Samonte vs. Atty. Gatdula, A.M. No.

P-99-1292 – Case Digest

FACTS
Respondent Gatdula was charged with grave misconduct in engaging in the private practice of law. The complainant was the repr esentative of her
sister for ejectment pending with the MTC. The execution of that decision in favor of the plaintiff was enjoined by Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City where
the respondent is the Branch Clerk of Court. The complainant alleged that the respondent tried to convince her to change his lawyer if she wanted the
execution of the judgment to proceed and even gave her his calling card with the name “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig, and Celera Law
Offices” with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City which complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint. Respondent,
when asked to comment, claimed that it was the complainant who showed him said calling card and asked him if he could handle the case but to which
he refused as he was not connected with the law firm, though he was invited to join the firm. The case was set for hearing se veral times but the
complainant nor her counsel did not appear. The return of the service stated that the complainant was abroad. Respondent testified in his own behalf
and vehemently denied the complainant’s allegation. He, however, did not deny that his name appeared on the calling card or that the calling card
was printed without his knowledge and consent.

The Court ruled that the inclusion or retention of respondent’s name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which is a violation of
Section 7, subparagraph (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials or Employees).

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest cler k must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion.

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 3.03 (Canon 2, Sec. 27, CPRA) for engaging in the private practice of law while holding public office.

RULING
YES. While the respondent vehemently denies the complainant’s allegations, he does not deny that his name appears on the calling card attached to
the complaint, which admittedly came into the hands of the complainant.

The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name that appears on the calling card, a permissible form of advertising
or solicitation of legal services. Respondent does not claim that the calling card was printed without his knowledge or cons ent, and the calling card
carries his name primarily and the name of Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig, and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg ., 717 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City” in the left corner. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his
name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as
“Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.”

“(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such prac tice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with official functions.”

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum
but above all else must be above suspicion. Responded was reprimanded and ordered by the court to exclude his name in the firm name of any office
engaged in the private practice of law.

PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service. Here, the advice given by respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General on the procedure to liquidate GENBANKis
not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

FACTS
Former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in the GenBank’s
liquidation. Mendoza gave advice on the procedure to liquidate the GenBank. Subsequently, President Aquino established the PC GG to recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his family and cronies. The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for rever sion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against Tan,et al. and issued several writs of sequestration on properties they allegedly acquired.
Tan,et al. were represented by former SolGen Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law. The PCGG filed motion s to disqualify
Mendoza as counsel for Tan, et al., alleging that then SolGen and counsel to Central Bank, “actively intervened” in the liquidation of GenBank, which
was subsequently acquired by Tan,et al.

ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. (NO)

RULING
The “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with
thesaid bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.” Said procedure of liquidation is given in black and white
in Republic Act No. 265, section 29. Thus, the Court held that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Supreme Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counse l as well as deprive his
client of competent legal representation - the danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork.
VITRIOLO v. DASIG A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003

Facts:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge
involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment
of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-
Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed
acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

She demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P5,000.00
for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela
Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED. She demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which wa s subsequently
confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED.

Issue:
Whether the Respondent violated her Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:
Yes, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby ordered DISBARRED. Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests
pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging
or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.0219 of the Code which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any
transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected
not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 120 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the C ode of Professional
Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not
just the penalty of three years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors,
but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.

Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 38581, March 31, 1976.

In Suarez vs. Platon, et al., the Court held that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not
escape, innocence shall not suffer. Here, the Court gave due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for upholding the aforementioned time-honored
principle.

FACTS
Petitioner Lorenzo Jose who was convicted of illegal possession of explosives (handgrenade) seeks a new trial which was denied him by the Court of
First Instance and by respondent Court of Appeals. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with a permit to possess explosives such
as the handgrenade in question. Hence, this motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner, which was opposed by the Solicitor General. Later on,
a Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General informing the Court that in view of the “persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo Jose both
before this Honorable Court and respondent Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing appointment as Philippine Constabulary Agent and/or authority
to possess handgrenade,” in the interest of justice, he was constrained to make pertinent inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos. The latter
in his letter confirmed the appointment of petitioner Lorenzo Jose as a PC Agent of the Pampanga Constabulary Command. Therea fter, the Solicitor
General conceded that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new trial.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner’s motion for new trial should be granted. (YES)

