DAVIS-FourHumanAims-2024
DAVIS-FourHumanAims-2024
DAVIS-FourHumanAims-2024
Chapter Title: The Four Human Aims: Guides for the Good Life
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11
The Four H uman Aims:
Guides for the Good Life
once upon a time, the story goes, p eople did not need a king or a government.
There was no punishment, and none was needed, since p eople carefully main-
tained Dharma. But then confusion (moha) entered the picture, and along with
it came greed (lobha). Due to greed, p
eople were overpowered by desire (kama).
And when they were dominated by desire, Dharma disappeared.
When humans came into contact with things they did not own, desire became
their highest concern. As they came to be dominated by desire, p assion af-
flicted them. Overcome with passion, they did not remember what should
be done and what should not, which women could be approached sexually
and which could not, what can be eaten and what cannot, what sin is and what
it is not. They no longer offered up sacrifice. When this human world fell into
complete disorder, the Veda perished. And with the loss of the Veda, Dharma
was ruined. (MBh 12.59.18-21)
The gods w ere terrified. Without the Vedic sacrifices to nourish them, they began
to lose their powers. They sought out the help of the creator god Brahman, and
Brahman promised to do his best to restore the proper order of things.
In the Mahabharata, Bhishma tells this story to Yudhishthira to explain the
genesis of kingship and the special status of kings. According to his origin story,
the overwhelming forces of greed, desire, and passion lead to a complete
deterioration of the social order, and this ruptures the productive reciprocity of
humans and gods. Deprived of sacrificial offerings, the gods are reduced in
power, and they can no longer shower their benefits down onto humans in re-
turn. This is the state of anarchy—both within human society and in the broader
cosmic order binding together humans and the divine. To restore the Veda and
383
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 385
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 387
A Science of Kama
Why should Indians of classical times require a science of Kama? W asn’t desire
a hindrance to the religious life? From the time of Yajnavalkya in the Brihad
aranyaka Upanishad, Indian religious thinkers had consistently portrayed Kama,
or desire, as a problem. Among the Shramana groups, teachers repeatedly cited
Kama as one of the most pernicious obstacles to overcome for religious seekers.
Kama, they argued, leads to attachment, to all the ties that keep us bound to the
world. This is true for individuals and for society as a whole. In Bhishma’s origin
story about kingship in the Mahabharata, Kama is one of the forces that over-
powers people and leads to a state of social deterioration. The early Buddhists
told a similar story—though without the Vedas or divine intervention—in which
greed and desire enter into a previously idyllic social order, create chaos, and re-
quire the disciplining force of a king to restore order.6
Yet it is necessary to acknowledge that Kama is a potent, even ubiquitous, force
in human life. Kama can lead also to beneficial religious actions. In his Dharma-
shastra, Manu, no friend of hedonism, portrays Kama as universal.
To be ruled by Kama is not praised. But in this world t here is no such t hing
as desirelessness. Even Vedic Brahmins study the Veda and perform their rites
out of Kama. Kama is the root of intention, and sacrifices arise from inten-
tions. Every vow and moral self-restraint is born of intention, so it is said. We
never see anything done in this world by someone without Kama; w hatever
is done is set in motion through Kama. By engaging in them properly, one can
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388 C h a p t e r 1 1
obtain all one’s intended desires in this world, and go to the world of the gods
hereafter. (MDhSh 2.2-5)
For Manu, the key word here is “properly.” As the basis for intentional action, he
asserts, Kama must be properly directed toward righteous ends or Dharma.
In the Kamasutras, Vatsyayana defines Kama differently. Kama can have both
transitive and intransitive meanings. Manu uses Kama transitively, as the desire
for something (worldly benefits, heavenly afterlife), which provides the intention
to take actions (learning the Veda, performing sacrifices) that lead to those
ends. Vatsyayana focuses on Kama intransitively, as the experience of sensory
pleasure. “Kama,” he states, “consists of the pleasurable engagement of the sensory
faculties—ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose—with their proper objects of sensation,
supervised by the mind, in connection with the self ” (KS 1.2.11). Here Vatsyayana
refers to the broadly held psychology of perception in early India. Human sense
faculties are oriented outward; they are attracted by objects of s ensation and reach
out t oward the world. Of all t hese p
leasurable sensory engagements, according to
the Kamasutras, the highest form of Kama lies within sexual intercourse.
The purpose of Vatsyayana’s guidebook in the broadest sense is to instruct his
audience in attaining sensory p leasure. This requires knowledge and technique.
