Chapter 4: Contemporary Models of Development and Underdevelopment
Chapter 4: Contemporary Models of Development and Underdevelopment
Chapter 4: Contemporary Models of Development and Underdevelopment
MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT
AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT
DEGUIT, KHRYSS LIN
RUALES, CHABELITA
4.1 Underdevelopment as a
Coordination Failure
◦ Many newer theories of economic development that became influential in
the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century have emphasized
complementarities between several conditions necessary for successful
development. These theories often highlight the problem that several things
must work well enough, at the same time, to get sustainable development
under way.
◦ Models of development that stress complementarities are related to some of
the models used in the endogenous growth approach, but the coordination
failure approach has evolved relatively independently and offers some
significant and distinct insights. Put simply, a coordination failure is a state of
affairs in which agents’ inability to coordinate their behavior (choices) leads to
an outcome (equilibrium) that leaves all agents worse off than in an
alternative situation that is also an equilibrium.
◦ When complementarities are present, an action taken by one firm, worker,
organization, or government increases the incentives for other agents to take
similar actions. In particular, these complementarities often involve investments
whose return depends on other investments being made by other agents.
Deep intervention
A government policy that can move the economy to a preferred equilibrium
or even to a higher permanent rate of growth, which can then be self-
sustaining so that the policy need no longer be enforced because the better
equilibrium will then prevail without further intervention.
4.2 MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA: A
Diagrammatic Approach
Multiple equilibria
- A condition in which more than one equilibrium exists. These
equilibria sometimes may be ranked, in the sense that one is
preferred over another, but the unaided market will not move the
economy to the preferred outcome.
The basic idea
reflected in the S-
shaped function of
Figure 4.1 is that the
benefits an agent
receives from taking an
action depend
positively on how many
other agents are
expected to take the
action or on the extent
of those actions.
How do we find the equilibria in this
type of problem?
Components:
◦ Indivisibility of demand, i.e.,
complementarity of demand.
The O-ring result of positive assortative matching relies on some rather strong
assumptions. How important are each of these, and how much can they be
relaxed?
Two points are crucial:
(1)Workers must be sufficiently imperfect substitutes for each other, and
(2)we must have sufficient complementarity of tasks.
◦ Third, every developing nation must provide the vital infrastructure needed to achieve
and sustain a modern economy, beginning with basic physical structures such as roads,
bridges, railroads, ports, telecommunications, and other utilities. With bad infrastructure,
otherwise high-return economic activities may prove unprofitable. In some countries,
inadequate and imbalanced infrastructure is the main factor preventing an
acceleration of growth, and in such cases, policies focusing on providing it would
boost investment and growth the most.
But the problem may lie not with the underlying social return to economic activities but with low
appropriability, meaning that investors cannot reap an adequate share of returns to investment. In turn,
appropriability problems can be due to either government failures or market failures.
The fundamental problem may also be large-scale market failures of the type stressed in this chapter.
These may include the self-discovery problems pointed up by Hausmann and Rodrik and reviewed in
section 4.6. They may also take the form of coordination externalities, such as seen in the big push model
of underdevelopment, examined in section 4.3.
In yet other cases, the main problem may not be underlying low rates of return but rather an abnormally
high cost of finance.
Here the problem may be bad international finance—inadequate access to foreign sources of capital or
problems with debt, examined in Chapter 13; or the problem may reside in bad local finance, due either
to low availability of loanable funds through domestic financial markets, traced to low domestic saving, or
to poor intermediation owing to an inadequate or overregulated banking system that is unable or unwilling
to channel funds to the economic activities with high returns.
It is often difficult to observe a binding constraint directly. In practice, growth diagnostics usually involves
some economic detective work. To evaluate whether a proposed constraint is binding, a growth
diagnostician looks for evidence on its implications.
Clearly, identifying and addressing constraints that are likely to become binding in the future is even more
challenging than targeting today’s more visible bottlenecks.
Although growth diagnostics might be criticized as “more art than science,” at the very least this new
approach forces the analyst to focus on country-specific circumstances and thus to get to know the
individual country very well. This is one of the reasons that growth diagnostics offers a valuable
complement to econometric studies.
4.8 CONCLUSIONS
CASE STUDY
UNDERSTANDING A
DEVELOPMENT MIRACLE: CHINA
An Extraordinary Performance
From 1978 to 2011, the economy of China grew at an average rate of close to 9% a year,
an unprecedented achievement for any economy in history, let alone the world’s most
populous nation, with over 19% of global population. China’s income per capita by 2012
was approaching six times what it was in 1978, when reforms began. Growth was three
times the rate that would be considered respectable by the recent standards of most
low-income countries. China has also experienced the world’s most dramatic reductions
in poverty. The World Bank’s most recent estimate is that just 12% of China’s population
lives on less than $1.25 per day (27% below $2 per day). This means that hundreds of
millions fewer people were living in extreme poverty in a span of just three decades.
Reductions in extreme poverty in China are far faster and greater than anywhere else in
the world.
China is hailed as an example of the benefits of markets, trade, and globalization. Yet
by conventional measures, institutions in China remain quite weak. For example, the
World Bank’s 2013 “Ease of Doing Business” index ranks China poorly, at No. 96—worse
than Russia, Mongolia, Zambia, or Serbia.
Manufactured exports are a key to China’s growth, and market incentives have played
a primary motivational role in business decisions. But China has also adopted activist
industrial policies, pushing exports of increasingly higher skill and technology content,
and it embarked on its period of rapid growth around 1980, more than a decade before
significant trade liberalization.
