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Jus Cogens
E LE M E NTS O F INTERNAT IO NAL LAW
Series Editors
Mark Janis is William F. Starr Professor of Law at the
University of Connecticut.
Douglas Guilfoyle is Associate Professor of International and
Security Law at UNSW Canberra.
Stephan Schill is Professor of International and Economic Law and
Governance at the University of Amsterdam.
Bruno Simma is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan and a
Judge at the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in The Hague.
Kimberley Trapp is Professor of Public International Law at
University College London.
Elements of International Law represents a fresh approach in the

literature of international law. It is a long series of short books.
Elements adopts an objective, non-argumentative approach to
its subject matter, focusing on narrowly defined core topics in
international law. Eventually, the series will offer a comprehensive
treatment of the whole of the field. At the same time, each
individual title will be a reliable go- to source for practicing
international lawyers, judges and arbitrators, government and
military officers, scholars, teachers, and students engaged in the
discipline of international law.
Previously Published in this Series

The European Court of Human Rights
Angelika Nussberger
International Law in the Russian Legal System
William E. Butler
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
Kriangsak Kittichaisaree
Jus Cogens
Dinah Shelton
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Dinah Shelton 2021
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2021
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Crown copyright material is reproduced under Class Licence
Number C01P0000148 with the permission of OPSI
and the Queen’s Printer for Scotland
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2020945210
ISBN 978–0–19–886595–7 (hbk.)
ISBN 978–0–19–886596–4 (pbk.)
DOI: 10.1093/law/9780198865957.001.0001
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
Series Editors’ Preface
I am delighted to welcome this wonderful contribution to our new series,

Elements of International Law: Jus Cogens by Professor Dinah Shelton.
When the Elements’ Editors set out to find the best-qualified author to
write our jus cogens volume, it was really not a difficult task of discovery.
One scholar stood out: Dinah Shelton. Through a remarkable and distin-
guished career, Professor Shelton has secured her place as one of the most
respected authorities in International Law, and her work on the important
and complex role of fundamental norms in our discipline is unique and
without modern parallel. All of the editors of Elements are honored to have
Professor Shelton joining our series.
Let me briefly put Professor Shelton’s book into the larger context of
Elements of International Law. Some years ago I brought the concept
of the series to John Louth and Merel Alsteen, international law edi-
tors at Oxford University Press. Together, along with co-editors Douglas
Guilfoyle, Stephan Schill, Bruno Simma, and Kimberley Trapp, we struc-
tured Elements, chose topics, sought out the best person for each book, and
edited their contributions. There are several dozen authors already working
on Elements books and we anticipate about six published works in 2020,
and ten or so more in each of the next years, in time numbering more than
one hundred volumes.
Elements represents a fresh approach to the literature of international
law. It is a long series of short books. Following the traditional path of an
international law treatise, Elements, rather than treating the whole of the
field in one increasingly heavy volume, focuses on more narrowly-defined
subject matters, such as Jus Cogens and International Law.
There is nothing like Elements. It treats particular topics of international
law much more extensively and in significantly more depth than traditional
international law texts or encyclopedias. Each book in the Elements series
has a relatively narrow focus and renders a comprehensive treatment of a
specialized subject matter, in comparison to the more limited treatment of
the same subject matter in other general works.
Like a classic textbook, Elements aims to provide objective statements
of the law. The series does not concern itself with the academic niches
vi Series Editors’ Preface
filled ably by doctoral theses, nor include works which take an argumenta-
tive point of view, already well done by the OUP Monograph series. Except
in length and integration, Elements is for substantive topics comparable
to OUP’s Commentary series on individual treaties: a highly reliable, ob-
jective, in-depth, and readable account of its subject.
Each book in Elements is exhaustively footnoted in respect of inter-
national legal practice and scholarship, e.g., treaties, diplomatic practice,
decisions by international and municipal courts and arbitral tribunals,
resolutions and acts of international organizations, and commentary by the
most authoritative jurists. Elements adopts an objective, non-argumentative
approach to its many subject matters and constitutes a reliable go-to source
for practicing international lawyers, judges and arbitrators, government
and military lawyers, and scholars, teachers, and students engaged in the
discipline of international law.
All of us committed to Elements –authors, editors, publishers –hope that
our series will make a real difference to international law and to the rule of
law. We are so delighted to have Professor Shelton’s Jus Cogens as one of our
earliest books in the series. Not only because of its accomplished author, but
because jus cogens is both one of the more difficult-to-understand concepts
in our discipline and one of the most important, laying a foundation for the
other norms of International Law. I am sure you will find Professor Shelton’s
book to be an important guide to understanding this concept in depth.
Mark Janis
Editor-in-Chief, Editorial Board,
Elements of International Law
William F Starr Professor of Law,
University of Connecticut
31 August 2020
Hartford, Connecticut
Preface
This book has been a long time in preparation, especially considering the
many years of teaching international law and thinking about its sources.
I have previously written about the topic of jus cogens, including in the
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 2015, and the American Journal
of International Law, among others. Inevitably, some of the basics of this
volume draw upon those earlier publications. I have listed these in full
below and am grateful for and wish to acknowledge them here.
I am also very appreciative of Mark Janis’s invitation to embark on the
work of writing this work as part of the series Elements of International Law.
Undertaking the study has required me to update my previous writings and
to follow closely the recent work of the UN International Law Commission
on the topic. I hope I have done justice to the excellent reports of its special
rapporteur, Mr Dire Tladi, on peremptory norms of general international
law (jus cogens). There are many new elements in his four reports and the
responses to them from states and other members of the ILC. I hope they
are all adequately treated herein. Any errors are entirely my responsibility,
of course.
As is always the case with my research and writing, I owe an enormous
debt of gratitude to the law librarians at the George Washington University
Law School. They are always unfailing in their expertise and assistance.
Thanks also to OUP and Newgen for its work on editing and publishing this
work.
1. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 draw upon materials published in

Dinah Shelton, ‘Sherlock Holmes and the mystery of jus cogens’, 46
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, (2015) 23–50. Reprinted
with permission.
2. Chapters 1,2,3,5, and 6 draw upon materials published in Dinah
Shelton, ‘International Law and “Relative Normativity”’ in M.D Evans
(ed.), International Law, (4th edn, OUP 2014) 137–166.
3. Chapter 2 draws upon material published in Dinah Shelton,
‘Normative Hierarchy and International Law’, (2006) 100 American
Journal of International Law, 291–326. Reprinted with permission.
viii Series Editors’ Preface
4. The book reviews: R. Kolb, Peremptory International Law (Jus Cogens):

A General Inventory (Oxford and Portland, OR, Hart 2015) xv, 148,
Bibliography, Index; and T. Weatherall, Jus Cogens: International Law
and Social Contract (Cambridge University Press 2015), xliv, 509,
Index.
5. Dinah Shelton, ‘Resolving conflicts between human rights and envir-
onmental protection: Is there a hierarchy?’ in E. de Wet and J. Vidmar
(eds), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights
(OUP, 2012), 206–235.
6. ‘The Legal Status of Normative Pronouncements of Human Rights
Treaty Bodies’ in H. Hestermeyer et al (eds) Coexistence, Cooperation
and Solidarity: liber Amicorum Rudiger Wolfrum, vol I (Brill
Publishers, 2011), 553–577.
7. ‘Hiérarchie des normes en droit international des droits de l’homme,’
26 La protection des espaces- L’Observateur des Nations Unies, 237
(2009-1).
8. ‘Mettre en balance les droits : vers une hiérarchie des norms en droit
international des droits de l’homme,’ in E. Bribosia & L. Hennebel
(eds) Classer les droits de l’homme (BRUYLANT 2004) 153.
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations  xi
1. Introduction  1
2. The Origins and Sources of Jus Cogens  3

2.1 Natural Law  3
2.2 Public Policy: Logical or Legal Necessity  5
2.3 General Principles of Law  7
2.4 Consent  9
3. The Law of Treaties  13

3.1 Drafting the VCLT  13
3.2 Definition of Jus Cogens  16
4. Recent Work of the International Law Commission  17

4.1 Recent ILC Consideration of the Topic of Jus Cogens  17
4.2 The First Report  19
4.3 The Second Report  20
4.4 The Third Report  21
4.5 The Fourth Report  26
a. The question of regional jus cogens  27
b. Whether to include an illustrative list of jus cogens norms  32
5. State Practice  36
5.1 Treaty Practice, Votes, and Official Statements in
International Organizations  36
5.2 International Jurisprudence  47
a. Jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals  48
b. Jurisprudence of regional courts and tribunals  62
5.3 National Legislation and Jurisprudence  70
5.4 Other Candidates Considered  76
x Table of Contents
6. Jus Cogens in Recent Legal Scholarship  86
7. Functions of Jus Cogens  91

7.1 The Law of Treaties  91
7.2 Accountability  99
a. Issues of hierarchy: Resolving priorities
between conflicting norms  101
7.3 Declaration of Fundamental Values  104
7.4 Concluding Remarks  106
References  109
Index  119
List of Abbreviations
ASR Articles on State Responsibility

ATCA US Alien Tort Claim Act
CJEC Court of Justice of the European Union
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EU European Union
IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
ILC International Law Commission
OAS Organization of American States
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice
SR Special Rapporteur
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US United States
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
1
Introduction*
Publicists have long sought to develop a theory that would serve to constrain
the claimed unlimited State discretion, in the exercise of sovereignty, to ac-
cept or reject an international treaty norm or developing customary inter-
national law. The doctrine of peremptory norms (jus cogens) is the primary
theory developed in this effort. Notably, however, the norms most often
cited as jus cogens have been universally accepted as customary international
law or are contained in treaties adhered to by all or nearly all States. Breach of
any such norm is a violation of international law; calling the norm jus cogens
seems to add little—unless the consequences of violating such norms are en-
hanced or differ in other ways from breaches of ‘normal’ international law.
On the positive side, however, it may be speculated that at least some
support for the development of international criminal law has been based
in the desire to limit the ability to opt out of particularly important inter-
national norms. In practice, it seems that each lawyer, scholar, and judge
brings a particular vision to the issue of identifying what are the important
or essential international norms that States should be unable to opt out of
or reject. In fact, the content of jus cogens involve considerable subjectivity.
Nonetheless, this does not diminish the value of jus cogens as a represen-
tation of the idea that there is an international society with core values. In
the end, belief that jus cogens exists may be its most important attribute, en-
suring that it has some, albeit ill-defined impact.
Available evidence suggests that international jus cogens originated as
a construct of writers, in this case in the efforts of early publicists to ex-
plain an emerging legal system governing sovereign states, where rulers
often claimed absolute power unrestrained by law.1 Scholars sought to
* This chapter draws upon materials published in: Dinah Shelton, ‘Sherlock Holmes and the
mystery of jus cogens’, 46 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, (2015) 23–50. Reprinted
with permission. Dinah Shelton, ‘International Law and “Relative Normativity”’ in M.D Evans
1 For historical development of jus cogens, see, A.G. Robledo, 1982a, El ius cogens
internacional (Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México); and A.G. Robledo, 1982b,
‘Le ius cogens international: Sa genese, sa nature, ses fonctions’, 172 Recueil des Cours, 10–68.
2 Introduction
understand the nature and source of obligations that could limit the power
of governments internally and internationally, binding them to a set of
legal norms to which they did not necessarily express consent.2 Finding the
source of such international obligations became a perpetual quest.
Early writers also foresaw problems of hierarchy that would surface
with the emergence of conflicting obligations. In attempting to propound
a coherent legal system, they turned to analogies from private law, general
principles, legal theory, moral and legal philosophy, and religion. They de-
veloped the notion of a ‘higher’ law, from which the doctrine jus cogens
emerged. Since then, proponents have argued strongly for the existence
and functions of jus cogens in international law, while critics have expressed
scepticism about the reality or practical value of the concept.3
The only references to peremptory norms in positive law are found in the
Vienna conventions on the law of treaties,4 further discussed in section 2.3.
Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
concerning treaties between States, provides that a treaty will be void ‘if,
at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of gen-
eral international law’. The 1986 Convention on Treaties between States
and International Organizations or between International Organizations
is similar in content. Anticipating the VCLT provisions are the writings of
classic and modern publicists proposing various sources and functions of
jus cogens, as discussed in the chapters that follow. They reveal the cultural
importance of jus cogens, but also the very limited role it plays in dispute
settlement or enforcement of norms.
2 For a discussion of early attempts to ascertain limits on the exercise of sovereignty, see
S. Kadelbach, 2006, at 21; Haimbaugh, 1987, at 207–211.

