The document is a memorandum discussing when ownership of property is transferred between parties. It addresses two specific cases:
1) Ownership of a condominium unit (Columns Unit). The memorandum argues that ownership was transferred when CJ Corona physically accepted delivery in 2009, not in 2004 when the deed of sale was signed or the title issued, because symbolic delivery can be negated by failure to take actual possession.
2) Ownership of Marikina properties. The memorandum argues that ownership was transferred in 1990 when the deed of sale was signed and actual possession given to the buyer, even though the title remains in the original owner's name, because delivery of possession was complete.
The memorandum analyzes when
The document is a memorandum discussing when ownership of property is transferred between parties. It addresses two specific cases:
1) Ownership of a condominium unit (Columns Unit). The memorandum argues that ownership was transferred when CJ Corona physically accepted delivery in 2009, not in 2004 when the deed of sale was signed or the title issued, because symbolic delivery can be negated by failure to take actual possession.
2) Ownership of Marikina properties. The memorandum argues that ownership was transferred in 1990 when the deed of sale was signed and actual possession given to the buyer, even though the title remains in the original owner's name, because delivery of possession was complete.
The memorandum analyzes when
The document is a memorandum discussing when ownership of property is transferred between parties. It addresses two specific cases:
1) Ownership of a condominium unit (Columns Unit). The memorandum argues that ownership was transferred when CJ Corona physically accepted delivery in 2009, not in 2004 when the deed of sale was signed or the title issued, because symbolic delivery can be negated by failure to take actual possession.
2) Ownership of Marikina properties. The memorandum argues that ownership was transferred in 1990 when the deed of sale was signed and actual possession given to the buyer, even though the title remains in the original owner's name, because delivery of possession was complete.
The memorandum analyzes when
The document is a memorandum discussing when ownership of property is transferred between parties. It addresses two specific cases:
1) Ownership of a condominium unit (Columns Unit). The memorandum argues that ownership was transferred when CJ Corona physically accepted delivery in 2009, not in 2004 when the deed of sale was signed or the title issued, because symbolic delivery can be negated by failure to take actual possession.
2) Ownership of Marikina properties. The memorandum argues that ownership was transferred in 1990 when the deed of sale was signed and actual possession given to the buyer, even though the title remains in the original owner's name, because delivery of possession was complete.
The memorandum analyzes when
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3itepubHc of tbe
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kl {!iHhre (}f H!: SITTING AS AN IMPEACHMENT COURT FEB 16 1\11 :07 IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF RENATO C. CORONA AS CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES. REPRESENTATIVES NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, LORENZO R. TANADA HI, REYNALDO V. UMALI, ARLENE J. BAG-AO (other complainants comprising at least one tlhird (1/3) of the total Members of the House of Repres(:ntatives as are indicated in the Complaint), Complainants. Case No. 002-2011 }(---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------)( MEMORANDUM (On Transfer of Ownership) Chief Jm:tice Renato C. Corona ("CJ Corona"), by counsel, respectfully states: 1. In compliance with this Honorable Court's directive, CJ Corona humbly submits this memorandum on the following issues: (A) WHE'THER CJ CORONA BECAME 'THE OWNER OF THE COLUMNS CONDOMINIUM UNIT (THE "COLUMNS UNIT") lJPON 'THE EXECU'TION OF 'THE DEED OF SALE ON 1 OC'TOBER 2004, AND 'THE ISSUANCE OF THE CONDOMINIUM CER'TIFICA'TE OF 'TI'fLE NO. 85716 ON 3 NOVEMBER 2004, OR AT 'THE TIME HE AC'TUALLY ACCEPTED PHYSICAL DELIVERY AND POSSESSION THEREOF; AND (B) WHE'THER OR NOT CJ CORONA SHOULD STILL BE CONSIDERED 'THE OWNER OF 'THE MARIKINA PROPERTIES COVERED BY TeT NOS. N-97119 TO N-97125.' 2. This Memorandum aims to clarify discuss the delivery of property as a necessary dement for dete.rmining the moment of the transfer of ownership. There are 2 modes of delivery, namely: constructive and actual. In constructive delivery, the property is deemed delivered to the buyer or transferee by symbolic means, such as the execution and giving of a deed of transfer or sale, or the giving of keys. In actual delivery, the property is abandoned by the seller or transferor and actually or physically put in the control of the seller or transferee. 