Updates in Criminal

Procedure
Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Seminar
• Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases
(A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC)
• Precautionary Hold Departure Order (A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC)
• Chain of Custody (People v. Romy Lim, 2018)
• Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases (OCA Circular No.
90-2018)
• Speedy disposition of cases (Cagang, 2018)
• Judicial Affidavit Rule (Lara’s Gift Inc., 2018)
• Hearsay as basis of probable cause (Estrada, 2015)
• Bail (Enrile, 2015)
• Bill of Particulars (Enrile, 2015)
• Demurrer to Evidence (Arroyo v. People, 2017)
• Adjustment of penalties RPC (R.A. No. 10951)

Outline
REVISED GUIDELINES FOR
CONTINUOUS TRIAL OF
CRIMINAL CASES
A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC
• Effectivity: September 1, 2017
• Applicability
• All newly filed criminal cases – including those governed
by Special Laws
• In the First and Second Level Courts,
• Sandiganbayan
• Court of Tax Appeals
• Pending criminal cases with respect to the remainder of
the proceedings
• Exception: cases filed under Rule on Summary Procedure
• Exception to the exception: unless otherwise provided
herein

REVISED GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS

TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES
• Trial shall be held from Monday to Thursday, and courts
shall call the cases at exactly 8:30 A.M. and 2:00 P.M.

• Hearing on Motions, arraignment, and pre-trial, and

promulgation of decisions shall be held in the morning of
Fridays

• All courts shall ensure the posting of their court calendars

outside their courtrooms at least one day before scheduled
hearings

Hearing Days and

Calendar Call
• Motion for Inhibition
• Based on grounds provided for under Rule 137
• Shall be resolved immediately or within two
(2) calendar days from date of their filing

Motions
Shall be denied outright before the scheduled arraignment
without need of comment/opposition

 Motion for judicial determination of probable cause

 Motion for preliminary investigation
 filed beyond the 5 day reglementary period in inquest
proceedings (sec. 6, Rule 112), or
 when Preliminary investigation is required (sec. 8, Rule 112),
or
 allowed in inquest proceedings and accused failed to
participate despite due notice

Prohibited Motions
 Motion for reinvestigation of the prosecutor
recommending the filing of information once the
information has been filed before the court
1. If motion is filed without prior leave of court
2. When Preliminary Investigation is not required (Rule 112,
sec. 8)
3. When actual P.I. has been actually conducted, and the
grounds relied upon in the motion are not meritorious
o Such as credibility, admissibility of evidence, innocence of
accused, lack of due process when accused was actually
notified

Prohibited Motions
• Motion to Quash Information when ground is not
stated in sec. 3, Rule 117
• Motion for Bill of Particulars which does not conform
to sec. 9, Rule 116
• Motion to suspend the arraignment based on grounds
not stated under sec. 11, Rule 116
• Petition to suspend the criminal action on the ground
of prejudicial question, when no civil case has been
filed, sec. 7, Rule 111

Prohibited Motions
• Motion to withdraw information, downgrade charge in the
information, exclude an accused – filed by the prosecution as a result
of a reinvestigation, reconsideration and review
• Motion to Quash Warrant of arrest
• Motion to suspend arraignment on ground of unsound mental
condition
• Motion to suspend proceedings on ground of prejudicial question
where civil case was filed prior to criminal case
• Motion to Quash sec. 3, par (a), (b), (g), (i) Rule 117
• (a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
• (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged
• (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
• (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

Meritorious Motions
• Motion to discharge accused as state witness, sec. 17.
Rule 119
• Motion to quash search warrant (sec. 17, Rule 126)/
motion to suppress evidence
• Motion to dismiss – when the criminal case is a Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) under
Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases

Meritorious Motions
• GR: Motion for Postponement is prohibited
• Exceptions:
• Acts of God
• Force Majeure
• Physical Inability of witness to appear or testify

Note: An oral or written motion for postponement shall be

accompanied by the Original Receipt evidencing payment
of the postponement fee (sec. 21 (b), Rule 141)

Motion for Postponement

• When a party fails to qualify for the availment of the
services of the Public Attorney’s Office

• The IBP Local Chapter shall submit to the Executive

Judges a list of IBP-local lawyers who may be
appointed as counsel de officio in such case

• The list shall be disseminated among trial courts in the

station

Free Legal Assistance

• Applies where only civil liability is being prosecuted

• The private prosecutor must submit a written authority

from the head of the prosecution office to try the case
even in the absence of the public prosecutor

• The authority must be submitted to the court prior to the

presentation of evidence

Private Prosecutor
• A) Newly filed cases
• If same facts or
• Part of a series of offenses similar in character
• Will be consolidated and raffled to only one court

B) Pending cases with multiple accused

• A subsequent information
• But the accused is involved in the same incident in a previously
filed information against other persons
• No more raffle – the subsequent case shall be assigned
directly to the court where the earlier case is pending

Consolidations
• A criminal case shall be archived only if, after issuance of
warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for 6
months from the delivery of the warrant to the proper
peace officer

Archiving of Cases
• Accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mind
which renders him unable to plead intelligently, or go to
trial and has to be committed to a mental hospital
• A valid prejudicial question
• A higher court has issued a temporary restraining order
• Accused jumped bail before arraignment

Archiving of cases –
other grounds
• The provisional dismissal becomes permanent 1 year
after the issuance of the order
• If offense is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6
years

• The provisional dismissal becomes permanent 2 years

after the issuance of the order
• If offense is punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 years

Revival of Provisionally
Dismissed Cases
• Notice shall be sent to:
• Accused
• His/her counsel
• Private complainant/complaining law officer
• Public prosecutor
• Witnesses whose names appear in the information

Arraignment and Pre-Trial

• Waiver of reading of information – in multiple cases,
the court, upon personal examination of the accused, may
allow a waiver of the reading of information upon full
understanding and express consent of the accused and
his/her counsel, which consent shall be expressly stated in
both the minutes/certificate of arraignment and the order
of arraignment. The court shall explain the waiver to the
accused in the language or dialect known to him or her,
and ensure the accused’s full understanding of the
consequences of the waiver before approving the same

A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC

Plea of guilty to a lesser offense Plea bargaining proceeds
o Offended party/arresting officers
must be present
o With consent of Prosecutor
Plea of guilty Judgment shall be immediately
rendered
o Except capital punishment
No plea bargaining or plea of guilty o Court immediately proceeds with
arraignment and pre-trial

The schedule of the trial dates for both prosecution and the accused
Shall be continuous and within the periods provided in the Rules/Special Rules
Arraignment shall be simultaneously held with the Preliminary Conference

Arraignment proper
• i. Absence of parties – the Court shall proceed with the
pre-trial despite the absence of the accused and/or
private complainant, provided they were duly notified
of the same, and the counsel for the accused, as well as
the public prosecutor is present
• ii. Stipulations
• iii. Marking of evidence
• iv. Pre-trial Order
• v. Compliance with AM No. 03-1-09-SC (Guidelines to
be Observed in the Conduct of Pre-trial)

Conduct of Pre-trial
• The following shall be referred to mediation on the civil liability
unless a settlement is reached earlier in the pre-trial/ preliminary
conference
a. B.P. 22
b. SSS Law (RA no. 1161, as amended by RA 8282)
c. PAG-IBIG Law (RA no. 9679)
d. Crimes against property under Title 10 of the RPC
e. Crimes against honor under Title 13 of the RPC Libel under RA
10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012)
f. Criminal Negligence under Title 14 of the RPC
g. Intellectual property rights cases where liability is civil in nature

Note: the referral to the Philippine Mediation Center shall be made only after
the conduct of the arraignment and the pre-trial/preliminary conference
The mediation shall be terminated within 30 calendar days from referral.