3 For critical assessments, see, e.g. Schwarzenberger 1967, at 29–30; Schwelb 1967, at 961
(referring to ‘the vagueness, the elasticity, and the dangers of the concept of international
jus cogens’); J. Sztucki, 1974, Jus cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna, Springer); G.A. Christenson, 1988, ‘Jus cogens: Guarding interests fundamental to
international society’, 28 Virginia J. Int’l Law, 585–648; G. Danilenko, 1991, ‘International jus
cogens: Issues of law-making’, 2 Eur. J. Int’l Law, 42–65; M. Weisburd, 1995, ‘The emptiness of
the concept of jus cogens, as illustrated by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, 17 Michigan J. Int’l
Law, 1–51.
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331; 1986 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations, UN Doc. A/CONF.129/15.
2
The Origins and Sources
of Jus Cogens*
Jus cogens has been developed largely by international legal scholarship,1

which has attempted to identify the theoretical foundations of a world jur-
idical order. Every classic author in the field of international law expounds a
theory of the source of obligation and the nature of international law. They
typically distinguish between voluntary or consensual law and compulsory
norms that bind a state independently of its will. Some early writers found
the source of compulsory law in divine or religious law, binding all humans
and human institutions.2 A related theory derives the concept of jus cogens
from general principles of law, noting the existence of overriding public
policy and superior norms in all legal systems. Finally, positivists rely on
state consent for the origin, content, and functions of jus cogens. Each of
these conceptual approaches is discussed in the following subsections.
2.1 Natural Law

For most classical writers, there existed three levels of legal obligation: jus
dispositivum or voluntary law, divine law, and jus naturale necessarium (ne-
cessary natural law), the last mentioned being the highest category. Gentili3
1 For a history of this doctrinal development, see A.G. Robledo, 1982, El ius cogens
internacional (Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México); and A.G. Robledo, 1982,
‘Le ius cogens international: Sa genese, sa nature, ses fonctions’, 172 Recueil des Cours, 10–68.
2 The earliest evidence of treaty practice indicates that the entirety of international obliga-
tion was perceived to originate in divine mandates, and any trespass of borders or subjugation
of one country by another was regarded as a violation of the divine established order and a
grave offence which could lead to immediate sanction by the gods of the breaching party. See
A. Amnon, 2012, Tracing the Earliest Recorded Concepts of International Law: The Ancient Near
East (2500–330 BC) (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff).
3 A. Gentili, 1933, De iure belli libri tres (Oxford, Clarendon Press; London, H. Milford).
4 The Origins and Sources of Jus Cogens
connected natural law to the law of nations, influencing Grotius who gave
primary place to natural law, even over divine law: ‘The law of nature, again,
is unchangeable—even in the sense that it cannot be changed by God.
Measureless as is the power of God, nevertheless it can be said that there are
certain things over which that power does not extend.’4 If such principles
of natural law were unchangeable even by God, they necessarily bound all
sovereigns on earth: ‘Since this law is not subject to change and the obli-
gations which it imposes are necessary and indispensable, Nations cannot
alter it by agreement, nor individually or mutually release themselves from
it.’5 So, while voluntary or consent-based law could be created by the ex-
press or tacit will of states, such law could not override natural law.
Wolff6 and Vattel7 agreed that there existed ‘necessary law’ by which they
meant it was binding and overriding of state consent. This law was natural
to all states and made illegal all treaties and customs which contravened this
necessary law. Wolff ’s necessary law of nations8 included the immutable
laws of justice, the ‘sacred law’, which nations and sovereigns are bound to
respect and follow in all their actions.9 Pufendorf10 and Vattel also relied
on natural law ‘no less binding on states, on men united in political society,
than on individuals’.11 They saw the natural law of nations as a particular
science, ‘consisting in a just and rational application of the law of nature to
the affairs and conduct of nations or sovereigns’.12 The distinction between
jus dispositivum and the ‘necessary principles of international law that bind
all states regardless of consent’ lies in the origin of the latter in the natural
law of reason:
4 H. Grotius, 1625, On the Law of War and Peace (De jure belli ac pacis libri tres) (1646 edn
transl. by F.W. Kelsey, 1925, Oxford, Clarendon Press).

5 Ibid.
6 C. Wolff, 1764, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractorum [A scientific method for
understanding the law of nations] (transl. by J.H. Drake, S.J. Brown, ed., London, Clarendon
Press), para. 5.
7 E. de Vattel, 1758, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle (London, Neuchâtel),
para. 9.
8 J. Chitty, 1849, ‘Preface’, in E. de Vattel (ed.), The Law of Nations; Or Principles of the Law
of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (transl. and intro. by J.
Chitty, 7th Am. edn, Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson Law Booksellers), at ix (citing C. Wolff,
1764), ‘[T]‌he law of nations certainly belongs to the law of nature: it is, therefore, on account of
its origin, called the Natural, and, by reason of its obligatory force, the necessary law of nations.’
9 Ibid., at xiii.
10 S. Pufendorf, 1710, Of law of Nature and Nations (Oxford, L. Lichfield, for A. &
J. Churchill), at Book ii, ch. iii, Sect. 23.

11 Chitty (n 8), at xi.
12 Ibid.
Public Policy: Logical or Legal Necessity 5
We use the term necessary Law of Nations for that law which results from
applying the natural law to Nations. It is necessary, because Nations are
absolutely bound to observe it . . . This same law is called by Grotius and
his followers the internal Law of Nations, inasmuch as it is binding upon
the conscience of Nations . . . It is by the application of this principle that
a distinction can be made between lawful and unlawful treaties or con-
ventions and between customs which are innocent and reasonable and
those which are unjust and deserving of condemnation.13
Suy claims that the actual words jus cogens are not found in any text prior
to the nineteenth century,14 although the idea of a law binding irrespective
of the will of individual parties is common through ‘the whole theory and
philosophy of law’.15 Early twentieth-century publicists, such as Lassa
Oppenheim and William Hall, continued to assert that states could not ab-
rogate certain ‘universally recognized principles’ by mutual agreement.16
The rise of positivism reduced although it did not entirely eliminate natural
law from theoretical discourse.
2.2 Public Policy: Logical or Legal Necessity

Necessity took on another meaning for authors who focused their attention
on positing the fundamental needs of any legal system and on the definition
of law itself. Several writers suggested that any society operating under law
must have fundamental rules allowing for no dissent if the existence of the
law and society is to be maintained. According to Rozakis, the ratio legis
of jus cogens is to protect the common concerns of the subjects of law, the
values and interests considered indispensable by a society at a given time.17
Organized society creates an ordering of norms, but only when there is a
minimum degree of community feeling does it elevate certain values as
13 de Vattel (n 8), pp. 7 and 9.

14 He cites first the 1847 Pandecten of van Gluck I who refers to those laws which categor-
ically prescribe an action or prohibit it and whose binding force is absolute. E. Suy, 1967, ‘The
concept of jus cogens in public international law’, in The Concept of Jus Cogens in International
Law: Papers and Proceedings, Report of Conference organized by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Lagonissi, Greece (April 1966), at 19.
15 Ibid., at 18.
16 W. Hall, 1924, A Treatise on International Law (8th edn, Oxford, Clarendon), pp. 382–
383; L. Oppenheim, 1905, International Law (London, Longmans), p. 528.

17 C. Rozakis, 1976, The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties (Amsterdam, North
Holland Publishing Co.), p. 2.

necessary, with primacy over others.18 Jus cogens in international law there-
fore starts to appear in positive law as international society develops from
relatively unorganized into an increasingly organized one with common
interests and values.19
The existence of an international legal system means that public policy
requires states to conform to those principles whose non-observance
would render illusory the very concept of an international society of states
or the concept of international law itself, such as the principles of sovereign
equality and pacta sunt servanda. Public policy—ordre public—may be de-
fined by its effects, that is, the impossibility for individuals of opting out,
or by its objective: to protect the essential interest of the state and establish
the legal foundations of the economic and moral order of the society.20 This
implies limiting the will of the individual to meet the essential needs of the
community.
According to Tomuschat, such a society of fundamental principles has
emerged gradually in international relations:
[t]‌he fact is that the cohesive legal bonds tying States to one another
have considerably strengthened since the coming into force of the
United Nations Charter; . . . a community model of international society
would seem to come closer to reality than at any time before in history.21
States live within a legal framework of a few basic rules that nonetheless
allow them considerable freedom of action. Such a framework has become
necessary in the light of global problems threatening human survival in
an unprecedented fashion. Recalcitrant states would not only profit by re-
jecting regulatory regimes adopted by the overwhelming majority of states,
they would also threaten the effectiveness of such regimes and pose risks to
all humanity.22
18 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Concept of Jus Cogens in International
Law: Papers and Proceedings (n 14), at 10.

19 Ibid., at 12.
20 H. de Page, 1962, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge (Brussels, Bruylant), p. 111.
21 C. Tomuschat, 1993, ‘Obligations arising for states without or against their will’, 241
Recueil des Cours, 191–374, at 210–211.

22 Ibid. The emergence of global resource crises, such as the widespread depletion of com-
mercial fish stocks, destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer, and anthropogenic climate
change, has produced growing concern about the ‘free rider’, the holdout state that benefits
from legal regulation accepted by others while enhancing its own profits through continued
utilization of the resource or by ongoing production and sale of banned substances.
General Principles of Law 7
In this public order theory, jus cogens norms exist as imperative and hier-
archically superior to other international law in order to promote the inter-
ests of the international community as a whole and preserve core values.
According to von Verdross, this is inherent in all legal systems: ‘A truly real-
istic analysis of the law shows us that every positive juridical order has its
roots in the ethics of a certain community, that it cannot be understood
apart from its moral basis.’23 As a consequence, the principle of immoral
agreements is recognized in every national legal order. In his third report
on the law of treaties in 1958, rapporteur Fitzmaurice appeared to see jus
cogens from the public order perspective, as he asserted that rules of jus
cogens ‘possess a common characteristic’, namely ‘that they involve not only
legal rules but considerations of morals and of international good order’.24
An international tribunal might refuse to recognize a treaty or to apply it
where the treaty ‘is clearly contrary to humanity, good morals, or to inter-
national good order or the recognized ethics of international behaviour’.25
The origin of jus cogens would thus seem to lie in the sociology or logic of
law which requires compliance with essential rules on which the system it-
self is based; it does not, however, indicate the process by which such rules
may be identified on the international level.
2.3 General Principles of Law

The theory that finds the origin of jus cogens in general principles of law
recognized in all legal systems, is linked to logical or legal necessity, but is
more in keeping with international law doctrine on sources of law. Private
agreements contrary to public policy or ordre public are void, voidable, or
unenforceable. The rules of public policy are an essential part of the legal
and social framework on which every effective legal system, including the
international one, ultimately rests.26 In its study on fragmentation of inter-
national law, the International Law Commission (ILC) Study Group ad-
dressed jus cogens, noting that the idea of hierarchy of norms ‘has found its
23 A. von Verdross, 1937, ‘Forbidden treaties in international law: Comments on Professor
Garner’s report on “The Law of Treaties” ’, 31 Am. J. Int’l Law, 571–577, at 574–576.
24 G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, Third report on the law of treaties, 10th sess. of the
ILC, A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.l, 1958, at 41.

25 Ibid., at 28.
26 Georg Schwarzenberger, 1965, ‘International Jus Cogens’ 43 Tex. L. Rev. 455, at 457.
expression in one way or another in all legal systems’.27 Like many authors,
the Study Group pointed to the Roman law distinction between jus cogens
or jus strictum and jus dispositivum and the maxim jus publicum privatorum
pactis mutari non potest.28
Domestic laws generally provide for the invalidity of agreements that
conflict with public policy or ordre public. German authors writing in the
early 1930s referred to jus cogens as general principles of law which are rec-
ognized as overriding norms by all civilized nations.29 For some French
scholars, humanitarian rules also belong to general principles of law from
which no derogation is possible.30 In Lauterpacht’s view, the illegality of the
object of the treaty and consequently the nullity of the agreement would
result from ‘inconsistency with such overriding principles of international
law which may be regarded as constituting principles of international public
policy (ordre international public)’.31 These principles need not necessarily
be codified or crystallized. Lauterpacht asserts that ‘overriding principles
of international law’, such as the suppression of slavery, ‘may be regarded
as constituting principles of international public policy (ordre international
public). These principles . . . may be expressive of rules of international mor-
ality so cogent that an international tribunal would consider them forming
a part of those principles of law generally recognized by civilized nations
which the ICJ is bound to apply [under] its Statute’.32
In McNair’s classic work on the law of treaties, the author found it ‘diffi-
cult to imagine any society, whether of individuals or of States whose law
sets no limit whatever to freedom of contract’.33 Every civilized community
27 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising
from the diversification and expansion of international law, Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission, 58th Sess., UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, at 181.
28 Ibid., 182. Jus publicum was not only public law, but all rules are important to the society.
29 F.A. von der Heydte, 1932, ‘Die Erscheinungsformen des Zwischenstaatlichen Rechts: jus
cogens und jus dispositivum im Volkerrecht’, 16 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, 461–487. The au-
thor cited, in particular, the rules indispensable and necessary to the existence of every legal
order, e.g. pacta sunt servanda and the obligation to make reparation for damages.
30 L. Delbez, 1964, Les principes generaux du droit international public (3rd edn, Paris,
Pichon et Durand-Auzias), pp. 317–318. ‘The object of a treaty is unlawful when the obliga-
tions it contains are contrary to prior conventional obligations, rules of customary law or rules
based on universal morality of an imperative character.’ See also L. Cavare, 1962, Droit inter-
national public positif (2nd edn, Paris, Pedone), p. 69 (agreements cannot be contrary to ‘le
droit commun de l’humanite’); and P. Reuter, 1961, ‘Principes de droit international public’,
103 Recueil des Cours, Hague Academy Int’l Law,425–655, at 466–467.
31 H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, Report on the law of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/63,
24 March 1953.
32 Ibid., para. 4.
33 A.D. McNair, 1961, Law of Treaties (Oxford, Clarendon Press), pp. 213–214.
Consent 9
contains norms from which no derogation is allowed and the community

