judgement2023-09-29

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
PUNJAB, CHANDIGARH.
Revision Petition No.28 of 2023
Date of institution : 18.04.2023

Reserved On : 09.08.2023
Date of decision : 29.09.2023
1. Care Diagnostic Centre, SCO No.22, New Leela Bhawan, Income

Tax Office Road, Opp. Kamal Lab., Patiala-147001, through its
Proprietor.
2. Dr. (Mrs.) Jyotika Sehgal, MBBS, DNB (Radio Diagnosis),

Consultant Radiologist, Care Diagnostic Centre, SCO No.22, New
Leela Bhawan, Income Tax Office Road, Opp. Kamal Lab., Patiala-
147001.
3. Muskaan, OBST & GYNAE Centre, Shere-e-Punjab Market,

Patiala, through its Proprietor.
4. Dr. Shalini Ahluwalia, M.D. (OBST & GYNAE) Shere-e-Punjab,

Market, Patiala trough its Proprietor.
5. Kuber Hospital, SST Nagar, Patiala, through its Proprietor.
6. Dr. Monika, MBBS, MD, Kuber Hospital, SST Nagar, Patiala.
….Petitioners/OPs No.1 to 4, 6 & 7

Versus
1. Richa Joshi aged 31 years wife of Raman Mehal;
2. Raman Mehal aged about 35 years son of Sham Sunder Mehal;
Both residents of House No.5, Village Deelwal, P.O. Punjabi

University, Patiala.
….Respondents/Complainants
3. Bindi Nusing Home, # 112, Ajit Nagar, Patiala, through its
Proprietor.
….Respondent/OP No.5
Revision Petition under Section 47 (1) (b) of

the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 against
the order dated 17.02.2023 passed by the
Revision Petition No.28 of 2023 2
District Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission, Patiala.
Quorum:-
Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Daya Chaudhary, President
Ms. Simarjot Kaur, Member
1) Whether Reporters of the Newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2) To be referred to the Reporters or not? Yes/No
3) Whether judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes/No
Present:-
For the petitioners : Sh. Munish Kapila, Advocate
For respondents No.1 & 2 : Sh. Yagsimant Attri, Advocate.
JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY, PRESIDENT
This order of ours shall dispose off Revision Petition No.28
of 2023, Revision Petition No.18 of 2023 and Misc. Application
No.205 of 2023 in CC No.77 of 2022, as the similar question of law and
facts are involved in all the cases i.e. as to whether the Consumer
Commission has power to extend the period beyond the stipulated period
of 45 days as prescribed under the provisions of the Consumer
Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 2019’) to
file written version or not?
The facts are being extracted from Revision Petition No.28 of
2023.
Revision Petition No.28 of 2023
2. The petitioners/OPs No.1 to 4, 6 & 7 have approached this
Commission by way of filing the present Revision Petition Section 47 (1)
(b) of the Act of 2019 for setting aside the impugned order dated
17.02.2023 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission, Patiala (in short, “the District Commission”) in CC No.159
of 2022, whereby the petitioner/OPs were not allowed to file the written
replies beyond the period of 45 days as provided under the Act.
3. It would be apposite to mention here that hereinafter the
parties will be referred, as were arrayed before the District Commission.
4. Briefly, the facts of the case, which are necessary for
disposal of the present Revision Petition, are that respondents No.1 &
2/complainants had filed CC No.159 of 2022 against the OPs on the
grounds that there was negligence on their part in not diagnosing the
fetal abnormality in the case of their son namely Tejas, who was born on
12.12.2022 in the Hospital OP No.5 i.e. Bindi Nursing Home.
5. The complaint was filed with the prayer for issuance of
directions to the OPs to grant compensation to the tune of ₹50 lac on
account of negligence and carelessness and also for causing physical
harassment, mental agony, pain and depression. The prayer was also
made to grant litigation expenses to the tune of ₹20,000/-.
6. Upon issuing notice in the complaint, the OPs engaged their
counsel/lawyers to represent them in the case before the District
Commission. OPs No.1,2,5 & 6 had also moved an application to accept
their written replies but the District Commission instead of allowing them
had struck off their defence on the ground that the written reply was not
filed within the statutory period of 45 days from the date of receipt of the
notice and the written reply was ordered to be returned. Even the
defence of OPs No.3 & 4 was also struck off on the same ground.
7. The District Commission had struck off the defence of the
petitioners vide the impugned order dated 17.02.2023 by relying upon
the judgment of the Constitutional Bench of Five Judges of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court passed in the case titled as New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. II (2020) CPJ 1 (SC)
wherein it was held that the Consumer Commission was not having any
power or jurisdiction to accept the written statement beyond the statutory
period of 45 days,. The District Commission had also relied upon the
judgment passed by the Hon’ble National Commission of case of
Srinivas Rao v. R. Nagesh & Anr. First Appeal No.678 of 2021, which
was decided on 01.07.2022.
8. Being aggrieved by said order dated 17.02.2023, the
petitioners have filed the present Revision Petition before this
Commission by raising a number of arguments.
9. Mr. Munish Kapila, learned counsel for the
petitioners/OPs in Revision Petition No.28 of 2023 and Ms. Archna
Sharma, learned counsel for petitioners/OPs in Revision Petition
No.18 of 2023 have submitted that the ratio of the law as laid down in
the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) was applicable to
the District Commission but not to the State Commission. Said judgment
had only discussed the procedure as provided under Section 13 of the

