, 2010 (previously filed as attachments to Defendants' Requests for Admission) in the following matter: Maine District Court, District Nine Division of North Cumberland Federal National Mortgage Association v Nicolem Bradbury and GMAC Mortgage, d/b/a Ditech, LLC.com and Bank of America DocketNumberBRI-RE-09-65 b. Deposition of Jeffrey Stephan taken December 10, 2009 (previously filed as attachment to Defendants' Requests for Admission) in the following matter: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO. 50 2008 CA 040805XXXX MB GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC, Plaintiff,-vs- Ann M. Neu a/k/a Ann Michelle Perez UNKNOWN TENANT (S) IN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, Defendants c. Maine Supreme Judicial Court Opinion in Federal National Mortgage Association v. Bradbury, et al. 2011 ME 120, Decided December 6,201 1 Attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Page 2 of 5

3. Defendants rely upon the following for their Request: Florida Evidence Code 90.202 Matters which may be judicially noticed.--A court may take judicial notice of the following matters, to the extent that they are not embraced within s. 90.201:

(I) Special, local, and private acts and resolutions of the Congress of the United States and of the Florida Legislature.
(2) Decisional, constitutional, and public statutory law of every other state, territory, and jurisdiction of the United States. (3) Contents of the Federal Register.
(4) Laws of foreign nations and of an organization of nations.

(5) Official actions of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.
(6) Records of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United States or of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States. (7) Rules of court of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United States or of any other state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.

(8) Provisions of all municipal and county charters and charter amendments of this state, provided they are available in printed copies or as certified copies. (9) Rules promulgated by governmental agencies of this state which are published in the Florida Administrative Code or in bound written copies. (10) Duly enacted ordinances and resolutions of municipalities and counties located in Florida, provided such ordinances and resolutions are available in printed copies or as certified copies.
(11) Facts that are not subject to dispute because they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Page 3 of 5

(12) Facts that are not subject to dispute because they are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned. (13) Official seals of governmental agencies and departments of the United States and of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States. 3. Defendants further rely upon the following for their Request: Florida Evidence 90.203 Compulsory judicial notice upon request.--A court shall take judicial notice of any matter in s. 90.202 when a party requests it and: (1) Gives each adverse party timely written notice of the request, proof of which is filed with the court, to enable the adverse party to prepare to mee the request. (2) Furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter. WHEREFORE the Defendants request that the Court Judicially notice the ,matters set forth herein. Respectfully submitted this L - a y of December. 201 1

fi

Florida Bar #215007 BRENDAN R. RILEY Florida Bar #87954 5426 Crafts Street New Port Richey, FL 34652 (727) 848-5440 (Fax) 727- 845-4651

Page 4 of 5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the Defendants' Request to take Judici Notice has been furnished via regular United States Mail on this the day of December, 201 1 to Lourdes W. Clerge, Esq., Law Offices of David Stern, P.A., 900 South Pine Island Road, M O O , Plantation, Florida 33324 and Lindsay Wickham, Esq., Albertelli Law, P.O. Box 23028,Tampa, Florida 33623.

$; 1

Page 5 of 5

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Decision: 201 1 ME 120 Docket: Cum-10-662 Argued: September 14,201 1 Decided: December 6,201 1 Panel: Majority: Dissent:

Reporter of Decisions

ALEXANDER. LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN. and JABAR, JJ. LEVY, J.

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION

NICOLLE M. BRADBURY et al. GORMAN, J.

Nicolle M. Bradbury appeals from a judgment of the District Court

(Bridgton, Powers,J.)dismissing without prejudice the complaint for foreclosure initiated against her by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Bradbury challenges the court's failure to find loan servicer GMAC Mortgage, LLC in contempt pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(g) after sanctioning Fannie Mae for submitting a bad faith affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. She also

contends that the court erred in failing to award her attorney fees and costs associated with opposing Fannie Mae's motion for a protective order. We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND
[72]

In 2009, Fannie Mae instituted foreclosure proceedings against

'

Bradbury for residential property she owns in Denmark, Maine. Fannie Mae named GMAC Mortgage, LLC, d/b/a Ditech, LLC.com, the loan servicer, as a party-in-interest.' Fannie Mae moved for a summary judgment relying in part on an affidavit executed by Jeffiey Stephan, a "[llimited [sligning [olfficer" for GMAC, which purported to establish the execution and recording of the mortgage and note, and the amount owed. The court granted a partial summary judgment determining that Fannie Mae established Bradbury's liability as a matter of law, but concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained as to the amount owed on the note for the damages portion of the claim. [I31 A few months later, the court granted Bradbury's request for a letter rogatory to depose Stephan pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 28(b). During that deposition, Stephan testified that he does not read the affidavits he signs, reviews only the computations of amounts owed, does not review the exhibits to the affidavits, and does not execute the affidavits before a notary. Based on this testimony, the parties filed several motions, among them Fannie Mae's motion for a protective order to prevent the public disclosure of Stephan's deposition, see M.R. Civ. P.