RULING
The Court gave due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for upholding the time-honored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court
inSuarez vs. Platon, et al., that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not escape, innocence
shall not suffer. The Court found and held that the circumstances of petitioner justify a reopening of his case to afford him the opportunity of producing
exculpating evidence. An outright acquittal from the Court which petitioner seeks as an alternative relief is not proper. As correctly stressed by the
Solicitor General, the People is to be given the chance of examining the documentary evidence sought to be produced, and of cross-examining the
persons who executed the same, as well as the accused himself, now petitioner, on his explanation for the non-production of the evidence during the
trial.
Ana Marie Cambaliza, Complainant, v. Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristobal-Tenorio, Respondent | Adm. Case No. 6290 | 14 July 2004

FACTS
Cambaliza, a former employee of Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, filed a disbarment complaint on the grounds of deceit, grossly immoral conduct and
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.

Deceit: represented herself to be married to Felicisimo Tenorio Jr, who has a prior existing marriage
Grossly immoral conduct: disseminated libelous affidavits against a Makati City counselor.
Malpractice: allowed her husband, a non-lawyer, to practice by making him a senior partner in her law office. This is evidenced by 1) the law office
letterhead which included the husband as a senior partner, 2) an id wherein he signed as an “atty”, 3) appearance in court as counsel.

ISSUE:
Was the Respondent in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:
Yes, the respondent was GUILTY of malpractice, specifically, violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01.

Canon 9: a lawyer shall not assist in unauthorized practice of law

Even though Cambaliza later on withdrew her complaint, IBP still pushed through with the investigation because such is a disciplinary proceeding.
There is no private interest affected such that desistance of the complainant will terminate the proceedings. The purpose is to protect the bar from
those unfit to practice law.

For violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of l aw for
a period of six (6) months effectively immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same o similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

BELO-HENARES v. ATTY. GUEVARRA A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016

FACTS:
Respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio, who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical
procedure on her buttocks purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook
account insulting and verbally abusing complainant. Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire
public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his
demand letter dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged this complaint for disbarment against respondent.

ISSUE:
WON respondent should be administratively liable

HELD:

YES.

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of
complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to
observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of
the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and
conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation
BRUNET V. GUAREN, A.C. No. 10164, 10 Mar. 2014

FACTS:
Complainants alleged that they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that
Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was ag reed that full payment
of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) which they
gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original copy of the
deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional
payment of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case
and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return
of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be deducted to
answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance
against them in a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

ISSUE:
Whether or not resondent violated the code of professional responsibility

RULING:

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be
a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to
perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants’ lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client
with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

COBB-PEREZ vs LANTIN GR No. L-22320 Jul. 29, 1968

FACTS
A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latter’s failure to pay a debt of Php 17,000.00. Hermoso won and a writ of
execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Perez worth Php 300,000.00. This was opposed by
Perez as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount of the debt. Respondent Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this,
hence he amended his earlier decision and issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale of Perez’ 210 shares of stock
approximately worth Php17,000.00Subsequently, Perez and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the public sale. The case
eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for
injunction are contemplated for delay. I n said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should be paid
by their counsels, Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinao. The counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision
reflected adversely against their professionalism; that “If therewas delay, it was because petitioners’ counsel happened to be more assertive… a quality
of the lawyers(which) is not to be condemned.”

ISSUE
WON the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.