Unlike sexual coupling among animals, he observes, h uman sexuality is a social
act involving both male and female whose mutual engagement enhances the erotic
pleasures for both. For that reason, both males and females o ught to study the
Kamasutras. (Homoerotic guidance is largely absent from Vatsyayana’s account,
but Doniger and Kakar suggest that “it is possible to excavate several alternative
sexualities latent in the text’s somewhat fuzzy boundaries between homoeroti-
cism and heteroeroticism.”7) Kama can and should be cultivated.
Vatsyayana sees Kama as a key part of the good life. In fact, it is essential, a
necessary means of sustaining the body, just as much as food is. But he also
acknowledges that Kama can have damaging effects, just as infectious diseases
may weaken or destroy the body. Vatsyayana cites famous cases where even the
most powerf ul males came undone due to their lust for desirable but improper
females: the Vedic god Indra’s desire for the sage’s wife Ahalya, the demonic
ruler Ravana for Rama’s wife Sita, the powerf ul prince Kichaka for Draupadi.
Kama, then, is not to be pursued when it conflicts with other life purposes.
Even Vatsyayana admits that one should not transgress Dharma in pursuit of
Kama. When the three aims compete, he says, Dharma takes precedence over
Artha, which in turn precedes Kama, since adequate wealth allows the pursuit
of pleasure.
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 389
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 391
in the Kamasutras according to their relationships with males. T hese include the
young unmarried woman (kanya, or “virgin”); the “only wife”; wives in polyga-
mous households; women in harems; and courtesans.
Vatsyayana devotes one chapter to the young w oman seeking an appropriate
husband. He begins with a description of a desirable marriage partner from a male
perspective: a virgin of good family, with parents still alive, with beauty, good
character, and lucky marks on her body. The suitor should court such a girl, and
Vatsyayana gives suggestions for how to go about this. But in contrast with many
other early Indian sources such as the Dharmashastras, Vatsyayana allows the
woman agency in this endeavor. Her goal, he says, should be to form the “best
alliance” that w ill enable both wife and husband to treat each other as unique
individuals and to make one another happy. In the play of courtship, the female
has choices to make among suitors, and ways to convey her intentions, both wel-
coming and dismissive. The male suitor must be conscientious and alert to these
signals. Much different from a s imple transaction or alliance among families, Vat-
syayana treats the dance of courtship between male and female with complexity,
involving personal and social calculations.
Among wives, Vatsyayana distinguishes the “only wife” in a monogamous
marriage from t hese w omen in h ouseholds with two or more wives. A prime
consideration for the only wife is to conduct herself in a way that prevents or
discourages her husband from taking a second wife. She should treat her hus-
band like a god. Vatsyayana sets out the numerous and laborious ways the wife
should seek to hold her husband’s heart: the close attention to home cleanli-
ness, the garden she should plant, the careful supervision of domestic expenses,
the beautification and adornment of her own body, and her sexual availability
to her husband. And she should bear sons, for if she fails to bear c hildren or gives
birth only to daughters, she may well be supplanted by a co-wife. Vatsyayana
recommends that, if she does not have children, the wife be the one to suggest
that her husband take on another wife. But she must then use all her powers to
ensure that she prevails as the higher or senior wife. The junior wife treats her
co-wife outwardly as a mother, says Vatsyayana, but she may eventually be able
to dislodge the s enior wife and assume the role of the only wife. And when many
wives share a husband and h ousehold, Vatsyayana advises the female on how to
form alliances, provoke quarrels, and gain the upper hand with the presiding male,
the husband. The domestic world of husbands and wives, as Vatsyayana sets it
out, is a patriarchal one centered on the male husband, where the female wives
must engage in active calculation and sometimes aggressive domestic politics.
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392 C h a p t e r 1 1
While most females in the world of the Kamasutra must gauge their pursuits
with reference to the males on whom they depend, t here is one category of females
who act as autonomous agents: the ganikas, or high-class courtesans. They even
insist that their own voices be represented in the male-authored Kamasutras.
Vatsyayana explains that his chapter on the courtesans draws on an independent
work by Dattaka, commissioned by the courtesan community of Pataliputra.
Dattaka was uniquely qualified to compose this, according to a well-known
story. It seems that he had once, during a festival to bless a pregnant woman,
touched the god Shiva with his foot. For this polluting faux pas, Dattaka was
cursed by Shiva to become a w oman. Later, he persuaded Shiva to remove the
curse, and he transitioned back to his e arlier male identity. But he had profited
in experience from his time as a w oman. His double knowledge as both female
and male, it was said, made him especially qualified to represent authoritatively
the perspective of female courtesans.9
In many ways the courtesan is the female counterpart of the nagaraka. She
participates in the social get-togethers and garden parties of the affluent men, and
courtesans may hold their own drinking parties and invite men. Like the man-
about-town, the courtesan should be proficient in the arts, and she displays her
skills at t hose gatherings. They might include singing, playing musical instru-
ments, or impromptu composition and recitation of poetry.