3. As a preliminary matter, the factual and legal issuesturnon two seeming contradictory situations. Firstly, the Certificate of Title No. 85716 2 over the Columns condominium unit of CJ Corona was issued on 3 November 2004. The developer, Community Innovations, Inc., took the position that the unit was "deemed accepted." CJ Corona maintains the position that he became the full owner of the Columns Unit only in 2009, when he took actual possession. CJ Corona refused to accept delivery in order to preserve his right to pursue legal remedies against the developer for the repair of the defects and damage to the Columns Unit. For this reason, CJ Corona could not mention the Columns Unit in his SALN before 2010. tExhs. "HH" to ''N]SL'' 2 Exh. '1J]." Memorandum on T ran.rfor if Ownership Page 2 ifl1 4. In contrast, a second and converse problem arises with respect to the Marikina ptoperty transferred by Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 July 1990, executed by Mrs. Cristina R. Corona in favor of Demetrio C. Vicente (Mr. Vicente). The parties agreed that registration of the sale and transfer of title would be the responsibilty of Mr. Vicente, the buyer. After execution of a deed of sale and t a l ~ t n g actual, physical possession of the Marikina property by Mr. Vicente, he has not transferred the property to his name. As a result, all 7 relevant titles remain in the name of "Cristina R. Corona, married to Renato C. Corona." All the while, however, Mr. Vicente has been occupying the property and even paying the real property tax thereon. CJ Corona maintains that he is no longer the owner of the property since delivery of ownership and possession to Mr. Vicente are complete. CJ Corona, therefore, should not mention the Marikina property in his SALN. Discussion THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHII:I OVER THE COLUMNS UNIT SHOULD BE RECKONED AT THE TIME TH1E PHYSICAL DELIVERY THEREOF WAS ACCEPTED UY CJ CORONA. 5. Complainants attempt to show that the ownership of the Columns Unit was transEerred to CJ Corona at the time that the Deed of Absolute Sale 3 over said prope:rty was executed on 1 October 2004, or at the latest, when the Condominium Certificate of Ticle No. 85716 4 was issued on 3 November 2004. 3 Exh. ''PPP.'' 4 Exh. "JJJ." Memorandum on Transfer qf Ownership Page 3 qfll Hence, according to complainants, since ownership of the Columns Unit was supposedly transferred in 2004 through symbolic delivery, it should have been reported in CJ Corona's 2004 SALN,5 and not in his 2010 SALN.6 6. Complainants' sole reliance on the concept of symbolic deliveryis mistaken. In Cebu Winland Development Corporation v. Ong Siao Hua/the Supreme Court held thatsymbolic (or presumptive) delivery by the execution of a public insttumentcan be negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold, vii} The resolution of the issue at bar necessitates a scrutiny of the concept of "delivety" in the context of the Law on Sales or as used in Article 1543 of the Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver the thing which is the object of the sale. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on the obligation of the vendor to deliver the object of the sale provide: ARTICLE 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale. (1461a) ARTICLE 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. (n) ARTICLE 1497. The thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. (1462a) ARTICLE 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. XXX]{ 7. Under the Civil Code, ownership does not pass by mere stipulation but only by delivery. Manresa explains, "the delivery of the thing * * signifies that title has passed from IDe seller to IDe 5 Exhs. "D" to "D-1." 6 Exhs. "M" to "M-l." 7G.R. No. 173215, 21 May 2009. Memorandum on Tranifcr of Ownership Page 4 of11 buyer." Accordling to Tolentino, the purpose of delivery is not only for the enjoyment of the thing but also a mode of acquiring dominion and determines the transmission of ownership, the birth of the real right. The delivery under any of the forms provided by Articles 1497 to 1505 of the Civil Code signifies that the transmission of ownership from vendor to vendee has tal,en place. 8 8. Article 1497 above contemplates what is known as real or actual delivery, when the thing sold is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. Article 1498, on the one hand, refers to symbolic delivery by the execution of a public instrument. It should be noted, however, that Article 1498 does not say that the execution of the deed provides a conclusive presumption of the delivery of possession. It confines itself to providing that the execution thereof is equivalent to delivery, which means that the presumption therein can be rebutted by means of clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the presumptive delivery by the execution of a public instrument can be negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. 9 9. "Delivery" as used in the Law on Sales refers to the transfer of two things: (1) possession and (2) ownership. This is the rationale behind the doctrine that presumptive delivery via execution of a public instrument is negated when the vendee actually fails to obtain material possession of the land subject of the sale. In the same vein, if the buyer is 8[d. 