HELD
No. A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause must been couraged and is to be commended; what is not
tolerated is a lawyer’s insistence despite the patent futility of his client’s position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client’s cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client and temper his client’s propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable. Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinao jointly and severally liable for the treble costs.
PETER DONTON v. ATTY. TANSINGCO A.C. No. 6057June 27, 2006

FACTS:
Peter Donton files a complaint against Atty Emmanuel Tansingco as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement and against others
(Diane Stier, and Emelyn Manggay) for estafa thru falsification of public document. A disbarment complaint filed by petitioner against respondent for
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the Coe of Professional Resposibility arose when respondent filed a
counter–charge of perjury against petitioner. Atty. Tansingco in his answer stated that he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement at the
request of Mr. Stier, and owner an a long-time resident ofa real property locate in the country. Since Mr. Stier is an alien and not a citizen of the
Philippines and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name, he agreed thatthe property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
Petitioner Donton averred that respondent lawyer committed a serious misconduct due to his act of preparing an Occupancy Agreement despite
knowledge that Stier is a foreign national and therefore is a deliberate violation of the code.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Atty. Emmanuel Tansingco committed serious misconduct

RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that a lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound
to obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating a law commits an act which justifies disciplinary actions
against the lawyer. Respondent lawyer knows about the law that a foreign national is disqualified in owning real lands in the country but he still
continued his act and transferred the title to petitioner’s name and aware of the prohibition, respondent then quickly rectified his act and provided some
safeguards by preparing several documents including the Occupancy Agreement. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents.

Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs FASGI Enterprises GR 137378; 12 October 2000

FACTS:
On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (“FASGI”), a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the la ws of the State of
California, United States of America, entered into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated (“PAWI”), a Philippine
corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. (“FPS”), an Italian corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and
distributorship in the United States of aluminium wheels manufactured by PAWI. FASGI then paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately,
FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with the contract.

On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of damages in the amount of
US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In the interim, two agreements were entered by the parties
but PAWI kept on failing to discharge its obligations therein. Irked by PAWI’s persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central
District of California the agreements for judgment against PAWI.

On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed
a complaint for “enforcement of foreign judgment”, before RTC Makati. The Makati court, however, dismissed the case, on the ground that the decree
was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations
of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was m ade requiring FASGI
to return to PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels. This situation amounted to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the
RTC said, agreements which the California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Tho mas Ready, counsel
for PAWI, without the latter’s authorization. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

ISSUE:
WON the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign judgment.

HELD:
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of
action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the
system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority.
Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client’s authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even when
he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his client’s interest. However, PAWI failed to substantiate this complain with sufficient
evidence. Hence, the foreign judgment must be enforced.

Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court based its judgment, this cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment.
PAWI claimed that there was collusion and fraud in the signing of the agreements. Although the US Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI
insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud
based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would
deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic
fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of action – such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract – is deemed already
adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.
LORENZANA FOOD CORPORATION vs ATTY. FRANCISCO L. DARIA
A.C. No. 2736, SECOND DIVISION, May 27, 1991, PER CURIAM.

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext
that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case.

FACTS:
Respondent was hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) as its legal counsel and was designated as its personnel manager six
months later. LFC employee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against complainant. During the initial
hearing, Hanopol and respondent tried to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. Since no agreement was reached the hearing was reset.
On the pretext that Hanopol was supposed to go to his office on that date, respondent failed to appear for the second setting. So, the Labor Arbiter
was constrained to further reset the hearing to June 28, 1983. In the meantime, respondent received an Order in another labor case, setting the hearing
therein also on June 28, 1983. Faced with a conflicting schedule, respondent decided to move to postpone the hearing in the Hanopol case. However,
instead of filing a written motion for postponement, he opted to call, through his secretary, the Office of the Labor Arbiter to move for postponement.
Respondent's telephone message apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the hearing on June 28, 1983, he considered the case
submitted for decision on the basis of Hanopol's complaint and affidavit. Respondent had not submitted a position paper. Respondent Daria appealed
the Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. In the
meantime, the middle of June 1984, respondent signified to management his intention to resign.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Daria should be held liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18. (YES)

RULING:
For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol case which resulted in complainant LFC's default and
judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter, the respondent is faulted for negligence. The respondent avers that Hanopol should have seen him in his
office to work out a compromise agreement, on the scheduled day of the second hearing but did not. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the
Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate the effects of respondent's negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the
required position paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case, which, perhaps, would have been in favor of
complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because it deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting
to other cases of complainant. In fact he had to prepare complainant's position paper which respondent should have done earlier. From the foregoing,
it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. An attorney owes loyalty
to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good
practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from and
independent of the former case.