The courtesan should also be proficient in the sixty-four erotic arts, as out-
lined by Babhravya. But for her, sexuality is not just about Kama; it also involves
Artha. Vatsyayana begins the chapter:
For courtesans, there is both pleasure and livelihood in their sexual relations
with men. Having sex for the sake of p leasure is natural; doing it for wealth
is artificial. Even so, the courtesan should make it appear natural, b ecause men
trust w omen who are motivated by desire. (KS 6.1.1-4)
Dissimulation is part of the skill set of the working courtesan. In one sense she
also depends on males for her livelihood, just as wives do, but the courtesan is
able to seek her own ends with a greater degree of autonomy. “Courtesans,” says
Vatsyayana, echoing the views of the Pataliputra courtesans, “examine lovers and
join with them. In joining with them, they enchant them. From those who are
enchanted, they get their money. And in the end, the courtesans release them”
(KS 6.3.45-46). Within marriage, if a wife fails to satisfy, the husband has the op-
tion of taking on another wife. In the world of the courtesan, she retains the
capability of cutting off her relations with men who fail to please or support her
adequately. She operates as a businesswoman, pursuing Artha.
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 393
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394 C h a p t e r 1 1
education of the ruler, the broad shape of the monarchy, and the role of religion
within Kautilya’s vision of society.
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 395
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396 C h a p t e r 1 1
eople in his s ervice also act with vigor. At the innermost circle are the ministers
p
who consult directly with the king and act on his behalf. Under these high offi-
cials, there are departments that are responsible for the collection of revenue
through taxation on agricultural produce, tariffs on trade, and taxes levied on
other profitable enterprises. The king is responsible for the administration of jus-
tice, and for this he appoints ministerial judges to adjudicate disputes and to
conduct trials. The king also assigns superintendents for all sorts of enterprises
within the realm: mines, the mint, liquor, gambling, courtesans, elephant for-
ests, prisons, shipping, and many more.
Governing a kingdom in early India required attention both to its internal
prosperity and to its external relations with other kingdoms. Kautilya assumes
that a ruler w ill seek to expand his resources, to obtain what has not yet been
obtained. But one kingdom is surrounded by others, and these, too, the king must
presume, w ill seek their own growth. A monarch therefore requires knowledge
of the other surrounding polities. He must be able to form alliances, engage in
negotiations, make calculations of relative strength, and conduct military cam-
paigns against other rulers when prudent and promising.
As a framework for t hese calculations, Kautilya introduces a model of the
“circles of kingdoms” (mandala). The innermost circle is one’s own state. One
begins from the assumption that bordering kingdoms are by nature adversaries,
since they are likely to covet their neighboring territories. The circle of one’s own
kingdom, then, is encircled by other enemy kingdoms. These kingdoms, too, have
their enemies, so the kingdom on the other side of one’s neighbor is an enemy of
one’s e nemy and therefore potentially an ally. T hings become complex quite
quickly in this abstract modeling of interstate politics, but it offers a useful start-
ing point. Based on these assessments, a king could employ a variety of methods—
Kautilya outlines a sixfold strategy—to achieve the best outcome for his kingdom.
But in the monarchical world envisioned in the Arthashastra, the king’s position
is always precarious, since other polities are likewise motivated toward their own
interests. Hence, Kautilya stresses the importance of careful analysis and rational
deliberation, within a royal policy we would term realpolitik.
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 397
one may obtain good fortune or bad fortune, but the c auses of these outcomes
remain invisible. “One can think rationally about action in the h uman realm; the
divine realm is outside rational comprehension” (ASh 6.2.6). Within the h uman
realm, Kautilya argues, the king should act as a rational agent, employing good
policies to achieve beneficial outcomes for the kingdom. This involves support
of religious institutions as part of the existing social order.
At a personal level, Kautilya recommends that the king study the Veda and
perform some daily ceremonies. These activities are part of the discipline and
training of the ruler. He appoints as his chief counselor (purohita) a Brahmin
learned in the Vedas and its auxiliary disciplines, and expert in divine omens as
well as in the science of Artha. “The king should follow his counsel like a pupil
follows his preceptor, a son his f ather, or a servant does his master” (ASh 1.9.10).