of states is no exception. This suggests that he viewed jus cogens as origin-
ating in general principles of law, but he goes on to indicate that the spe-
cific content of such rules emerges from the consent of states. Where there
is a conflict between a treaty and a norm of customary international law,
McNair concludes that certain of these norms ‘cannot be set aside or modi-
fied by contracting States . . . they consist of rules which have been accepted,
either expressly by treaty or tacitly by custom, as being necessary to protect
the public interests of the society of States or to maintain the standards of
public morality recognized by them’.34
2.4 Consent
In the nineteenth century, a notion of international law emerged that was
based strictly on the consent of states.35 Nevertheless authors from the be-
ginning of the twentieth century continued to assert the existence of fun-
damental norms (Grundnorms)36 sometimes founded on la solidarité
naturelle,37 but more often contending that states themselves had recog-
nized peremptory norms and their effect in customary international law.
Oppenheim stated in 1905 that in his view ‘a number of “universally rec-
ognised principles” of international law existed which rendered any con-
flicting treaty void and that the peremptory effect of such principles was
itself a unanimously recognized customary rule of international law’.38
Similarly, Hall stated that:
[t]‌he requirement that contracts shall be in conformity with law invali-

dates, or at least renders voidable, all agreements which are at vari-
ance with the fundamental principles of international law and their
34 Ibid., p. 215.
35 ‘Les règles de droit international n’ont pas un caractère imperatif. Le droit international
admet en conséquence qu’un traité peut avoir n’importe quel contenu’, P. Guggenheim, 1953,
Traité de droit international public (Genf, Georg), pp. 57–58. See also G. Morelli, 1951, Nozioni
di diritto internazionale (Padova, CEDAM), p. 37; The Case of the S.S. Lotus, PCIJ, Judgment 9
of 7 September 1927, at 18.
36 H. Kelsen, 1945, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, Harvard University Press),
pp. 110 ff.

37 G. Scelle, 1932, Précis de droit des gens (Paris, Recueil Sirey), Premiére Partie, p. 3; and G.
Scelle, 1948, Cours de droit international public (Paris Dormat-Montchrestien), pp. 5 ff.
38 Oppenheim (n 16), p. 528.
undisputed applications, and with the arbitrary usages which have ac-
quired decisive authority.39
In 1934, Judge Schücking asserted that the League of Nations would not
have embarked on the codification of international law ‘if it were not pos-
sible to create jus cogens, the effect of which would be that, once States have
agreed on certain rules of law, and have also given an undertaking that these
rules may not be altered by some only of their number, any act adopted in
contravention of that undertaking would be automatically void’.40
A strictly voluntarist view of international law rejects the notion that a
state may be bound to an international legal rule without its consent and
thus does not recognize a collective interest that is capable of overriding the
will of an individual member of the society. States are deemed to construct
the corpus of international law either through agreements or through re-
peated practice out of a sense of legal obligation.41 The Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ), in one of its first decisions, stated that ‘[t]‌he
rules of law binding upon States . . . emanate from their own free will as ex-
pressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing prin-
ciples of law’.42 As recently as 1986, the ICJ reaffirmed this approach in
respect to the acquisition of weaponry by states. In the Nicaragua judgment
the Court stated:
In international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be
accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the
level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited, and this principle
is valid for all States without exception.43
Some legal theorists have long objected that the source of international ob-
ligation cannot lie in consent, but must be based on a prior, fundamental
norm that imposes a duty to comply with obligations freely accepted
39 Hall (n 16), p. 382.

40 See, Oscar Chinn case, 1934 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 149–150 (Schücking, J. dissenting).
41 See L. Henkin, 1989, ‘International law: Politics, values and functions’, 216 Recueil des
Cours, 9–416, at 45; P. Weil, 1983, ‘Towards relative normativity in international law?’, 77 Am.
J. Int’l L., 413–442; G. Danilenko, 1991, ‘International jus cogens: Issues of law-making’, 2 Eur.
J. Int’l Law 42–65, at 42; I.I. Lukashuk, 1989, ‘The principle pacta sunt servanda and the nature
of obligation under international law’, 83 Am. J. Int’l Law, 513–518.
42 Lotus, Judgment No. 9, 1927, PCIJ, Ser A, No. 10, at 18.
43 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States
of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, at 14, para. 269.

Consent 11
(Kelsen, 1945). Without a source of this norm outside consent there is an

unavoidable circularity of reasoning. A natural law origin of international
obligation was dominant among scholars until the nineteenth century,
when positivism and an emphasis on the sovereignty of states emerged in
theory and practice.44
Most contemporary commentators continue to view jus cogens through
the prism of state consent.45 Specifically, states may identify peremptory
norms in treaties, accept them as a higher form of customary international
law, or derive from them general principles of municipal law.46 In practice,
few if any examples can be found where states have expressly indicated their
intent to identify or create a peremptory norm; identification is thus by im-
plication. Yet, the positivist approach to identifying jus cogens, if not to ex-
plaining its origin, appears accepted by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). In Arrest Warrant Case the Court concluded that the prohibition
against torture is a norm of jus cogens based on ‘widespread international
practice and on the opinio juris of States’.47
It is unclear how, in a consent-based system, peremptory norms bind
those who object to the very concept of jus cogens or to a notion that such
norms can be identified by a large majority and imposed on dissenters. The
International Law Commission Commentary to Article 53 VCLT suggests
that peremptory norms need not achieve universal acceptance to create
a binding international consensus; it is sufficient if a ‘very large majority’
of representative states accept the norms as non-derogable.48 The posi-
tivist concept of peremptory norms thus reaches a conundrum in having a
consensual process with a non-consensual result—the imposition of rules
adopted by a large majority of dissenting states. Even if states consented to
a consensus-based source of international lawmaking, this would not pre-
clude them from withdrawing their consent at will.49 In fact, it is difficult to
44 See ch. 1.
45 M.N. Shaw, 2008, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press),
p. 97: ‘[O]‌nly rules based on custom or treaties may form the foundation of jus cogens norms.’
46 See, e.g. M. Byers, 1997, ‘Conceptualizing the relationship between jus cogens and erga
omnes rules’, 66 Nordic J. Int’l Law, 211–239, at 212 (jus cogens rules are derived from the pro-
cess of customary international law).
47 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), ICJ,
Judgment of 20 July 2012, at para. 99.

48 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States, para. 102, n. 6. The
Restatement cites the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Report of the proceedings of the
Committee of the Whole, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/11, 21 May 1968, at 471–472 (comments of
the chairman).
49 See J. Sztucki, 1974, Jus cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna,
Springer), p. 97.
reconcile peremptory norms that bind dissenting states with the positivist
theory of international law.50
The extent to which the system has moved and may still move towards
the imposition of global public policy on non-consenting states remains
highly debated, but the need for limits on state freedom of action seems
to be increasingly recognized. International legal instruments and doc-
trine now often refer to the ‘common interest of humanity’51 or ‘common
concern of mankind’ to identify broad concerns that could form part of
international public policy. References are also more frequent to ‘the inter-
national community’ as an entity or authority of collective action.52 In add-
ition, multilateral international agreements increasingly contain provisions
that affect non-party states, either providing incentives to adhere to the
norms, or allowing parties to take coercive measures that in practice re-
quire conforming behaviour of states not adhering to the treaty. The UN
Charter itself contains a list of fundamental principles and in Article 2(6)
asserts that these may be imposed on non-parties if necessary to ensure
international peace and security.
It should be noted that the problem of dissenting states is not as wide-
spread as might be assumed. First, the obligations deemed basic to the
international community—to refrain from the use of force against another
state, to peacefully settle disputes, and to respect human rights, funda-
mental freedoms, and self-determination—are conventional obligations
contained in the UN Charter, to which all member states have consented.
All states have accepted the humanitarian conventions on the laws of war
which express customary international law. The multilateral regimes for
the oceans, outer space, and key components of the environment (climate
change, protection of the ozone layer, and biological diversity) are widely
accepted. Thus in most cases the problem is one of ensuring compliance by
states that have freely consented to the obligations in question and not one
of imposing obligations on dissenting states.
50 See ibid., p. 64. ‘[T]‌he introduction of a consensual ingredient into the concept of jus
cogens leads inevitably, in the ultimate instance, to the very negation of that concept.’ See also
Siderman de Blake v Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that jus
cogens norms ‘transcend . . . consent’).
51 See, UNCLOS, Art. 137(2); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967),
pmbl., para. 2.
52 See, e.g. Art. 53, VCLT; Arts 136–137 UNCLOS.
3
The Law of Treaties*
3.1 Drafting the VCLT

Peremptory norms/jus cogens entered positive law with the Vienna treaties
on treaties. Jus cogens was first included in the work of the ILC with the Third
Report of G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, under
the heading ‘legality of the object’.1 The first two Special Rapporteurs on the
law of treaties, Brierly2 and Lauterpacht,3 supported the notion of peremp-
tory norms in international law.4 During ILC work on the law of treaties,
however, most of the members joined the ILC’s fourth Special Rapporteur on
treaty law, Sir Humphrey Waldock, who sought to reconcile jus cogens with
the doctrine of positivism. They spent little time speculating on the origin of
jus cogens. The final ILC draft on the law of treaties was produced by Waldock.
The work of the International Law Commission on the law of treaties was
based essentially on the notion of barring illegal agreements as a general
principle of law. The ILC’s first Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties,
Brierly, did not refer to jus cogens, but did speak of contractual limitations.5
The first report of the second ILC Special Rapporteur, H. Lauterpacht, pro-
posed an article on jus cogens,6 arguing that:
the voidance of contractual agreements whose object is illegal is a general

principle of law. As such it must find a place in a codification of the law of
1 A/CN.4/114; see 1958 Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. II: Documents of
the Tenth Session including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, at 26–27.
2 J.L. Brierly, 1936, ‘Régles générales de droit de la paix’, 58 Recueil des Cours, 5–242, at 218–219.
3 H. Lauterpacht, 1937, ‘Régles générales de droit de la paix’, 62 Recueil des Cours, 95–422,
at 153ff.
4 Ibid., at 306–307.
5 J.L. Brierly, Special Rapporteur, Report on the law of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/23, 14
April 1950, at 246 ff.

6 H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur, Report on the law of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/63, 24
March 1953.
14 The Law of Treaties
treaties. This is so although there are no instances in international judicial

and arbitral practice of a treaty being declared void on account of the il-
legality of its object.7
In the ILC report submitted to the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties,
the ILC stated that it had become increasingly difficult to sustain the propos-
ition that there is no rule of international law from which states cannot at their
own free will derogate.8 The law of treaties thus must accept that there are cer-
tain rules from which states are not competent to withdraw, and which may
be changed only by another rule of the same character.9 The ILC also stated
that although there is no simple criterion by which to identify a general rule of
international law as having the character of jus cogens, the particular nature of
the subject matter with which it deals may give it the character of jus cogens.10
Article 53 VCLT, concerning treaties between states, provides that a
treaty will be void ‘if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a per-
emptory norm of general international law’. Such a norm is defined by the
VCLT as one ‘accepted and recognized by the international community
of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm having the same char-
acter’. Article 64 adds that the emergence of a new peremptory norm of gen-
eral international law will render void any existing treaty in conflict with
the norm. No clear agreement was reached during the VCLT negotiations
nor has one emerged since then about the content of jus cogens.
The final version of Article 53 VCLT11 was adopted by a majority of 87
votes in favour, with 8 votes against,12 and 12 abstentions.13 Because of this
division, and the specific formulation of the article, René Jean Dupuy, in
7 Ibid., para. 5.
8 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the
work of the second part of its 17th sess., 17th sess. of the ICL, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, 3–28
January 1966, at 247 ff.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 The draft article was adopted at the Vienna Conference largely as suggested, save for the
addition of the words ‘accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a
whole’. UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary records of the plenary meeting and of
the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 1st Sess., A/CONF.39/11, 1968, at 471.
12 Australia, Belgium, France, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Switzerland, and
Turkey. UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary records of the plenary meeting and
of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 2nd Sess., A/CONF.39/11/Add.1, 12 May
1969, at 107.
13 New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, United Kingdom,
Gabon, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, and Malta. Ibid.