But often overlooked is that China’s agricultural productivity growth was also very high.
Moreover, much of China’s growth in the 1980s and early 1990s was due to rural
township and village enterprises, which had a quasi-cooperative and quasi-municipally
owned character.
Sources of Success
◦ Regional “Demonstrations.” The presence of regional “demonstration” models has
been crucial. Japan was emulated by other countries in the East Asian region. Hong
Kong provided an additional example for China, as did China’s archrival Taiwan.
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea focused on export-oriented industrialization
strategy at a time when world trade was growing rapidly.
◦ Leveraging the Lure of a Billion Consumers By the late 1980s, the locus of regional
growth shifted to China as investors began to pour investments into China in large part
because of the allure of its eventual market of more than 1.3 billion consumers.
◦ Export-Led Investment and Growth Once early investments built up a sufficient critical
mass, agglomeration benefits of concentrated economic activity kicked in. The more
producers located in China, the greater the benefits for an increasing number of
suppliers to operate there.
◦ Health and Education Investments The central planning of China’s first decades after its
1949 Communist revolution were by most measures a failure. Industry was highly
inefficient. As many as 30 million people died in a late-1950s famine caused by poor
central planning decisions and political pressures that led party and government
officials to regularly overstate the harvest prospects.
◦ Such disasters were only partly offset by the early and ongoing emphasis on basic
health and education in China and then on reductions of fertility through China’s one
child policy. These basic first steps on education, health, and eventually fertility helped
set the stage for growth and poverty reduction when later combined with market
incentives. One of the results is the apparently higher educational and skill level of
factory workers for given wages in China in comparison to its competitor countries.
◦ Productivity Growth There has been considerable debate about whether rapid growth
in other East Asian countries is the result of capital accumulation or productivity gains.
◦ Most of China’s growth came from the reallocation of labor, particularly from
agriculture to other activities, and that sustainable total factor productivity progress
was much lower, on the order of 2% per year.
China has introduced new and transitional institutions that exist side by side with previous
institutions of central planning for extended periods.
China has a large population, a vast territory, and a complex situation. This is why Deng
Xiaoping adopted a strategy of “feeling out the stones to cross the river.” He
encouraged all types of trial reforms, such as the creation of Special Economic Zones
(SEZs).
China’s reforms are progressing in the following order: first the countryside and then the
cities; first coastal areas and then inland areas; first predominantly economic reforms and
then political reforms; first relatively easy reforms followed by more difficult reforms. The
advantage of this approach is that the experiences gained in the first phase of reform
may be used to lay down the foundations for the later stages of reform. This approach is
influenced by the Chinese tradition of integrated thinking. Back in the 1980s, Deng
Xiaoping devised a 70 year-strategy to turn China into a developed country, and this
strategy is still being implemented to this very day.
China’s Coming Challenges
China’s successes do need to be kept in perspective. Since 1980, China has grown
about 4½ times faster than the United States, as measured by per capita output. As a
result, China has been closing the relative gap in living standards. In 1980, China’s
income per person was only 2% of that in the United States, but by 2012, it had grown to
over 15%. But even if China’s output per person continued to grow at its unprecedented
recent rate of 8.4% and the United States at its long-run rate of just 1.9%, China would still
not catch up until close to 2040. A high rate of domestic saving is associated with a trade
surplus. Savings have been extremely high and rising in China. As of 2011, China was
saving nearly half of its national income—an astounding and unprecedented rate
compared to the country’s own past rates (already a high 35% in 1990) and in relation to
the high rates that have generally prevailed in East Asia. Such high rates are not
consistent with the pivot toward increasing local consumption as an engine of growth.
◦ Poverty and Vulnerability - Life can indeed be harder than ever for the millions remaining in
extreme poverty, such as rural peasants in some parts of the country facing the loss of
security; official corruption, including reports of official land grabs from peasants; rising local
taxes; and minimal improvements in technology or skills.
◦ Environment and Pollution - A majority of the most polluted cities in the world are located in
China, and health problems are growing.
◦ Product and worker safety- China’s regulatory institutions will need to catch up with the
progress made in other aspects of national economic development.
◦ Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap - The question for China will be how it can maintain
somewhat more modest but historically still high growth, of perhaps 6.5%, sustainably over
the next three decades.
◦ Addressing Structural Imbalances- China’s very large export surplus has come under great
criticism, as this was widely argued to be one of the underlying causes of the global financial
crisis. One cause of the surpluses is probably the undervaluation of China’s exchange rate,
estimated to be at least 20%.
Demographic Challenges
China also has a rapidly aging population. For the last decade of the twentieth century and
first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, China has benefited from a demographic
dividend, in which by global standards an unusually large fraction of its population has been
of working age (neither too young nor too old to be active in the workforce). This “dividend”
occurs in the process of economic development after the drop in births per woman but
before the previous larger cohorts retire, allowing for rapid income growth. China is now
entering a phase in which a large fraction of its working population will begin to retire. One
challenge is the need to implement a modern pension system. Another is to respond to a
shrinking workforce and the need to support a large retired population. It is a challenge
common to many modern societies but may be particularly acute in China due to its one-
child policy that has been in effect since about 1980, which has greatly accelerated the
demographic transition. There was a slight relaxation of this policy at the Third Plenum in
November 2013, to allow urban families for which either husband or wife is an only child to
have a second child (previously this was allowed only if each was an only child). But this
change may have very limited impact on fertility because of the high cost of raising children
in China’s cities. The very high ratio of males to females remains another serious demographic
challenge that may lead to continued distortions.
Comparison between China and
Philippines
Similarities Differences