He should also employ Vedic Brahmins as his court priests, and they should ob-
serve the prevailing ritual practices. In the Arthashastra, Kautilya assumes that
this royal ceremonial will be in the Vedic sacrificial lineage. But he is not con-
cerned with the liturgical rites by which one becomes a king ritually, such as the
Rajasuya, nor with imperial rituals like the Horse Sacrifice. T hese Vedic rituals
may impart a divine quality to the king, but Kautilya’s overriding concern is with
the king as a human actor.12
The Arthashastra recognizes the multiplicity of religious specialists and in-
stitutions within early Indian society. Kautilya mentions Shramana groups like
Buddhists and Ajivakas, renouncers, and ascetics as well as Vedic Brahmins. The
king can make use of them for his own benefit. For example, the peripatetic life-
style of homeless ascetics makes them particularly useful as royal spies, since
they can wander into other territories and other kingdoms with impunity. Vedic
Brahmins are valuable for settling the countryside and thereby increasing its
productivity. Kautilya recommends that the king give land grants to Brahmins,
exempt from all fines and taxes. The actual farming labor in these Brahmin settle-
ments would be carried out mostly by Shudra agriculturalists, while the Brah-
min males are left f ree to pursue their ritual and pedagogic activities. Farther
afield, in marginal land that is not suitable for cultivation, the king should pro-
vide tracts to Brahmin renouncers for Vedic study and sacrifice. In the towns also,
the king should have temples for the gods placed in the center, and shrines for
Yakshas acting as guardian spirits placed on the outskirts.
The pragmatic king envisioned in the Arthashastra acts for the good of himself
and for the polity over which he presides. He protects the security of the kingdom
and seeks to increase its prosperity. Religion can be useful in this. The king stud-
ies the Vedas and the sciences to gain self-mastery, and he employs Brahmins as
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398 C h a p t e r 1 1
counselors and ministers. He supports the various religious groups within the
kingdom and gives special consideration to Vedic Brahmins through land grants
and provisions for renunciatory ashrams. But this forms a minor part of his royal
activities. If religion concerns itself primarily with the divine realm, as Kautilya
would see it, the king focuses his greatest effort within the h uman realm.
The root of Dharma is the entire Veda, and also the remembered tradition
(smriti) and virtuous conduct of those who know the Veda, the actions of wise
people, and what is pleasing to the soul. Any Dharma that Manu has declared
for anyone—all that is stated in the Veda, for it is the basis of all knowledge.
A wise person should consider this fully through the eye of knowledge and
then follow one’s own Dharma, with the Veda as its authority, for those who
follow Dharma based on the Veda and remembered tradition w ill obtain a
good reputation in this world and an unsurpassed happiness when they pass
on. (MDhSh 2.6-9)
Dharma may be singular in its Vedic foundation, but it is also diverse in its
application. For that reason, Manu speaks of “one’s own Dharma” (sva-dharma).
Dharma applies to all members of h uman society, but it differs according to class,
gender, stage of life, and other distinguishing individual factors. Even so, Manu
asserts that all who follow their own proper Dharma will achieve the desirable
results of a good reputation while alive and a happy outcome afterward.
The C
areer of the Smarta Brahmin
As a historical work, scholars date Manu’s Dharmashastra to roughly the second
century CE. The Dharmashastra grows out of the e arlier Dharmasutra literature
of Smarta Brahmins loyal to the Vedic tradition and expands its range. H
ere, too,
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 399
the lives of Brahmins are a major concern, and the male B rahmin h ouseholder
continues to be a model and religious ideal. Manu is extravagant in praising him:
“The Brahmin is lord of all creation, according to Dharma, b ecause he arose from
the highest part of the creator, because he came first, and because he bears in
himself the Veda” (MDhSh 1.93). But Manu extends his attention well beyond
the Brahmin focus of the Dharmasutras. Following the paradigm first set out in
the Rig Veda’s Purushasukta hymn, Manu envisions all of society as a hierarchi-
cal organic unity, with the four ranked classes assigned appropriate duties based
on that original emanation. The Brahmin class came first and emerged from
the head, the highest part, of that Highest Being. This orderly society, in Manu’s
view, requires the supervision of a king guided by knowledgeable Brahmins.
His guidebook to Dharma, therefore, addresses the lives of Brahmins, the duties
of all classes, the training and conduct of the king, the administration of justice—
all necessary to realizing the ideal of a Dharma-based social order as Manu envi-
sions it.
In Manu’s righteous society, each of the four classes has distinct responsibili-
ties. These were set out in the beginning by the Creator.