Drafting the VCLT 15
1966 a member of the Holy See’s delegation to the Vienna Conference, noted
that the inclusion of Article 53 in the VCLT sanctioned the ‘positivization of
international law’.14 Despite the majority being in favour of the VCLT with
Article 53 on jus cogens, the ILC decided to appoint a new rapporteur on the
topic in 2015. He noted in his first report that ‘the contours and legal effects
of jus cogens remain ill-defined and contentious’.15 He could also have re-
ported that there is very little case law invoking the concept to impeach the
validity of a treaty.
The second treaty on the law of treaties echoed the first one. The drafting
of the second treaty on treaties, the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties between States and International Organizations, indicated con-
tinued controversy over the concept of norms jus cogens. The text proposed
by the ILC included provisions on jus cogens modelled after the 1969 VCLT.
The commentary called the prohibition of the illegal use of armed force
embodied in the UN Charter ‘the most reliable known example of a per-
emptory norm’ and also claimed that the notion of peremptory norms, as
embodied in VCLT Article 53, ‘had been recognized in public international
law before the Convention existed, but that instrument gave it both a pre-
cision and a substance which made the notion one of its essential provi-
sions’.16 The representative of France disagreed during the plenary drafting
session, expressing his government’s opposition to VCLT Article 53 ‘be-
cause it did not agree with the recognition that article gave to jus cogens’
while another government called jus cogens ‘still a highly controversial con-
cept which raised the fundamental question of how to recognize the scope
and content of a peremptory norm of general international law’, noting that
time had revealed ‘a divergence of views since 1969 regarding the nature of
norms of jus cogens, which it had not been possible to define’.17 The text of
the Convention was adopted by 67:1, with twenty-three states abstaining; it
14 See René-Jean Dupuy’s remarks at the meeting of the Committee of the Whole on 30
April 1968 (UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess. Vienna, 26 March–24 May 1968,
Ofﬁcial Records, Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Committee of the Whole, at
258, para. 74).
15 First Report of Mr. Dire D. Tladi, Special Rapporteur of the International Law
Commission on the topic of jus cogens, A/69/10, at 274, para. 3.

16 According to the Commentary, ‘it is apparent from the draft articles that peremptory
norms of international law apply to international organizations as well as to states, and this is
not surprising’. A/Conf.129/16/Add.1 (vol. II), pp. 39, 44.
17 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, Vienna, 18 February–21 March 1986,

A/Conf.129/16 (vol. I), 17. See also the concerns expressed by Germany, and similar objec-
tions raised to Art. 64 which concerns the emergence of a new peremptory norm of general
international law (p. 18).
16 The Law of Treaties
has yet to enter into force. Several states explained their abstention by refer-
ring to the articles concerning jus cogens, including the dispute settlement
provisions on the topic.18 Even some of those that favoured jus cogens ex-
pressed uncertainty. The representative of Brazil called jus cogens ‘a concept
in evolution’.19
3.2 Definition of Jus Cogens

There are many proposed lists of claimed norms jus cogens, but the VCLT
provides only a cursory and circular means of identification, which falls
short of any meaningful definition. According to this, jus cogens norms are
those accepted and recognized by the international community of states as
a whole as ones from which no derogation is permitted. In other words, jus
cogens norms are jus cogens norms. What this formulation does indicate is
that it is the attitude of states that determines the issue and that unanimity
among them is not required. The ILC, in discussing the first report of its
new Special Rapporteur on the topic, agreed that it is the practice of states
which gives norms their peremptory character. Further, some ILC mem-
bers expressed the view that jus cogens norms have as their purpose the pro-
tection of international public order; yet they still require opinio juris, the
conviction of the existence of a legal right or obligation of a peremptory
nature. The ILC was divided over the issue of whether to provide an illustra-
tive list of jus cogens norms.
18 Ibid., pp. 186–194.

19 Ibid., p. 188.
4
Recent Work of the International
Law Commission
4.1 Recent ILC Consideration of the Topic

of Jus Cogens
Uncertainties over the precise nature of jus cogens and its consequences,
as well as lack of consensus about which norms fall within this higher cat-
egory of law led a member of the ILC, Andreas Jacovides, to propose in
1993 the inclusion of jus cogens as a possible topic for ILC study. His com-
ment at the time about the lack of relevant standards to determine the legal
content of jus cogens, or the process by which norms may rise to peremp-
tory status, continue to resonate nearly a quarter of a century after adop-
tion of the VCLT. Nonetheless, the ILC declined to include the topic in the
Commission’s programme of work at that time, doubting that the proposed
study would serve a useful purpose in the absence of relevant State practice
and jurisprudence.1
In the period since the 1966 draft articles and the 1993 proposal by
Mr Jacovides, practice developed rapidly. National and international
courts began to refer to jus cogens and provide insights about its forma-
tion, operation, content, and consequences or effects.2 States have at times
1 Already in the 1966 Draft Articles, the Commission noted that the ‘view that there is no
rule of international law from which States cannot at their own free will contract out has be-
come increasingly difficult to sustain’. See paragraph 1 of the commentary to Draft Article 50
of the 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties. In paragraph 3 of the commentary to Draft
Article 50, the Commission stated that, at that point, it was appropriate to provide for the rule
in general terms ‘and to leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and
in the jurisprudence of international tribunals’. See Annex A of the Report of the International
Law Commission, 69th Sess. (A/69/10) at para. 3.
2 See, e.g. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
United States), ICJ Reports 1986, 14; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium) ICJ
Reports 2002, 3; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application 2002: DRC v
Rwanda), ICJ Reports 2006, 99; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece
Intervening), ICJ Reports 2012, 99. See especially the dissenting opinion of Judge Trindade in
the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case, the joint separate opinions of Judges Higgins,
18 Recent Work of the International Law Commission
also referred to jus cogens in support of positions that they advance.3 The
Commission itself, in the course of considering other topics, has also made
contributions to this development. Article 26 of the Draft Articles on State
responsibility, for example, provides that circumstances precluding wrong-
fulness provided in the draft articles may not be used to justify conduct
that is inconsistent with jus cogens. The commentary thereto presents a
non-exhaustive list of jus cogens norms.4 In addition to repeating the list
contained in the commentary to Draft Article 26, the Report of the Study
Group on Fragmentation provides a list of ‘the most frequently cited candi-
dates’ for the status of jus cogens.5 The Commission’s Guide to Practice on
Reservations to Treaties also provides detailed analysis on the effects of jus
cogens on the permissibility and consequences of reservations.6
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, and the dissenting opinions of Judges Oda, Al-Khasawneh, and
van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant case. Al-Adsani v UK (Application No. 35763/97), 21
November 2001. See also the separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in the Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ Reports 1993, p. 325 (Separate Opinion of Judge
Lauterpacht), paras 100–104 and Regina v Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 24 March 1999, House of Lords, 119 ILR, p. 136.
3 See, e.g. statement by Counsel to Belgium in Questions Relating to the Obligation to
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Oral Proceedings, 13 March 2012 (CR 2012/3),
para. 3 and statement by Counsel to Senegal in Questions Relating to the Obligation to
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Oral Proceedings, 15 March 2012 (CR 2012/
4), para. 39. See also Counter-Memorial of Senegal in Questions Relating to the Obligation
to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), para. 51. Similarly, while Germany sought to
limit the effects of jus cogens in the Jurisdictional Immunities case, its own statement not only
did not dispute the existence of jus cogens but in fact positively asserted the character of cer-
tain norms as jus cogens. See, e.g. the Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany in the
Jurisdiction Immunities case, 12 June 2009, para. 86 where Germany states: ‘Undoubtedly,
for instance, jus cogens prohibits genocide.’ See also Statement of South Africa of 29 October
2009 on the report of the International Law Commission (A/C.6/64/SR.15, paras 69–70) cited
in the second report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr Roman Kolodkin on Immunity of State
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 10 June 2010 (A/CN.4/631), para. 9, especially
n. 13. On 28 October 2013, during the Sixth Committee’s consideration of the report of the
International Law Commission, Portugal highlighted jus cogens as of ‘utmost importance’
(A/C.6/68/SR.17), para. 88.
4 See paragraph 5 of the commentary to Draft Article 26 in which the Commission, in
fairly unequivocal terms, states that those ‘peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and
recognised include the prohibition of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination,
crimes against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination’.
5 See paragraph 374 of Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission
on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification

and Expansion of International Law, 13 April 2006 (A/CN.4/L.682). See also Conclusion 33
of the Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law (2006).
6 See, e.g. Commentary to Draft Guide 3.1.5.4 and Guide 4.4.3 of the Guide to Practice
on Reservations to Treaties. See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New
Application 2002: DRC v Rwanda) (Separate Opinion of Judge Dugard) (discussing the effect
The First Report 19
4.2 The First Report

Despite these developments, it was not until 2015 that the ILC decided to
include the topic in its programme of work and appointed South African
member Dire Tladi as Special Rapporteur (SR) for the topic.7 The General
Assembly took note of the ILC decision in resolution 70/236 adopted 23
December 2015. At the following session of the ILC, held in 2016, Tladi
presented his first report.8 It set forth his general approach to the topic, and
provided a general overview of the issues identified. After consideration at
the 2016 session, the Commission referred his draft conclusions in the re-
port to the Drafting Committee, which adopted them provisionally.9
The initial report of Tladi addressed conceptual matters such as the na-
ture and definition of jus cogens norms.10 Concerning the methodology,
States and the SR agreed that the latter should undertake a thorough ana-
lysis of State and judicial practice. Scholarly writings could be used to sup-
plement these sources.
As for the historical antecedents of jus cogens, the SR noted that it was
literature, going back to the seventeenth century, that recognized the ex-
istence of norms from which States could not opt out. He added that State
practice was scant, but States had not questioned, during the Vienna
Conference, the idea of jus cogens, nor its status as part of international law.
The SR did not attempt to resolve the theoretical debate concerning the
nature of jus cogens; instead he proposed three draft conclusions, the first
concerning the way in which jus cogens rules are to be identified and the
legal consequences of that identification. The second draft conclusion states
the rule of jus cogens may only be modified, derogated from, or abrogated
by another rule of jus cogens. Finally, the third draft conclusion defines jus
cogens norms as jus cogens norms, that is, as those accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as those from which
no derogation, modification, or abrogation is permitted. Significantly, it
adds that these norms protect the fundamental values of the international
of reservations that violate jus cogens), para. 9. See also Principle 8 of the Guiding Principles
applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations, with com-
mentaries thereto, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two.
7 A/CN.4/693, First Report of Mr Dire Tladi, SR on the topic of jus cogens. Annual Report
of the ILC, ORGA, 71st Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/71/10.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
community and are hierarchically superior to other international law

norms and are universally applicable. This suggests that the origins lie in the
public policy approach described above.
4.3 The Second Report

At its 69th Session in 2017, the ILC had before it the second report sub-
mitted by the SR11 which aimed to set forth the criteria for the identifica-
tion of peremptory norms, using the VCLT as a starting point. It was at this
session that the ILC decided to change the title of the topic to Peremptory
Norms of general international law (jus cogens), as the SR had proposed.12
It also referred to the Drafting Committee draft conclusions 2, 4, 5, 6, and
7.13 The draft conclusions made little progress in developing criteria for
identifying norms jus cogens, beyond the statement in the first report that
took a positivist approach in referring to recognition and acceptance by the
international community of States. Draft conclusion 4 identified two cri-
teria: first, the norm proposed must be a norm of general international law;
second, it must be accepted and recognized by the international commu-
nity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.
This reiterates the positivist position of the VCLT in its focus on State
practice, reinforced in draft conclusion 5, which provides that customary
international law is the most common basis for the formation of jus cogens
norms of international law.14 General principles of law can also serve as
the basis for jus cogens norms, while treaties ‘may reflect a norm of general
international law capable of rising to the level of a jus cogens norm of gen-
eral international law’.15 This departs somewhat from the jurisprudence of
the ICJ, which has looked more favourably to treaty practice.16
11 See second report of the SR, Mr Dire Tladi, on jus cogens, Doc. A/CN,4/706.
12 Report of the Commission on the work of its 69th Sess., Official Records of the General
Assembly, 72nd Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/72/10), para. 146. Mr Cissé, however, had suggested
that the name of the topic be changed to ‘Identification of peremptory norms of international
law’ (A/CN.4/SR.3373). While Ms Oral agreed with the name change, she stated that the
phrase ‘general international law’ should not be understood as excluding norms under special-
ized regimes (ibid.).
13 Report of the Commission on the work of its 69th Sess., Official Records of the General
Assembly, 72nd Sess., Suppl. No. 10 (A/72/10), paras 162–210. See also, the Third Report,
para. 11.
14 Draft conclusion 5, para. 1, Second Report (n 13).
15 Draft conclusion 5, para. 4, ibid.
16 See section 5.2. For criticism of the report for reducing the value of treaties and gen-
eral principles of law in the formation of norms jus cogens, see the comments of members of
The Third Report 21
The emphasis on customary international law also clear in the next two
draft conclusions, which focus on opinio juris, requiring ‘an assessment of
the opinion of the international community of States as a whole’ (draft con-
clusion 6) and insisting that it is the attitude of States that is relevant; other
actors ‘may be relevant in providing context and assessing the attitude of
States’.17 Importantly, acceptance and recognition by ‘a large majority’ of
States is sufficient to identify a norm as one of jus cogens; universal accept-
ance and recognition is not needed.18
4.4 The Third Report