'ld. Memorandum on Transfer '!IOwnership Page 5 '!I" placed in actual possession of the property, but by agreement of the parties, ownership of the same is retained by the seller until the price is fully paid, the mere transfer of the possession of the property subject of the sale is not the "delivery" contemplated in the Law on Sales or as used in Article 1543 of the Civil Code.1O 10. A well-respected authority in Civil law has also stated that: It :is further necessary that the act be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. For instance, where the keys to the place where the thing is deposited are delivered to the vendee in order that he may examine it, but not with the intention of making delivery, or where the titles of ownership of incorporeal property are placed in the possession of the vendee for his study or inspection, but not with the intent of making the tradition, it cannot be said that there has been a constructive delivery. The act without the intention is insufficient. For the same reason, any act, althongh not provided in these articles, but accompanied by evident intention of the vendor to deliver or of the vendee: to receive the thing, will be considered as constituting tradition. It is the intention which is essential.!! 11. As ruled by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, "(n)owhere in the Civil Code, however, does it provide that execution of a deed of sale is a conclusive presumption of delivery of possession. The Code merely said that the execution shall be equivalent to delivery. The presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing: evidence. Presumptive delivery can be negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold."12 12. In other words, even if there has been complete documentation and registtation of the sale or transfer, delivery is not deemed complete, and it negated if there: is proof that the buyer did not take actual possession of the 101d. !! V TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 55 (1992). 12Ten FortY Realty and Development Corp. v. Marina Ct7It, G.R. No. 151212, 10 September 2003; Santos v. Santos, et ah, G.R. No. 133895,2 October 2001. Memorandum on Transfer rifOwnership Page 6 rifll property. It is only when both documentation and registration, coupled with placing the buyer in actual, physical control of the property, is there completion of delivery. 13. Delivery has been described as a composite act, a thing in which both parties must join and the minds of both parties concur. It is an act by which one partV parts with the title to and the possession of the property, and the other acquires the right to and the possession of the same. In its natural sense, delivery means something in addition to the delivery of property or title; it means transfer of possession. In the Law on Sales, delivery may be either actual or constructive, but both forms of delivery contemplate "the absolute giving up of the control and custody of the property on the part of the vendor, and the assumption of the same by the vendee. ,,13 14. In the case of Santos v. Santos, et al.,14 it was further explained that if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy nor make use of it himself or through another in his name, then delivery has not been effected, v i ~ : On the second issue, is a sale through a public instrument tantamount to delivery of the thing sold? Petitioner in her memorandum invokes Article 1477 of the Civil Code which provides that ownership of the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon its actual or constructive delivery. Article 1498, in turn, provides that when the sale is made through a public instrument, its execution .is equivalent to the delivery of the thing subject of the contract. Petitioner avers that applying said provisions to the case, Salvador became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the two deeds of sale executed in his favor. *** 13EquatonalRcalty Development, Inc. v. M'fYjair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 133879,21 November 2001. 14Santos v. Santos, et a,(, G.R. No. 133895,2 October 2001. Memorandum on Transfer 0/ Ownership Page 70/11 In Danguilan vs. lAC, 168 SCRA 22, 32 (1988), we held that for the execution of a public instrument to effect tradition, the purchaser must be placed in wntrol of the thing sold. When there is no impediment to prevent the thing sold from converting to tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendo:t, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaset: cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy nor make use of it l ~ i m s e l f or through another in his name, then delivery has not been effected. As found by both the trial and appellate courts and amply supported by the evidence on record, Salvador was never placed in control of the property. The original sellers retained their control and possession. Therefore, there