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of
1986’) and Section 38 of the Act of 2019 and had held that the District
Commission was not competent to extend the period beyond the period
of 45 days to the OPs to file written reply. Said judgment has not
discussed the consequences relating to the procedure (i.e. Section 18 of
the Act of 1986 or Section 49 of the Act of 2019) or the powers of the
State Commission. Leaned counsel has further submitted that Section 49
of the Act of 2019 has specifically provided that the provisions relating to
complaints under Sections 35, 36,37, 38 & 39 with such modifications, as
may be necessary, would be applicable in disposal of the complaints by
the State Commission. The State Commission has wider powers vis a vis
the District Commission. Learned counsel has further submitted that the
State Commission is competent to extend the period beyond the period
of 45 days as contemplated under both the Acts i.e. the Act of 1986 and
the Act of 2019. The complaints were filed before the District
Commission under Section 38 of the Act of 2019 or even Section 13 of
the Act of 1986. In the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, nothing
has been mentioned with regard to this aspect, whereas wider powers
have been granted by the Act to the State Commission for passing the
appropriate order. At the end, learned counsel has submitted that the
complaint is still at the initial stage and in case the written replies of the
petitioners No.1,2,5 & 6 are not taken on record or petitioners No.3 & 4
are not granted opportunity to file their written version, a great loss would
be caused, which cannot be compensated in any manner.
10. In addition to the said arguments, Ms. Diya Sodhi for Mr.
Sehajbir Singh, learned counsel for OPs No.1 to 3 in Misc. Application
No.205 of 2023 in CC No.77 of 2022 has vehemently argued that the
judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hilli
Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) has not discussed the
consequences relating to the procedure i.e. Section 18 of the Act of 1986
or Section 49 of the Act of 2019 or even the powers of the State
Commission in the entire judgment. Learned counsel has also submitted
that the State Commission has wider powers vis a vis the District
Commission and in both the original jurisdiction as well as in the
revisional jurisdiction/appellate jurisdiction, the parties were entitled for
extension of time beyond the period of 45 days as per the provisions of
Section 13 of the Act of 1986 and Section 38 of the Act of 2019. She has
also reiterated that the complaints, which were filed before the District
Commissions, were filed under Section 38 of the Act of 2019, which is
para materia to Section 13 of the Act of 1986, as these Sections have set
out the procedure for admission of the complaints before the District
Commission. The Hon’ble Apex Court has only dealt with Section 13 of
the Act of 1986 while taking cognizance of the issue of grant of extension
of time in filing the written reply before the District Commission. Learned
counsel has further submitted that the issue before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) was very
limited and it was confined only as to whether Section 13 (2) (a) of the
Act of 1986 relating to the period of 30 days in filing the written reply
which could be extended not more than 15 days or not or it was to be
read as mandatory or directory. At the end, learned counsel has
submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court had settled the law in the case of
Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) only to the limited extent to the
powers of the District Commission and the same would not be applicable
to the State Commission.
11. Mr. Yagsimant Attri, learned counsel for respondents
No.1 & 2/complainants in Revision Petition No.28 of 2023, Mr.
Arshdeep Singh, learned counsel for respondent No.1/complainant
in Revision Petition No.18 of 2023 and Mr. Vineet Bali, learned counsel
for the complainant in Misc. Application No.205 of 2023 in CC No.77
of 2022 have submitted that sufficient time was granted to the
petitioners/OPs to file the written replies but still the written replies were
not filed despite the fact that the period of not only 30 days had expired
but the extended period of 15 days had also expired. Total period of 45
days was prescribed under the provisions of the Act. Learned counsels
have further submitted that the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra)
had clearly held that the Consumer Commissions have no power or
jurisdiction to accept the written statement beyond the statutory period of

45 days as prescribed under the Act i.e. 45 days in total. Similar view
was also taken by the Hon’ble National Commission in the case of
Srinivas Rao (supra). Therefore, the defence of the OPs was rightly
struck off in view of the provisions of the Act and as such they were not
held entitled for extension of time.
12. Heard the arguments raised by learned counsel for the
parties. We have also carefully perused the impugned orders passed by
the District Commission and all other documents available on the files.
13. The issue involves in the cases in hand is as to whether
the time/period of 45 days i.e. 30+15 days as fixed under Section 38
(2) (a) of the Act, 2019, which is the maximum time limit to file the
written reply/written statement, can be further extended or not?
14. As per the judgment passed by the Three Judges Bench of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of J.J. Merchant & Ors. v.
Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635, there is no power to condone
the delay beyond the period of 45 days in filing the written reply. The
relevant portion of said judgment is reproduced as under:
“For having speedy trial, this legislative mandate of not giving more
than 45 days in submitting the written statement or the version of the
case is required to be adhered. If this is not adhered, the legislative
mandate of disposing of the cases within three or five months would
be defeated.”
15. Thereafter, another judgment of Two Judges Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 16 SCC 20, it was
held that the time/period for filing the written reply cannot be extended
beyond the period of 45 days.
16. In the judgment passed by a Two Judges Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Reliance General Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. M/s Mampee Timbers & Hardwares Pvt. Ltd. decided on
10.02.2017, it was held that in some suitable cases, the delay could be
condoned beyond the stipulated period of 45 days, as the aforesaid
judgment of case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli
Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 16 SCC 20 was referred to
a Constitution Bench.
17. In the aforesaid case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. II (2020) CPJ 1 (SC), the
Constitutional Bench had upheld the law as laid down in the case of J.J.
Merchant (supra).
18. Thereafter, in one subsequent judgment of case M/s
Daddy’s Builders Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Manish Bhargava & Anr. dated
11.02.2021 passed by Two Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the delay was not condoned by holding that even as per the view
taken in the judgment of case of M/s Mampee Timbers (supra) , there
was no mandate on the Fora that in those cases, the delay beyond the
stipulated period of 45 days could be condoned. However, nothing had
been said about such suitable case. Ultimately, by relying upon the
judgment of case Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra), the delay
was not condoned.
19. Thereafter, in one latest judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Diamond Exports & Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. &
Ors. (Three Judges Bench) 2022 (4) SCC 169, the order passed by the
Hon’ble National Commission condoning the delay was upheld.
However, in the said judgment of the Apex Court, it was held that the
delay could be condoned only in those cases, where the applications
seeking condonation of delay were pending or decided before
04.03.2020 i.e. the date on which the judgment of case Hilli
Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) was delivered by the Constitutional
Bench.
20. By considering these aspects, we deem it appropriate to
discuss almost the similar provisions under Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC,
which lay down the maximum period for filing written statement i.e.
30+90 days in a suit. Said provision has been held to be directory in
nature in the case titled as Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil
Nadu v. Union of India AIR 2005 (SC) 3353.
21. Learned counsel for the petitioner(s)/OPs have emphasized
in their respective arguments that the provisions for filing reply within a
period of 30+15 days are applicable to the complaints filed before the
District Commission and not to the State Commission. In the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage

(supra), no such discussion was there and the State Commission was
having wider power vis a vis the District Commission. In Section 49 of
the Act of 2019, it has been provided that the provisions relating to the
complaints under Sections 35 to 39 are applicable for disposal of the
complaints by the State Commission, with such modification as may be
necessary. It has also been submitted that the State Commission while
dealing with the complaints originally filed before the State Commission,
can modify the provisions contained in Sections 35 to 39 of the Act,
which includes Section 38. Learned counsel have also emphasized that
the State Commission can extend the time as provided under Section 38
of the Act even beyond the period of 45 days (30+45) days in such like
cases.
22. However, same issue was there before the Hon’ble National
Commission in Consumer Case No.28 of 2021 titled as Kutumb Welfare
Society v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (Noida) &
Anr. The order passed by the Hon’ble National Commission in the said
case on 13.06.2022 is reproduced as under:
“ Mr. Prabhakar Tiwari, learned Counsel appearing for the

Opposite Party No.2 has not filed Written Version so far. Time for
filing the Written Version as provided under Section 13 (1) (a) of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 now replaced by Section 38 (2) (a) of
the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which is in force since
20/24.07.2020 has expired. This Commission does not have the
power to condone the delay beyond 30 + 15 days as provided in
the statute. Right of Opposite Party No.2 to file the Written
Version stands closed.
Rejoinder and Evidence by way of Affidavit be filed by the

Complainant, within four weeks. Thereafter, the Opposite Party no.1
shall file Evidence by way of Affidavit, within four weeks.
List for Final Hearing on 14.12.2022 before the appropriate

Bench as per Roster.
In the meanwhile, learned Counsel for the Parties may file

Written Submissions after exchanging them.”
23. Said order dated 13.06.2022 was challenged by the OP
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of filing SLP (Civil) Diary
No(s).31629/2022 and it was dismissed vide order dated 04.11.2022.
The order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 04.11.2022 is
reproduced as under:
“Delay condoned.
It is not in dispute that the written statement was filed beyond the
period of 45 days. The period of limitation to file is 30 days which
can be condoned up to 15 days only.
As observed and held by this Court in the case of New India
Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (P) Ltd.
(2020) 5 SCC 757, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone
the delay beyond the prescribed period mentioned in the
Statute.
In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission has committed any
error in refusing to condone the delay which was beyond 45
days.
The present Special Leave Petition stands dismissed.
Pending application stands disposed of.”
24. On perusal of said order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, it is apparent that in the beginning it has been mentioned that in
that case, the written statements were filed beyond the period of 45
days, whereas the period of limitation to file reply was 30 days and it was
mentioned that the delay could be condoned up to 15 days only. By
relying upon the judgment passed by the Constitutional Bench of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage
(supra), it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the Hon’ble
National Commission had not committed any error in refusing to
condone the delay, which was beyond the period of 45 days and the
SLP filed by the OP was dismissed. Meaning thereby the order passed
by the Five Judges Bench in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold
Storage (supra) was relied upon and followed.
25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the issues in Hilli
Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra), had emphasized on the provisions
of Section 13 (2) (a), from which it is clear that the notice along with copy
of the complaint, which was to be sent to the OP, is always with the
directions to file written reply within a period of 30 days with further
provision that such period of 30 days is extendable by the District
Commission but not beyond a period of 15 days i.e. the maximum period
for filing the written version is 45 days from the date of receipt of notice
along with copy of the complaint.
26. The word “shall” has been used, which is mandatory.
Normally, the word “shall” prima facie is to be considered mandatory but
the intention of the legislature is also to decide the complaint at the
earliest. The meaning has to be ascribed to the word “shall” as
mandatory or directory. Whenever any statute uses or used the word
“shall”, it is prima facie mandatory. The impact of such provision is to
comply with the provision in dispute within the time bound period, which
shows the serious concern and the same is to be followed by considering
the object of legislation, so that the very purpose of legislation is not
defeated or frustrated. Moreover, in a number of judgments, the use of
word “shall” prima facie has been considered mandatory but it is the
duty of the Court to ascertain the real and actual intention of the
legislature by a careful examination of the object and the statute, so that
the object of providing speedy justice in a time bound manner can be
achieved. However, in some of the arguments raised by the learned
counsels for the petitioners/OPs, the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of
CPC have been relied upon just in support of their contentions, but the
language of relevant Sections of the Act is not para materia to Order VIII
Rule 1 of CPC. The time of 120 days as provided under Order VIII Rule 1
of CPC, 1908 is actually means not to be mandatory but only directory
and the Courts are having discretion to grant time beyond the period of
120 days. However, Section 13 (2) (b) (ii) of the Act of 1986 clearly
provides the consequence of the complaint to be proceeded ex parte, if
the OP had failed to file the written version within the time so granted
under Section 13 (2) (a) i.e. within a period of 45 days. Accordingly, the
time so provided under Section 13 (2) of the Act of 1986 or Section 38 of
the Act of 2019 is to be read as mandatory and not directory.
Moreover, the objective of the Consumer Protection Act is to
provide speedy justice, as is clear from the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators

Assn. of India (2011) 14 SCC 337. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held in the said case as under:
“…..The 1986 Act was enacted for the better protection of the
interests of consumers by making provision for the establishment of
consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of
consumer disputes. The object and purpose of enacting the 1986 Act
is to provide for simple, inexpensive and speedy remedy to the
consumers who have grievance against defective goods and
deficient services. This benevolent piece of legislation intended to
protect a large body of consumers from exploitation.”
27. In another case titled as CCI Chambers Coop. Hsg. Society
Ltd. v. Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as under:
“…..It cannot be denied that fora at the national level, the State level
and at the district level have been constituted under the Act with the
avowed object of providing summary and speedy remedy in
conformity with the principles of natural justice, taking care of such
grievances as are amenable to the jurisdiction of the fora established
under the Act. These fora have been established and conferred with
the jurisdiction in addition to the conventional courts. The principal
object sought to be achieved by establishing such fora is to relieve
the conventional courts of their burden which is ever-increasing with
the mounting arrears and whereat the disposal is delayed because of
the complicated and detailed procedure which at times is
accompanied by technicalities. Merely because recording of
evidence is required, or some questions of fact and law arise which
would need to be investigated and determined, cannot be a ground
for shutting the doors of any forum under the Act to the person
aggrieved.”
28. The observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court even in
the case of J.J. Merchant & Ors. (supra) is also relevant, which is
“….There is legislative mandate to the District Forum or the

Commissions to dispose of the complaints as far as possible within
prescribed time of three months by adhering strictly to the procedure
prescribed under the Act. The opposite party has to submit its
version within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the complaint
by him and Commission can give at the most further 15 days for
some unavoidable reasons to file its version.”
29. Further in the case of Dr. Rabindra Nath Jana v. Alpana
Bera Sasmal & Ors. 2017 (1) CPR 141 (NC), the Hon’ble National
Commission has observed as under:
“Consumer Fora have no jurisdiction to extend period of limitation of

30 days provided under Section 13 (2) of the Act beyond a further
period of 15 days- Written statement was sought to be filed in State
Commission after expiry of 45 days from date of service of notice of
complaint along-with application for condonation of delay- State
Commission was fully justified in declining to condone delay in filing
of written statement.”
30. In another case titled as KAD Housing Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v.
M.L. Varma & Anr. 2016 (4) CPR 510 (NC), the Hon’ble National
Commission has observed as under:
“6…….It is evident, therefore, that in terms of Section 13(2)(a) of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986, it was obligatory on the part of the
appellants/OPs to file the written version to the complaint within the
prescribed period of 30 days, extendable by 15 days. The plea taken

by them that the notice got misplaced by the security personnel does
not help them to seek extension of time on this ground.”
31. As per provisions of Section 41 of the Act of 2019, the appeal
can be filed against the order passed by the District Commission before
the State Commission within a period of 45 days from the date of the
order. However, the State Commission can entertain an appeal so filed
beyond said period of 45 days provided the appellant is able to make a
sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Section 41 of the Act of 2019 is
“41. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District

Commission may prefer an appeal against such order to the State
Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-
five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as
may be prescribed:
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after
the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, if it is satisfied that
there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period……..”
32. Similarly, as per Section 69(1) of the Act of 2019, the District
Commission, the State Commission or the Hon’ble National Commission
do not admit a complaint unless it is filed within a period of 2 years from
the date of accrual of cause of action. However, discretion has been
granted to condone the delay if the complainant is able to show sufficient
cause for not filing the complaint within such period. Section 69(1) of the
Act of 2019 is reproduced as under:
“69. (1) The District Commission, the State Commission or the

National Commission shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed
within two years from the date on which the cause of action has
arisen.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a
complaint may be entertained after the period specified in sub-
section (1), if the complainant satisfies the District Commission, the

State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be,
that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within such
period:
Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless the
District Commission or the State Commission or the National
Commission, as the case may be, records its reasons for condoning
such delay.”
33. However, no such discretion or power has been
conferred by the legislation under Section 13(2)(a) of the Act of 1986
or Section 38 (2) (a) of the Act of 2019 for filing reply to the complaint
beyond the extended period of 45 days (30+15 days). There is no
question of making out/considering any sufficient cause for not filing the
reply within the said period. The Courts are not empowered to carve out
an exception in a specific provision of the statute, which is mandatory
and if it is done, it would amount to insert a new provision into the
statute, which is not permissible.
34. The Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while
deciding the issues in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage
(supra) has discussed the various provisions of the Consumer
Protection Act. In Para Nos.8 to 17 it has been held as under:
“8. A bare reading of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act makes it clear that
the copy of the complaint which is to be sent to the opposite party, is
to be with the direction to give his version of (or response to) the
case (or complaint) within a period of 30 days. It further provides that
such period of 30 days can be extended by the District Forum, but
not beyond 15 days.
9. Sub Section 2(b)(i) of Section 13 of the Act provides for a

complaint to be decided on the basis of the response by the opposite
party and the evidence of the complainant and the opposite party,
where allegations contained in the complaint are denied or disputed
by the opposite party. SubSection 2(b)(ii) of Section 13 of the Act
provides that where no response is filed by the opposite party, the
complaint may be decided ex parte on the basis of evidence brought

forth by the complainant.
10. SubSection 2(c) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection

Act further provides that where the complainant fails to appear on the
date of hearing before the District Forum, the District Forum may
either dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits. The
aforesaid provision [subSection 2(c)] was inserted by Act 62 of 2002,
w.e.f. 15.03.2003. Similarly, Section (3A) of Section 13 of the
Consumer Protection Act, which was also inserted by Act 62 of 2002,
provides for deciding every complaint as expeditiously as possible
and endeavour shall be made to decide the complaint within a period
of three months from the receipt of notice by the opposite party, and
within five months, if the complaint requires analysis or testing of
commodities. It also provides that no adjournment shall ordinarily be
granted by the District Forum, and if the same is to be granted, costs
may be imposed, and further that reasons be recorded if the
complaint is disposed of after the time so provided.
11. From the above, it is clear that as mentioned in the Statement of