For the preservation of this entire creation, the Splendid One assigned
separate duties to t hose born of his mouth, arms, thighs, and feet. For Brah-
mins, he assigned reciting and teaching the Veda, offering and officiating at
sacrifices, giving and receiving gifts. To the Kshatriya, he assigned protection
of all creatures, giving gifts, offering sacrifices, reciting the Veda, and remain-
ing unattached to sensory objects. To the Vaishya, he assigned protection of
animals, giving gifts, offering sacrifices, reciting the Veda, and pursuing
livelihoods such as commerce, moneylending, and plough agriculture. To
the Shudra, the Lord assigned one task only—to serve these other classes with-
out resentment. (MDhSh 1.87-91)
Within this class system, the Veda constitutes a key status marker. The three upper
groups are “twice-born” classes, since t hose males are eligible to be initiated into
the Veda. Hence they are qualified to recite the Veda themselves and offer sac-
rifices on their own behalf. But only Brahmins are entitled to transmit and teach
others the Veda and to officiate at sacrifices on behalf of o thers. The Brahmin
stands at the head of society, and even among Brahmin males t here are further
rankings. Learned Brahmins are good, those who perform rites are better, and
experts in the Veda are best of all.
The life path of the Smarta Brahmin male, accordingly, rests on the f oundation
of the Veda. As in the Dharmasutras, Manu’s Dharmashastra emphasizes the study
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 401
equanimity to all this. (This parallels the austere promise the Buddha Shakya-
muni gave to new members of his following.) Manu says nothing about Vedic
recitation at this stage, and the ascetic’s sacrificial practices are solely internal ones.
Now, the Brahmin engages in the yogic practices of breath control and medita-
tion. And through meditation, the wandering ascetic may attain oneness with
brahman, the final liberation as envisioned by the Upanishad teachers.
As for women, Manu is notorious for his insistence that females be dependent
on males at every stage of their lives.
When she is a child, a young woman, or an older woman, a female should not
carry out any duty independently, even in her own h
ouse. As a child she should
live u
nder control of her f ather, as a young w
oman under her husband, and
under her sons when her husband has passed away. A woman should not have
independence. She should not wish to separate herself from her f ather, hus-
band, or sons. By separating from them she would bring disgrace on both
families. (MDhSh 5.147-149)
Manu stresses the ideal virtues of the good housewife: cheerfulness, cleanliness,
and frugality. She should honor her husband as her god and not carry out any
religious rites on her own. Manu’s emphatic concern h ere appears to rest on the
patriarchal idea that females are particularly susceptible to sensual pleasures. Bet-
ter able to gain self-mastery, males should exercise control over the women
dependent on them. But if a woman sticks to this female Dharma of dependence
and self-restraint, she too gains rewards in this life and in the afterlife—with her
husband. “The wife who is never unfaithful to her husband and keeps her mind,
speech, and body restrained is called a good w oman by good people, and she at-
tains the heaven of her husband” (MDhSh 5.165).
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402 C h a p t e r 1 1
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 403
due to transgressions of the proper order of t hings. Males and females o ught to
mix with members of their own class. However, Manu admits, this is not always
the case. “The mixture of classes originates from adultery across classes, from
marriage with t hose one should not marry, and from abandonment of one’s own
proper occupations” (MDhSh 10.24). Historically, the groups he mentions mostly
represent real existing communities of the time, but Manu’s theory of origina-
tion places them all in a subordinate role to the purer varna classes. Manu goes
on to set out a kind of matrix of interbreeding. A Brahmin male and a Vaishya
female produce an Ambashta, a Brahmin male with a Shudra female give birth to
a Nishada, a Kshatriya male and a Brahmin female lead to a Suta, and so on. Manu
observes that many of the resulting birth-groups follow specific occupations or
forms of livelihood: ship workers, animal trappers, medical workers, trades-
men, fishermen, carpenters, and others. This enables him to generate the histori-
cal complexity of social and occupational groupings in early India from the
Vedic model of four original classes.14
Among the derivative communities, t here are some that are truly at the bot-
tom of the social heap. T hese are the Chandalas and the Shvapachas (“dog cook-
ers”). Manu sets out special restrictions applying to them. They must reside
outside the town and must not venture into town at night. They get their clothes
from the dead, and they eat out of broken vessels. They carry out unwanted tasks,
such as serving as executioners for the king, and they carry away the corpses of
those without relatives to do so. Those who follow Dharma should have nothing
to do with Chandalas, says Manu. If they do, they are considered to be polluted
by that contact, and they should take a bath to restore their normal state of pu-
rity. From this, the Chandalas and other deeply marginalized groups in early
India and subsequently came to be known as “untouchables.” In modern times
their descendants are preferably designated as Dalits.
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404 C h a p t e r 1 1
treatise was an expansive and innovative step forward. But in relation to the
dynamic Indian society of the period, Manu articulates a conservative response.
Manu’s compelling vision of an orderly righteous society is in many ways a throw-
back. Manu reiterates the key values of the Vedic tradition—the centrality of the
Veda, the efficacy of sacrifice in binding h umans and gods in shared prosperity,
and the preeminent status of the Brahmin male householder—in the face of a
changing and expanding religious landscape.