Mediation
• When filed – after the filing of the information shall be
set for summary hearing after arraignment and pre-trial.

• Petition for bail shall be heard and resolved within 30

calendar days from the date of the first hearing.
• Except in drug cases (20 calendar days)

• Motion for reconsideration on resolution for petition for

bail shall be resolved within 10 calendar days from
submission of Motion for reconsideration

Petition for Bail

• Resolution shall be based solely on evidence presented
during bail proceedings by the prosecution
• The accused need not present evidence to contradict or
rebut the prosecution’s evidence
• The court shall not suspend the presentation of evidence
in chief while awaiting resolution of the petition for bail
or the motion for reconsideration

Evidence in petition for bail

• For First Level Courts, in all criminal cases, including
those covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, the
testimonies of witnesses shall consist of the duly
subscribed written statements given to law enforcement
officers or the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted
before the investigating prosecutor and if such are not
available, testimonies shall be in the form of judicial
affidavits. The trial prosecutor may opt to dispense with
the sworn statements submitted to the law enforcement
officers and instead prepare judicial affidavits or modify
or revise the said sworn statements

Form of Testimony
• For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals, where the demeanor of the witnesses is not
essential, like the forensic chemist, medico-legal officers,
investigators, auditors, accountants, engineers, custodians,
expert witnesses and other similar witnesses, who will testify
on the authenticity, due execution and the contents of public
documents and reports, and in criminal cases that are
transactional in character, such as falsification, malversation,
estafa or other crimes where the culpability or innocence of the
accused can be established through documents, the
testimonies of the witnesses shall be the duly subscribed
written statements given to law enforcement officers or the
affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted before the
investigating prosecutor, and if such are not available,
testimonies shall be in the form of judicial affidavits.

Form of Testimony
• After the prosecution has rested its case, the court shall inquire
from the accused if he/she desires to move for leave of court to
file a demurrer to evidence, or to proceed with the presentation
of his/her evidence
• If the accused orally moves for leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence, the court shall orally resolve the same.
• If motion for leave is denied, the court shall issue an order for
the accused to present and terminate his/her evidence on the
dates previously scheduled and agreed upon and to orally offer
and rest his/her case on the day his/her last witness is presented

Trial: Demurrer to Evidence

• Demurrer shall be filed within 10 calendar days from the
date leave of court is granted
• The corresponding comment shall be filed within 10
calendar days from date of receipt of demurrer
• The court shall resolve the demurrer within a non-
extendible period of 30 calendar days from the date of
filing the comment or lapse of the 10 day period to file
the same

Trial: Demurrer to Evidence

• One day examination of witness rule – The
Court shall strictly adhere to the rule that a
witness has to be fully examined in one (1)
day.

Trial: Examination of witnesses

PRECAUTIONARY HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER
A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC
• An order in writing issued by a court commanding the
Bureau of Immigration to prevent any attempt by a
person suspected of a crime to depart from ·the
Philippines
• Issued ex-parte in cases involving crimes where the
minimum of the penalty prescribed by law is at least six (
6) years and one (I) day or when the offender is a
foreigner regardless of the imposable penalty

Precautionary Hold
Departure Order
• Filed by the prosecutor with:
a. any regional trial court within whose territorial
jurisdiction the alleged crime was committed
b. For compelling reasons, it can be filed with any regional
trial court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known
c. the regional trial courts in the City of Manila, Quezon
City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de
Oro City shall also have the authority to act on
applications filed by the prosecutor based on complaints
instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation,
regardless where the alleged crime was committed.

Where filed sec. 2

• After prosecutor’s preliminary determination of probable
cause, the prosecutor may file an application in the name
of the People of the Philippines for a precautionary hold
departure order (PHDO) with the proper regional trial
court. Accompanied by the complaint-affidavit and its
attachments.

Prosecutor finding of
Probable Cause sec. 3
• A precautionary hold departure order shall not issue
except upon determination by the judge, in whose court
the application is filed, that probable cause exists, and
there is a high probability that respondent will depart
from the Philippines to evade arrest and prosecution of
crime against him or her. The judge shall personally
examine under oath or affirmation, in the form of
searching questions and answers in writing, the applicant
and the witnesses he or she may produce on facts
personally known to them and attaching to the record
their sworn statements.

Grounds sec. 4
• If judge finds probable cause, he/she shall issue the
PHDO and direct the Bureau of Immigration to hold and
prevent the departure of the respondent at any Philippine
airport or ports

• Otherwise, the judge shall order the dismissal of the

application

Grounds sec. 4
• Since the finding of probable cause by the judge is solely
based on the complaint and is specifically issued for the
purpose of issuing the PHDO, the same shall be without
prejudice to the resolution of the prosecutor of the
criminal complaint considering the complaint-affidavit,
counter-affidavit, reply affidavit, and the evidence
presented by both parties during the preliminary
investigation.

Preliminary finding of
probable cause sec. 5
• If the prosecutor after preliminary investigation dismisses
the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause then the
respondent may use the dismissal as a ground for the
lifting of the PHDO with the regional trial court that
issued the order.
• If the prosecutor finds probable cause and files the
criminal information, the case with the court that issued
the PHDO, on motion of the prosecutor shall be
consolidated with the court where the criminal
information is filed.

Preliminary finding of
probable cause sec. 5
PHDO should indicate: What should be
• name of the appended
respondent, • copy of the
• his or her alleged application,
crime,
• the time and
• personal details,
• place of its • passport number,
commission, and the • photograph of the
• name of the respondent, if
complainant available

Form sec. 6
Validity of the PHDO
• valid until lifted by the issuing court as may be warranted
by the result of the preliminary investigation

Duly certified copy of the PHDO should be:

• Furnished to the Bureau of Immigration
• within twenty-four (24) hours from issuance

Validity
• Respondent may file a verified motion before the issuing court for
the temporary lifting of the PHDO
• On Meritorious Grounds
• based on the complaint-affidavit and the evidence that he or she
will present, there is doubt that probable cause exists to issue the
PHDO, or
• That he or she is not a flight risk

Conditions
• respondent posts a bond (to be determined by the Court (sec. 8)
• the lifting of the PHDO is without prejudice to the resolution of
the preliminary investigation against the respondent

Lifting of the Order sec. 7

PHDO Diagram
 HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER & BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION WATCHLIST
• Bondsmen can prevent accused from leaving country by
arresting him or asking for him to be re-arrested by a police
officer upon written authority. (Rule 114, Sec. 23)
• The accused may be prohibited from the leaving country
during the pendency of his case (People v. Uy Tuising, 1935;
Manotoc v. CA 1986). If the accused released on bail attempts
to depart from the Philippines without the permission of the
court where his cases is pending, he may be re-arrested
without warrant. (Rule 113, Sec. 23)
• Hold-Departure Orders: This may be issued only by the RTCs
in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction. (SC
Circular No. 39-97, 19 June 1997)
• Presently, there is no law allowing the issuance of hold
departure orders in a pending preliminary investigation.
Although courts have the inherent power to issue hold
departure orders, this presupposes that a criminal case has
been filed against the accused

• The Rule amounts to judicial legislation. It arbitrarily sets

a cluster of crimes and construes, through a judicial rule,
that these are what constitute threats to "national security,
public safety, or public health."