Objects and Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, the District
Forum is to provide speedy disposal of consumer disputes. The
same has been further reiterated by the legislature by insertion
of Section 13(2)(c) and 13(3A) by Act 62 of 2002.
12. Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly contemplates

where time can be extended by the District Forum, and where it is
not to be extended. Like, under subSection (3A) of Section 13,
despite the best efforts of the District Forum, in situations where the
complaint cannot be decided within the period specified therein, the
same can be decided beyond the specified period for reasons to be
recorded in writing by the District Forum at the time of disposing of
the complaint. Meaning thereby that the same would not be
mandatory, but only directory. The phrase “endeavour shall be
made”, makes the intention of the legislature evident that the District
Forum is to make every effort to decide the case expeditiously within
time, but the same can also be decided beyond the said period, but
for reasons to be recorded.
13. On the contrary, subSection (2)(a) of Section 13 of the Consumer

Protection Act provides for the opposite party to give his response
‘within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15
days as may be granted by the District Forum’. The intention of the
legislature seems to be very clear that the opposite party would get
the time of 30 days, and in addition another 15 days at the discretion
of the Forum to file its response. No further discretion of granting
time beyond 45 days is intended under the Act.
The question of natural justice is dealt with by the legislature in sub-

Section (3) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, which
clearly provides that “No proceedings complying with the procedure
laid down in the subSection (1) and (2) shall be called in question in
any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not
been complied with.” The legislature was conscious that the
complaint would result in being decided ex parte, or without the

response of the opposite party, if not filed within such time as
provided under the Consumer Protection Act, and in such a case, the
opposite party will not be allowed to take the plea that he was not
given sufficient time or that principles of natural justice were not
complied with. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose
of subSection (3) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act.
14. The maximum period of 45 days, as provided under

the Consumer Protection Act, would not mean that the complainant
has a right to always avail such maximum period of 45 days to file its
response. Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations,
2005 clearly provides that ordinarily such notice to the opposite party
to file its response shall be issued for a period of 30 days, but the
same can be even less than 30 days, depending upon the
circumstances of each case.
15. Now, reverting back to the provisions of the Consumer Protection

Act to consider as to whether the provision of sub Section 2(a) of
Section 13 granting a maximum period of 15 days in addition to 30
days has to be read as mandatory or not, we may also consider the
other provisions of the Consumer Protection Act where the
legislature intended to allow extension of period of limitation.
Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act provides for filing of

an appeal from the order of the District Forum to the State
Commission within a period of 30 days. However, it leaves a
discretion with the State Commission to entertain an appeal
filed after the expiry of the said period of 30 days, if it is
satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within
the stipulated period. Similarly, discretion for filing an appeal before
the National Commission beyond the period of 30 days has also
been provided under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act.
Section 24A provides for the limitation period of 2 years for

filing the complaint. However, subSection (2) of Section
24A gives a discretion to entertain a complaint even after the
period of 2 years, if there is a satisfactory cause for not filing
the complaint within such period, which has to be recorded in
writing.
16. Regulation 14 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005

also deals with limitation. In addition, the same provides for
limitation while dealing with appeals (under Section 15 and 19)
and complaint (under Section 24A). SubRegulation (2) of
Regulation 14 provides for condonation of delay for sufficient
reasons to be recorded.
17. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of complaint
or appeals beyond the period specified under the relevant provisions
of the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient cause given by the
party, which has to be to the satisfaction of the concerned authority.
No such discretion has been provided for under Section
13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act for filing a response to
the complaint beyond the extended period of 45 days (30 days

plus 15 days). Had the legislature not wanted to make such
provision mandatory but only directory, the provision for further
extension of the period for filing the response beyond 45 days would
have been provided, as has been provided for in the cases of filing of
complaint and appeals. To carve out an exception in a specific
provision of the statute is not within the jurisdiction of the Courts, and
if it is so done, it would amount to legislating or inserting a provision
into the statute, which is not permissible.
By specifically enacting a provision under subSection (3) of Section

13, with a specific clarification that violation of the principles of
natural justice shall not be called in question where the procedure
prescribed under subSections (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the
Consumer Protection Act has been followed or complied with, the
intention of the legislature is clear that mere denial of further
extension of time for filing the response (by the opposite party) would
not amount to denial or violation of the principles of natural justice.
This provision of Section 13(3) reinforces the time limit specified
in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act.”
35. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners/OPs that there can be some cases, where extreme hardship
is there, which is beyond anybody’s reach. The Constitutional Bench of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the issues in the case of Hilli
Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) has also dealt with the issue of
hardship in Para Nos.18 & 19 as under:
“18………..Further, hardship cannot be a ground for changing

the mandatory nature of the statute, as has been held by this
Court in Bhikraj Jaipurai vs Union of India AIR 1962 SC
113=(1962) 2 SCR 880 and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs
Custodian (2004) 11 SCC
472. Hardship cannot thus be a ground to interpret the provision

so as to enlarge the time, where the statute provides for a
specific time, which, in our opinion, has to be complied in letter
and spirit.
This Court, in the case of Rohitash Kumar vs Om Prakash

Sharma (2013) 11 SCC 451 has, in paragraph 23, held as under:
“23. There may be a statutory provision, which causes great

hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to
an individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full
rigor.
It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or

inconvenience caused, cannot be used as a basis to alter the
meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if such
meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of the statute. If the
language is plain and hence allows only one meaning, the same has
to be given effect to, even if it causes hardship or possible
injustice.” While concluding, it was observed “that the hardship
caused to an individual, cannot be a ground for not giving
effective and grammatical meaning to every word of the
provision, if the language used therein, is unequivocal.” Further,
it has been held by this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru
Govardhane vs Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765
that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes
and that the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds, even if the statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party.
19. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that
by not leaving a discretion with the District Forum for extending the
period of limitation for filing the response before it by the opposite
party, grave injustice would be caused as there could be
circumstances beyond the control of the opposite party because of
which the opposite party may not be able to file the response within
the period of 30 days or the extended period of 15 days. In our view,
if the law so provides, the same has to be strictly complied, so
as to achieve the object of the statute. It is well settled that law
prevails over equity, as equity can only supplement the law, and
not supplant it.
This Court, in the case of Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs State of