Vedic Brahmins faced multiple challenges in the early centuries CE. First, they
confronted competition for economic resources. Buddhists and other Shramana
groups had been highly successful in gaining patronage from affluent social
groups, thereby reducing the provisions that could be directed toward Vedic ritual
practices. Against this, Manu emphasizes the great value—infinitely greater—of
donations made to support Brahmin masters of the Veda. Brahmins had also
found themselves challenged for religious primacy in the royal courts. Starting
during the Mauryan period, Shramana groups challenged the older mutuality
of Kshatriya and Brahmin. Some imperial rulers like Ashoka and Kanishka had
allied themselves forthrightly with Buddhist advisers. In response, Manu empha-
sizes the importance of maintaining educated Brahmins as court advisers and
royal officials. More generally, Manu refers to the Shramana groups as “atheists”
(nastikas) and advocates a policy of social exclusion. He includes atheists in his
long list of those who committed sins that entailed loss of class—along with cow
killers, adulterers, and usurers. A respectable Brahmin householder should not
invite an atheist to ancestral rituals or other domestic rites at his home.
Despite this disdain toward Shramana communities, Manu also recognizes
the strength of some of their criticisms of the Vedic order. This is best seen in Ma
nu’s treatment of meat-eating. Jains and Buddhists, as we’ve seen, were deeply
critical of the violence in Vedic animal sacrifice and advocated a personal practice
of nonviolence, entailing the abstention from the eating of meat. Manu also favors
nonviolence and the avoidance of meat.
One can never obtain meat without doing violence to living beings, and the
slaughter of living beings does not lead to heaven. Therefore one should avoid
meat. Reflecting that meat originates in the binding and killing of their bodies,
one should refrain from all eating of meat . . . There is no greater sinner than
the one who wishes to feed his own flesh with the flesh of another creature—
unless it is used in sacrifices to the ancestors or the gods. (MDhSh 5.48-52)
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 405
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406 C h a p t e r 1 1
to the present. Manu’s treatise is the earliest surviving Dharmashastra, but writ-
ing a century or two later, Yajnavalkya lists twenty authors of Dharmashastras.16
In classical and medieval India, kings did endow the educational institutions of
Vedic Brahmins, much as Manu advised, and recorded their gifts of brahmadeyas
(Brahmin landholdings) in the permanent form of copper-plate inscriptions. Edu-
cated Brahmins in turn brought their knowledge of Dharma to the royal courts.
From the eighth century on, learned Brahmin scholars wrote commentaries and
digests of the Dharmashastra literature, establishing it as a significant h
uman sci-
ence within Indian society. And when the British established a beachhead of
colonial control over eastern India in the eighteenth century and sought to
govern Indians according to “their own legal codes,” they turned to Brahmin
pandits (panditas) and the Dharmashastras—with vast and often unfortunate
consequences. But that is another story.17
Varieties of Moksha
In Mircea Eliade’s classic 1954 work, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, the historian
of religion introduced four “kinetic ideas” at the core of Indian spirituality.18 These
can serve as a useful point of departure for any discussion of soteriology in early
India. First, he says, t here is a law of universal causality, karman, which is closely
connected with worldly suffering and with the assumption of transmigration. The
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 407
second kinetic idea is the process that engenders the cosmos and snares human
beings in ignorance and bondage. This is often called maya, or “cosmic illusion.”
Third, Indians identify an “absolute reality” that offers an alternative to the suf-
fering and limitation caused by karman and ignorance. This is called by various
names—the transcendent, the unconditioned, brahman, Nirvana. Here I am using
the most common general term, Moksha, which points particularly to the lib-
eration or salvation it offers from whatever binds us. Fourth are the effective
techniques for attaining this absolute reality or Moksha. These methods, Eliade
states, constitute Yoga. One will notice that Eliade’s kinetic ideas parallel the four
“noble truths” that the Buddha Shakyamuni had set out long before in his first
discourse at Sarnath.
Like other key terms in Indic religious cultures, however, Moksha does not
have a single uncontested meaning. While the term always refers to the endpoint
in a p rocess of individual salvation, there are basic points of disagreement and
debate. These are grounded in the basic ontological presuppositions held by the
different schools of thought. What is the fundamental problem to which Mok-
sha is the solution? What is the entity that experiences this problematic worldly
situation and seeks a solution? How can this transcendent state be understood
or described? Who is qualified to pursue it? What are the most effective means
of reaching that goal? And what happens when a human does attain the transcen-
dent end of Moksha? In the early centuries CE, teachers in the various religious
cultures of India addressed these basic issues, and argued over them, in a series
of foundational works.
