Principles of Natural Justice

The principles of natural justice are enforceable on all courts of law,

general or special, all tribunals(statutory or otherwise), and all persons
or bodies exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function by statute or by
agreement between the parties. This applies equally to any domestic
enquiry.
 [A] Rule against Bias
(Nemo Judex in causa sua)
(No one should be made a judge in his own case)
• Pecuniary bias- any financial interest, however small would vitiate administrative action.
• Personal bias- The judge may be a friend of the party or related to him or have business or
professional relationship with him or may even have personal animosity or hostility against him.
• Bias as to subject matter – where the deciding officer is directly , or otherwise, involved in the
subject matter of the case.
a) Partiality or connection with issues- to disqualify there has to be some close and direct
connection between the adjudicating authority and the issue in the controversy.
b) Departmental bias/Official bias- in proceedings before an administrative authority, one of the
parties is usually the administration itself, the authority may have ‘official’ bias towards the
department with which it is attached, or may have a policy biased.
c) Prior utterances/ Pre-judgement of issues/ Preconceived notion bias – adjudicator’s mind
should not be ‘irrevocably closed’

- Burden of Proof in bias/Malafides- on the person who alleges it.

 A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150
• Personal Bias
• ‘The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial
power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated.’
• The acting Chief Conservator of forests was a member of the selection board
and was also a candidate for the selection to the All India Cadre of forest
service. He did not take part in the deliberations of board when his name was
considered and approved, but he did participated when the names of his
rivals were considered for selection. And he did participate in the
deliberations of the board while preparing list of selected candidates in order
of preferences.
• The SC held that there was a real likelihood of bias for the mere presence of
candidate on the selection board may adversely influence the judgement of
other members. The actual bias is not necessary.
 G.N. Nayak v Goa University (AIR 2002 SC 790)
• In this case , on 10/08/1994, an advertisement was issued for the post of Professor,
Marine Science. Both the appellant and respondent 5 applied for the post. Both of
them were Readers in the department of Marine Science, Respondent 5 being
senior most. Sometime before the date of the interview a note was written by
Respondent 2 as Head of the Department to the VC requesting for the holding of an
urgent interview for the appointment of Professor, Marine Science. The note placed
on record an appointment letter received by the appellant for appointment as
professor in Geology in University of Gulbarga. The note extolled the qualities of
the appellant and concluded with following paragraphs :
• “HOD submits that if Dr Nayak (the appellant) is relieved from this dept. , the
university will lose a dedicated and intelligent faculty.. Goa University had already
advertised a post of professor in Marine science in January 1995 for which Dr.
Nayak is also an applicant. In the light of the above, it is requested that the VC may
kindly hold the interviews so that Dr. Nayak is given a chance to answer the
interview and if selected ”
• This note was endorsed by the Dean of the faculty on 6-8-1995 who forwarded the note
with the endorsement that he fully agreed with the views expressed by Respondent 2
and suggested that interviews should be held. Respondent 5 obtained a copy of this
note and on 23-08-1995 wrote a letter to the chancellor as well as the Vice- Chancellor
objecting to the participation of respondent 2 and the dean of the faculty in the
selection on the ground that he apprehended that they would be biased against him
and that they had in writing disclosed their bias in favour of the appellant. Respondent
5 filed a writ in high court.
• High Court- A writ was filed in the High court which upheld the challenge on the
ground that the selection was vitiated by bias.
• SC- no doubt respondent 2 has in note, lavished praise on the performance of the
appellant. As the HOD it would be but natural that he formed an opinion as to the
abilities of the readers working under him. It is noteworthy that it was not respondent
5’s case that respondent 2’s praise of the appellant was unmerited or that respondent 2
had any extraneous reasons or reason other than the competence of the appellant for
selecting the appellant as professor. The SC reserversed the finding of the high court.
 [B] Rule of Fair Hearing
(Audi Alteram Partem)

The expression audi alteram partem implies that a person must be given an opportunity to defend himself. This principle is
a sine qua non of every civilized society. Administrative difficulty in giving notice and hearing a person cannot provide
any justification for depriving the person of opportunity of being heard.
(i) Right to Notice
(ii) Right to Present Case and Evidence
(iii) Right to Rebut Adverse Evidence
a) Cross- Examination
b) Legal Representative
c) Right to Representation and industrial standing orders
(iv) No evidence to be taken at the back of other party (Disclosure of evidence to the party)
(v) Report of the enquiry to be shown to the other party (failure to supply enquiry report)
(vi) Reasoned Decisions or Speaking Orders
• Importance of Recording of Reasons