Bank of America, another of Bradbury's creditors, was also named as a party-in-interest. Bank of America is not a party to this appeal.

26(c); Bradbury's request for an award of expenses incurred in opposing the protective motion, see M.R. Civ. P. 26(c), 37(a)(4); and Bradbury's motion seeking a finding that the Stephan affidavit was presented in bad faith, a finding that both Fannie Mae and counsel for Fannie Mae were in contempt for submitting the bad faith affidavit, and an award of attomey fees and costs, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(g).2 [74] The court denied Fannie Mae's motion for a protective order after determining that Fannie Mae failed to establish the requisite "good c a ~ s e . " ~ M.R. Civ. P. 26(c). The court also found that Stephan's affidavit was submitted in bad faith within the meaning of Rule 56(g), and ordered Fannie Mae to pay Bradbury for the attomey fees and costs she incurred in demonstrating the bad faith of Stephan's affidavit, i.e., the expenses associated with taking his deposition and with prosecuting the Rule 56(g) motion. Determining that its award of fees and costs was "a sufficient sanction" for Fannie Mae's bad faith conduct, the court "decline[d] to explore the issue of contempt in this case as requested by

We note that the motion presented to the trial court did not specifically request that the court find GMAC in contempt. Nonetheless, a generous reading of irs multiple paragraphs indicates that Bradbury wished to have GMAC sanctioned in some way. "Upon motion by a party . . . and for good cause shown, any justice or judge of the court in which the action is pending may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . ." M.R.Civ. P. 26(c).
3

[ ~ r a d b u r ~ ] . After the submission of fees affidavits, the court ordered Fannie "~ Mae to pay $23,779.36 of Bradbury's attorney fees and costs.

[115] On Fannie Mae's motion, the court then dismissed the complaint
without prejudice. Bradbury appeals.
11. DISCUSSION

[I61 Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) authorizes the court to find that a summary judgment affidavit was submitted in bad faith, and sets forth the applicable sanctions:

(g) Amdavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the other party to incur, including reasonable attorney fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Although the court ordered Fannie Mae to pay her attorney fees and costs associated with its submission of the bad faith affidavit consistent with Rule 56(g), Bradbury argues that because the affidavit was executed by a GMAC employee, the court erred in declining to also fmd GMAC in contempt. In the context of the national "robo-signing" scandal, for which GMAC has already been sanctioned in other jurisdictions, and based on the "extreme and outrageous misconduct" GMAC
In the same order, the court also considered and denied Fannie Mae's "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment," and vacated its prior grant of a partial summary judgment.
4

perpetrated, Bradbury contends that the District Court erred in refusing to exercise its contempt power. [I71 The affidavit in this case is a disturbing example of a reprehensible practice. That such fraudulent evidentiary filings are being submitted to courts is both violative of the rules of court and ethically indefensible. The conduct through which this affidavit was created and submitted displays a serious and alarming lack of respect for the nation's judiciaries. [78] In the circumstances of this case, however, we do not disturb the sanctions fashioned by the court for the bad faith affidavit. Courts have rule-based, as well as inherent, power to hold parties in contempt, see M.R. Civ. P. 66;

Edwards v. Campbell, 2008 ME 173,

8, 960 A.2d 324, but the decision of

whether or not to do so rests in the considerable discretion of the trial court. Cayer
v. Town of Madawaska, 2009 ME 122,77, 984 A.2d 207; see 10B Charles Alan

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure

5 2742

(3d ed. 1998) ("Subdivision (g) makes it clear that the imposition of a

contempt sanction is left to the court's discretion."). [79] Even if we assume that the language of Rule 56(g) allows any party-and not just Fannie Mae as the party who submitted the affidavit to the court-to be held in contempt, we decline to hold that the court exceeded its discretion in declining to specifically find GMAC in contempt when it fashioned the sanction.