CASTANEDA vs AGO G.R. No. L-28546

FACTS
Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries. - Judgment in favor of Castaneda and
Henson - SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Ago’s motion denied, levy was made on Ago’s house and lots; sherif advertised
the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC ffirmed dismissal - Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain sherif from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied - Sherif sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed
to redeem - Sherif executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties - Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered
against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by
the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sherif fro m registering the final
deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued - Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin
sherif from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to
SC which dismissed the petition - Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy

RULING
No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sherif’s sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the
fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal
remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the pe titioners. Forgetting his
sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an ins tigator
of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his
client’s cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyer’s insistence despite the patent
futility of his client’s position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless,
then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices
of his client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate.
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION v. ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK, AC. No. 9094, 2012-08-15

FACTS:

This is a disbarment case against a lawyer who sued a former client in representation of a new one. Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation,
Inc. (Hocorma Foundation) filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Richard Funk.It alleged that Atty. Funk used to work as corporate
secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the foundation... from 1983 to 1985.[1] He also served as its counsel in several criminal and
civil cases. Atty. Funk filed an action for quieting of title and damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat Institute, Inc . (Mabalacat
Institute). Atty. Funk did so, according to the foundation, using information... that he acquired while serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and in breach of attorney-client relationship. Atty. Funk averred that Don Teodoro V. Santos (Santos) organized
Mabalacat Institute in 1950 and Hocorma Foundation in 1979. In 1983 the Mabalacat Institute made Atty. Funk serve as a director and legal counsel.
According to Atty. Funk, when Santos got involved in various litigations, he sold or donated substantial portions of his real and personal properties to
the Hocorma Foundation. Santos hired Atty. Funk for this purpose. The latter emphasized that, in all these, the... attorney-client relationship was always
between Santos and him. He was more of Santos' personal lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation. Atty. Funk also claimed that Santos
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in his favor on August 13, 1983. The SPA authorized him to advise Hocorma Foundati on and follow up
with it Santos' sale or donation of a 5-hectare land in Pampanga to Mabalacat Institute,... When Santos issued the SPA, Atty. Funk was Mabalacat
Institute's director and counsel. He was not yet Hocorma Foundation's counsel.[7] When Santos executed the deeds of conveyances, Atty. Funk's
clients were only Santos and Mabalacat Institute. After Santos died on September 14, 1983, Atty. Funk was elected President of Mabalacat Institute
Atty. Funk claims that in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation refused to pay his attorney's fees, he severed his professional relationship with it. On
November 9, 1989, four years later, he filed a complaint against the foundation for collection of his attorney's fees. The tr ial court,... the Court of
Appeals (CA), and the Supreme Court decided the claim in his favor. After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03[12] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) with the aggravating circumstance of a pat tern of misconduct
consisting of four court... appearances against his former client, the Hocorma Foundation.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation of the CPR when he filed several actions against such client
on behalf of a new one.

RULING:
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written consent of al l concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years... after terminating his
relationship with the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of another client, the Mabalacat Institute, without the foundation's written
consent. An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that
he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being... guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and
honest intention on the erring lawyer's part does not make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client's
doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in
the light of their relationship. It would simply... be impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision or
lock the same into an iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one. Atty. Funk... collected attorney's fees from the foundation for such
services. Thus, he had an obligation not to use any knowledge he acquired during that relationship, including the fact that the property under litigation
existed at all, when he sued the foundation.

OROLA vs. ATTY. RAMOS, A.C. No.9860, September 11, 2013

FACTS
The respondent acted as a collaborating counsel with Atty. Ely Azarraga, Jr. in representing Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs of late Antonio L. Orola (Heirs
of Antonio) in the settlement of the estate of Trinidad Laserna-Orola. The heirs of Antonio, together with the heirs of Trinidad, who were the complainants in
the disbarment case, moved for the removal of Emilio Orola, the adverse party, as the administrator of Trinidad’s estate. Subsequently, respondent appeared
as a collaborating counsel for Emilio, the opposing party, in the same case. Due to this, complainants filed a disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on the ground that the respondent violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests under Rule 15.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Respondent contended that he never appeared as counsel for the complainants. He merely represented Maricar temporarily at the latter’s request due to the
unavailability of Atty. Azarraga and his service was free of charge. He also contended that he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the
same case and that no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or Atty. Azarraga at any instance.