In 2018, the ILC’s 70th Session, the SR delivered his third report,19 which
considered the consequences and legal effects of peremptory norms of gen-
eral international law. Based on this report, the Commission decided to
refer draft conclusions 10 to 23 to the Drafting Committee.20 In his intro-
duction to this report, the SR noted ‘that there was near-universal agree-
ment that customary international law was the most common basis for jus
cogens norms’.21 This is a somewhat surprising statement, given that the
focus of nearly all the work thus far had been on the impact of peremptory
norms on the law of treaties. In fact, much of this report also concerns treaty
law, including draft conclusion 13, which addresses the effects of peremp-
tory norms on reservations to treaties, based on earlier work of the ILC and
the practice of UN treaty bodies. As for dispute settlement procedures, the
SR limits himself to ‘encouraging’ parties to submit their disputes involving
conflict between a treaty and a norm of jus cogens to judicial settlement, in-
cluding the ICJ.22
the ILC, in particular, Mr Grossman Guiloff (A/CN.4/SR.3370) and Ms Escobar Hernández

(A/CN.4/SR.3373); Mr Kolodkin (A/CN.4/SR.3372) and Ms Galvão Teles (A/CN.4/SR.3373).
See, for examples of a contrary view, Mr Vásquez-Bermúdez (A/CN.4/SR.3372), Mr Ruda
Santolaria (ibid.), and Mr Reinisch (ibid.).
17 Draft conclusion 7 (n 13), paras 2 and 3.

18 Draft conclusion 7, para. 3, ibid.
19 Third report of the SR on peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens), Mr
Dire Tladi, Doc. A/CN.4//714 (12 February 2018); Report of the ILC on its 70th sess., Official
Records of the General Assembly, 72nd Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/72/10), para. 146).
20 Ibid., para. 96.
21 Ibid., para. 98.
22 Ibid., para. 101.
Draft conclusion 15 addresses fundamental issues of the relationship

between customary international law and jus cogens norms. First, based
mostly on the decisions of national courts,23 paragraph 1 asserts that the
latter prevail over the former, that is, existing jus cogens invalidates con-
flicting customary rules or prevents them from coming into being. The
second paragraph draws inspiration from Article 64 of the VCLT as well
as State opinions and judgments of the European Court of Justice. Finally,
paragraph 3 insists that the persistent objector rule does not apply to jus
cogens norms, ‘consistent with the universal nature of jus cogens’, State prac-
tice, and the decisions of national and regional courts.24
The broad and varied impacts of jus cogens norms are further asserted in
draft conclusions 16 and 17, which first declare invalid any unilateral act in
23 The notion that customary international law rules that conflict with norms of jus cogens
are invalid flows from the hierarchical superiority, reflected in the jurisprudence of national
and international courts. In Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v Reagan,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia observed that jus cogens norms
‘enjoy the highest status in international law and prevail over both customary international law
and treaties’. In the United Kingdom, the Queen’s Bench Division of the England and Wales
High Court of Justice in R (Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, also referred to the hierarchical superiority of jus cogens norms and, consequently, ‘that
derogation by States through treaties or rules of customary law not possessing the same status
[was] not permitted’. The Argentine Supreme Court has similarly stated that crimes against
humanity had the ‘character of jus cogens, meaning that [the prohibition is] above both treaty
law, but above all other sources of international law’. In the Kenya Section of the International
Commission of Jurists v Attorney-General, the Kenyan High Court stated that jus cogens norms
‘rendered void any other pre-emptory rules which come into conflict with them’. This sense
that norms of jus cogens take precedence over other customary international law has also been
affirmed in the jurisprudence of regional courts. In Al-Adsani, for example, the ECtHR de-
termined that jus cogens norms are those norms that enjoy ‘a higher rank in the international
hierarchy than treaty law and even “ordinary” customary rules’. Al-Adsani v United Kingdom,
joint dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch (joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa,
Cabral Barreto, and Vajić), para. 1. Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, joint dissenting opinion of
Judges Rozakis and Caflisch (joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto, and Vajić),
para. 1. Furthermore, in Belhas et al. v Moshe Ya’Alon, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia described jus cogens norms as ‘norms so universally accepted that all
States are deemed to be bound by them under international law’. Furthermore, in Belhas et al.
v Moshe Ya’Alon, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described jus
cogens norms as ‘norms so universally accepted that all States are deemed to be bound by them
under international law’. United States, Belhas et al. v Moshe Ya’Alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (DC Cir.
2008), at 1291–1292 (emphasis added). The IACtHR has similarly concluded that norms of
jus cogens ‘bind all States’. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of 17 September 2003 on the juridical
condition and rights of undocumented migrants, requested by the United Mexican States, Ser.
A, No. 18, paras 4–5. See also written statement of 19 June 1995 by the Government of Mexico
on the request for an advisory opinion submitted to the International Court of Justice by the
General Assembly at its 49th Sess. (resolution 49/75K), para. 7 (‘The norms . . . are of a legally
binding nature for all the States (jus cogens)’). See also Iran (Islamic Republic of) (A/C.6/68/
SR.26), para. 4 (‘the “persistent objector”, had no place in the formation of jus cogens’).
The Third Report 23
conflict with a norm of jus cogens and then asserts that resolutions of inter-
governmental organizations do not create obligations for States if they con-
flict with a norm of jus cogens.25 This proposed conclusion, according to the
SR, is supported by ‘a significant amount of literature and public statements
of States’,26 as well as by decisions of domestic, regional, and international
courts. To the extent possible such resolutions should be interpreted in a
manner consistent with jus cogens norms.
Draft conclusion 18 is said to reflect virtually universal agreement that
jus cogens norms also establish erga omnes obligations.27 The remaining
draft conclusions address State responsibility and jus cogens norms.
Paragraph 1 of Draft conclusion 19 confirms that the circumstances pre-
cluding wrongfulness in the articles on State responsibility do not apply to
breaches of obligations arising from jus cogens norms. Draft conclusion 20
concerns an asserted duty to cooperate to bring to an end, by lawful means,
any serious breach of a jus cogens norm, defined as a breach that is either
gross or systematic. The SR finds support for this ‘well-established principle
of international law’ in the Wall Advisory Opinion28 of the ICJ as well as the
La Cantuta case29 decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR).
Draft conclusion 20 continues in this vein, setting forth a duty not to
recognize as lawful a situation created by breach of a jus cogens norm and
a duty not to aid or assist in maintaining such a situation,30 as previously
affirmed by the ILC in the articles on State responsibility31 and the ICJ in
the Namibia32 and the Wall advisory opinions, as well as in UN resolutions.
Unlike draft conclusion 20, these duties apply even to breaches not deemed
‘serious’, because the duty of non-recognition arises based on the violation
of a peremptory norm and neither of the cited ICJ opinions had specified
seriousness as a requisite to the duty not to recognize or assist in a jus cogens
25 Ibid., paras 103–104.

28 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, at p. 200, para. 159.

29 La Cantuta v Peru (Merits, Reparations, and Costs) Series C, No. 162, Judgment, 29
November 2006, IACtHR, para. 160.

30 Report of the ILC on its 70th sess. (n 19), para. 107.
31 Yearbook . . . 2001, vol. II (Part Two) and corrigendum, para. 76.
32 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16 at p. 54, para. 119.
violation. Also, the duty of non-recognition did not require positive action,
warranting the lower threshold.
The remaining draft conclusions deal with crimes prohibited by jus
cogens norms, based on the ILC draft articles on crimes against humanity.33
The first of the draft conclusions in this section, number 23, concerns jur-
isdiction based on nationality, territory, or universality, although it is ac-
knowledged that the practice in this regard is not settled. The final draft
conclusion concerns the lack of immunity for commission of jus cogens
crimes. The report notes the criticism and conflicting State practice on this
issue, but points out that the conflicting cases are typically based on civil
proceedings and those brought against States. They are not meant to serve
as precedents for immunities in a criminal context, as reflected in the ICJ
judgment in the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy,
Greece intervening) case.34
The third report went well beyond the law of treaties and State respon-
sibility, in looking at the consequences of peremptory norms for States in
respect to international criminal law, customary international law, and
the law of international organizations, all of which have generated diver-
gent views in the literature, and concern for the practice problems that may
arise.35 The debate in the ILC also revealed considerable caution. Several
members referred to the dearth of relevant State practice and the com-
plexity of the issues involved.36 As much as possible, these members sought
to have the results of this study reflect existing law and established prac-
tice, especially in regard to the consequences of jus cogens on other sources
of international law.37 Specific issues were raised about the Rapporteur’s
proposal to eliminate the possibility of being a persistent objector to a rule
of jus cogens emerging from customary international law. Some members
felt the proposal did not reflect the complexity of the relationship between
the superior status of jus cogens norms and the principle of State consent.38
One key question concerned the appropriate result if a persistent objector
should raise objections before a norm is recognized as a jus cogens norm,
being expressed during the formative period.39
33Official Records of the General Assembly, 72nd Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/72/10), para. 45.
34Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy, Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ
Reports 2012, p. 99, 130, and 141, paras 70 and 96.
35 Report of the ILC on its 70th sess. (n 19), para. 111.
37 Ibid.
The Third Report 25
Another issue of concern was the reference to the Security Council in

draft conclusion 17. Some members objected to singling out the Council,
while other members felt it was important to do so, given the unique powers
and legal consequences for States of the resolutions adopted under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter as well the impact of Article 103.40
Draft conclusions 22 and 23 also provoked conflicting views about
the advisability of addressing individual criminal responsibility and im-
munity.41 Some members objected, considering it beyond the scope of the
project, while others expressed support for including the topics. Members
were particularly concerned about the lack of national legislation or case
law on prosecuting jus cogens violations committed on a State’s territory
or by a State’s national. They claimed the lack of State practice provided
no support for the draft conclusion; the same point was made about the
asserted duty to exercise universal jurisdiction. Some suggested adding a
‘without prejudice’ clause or the phrase ‘in accordance with international
law’.42 There were more objections to these final draft conclusions, again
based on the argument that State practice does not support them. The SR
admitted that the relative dearth of State practice presented a challenge,
but he felt it was not an insurmountable obstacle, because the Commission
could faithfully assess the practice, together with other reliable sources, to
come to the most accurate description of existing international law. As the
SR observed in his subsequent fourth report, there were some sharply crit-
ical comments on the ‘complicated and sensitive’ issues discussed in the
third report.43 The States in the Sixth Committee were also divided in their
reactions to the third report.44
40 Ibid., paras 131–133.
41 Ibid., paras 141–148.
42 Ibid.
43 Fourth report on peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) by Dire
Tladi, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission 71st Sess., Geneva, 29 April–7 June
and 8 July–9 August 2019 (A/CN.4/727) 31 January 2019, para. 5, n. 7. Mr Tladi noted that
strongly critical statements were made by Mr Zagaynov (A/CN.4/SR.3416); Mr Murphy (A/
CN.4/SR.3416); Mr Rajput (A/CN.4/SR.3418); Mr Huang (A/CN.4/SR.3419); Sir Michael
Wood (A/CN.4/SR.3421); and Mr Valencia-Ospina (A/CN.4/SR.3421). However, unlike other
critical members, Mr Valencia-Ospina’s criticism was not that the SR went too far, but, on the
contrary, that he did not go far enough. The SR added that Mr Nolte (A/CN.4/SR.3417), while
generally critical, was not as severe as the others.
44 Of the States that commented on the topic, the following were generally negative: China
(A/C.6/73/SR.25); France (A/C.6/73/SR.26); Romania (ibid.); Israel (A/C.6/73/SR.27); Turkey

(ibid.); and the United States of America (A/C.6/73/SR.29). States that adopted an overall
positive stance were: Bahamas, on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (A/C.6/
73/SR.20); Austria (statement of 26 October 2018; see also A/C.6/73/SR.25); Brazil (A/C.6/
73/SR.25); Cyprus (ibid.); Egypt (ibid.); Mexico (ibid.); Singapore (statement of 30 October
2018; see also A/C.6/73/SR.25); Estonia (A/C.6/73/SR.26); Japan (ibid.); New Zealand (ibid.);
4.5 The Fourth Report

The fourth report, presented in 2019,45 dealt with the question of the exist-
ence of regional jus cogens and the contentious issue of whether or not to
include an illustrative list in the conclusions to the study, based on norms
previously recognized by the Commission as possessing a peremptory
character. The Commission debated these two matters, then adopted on
first reading, 23 draft conclusions and a draft annex, together with com-
mentaries thereto, on peremptory norms of general international law (jus
cogens). These were meant to be transmitted through the UN Secretary
General to governments for comments and observations.
The illustrative list is especially noteworthy, identifying norms the ILC
has previously labelled as peremptory in character; most of them are also
recognized as violations of international criminal law. They are: the prohib-
itions of aggression, torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, apartheid
and racial discrimination, and slavery. To these, the SR added the right of
self-determination and the basic rules of humanitarian law.
In the fourth report, the SR responded to several criticisms raised
by delegations in the Sixth Committee to his work. One methodological
issue raised by several delegations concerned the importance of practice in
the consideration of the topic. A number of States questioned the Special
Rapporteur’s reliance on theory and doctrine rather than State practice.46
The Rapporteur ‘noted that, although a few States made this assertion, this
was not the majority view and, in fact, some States explicitly observed that
Portugal (ibid.); Thailand (ibid.); Greece (A/C.6/73/SR.27 and statement of 30 October 2018);
Islamic Republic of Iran (A/C.6/73/SR.27); Malaysia (statement of 30 October 2018; see also
A/C.6/73/SR.27); Republic of Korea (A/C.6/73/SR.27 and statement of 30 October 2018).
45 Fourth Report (n 43).