The court ordered Fannie Mae to pay attorney fees and costs totaling more than $23,000. Although the court would have acted well within its discretion in granting a much more burdensome sanction at a much greater cost to Fannie Mae andfor GMAC, we conclude that the sanction it did impose was also within its discretion. [YlO] Our decision is supported by substantial authority--or rather, the lack thereof-from other jurisdictions. To date, no published opinion shows that a

court in Maine or any other state has imposed a contempt finding pursuant to Rule 56(g) for submitting a bad faith affidavit. Further, although M.R. Civ. P. 56(g)--in effect without amendment since 1959-largely Civ. P. 56(l1)~-in effect since 1937-no contempt on this basis. promulgation. duplicates the language of Fed. R.

federal court has ever issued a finding of

See M.R. Civ. P . 56 Reporter's Notes to 1959

Indeed, only in "rare instances" are any Rule 56(g) sanctions

imposed. Fort Hl Builders, Inc. v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 866 F.2d 11, 16 il (1st Cir. 1989); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note to 2010 amend. (discussing rule amendments that "reflect[] the experience that courts seldom invoke the independent Rule 56 authority to impose sanctions"). In short, no court in the nation-state or federal-has ever issued a finding of contempt and

The bad faith affidavit provision was initially promulgated as Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisoly committee's note to 201 0 amend.

additional resulting sanctions pursuant to the state or federal version of Rule 56(g). 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure $2742 (3d ed. 1998) ("To date, this penalty does not appear to have been applied in any reported case."). Against this backdrop of precedent, and

given our highly deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to be the first court in the nation to employ Rule 56(g) contempt sanctions.

[?I111 We also discern no error or abuse of discretion in the court's failure to

award Bradbury attorney fees and costs in defending against the motion for a protective order pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

See M.R. Civ. P. 26(c)

(applying the fees and costs provision of Rule 37(a)(4) to unsuccessful motions for protective orders). Contrary to Bradbury's contention, the court's determination that Fannie Mae did not establish the "good cause" necessary to obtain a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) does not preclude its authority to also find that the motion was "substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust" pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4). See M.R. Civ. P. 52(b); Brown v.

Habrle, 2008 M E 1 7 , l 10, 940 A.2d 1091 (stating that in the absence of a motion
for findings of fact or conclusions of law, we must assume that the fact-finder made all fmdings necessary to support its judgment); see also Battryn v. Indian Oil

Co., 472 A.2d 937, 940 (Me. 1984); 2 Harvey, Maine Civil Practice
(3d ed. 201 1). The entry is: Judgment affirmed.

5 37:2 at 735

LEVY, J., dissenting.

[712] I respectfully dissent. [TI31 The District Court did not simply conclude that Fannie Mae and GMAC should not be found in contempt; rather, as the court explained, it "decline[d] to explore the issue of contempt in this case as requested by [Bradbury]." Because the circumstances known to the court called into question the very integrity of the summary judgment process as it relates to this and possibly numerous similar cases, I conclude that the court should have conducted a hearing before it determined that a finding of contempt was not warranted. n14] The bad faith extant in this case was, as the court found, "serious and troubling" misconduct. GMAC's loan semicer, Jeffrey Stephan, testified at his deposition that he signed about 8,000 documents each month. He testified that he did not read affidavits before he signed them; he did not have custody or personal knowledge of loan files or documents, even though his affidavit said he did; and he did not know whether the documents attached to his affidavit were true and correct

copies, even though his affidavit said that they were. Stephan did not know whether the documents referred to in his affidavit in this case were attached to the affidavit when he signed it. He further testified that after he signed affidavits, they were taken to another location by another employee to be notarized by a notary who certified that Stephan personally appeared and swore to the truth of the affidavits, even though Stephan did not.6 In addition, GMAC was previously sanctioned by a Florida court for engaging in the very same practices. See TCZF

RE02, LLC v. Leibowitz, No. 16-2004-CA-4835-XXXX-MA (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 1,

2006) (unpublished order). [jil5] Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) directs that if a court determines that a party's summary judgment affidavit was "presented in bad faith," it "shall forthwith" award reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, to the other party. This is what occurred here. The rule further provides that "any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt." M.R. Civ. P. 56(g). The precise question presented is whether the court may exercise this discretion regarding contempt without conducting a hearing. The answer should account for the