PHDO – Leonen, J. dissent

• A “preliminary determination of probable cause”
[conducted by the prosecutor before referring the matter
to the judge] only complicates our rules on criminal
procedure.
• A preliminary determination of probable cause, though
intended to be without prejudice to the investigating
prosecutor's resolution of the criminal case, would
render the conduct of preliminary investigation moot
and academic

PHDO – Leonen, J. dissent

• Under the Rule, the preliminary determination of probable
cause of the investigating prosecutor and the court to which an
application is filed is confined to an examination of the
complaint and its attachments. Such a limited set of evidence
can hardly give investigating prosecutors and courts enough
basis to support a finding of probable cause.

• The more prudent course of action is for the investigating

prosecutor to proceed with investigation and file an
Information if probable cause exists. The court to which the
Information is filed can then issue a hold departure order

PHDO – Leonen, J. dissent

• Once the investigating prosecutor finds that there is
probable cause to support an application for a
precautionary hold departure order, the resolution of the
court to which the application is filed would necessarily
taint the prosecutor's own determination of probable
cause for purposes of filing an Information.
• the executive determination of probable cause, in the
context of a preliminary investigation, would be an idle
ceremony rendered moot by the two (2)-tier preliminary
determination of probable cause.

PHDO – Leonen, J. dissent

• By coming out with this Rule, this Court is, in effect,
appropriating portions of prosecutorial discretion and
condoning delay in preliminary investigation.
• The Rule would also lead to the filing of numerous cases
questioning the preliminary determination of probable
cause, thus, creating further delay at the investigation
stage.

PHDO – Leonen, J. dissent

• The Rule, allowing the "preliminary determination" of
probable cause by a judge, even before inquest, effectively
nullifies paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Article 124 of the Revised
Penal Code. In my view, this Court will succeed in repealing
legislative policy through a procedural artifice.
• If the crime was committed outside the circumstances allowing
warrantless arrest ·and the government is convinced that there
is sufficient evidence that will prove its existence as well as the
liability of an accused, then I see no reason why the
prosecution will not be able to efficiently conduct preliminary
investigation.

PHDO – Leonen, J. dissent

• The ex parte procedure of issuing a PHDO on the basis of
the complaint and the attachments unduly burdens the
rights of a person who has only been suspected of
committing a crime.

• A respondent, therefore, who has only been suspected of

committing a crime, is left in the dark, completely
uninformed about the impending curtailment of his or her
constitutional right to travel.

PHDO – Leonen, J. dissent

GMA v. De Lima et al./Jose Miguel Arroyo v. De Lima
G.R. No. 199034/ G.R. No. 199046
15 November 2011

The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order

enjoining Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima, her agents,
representatives, or persons acting in her place or stead, from
enforcing or implementing DOJ Department Circular No. 41,
which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to issue a Hold
Departure Order. Said temporary restraining order is effective
until further orders from the Supreme Court.
 EFRAIM C. GENUINO et al. v. LEILA DE LIMA
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. De LIMA
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, 199046
April 17, 2018

• The Supreme Court declared that DOJ Circular No. 41 is

unconstitutional
• sec. 6, Art. III of the Constitution, provides the limits for
impairment of a person’s right to travel – namely:
national security, public safety, or public health" and "as
may be provided by law”

• DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law.

• It is a mere administrative issuance which the DOJ
Secretary believed to carry out the provisions of an
enabling law (Administrative Code of 1987)
• The questioned circular does not come under the
inherent power of the executive department to adopt
rules and regulations as clearly the issuance of HDO and
WLO is not the DOJ's business.

• As such, it is a compulsory requirement that there be an

existing law, complete and sufficient in itself, conferring
the expressed authority to the concerned agency to
promulgate rules.

• Without a clear mandate of an existing law, an

administrative issuance is ultra vires.

EFRAIM C. GENUINO et al. v. DE LIMA,

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. De LIMA
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, 199046
April 17, 2018
• There is also no authority of law granting it the
power to compel the attendance of the subjects of a
preliminary investigation, pursuant to its
investigatory powers under E.O. No. 292.

• Its investigatory power is simply inquisitorial and,

unfortunately, not broad enough to embrace the
imposition of restraint on the liberty of movement.

EFRAIM C. GENUINO et al. v. DE LIMA,

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. De LIMA
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, 199046 April 17,
2018
LEONEN, J. separate opinion
• In my view, the phrase "as may be provided by law"
should not be literally interpreted to mean statutory law.
• The application of the clauses due process of “law” and
equal protection of the “laws” have been tested even
against executive issuances
• As in the cases of Ynot v. IAC, (1987), Corona v. United
Harbor Pilots (1997), Biraogo v. Truth Commission (2010)
• In this regard, it is inaccurate to say that the right of persons
to travel to and from the Philippines can only be impaired
by statutory law.
EFRAIM C. GENUINO et al. v. Hon. LEILA DE
LIMA Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. De LIMA
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, 199046
April 17, 2018
LEONEN, J. separate opinion
• It is also inaccurate to say that the impairment should
only be limited to national security, public safety, or
public health considerations for it to be valid
• in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. v. Drilon (1988) the policy was for the protection of
labor

EFRAIM C. GENUINO et al. v. Hon. LEILA DE

LIMA Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. De LIMA
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, 199046
April 17, 2018
LEONEN, J. separate opinion
• The Department of Justice is neither empowered by a specific
law nor does it possess the inherent power (unlike the Courts)
to restrict the right to travel of persons under criminal
investigation through the issuance of hold departure orders,
watchlist orders, and allow departure orders.

• [The DOJ’s] mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987

to "[i]nvestigate the commission of crimes [and] prosecute
offenders" cannot be interpreted so broadly as to include the
power to curtail a person's right to travel.

EFRAIM C. GENUINO et al. v. Hon. LEILA DE

LIMA Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. De LIMA
G.R. Nos. 197930, 199034, 199046 April 17,
2018
 IMMIGRATION LOOKOUT BULLETIN

The Bureau of Immigration may place a person

in its Immigration Lookout Bulletin (ILB) pursuant to an
order by the Department of Justice. Said order merely
directs the Bureau of Immigration to be on the “lookout”
and take prudent steps to verify on the status of the
criminal case against a person. If the concerned agency
raises no objection to the departure, then the person
will be allowed to leave.

For foreign nationals, the ILB requires subjects to

obtain the Emigration Clearance Certificate, pursuant to
Section 22-A of the Philippine Immigration Act, to
ensure that the foreign national has no pending
obligations in the Philippines.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY IN
DRUG CASES
New Guidelines (People v. Lim, 2018)
PEOPLE V. ROMY LIM G.R. No. 231989
September 4, 2018
Facts:
• Police officers conducted a buy-bust operation at the
house of accused Romy Lim. The alleged shabu sachets
were seized from the accused and an inventory was
immediately made by the officers at Lim’s house
• However, the Inventory Report does not contain the
signatures of elected officials, or a representative of the
DOJ, or the media. It was also not signed by the accused.