The Jain preceptor Umasvati set out a Jain understanding of bondage and
Moksha in his Tattvartha Sutras, an authoritative Sanskrit work of the second
century CE.19 The non-theistic Jain ontology begins with the soul. According to
Jain premises, t here are multiple individual souls inhabiting all kinds of physical
bodies. Umasvati distinguished two fundamental categories of souls: t hose l iving
in worldly samsara and those that are liberated. The great goal of the soul living in
worldly samsara, he begins, is to attain Moksha, which he defines as perfect
knowledge, perfect intuition, and perfect bliss. However, in worldly conditions
souls are hindered from t hese perfections. The predicament of all worldly souls
revolves around karman. Actions—whether of body, speech, or mind—cause an
inflow of karman, which adheres like particles of darkening matter to the soul
and binds it to the world. Spiritual development leading away from worldly
confinement and toward Moksha involves stopping the acquisition of karman.
This can be done, first of all, by observing the five vows, the ethical founda-
tions of the religious life, which prevent the most pernicious karman. Bodily
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408 C h a p t e r 1 1
austerities can wear off existing karman, as well as inhibit new karman. Like-
wise, Umasvati advocates meditation as another means of removing and
preventing karman. Meditation involves “the concentration of one’s thought on
a single object by a person with good bone-joints,” says Umasvati, and then he
goes on to analyze the various types of Jain meditations.20 As deluding karman is
eliminated, omniscience arises. And with the complete elimination of all types
of karman, the soul attains Moksha. At this point, in the Jain understanding, the
liberated soul soars upward to the border of cosmic space, in perfect stasis and
autonomy, which the Jains call Kaivalya.
Like the Jains, the non-theistic Buddhist religious community concerned it-
self fundamentally with the attainment of Moksha. From the time of the Buddha
Shakyamuni, Buddhists most often used the term Nirvana, which emphasizes the
“extinguishing” of worldly suffering and subsequent rebirth. Buddhists insisted
that there exists no i ndependent, enduring “self ” or “soul” (atman). So distinc-
tive was this denial that o thers characterized Buddhists as anatmavadins, those
who proclaim the “no-soul” theory. From an early time Buddhists held to ideas
of thoroughgoing impermanence and dependent causality. With the rise of the
Madhyamika (Middle Way) philosophical school within the broader Mahayana
developments of the early centuries CE, the anti-essentialism inherent in these
formative Buddhist ideas was stretched into a universal principle. In the works
of Nagarjuna, dating to the second century CE, all objects and categories are de-
nied any fundamental or essential being. They can be characterized only by the
negative term shunyata, emptiness. And in the Yogachara school of Buddhism
established in the fourth century CE by two brothers from Purushapura, Asanga
and Vasubandhu, Buddhist anti-essentialism is directed at everyday phenom-
enological experience. Yogachara Buddhism (also identified as the “Mind-Only”
school) insisted that our everyday notion that objects of experience exist exter-
nal to and independent of our own perceiving consciousness is a fundamental
form of ignorance and a cause of suffering. Yogachara proponents emphasize that
one must overcome the mistaken division between oneself as a perceiving sub-
ject and the world as perceived objects.
These ontological commitments form the basis for the Buddhist soteriologi-
cal path. Buddhists often formalize the route from basic worldly suffering to
enlightenment or Moksha in five stages (pancha-marga, literally the “five
roads”). The first two Buddhist roads involve preparation. The Buddhist seeker
begins the quest by cultivating moral conduct, developing the practice of medi-
tation, and learning important doctrinal tenets. These preparations lead one to
the crucial third stage, the “road of insight.” Here the seeker comes to a direct
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 409
and intense perception of the true nature of reality just as it is—that is, as the
Buddhist teachings portray it. Here is where different emphases in the path may
occur. A Buddhist monk or nun of the Theravada might come to a profound
recognition of the four noble truths. A Mahayana-oriented seeker might realize
the deep truth of emptiness, and a seeker following the Yogachara orientation
could experience a transformation in consciousness where subject and object are
no longer bifurcated. In all cases, this insight is transformative. The subsequent
stage in this Buddhist route involves the cultivation of t hese insights and aban-
doning any lingering afflictions. The fifth and final “road of completion” is syn-
onymous with attaining one’s goal. The enlightened Buddhist recognizes that all
fetters are eliminated and w ill not return. One is freed from all rebirth since no
causal force of karman remains. With the doctrine of no-soul, there is no endur-
ing entity to fly to the top of the cosmos or go anywhere. T here is Nirvana only.