• Post Decisional Hearing

• Exceptions to Rules of Natural Justice
 (i) Right to Notice
• Unless a person knows the formulation of subjects and issues involved in
the case, he cannot defend himself. A notice must be adequate and
contain:
• 1 time, place and nature of hearing,
• 2 legal authority under which hearing is to be held,
• 3 statement of specific charges (or grounds) and proposed action (or
grounds) which the person has to meet.
• Where a statute expressly provides that a notice be given, failure to give
notice makes the act void.
• Sir Shadilal Distillery & Chemical Works v State of U.P (AIR 1997 SC 2152)-
the respondent was given no notice before cancelling his licenses of supply
of liquor.
 (ii) Right to Present case and Evidence
• This can be done through writing or orally. The courts are unanimous
on the point that oral/personal hearing is not an integral part of fair
hearing unless under exceptional circumstances.
• Travancore Rayons Ltd. V Union of India (AIR 1971 SC 862), the court
observed that the party affected should have an opportunity of
adequately meeting the case against him and of presenting his case,
and, that may be achieved through written memoranda and
explanation and not necessarily through an oral hearing. If this
minimum does not take place, the principles of natural justice would
be violated. However, where complex and technical questions are
involved and fresh material are brought on record, oral hearing
becomes necessary.
 (iii) Right to Rebut adverse Evidence

• This right presupposes that the person has been informed about the evidence
against him. The opportunity to rebut evidence necessarily involves
consideration of two factors:
• (a) Cross- Examination-
• (b) Legal Representation (Right to Counsel)
• J.K. Aggarwal v Haryana Seeds Dev. Corp. Ltd. [AIR 1991 SC 1221]- the right of representation by a lawyer
may not in all cases be held to be a part of natural justice. No general principle valid in all cases can be
enunciated. In non-statutory domestic tribunals, the courts favour such a right where a serious charge had been
made which affected the livelihood or the right of a person to pursue an avocation. In many cases, it may be good
thing for the proceedings of a domestic tribunal to be conducted informally without legal representation. Justice
can often be done in them better by a good layman than by a bad lawyer….But the discretion must be properly
exercised.
• Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v Maharastra General Kamgar Union [(1999) 1 SCC 626] (Read this case on
own)
 (iv) No Evidence to be taken at the back of other party
(Disclosure of evidence to the party)
• It is a fundamental principle of natural justice that no material should
be relied on against a party without his being given an opportunity of
explaining them. The right to know the materials (e.g reports,
evidences, statements, etc.) on which the authority is going to take a
decision is a part of the right to defend oneself.
• Hira Nath Mishra v Principal, Rajendra Med. College (AIR 1973 SC 1260)-
in this case, 36 girls students of a medical college filed a report with the Principal
regarding misbehavior of the boys of the same college in the girls’ hostel. The
Enquiry Committee appointed by Principal recorded the statements of girls in the
absence of appellants. The Committee found appellants guilty and an expulsion
order was served on them by the Principal of the college.
• The order was challenged on the ground that evidence was ‘taken at their
back.’ it was submitted that the enquiry, if any, had been held behind their
back; the witnesses who gave evidence against them were not examined in
their presence; there was no opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses
with a view to test their veracity; the Committee’s report was not made
available to them and for all these reasons the enquiry was vitiated and the
order passed by the Principal acting on the report was illegal.
• The court rejected the contention holding that girls would not have
ventured to make the statements in the presence of appellants except at a
great risk of retaliation and harassment thereafter. The college authorities
are in no position to protect the girls students outside the college precincts.
There, the authorities had to devise a just and reasonable plan of enquiry
which, on the one hand, would not expose the individual girls to
harassment by the male students and , on the other, secure reasonable
opportunity to the accused to state their case.
• In this case, whatever evidence was collected at the back of appellant was
brought to their notice and they were provided with an opportunity to
rebut the evidence. However, the very reasons for which the girls were not
examined in the presence of appellants, prevailed on the authorities not to
give a copy of the committee’s report to them.
• Board of Education v Rice (1911) AC 179;Russell v Duke (1949) 1 All ER
109,Union of India v P.K. Roy [(1968) 2 SCR 186]
• Based on the above three cases it was observed that there are three major
requirements of natural justice.
• (i) The accused should know the accusation made; (ii) he should be given
an opportunity to state his case ,(iii) that the tribunal should act in good
faith.
• SC- It held that the principles of natural justice were observed into the
proceedings by the College authorities.
 (v) Report of the enquiry to be shown to the other party
(failure to supply enquiry Report)

• Managing Director, Electronic Corpn. Of India v B. Karunakar (“ECIL case”)

[(1992) 1 SCC 70] &
• An order passed in a disciplinary proceedings cannot ipso facto be quashed
merely because a copy of the enquiry report has not been furnished to the
delinquent officer, but he is obliged to show that by non-furnishing of such a
report he has been prejudiced. It would apply even to cases where there is
requirement of furnishing a copy of enquiry report under the statutory provisions
and/ or service rules.
• State of U.P v Harendra Arora [AIR 2001 SC 2319] (Read on your own)
 (vi) Reasoned Decisions or Speaking orders
• The decision given must be reasoned one and therefore, the decision
must be evidenced by a speaking order which enumerates the reasons for
coming to a particular conclusion. The Supreme Court has unequivocally
accepted that speaking order is the third important basic principle of
natural justice. Thus, party ought to know the result of the inquiry and the
reasons for the decision.
• S.N. Mukherjee v Union of India [AIR 1990 SC 1984] in this case, the
issue was whether it was incumbent for the Chief of the Army Staff, while
confirming the findings and the sentence of the central government, and
rejecting the post- confirmation petition of the appellant, to record their
reasons for the orders passed by them. The court also examined – is there
any general principle of law which requires an administrative authority to
record the reasons for its decision?
• Except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with
expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the
reasons for its decision.
• The court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on
two grounds; one that the party aggrieved has the opportunity to
demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject
his case were erroneous, the other that the obligation to record
reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the
executive authority invested with the judicial power.
 Hearing in Educational Matters

