School of Civil Engineering Offshore Structures Assignment - 2
School of Civil Engineering Offshore Structures Assignment - 2
School of Civil Engineering Offshore Structures Assignment - 2
OFFSHORE STRUCTURES
ASSIGNMENT -2
• The safety management of structures is different for different industries depending on the
organisation as well as regulatory contents.
• Over the time safety management of offshore structures has been developed, in parallel
with the evolvement of the technology and the competence to deal with it.
• Initially civil engineering was the driving force for structural safety management. Later the
aeronautical and nuclear industry played an important role.
• However in the last 20-30 years the developments in the offshore industry has had a
significant impact on the development of safety approaches.
ACCIDENT EXPERIENCES
• Safety may be regarded as the absence of accidents or failures. Hence the insight
about safety features can be gained from detailed information about accidents and
failures.
• Global failure modes of concern are
1. - capsizing/sinking
2. - structural failure
3. - positioning system failure
FAILURE IN STORM
Floating platforms
FAILURE IN FIRE OR EXPLOSION
• The offshore platform started
producing gas in the early 1980s and
had three main gas transport risers and
an oil export riser before the incident,
which destroyed the entire facility and
caused an estimated loss of $1.4bn.
• Official investigations concluded that
the root cause of the accident was an
undetected fatigue crack in the weld of
an instrument connection on the
bracing.
SAFETY MANAGEMENT
•Offshore drilling, production or transport facilities are systems consisting of struc-
tures, equipments and other hardware’s, as well as specified operational procedures
and operational personnel.
• Ideally these systems should be designed and operated to comply with a certain
acceptable risk levels as specified for example by the probabil- ity of undesirable
consequences and their implications
•. The safety management needs to be synchronised with the life cycle of the
structure. Structural failures are mainly attributed to errors and omissions in design,
fabrication and, especially, during opera- tion.
• Therefore, Quality Assurance and Control (QA/QC) of procedures and the struc-
ture during fabrication and use (operation) is crucial.
•To do a truly risk based design, by carrying out the design iteration on the basis of a risk
acceptance criterion, and to achieve a design that satisfies the acceptable safety level, is not
feasible. In reality, different subsystems, like:
- loads-carrying structure & mooring system
- process equipment
- evacuation and escape system
•Are designed according to criteria given for that particular subsystems. For instance, to
achieve a certain target level, which implies a certain residual risk level, safety criteria for
structural design are given in terms of Ultimate Limit State (ULS) and Fatigue Limit State
(FLS) criteria.
• Using appropriate probabilistic definitions of loads and resistance together with safety
factors, the desired safety level is achieved.
•The im- plicit risk associated with these common structural design criteria is generally
small! The philosophy behind the Accidental Collapse Limit (ALS) criteria is discussed be-
low.
CONCLUSION
• In order to ensure the safety of an offshore structure it is important to identify and
maintain the barriers preventing hazardous events.
• Also, when monitoring the safety, the monitoring should be regarding how well
these barriers are functioning, and utilise these to reassess the safety of the structure
over time.
• The purpose of this paper is to apply a well-known method in risk assessment,
Haddon’s energy and barrier model, to a new area; structural safety
RECOMMENDATION ON SAFETY ZONES AND SAFETY OF NAVIGATION
AROUND OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS AND STRUCTURES
THANKYOU