Dangerous Drugs Act

(R.A. No. 9165)
• Sec. 21 (1), Article II of R.A. 9165 –amended by RA
10640, guidelines on immediate physical inventory
• We have held that the immediate physical inventory
and photograph of the confiscated items at the place
of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety
and security of the apprehending officers and the
witnesses required by law or of the items seized are
threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as
retaliatory action of those who have the resources to
mount a counter assault

PEOPLE V. ROMY LIM G.R. No. 231989,

September 4, 2018
Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules
and Regulations directs that the
1) justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the
requirements of Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165 shall be clearly stated in the
affidavits of the apprehending officers as well as,
2) the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized/confiscated items
3) and to present a certification or record of coordination for operating
units other than the PDEA

While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it
has not been practiced in most cases elevated before us.

PEOPLE V. ROMY LIM G.R. No. 231989,

September 4, 2018
• For drug cases, the Court laid out a mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the
apprehending/seizing officers must state their
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the

apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification
or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have
taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized/ confiscated items

PEOPLE V. ROMY LIM G.R. No. 231989,

September 4, 2018
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in
the sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must
not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she
must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order
to determine the (non) existence of probable cause

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence,

the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a
commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case
outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section
5,40 Rule 112, Rules of Court.

PEOPLE V. ROMY LIM G.R. No. 231989,

September 4, 2018
Plea Bargaining Framework in
Drug Cases

A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC,

April 10, 2018
 Acceptable Plea
Substance Offense Quantity Penalty Bargain

12 years, 1 day to 20 6 months, 1 day to 4

0.01-299.99 grams years & fine of years & fine of
P300,000 to P400,000 P10,000 to P50,000
Possession
20 years to life
imprisonment & fine 12 years, 1 day to 20
300-499 grams of P300,000 to years & fine of
Marijuana P500,000 P300,000 to P400,000

500 grams + No plea bargaining

A.M. No. 18-03-16-sc, April Life imprisonment to

allowed

10, 2018
death & fine of 6 months, 1 day to 4
0.01 -9.99 grams P500,000 to years & fine of
Sale, Trade
P10,000,000 P10,000 to P50,000

10 grams + No plea bargaining

allowed
 Substance Offense Quantity Penalty Acceptable Plea Bargain

12 years, 1 day to 20 6 months, 1 day to 4

Shabu,
0.01-4.99 grams years & fine of P300,000 years & fine of
opium,
to P400,000 P10,000 to P50,000
morphine, Possession
heroin.
20 years to life 12 years, 1 day to 20
Cocaine
5-9.99 grams imprisonment & fine of years & fine of
P300,000 to P500,000 P300,000 to P400,000

10 grams + No plea bargaining

A.M. No. 18-03-16-sc, April allowed

10, 2018
Metampheta Sale, trade Life imprisonment to 6 months, 1 day to 4
mine 0.01-0.99 grams death & fine of P500,000 years & fine of
hydrochloride to P10,000,000 P10,000 to P50,000
or shabu only
1.00 gram + No plea bargaining
allowed
 if:
a. accused admits
6 months, 1 day drug use or
Possession to 4 years & fine 6 months treatment and
of P10,000 to rehabilitation b. denies but found
P50,000 positive after drug
dependency test

Equipment, undergo counselling

If accused is found
apparatus and program at
negative for drug
other rehabilitation center
use/dependency
paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs if:
a. accused admits
Possession Maximum of drug use or
during parties, penalty in sec. 6 months treatment and
social gatherings 12 rehabilitation b. denies but found
or meetings positive after drug
dependency test

undergo counselling
program at If accused is found
rehabilitation center negative for drug
use/dependency
• In all instances, whether or not the maximum period of the penalty imposed is
already served, drug dependency test shall be required.
 If accused admits drug use, or denies it but is found positive after drug
dependency test, he/she shall undergo treatment and rehabilitation for a
period of not less than 6 months. Said period shall be credited to his/her
penalty and the period of his after-care and follow up program if penalty is
still unserved.
 If accused is found negative for drug use/dependency, he/she will be
released on time served, otherwise, he/she will serve his sentence in jail
minus the counseling period at rehabilitation center.
 However, if accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under
R.A. No. 9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking or pushing under sec. 5
in relation to Sec. 24 thereof, then the law on probation shall apply

A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, April 10, 2018

Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug cases
• If acceptable plea bargaining is 6 months, 1 day to 4
years & fine of P10,000 to P50,000:
 The Court is given the discretion to impose a
minimum period and a maximum period to be
taken from the range of penalty provided by law. A
straight penalty within the range of 6 months and
1 day to 1 year may likewise be imposed

A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, April 10, 2018

Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug
cases
SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF CASES
CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2018)
Facts:
• Accused Cagang (provincial treasurer) was among the hundred
individuals in Sarangani province investigated for Malversation of
Public Funds
• Around 61 million was allegedly embezzled from the Countrywide
Development Fund. Petitioner was among the 40 determined to have
been involved in 81 different anomalous transactions.
• It took the Ombudsman more than 7 years to study the evidence
needed to establish probable cause.
• The anonymous complaint was filed on February 10, 2003, the
preliminary investigation was concluded in 2005 and the information
was filed only on November 17, 2011.
• Petitioner claims that there was inordinate delay in the disposition
of his case

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
 Right to a speedy trial Right to speedy disposition of cases
Art. III, Sec. 14(2) Art. III, Sec. 16
invoked against the courts in a invoked even against quasi-judicial or
criminal prosecution administrative bodies in civil,
criminal, or administrative cases
before them

What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the

proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
• A case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal
complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary
investigation

• The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,

(2013) that fact-finding investigations are included in the
period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
• The Court noted that:
• The Ombudsman is mandated to “act promptly” on
complaints filed before it (Art. XI, sec. 12, Constitution and
R.A. No. 6770 sec. 13)
• Both provisions do not provide for a specific period within
which to measure promptness. Neither do they provide for
criteria within which to determine what could already be
considered as delay in the disposition of complaints.