46 Czech Republic (A/C.6/73/SR.25) (‘the Special Rapporteur’s approach was based pri-
marily on references to doctrine rather than to international practice’); France (A/C.6/73/
SR.26); Romania (ibid.) (‘The Commission’s consideration of the topic must be based on State
practice, rather than on doctrinal approaches’); Slovakia (ibid.) (‘Slovakia noted with concern
that several of the draft conclusions on the topic proposed by the SR were based merely on
doctrinal opinions rather than State practice’); and Israel (A/C.6/73/SR.27 and statement of 30
October 2018) (which had a number of concerns regarding the methodology employed by the
SR, including that ‘the Special Rapporteur had relied too much on theory and doctrine, rather
than on relevant State practice’). See also United States (A/C.6/73/SR.29) (‘More generally, the
lack of State practice or jurisprudence on the bulk of the questions addressed in the project had
clear implications for the role and function of any draft conclusions ultimately adopted on the
topic. Although framed as “draft conclusions”, the statements contained in the project were not
grounded in legal authority, but rather reflected an effort to imagine, through deductive rea-
soning, ways in which certain principles could apply in hypothetical circumstances.’).
The Fourth Report 27
the Special Rapporteur’s third report relied on State practice, notwith-

standing the dearth thereof ’.47 He responded that it was difficult to answer
the criticism that the work followed a theoretical approach and had not
relied on practice, ‘since none of the States have pointed to a single draft
conclusion entirely unsupported by practice. Not a single draft conclusion
proposed in the third report (or for that matter any of the previous reports)
is based solely on doctrine’.48 Despite the small minority of States that made
this allegation, he found it ‘so serious and damning that’ he felt it neces-
sary to give some examples to refute it. State practice in the form of na-
tional judicial decisions, statements by States, treaty practice, resolutions
of the General Assembly,49 and resolutions of the Security Council50 was
provided in the third report. The report also contains invocations of inter-
national and regional jurisprudence.51 He concluded his defence by saying
that ‘It suffices to say that much of the work in the third report is based on
the 1969 Vienna Convention.’52
a. The question of regional jus cogens
States have long been concerned about how the Commission would, even-
tually, address the issue of regional jus cogens.53 During the debate on the
Commission’s report in 2018, several States commented on the matter and
debated whether regional peremptory norms could exist. Malaysia, for ex-
ample, noted that the concept of regional jus cogens ‘might . . . create con-
fusion and should therefore be avoided’.54 The United Kingdom said it
was ‘doubtful as to the utility of considering “regional” jus cogens’.55 In its
47 Fourth Report (n 43), para. 16.

48 Ibid.
49 See the third report for references to General Assembly resolution 33/28 A of 7 December
1979 and General Assembly resolution 3411 D of 28 November 1975.
50 See the third report for references to Security Council resolution 353 (1974); 241 and
Security Council resolution 276 (1970).

51 See the third report for references to Prosecutor v Taylor (Special Court for Sierra Leone);
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (judgment of the International Court of Justice);
Council of the European Union v Front populaire pour la libération de la sauguiael-hamra et du
rio de oro (Front Polisario); and the Oil Platforms case (ICJ).
52 He claimed that the work of the third report was based on the VCLT, Fourth Report
(n 43), at n. 31.
53 K. Gastorn, 2017, ‘Defining the imprecise contours of jus cogens in international law’, 16
Chinese J. Int’l Law, 643–662, at 659–660.

54 Malaysia (A/C.6/73/SR.27).
55 United Kingdom (statement of 30 October 2018; see also A/C.6/73/SR.27).
Exploring the Variety of Random
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Ledunt nam iacula visa perante minus.
Respice cotidie, mortis quia tempus adesse
Festinat, que simul prospera cuncta ruet.
Hic loquitur quod sunt modo pauci, qui aut

propter celi affectum aut gehenne metum huius
vite voluptatibus renunciant; set quecumque
caro concupiscit, omni postposita racione,
ardencius perficere conantur.
Capm. xxi. Qui sibi commemorans, puto, singula ponderat
eque,
1160 Senciet a fine gaudia vana fore:
Nunc tamen a viciis est quilibet infatuatus,
Quod de fine suo vix memoratur homo.
Quisque suum corpus colit, et de carnis amore
Gaudet, et est anime causa relicta sue:
Gloria nec celi mentes neque pena gehenne
A mundi labe iam reuocare queunt.
Sic caro, sic demon, sic mundus vbique modernos
Deuiat, vt Cristi vix sciat vnus iter:
Est caro que fragilis, demon versutus, iniqus
1170 Mundus, in hoc hominum tempore regna colunt:
Et sic bruta quasi perit humane racionis
Virtus, dum vicium corporis acta regit.
Est homo nunc animal dicam, set non racionis,
Dum viuit bruti condicione pari.
Nescia scripture brutum natura gubernat,
Iudicis arbitrium nec racionis habet:
Est igitur brutis homo peior, quando voluntas
Preter naturam sola gubernat eum.
Corporis, heu! virtus per singula membra
revoluens
1180 Naturam viciis seruit ad acta foris;
Ac anime racio carnis viciata vigore
De virtute nichil interiore sapit.
Morigeri cicius modo sunt derisio plebis,
Et scola peccati iustificabit opus:
Que solet illa viros veteri de more beare,
Iam noua virtuti frena libido mouet.634
Inter eos mundi quibus est donata potestas,
‘Sic volo, sic iubeo,’ sunt quasi iura modo.
Succumbunt iusti clamantes, ‘Ve! quod in orbe
1190 Impia pars hominum singula regna terit.’
Vis prohibet leges, euertunt crimina mores,
Virtus peccati turbine quassa perit:
Mundus turbatur, rerum confunditur ordo,
Involuitque simul omnia grande chaos.
Squalidus in terra sic stat genitor genitusque,
Quod natura suo vix stat in orbe loco.
Liuor et ambicio, gula, fraus, metuenda libido,
Ira, tumor mentis, scismata, laudis amor,
Ambiciosus honor, amor et sceleratus habendi,
1200 Ipse voluptatis vsus et ecce malus,
Furta, rapina, dolus, metus et periuria, testes
Sunt mundi quod erit ammodo nulla fides.
Hic loquitur de variis vindictis occasione

peccati in hoc seculo iam quasi cotidie635
contingentibus, que absque iustorum virorum
meritis et oracionibus nullatenus sedari
poterunt.
Ecce dies veniunt, predixit quos fore Cristus,

Capm. xxii.
Et patuere diu verba timenda dei.
Precessere fames, pestis, motus quoque terre,
Signaque de celo, stat quoque guerra modo:
Nititur aduersus regnum consurgere regnum,
Gens contra gentem, sic patet omne malum.
Vt pecoris sic est hominis fusus modo sanguis,
1210 Victa iacet pietas, et sinit ista deus:
Est et adhuc vindex extenta manus ferientis
Continuans plagas, nec timet vllus eas.
Longanimis domini sentencia sepe moratur,
Vir bonus inmunis nec malus vllus erit.
Quem deus ille ferit, nullo valet orbe tueri,
Si non contritum culpa relinquat eum.
Mortem peccantis non vult deus, immo misertus
Vult vt vertatur, quo sibi vita datur:
Est pius ipse deus, scripturis sicut habemus,
1220 Pro Sodomis Abrahe dixerat ipse pie:
‘Inter iniquorum tot milia tu populorum
Redde decem iustos, et miserebor eis.
Est michi nam soli proprium miseris misereri,
Multis pro paucis parcere curo libens.’
O deus, ergo tibi quid dicam, quomodo nostri
Luctus continui sunt tibi nuga quasi?
Nonne decem iusti modo sunt, meritis vt eorum
Stellifer ipse dies curet in orbe malos?
Aut deus oblitus est immemor ad miserandum,
1230 Dormit vel fingit, aut sibi facta latent.
Verius vt dicam, deus est accensus, et ignis
Fulminat inde Iacob, iraque lata furit:
Sic et plasma suum plasmator abhorret, et ipsum
Torquet pro factis que videt ipse malis.
O, qui mentali videt ex oculo mala nostra
Omnibus in gradibus continuare dies,
Dicere tunc poterit quod talia nullus ab euo
Impunita diu crimina vidit homo.
Quis status ille modo, quin sit transgressus, et
ordo,
1240 Quem iustum dicam, deficit vnde sciam.
Hoc nisi gratis emat, dubito prope quod generalis
Decasus nostre prosperitatis adest:
Set quia de summis gradibus mala progrediuntur,
Est qui summus eos corrigat ipse deus.
Hic loquitur sub compendio recapitulando

finaliter de singulis mundi gradibus, qui
singillatim a debito deuiantes ordine virtutes
diminuendo extingunt, et ea que viciorum sunt
augmentando multipliciter exercent.
Dudum prelatus solum diuina gerebat,

Capm. xxiii.
Nunc propter mundum nescit habere deum:
Curatus cure dudum seruiuit, et ipse
Nunc vagus exterius circuit omne genus:
Dudum presbiteri casti, nunc luxuriosi;
1250 Ocia que querunt plurima dampna fouent:
Ex studio mores dudum didicere scolares,
Nunc tamen econtra stat viciata scola:
Indiuisus amor monachos sibi strinxit vt ardor,
Nunc petit inuidia claustra tenere sua:
Asperitas dudum fratres in carne domabat,
Regula set mollis ammodo parcet eis:636
Dudum milicia fuit et sibi gracia prompta,
Gracia nunc tarda stat, quia vita mala:
Mercator dudum iustum peciit sibi lucrum,
1260 Nunc quoque fraude sua querit habere lucra:
Simplicitas animi fuerat sociata coloni,
Nunc magis indomitum cor gerit ipse ferum:
Lex dudum iusta nulli parcebat amica,
Quam vigor argenti subdit vbique sibi.
Par status imparibus est actibus attenuatus,
Exceditque suum quisque viator iter.
Sic pietas humilis teritur, que superbia regnat;
Liuor adest agilis, torpet et omnis amor:
Permanet ira ferox, et abit paciencia suplex,
1270 Viuit et accidia, sollicitudo perit:
Ebrietas, non sobrietas, tenet ammodo mensas,
Feruet et in viciis crapula plena cibis:
Casta pudicicia dudum precingere lumbos
Affuit, et modo vult soluere luxus eos:
Nuper larga manus inopi sua munera spersit,
Nunc cupit et bursam claudit auara tenax.
Dic modo quot viciis modo sola superbia
mundum
Ad varii sceleris precipitauit opus:637
Dic quot liuor edax acies sua signa sequentes
1280 Subdidit imperio vique metuque suo:
Dic quot auaricie manibus vel mente rapaci
Intendunt populi iura negando dei;
Quot gula deliciis torpet, quot torpor inanes
Carnis adulterio fedat in orbe suo.
Singula nempe vorat anime caro, sic quod vbique
Subdidit inmundam crimine mundus eam:
Singula fallacis mundi dulcedo subegit,
Nos tamen inmundos mundificare nequit.
Iam in fine libri loquitur magis in speciali de

patria illa in qua natus fuerat, vbi quasi
plangendo conqueritur, qualiter honores et
virtutes veteres a variis ibidem erroribus
superuenientibus, vt dicitur, ad presens
multipliciter eneruantur.
Singula que dominus statuit sibi regna per