• In educational matters students using unfair means are not always entitled to
oral hearing and cross examination. However a notice and an opportunity to be
heard has been held to be necessary.
• Where a student’s result was cancelled and he was debarred from appearing in
the examination without giving notice and an opportunity to be heard, the
action was held to be illegal (Pradip Kumar v Utkal Univ.AIR 1987 Ori. 98; Board
of high School v Ghanshyam AIR 1962 SC 1110 )
• Where a student was caught red handed by the invigilator while copying, non-
examination of the invigilator in the enquiry did not vitiate the hearing. The
court pointed out that rigid and mechanical insistence on the full-fledged
enquiry was not conducive to effective functioning of the educational
institutions. (Bright Son Jose v Madurai Kamraj Univ. AIR 1982 mad. 79)
• In cases of ineligibility of students to appear for an examination the
requirement would be satisfied if the student knew why he was being
held ineligible and was given a fair opportunity to explain the contrary
point of view. [Aarti Gupta v state of Punjab (1998) 1 SCC 258]
• Expulsion of students, involved in unruly behavior such as assaults
with swords, rods etc. has held to be valid in the absence of an oral
hearing. [U.P.Singh v Board of Governors, MACT, AIR 1982 M.P.59]
 Writs
• Habeas Corpus – to decide the legality of an arrest/detention. It is necessary
to produce the arrested/ detained person in the court and if dead, the dead
body must be produced in the court.
• Mandamus- to command the performance of a statutory or public duty; not
issued for exercise of discretionary power or against the legislature/legislators;
can be issued both against the executive authorities as well as private
individuals/persons.
• Certiorari - (to decide the legality of an order/ decision already passed/given)
and for the purpose to produce all records of the case before the writ court-
grounds on which issued. (Jurisdictional Error- Excess of jurisdiction, exercising
jurisdiction not vested; non- exercise of jurisdiction)
• Prohibition- to decide the legality of pending proceedings
• Quo Warranto – to decide the legal authority of a person to hold a public
office.
 Tribunals
A.323A & 323B
• Tribunals are being established outside the judicial hierarchy to decide
types of disputes between the citizens inter se or between the
government and the citizen. Tribunals are established at two levels; at the
district level and at the High Court level.
• Tribunals are being established to provide for speedy disposal of case and
thus reduce the pressure on the civil courts.
• Tribunals have grown in response to the need to provide for specialized
forums of dispute settlement that would possess some expertise and
policy commitment and would be comparatively cheaper, more
expeditious and relatively free from technical procedures. Tribunals came
as a substitute for courts when lesser formalism, greater expediency, and
better expertise were required in adjudication of disputes.
• Articles 323-A and 323-B were added to the Constitution by the Constitution 42 nd
Amendment, 1976.
• The tribunals established under Articles 323-A and 323-B have the same status as the
High Courts as the appeals from these tribunals can go directly to the Supreme Court
under Article 136.
• S.P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India AIR 1987 SC 386- the SC held that a tribunal
could be a substitute for a high court.
• L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC 1125 - the SC overruled its
earlier decision in S.P. Sampath Kumar v UOI, 1987 and held that :
• (i) Administrative Tribunals under Art.323-A could examine the constitutional validity
of various statutes or rules. There would be one exception to this rule : the
administrative tribunals would not be competent to examine the validity of the
statute under which they are created. Barring cases where the constitutionality of the
parent act is challenged, all questions regarding services must be raised only before an
administrative tribunal and only writs appeals could go to a division bench of a High
Court. From a decision of a High Court’s Division Bench, an appeal could be preferred
under Article 136 of the Constitution to the Supreme Court.
• (ii) Administrative tribunals need not consist only of members from the judicial stream
but could also include members from the administrative stream, because a tribunal
consisting of such mixed composition would be able to bring varied experience to bear on
the service matters that come to it for adjudication;
• (iii) A writ would lie against an administrative tribunal’s decision to a high court having
jurisdiction over it. An appeal would also lie to the High Court from a tribunal’s
decision. These directions were however, to apply to decisions rendered thereafter (after
the decision in L. Chandra’s case); and
• (iv) An administrative tribunal may not be subject to the power of superintendence of a
High Court under Art.227, but the tribunals could work under the supervision of a
nodal government department, which would preferably be the ministry of law. The
Court expressed a hope that the ministry would set up an independent nodal agency for
overseeing the work of tribunals.
• While this decision recognizes the need for tribunals as distinct from courts, it insists that
such tribunals must be subject to the writ jurisdiction of High Courts. The Supreme Court
has, in the light of last decade’s experience, come to the conclusion that factually, no
tribunal could really be a substitute (Supplant)for a High court rather supplement the
High Courts.