• The Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for

preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities
and nuances of each case

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
Defense has the burden to prove Prosecution has the burden of
delay when: justifying the delay if
1. the right is invoked within the o the delay occurs beyond the
given time periods contained in given time period and the right
current Supreme Court is invoked
resolutions and circulars, and

2. the time periods that will be

promulgated by the Office of
the Ombudsman

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
Defense must prove Prosecution must prove
1. whether the case is motivated 1. that it followed the prescribed
by malice or clearly only procedure in the conduct of
politically motivated (as in the preliminary investigation and
case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, in the prosecution of the case
1988) and is attended by utter
lack of evidence 2. complexity of the issues and
the volume of evidence made
2. that the defense did not the delay inevitable
contribute to the delay
3. no prejudice was suffered by
the accused as a result of the
delay

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
Guideline Diagram
• The determination of length of delay is not a “mere mathematical reckoning”
• Courts must consider:
• the entire context of the case,
• the amount of evidence to be weighed
• the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised
Exceptions
1. The prosecution is alleged to be solely motivated by malice – such as:
• when a case is politically motivated,
• prosecution continued despite utter lack of evidence
• If malicious prosecution is alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be
dismissed

2. Waiver of the accused of the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial
• If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right
can no longer be invoked (laches)
• The causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
• Right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial
must be timely raised
• The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion
upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods
• Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to
speedy disposition of cases
• "The State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to
prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude
or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman." (Jacob v.
Sandiganbayan, 2010)

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
Institutional Delay
• The reality is that institutional delay a reality that the court
must address. The prosecution is staffed by overworked and
underpaid gove1nment lawyers with mounting caseloads. The
courts' dockets are congested.
• This Court has already launched programs to remedy this
situation, such as:
• the Judicial Affidavit Rule,
• Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Right
of the Accused to Bail and to Speedy Trial, and the
• Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial.
• These programs, however, are mere stepping stones. The
complete eradication of institutional delay requires these
sustained actions.
CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
Institutional Delay

• Institutional delay, in the proper context, should not be taken against

the State. Most cases handled by the Office of the Ombudsman
involve individuals who have the resources and who engage private
counsel with the means and resources to fully dedicate themselves to
their client's case.

• More often than not, the accused only invoke the right to speedy
disposition of cases when the Ombudsman has already rendered an
unfavorable decision. The prosecution should not be prejudiced by
private counsels' failure to protect the interests of their clients or the
accused's lack of interest in the prosecution of their case.

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
• CAGUIOA, J. dissenting opinion

• The main decision states that the petitioner is precluded

from invoking his right to speedy disposition as he failed
to assert the same in a timely manner. the Court (citing
Dela Pena (2001) held that silence on the part of the
accused operates as an implied waiver of one's right to
speedy disposition.

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
• CAGUIOA, J. dissenting opinion

• The criterion set in the main decision adopts the "balancing

test" which finds its roots in the American case of Barker v.
Wingo (1972) where the U.S. Supreme Court explained the
nature of the accused's right to speedy trial under the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Sixth Amendment), and
set forth the four factors to be considered in determining
whether such right had been violated –
• 1. length of delay,
• 2. the reason for the delay,
• 3. the defendant's assertion of his right, and
• 4. prejudice to the defendant

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
• CAGUIOA, J. dissenting opinion

• Barker's “balancing test” should not be understood to

contemplate unreasonable delay during "pre-accusation,"
or the period within which the State conducts an investigation
to determine whether there exists probable cause to arrest or
charge a particular suspect.
• The constitutional right, our precedent holds, does not attach until
this phase begins, that is, when a defendant is arrested or formally
accused [Betterman v. Montana, 2016]
• the protection of the Sixth Amendment is activated only when a
criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons
who have been "accused" in the course of that prosecution [United
States v. Marion, 1971]

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
• CAGUIOA, J. dissenting opinion
• In Philippine Context
• This "pre-accusation" period falls precisely within the scope of
the right to speedy disposition protected by the Constitution,
particularly, under Section 16, Article III.
• The right to speedy disposition covers the periods "before, during,
and after trial" (Bernas, 1974).
• This protection covers not only preliminary investigation, but
extends further, to cover the fact-finding process (People v.
Sandiganbayan, 2013).
• It even includes “fact-finding investigations conducted prior to the
preliminary investigation proper” (Torres v. Sandiganbayan,
2016).

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42/July 31,
2018
• CAGUIOA, J. dissenting opinion
• The right to speedy disposition is two-pronged.
• Primarily, it serves to extend to the individual citizen a guarantee
against State abuse brought about by protracted prosecution.
• Conversely, it imposes upon the State the concomitant duty to
expedite all proceedings lodged against individual citizens,
whether they be judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative in nature.

• Citizens, whether they be judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative in

nature. This constitutional duty imposed upon the State stands
regardless of the vigor with which the individual citizen asserts his
right to speedy disposition

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
• CAGUIOA, J. dissenting opinion

• Considering that the Constitution, unlike its U.S. counterpart,

imposes upon the State the positive duty to ensure the speedy
disposition of all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
proceedings, waiver of the right to speedy disposition should
not be implied solely from the respondent's silence.

• The duty to expedite proceedings under the Constitution

does not pertain to the respondent, but to the State. To fault
the respondent for the State's inability to comply with such
positive duty on the basis of mere silence is, in my view, the
height of injustice.

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
• CAGUIOA, J. dissenting opinion
• This Court has held that every reasonable presumption against
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights must be
afforded. The person possessing the right has to have the actual
intention to relinquish the right.

• Intent, being a product of one's state of mind, may be inferred

only from external acts. Hence, the intention to relinquish a
constitutional right cannot be deduced solely from silence or
inaction. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be
easily construed as surrender thereof.

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
CAGUIOA, J. dissenting opinion
On Institutional Delay
• Even as the Court may recognize institutional delay as a
reality, the result of such recognition should be a thrust
towards structural and procedural changes.

• The answer lies in reforming these institutions, but

certainly not in sanctioning a violation of an individual's
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition
of his case.

CESAR MATAS CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42
July 31, 2018
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT
RULE
(A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)
 JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
(A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)
The Judicial Affidavit Rule is applicable to all
criminal actions:
• where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed
six years;

• where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits,

irrespective of the penalty involved; or

• with respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the

penalties involved are (Judicial Affidavit Rule, Section 9).

*Note that the Judicial Affidavit Rule is deemed modified by A.M.

No.15-06-10-SC, or the “Revised Guidelines For Continuous Trial
Of Criminal Cases,” which will take effect on 1 September 2017.
 JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)

• The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its

witnesses not later than five days before the pre-
trial, serving copies of the same upon the accused.
The complainant or public prosecutor shall attach to
the affidavits such documentary or object evidence as
he may have, marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so
on. No further judicial affidavit, documentary, or object
evidence shall be admitted at the trial (Judicial Affidavit
Rule, Section 9).
 JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)

• If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after

receipt of the judicial affidavits of the prosecution, he
shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as
well as those of his witnesses to the court within ten
days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of
each on the public and private prosecutor, including his
documentary and object evidence previously marked
as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits shall
serve as direct testimonies of the accused and his
witnesses when they appear before the court to testify
(Judicial Affidavit Rule, Section 9).
Facts:
• Lara’s Gift and Decors Inc. was claiming fire insurance
from PNB Insurers Co. However, PNB Insurers refused
because the petitioner has not submitted the required
documents and that they violated their fire insurance
policy. As a result, Lara’s Gift Inc. filed a complaint for
specific performance against PNB Insurers.

LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC. v. PNB

GENERAL INSURERS CO.
G.R. No. 230429 January 24, 2018
• During the pre-trial conference, the RTC issued a Pre-Trail
Order which states that:
• "no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during
the trial in support of a party's evidence-in-chief other than those
that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-
trial, except if allowed by the Court for good cause shown."