Maharashtra (2003) 5 SCC 413, has observed that “when there is a
conflict between law and equity the former shall prevail.” In P.M.
Latha vs State of Kerala (2003) 3 SCC 541, this Court held that
“Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied and
interpreted equitably, but equity cannot override written or settled
law.” In Nasiruddin vs Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577, this
Court observed that “in a case where the statutory provision is
plain and unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in
a different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising
therefrom.” In E. Palanisamy vs Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123, it
was held that “Equitable considerations have no place where the
statute contained express provisions.” Further, in India House vs
Kishan N. Lalwani (2003) 9 SCC 393, this Court held that “The period
of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and
cannot be relaxed or departed from by equitable considerations.” It is
thus settled law that where the provision of the Act is clear and
unambiguous, it has no scope for any interpretation on
equitable ground.”
36. The Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
further held in the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) as
under:
“20. It is true that ‘justice hurried is justice buried’. But in the same
breath it is also said that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. The
legislature has chosen the latter, and for a good reason. It goes with
the objective sought to be achieved by the Consumer Protection Act,
which is to provide speedy justice to the consumer. It is not that
sufficient time to file a response to the complaint has been denied to
the opposite party. It is just that discretion of extension of time
beyond 15 days (after the 30 days period) has been curtailed and
consequences for the same have been provided under Section
13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act. It may be that in some
cases the opposite party could face hardship because of such
provision, yet for achieving the object of the Act, which is speedy and
simple redressal of consumer disputes, hardship which may be
caused to a party has to be ignored.
21. It has been further contended that the language of Section

13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act is pari materia to Order VIII
Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘the Code’) and
if time can be extended for filing of written submission in a suit under
the aforesaid provision of the Code, the same would apply to the
filing of response to complaint under the Consumer Protection Act as
well, and hence the provision of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer
Protection Act would be directory and not mandatory.
In this regard, what is noteworthy is that Regulation 26 of the

Consumer Protection Regulation, 2005, clearly mandates that
endeavour is to be made to avoid the use of the provisions of the
Code except for such provisions, which have been referred to in
the Consumer Protection Act and the Regulations framed
thereunder, which is provided for in respect of specific matters
enumerated in Section 13(4) of the Consumer Protection Act. It is
pertinent to note that nonfiling of written statement under Order VIII
Rule 1 of the Code is not followed by any consequence of such non-
filing within the time so provided in the Code.
Now, while considering the relevant provisions of the Code, it is

noteworthy that Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII Rule 10
prescribes that the maximum period of 120 days provided under
Order VIII Rule 1 is actually not meant to be mandatory, but only
directory. Order VIII Rule 10 mandates that where written statement
is not filed within the time provided under Order VIII Rule 1 “the court
shall pronounce the judgment against him, or make such order in
relation to the suit as it thinks fit”. A harmonious construction of these
provisions is clearly indicative of the fact that the discretion is left with
the Court to grant time beyond the maximum period of 120 days,
which may be in exceptional cases. On the other hand, subSection
(2)(b)(ii) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly

provides for the consequence of the complaint to be proceeded ex
parte against the opposite party, if the opposite party omits or fails to
represent his case within the time given.
It may further be noted that in Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code, for
suits filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, a proviso has
been inserted for ‘commercial disputes of a specified value’ (vide Act
4 of 2016 w.r.e.f. 23.10.2015), which reads as under:
“Provided further that no Court shall make an Order to extend the

time provided under Rule 1 of this Order for filing the written
statement” From the above, it is clear that for commercial suits, time
for filing written statement provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is
meant to be mandatory, but not so for ordinary civil suits. Similarly, in
our considered view, for cases under the Consumer Protection
Act also, the time provided under Section 13(2)(a) of the Act has to
be read as mandatory, and not directory.
Once consequences are provided for not filing the response to the
complaint within the time specified, and it is further provided that
proceedings complying with the procedure laid down under sub
Section (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act
shall not be called in question in any Court on the ground that the
principles of natural justice have not been complied with, the
intention of the legislature is absolutely clear that the provision of
subSection 2(a) of Section 13 of the Act in specifying the time limit
for filing the response to the complaint is mandatory, and not
directory.
22. After noticing that there were delays in deciding the complaints
by the District Forum, the legislature inserted sub Section (3A)
of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act providing for a time
limit for deciding the complaints. From this it is amply clear that the
intention of the legislature was, and has always been, for expeditious
disposal of the complaints. By providing for extension of time for
disposal of the cases filed, for reasons to be recorded, the legislature
has provided for a discretion to the Forum that wherever necessary,
the extension of the time can be provided for, and where such further
extension is not to be granted [as in the case of Section 13(2)(a)], the
legislature has consciously not provided for the same, so as to
achieve the object of the Act.
23. In SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited vs K.S. Chamankar

Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) 12 SCC 210, this Court, was
dealing with a case relating to the filing of written statement under the
Code, in respect of a case under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
After noticing the amendments brought in Order V Rule 1, Order VIII
Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code with regard to ‘commercial
disputes of specified value’ under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
by way of insertion of the Provisos in the aforesaid provisions, this
Court held that “….the clear, definite and mandatory provisions of
Order V read with Order VIII Rule 1 and 10 cannot be circumvented
by recourse to the inherent power under Section 151 to do the
opposite of what is stated therein”. It was, thus, held that there was
no scope for enlarging the time for filing of written statement beyond
the period of 120 days in commercial suits, as the provision with
regard to such suits would be mandatory, and not directory. The said
judgment has been affirmed by a Bench of three Judges in Desh Raj
vs Balkishan decided on 20.01.2020 in Civil Appeal No.433 of 2020.
24. In Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs Custodian (2004) 11 SCC 472,

this Court was dealing with the provisions of the Special Court (Trial
of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, and the
question was whether the Special Court has power to condone the
delay in filing the petition under Section 4(2) of the said Act. While
holding, that the said provision would be mandatory, it was held in
paragraph 13 as under:
“13. It is not for the courts to determine whether the period