Capm. xxiiii.
orbem,
1290 Que magis in Cristi nomine signa gerunt,
Diligo, set propriam super omnia diligo terram,
In qua principium duxit origo meum.
Quicquid agant alie terre, non subruor inde,
Dum tamen ipse foris sisto remotus eis;
Patria set iuuenem que me suscepit alumpnum,
Partibus in cuius semper adhero manens,
Hec si quid patitur, mea viscera compaciuntur,
Nec sine me dampna ferre valebit ea:
Eius in aduersis de pondere sum quasi versus;
1300 Si perstet, persto, si cadat illa, cado.
Que magis ergo grauant presenti tempore, saltem
Vt dicunt alii, scismata plango michi.
Vna meo sensu res est, que pessima cunctis
Iam poterit dici fons et origo mali.
Heu! quia iusticia procul abcessit fugitiua,
Cessit et est alibi pax sociata sibi:
Pax, que iusticie dudum solet oscula ferre,
Nunc fugit a terra, ius perit ecce quia.
Plures iam nocui sumunt sibi regna magistri,
1310 Vis iubet et velle, iura nec vlla videt:
Nunc vbi se vertit magnas, sine iure sequntur
Leges, set populus inde subibit onus:
Corpore sicque meo non tantum torqueor, immo
Sunt michi pro minimo res quibus vtar ego.
Non est de modicis quod adulterium modo ledit;
Que caro deposcit omnia namque licent.
In terris aliis Venus et si predominetur,
Exsoluunt meritis hoc aliunde suis;
Est ibi nam posita lex, que communis ad omnes
1320 Iudicat, et causas terminat absque dolo:
Non status aut sexus, non dona, preces, timor aut
quid
Possunt a minimo tollere iura viro:
Et sic iusticia redimit quodammodo culpam
Carnis, que fragili condicione cadit.
Set nos in patria non solum vincimur ista
Ex carnis stimulo, quo stimulatur homo;
Immo suas metas lex transit nescia iuris,
Sicque per obliquas patria nostra vias
Deuiat in tanto, quod, dicunt, amplius ordo
1330 Non erit in nostris partibus: vnde deus
Visitat has partes vindicta, qualis ab euo
In nullo mundi tempore visa fuit.
Non tamen est terra que gaudet in omnibus vna,
Set magis in nostra fit modo virga fera:
Clamor vbique, vide, non solus conqueror ipse;
Culpas tam patulas est reticere nephas:
Sic fleo cum flente, lex fallit, fallor et ipse;
Stat mea nam grauibus patria plena malis.
Nos, quibus assueuit numquam crudeliter vti
1340 Fatum, iam pressos sternit vbique reos.
Que fuerat tellus omni preciosa metallo,
Iam nequit ex plumbo pondus habere suum;638
Dignior argento, fuluo quoque dignior auro,
Nobile que genuit, vix valet esse quadrans.
Nuper dixerunt quicumque venire solebant,
‘Venimus ad portus, vbera terra, tuos.’
Nunc tamen vt sterilis reputaris et es, quia mores
Nunc neque diuicie sunt aliquando tue.
Quo ferar, vnde petam mestis solacia rebus?
1350 Anchora iam nostram non tenet vlla ratem.
Sic mea, que stabilis fuit, infirmatur iniquis
Patria iudiciis, iura negando viris:
Sic gentis domina, quasi iam viduata, tributa
Reddit peccato, statque remota deo.
Sic que morigera fuerat, nunc est viciosa;
Dudum legifera, nunc sine lege fera:
Sic ea que larga fuerat, nunc tollit egena;
Que fuerat sancta, fit Venus ipsa dea:
Est sale iam spersa, fuerat que fructibus ampla,
1360 Et velut vrtica, que solet esse rosa:
Que fuerat pulcra, quasi monstrum stat reputata;
Fit caput in caudam, sic terit omnis eam.
Scandala feda parit nouiter transgressa nouerca,
Omnis que laudis mater et hospes erat:
Que fuit angelica nuper, nunc angulus extat,
Languet et in tenebris sorde repressa magis.
Patria, quam famam dicunt habuisse sororem,
Est magis infamis omnibus ipsa locis:
Que fuerat digne super omnes celsior orbe,
1370 Nunc deus est alibi, subditur ipsa quasi:
Ordine retrogrado quicquid sibi laudis habebat
Cedit, et instabilis vndique spreta iacet.
Firma mouet, ruit alta, terit modo forcia discors
Error, et innumera spergit vbique mala:
Torpescunt proceres, clerus dissoluitur, vrbes
Discordant, leges sunt sine iure graues:
Murmurat indomitus vulgus, concrescit abvsus
Peccati solitus; sic dolet omnis humus.
Hinc puto quod seuit pes terreus in caput auri,
1380 Et lupus agnorum cornua vana timet.639
In meritis hominum solum deus aspicit orbem,
Et sua de facto tempora causat homo.
O sterilis terra morum, sani viduata

Consilii, lesa nec medicamen habens,
Dic vbi fortuna latitat modo, qua reputabas
Nuper in orbe tuum non habuisse parem.
Si Lachesis sortem tibi contulit esse dolosam,
Iam venit ipsa tui r e d d e r e pacta doli:640
Nunc palletque tuis nigris Aurora venenis,
1390 Cuius lux aliis fulsit in orbe magis;
Nuncque iuuentutis flos que tibi creuit habunde
Aret, et a viciis inveterata peris;
Fedaque nunc volucris, venturi nuncia luctus,
Concinit in fatis bubo propheta tuis.
Scit deus hanc causam specialius esse notandam,
Qua locus iste modo distat honore suo:
Hoc scio, quod cunctis locus in prouerbia crescit,
Et quasi nunc speculum denotat omnis eum.
Talia per terras fatali lege geruntur,
1400 Vt reputant, set ego non ita stare puto:
Non est fortuna, que talia causat habenda,
Nec sors, set merita nostra per acta mala.
Qui tamen hanc stare modo credit et hanc
reuocare
Vult, purget crimen, sic reuocabit eam:
Gracia prompta dei querentibus inuenietur,
Nam sibi conuersis vertitur ipse deus.
Dum pia pro pace cecinit processio terre,
Firmaque iusticia fecerat acta sua,
Dumque fides steterat et amor s i n e l a b e
m a n e b a t,641
Tunc, quia pax viguit, sors bona
1410 c u n c t a t u l i t.
N u n c igitur nostra s i t v i t a d e o renouata,642
Ne sors fortuita plus queat esse mala:
Vota vetusta precum redeant domino dominorum,
Vt redeat dominus cum pietate suis;
Per quem pax et honor et tempora sana redibunt,
Que pro peccato sunt fugitiua modo.
Prospera qui veteris vult temporis esse renata,
Reddat et emendet facta priora nouis.
Est deus ipse piis pius et seuerus iniquis,
1420 Sic valet ob meritum quisquis habere deum.
Nos igitur, domine, tua gracia, que solet olim
Ferre reis veniam, te miserante iuuet:
Anticipet pietas tua nos, ne dicat eorum
Gens, ‘Vbi sit dominus, qui solet esse pius?’
Da, precor, accessum lacrimis, mitissime, nostris,
Nam sine te nullum scis quod habemus opem:
Nunc tua pro lapsis nitatur gracia rebus,
Nostra nec anterior sit tibi culpa memor:
Numquam pigra fuit causis tua gracia nostris:
1430 Est vbi nunc illa, que solet esse salus?
Nos peccatores sumus, et tu plus miserator,
Scit bonitasque tua nos opus esse tuum:
Si plus peccaret vir, plura remittere posses,
Materiam venie sors tibi nostra dedit.
Si quociens homines peccant, tua fulmina mittas,
Exiguo presens tempore mundus erit:
A te pendentem sic cum circumspicis orbem,
Auctor, pacificum fac opus esse tuum.
Nos, deus alme, tui serui, quamuis modo tardi,
1440 Te, non fortunam, credimus esse deum:
Scimus te solum super omnes esse colendum;
Sic nostri solus tu miserere, deus!
Hic loquitur qualiter ea que in hoc presenti

libello quasi sompniando de mundi scripsit
erroribus, non ex se tantum, set ex plebis voce
communi concepit. Consulit tamen finaliter
quod, si quis inde se culpabilem senciat,
priusquam nobis peiora succedant tempora,
suam ex humili corde culpam penitens
emendet.
Capm. xxv. Hos ego compegi versus, quos fuderat in me

Spiritus in sompnis: nox erat illa grauis.
Hec set vt auctor ego non scripsi metra libello,
Que tamen audiui trado legenda tibi:
Non tumor ex capite proprio me scribere fecit
Ista, set vt voces plebis in aure dabant.
Quem sua mens mordet, de voce sit ille remorsus,
1450 Curet vt in melius que tulit egra prius:
Qui tamen inmunem se sentit, ab inde quietus643
Transeat, et meritis sic stet vterque suis.
Quem non culpa grauat mea non sentencia culpat,
L e d i t u r h i n c n u l l u s, sit nisi forte reus:644
N e g r a u e t e r g o t i b i, gibbosus namque
panelli645
Et non sanus equs ferre recusat onus.
Non tamen in specie quemquam de pondere culpe
Accuso, set eo se probet intus homo:
Non ego mordaci distrinxi crimine quemquam,
1460 Nec meus vllius crimina versus habet.
Que sompno cepi, vigilans mea scripta peregi,
Sint bona dicta bonis, et mala linquo malis:
Omnis enim mundum gemit esse dei laceratum
Vindicta nostri pro grauitate mali.
Ergo suam culpam contrito corde, priusquam
Consumpti simus, corrigat ipse malus.
Corrigit hic mundum, qui cor retinet sibi
mundum:
Cor magis vnde regat, hec sibi scripta legat.
Quod scripsi plebis vox est, s e t e t i s t a
v i d e b i s,646
Quo clamat populus, est ibi sepe
1470 d e u s.
Qui bonus est audit bona, set peruersus obaudit,
Ad bona set pronus audiat ista bonus.
Hec ita scripta sciat malus, vt bonus ammodo fiat,
Et bonus hec querat, vt meliora gerat.
Mundus non ledit iustum, bene dummodo credit,
Quando set excedit, mundus ad arma redit:
Mundus erit talis, fuerit viuens homo qualis;
Obstet vitalis quilibet ergo malis.
Culpa quidem lata, qua virtus stat
v i c i a t a ,647
Cum non purgata fuerit set
1480 continuata,
Que meruit fata sunt sibi fine data.
648Explicit libellus qui intitulatur Vox

Clamantis, editus precipue super articulo primi
infortunii, quod infortunato Ricardo secundo in
primordiis regni sui, vt audistis, quasi ex dei
virga649 notabiliter in Anglia contingebat. Et
nunc vlterius, quia ipse non inde remorsus,
immo magis ad modum tiranni induratus,
regnum suum assiduis oppressionibus
incessanter flagellare non desistit, diuine
vindicte flagellum vsque in sue deposicionis
exterminium non inmerito assecutus est. Tres
namque tunc regni nobiles super hoc specialius
moti, scilicet Thomas Dux Glouernie, qui
vulgariter dictus est Cignus, Ricardus Comes
Arundellie, qui dicitur Equs, Thomas Comes de
Warrewyk,650 cuius nomen Vrsus, hii vero
vnanimes cum quibusdam aliis proceribus sibi
adherentibus, vt regie malicie fautores delerent,
ad dei laudem regnique commodum in manu
forti iusto animo viriliter insurrexerunt, prout in
hac consequenti cronica, que tripertita est,
scriptor manifestius declarare intendit.
FOOTNOTES:
590 9 magnanimi CEHDL magnatum S
591 27 Consilium CEHDL
592 43 descessit SHG descescit L decessit CED
593 87 da pinguibus CE
594 125 circumprecordia SG
595 160 Est S Et CEHDL
596 167 grossantur S grassantur HDLT crassantur CEG
597 182 dolum SCGDL suum EHT
598 184 scelus] dolus EH
599 187 rutilans albedo set SCGDL albus paries tamen EHT
600 189f.
Sic foris ex auro tumulus splendescit, et intro

Fetet putredo, vermibus esca caro. EHT
DL have both this couplet and that in the text