• “all the parties made a reservation for the presentation of

additional documentary exhibits in the course of the trial”

LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC. v. PNB

GENERAL INSURERS CO.
G.R. No. 230429 January 24, 2018
• Trial on the merits ensued.
• During the cross examination a witness for Lara’s Gift
Inc., petitioner furnished respondents with a copy of the
2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit
• Respondents sought to strike from the records the said
2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit as it violated the
Judicial Affidavit Rule, and the Guidelines on Pre-trial
(A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC)

LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC. v. PNB

GENERAL INSURERS CO.
G.R. No. 230429 January 24, 2018
• The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally
proscribe the submission of additional evidence even after trial
had already commenced
• The parties are mandated under Sec. 2 of the JA Rule to file and
serve the judicial affidavits of their witnesses, together with their
documentary or object evidence, not later than five days before
pre-trial or preliminary conference
• The documentary and testimonial evidence submitted will then be
specified by the trial judge in the Pre-Trial Order. Concomitant
thereto, Sec. 10 of the same Rule contains a caveat that the failure
to timely submit the affidavits and documentary evidence shall be
deemed to be a waiver of their submission

LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC. v. PNB

GENERAL INSURERS CO.
G.R. No. 230429 January 24, 2018
• Sec. 10 does not contain a blanket prohibition on the
submission of additional evidence

• However, the submission of evidence beyond the mandated

period in the JA Rule is strictly subject to the conditions that:
a) the court may allow the late submission of evidence only
once;
b) the party presenting the evidence proffers a valid reason for
the delay; and
c) the opposing party will not be prejudiced thereby

LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC. v. PNB

GENERAL INSURERS CO.
G.R. No. 230429 January 24, 2018
• Corollary thereto, the Guidelines on Pre-Trial instructs the
parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three
(3) days before the pretrial, containing, inter alia, the
documents or exhibits to be presented and to state the purposes
thereof

• I. A. 2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days before the
pretrial, pre-trial briefs containing the following:
• d. The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose
thereof (No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered
during the trial in support of a party's evidence-in-chief other than
those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-
trial, except if allowed by the court for good cause shown)

LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC. v. PNB

GENERAL INSURERS CO.
G.R. No. 230429 January 24, 2018
• In this case, the reservation of the parties as stated in the
Pre-Trial Order is tantamount to a waiver of the
application of Secs. 2 and 10 of the JA Rule

• Records do not disclose that the respondents endeavored

to amend the Pre-Trial Order to withdraw their assent to
their reservation. Consequently, they cannot now dispute
the contents of the Pre-Trial Order.

LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC. v. PNB

GENERAL INSURERS CO.
G.R. No. 230429 January 24, 2018
HEARSAY AS BASIS OF
PROBABLE CAUSE
Jinggoy Estrada v. Ombudsman (2015)
Facts:
• In 2013, the Ombudsman filed a complaint for Plunder
against Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
• Senator Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with
Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings citing his
right to examine evidence from the Rules (112 sec. 3(b)),
and Ombudsman Rules (sec. 4(c), Rule II)

Jinggoy Estrada v. Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
• The DOJ denied petitioner’s request

• Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is

only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.

• In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel adjudged that enough

evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause
and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary

Jinggoy Estrada v. Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
• While probable cause demands more than "bare
suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.

Jinggoy Estrada v. Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
• “The determination of probable cause does not depend on
the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or
on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented"
(Unilever v. Tan, 2014)

• The doctrine in the United States that the determination

of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on
hearsay evidence, as long as the person making the
hearsay statement is credible.

Jinggoy Estrada v. Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
Citing United States v. Ventresca:
• While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of "probable cause," this Court has
long held that "the term ‘probable cause’ . . . means less than evidence which would
justify condemnation,", and that a finding of "probable cause" may rest upon evidence
which is not legally competent in a criminal trial.

• "There is a large difference between the two things to be proved (guilt and probable
cause), as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like
difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them."

• Thus, hearsay may be the basis for issuance of the warrant "so long as there . . . [is] a
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."

• "an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct
personal observations of the affiant," so long as the magistrate is "informed of some of
the underlying circumstances" supporting the affiant’s conclusions and his belief that
any informant involved "whose identity need not be disclosed . . ." was "credible" or
his information "reliable."

Jinggoy Estrada v. Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
• Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence,
as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.

• Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause

in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is
merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.

• However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations

are finally adjudicated, what is required is "substantial
evidence" which cannot rest entirely or even partially on
hearsay evidence.

Jinggoy Estrada v. Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
• Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence
because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence
while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence.

• To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in

GSIS (“substantial evidence” for administrative cases), in
preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required in determining probable cause from
evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to
substantial evidence of guilt.

Jinggoy Estrada v. Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
BAIL
ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015, Bersamin, J.
• Enrile was charged of plunder before the Sandiganbayan. He
filed his Omnibus motion which included among others, an
application to post bail.
• When a warrant of arrest was issued against Enrile, he
voluntarily surrendered to Director Magalong in Camp Crame
and was later on confined at the PNP General Hospital.
• He argued that he should be allowed to post bail because it was
not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong, the
penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal due to
mitigating circumstances, and that his age and physical
condition does not make him a flight risk

ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
• Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
• We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix
Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that
should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily
surrendered.

ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
• In now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court
is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of
bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The
Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility
in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights:
• To uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person.
• These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail

ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN,
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
BILL OF PARTICULARS
Juan Ponce Enrile v. People
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015 Brion, J.
• The Ombudsman filed an Information for Plunder against
Senator Enrile, his chief of staff Gigi Reyes and others
• A day before the scheduled araignment, Enrile filed a
petition for bill of particulars as “the details cannot be
found in the bundle of evidence by the prosecution”
• The Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s petition claiming that
the details he desires are evidentiary in nature and are
best ventilated during trial

Juan Ponce Enrile v. People

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
 Ultimate Facts Evidentiary Facts

Essential and substantial Establishes or proves the

facts which form basis ultimate facts. They
of primary right and support the existence of
duty which directly other alleged facts
make up the wrongful
acts or omissions

Juan Ponce Enrile v. People

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
• BILL OF PARTICULARS
• It is the further specification of charges or claims in an
action
• It is filed before arraignment for the accused to properly
prepare for trial and respond
• It is before arraignment because once arraigned, the
accused is presumed to understand the charge against him

Juan Ponce Enrile v. People

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
• Purpose of Bill of Particulars
1. For the accused to know he theory of the government’s
case
2. To prepare his defense and avoid surprise at the trial
3. A bar to another prosecution in case of acquittal or
conviction
4. To compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations
in offering evidence

Juan Ponce Enrile v. People

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
 Motion to Quash Motion for Bill of
Particulars
Jurisdictional defect Presupposes a valid
information
Proper remedy when Proper remedy when
there is no offense there is a supposed
ambiguity in an
otherwise valid
information

Juan Ponce Enrile v. People

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
• In this case, the Court ordered the prosecution to describe
the following with particularity:

“Series”, “combination of acts” Offense could not be plunder if

there is only a single act
“From 2004-2010” Accused should not be left guessing
which transactions involving his
PDAF are being mentioned
“NGOs of Napoles” Identify which NGO received the
funds
“Government Agencies” As indispensable parties in the
scheme, they should be properly
identified

Juan Ponce Enrile v. People

G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People, April 18, 2017
Facts:
• Arroyo was charged with plunder before the
Sandiganbayan. Before judgment, petitioner filed a
motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence
• However, the court denied her motion
• She files this petition for certiorari – alleging that there
was grave abuse of discretion in Sandiganbayan’s denial
of her motion

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People, April 18, 2017

• The State on the other hand, claims that a denial of
motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment (citing Rule 119, sec. 23)

• The special civil action for certiorari is generally not

proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the
trial court because of the availability of another remedy in
the ordinary course of law (as stated in Section 23, Rule
119). The proper recourse was to go to trial and in case of
conviction, may then appeal the conviction.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People, April 18, 2017

• it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ
of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to
do so x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness
and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the com1 that
authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus.
• In the exercise of our superintending control over other
courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of
each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.'
So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to
prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People, April 18, 2017

• Notwithstanding the interlocutory character and
effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of
the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
• The Sandiganbayan and the trial court was guilty of
grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied
the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of
competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the
factual bases to expect a guilty verdict

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People, April 18, 2017

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10951
AN ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT OR THE VALUE OF PROPERTY
AND DAMAGE ON WHICH A PENALTY IS BASED AND THE FINES
IMPOSED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE REVISED
PENAL CODE,” AS AMENDED
• Light felonies as defined under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are:
(a) infractions of law or the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor;
or (b) fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) or both is provided.

