Cornell - Case Study LBO
Cornell - Case Study LBO
Cornell - Case Study LBO
Team Seven
Heather Jiang, Bryan Koch, Jake Mattison, Austin Pritchett, Steve Tabor
Williams-Sonoma Overview
Financial Highlights, Timeline and LBO Candidacy
Deal Overview
Why Go After Williams-Sonoma
Our proposal is to LBO WSM and immediately sell the
Williams-Sonoma brand in order to focus on the faster growing
brands.
The majority (54%) of WSM revenue is generated by West Elm
and Pottery Barn which are better positioned to take advantage
of the growing housing and consumer discretionary markets
Williams-Sonoma Branded stores are only growing 0.01% while
the other brands are growing at 8%
Pottery Barn and West Elm are able to quickly identify and
capitalize on trends as they design 90% of their own products
Pottery Barn and West Elm have been able to leverage the
showrooming approach to retail were they utilize small retail
operations to drive significant online sales
WSM was trading at a premium to the consumer discretionary
index over the last year but recently began to converge
The Williams-Sonoma brand is tied closely to the luxury
products market as people tend to be able to afford the luxury
items sold in those stores at times when the luxury market at as
a whole is improving
The West Elm and Pottery Barn brands are more closely
correlated with consumer discretionary spending
The luxury and consumer discretionary markets were growing
at similar rates for the last 2 years but recently the consumer
discretionary market has started to take off
S&P 500 Sector Indices - Consumer Discretionary Sector Index (^SP500-25) - Index Value
S&P 500 Index (^SPX) - Index Value
S&P 500 Apparel, Accessories & Luxury Goods (Sub Ind) Index
S&P 500 Sector Indices - Consumer Discretionary Sector Index
Firm remains under levered at 0.0x LTM Debt/EBITDA However: $1.8 billion in pro-forma
capitalized debt if leases are treated as debt-like
Given recent stagnation in WSMs stock, a premium of 10-15% could result in a deal. Equates
to at least $87.70/share or an equity check of at least $3.1 billion
A key component of this deal involves selling the WSM core kitchen retail brand, preliminary
work can be done before LBO closes to find buyers
LBO Timeline
Year
2015
2016
2017
October 2015
2018
2019
Financial Highlights
Historical Performance
Highlights
$mm
4,388
4,043
3,721
3,504
310
2010
2011
2012
Revenue
287
191
171
Gross Profit
880
816
754
708
656
1,801
1,704
1,592
1,460
1,374
4,699
246
2013
EBITDAR
2014
FCFF
11,881
Pbteen; 6% Other; 3%
Pottery Barn Kids; 13%
Pottery Barn; 43%
West Elm; 14%
Retial ; 54%
E-Commerce; 46%
4,699
4,620
1,793
957
1,801
Williams-Sonoma; 21%
BBBY
Revenue by Brands
5
Revenue by Channels
Source: Capital IQ, Morgan Stanley Research Report, UBS Research Report
1,867
WSM
Revenue
1,866
691 208
91
657 309
750
182 75
Gross Profit
EBITDA
Net Profit
Highlights
$mm
$mm
3.50x
350.0
300.0
2.7x
2.5x
2.2x
2.2x
2.9x
2.1x
200.0
183.4
2.7x
2.6x
2.1x
2.0x
210.4
222.9
197.5
192.8
625
336
430
531
669
994
981
978
995
1,601
1,753
1,911
2,022
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
West Elm
Williams-Sonoma
3.00x
Pottery Barn
(2)
$mm
1,276
1,160
1,106
2.50x
657
714 742
523 536
1.00x
100.0
0.50x
50.0
FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
FY2013
Historical EBITDA
6
522
1.50x
150.0
0.0
261
598
2.00x
Adj. Debt/EBITDAR
250.0
246
558
500.0
400.0
220
Pbteen
212
FY2014
West Elm
Pottery Barn
0.00x
FY2012
FY2013
FY2014
Market Overview
High Yield Bond and Consumer
Consumer Confidence
150
120
90
60
30
Source: Bloomberg
Homebuilders
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Highlights
High yield bond flow has been relatively stable throughout the
first quarter and a half of 2015, signifying a rather positive
outlook from the market. (Below)
Many of the largest banks have been leading the market in the
issuance of HY Bonds. (Right)
There is a money in the market that will be willing to fund an
LBO of Williams-Sonoma.
300
$183,141.2
160,000
120,000
250
$143,741.1
$112,916.1
$111,890.7
$125,225.2
200
$110,313.4
$91,625.5
150
80,000
$45,797.1
40,000
0
50
2Q13
3Q13
4Q13
1Q14
Amount
100
2Q14
$101,852.8
3Q14
# Issuances
4Q14
1Q15
2Q15
LBO Model
Assumptions, Comps and Return Analysis
10
Summary of Assumptions
Revenue growth slows down in 2015 2016 due to fewer store openings
SG&A expense improves due to managements focus on operating with few employees and outsourcing some manufacturing operations
Capex is cut immediately post-LBO to 1% of sales in order to meet debt payments, however, Capex can be increased by 2018 in reparation for an exit
via an IPO or sale to strategic
This implies that new store openings will temporarily cease or meaningfully slow down
Inventories days outstanding is improved as management shifts focus from opening new stores to improving operational efficiency, potential
efficiencies include consolidating the supply chain from the current 50 countries to fewer than 20
WSM is the 22nd largest importer of shipping containers in the U.S.