Contrary to GMAC's arguments in response to the motion in District Court, the defects with Stephan's affidavit were not merely "procedural." Although the affidavit stated that true and accurate copies of the note and mortgage were attached to it, the affidavit failed to attach a loan modification agreement that amended both the note and mortgage. The affidavit also asserted that a true and correct copy of the mortgage assignment from GMAC to Fannie Mae, dated September 17,2007, was attached. If this is true, the October 16,2007 loan modification agreement entered into by GMAC as the mortgagee was ineffective because Fannie Mae, and not GMAC, would have been the mortgagee as of that date.

seriousness of the bad faith committed before the court and the extent to which it has or will undermine the administration of justice. [I161 In this case, the dishonesty associated with the preparation and notarization of Stephan's affidavit was severe. Not only did the affidavit fail to present admissible evidence, as the rule requires, but it deceived a judge into believing that it did. Furthermore, we can take judicial notice that GMAC is one of the largest mortgage loan servicers in the United states.' Accordingly, if contempt was found in this case, the court would need to consider whether the resulting sanctions should be sufficient to deter similar misconduct in future cases. Because Stephan admitted that he signed thousands of such affidavits and related documents each month and GMAC was previously sanctioned for similar conduct, there was good cause to believe that such misconduct was not limited to this case and that the management of GMAC and Fannie Mae, and their attorneys, knew or should have known of the wrongful manner in which the affidavit presented in this case was produced.s

See Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other issues in Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportuniry of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 307 (201 1) (statement of Thomas Marano, Chief Executive Officer, Mortgage Operations, Ally Financial Inc.) available at http://fmancialservices.house.gov/Media/gs/l1 l/Marano1118lO.pdf.

Indeed, several other jurisdictions have grappled with similar misconduct on the part of Jeffrey Stephan and GMAC. See Sheenan v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 201 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88514, at '4 (D.N.J.Aug. 10, 201 1); Ohio ex rel. DeWine v. G M C Mortg., LLC, 201 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53449, at '2, * 5 (N.D. Ohio May 18,2011); Huber v. G M C , LLC, 201 1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44148, at *5-7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18,201 1); U.S. Bank v. Coley, 201 1 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1508, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10,

11

[TI171 The medium of the mortgage foreclosure summary judgment process

is the paper submissions authorized by Rule Scaffidavits, statements of material facts, motions, and memoranda of law. Unlike live testimony, which is subject to the fact-finder's scrutiny of its credibility, the veracity of a paper submission is not easily determined. An affiant who is careless or is willing to fabricate facts encounters few barriers to the production of an affidavit that, within its four comers, appears to be well-conceived and trustworthy. Consequently, the integrity of the process depends largely on the good faith of the financial institutions and attorneys who invoke the rule. As we recognized in HSBC v. Murphy, the

obligation of good faith is made real by the signature requirements of M.R. Civ. P. 11, which is the primary sentry guarding against the corruption of the summary judgment process, and the other requirements of the civil rules. See

HSBC Mortg. Servs., Znc. v. Murphy, 201 1 ME 59,7 15 n.8, 19 A.3d 815. Rule 1 1
is nothing more than a dead letter, however, if there is no serious consideration of additional consequences, beyond an award of expenses and fees, for a flagrant violation of the summary judgment rule. [Tl8] Faced with extreme misconduct which misled the court and thereby undermined the integrity of the judicial process, the court should have granted

201 1); In re Simpson, 71 1 S.E.2d 165, 173-74 (N.C. Ct. App. 201 1); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. KimbaN, 2011 VT 8 1 , m 4 , 6 - 7 , 9 , 2 7 A.3d 1087.

Bradbury's request that it undertake a more searching inquiry before it determined whether a finding of contempt was warranted.

On the briefs: Geoffrey S. Lewis, Esq., Hastings Law Office, P.A., Fryeburg, and Thomas A. Cox, Esq., Portland, for appellant Nicolle M. Bradbury John J. Aromando, Esq., and Catherine R. Connors, Esq., Pierce Atwood, LLP, Portland, for appellees Federal National Mortgage Association and GMAC Mortgage, LLC At oral argument: Thomas A. Cox, Esq, for appellant Nicolle M. Bradbury John J. Aromando, Esq., for appellees Federal National Mortgage Association and GMAC Mortgage, LLC

Portland District Court docket number RE-2010-430 FOR C L W ~ REmmcx ONLY