• Schedule of penalties under Article 26 of the RPC was revised as follows:

Penalty Under old RPC Under R.A. No. 10951

Afflictive If it exceeds If it exceeds

Php6,000.00 Php1,200,000.00

Correctional Php200.00 to Php40,000.00 to

Php6,000.00 Php1,200,000.00

Light Less than Php200.00 Less than Php40,000.00

Pertinent amendments to the

Revised Penal Code
• PENALTIES FOR ROBBERY UNDER ARTICLES
299 AND 302 OF THE RPC
Article Felony Under old RPC Under R.A. No. 10951

299 Robbery in an Any armed person Any armed person who

inhabited house who shall commit shall commit robbery in an
or public robbery in an inhabited house or public
building or inhabited house or building or edifice devoted
edifice devoted public building or to religious worship, shall
to worship. edifice devoted to be punished by reclusion
religious worship, temporal, if the value of the
shall be punished by property taken shall exceed
reclusion temporal, if Php50,000.00 x x x
the value of the
property taken shall
exceed Php250.00 x x
x
Article Felony Under old RPC Under R.A. No. 10951

299 Robbery in an When the offenders do When the offenders do

inhabited house not carry arms, and the not carry arms, and the
or public value of the property value of the property
building or taken exceeds Php250.00, taken exceeds
edifice devoted the penalty next lower in Php50,000.00, the
to worship. degree shall be imposed. penalty next lower in
degree shall be imposed.

The same rule shall be The same rule shall be

applied when the applied when the
offenders are armed, but offenders are armed, but
the value of the property the value of the property
taken does not exceed taken does not exceed
Php250.00. Php50,000.00.
When said offenders do When said offenders do
not carry arms and the not carry arms and the
value of the property value of the property
taken does not exceed taken does not exceed
Php250.00, they shall Php50,000.00, they shall
suffer the penalty suffer the penalty
prescribed in the two prescribed in the two (2)
next preceding next preceding
paragraphs, in its paragraphs, in its
minimum period. minimum period.
Article Felony Under old RPC Under R.A. No. 10951

302 Robbery in an Any robbery committed Any robbery committed in an

uninhabited place in an uninhabited place uninhabited place or in a
or in a private or in a building other building other than those
building. than those mentioned in mentioned in the first
the first paragraph of paragraph of Article 299, if the
Article 299, if the value of value of the property taken
the property taken exceeds Php50,000.00 shall be
exceeds 250 pesos, shall punished by prisión
be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
correccional if any of the maximum periods x x x
following circumstances
is present x x x

When the value of the When the value of the property

property takes does not taken does not exceed
exceed Php250.00, the Php50,000.00, the penalty next
penalty next lower in lower in degree shall be
degree shall be imposed. imposed.
• PENALTIES FOR THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 309
OF THE RPC

Penalty Value of Property under Value of Property under

Old RPC R.A. No. 10951

Prision mayor in its More than Php12,000.00 but More than Php1,200,000.00
minimum and medium does not exceed but does not exceed
periods Php22,000.00 Php2,200,000.00

If the value of the thing If the value of the thing

stolen exceeds Php22,000.00 stolen exceeds
amount the penalty shall be Php2,200,000.00, the
the maximum period of penalty shall be the
prision mayor, and one maximum period of prision
year for each additional mayor, and one (1) year for
Php10,000.00, but the total each additional
of the penalty which may Php1,000,000.00, but the
be imposed shall not total of the penalty which
exceed 20 years. may be imposed shall not
exceed 20 years
 Penalty Value of Property under Value of Property under
Old RPC R.A. No. 10951

Prision correccional in its More than Php6,000.00 but More than Php600,000.00
medium and maximum does not exceed but does not exceed
periods Php12,000.00. Php1,200,00.00

Prision correccional in its More than Php200.00 but More than Php20,000.00 but
minimum and medium does not exceed does not exceed
periods Php6,000.00. Php600,000.00

Arresto mayor in its Over Php50.00 but does not over Php5,000.00 but does
medium period to prision exceed Php200.00. not exceed Php20,000.00
correccional in its
minimum period

Arresto mayor to its full Over Php5.00 but does not Over Php500.00 but does
extent exceed Php50.00 not exceed Php5,000.00

Arresto mayor in its Does not exceed Php5.00 Does not exceed Php500.00
minimum and medium
periods

PENALTIES FOR THEFT UNDER

ARTICLE 309 OF THE RPC
 Penalty Value of Property under Old Value of Property under R.A.
RPC No. 10951

Arresto menor or a fine not If the theft is committed under

exceeding 200 pesos the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article and the value
of the thing stolen does not
exceed Php5.00. If such value
exceeds said amount, the
provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.

Arresto menor or a fine not If the theft is committed under

exceeding Php20,000.00 the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article and the value
of the thing stolen does not
exceed Php500.00. If such value
exceeds said amount, the
provisions of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.

PENALTIES FOR THEFT UNDER

ARTICLE 309 OF THE RPC
 Penalty Value of Property under Old Value of Property under R.A.
RPC No. 10951

Arresto menor in its When the value of the thing

minimum period or a fine stolen is not over Php5.00,
not exceeding Php50.00 and the offender shall have
acted under the impulse of
hunger, poverty, or the
difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.

Arresto menor in its When the value of the thing

minimum period or a fine of stolen is not over Php500.00,
not exceeding Php5,000.00 and the offender shall have
acted under the impulse of
hunger, poverty, or the
difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.

PENALTIES FOR THEFT UNDER ARTICLE

309 OF THE RPC
 Penalty Value of Property under Value of Property under
Old RPC R.A. No. 10951

Prisión correccional in its does not exceed Php200.00 does not exceed
medium and maximum Php40,000.00
periods

Prisión mayor in its more than Php200.00 but more than Php40,000.00
minimum and medium does not exceed but does not exceed
periods Php6,000.00. Php1,200,000.00

Prision mayor in its more than Php6,000.00 but more than Php1,200,000.00
maximum period to is less than Php12,000.00 but does not exceed
reclusion temporal in its Php2,400,000.00
minimum period

PENALTIES FOR MALVERSATION

UNDER ARTICLE 217 OF THE RPC
 Penalty Value of Property under Value of Property under
Old RPC R.A. No. 10951

Reclusion temporal in its more than Php12,000.00 more than Php2,400,000.00

medium and maximum but is less than but does not exceed
periods Php20,000.00 Php4,400,000.00

Reclusion temporal in its more than Php4,400,000.00

maximum period but does not exceed Eight
million Php8,800,000.00.