11
6.0x
3.0x
0.0x
12
7.0x
5.0x
4.0x
2.0x
1.0x
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Other Debt
2009
2010
2011
First-Lien Debt
2012
2013
2014
Return Analysis
Summary Financial Ratios (1)
PF 2015
2016
EBITDAR
2017
$599.6
$564.6
$601.3
EBITDAR/Cash Interest
EBITDAR-CapEx/Cash Interest
1.8x
1.2x
2.2x
2.1x
2.5x
2.3x
Senior Debt/EBITDAR
2.4x
2.2x
1.7x
7.9x
46.2%
8.0x
48.6%
6.9x
51.9%
Total Debt/EBITDAR
Equity as % of Total Capitalization
Pro Forma
2014
$944.7
2.0x
2015
$956
Year 6
Year 7
70.5%
83.3%
4 Year
5 Year
2020
2021
15.4%
16.6%
$1,015
$1,027
19.0%
19.3%
22.3%
6 Year
17.4%
19.6%
21.8%
21.5%
PF 2015
2016
TV/Sales
1.72x
2.03x
TV/EBITDAR
13.5x
14.3x
$1,889.3
Multiple Analysis(1)
Transaction Value
After
tax Amount
( tax = 20%)
$1,511.4
13 1 Adjusted
debt / EBITDAR
is calculated as a sum
of adjusted rent and total debt capacity divided by LTM EBITDAR
$8,074.0
Selected Companies
Relative Valuation
Pier 1 (PIR) and Bed Bath & Beyond (BBBY) also received higher
weights (20% each), as they both provide a diverse mix of products
in the home furnishing segment
Ethan Allen and Havertys received the lowest weights (10% each)
as they are more narrowly focused in the furniture segment
14
-See Appendix for detailed comparable company metrics and summary statistics
Appendix
15
Total Revenue
(NTM)
WSM
RH
Relative Valuation
PIR
BBBY
EBITDAR (NTM)
EBITDAR Margin
(NTM)
14.0% 12.7%
9.7%
Net Income (NTM)
316.9
121.3
76.6
Net Debt
-221.0
225.1
106.7
Shareholders'
Equity
1,224.7 702.9
337.2
S/O
91.6
39.8
90.0
76.9
91.8
13.2
Current Share
Price
Equity Value
7,048
3,666
1,196
6,827
3,891
1,303
Enterprise Value
EV/EBITDAR
9.8x
14.2x
6.9x
Comparable Company
Summary
Statistics
Price/Earnings
22.2x
30.2x
15.6x
Relative weights
assigned
Total Revenue (NTM)
EBITDAR (NTM)
EBITDAR Margin
(NTM)
Net Income (NTM)
Net Debt
Shareholders' Equity
S/O
Current Share Price
Equity Value
Enterprise Value
16
EV/EBITDAR
Price/Earnings
High
Low
HVT
$815.2
93.9
78.1
14.4%
978.11
514.40
11.9%
47.40
13.00
9.6%
30.5
-23.7
2,743.2
185.6
72.5
376.1
28.9
25.3
292.0
22.6
22.5
13,462
13,976
7.9x
13.8x
733
511
746
487
7.9x
6.2x
15.5x
16.7x
Weighte
d
Mean Median average WSM
40%
20%
20%
$12,273
$786 $3,597 $1,948
1,764
78
480
189
14.4%
978
514
2,743
186
91.89
13,462
13,976
14.2x
30.2x
ETH
$786.2
9.6% 11.7%
31
251
(24)
167
292
890
23
73
13.29
45.12
511
3,914
487
4,081
6.2x
8.6x
13.8x
18.4x
11.9%
77
107
376
40
25.34
1,196
1,303
7.9x
15.6x
10%
10%
$3,870 $4,989.7
517 698.5
12.0%
267
213
964
76
58.71
4,522
4,735
10.1x
21.2x
14.0%
316.9
-221.0
1,224.7
91.642
76.91
7,048
6,827.2
9.8x
22.2x
EV/
Equity
EBITDAR
EV
Value
Min
6.2x
$4,355 $4,576
Mean
10.1x
$7,030 $7,251
$10,14
Max
14.2x
$9,927
8 $110.73
Institutions
Hedge Fund
Managers
8% 4%
Government Pension
Sponsors
Individuals/Insiders
88%
Banks/Investment
Banks
8% 2% 1%
3%
1%
85%
Family Offices/Trusts
Other
Notable Insiders
Ownership Commentary
Appendix: Model
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Appendix: Model
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Appendix: Model
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Appendix: Model
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Appendix: Model
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Appendix: Model
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Appendix: Model
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