ISSUE
Whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests

RULING
YES. Under Canon 15, Rule 15.03, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether
they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy. The test is, whether in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for a claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether
the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar but for all the
Heirs of Antonio. The Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their
interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly
worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos represented conflicting interests; he is suspended from the practice of law
for 3 months
JONAR SANTIAGO VS. ATTY. EDISON V. RAFANANA.C. NO. 6252, October 5, 2004, THIRD DIVISION, (Panganiban, J.)

FACTS:
Santiago filed a complaint against Atty. Rafanan alleging that in notarizing several documents on different dates he failed or/and refused to: (a) make
proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; (b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register,
and (c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized. Rafanan admitted to having
administered the oath to affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. However, he believed that the non-notation of their
Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-Affidavits was allowed. He opined that the notation of the residence certificates applied only
to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before the courts and other government
agencies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is liable for malpractice or other gross misconduct in office?

HELD:
Yes. It is clear from the pleadings before us and respondent has readily admitted that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter the documents
notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry. Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver
responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws. No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or
justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited clear ignorance of the Notarial
Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public. WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of
violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby fined P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

Mejia vs Reyes [A.C. No. 378. March 30, 1962]

FACTS:
Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed bank attorney and notary public for the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank. While
still holding such position his professional services were engaged by Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action
in court against the Philippine National Bank and the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now the Development Bank of the Philippines) as successor-
in-interest of the defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank for the cancellation of a mortgage on a parcel of land situated in Baguio City.

[C]omplainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera allege that they had desired to take an appeal from the judgment rendered b y the Court of First
Instance of Baguio but did not, upon the respondent’s advice; that thereafter for the first time they learned that the respondent was counsel and notary
public of the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that his representing them against the Philippine National Bank, in whose Baguio Branch
he was bank attorney and notary public, without revealing to them such connection with the Bank, constitutes malpractice; and pray this Court to disbar
him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Reyes is guilty of malpractice and should be disbarred.

HELD:
YES. But the malpractice committed is not so serious. Respondent was just admonished and warned not to repeat it.

RATIO:
Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case. The respondent’s act of appearing and acting as counsel for the complainants
Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him bank attorney and notary public,
constitutes malpractice. However, it does not appear satisfactorily proven that during the pendency of their case the complaints did not know of the
respondents connection with the bank as attorney and notary public. Evidence shows that the Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was
appearing as counsel for the complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and notary public.

BENEDICTO HORNILLA v. ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, AC. No. 5804, 2003-07-01

Facts:
Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995
and 1995-1997 before the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in the said cases. Complainants contend that respondent was guilty...
of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its corporate funds
where complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest, respondent refused to... withdraw his
appearance in the said cases.

Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.06[2] of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he appeare d at the meeting of
the PPSTA Board and assured its members that he will win the PPSTA cases. Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was
immaterial; and that when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in his individual capacity, but in representation of
the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the... victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He merely assured the Board that the
truth will come out and that the case before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, considering that respondents therein are not
public officials, but private... employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo
de Mesa, and not ASSA.

Issues:
can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue , the... following
disquisition is enlightening:

Ruling:
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled "Philippine Public School Teacher's Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board
of Directors of the Philippine Public School Teacher's Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA against its own

Board of Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he
appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of... interest when he
represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.

In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation
of Extreme Urgency wherein he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By... filing the said pleading,
he necessarily entered his appearance therein.[15] Again, this constituted conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit
in the name of the individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of... and to protect the interest of the corporation.

penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP Resolution No. XV-2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish...
respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.

Principles:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "w hether or not in behalf of
one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In... brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client."[5] This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been... bestowed or will be used.[6] Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he... will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[7] Another test of
the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full... discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.[... a stockholder may sue on behalf of
himself and other stockholders and for... the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation and
indirectly to the stockholders.[11] This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation... is the
real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the corporation's behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be included as a party in
the suit.[12]