Reclusion perpetua exceeds Php20,000.00 exceeds Php8,800,000.00

PENALTIES FOR MALVERSATION UNDER

ARTICLE 217 OF THE RPC
 Penalty Amount of the Fraud under Old Amount of the Fraud under R.A.
RPC No. 10951

Prision correccional in its Over Php12,000.00 but does not over Php2,400,000.00 but does
maximum period to prision exceed Php22,000.00 not exceed Four million
mayor in its minimum period Php4,400,000.00

If such amount exceeds If such amount exceeds

Php22,000.00, the penalty Php4,400,000.00, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the additional Php2,000,000.00; but
total penalty which may be the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed 20 imposed shall not exceed 20
years. years.

PENALTIES FOR ESTAFA UNDER

ARTICLE 315 OF THE RPC
 Penalty Amount of the Fraud under Amount of the Fraud under
Old RPC R.A. No. 10951

Prision correccional in Over Php6,000.00 but Over Php1,200,000.00 but

its minimum and does not exceed does not exceed
medium periods Php12,000.00 Php2,400,000.00

Arresto mayor in its Over Php200.00 but does Over Php40,000.00 but
maximum period to not exceed Php6,000.00 does not exceed
prision correccional in Php1,200,000.00
its minimum period
Arresto mayor in its Does not exceed Does not exceed
maximum period Php200.00 Php40,000.00

PENALTIES FOR ESTAFA UNDER

ARTICLE 315 OF THE RPC
The penalties and/or fines for the following crimes have been amended by R.A. No.
10951:

• Treason (Art. 114);

• Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason (Art. 115);
• Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained (Art. 129);
• Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion or insurrection (Art. 136);
• Sedition (Art. 140);
• Conspiracy to commit sedition (Art. 141);
• Inciting to sedition (Art. 142)
• Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and similar bodies (Art. 143);
• Disturbance of proceedings (Art. 144);
• Illegal associations (Art. 147);

Felonies with revised penalties under

R.A. No. 10951
• Direct assaults (Art. 148);
• Indirect assaults (Art. 149);
• Disobedience to summons issued by Congress, its committees or subcommittees, by
the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions (Art.
150);
• Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person
(Art. 151);
• Tumults and other disturbances of public order; tumultuous disturbance or
interruption liable to cause disturbance (Art. 153);
• Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful detainer (Art 154);
• Alarms and scandals (Art. 155);
• Making and importing and uttering false coins (Art. 163);
• Mutilation of coins; importation and utterance of mutilated coins (art. 164);
• Forging treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer; importing and
uttering such false or forged notes and documents (Art. 166);
• Counterfeiting, importing and uttering instruments not payable to bearer (Art. 167);
• Falsification of legislative documents (Art. 170);
• Falsification by public officer or employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister (Art.171);
• Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents (Art. 172);

Felonies with revised penalties

under R.A. No. 10951
• False medical certificates, false certificates of merits or service, etc. (Art. 174);
• Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification (Art. 176);
• Using fictitious name and concealing true name (Art. 178);
• False testimony against a defendant (Art. 180);
• False testimony favorable to the defendant (Art. 181);
• False testimony in civil cases (Art. 182);
• Importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or merchandise made of gold,
silver, or other precious metals or their alloys (Art. 187);
• Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows (Art. 201);
• Prostitutes (Art. 202);
• Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor (Art. 209);
• Frauds against the public treasury (Art. 213);
• Prohibited transactions (Art. 215);
• Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (Art. 216);
• Malversation of public funds or property (Art. 217);
• Failure of accountable officer to render accounts (Art. 218);
• Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country (Art.
219);

Felonies with revised penalties under

R.A. No. 10951
• Failure to make delivery of public funds or property (Art. 221);
• Removal, concealment, or destruction of documents (Art. 226);
• Officer breaking seal (Art. 227);
• Opening of closed documents (Art. 228);
• Revelation of secrets by an officer (Art. 229);
• Public officer revealing secrets of private individuals (Art. 230);
• Open disobedience (Art. 231);
• Refusal of assistance (Art. 233);
• Refusal to discharge elective office (Art. 234);
• Maltreatment of prisoners (Art. 235);
• Anticipation of duties of a public office (Art. 236);
• Prolonging performance of duties and powers (Art. 237);
• Usurpation of legislative powers (Art. 239);
• Disobeying request for disqualification (Art. 242);
• Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial authority (Art. 243);
• Unlawful appointments (Art. 244);

Felonies with revised penalties under

R.A. No. 10951
• Abortion practiced by a physician (Art. 259);
• Less serious physical injuries (Art. 265);
• Slight physical injuries and maltreatment (Art. 266);
• Slight illegal detention (Art. 268);
• Unlawful arrest (Art. 269);
• Inducing a minor to abandon his home (Art. 271);
• Abandoning a minor (Art. 276);
• Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody: indifference of
parents (Art. 277);
• Exploitation of minors (Art. 278);
• Qualified trespass to dwelling (Art. 280);
• Other forms of trespass (Art. 281);
• Grave threats (Art. 282);
• Other light threats (Art. 285);
• Grave coercions (Art. 286);
• Light coercions (Art. 287);
• Other similar coercions (Art. 288);
• Formation, maintenance and prohibition of combination of capital or labor through
violence or threats (Art. 289);

Felonies with revised penalties under

R.A. No. 10951
• Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence (Art. 290);
• Revealing secrets with abuse of office (Art. 291);
• Revelation of industrial secrets (Art. 292);
• Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice
devoted to worship (Art. 299);
• Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building (Art.
302);
• Theft (Art. 309);
• Theft of the property of the National Library and National
Museum (Art. 311);
• Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property (Art. 312);
• Altering boundaries or landmarks (Art. 313);
• Swindling (Art. 315);
• Other deceits (Art. 318);

Felonies with revised penalties under R.A.

No. 10951
• Special cases of malicious mischief (Art. 328);
• Other mischiefs (Art. 329);
• Destroying or damaging statues (Art. 331);
• Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and
concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child (Art. 347);
• Libel by means of writing or similar means (Art. 355);
• Threatening to public and offer to prevent such publication for
a compensation (Art. 356);
• Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of
official proceedings (Art. 357);
• Slander (Art. 358);
• Slander by deed (Art. 359);
• Intriguing against honor (Art. 364); and
• Imprudence and negligence (Art. 365).

Felonies with revised penalties

under R.A. No. 10951
• On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys,
private counsels, and such other officers of the law are
hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No.
10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called
for by the facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation
shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of
the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa,
robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief,
malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is
dependent upon the value of the object in consideration
thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into
consideration the presence of existing circumstances attending
its commission.

OPHELIA HERNAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 217874 December 5, 2017
• For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent
legislation shall find application regardless of whether its
effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of
conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has
already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances,
shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him
to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already
begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already
accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter
case, moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and
expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action
before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather
than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.

OPHELIA HERNAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 217874 December 5, 2017