of 30 days is too short to take into account the various
misfortunes that may be faced by notified persons who
wish to file objections under Section 4(2) of the Act nor
can the section be held to be directory because of such
alleged inadequacy of time.” Then, after considering the
decisions of this Court in Topline Shoes Ltd. vs.
Corporation Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33 and Dr. J. J. Merchant
vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635, this Court held
that “the period for filing an objection in Section 4(2) in the
Act is a mandatory provision given the language of the
Section and having regard to the objects sought to be
served by the Act.”
25. Certain other cases, which have been referred to by the learned
Counsel for the parties, have, in our considered opinion, no direct
bearing on the facts and issue involved in the present case relating to
the Consumer Protection Act, and thus, the same are not being dealt
with and considered here.
26. We may now deal with the decisions rendered by this Court,
which have been referred to in the Reference Order.
27. Division Bench of this Court has referred this Question, after
observing that there is an apparent conflict between the decisions of
this Court in Topline Shoes (supra); Kailash Vs. Nanhku (2005) 4
SCC 480 and Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of
India (2005) 6 SCC 344 on the one hand; and Dr. J. J. Merchant
(supra) and NIA vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (2015) 16 SCC
22, on the other hand.
28. In Topline Shoes (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, while

dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer
Protection Act, has held that the said provision would be directory
and not mandatory. While holding so, the Bench relied on the
principles of natural justice, and also that no consequence of non-
filing of the response to the complaint within 45 days is provided for
in the Consumer Protection Act.
In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, this Court held:
“It is for the Forum or the Commission to consider all facts and
circumstances along with the provisions of the Act providing
time frame to file reply, as a guideline and then to exercise its
discretion as best as it may serve the ends of justice and
achieve the object of speedy disposal of such cases keeping in
mind the principles of natural justice as well”.
(emphasis supplied)
It is true that in Clause 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of

the Consumer Protection Act, the legislature provided that “quasi–
judicial bodies will observe the principles of natural justice”, however,
the same is to be observed generally, and not where the same is
specifically excluded. In the said judgment, subSection (3) of Section
13 has neither been referred, nor taken note of. The same mandates
that no proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in sub-
Sections (1) and (2) of Section 13 shall be called in question in any
Court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not
been complied with. From this it is evident that while considering the
provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, the
law mandates that the principles of natural justice cannot be said to
be violated by adopting the said procedure and that the time of 30
days plus 15 days provided for filing the response to the complaint
would be sufficient and final.
In case of Topline Shoes (supra), this Court was also of the view that
in the Consumer Protection Act, “no consequence is provided in case
the time granted to file reply exceeds the total period of 45 days”.
While observing so, the Bench did not take into account the
provisions of Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act,
which provides that where the opposite party fails to file response to
the complaint within the specified time provided in Clause (a), “the
District Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute……… on
the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant……..”.
After the said judgment, by Amendment Act 62 of 2002 (w.e.f.
15.03.2003), the legislature has provided that the District Forum shall
proceed to settle the consumer dispute “ex parte on the basis of the
evidence”. The word “ex parte” has been added by the Amending
Act. As we have observed herein above, the consequence of not
filing the response to the complaint within the stipulated time is thus
clearly provided for in the aforesaid subSection, which has not been
noticed by the Bench while deciding the aforesaid case.
29. In the case of Kailash vs. Nanhku (supra), this Court was dealing
with an election trial under the Representation of People Act, 1951,
and while considering the provision under Order VIII Rule 1 of the
Code, it held the same to be directory, and not mandatory. While
holding so, the Court was of the view that “the consequences flowing
from nonextension of time are not specifically provided” in the Code.
The decision in the said case has no bearing on the question under
consideration, as the present reference before us is under
the Consumer Protection Act, where, as we have already observed,

consequences are specifically provided for.
In passing, in paragraph 35 of the said judgment, the Bench referred

to the case of Topline Shoes (supra), where the provision of Section
13 of the Consumer Protection Act was considered to be directory,
and not mandatory. In our view, the same would not have the effect
of affirming the decision of Topline Shoes (supra) since the Court, in
the aforesaid case, was dealing with the provisions of the Code and
not the specific provisions of Consumer Protection Act.
We are thus of the opinion that Kailash vs Nanhku (supra) has not
overruled the decision in Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra) with regard to the
provision of the Consumer Protection Act.
30. Again, in the case of Salem Advocates Bar Association (supra),

this Court was dealing with a case under Order VIII Rule 1 of the
Code and in paragraph 20, it has been held as under:
“20.………The use of the word “shall” is ordinarily indicative of

mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the
context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of
the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The
rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to
defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the
cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or
procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has
to be preferred. The rules of procedure are the handmaid of
justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict
interpretation would defeat justice.”
Thereafter, the Court proceeded to refer to the provisions of Order
VIII Rule 1, along with Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code. On a
harmonious construction of the said provision, it held that the
provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code would be directory, and
not mandatory. Relevant paragraph 21 of the said judgment is below:
“21. In construing this provision, support can also be had
from Order 8 Rule 10 which provides that where any party
from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or
Rule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or
fixed by the court, the court shall pronounce judgment
against him, or make such other order in relation to the suit
as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this
provision, the court has been given the discretion either to
pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such
other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. In the context
of the provision, despite use of the word “shall”, the court has
been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce
the judgment against the defendant even if the written
statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may
think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of
Order 8 Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious
construction is required to be applied. The effect would be
that under Rule 10 Order 8, the court in its discretion would
have the power to allow the defendant to file written
statement even after expiry of the period of 90 days provided

in Order 8 Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order 8 Rule 10
that after expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be
granted. The court has wide power to “make such order in
relation to the suit as it thinks fit”. Clearly, therefore, the
provision of Order 8 Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90
days to file written statement is directory”.
As such in our view, the said judgment would hold the field with
regard to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code and would not be applicable
to cases dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2) of the
Consumer Protection Act, or such other enactment wherein a
provision akin to Section 13(2) is there and the consequences are
also provided.
………………………………….
………………………………….
41. To conclude, we hold that our answer to the first question is