Groups in the Vedic lineage also promoted the pursuit of Moksha. Two impor
tant soteriological works compiled in the early centuries CE are the Brahmasutras
of Badarayana and the Yogasutras of Patanjali. Both articulated conceptions of
Moksha and set out methods for its attainment, but with differing ontological
premises. Badarayana takes the monist orientation of the Upanishads as the foun-
dation for seeking the highest state, while Patanjali grounds his formulation of
the Yoga path on the dualist premises of the Samkhya (“enumerationist”) school.
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410 C h a p t e r 1 1
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 411
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412 C h a p t e r 1 1
Bhagavad Gita, as the three points of departure (prasthana-traya) for the devel-
opment of Vedanta philosophy and practice. In later centuries, this gave rise to
a highly erudite and argumentative literature of explication and interpretation
of t hese core texts. Most famous among the later Vedantins are the Advaita (non-
dualist) proponent Shankara of the eighth c entury, the Vishishthadvaita (quali-
fied nondualist) leader Ramanuja in the twelfth century, and the Dvaita (dualist)
advocate Madhva in the thirteenth century.
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 413
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414 C h a p t e r 1 1
five moral restraints that any practitioner should adopt as a starting point: non-
violence, truthfulness, avoidance of theft, celibacy, and nongreediness. The same
five ethical foundations of the religious life appear in early Jain and Buddhist
teachings, as we have seen, and Patanjali asserts that they are universal principles.
One need not be a Brahmin initiated into the Veda, or a Buddhist or Jain initiated
into a monastic community to enter onto the path of Yoga. Along with the re-
straints, Patanjali also lists a series of vows or observances: purification of the
body, self-contentment, self-restraint, study of scripture, and dedication to the
Lord of Yoga. (This Lord is sometimes identified as Shiva, but Patanjali’s approach
does not rely on a theistic orientation.) Together the restraints and observances
form the moral and behavioral foundation for successful practice of the following
stages of Yoga.
The third limb is posture or asana. Elaboration of this limb has evolved into
the proliferation of positions and movements in modern postural yoga, often re-
ferred to as hatha-yoga. But for Patanjali, posture means finding a comfortable
position in which one can be steady and easy, relaxing all effort. This steadiness
makes possible the subsequent limbs. Fourth is control of the breath ( pranayama),
in which the Yoga practitioner carefully regulates the rhythm of inhalation, re-
tention, and exhalation. This leads to the fifth limb, withdrawal of the senses
(pratyahara). In early Indian psychology, it was understood that our sense
faculties—sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch—reach outward into the world
to engage with their objects. To withdraw the senses, the yogi must “reverse the
course” or “cultivate the opposite.” That is, the discipline of Yoga, as Patanjali pre
sents it, requires an exercise of human will to go against “natural” forms of or-
dinary activity. Stilling the body, controlling the breath, and reining in the senses
allow one to enter into meditation.
For limbs six, seven, and eight, Patanjali describes three levels of meditative
practice: concentration (dharana), meditation (dhyana), and pure contempla-
tion (samadhi). T hese involve increasingly subtle states of mind. Concentration
requires that the practitioner fix one’s mind on a single spot. This could be a
physical one like the tip of the nose, or it could be a m ental one like a visualized
image. In a theistic setting, for example, one could focus on an interior visualiza-
tion of Shiva as the Lord of Yoga. At the next level, one meditates on a single
object without any interruption or interfering thoughts or perceptions. Finally,
at the stage of pure contemplation, Patanjali says, there is a dissolving of all dis-
tinctions between the meditating subject and the object of contemplation. Here
at the highest stage, despite the ontological differences, Patanjali’s account of
meditative states shows clear parallels with t hose of the other schools, such as
the Buddhists of the Yogachara school.
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T h e F ou r H u m a n A i m s: G u i de s f or t h e G o od L i f e 415
Through the practice of Yoga in this manner, Patanjali claims, one acquires
supernatural powers (siddhi). The Yoga a dept can know the past and f uture and
can remember previous births. One can gain extraordinary awareness of the
thoughts of o thers. One can enter into the bodies of other persons and can be-
come invisible oneself. These g reat powers, however, are not the same as true
Moksha and can even become a distraction that hinders one from that highest
aspiration. As Patanjali begins his Yogasutras with the central h uman problem
of endlessly turning thoughts, he closes with the attainment of liberation, em-
ploying Samkhya terms. Moksha, he concludes, involves the “reversal of the mani-
fest qualities of prakriti, which are devoid of meaning for the purusha such that
the power of pure consciousness is established in its true form, which is autono-
mous” ( YS 4.34) As the translator Barbara Stoler Miller suggests, citing T. S.
Eliot, the Yoga conception of Moksha finds the “still point of the turning world”
in perfect equilibrium and spiritual calm.24
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