was no real transfer of ownership. (Emphasis supplied) 15. The Supreme Court emphasized the need to show that the vendor intended to absolutely deliver control and custody of the property, and that it was likewise the: intention of the vendee to accept such delivery, thus: Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him "in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferted from the vendor to the vendee." This right is transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. Non nudis pactis sed traditiOn'o dominia remm traniferantur. And there is said to be delivery if and when the thing sold "is placed in the control and possession of the vendee." Thus, it has been held that while the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. 16. In the present proceedings, prosecution witness,Nerissa Josef, testified and confirmed that there was no actual acceptance by CJ Corona of the Columns Unit, and that it was only "deemed accepted" on 7 June 2008-a unilateral act of the -developer Community Innovations, IncYMs. Josef also admitted that there were issues concerning the Columns Unit as there was a need for re-inspection, 16 thus negating any delivery or transfer of ownership since 15 Please see Exh. "PPP-4," which is also marked as Exh. "45." 16 Please see Exh. "48." Memorandum on TmniferofOwnership Page 8 of11 CJ Corona did not have the enjoyment and material tenancy nor make use of the Columns Unit himself or through another in his name. 17. The record therefore shows that complainants have not proven that CJ Corona was mistaken in declaring his ownership of the Columns Unit in his 2010 SALN because as of this time, complainants have failed to show when CJ Corona actually and intention:ally accepted delivery of said Unit. THE MARIKINA PROPERTIES 17 NEED NOT BE REPORTED IN CJ CORONA'S SALNS FROM 2002 TO 2010 SINCE THE OWNERSHIl' THEREOF WAS TRANSFERRED IN 1990. 18. As mentioned above, in Equatorial Realry Development, Inc. v. M'!Yjair Theater, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled as follows: Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him "in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee." This right is transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. Non nudispactimdtraditionedominia1"l1rumtransferantur. And there is said to be delivery if and when the thing sold "is placed in the control and possession of the vendee." ... 19. During the proceedings held on 3 February 2012, it was shown that a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 July 1990 was executed by Mrs. Cristina R Corona in favolc of Demetrio C. Vicente ("Mr. Vicente") covering the Marikina properties. Evidence will likewise be presented and offered to show that 17 Exhs. "!Iff' to ~ ' N 1 ' . J ," Memorandum on Transfer of Ownership Page 9 of11 possession oveJt said properties was already transferred to Mr. Vicente, and that he has been exercising his ownership rights on said properties, since 1990. 20. The non-registration of the Marikina properties in the name of Mr. Vicente does not adversely affect the legal position of CJ Corona. Unlike the circumstances surrounding the Columns Unit, the express provisions of the Civil Code and applicable jurisprudence, as cited above, recognize the transfer of ownership over the Marikina properties from Mrs. Corona to M1:. Vicente by virtue of a contract and actual delivery by Mrs. Corona of possession of the prQperties to Mr. Vicente, who accepted such delivery. Consequently, Mr. Vicente has titLe to these properties because after execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale/a Mrs. Corona also delivered actual possession thereof to Mr Vicente, who unqualifiedly accepted delivery and possession of the properties." PRAYER WHEREFORE, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona respectfully prays that this Honorable Impeachment Court consider the above memorandum in its resolution of Article II of the "Verified" Complaint of Impeachment. Chief Justice Renato C. Corona further prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. Mahti for Pasay City, 15 February 2012. 18 Exh. "54" and "54_A.>1 Memorandum on Transfer of Ownership Page 10 ofll Respectfully submitted: Counsel for ChlefJustice Renato C. Corona. JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS (RET.) PTR No .. 2643828,January 4, 2011, Makati IBP No. 846915 issued January 6, 2011, Manila I Roll no. 3814 MCLE-exempt ]OSEM. III PTR No. 0038311; 1/09/12; Mahti City IBP LRN 02570 August 20, 2001 (Lifetime) Roll of Attorneys No. 37065 MCLE Exemption No. 1-000176 DENNIS P. MANALO PTR No. 2666920; 5 J anUM? 2011, Makati City IBP No. 839371.; 3 January 2011, Makati City Roll No. 40950, 12 Api"il1996 MCLE Compliance No. III-0009471, 26 Aptil2010 Copies furnished: House of RepJ:esentatives Batasan Complex Batasan Hills, Quezon City Senators of t h f ~ Republic of the Philippines GS1S Building Macapagal Highway Pasay City Memoralldum on T rallifer of Ownership Page 11 of11
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