601 192 falco SCGDL nisus EHT
602 218 pulchra C
603 237 ingenii H (corr.) Ingenuum L assimulari CE
604 256 ipse SL ille CEHD
605 269 Ordinary paragr. in CDL, no paragr. E
606 291 Ordinary paragr. CEDL
607 350 credet CEHGDL credit S
608 409 seruus CE
609 470 estatis C (ras.)
610 490 Passebatque S
611 535 set] et CEL
612 562 sunt] sint CE
613 599 sitis] satis D
614 611 tradidit] contulit CE
615 684 queris SGL mauis (mavis) CEHD
616 691 regno peccato EHL Regni peccato D
617 707 eum CEHDH₂ enim SGLT
618 721 perinterius GLT
619 767 spernens famam C famam serpens L
620 816 iuuat S iuuant EGDLTH₂
621 Cap. xiii. Heading 1 mortui corporis CH
622 843 redolens dudum CEHD
623 903 nisi] sibi C
624 918 et] est S
625 921 nostre D nostri SCEHGL
626 931 imparat C
627 961 fit S sit CEHGDL
628 997 et om. S
629 Cap. xix. Heading 1 duplici CEGL dupplici SHT duplice D
630 1067 Tethis D
631 1095 si SGL sit CEHD
632 1107 Cumque ST Dumque CEHGDL
633 1151 comixta H
634 1186 mouet] tenet EDLT
635 Cap. xxii. Heading 2 quotidie CED
636 1256 parcit CE
637 1278 opes S
638 1342 suum SG suo CEHDL
639 1380 Et lupus SHDL Pastor et CG (ras.) Lupus et E
640 1388 reddere SEHG soluere CDLT
641 1409 f. commune regebat Perstitit in nobis tunc honor atque
salus EDLTH₂ (gerebat E)
642 1411 Sint igitur nostra bona facta deo renouata EDLTH₂
(reuocata L)
643 1451 inmunen S
644 1454 Text SCEG Sic precor vt nullus DLT
645 1455 Text SCEG Detrahet inde michi DL Se trahit inde michi
T
646 1469 f. Text SCEHG (in ista E) per scripta cauebis Que mala
sunt, ideo te dabis atque deo DLTH₂ (perscripta D)
647 1479-81 DLTH₂ have two lines only, as follows:—
Omnibus ipse tamen peior sum, sed

releuamen
Det michi per flamen conditor orbis.
Amen.1480*
648 Explicit, &c. Explicit libellus qui intitulatur Vox Clamantis

(omitting the rest) EDTH₂ Explicit liber intitulatus Vox
clamantis (omitting the rest) L
649 4 virga dei CHG
650 12 Warwyk CH
CRONICA TRIPERTITA651
Ista tripertita, sequitur que, Opus
mente perita humanum est
Cronica seruetur; nam pars que inquirere
pacem et
prima videtur
persequi eam.
Est opus humanum, pars illa Hoc enim
secunda prophanum fecerunt hii tres
Est opus inferni, pars tercia iure proceres de
superni quibus infra fit
Est opus in Cristo. Vir qui bene mencio, vbi
sentit in isto fides interfuit.
Scire potest mira, quid amor sit, Opus inferni
quid sit et ira: est pacem
Est tamen hoc clamor, ‘Omnia turbare,
iustosque regni
vincit Amor.’ interficere. Hoc
enim Ricardus
c a p i t o s u s65
2 dolosa
circumvencione
facere non
timuit.
Opus in
Cristo est
deponere
superbos de
sede et
exalt a r e
humiles.
Hoc enim
deus fecit;
o d i o sum
R i c a rdum de
Solio suo
proiecit, et
pium Henricum
omni dileccione
gratissimum
cum gloria
sublimari
constituit.
Tolle caput mundi, C ter et sex Hic in prima

lustra fer illi, parte653 cronice
Et decies quinque cum septem comp o s i t o r
post super adde: tempora
Tempus tale nota, qui tunc fuit distinguens,654
causas vnde
Anglia mota. regnum fuit in
Dum stat commotus se diuisum,
Ricardus amore postmodum per
remotus, singula
Principio Regis oritur tractabit.
transgressio legis,
Quo fortuna cadit et humus
retrogreda vadit.
Quomodo surrexit populus, quem
non bene rexit,
Te m p u s a d h u c p l a n g i t s u p e r h o c ,
quod cronica tangit.
Libro testante, stat cronica scripta
per ante;
Est alibi dicta, transit nec ab aure
10 relicta:
Audistis mira, vulgaris que tulit
ira:
Omnibus in villis timuit vir iustus
ab illis.
Rex induratum cor semper habet, Qualiter
neque fatum infortunatus rex
Tale remordebat ipsum, qui iure Ricardus,
virgam dei non
carebat:655 metuens, de
malo in peius
Stultorum vile sibi consilium suam semper
iuuenile maliciam
continuauit.
Legerat, et sectam senium dedit
esse reiectam:
Consilio iuuenum spirauerat ille venenum,
Quo bona predaret procerum, quos mortificaret:
Sic malus ipse malis adhesit, eisque sodalis
20 Efficitur, tota regis pietate remota.
Tunc accusare quosdam presumpsit auare,
Vnde catallorum gazas spoliaret eorum.
Tres sunt antiqui proceres, quos regis iniqui
Ira magis nouit, et eos occidere vouit:
Et sic qui cati pellem cupit excoriati,
Fingebat causas fallaci pectore Nota de
clausas. iudicibus illis,
Caucius vt factum sibi possit qui vt regis
errorem
habere subactum,
precipue contra
Leges conduxit, pro parte suaque illos tres
reduxit: proceres quos
Munere corrupti suadente occidere vellet
timoreque rupti iustificarent,
Legis in errorem regi tribuere literas sub
30 fauorem: eorum sigillis
scriptas
Hii tunc legiste, quicquid rex dixerat erronice
iste, composuerunt.
Federa componunt, que sigilla sub
ordine ponunt.
Tunc rex letatur, super hoc quod fortificatur,
Quo magis ad plenum diffundat ille venenum:656
Tunc aderant tales iuuenes, qui sunt speciales,
Laudantes regem, quia vertit sic sibi legem.
Hoc concernentes alii, que dolos Qualiter tres
metuentes, proceres
Ad defendendum statuunt cito quid predicti de
regis malicia
sit agendum.
secrecius
Tunc rex festinat, et ad hoc sua premuniti in sui
iussa propinat,
Vt tres querantur vbi sunt, et ibi defensionem
40 capiantur. roborati sunt.
Tunc tres, qui iusti fuerant et ad arma robusti,
Factum disponunt et ad hoc sua robora ponunt.
Qui fuerant isti proceres, in nomine Cristi
Expedit vt dicam referens, et eis benedicam.
Si non directe procerum cognomina recte,
Hec tamen obscura referam, latitante figura:
Scribere que tendo si mistica verba legendo
Auribus apportant, verum tamen illa reportant.
Sunt Olor, Vrsus, Equs, stat Nota de
eorum quilibet equs, nominibus trium
Non hii diuisi, set in vnum sunt procerum
predictorum
50 quasi visi:
sub figura.
Penna coronata tribus hiis fuit Comes
associata: Marescallus.
Qui gerit S tandem turmam Strenuissimus
comitatur eandem, Comes
Nobilis ille quidem probus et Derbeie.
iuuenis fuit idem,
Sic quasi de celis interfuit ille fidelis:
Hac sub fortuna presens aquilonica Comes
luna657 Northumbrie,
cuius Signum
Non fuit ad sortem, sequitur set
fuit luna
mente cohortem.658 crescens.
Qui solem gessit tenebrosus Qualiter rex,
lumina nescit, cuius Signum
In Troie metas dum vendicat ipse Sol erat, ciues
dietas. Londonienses
Troia fuit prima, per quem sol tendit pro auxilio ab
eis contra
ad yma;
dictos tres
Pallet in eclipsi populus quia non proceres
fauet ipsi: optinendo
Obsistunt turbe Phebo, ne scandat requisiuit; set illi
60 in vrbe, regis maliciam
Dumque suis alis Cignus fuit perplectentes
imperialis. eidem
Fraus tamen obliquas nubes nullatenus
commouit iniquas, consensierunt.
Extera dum rebus temptauit lumina Qualiter rex
Phebus: Comitem
Cestria surrexit, Aper in qua lumina Oxonie, qui per
aprum
rexit, designatur, vt
Regis vexillum fatue signauerat ipse contra tres
illum. proceres
Set conspiranti deus obstat et antedictos
insidianti, gentes
Quo dolus exosos inuoluit fine bellatrices
secum duceret,
dolosos: in partes
Auxilio Cigni, regis pro parte Cestrie vna
maligni 659 cum regio
Si vis queratur, contraria vis vexillo
70 operatur. destinauit.
Querit Aper latebras, fraudes mortisque
tenebras,660
Quo regnum periat regisque superbia fiat;
Cignus et expresse super hiis que cernit adesse
Prouidet, et curam regni colit ipse futuram:
Ducit Aper gentes, quas concitat arma gerentes,
Liber vt hiis pergat proceresque per omnia
spergat.
Cignus vt hoc sciuit, venientibus Qualiter
obuius iuit, quodam die
Belliger et purgat regnum, quo vita Veneris Comes
Oxonie cum
resurgat:
suis
Cum Venus incepit lucem, sors sequentibus in
bella recepit. conspectu
Stat Tetis a parte, cecidit dum ducis
80 Cestria Marte; 661 Glouernie, qui
Thamisie fluctus capiunt de tunc vulpis
caudam in
sanguine luctus: lancea gessit,
Vicit Olor pennis, sit ei quo vita prope villam
perhennis. Oxonie in
fugam se vertit,
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One Summer in Savannah Terah Shelton Harris

Feminism and Intersectionality in Academia 1st ed. Edition

Governor of the Cordillera: John C. Early among the

Proceeding of 5 th International Conference on Recent

Safety Management Systems in Aviation 2nd Edition

EMR Complete: A Worktext 2nd Edition, (Ebook PDF)

Making Radio: Early Radio Production and the Rise of

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Political Science

Elements of International Law represents a fresh approach in the

Previously Published in this Series

I am delighted to welcome this wonderful contribution to our new series,

1. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 draw upon materials published in

4. The book reviews: R. Kolb, Peremptory International Law (Jus Cogens):

2. The Origins and Sources of Jus Cogens  3

3. The Law of Treaties  13

4. Recent Work of the International Law Commission  17

7. Functions of Jus Cogens  91

ASR Articles on State Responsibility

S. Kadelbach, 2006, at 21; Haimbaugh, 1987, at 207–​211.

Jus cogens has been developed largely by international legal scholarship,1

2.1 Natural Law

transl. by F.W. Kelsey, 1925, Oxford, Clarendon Press).

J. Churchill), at Book ii, ch. iii, Sect. 23.

2.2 Public Policy: Logical or Legal Necessity

13 de Vattel (n 8), pp. 7 and 9.

383; L. Oppenheim, 1905, International Law (London, Longmans), p. 528.

Holland Publishing Co.), p. 2.

Law: Papers and Proceedings (n 14), at 10.

Recueil des Cours, 191–​374, at 210–​211.

2.3 General Principles of Law

23 A. von Verdross, 1937, ‘Forbidden treaties in international law: Comments on Professor

ILC, A/​CN.4/​SER.A/​1958/​Add.l, 1958, at 41.

27 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising

contains norms from which no derogation is allowed and the community

[t]‌he requirement that contracts shall be in conformity with law invali-

pp. 110 ff.

39 Hall (n 16), p. 382.

of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, at 14, para. 269.

(Kelsen, 1945). Without a source of this norm outside consent there is an

Judgment of 20 July 2012, at para. 99.

3.1 Drafting the VCLT

the voidance of contractual agreements whose object is illegal is a general

April 1950, at 246 ff.

treaties. This is so although there are no instances in international judicial

Gabon, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, and Malta. Ibid.

Commission on the topic of jus cogens, A/​69/​10, at 274, para. 3.

Organizations or between International Organizations, Vienna, 18 February–​21 March 1986,

3.2 Definition of Jus Cogens

18 Ibid., pp. 186–​194.

4.1 Recent ILC Consideration of the Topic

3 See, e.g. statement by Counsel to Belgium in Questions Relating to the Obligation to

on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification

4.2 The First Report

community and are hierarchically superior to other international law

4.3 The Second Report

4.4 The Third Report

the ILC, in particular, Mr Grossman Guiloff (A/​CN.4/​SR.3370) and Ms Escobar Hernández

2. The Origins and Sources of Jus Cogens  3

3. The Law of Treaties  13

4. Recent Work of the International Law Commission  17

7. Functions of Jus Cogens  91

S. Kadelbach, 2006, at 21; Haimbaugh, 1987, at 207–211.

Recueil des Cours, 191–374, at 210–211.

ILC, A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.l, 1958, at 41.

Commission on the topic of jus cogens, A/69/10, at 274, para. 3.

Organizations or between International Organizations, Vienna, 18 February–21 March 1986,

18 Ibid., pp. 186–194.

the ILC, in particular, Mr Grossman Guiloff (A/CN.4/SR.3370) and Ms Escobar Hernández

25 Ibid., paras 103–104.

(A/C.6/73/SR.25); France (A/C.6/73/SR.26); Romania (ibid.); Israel (A/C.6/73/SR.27); Turkey

Chinese J. Int’l Law, 643–662, at 659–660.