that the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing
the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in
addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the
Consumer Protection Act; and the answer to the second question
is that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section
13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt
of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party,
and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.”
37. In Revision Petition No.18 of 2023, the defence of the
petitioners/OPs No.1 & 2 was struck off vide impugned order dated
15.12.2022, on the ground that the stipulated period of 45 days for filing
the written statement had already elapsed.
38. In Consumer Complaint No.77 of 2022, OPs No.1 to 3 had
failed to file their written version within the statutory period of 45 days.
Misc. Application No.205 of 2023 was filed by OPs No.1 to 3 seeking
extension of time for filing the written version beyond the period of 45
days. Another Misc. Application No.341 of 2023 filed by OPs No.1 to 3
for placing on record Annexure to the written statement.

39. In view of our above discussion as well as the settled law as
laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra), the period for
filing the written reply cannot be extended beyond the statutory period of
45 days (30+15) as prescribed under Section 13 (2) (a) of the Act of
1986 and Section 38 (2) (a) of the Act of 2019.
40. Accordingly, finding no force in the arguments raised by
learned counsel for the petitioners/OPs, the Revision Petition No.28
of 2023, Revision Petition No.18 of 2023 and Misc. Application
No.205 of 2023 (in Consumer Complaint No.77 of 2022) are hereby
dismissed.
41. Since the Revision Petition No.28 of 20223, Revision
Petition No.18 of 2023 have been dismissed/disposed of, so all the
pending Miscellaneous Applications therein, if any, are accordingly
disposed of.
42. Since Misc. Application No.205 of 2023 in Consumer
Complaint No.77 of 2022 has been dismissed, so the written statement
of OPs No.1 to 3 is ordered to be taken off the record. The other
Misc. Application No.341 of 2023 filed by OPs No.1 to 3 for placing
on record Annexure to the written statement has become
infructuous and the same is dismissed as such.
43. A copy of this order be placed in Revision Petition No.18 of
2023 and in Consumer Complaint No.77 of 2022.

44. The Revision Petition No.28 of 2023, Revision Petition No.18
of 2023 could not be decided and the order could not be pronounced
within the statutory period due to heavy pendency of court cases.
(JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY)

PRESIDENT
(SIMARJOT KAUR)
MEMBER
September 29, 2023.
(Gurmeet S)

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STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

Revision Petition No.28 of 2023

Date of institution : 18.04.2023

1. Care Diagnostic Centre, SCO No.22, New Leela Bhawan, Income

2. Dr. (Mrs.) Jyotika Sehgal, MBBS, DNB (Radio Diagnosis),

3. Muskaan, OBST & GYNAE Centre, Shere-e-Punjab Market,

4. Dr. Shalini Ahluwalia, M.D. (OBST & GYNAE) Shere-e-Punjab,

5. Kuber Hospital, SST Nagar, Patiala, through its Proprietor.

6. Dr. Monika, MBBS, MD, Kuber Hospital, SST Nagar, Patiala.

….Petitioners/OPs No.1 to 4, 6 & 7

1. Richa Joshi aged 31 years wife of Raman Mehal;

2. Raman Mehal aged about 35 years son of Sham Sunder Mehal;

Both residents of House No.5, Village Deelwal, P.O. Punjabi

Revision Petition under Section 47 (1) (b) of

District Consumer Disputes Redressal

1) Whether Reporters of the Newspapers

JUSTICE DAYA CHAUDHARY, PRESIDENT

This order of ours shall dispose off Revision Petition No.28

of 2023, Revision Petition No.18 of 2023 and Misc. Application

No.205 of 2023 in CC No.77 of 2022, as the similar question of law and

of 45 days as prescribed under the provisions of the Consumer

Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 2019’) to

file written version or not?

The facts are being extracted from Revision Petition No.28 of

Revision Petition No.28 of 2023

2. The petitioners/OPs No.1 to 4, 6 & 7 have approached this

Commission by way of filing the present Revision Petition Section 47 (1)

17.02.2023 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission, Patiala (in short, “the District Commission”) in CC No.159

replies beyond the period of 45 days as provided under the Act.

3. It would be apposite to mention here that hereinafter the

parties will be referred, as were arrayed before the District Commission.

4. Briefly, the facts of the case, which are necessary for

2/complainants had filed CC No.159 of 2022 against the OPs on the

12.12.2022 in the Hospital OP No.5 i.e. Bindi Nursing Home.

5. The complaint was filed with the prayer for issuance of

directions to the OPs to grant compensation to the tune of ₹50 lac on

account of negligence and carelessness and also for causing physical

made to grant litigation expenses to the tune of ₹20,000/-.

6. Upon issuing notice in the complaint, the OPs engaged their

counsel/lawyers to represent them in the case before the District

Commission. OPs No.1,2,5 & 6 had also moved an application to accept

7. The District Commission had struck off the defence of the

petitioners vide the impugned order dated 17.02.2023 by relying upon

the judgment of the Constitutional Bench of Five Judges of the Hon’ble

power or jurisdiction to accept the written statement beyond the statutory

judgment passed by the Hon’ble National Commission of case of

was decided on 01.07.2022.

8. Being aggrieved by said order dated 17.02.2023, the

petitioners have filed the present Revision Petition before this

Commission by raising a number of arguments.

9. Mr. Munish Kapila, learned counsel for the

petitioners/OPs in Revision Petition No.28 of 2023 and Ms. Archna

Sharma, learned counsel for petitioners/OPs in Revision Petition

the case of Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (supra) was applicable to

had only discussed the procedure as provided under Section 13 of the

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of

discussed the consequences relating to the procedure (i.e. Section 18 of

State Commission. Leaned counsel has further submitted that Section 49

complaints under Sections 35, 36,37, 38 & 39 with such modifications, as